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Abstract of the Dissertation

Empowerment Respect, Self-Respect, and Political Liberalism

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In this dissertation, I look for a way to capture respect and self-respect as freestanding political values, prizing respect apart from metaphysically weighty concepts of moral personhood. I do this because I think that concepts of respect and self-respect have an important role to play in political theory, independent of the work done by moral personhood arguments. A shift in our thinking about the meaning of respect might unlock new approaches to problems that bedevil political liberalism. Starting with a critical interpretation of Rawls's account of self-respect, this dissertation aims to re-think the appraisal and recognition distinction that has dominated the literature on respect and self-respect since the 1970s. As an alternative, I offer an "empowerment" concept of respect, where a relation counts as respectful only when it serves (or would serve) to advance the normative power of the respected. (By "normative power" I basically mean the leverage a person has to contribute to practices they have reason to value.) I theorize respect as part of an ongoing process of normative empowerment that has distinct stages: crediting (appreciation), reckoning, and accounting. With this conceptualization in hand, I work up an empowerment conception of self-respect. Could such a conception help produce an interpretation of Rawlsian liberalism that is better able to respond to those it marginalizes? Testing this idea, I use the empowerment conception to suggest adjustments to Rawls's "justice as fairness" on behalf of disabled members of the community and their caregivers, as well as on behalf of religiously devout members of the polity.

For Matthew Buckingham

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List of Abbreviations

AR – Appraisal respect

CP – *Collected Papers*

DRR – Darwall's Recognition Respect

EMPR – Empowerment respect

EMP-SR – Empowerment self-respec

e-pov – Evaluative point of view

ESR – Estimative self-respect

"JF" – the theory of "justice as fairness"

JFR – *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*

KSR – Kantian self-respect

PL – *Political Liberalism*

RawlsSR – Rawlsian self-respect

RR – Recognition respect

SR – Self-respect

TJ – *A Theory of Justice*

Preface -- Empowerment Respect, Self-respect, and Political Liberalism

This dissertation was initially conceived as a reconceptualization of self-respect that might help address abiding problems in political liberal theory. Two problems I was particularly interested in were (and continue to be) the place for people with serious cognitive impairments in how we conceive of liberal and democratic justice and, secondly, the value of liberal public reason for people whose identities are not liberal. These problems were not particularly related to each other but I had a hunch that progress on both fronts could be achieved if we could become clearer about what Rawlsian self-respect demands. My conjecture was that liberal theory had not sufficiently appreciated the complexity of the interplay between intimate practices of identity and the symbolic public dimensions of citizenship. A theory of self-respect might be developed that would be heuristically useful for identifying politically unacceptable kinds of vulnerability. I began my research by mining everything I could find in the English language literature on Rawls's notion of self-respect.[1] I would eventually locate three kinds of harms to the grounds of self-respect: isolation, stigma, and failure that could help identify problems within socially important practices (parenting, preservation of cultural identity).

Somewhere in the midst of this I realized that I could not really justify my tentative conclusions relating to Rawlsian self-respect without shifting to a direct investigation of the more basic concept of respect. I had come up with a lot of ideas about self-respect, but I had no clear way to defend those ideas or fully explain them unless I could show how they related to respect more generally. I set aside the *self* of "self" respect, in favor of reaching a preliminary goal: Could a more general concept and theory of *respect* be articulated that would support the ideas of *self-respect* that I was thinking about? Could such a concept be more useful than what we currently have available to us? Could the tangle of assumptions and principles in our language of respect be smoothed out enough to arrive at a distinct and normatively independent concept of respect? Can we have a concept of respect distinct from other important concepts like

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[1] Parallel to that I had also immersed myself in the historical literature around self-love which had culminated in Rousseau's famous approach to amour-propre. After a year or more working on this topic I finally realized it would have to be set aside as an independent project and not as part of the current dissertation.

care and also distinct from "thick" liberal values? What I offer here is an attempt give an affirmative answer to these questions.[2]

This dissertation work, which had led me to focus on the concept of respect, required me to closely analyze and compare various arguments about respect in recent political and ethical theory.[3] I had no particular desire to reduce something historically complex and evolving into a falsely reassuring definition; on the other hand, it seemed important to find ways to get a handle on the spirit of respect that seemed to animate so many diverse claims. That "spirit," I've concluded can be thought of as a value we place on social power, or what in these pages I tend to refer to as "normative power." Normative power, as I define it here, is what we have when we participate "valuably" in socially legible practices.[4] Thus, the concept of respect I arrive at is an Empowerment Concept, which I present here as a response to problems I have encountered in the literature. I argue that we can use the Empowerment Concept of respect as a political and ethical heuristic and that Empowerment Self-Respect has a meaningful place in Rawlsian Liberalism. Let me now briefly indicate the way my argument unfolds in the chapters to come.

In **Chapter One**, I try to give the reader an appreciation of the theoretical issues that have motivated my research. To do this, I give a detailed account of Rawls's ideas of self-respect, and the response made to it by Robin Dillon. I try to show why there is a need to identify a workable concept of respect before any real clarity will be had on self-respect, thereby postponing until the end of the dissertation the question of what to do about Rawlsian self-

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[2] I'm tempted to adapt a quote from Martin Jay, who wrote on the concept of experience in *Songs of Experience* He writes, "to what is the invocation 'experience' a response? Under what circumstances does that invocation lose its power?" (*Songs of Experience,* 4). I would offer the same questions about respect: *to what is the invocation of "respect" a response? Under what circumstances does that invocation lose its power?*

[3] "Recent" began in the late 1960s, and unsurprisingly many of the same writers who had discussed self-respect were those with theoretical points to make about respect. Because my interest was in a concept of respect suitable for improving political liberalism (in part through clarifying self-respect demands) I was able to narrow down my reading slightly—to books and articles that thought of themselves as answerable to (and for) recent liberal theory. Nevertheless, it was a pretty overwhelming topic and it is ironic, given the broad range of reading I did in preparation that this dissertation directly references only a handful of articles and books.

[4] A "practice" is a set of activities that can be identified in terms of particular organization of roles and standards, etc. Practices can be formal and institutional, or informal. (See Joseph Raz, *The Practice of Value* and Virginia Held, *The Ethics of Care.*) Either way, practices are historical and contingent activities made possible through conformity to norms, believed to be "intrinsically" worth engaging in because of the self-disclosure and/or the disclosure of values that depend on those practices. How a practice is bounded and defined is usually if not always contestable.

respect. **Chapter Two** begins the investigation of respect theories by engaging the most influential distinction in the relevant literature—Stephen Darwall's distinction between "recognition" and "appraisal" respect. While I maintain that we are looking for a concept that in some ways fits the "recognition respect" paradigm, I also criticize the general interpretation of Darwall's distinction and confidence writers have placed in it. **Chapters Three and Four** begin the work of arriving at a coherent concept of respect. Part of this work involves considering what sort of relational concept respect is, and part of this work involves sorting through the variety of common "types" of respect in order to discover connections among these types. **Chapter Five** is where I theorize empowerment respect and the process of normative empowerment. Empowerment Respect (EMPR) is a relationship of treatment (between an accountable agent and an "entity"—a being with integrity conditions) that takes place as part of a "process" of normative empowerment**.** Normative empowerment is an ongoing process whereby meaningful engagement in socially legible practices (normative power) is secured for the entity. The process can be thought of as taking place in relation to specific values and practices. One is not simply "normatively powerful"—one has significant normative power in this or that area of life.[5] Yet we must attend to whether the grounds for normative power in one area of life are destabilizers for it in another area. In **Chapter Six** I argue that we can consider Empowerment respect to be a freestanding value and identify various empowerment respect competencies or "virtues." As well, I identify different dimensions and degrees of disrespect and discuss the harms of disrespect.[6] Not only can EMPR be valued independently from people's moral commitments, being in an EMPR-relation can be understood as something any reasonable person could take to be prima facie good. Insofar as we want to promote the value of Empowerment Respect, it is then especially relevant to learn about competencies that make one better able to give it and receive it. Returning to the motivating concerns detailed in the first chapter, **Chapter Seven** gets to work mapping and analyzing **self-respect** under an Empowerment conception. This allows for me to explore some ideas about the "social bases" of Empowerment Self-Respect (EMP-SR). The heuristic possibilities of Empowerment Respect allow us to put the attitudes and feelings

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[5] All the same, we might be able to see some people (and entities) as having normative power in more areas of their life, and thus more normative power in general than others.

[6] While the literature usually suggests that morally required respect equates to respect for persons, I suggest here that practices related to personhood status do not alone determine when respect is morally required or what might make it a political good.

associated with respect and self-respect into a more dynamic normative context, explaining why the "goods" to support self-respect ought to be identified not chiefly for the attitude of "self-confidence" they produce, but for the concrete ways they are shown to help people to advance their own valuable participation in socially legible practices. Finally, in **Chapter Eight** I consider, albeit tentatively, how one might fit EMP-SR into Rawls's theory of primary goods (and into "justice as fairness" at large). I suggest that doing this increases the pressure on political liberalism (and justice as fairness) to address two of its serious problems: the unclear political status of people with severe cognitive disabilities, and the moral marginalization of some religious citizens. Empowerment self-respect circuitously helps to explain why robust efforts to support intimacy and efficacy are matters of justice for those who do not have the two moral powers. Empowerment self-respect also underlines the need to take more seriously and to perhaps give some formal support to certain kinds of non-public reasoning.

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1 -- The Unresolved Status of Rawlsian Self-Respect

1.1 Chapter Introduction

One way we respect someone is by helping her respect herself. As we normally think of this, it means, for example, that we will avoid humiliating her or forcing her to humiliate herself. It means we will do what we can to help that person to be more sure-footed and morally consistent in her choices in consequential matters. It means we will try to help her know herself and appreciate her own worth in ways that go beyond the fragility of material success. And we will avoid doing things that undermine her reasonable efforts to reach reasonable goals. If those who personally care about her want the world to become one that greets her with open arms, we who aim to respect her believe she can honor and dignify what's already good about the world we share.

Rawls's political thought can be read as trying to capture mutual respectfulness in a formal register. In "justice as fairness" ("JF") we are invited to model in our thoughts this effort to give one another respect, as we veil our desires and particular commitments in the so-called original position.[7] We say to one another that we know all people, present and future, will take on plans that express their own commitments, and that those (reasonable) commitments and those plans matter and warrant support and protection just because they are real to someone. The principles that regulate our self-rule and social cooperation should reflect this mutual respect, and in reflecting it, those principles, properly interpreted, should also reinforce it. Part of what this respectful cooperation requires is an effort to make social institutions effective in distributing "primary goods." Included in that central idea is a further idea of equal if not greater importance: part of what just cooperation requires is that the institutions and practices that enact our shared principles do so in a way that is consistent with the self-respect of all.

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[7] My references to the theory "justice as fairness" will be referred to as "JF" in order to distinguish the theory from Rawls's *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (2001) (which will be referred to as JFR). The theory of "justice as fairness" is laid out in in detail in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (1999 [1971]) and JFR.

Rawls offers that the most important of all the primary goods may be "self-respect," but what is it exactly that Rawls thinks we are supporting when we support self-respect? What could possibly endanger self-respect among mutual respecters, such that it needs to be jealously assessed at every stage in our considerations of justice? A close look at the role Rawls gives to self-respect reveals considerable theoretical consistency underneath an ambiguous surface. Yet there remain worries related to the deeper implications of how Rawls handles "self-respect," which are somehow not obviated by this theoretic consistency.

In the first part of this chapter I give Rawls's "self-respect" a close look and I try to show the various ways the conception Rawls uses resonates with other key elements of his theory. Protecting self-respect is entwined with the justice project as Rawls understands it. In the second part of this chapter I turn to issues raised in some of the earlier critiques of Rawls's use of self-respect, focusing on Robin Dillon's articulation of a set of concerns related to Rawls's ambiguity. Dillon argues that there is absence of clear support for citizens' respectful attitudes toward their own uniqueness and vulnerability, aspects of life that must be attended to if one is to have true confidence in one's abilities to achieve one's ends. Having a healthy relation to oneself, on Dillon's account, involves deeply valuing various dimensions of one's life, beyond those dimensions necessary for political moral standing (the two moral powers). In connection with the concerns Dillon voices, it is my sense that two of the most significant challenges to liberalism—challenges from disability and from religion—arise at least in part from issues related to the social bases of self-respect. It thus seems that we are still in a place in our understanding of political liberalism where we may need to rethink both respect and self-respect. In order to make such a rethinking amenable to political liberal theory, however, it seems that self-respect must somehow be theorized in a way that is consistent with liberalism's requirement that we avoid introducing full moral conceptions into the original position.

Before turning to the analysis of Rawls's theory, I want to reiterate that the point of this chapter is to offer the background that motivates the main work of my dissertation. That work is to locate problems in how we think of respect and self-respect and to try to offer theoretical tools for resolving those problems. Perhaps it will be possible to dissolve the impasse between theorizing respect and self-respect as the expression of moral ideals and theorizing rights or entitlements to receive the "goods" of respect and self-respect.

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1.2 Rawls's idea of "self-respect" and the roles he means for it to play in "Justice as Fairness"

A basic understanding of self-respect (SR) in "justice as fairness" ("JF") requires understanding it at three levels. First, the way Rawls defines it, second, its role as both a primary good and an ideal, and third, its specific relation to distributive justice by way of the "social bases" suggested by Rawls.

Let me begin with a brief synopsis before going into the details. Rawls holds that anyone who would agree to principles of justice[8] would, among other things, want to maximize their chances of developing two kinds of self-confidence—one related to moral personhood and the other related to having valuable abilities. Together these two sorts of self-confidence are called "self-respect." Self-respect is thought to be so important to those deciding on fair terms of cooperation that, for the sake of securing it, we would choose to guarantee equal basic liberties at the expense (so to speak) of all the goods that feasibly ground equal status. Moreover, self-respect is so important that we should be willing (and required by justice) to change otherwise justified patterns of schemes of distribution of income, wealth, and offices in order to better assure it.[9] Finally, self-respect is so essential to the stability of a society that the more it is secured by a society's system of justice, the more reasonable it is for us to conjecture that system is likely to endure. Rawlsian "self-respect" (RawlsSR) thus is a fundamental requirement of

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[8] "JF" begins with a few fundamental ideas or assumptions that arise from taking society as a fair system of cooperation from one generation to the next. Justice as fairness asks, given this conception of political society, how can we determine what basic principles and what organization of the basic institutions would be just. Rawls is not asking what would be just for any context, however, but instead, he is asking what would be just democratic institutions given the assumption of "reasonable pluralism," which involves the assumption that citizens are aware of and want to (or are, in the worst case, peacefully resigned to the fact that they must) live in a modern democracy, at least if they could be convinced that it would be a fair system of cooperation. The intuitive idea is this: we are trying to find principles we could agree on, as people who cannot convert one another to our comprehensive moral doctrine, but who want to be fair to one another and to cooperate for mutual benefit. This idea allows Rawls to posit a conception of the free and equal moral person (who has and wants to have the two moral powers and who has a determinate conception of the good, a "rational plan of life" for the sake of which she is moved to abide by fair terms of cooperation). In terms of being situated to reach a fair agreement we have to consider those we represent and others (those who we will cooperate with) to be free to determine what is good for them (self-determining) and symmetrically situated.

[9] At the legislative stage. See below.

justice from both from the ideal perspective of the "moral powers" imputed to citizens in the Original Position ("Original Position")[10] and from the perspective of empirical psychological laws. Because "justice as fairness" passes what we might call "the self-respect test" in both an ideal and empirical sense, it is choice-worthy—both absolutely and in comparison to what Rawls considered the viable options of Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.

To breathe life into these ideas in their roughest outlines let's consider an individual who we will call Adonis. Adonis is of regular intelligence, but perhaps some might say below-average work-ethic. He has always preferred friendship, sports, and spontaneity to professional achievements. What he really wants is a life that has as much "life" in it as possible. The jobs he is able to do for money are not where the "life" is, though he is willing to pay his dues, so to speak, and work for the weekend. What he fears is that he will turn around and be at the end of his life without many good memories, and so his self-ideal, you might say, is to not shy away from adventure, even if it's a bit risky. He also has loved ones—friends that go way back and family members that he feels responsible for (though no children). He wants to be the kind of person who puts a smile on their faces and doesn't cause them stress. He can't offer much in the way of money, but he's always there to offer a hand and a sense of humor. If he was unable to do that he would feel that he'd failed some important part of himself.

We might imagine from the Original Position that one could turn out to be like Adonis.[11] Rawls's claim would be that "JF" is a fitting answer to Adonis's need for self-respect. Some political systems might toss Adonis to the winds of utility or perfection (as someone lacking ambition, who is there for friends and family). His right to resources that are meaningful for his own aims might depend upon how he contributes to flourishing of many more people than just

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[10] The "Original Position" stage (stage one of four) has two parts. First is where the principles are chosen, second is where that choice is considered in relation to the likelihood that actual human beings as we know them (still from behind the veil), could be expected to become, over time, more psychologically suited to the state they are in, rather than less so. The PG of SBSR is offered to the parties at the first part of the "Original Position" stage and is part of their deliberations about interpersonal comparisons, and their choice of the second principle. But then in the second part of the "Original Position" stage the parties return again to look at the same idea from a slightly different position. They consider what ideals and self-concepts "JF" is likely to generate and ask if it will tend to make citizens more or less accepting of the terms of cooperation. (see *Justice as Fairness*, 116-118).

[11] This might be taken as a misunderstanding of how we are to think from the "Original Position" –certainly we are not to think about how well "JF" happens to promote this or that specific ideal life. I understand this, but I also think that one way we test/choose principles is by imagining "test cases" as best we can.

his loved ones; or, he might be faced with damning disincentives meant to push him toward kinds of excellence that he has no personal interest in, or ability for, achieving. By contrast, as we will see in detail below, justice as fairness accepts Adonis for who he is. Adonis's rights and his access to resources in no way depend on how his life's goals are judged—just as long as he includes among his aims that of being just to his fellow citizens. Moreover, Adonis receives a clear and constant message in the public political culture: any advantages anyone else has, she owes just as much to Adonis's willingness to cooperate as she owes to the most productive or otherwise "excellent" member of the polity. Now, let's turn to the details and see how such a view gets worked out by Rawls at the technical levels of his theory.

1.2.1 Defining RawlsSR[12]

In *A Theory of Justice* (TJ), Rawls states that self-respect has two components: (1) "[I]t includes a person's sense of his [sic] own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out" and (2) "[S]elf respect implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions."[13] In *Political Liberalism* (PL), Rawls states that "[s]elf-respect is rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society capable of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good over a complete life."[14] Similar ideas are embedded in Rawls's statements about the social bases of self-respect. For example, in "Social Unity and the Primary Goods," he writes that the social bases of self-respect are "those aspects of basic institutions that are normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own

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[12] Let me address the shift in Rawls's theory between *Theory of Justice* (TJ) and *Political Liberalism* (PL), as it pertains to RawlsSR. This well-known shift in Rawls's thought is between the "thin theory of the good" he offers in TJ and the aim to make "JF" "freestanding" in political liberalism. Must we choose, then, between a Rawlsian self-respect suitable to "early" or "late" Rawls? Luckily it seems that is not necessary, as the meaning he gives for SR undergoes no clear substantive change other than, as I will discuss below the terminological choice he makes to stick to the phrase "self-respect" and jettison the also-used phrase "self-esteem." Self-respect was never given a full or complete definition by Rawls, but at least he remained consistent in how he did talk about it.

[13] 386.
[14] 316.

worth as moral persons and to be able to realize their highest-order interests and advance their ends with self-confidence."[15]

Looking at these different formulations side by side, it is evident why readers might find Rawls's account of self-respect to be confusing and vague, and not simply ambiguous.[16] But let me offer a fairly simple interpretation: RawlsSR has two components, one is our certainty that we (have and) warrant moral standing, and the other is a sense that we are capable of doing valuable things. This interpretation is not simply the result of weighing the various statements Rawls makes about the definition of RawlsSR; rather, it is the statements, together with how he thinks the components are supported, that lead me to this simpler account. Let me restate it slightly less simply: RawlsSR is composed of ("involves") two attitudes (and perhaps dispositions): first, confidence in the intrinsic value of one's own moral personhood (self-worth/status); second, confidence that one can act in ways that will contribute to one's larger aims and goals (self-efficacy/achievement).[17]

What can be said about the objects of these two attitudes of RawlsSR? **The "moral person" attitude** seems to be the idea of oneself as a member of a moral community who has the right to press claims, but not only that. The attitude includes some sense in which one *sincerely values and sees worth in* one's moral status. Perhaps what gives the moral status this worth is that it that it opens the way for one to pursue one's conception of the good. Alternatively, Rawls may be referring to a conviction that one deserves a certain moral status, a status implying that one's moral personhood gives to one's desires intrinsic or a-priori worth[18]. **The "personal**

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[15] Rawls, *Collected Papers*, 366.

[16] An ambiguity that will be discussed later is whether self-confidence either in regard to one's moral status or in regard to one's efficacy should imply satisfying *pro-self* beliefs or more strictly a disposition to act in certain ways that would require for the beliefs to be rooted in a reasonable interpretation of one's situation and relevant norms. Either way, it is safe to assume that feelings, beliefs, and dispositions related to moral standing would, at least sometimes, require different supports than do feelings, beliefs, and dispositions related to personal efficacy. And both, Rawls insists, must be sufficiently supported, if justice is to prevail. This is the very ambiguity that motivates writers who rely on Darwall's distinction in order to sort out Rawls.

[17] Further support for my interpretation might be adduced from considering what Rawls says about envy: Envy is triggered apparently by an inversion or lack of self-respect. It is a "*lack* of self-confidence in our own worth combined with a sense of impotence."

[18] The desires warrant consideration because they are the desires of a moral person. As such they possess worth that is independent from the content of the desires themselves and perhaps even independent of the person's ability to fulfill them. All-things-equal, it would be better that a moral person has her desires answered.

efficacy" attitude seems to have as its focus the contingencies related to developing capabilities. First of all, Rawls suggests that one should have reasons to believe that one can effectively develop and enrich one's two moral powers. That is, one should be able to act in ways that enrich one's sense of justice and that refine and develop one's discernment about one's values. Second, one should see oneself as having the personal ability (the material, social, and technical capabilities) to succeed over time as one pursues plans that express one's values.

1.2.2 Two roles for SR—as an ideal and as a primary good

While the two kinds of self-confidence I've discussed above are easy to recognize as important to us psychologically, what work does Rawls intend for RawlsSR to do in shaping and defending his theory of justice? It turns out that RawlsSR has two general kinds of roles in guiding our thinking. The first role it plays is as, one might say, an ideal—it seems to play a part at a higher and meta-level of the theory. The second role is as a distributable primary good, where we must think about which social structures (institutions, etc.) normally influence it and how principles of justice can be influenced to support it.

The Ideal of RawlsSR

Common sense tells us that whatever in particular these two attitudes are, they are something a person must experience and live out for herself, and until such time as she is doing so, she cannot be said to "have" RawlsSR. Whether this is a matter of free will or psychology, the point is that no institutions can fully guarantee or deliver dispositions that include beliefs and feelings. As an ideal beyond any distributive guarantee, RawlsSR, however plays a role for the person who is trying to think from the original position. It gives her a deeper way of knowing the otherwise "veiled" individual she represents. The ideal of being someone whose two moral powers are richly developed, someone who believes in themselves, and for whom this belief is itself a "lively" force in their thought process – suggests a conception of self that is more specific than the vaguer idea that we have a determinate conception of the good life and a sense of justice. On this ideal, we'd always want to interpret our values in ways that will help us to realize

RawlsSR, since RawlsSR would be thought to enhance our connection to what we value. It is not at all the same with income or wealth, for example. We may have a conception of the good that rejects income and wealth, while Rawls suggests that RawlsSR is intrinsically valuable for all reasonable conceptions of the good. This, in turn, gives us an easier time of understanding how to think about the primary goods. Those goods are not simply meant to have all-purpose value for "any" (vaguely) reasonable conception of the good, but to serve the "agent" whose RawlsSR is itself part of the value of the conception of the good. As Rawls says, SR is extremely important because "without it nothing may seem worth *doing*" (my emphasis).[19] Logically, if parties to the "Original Position" are assumed to care about *advancing* their conception of the good, then they would certainly want to value their own genuine efforts to advance their conception of the good.

Rawls imagines that parties to the Original Position really want these kinds of self-confidence and even would be ashamed *not* to want RawlsSR. There is a second-order desire for RawlsSR imputed to the parties, or at least to those of us engaging in Rawls's thought experiment: we want it and we want to want it. Unlike cash money or even opportunity, which we may rationally want, but which it may turn out that we don't need, "self-respect" is something Rawls assumes we directly value and demand from justice if justice is to be worth achieving. Again, "[w]ithout it, nothing may seem worth doing," including seeking justice itself. I believe that this value of RawlsSR is behind the importance Rawls gives to it as a stricter and more limited "primary good."

Self-respect and the Social Bases of Self-respect as a Primary Good

> *The social bases of self-respect are those aspects of basic institutions that are normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as moral persons and to be able to realize their highest-order interests and advance their ends with self-confidence.* – "Social Unity and Primary Goods"[20]

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[19] *A Theory of Justice*, 386.
[20] Rawls, *Collected Papers, 366.*

The argument that the social bases of self-respect are a primary good is predicated on the idea "that self-respect depends upon and is encouraged by certain public features of basic social institutions, how they work together and how people who accept these arrangements are expected to (and normally do) regard and treat one another." In this subsection I explain the primary good of the "social bases of self-respect" (SBSR). First I outline the basic theory of primary goods as Rawls presents it, and then I discuss how Rawls understands the SBSR in this context.

The Primary Goods

Rawls puts free and equal and reasonable and rational people behind a "veil of ignorance" and endows them, so to speak, with a thin theory of the good on the basis of which they imagine their prospects under different political conceptions.[21] A theory of primary goods is crucial at this point of the thought experiment: the parties need something relatively objective that they can use to make interpersonal comparisons as to how the principles might generate different positions of relative and absolute advantage and disadvantage (in relation to rational plans of life and in relation to the two moral powers). Different conceptions of the good will clearly have different notions of what it is good to be and to do, and corresponding preferences and needs for material and social resources necessary for that desired being and doing (the plans of life that express it, etc.). We have therefore to try to imagine what things or relations would be essential or advantageous to anyone, given their two moral powers and their desire to find a stable system of cooperation. The primary goods rest first of all on the assumption that the same moral powers necessary to make a fair agreement (and to be motivated to do so) are those that are necessary for life in cooperative pluralistic society.

What is asked is, first, what goods/tools give essential support the formation of the two moral powers ("highest-order interests"). Second, what tools are essential for living the (reasonable) good life (however one sees it) ("higher-order interests"). In "Social Unity and the Primary

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[21] The veil is meant to model reasonableness. The parties have some general knowledge about economics and psychology. One does not know what social location one will find oneself in, including what generation, or how materially prosperous or technologically advanced one's society is (beyond a vague notion of moderate scarcity).

Goods" Rawls lays out the primary goods together with reasons these particular goods are essential for the support and formation of the two moral powers. I quote in full:

(i)   The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, etc.) are the background institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the capacity to decide upon and revise, and rationally to pursue, a conception of the good. Similarly, these liberties allow for the development and exercise of the sense of right and justice under political conditions that are free.

(ii)   Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities are required for the pursuit of final ends as well as to give effect to a decision to revise and change them, if one so desires.

(iii)   Powers and prerogatives of offices of responsibility are needed to give scope to various self-governing and social capacities of the self.

(iv)   Income and wealth, understood broadly as they must be, are all-purpose means (having an exchange value) for achieving directly or indirectly a wide range of ends, whatever they happen to be.

(v)   The social bases of self-respect are those aspects of basic institutions that are normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as moral persons and to be able to realize their highest-order interests and advance their ends with self-confidence.[22]

Each of the primary goods is thus justified in reference to the highest-(two moral powers) and higher-order interests (life plans) imputed to the parties, and without particular knowledge about the various social positions and desires of members of a given society.[23]

Before turning to the primary good of the social bases of self-respect (RawlsSR), a couple more things should be noted about the role primary goods play in the argument in general. One way to think about primary goods is that they become the *appropriate reasons* that parties can give to one another for accepting or rejecting proposed principles of justice. As we've just seen, these reasons are worked up from some basic theoretical assumptions about the moral

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[22] In *Collected Papers, 366 (my boldface).*

[23] Were the primary goods simply justified in reference to the latter (the higher order interests—i.e. the determinate conception of the good) then the list might reflect the methods of rational choice theory (or so Rawls seems to argue in "Social Unity and the Primary Goods" in *Collected Papers*), and would fall prey to the paradoxes therein, as described by Amartya Sen, following Kenneth Arrow (see Sen, "The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal."). But since the parties also have a fundamental interest in their two moral powers it is possible in this thought experiment to non-arbitrarily order the preferences. It should be noted that Rawls allows for changes to this list. Any additions to the list would have to be justified in the same manner and from behind the veil.

person and the goal of social cooperation. In addition, these reasons are given in arguments for principles that are to regulate the basic structure of society and not for principles that are to regulate particular associations or the internal life of particular institutions. These reasons are given in light of the idea that principles of justice are part of a well-ordered society, and one in which a social minimum is provided to all. So, the parties are not simply making comparisons of prospects for having primary goods, but asking whether, in a society in which basic needs were (at least) minimally met, we could imagine these principles, with the prospects they yield, being mutually accepted by everyone with sufficient information and acted on for the right reasons. RawlsSR is claimed, then, to be a rational need for citizens conceived of as having the two moral powers, etc. The social bases of self-respect (SBSR), then, are among the "reasons" that we are to consider, when imagining if justice as fairness could regulate a well-ordered society.

Now let's look more closely at how Rawls conceives of that need and those reasons.

The Social Bases of Self-Respect

The role of the **social bases of self-respect** (SBSR) as a "distributable" primary good is complex and requires that we keep in mind two-part definition of RawlsSR. Rawls believes, perhaps especially when it comes to RawlsSR, that it would be best if each citizen had it equally (or had equal expectations for it); yet, Rawls concedes that RawlsSR is vulnerable to forces that would make equal expectations unlikely. To equalize the grounds for self-respect as much as possible, Rawls argues for the lexical priority of the first principle of justice over the second. I will discuss this in greater detail in the next section, but, briefly, what prioritizing equal liberty does, Rawls believes, is to create a publicly known moral status, equally available to all, at the legal-symbolic level. This status (given through equal liberties, etc.) is easy to understand and reckon with, so that it is also relatively open to all who have it to actually claim it and make fair use of it—at least, as we will see, in comparison to claims we may make upon unequally available opportunities, associations, and skills. *"JF"* is thought to give especially good support to the belief in the worth of one's rightful moral standing when compared to Utilitarianism, which, Rawls argues, asks parties to risk the possibility that their moral standing will only

protect their fundamental interests *on the condition* that their life plans promote the greatest happiness principle.[24]

Rawls seems to understand that while having equal basic liberties may the most efficient way to ground RawlsSR, this does not guarantee sufficiency in the SBSR. This is because of the psychological and social complexities that attend human senses of self-worth (and related attitudes). It is perhaps for this reason that SBSR is also placed on the "list" of fungible primary goods (the goods that may be distributed unequally and whose distribution is conditional upon the security of the equal liberties). While it is hard to imagine "features of institutions" as the sort of thing that can be apportioned as wealth and income can, this is not really Rawls's point. Rather, Rawls here suggests that when we consider the various inequalities among the fungible primary goods (goods iii and iv above), the impact of this distribution upon self-confidence must be also weighed in the balance. SBSR is the final thing to be considered as we reflect upon the unequal expectations of these goods as a safety valve that would tend to favor equal distribution. In other words, if notably lower expectations for wealth that would have otherwise been the "best" worst result, would, once the veil is lifted, be the kind of thing that would damage the self-confidence of the least-advantaged group, then that becomes a reason, at least at the legislative stage of public reasoning, to argue for redistribution in favor of greater equality. If some degree of otherwise permissible inequality turns out to have historically potent symbolic power that is going to really disadvantage certain groups in the SBSR, then it is not acceptable. Likewise, if some otherwise choice-worthy (from the "Original Position") arrangement turns out, due to historical or psychological contingencies, to negatively influence some groups expectations for success in their reasonable plans of life, then that arrangement is no longer attractive to parties at the legislative stage.

Although the ideal of RawlsSR suggests that we would do almost anything for it, by including SBSR on the list, Rawls *also* implies that *parties must also accept lower expectations for (institutional supports for) self-respect* if this the way to achieve the highest *overall* expectations for the least advantaged group. In other words, the "minimax" principle applies to the SBSR as it does to opportunities, offices, and fungible goods: the justice project may require that we expose one another to additional vulnerabilities to self-confidence in order that our

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[24] It is far less clear, we will soon see, how the priority of the liberties serves the "efficacy" aspect of RawlsSR.

institutions will bring about more of what we need to pursue our conceptions of the good life. In addition to this flexibility with regard to the institutional supports for these two kinds of self-confidence, including SBSR may serve one other purpose. It may allow those interpreting *"JF"* to choose between expectation bundles that, while different in composition, seem equally "good" overall. In this case, the idea of RawlsSR is brought in (as SBSR) so that parties can look for possible dangers to RawlsSR; or, to put it differently, between two mathematically equal bundles, parties would choose the bundle containing higher expectations for SBSR.[25]

Common sense suggests that this weighing of the various aspects of social institutions and customs for RawlsSR is a way to answer to the importance self-efficacy (both in realizing one's moral powers and in pursuing one's particular goals).[26] But here there are so many moving parts that one hesitates to feel confident that *"JF"* can guarantee this aspect of RawlsSR better than could other principles—Utilitarianism or Perfectionism, just to take Rawls's (rather slim) menu of options. The best we can do at this point, is to review what Rawls says about the SBSR that "justice as fairness" is thought to provide.

1.2.3 Supporting RawlsSR

Since the two principles of justice guarantee the basic liberties, they are more effective than the other alternatives in encouraging and supporting the self-respect of citizens as equal persons. It is the content of these principles as public principles for the basic structure which has this result. This content has two aspects, each paired with one of the two elements of self-respect. Recall that the first element is our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society rooted in the development and exercise of the two moral powers (and so as possessing an effective sense of justice); the second element is our secure sense of our own value rooted in the conviction that we can carry out a worthwhile plan of life. The first element is supported by the basic liberties which guarantee the full and informed exercise of both moral powers. The second element is supported by the public nature of this guarantee and the affirmation of it by citizens generally, all in

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[25] Inequality of opportunity for example might be more damaging than inequality of income to SBSR, or vice versa. Had Rawls not included self-respect, the two scenarios would mistakenly look equal.

[26] Given how interdependent the two elements of RawlsSR actually are (as my dissertation will show), it is no wonder that it is difficult to figure out which is served best by the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity. Rawls argues on behalf of the symbolic effects of the DP—that it reinforces the idea that one is appreciated for participating in the justice project and gives us a better notion of what a contributor is.

conjunction with the fair value of the political liberties and the difference principle.
(Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 319)

In this section I will look a bit more closely at what Rawls says about the grounding *"JF"* gives to RawlsSR. Broadly speaking there are several ways RawlsSR is supported by "JF", most of which are obliquely referenced in the passage quoted above. First there is the arrangement of the principles itself—the lexical priority of the equal liberties over the difference principle. Second, there is the fact that both principles are *publicly* understood and accepted. Third, the effects expected from the actual primary goods upon associational life. Fourth, there is the way living in a WOS of "JF" is thought to intersect with "laws" of developmental psychology and moral psychology. I will review these four types of supports before moving on to the critical reception of Rawls's idea of self-respect.[27]

Priority

I have already discussed the way Rawls thinks equal liberties supports self-respect[28], but let me say a little more here. Recall that the idea is that we would have more self-confidence in our moral standing if we could be sure that our mere citizenship was a warrant for equal liberties. A "lively" sense of one's moral equality would seem to be better achieved by a civic status that was also inviolable and "distributed" equally to everyone under the law. No contingencies, arguably, can ever impede upon one's right to claim the same freedoms of speech that anyone else claims. So, of the two sorts of self-confidence, Rawls's theory seems to suggest the one that can be truly guaranteed in terms of social *bases* for it, is the attitude that we are equals in our rights to

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[27] Notice that while SBSR is something justice must support, it is also the thing that most supports justice—there is a circuit between achieving SR for citizens and achieving justice. Those of us who want justice in a democratic plurality, Rawls suggests, must, for the sake of justice, commit to supporting self-respect. Those who want self-respect in a democratic plurality, must, for the sake of self-respect, commit to justice as fairness or some other politically liberal conception.

[28] What prioritizing equal liberty does, Rawls believes, is to create a publicly known moral status, equally available to all, at the legal-symbolic level. This status (given through equal liberties, etc.) is easy to understand and reckon with, so that it is also relatively open to all who have it to actually claim it and make fair use of it—at least, as we will see, in comparison to claims we may make upon unequally available opportunities, associations, and skills.

exercise our two moral powers. The *worth* of this sort of moral status (believing it has worth is part of the attitude we are concerned with here) is supported by giving it such firm constitutional backing, and thus giving each of us real political power to constrain others' encroachments on our efforts to realize our plans of life and our conceptions of the good.

Publicity

> *[B]y publicly affirming the basic liberties citizens in a well-ordered society express their mutual respect for one another as reasonable and trustworthy, as well as their recognition of the worth all citizens attach to their way of life.*
> (Rawls, *A Theory of Justice,* 319)

Rawls seems to see publicity working on a couple of levels to support RawlsSR. In a well-ordered society, each mature citizen knows and *knows that the others know*, what the principles are that guide the arrangements of institutions. When one lives among those who evidently accept and agree to the idea that one is free and equal, reasonable and rational, etc. as well as when one lives among those who agree that wealth and other goods correspond not to personal excellence but to incentives related to maximizing the goods for the least advantaged, then Rawls thinks one will have reason to feel more confident overall.

Rawls emphasizes the relation of publicity to confidence in personal efficacy. In the quote above, he states that the "second element"—i.e. a sense of personal efficacy, "is supported by the public nature" of the priority of liberty "and the affirmation of it by citizens generally…" We must then ask why would personal efficacy (both in terms of developed moral powers and in terms of acting on life-plans) be so especially affected by publicity? One answer is that Rawls thinks that publicity gives us reason to expect sincere cooperation from fellow citizens. Fellow citizens must actually believe that my reasonable participation, whatever it comes to, contributes to society if they are willing to protect my liberties as equal to their own. If so, then I can count on others to share my reasons for not interfering with my reasonable activities. They take my efforts to actualize my dreams as part of their own good insofar as being part of this political community is part of their own good. While this explanation may sound convoluted, what it amounts to really is simply an expectation for sincere cooperation from others in the exercise of

one's basic rights. Insofar as the exercise of those rights is part of how I will pursue my plans, then I can have greater confidence in the abilities that I use that presuppose cooperation from others. On the contract-theoretical model, I can certainly abide by a contract that my co-contractor fails to understand or sincerely appreciate, but I am much more *able* to be an *effective* contracting party (it is much easier for me to do my part to make the contract effective) if the other party has the right set of beliefs about our shared endeavor.

There are also symbolic-psychological affects beyond this contract-theoretical model. Rawls suggests that one truly will feel more appreciated, as an equal, but also somehow personally, if one believes that people support the principles of justice for the right reasons. That is, that they know what it is they are supporting and why.[29]

Associational life

> [I]n a WOS the need for status is met by the public recognition of just institutions, together with the full and diverse internal life of the many free communities of interest that the equal liberties allow. (TJ, 477)

> Given our plan of life, we tend to be ashamed of those defects in our person and failures in our actions that indicate a loss or absence of the excellences essential to our carrying out our more important associative aims." (TJ, 390)

Perhaps the most complex social basis/bases for RawlsSR which Rawls tries to account for is that provided by the primary goods in their specific impact on the ways we experience our

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[29] In TJ §29 Rawls argues that the principle of Utility puts strains on commitment. Taking into account what Rawls takes to be an uncontroversial set of moral psychological laws [fn], compared to "JF", Utilitarianism makes unrealistic demands on the least advantaged social positions, who would have to have cultivated to a high degree the virtues of benevolence and sympathy in order to accept their lower position for the sake of others being even more well off. In addition, no matter what specific schemes a principle of utility yields—no matter how closely they may resemble those of "JF", the *publicity* of a Utilitarian principle of justice would be a fatal mark against it for reasons of self-respect. In asking the least well off to accept their lower expectations and lesser (value of?) liberties for the sake of the expectations of others, such a public principle strains and challenges the ability of most psychologically normal (i.e. not totally psychologically self-sufficient) people to believe in their own worth. In contrast, "JF" would place no such strains on citizens' sense of their own worth. Instead it would further insure that sense of worth by enshrining in the basic institutions of society the idea that each person is an end in herself and not merely a means. (TJ 155-158)

associational lives, whether in the family[30], workplace, neighborhood, school, or any other group we would consider our "associates." Though Rawls claims the priority of liberty to be *an* if not *the* essential social basis of self-respect, it is so *in conjunction with* the other parts of "JF"— namely, with fair value of political liberty, fair equality of opportunity (FEO), and the difference principle. Perhaps most importantly, all of these ways of "insuring" self-respect act as a kind of supportive background, an institutional background which itself is thought to be the most fertile political environment for the widest variety of associations (including family structures) and politically compatible (though incommensurable) conceptions of the good life, values, or doctrines.[31] The equal liberty of freedom of association, and the related freedoms of movement and conscience are thought to generate a basic structure conducive to the formation, survival, and flourishing of an indeterminate, but wide variety of associations.[32]

Rawls offers several interdependent claims related to how the associational lives promoted by *""JF""* will ground RawlsSR. Let me present them a bit more schematically than he does. The basic argument is that there are some basic patterns regarding how people respond to associations in a context of diverse associational possibilities together with the freedom to associate with whom one pleases (to move around as one pleases, etc.). Healthy associations, we might say, are indispensable for our confident realization of the two moral powers and to our self-efficacy. The more available such associations are to us, it would seem, the better supports we would have for RawlsSR. *"JF"* simply supports the following tendencies that allegedly work to the benefit of RawlsSR.[33]

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[30] *The Family*. Rawls talks about the family in three ways that are relevant to the arguments from SR. The first is found in TJ and has to do with moral development (TJ 205-6 – "a sense of his own worth developed in the smaller associations of his community"). The second is found also in TJ, is related to the first, and has to do with the emotional stability of those who are treated justly. The third is found in "JF" (how about PL?) and has to do with the possibility of unequal chances due to the core values of one's family.

[31] Implicit, too, is that sometimes this political institutional background serves the purpose of insuring us against the contingencies of rejection from associations, as it gives us a respectable identity or status that is independent of any status we may have (though it is not an absolutely guaranteed status, if we take into account incarceration, etc.).

[32] From the "Original Position" one cannot know the history and material conditions (beyond moderate scarcity) of one's society, but the general facts of history, of modern democracy, perhaps of global economic possibilities, and so forth, might give the parties enough information to make this judgment.

[33] See *A Theory of Justice,* 389 fn26 *(Associations and) Reasons of psychology* Rawls works from what he considers to be uncontroversial findings and theories of psychology and moral psychology in order to account for (1) the

1. **Associates tend to help and affirm one another.** Rawls draws upon this idea to argue that the self-efficacy of RawlsSR is largely supported through the willingness of one's friends, family, and other associates to help one to succeed as well as to solve problems and recover from failure and disappointment.[34]

2. **Personal standards are relative to one's associates.** Rawls discusses this in terms of "non-comparing groups." He argues that envy and resentment are not likely to result from casting one's eye across groups one is not involved in. We are not normally deflated by the thought of people excelling in practices and among associates that we are not involved with.

3. **People tend to find associations that reflect their values and abilities.** The more freedom of movement and variety of choice there is to enter into different associations, the more likely it is that citizens will find those associations that they are particularly well-suited for. When one finds oneself in a social environment that draws upon one's particular abilities and reflects one's values, one finds obvious supports for realizing a robust capacity to form and revise one's conception of the good and one has strong support for a sense of self-efficacy.[35]

4. **People tend to choose challenging activities that develop their existing capabilities.** With fair equality of opportunity and a variety of roles and positions of responsibility, people will tend to develop their abilities in ways that are

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assumption that supportive associations are normally necessary for SR and (2) that supportive associations are more likely under "JF".

[34] Rawls wants to resist the idea that associations tend to rank their members in ways that are harmful to the RawlsSR of those who are less appreciated. Though he does not directly discuss it, perhaps the thought is that a person with equal liberties is free to leave humiliating situations. This freedom would have the two-fold effect of empowering the individual to leave and encouraging associational cultures that do not rely on humiliating kinds of moral hierarchy—since they would likely not be able to find anyone willing to play the role of the moral inferior. Clearly this notion of freedom to exit has been seen as a problematic assumption, and we will discuss this issue in later sections.

[35] Rawls wants to indicate why it might be important *for self-respect* that we each have opportunities that are commensurate with our abilities. Work, for example, should be in some sense subjectively engaging and meaningful, or else citizens might feel that there was no plan of life open to them that is "worth" carrying out. (This amounts to a loss in the first element of self-respect, since one cannot value equal moral status if there is nothing valuable that it allows one to do or be). Also, Rawls wants to indicate how important cultivation is to receiving the appreciation of others. If we lack opportunities to develop our talents and skills then we are that much more vulnerable to shame among our associates. There is a downward spiral in these loses to the bases of SR. If one is not personally able to command very interesting or useful abilities, one thereby loses an important way of getting appreciation from others, and with this loss, an important ground to the second element of SR—for those who do not think you have much to offer are also not going to take much of an interest in helping you to achieve your goals.

challenging and satisfying. Greater and more refined abilities in turn ground greater self-confidence. [36]

5. **People are motivated by the social rewards they receive for succeeding at complex activities**.[37] The more complex and interesting one's activities, the more those are likely to be appreciated by associates in a variety of contexts. Since *"JF"* supports the "Aristotelian Principle," it also gives people another basis for self-confidence based on the appreciation of others for their particular achievements.[38]

Rawls's optimism about people finding supportive associational lives against the background of the liberties, FEO, etc., is linked in part to his conception of the person as free and the related view of the second moral power. Although Rawls poignantly writes of the agony facing people who transform their core attachments (Saul/Paul)[39], it is a centerpiece of his idea of the free person with the second moral power that she is able not only to affirm, but also to choose or reject her core beliefs (here we run into some difficulties related to the blurred theoretical line

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[36] The rationality of seeking modes of life that express one's deepest commitments while cultivating as much as possible upon one's various abilities and interests (the Aristotelian principle) is another way Rawls links associational choice and variety with self-respect. Under "JF" a person is to find opportunities open to them based on their talents and abilities and it is assumed that those opportunities are only multiplied when there are diverse associations generating different kinds of work and life activities. Later, in "The Priority of Right and the Ideas of the Good, CP 465, it seems that Rawls includes the development of the two moral powers as something that is a good according to laws of moral psychology.

[37] Rawls does not discuss any of these claims at length, but I will summarize what he does say and the arguments implied therein.

[38] Even though parties do not know the content of citizens' determinate conceptions of the good it is assumed that citizens want to be good (however they understand this) *and to appear good* to others. (PL 81ff RN 25) The normal desire to appear to be as one hopes to be, or to be taken as good in the ways that one really is good—to live up to one's standards and to be acknowledged for doing so—is incorporated into parties' assumptions about those they represent. SR is thus thought to depend in some fundamental way on the affirming (or at least tolerant) messages one gets from others. On this assumption, and for the sake of citizens' SR, parties will accept the goal of finding terms of cooperation that somehow result in institutions that express or cultivate mutual respect and civility (PL 81ff, TJ 155-8, 296-299; TJ 205-206). Rawls takes it as a psychological law that people's self-confidence in their own worth (perhaps here we may think of the second element of self-respect) is better supported the more affirmation they get from salient others. This admiring appreciation is more likely to come to those who do things that call for skill and talent, but even a presumably "dull" or "monotonous" activity can be executed in ways that can be appreciated by others.

[39] See JFR, §7.

between the doctrine and the determinate conception of the good).[40] Not only is freedom of conscience a basic liberty because it is necessary to support those conceptions of the good that contain reflective-affirmation at their core, but Rawls will go further and suggest that "it shows a lack of self-respect and weakness of character" for a person *not* to care directly about their liberties and opportunities—in other words, those very freedoms which make it possible for them to "choose" who they associate with and what loyalties they commit to.[41]

1.2.4 Self-Respect and the Stability Arguments for "JF"

> *The most stable conception of justice therefore, is presumably one that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in **affirmation of the self**.* (Rawls, *A Theory of Justice,* 436)[42]

There are two main questions that have to be affirmatively answered for *"JF"* to be considered stable. The first assesses whether citizens under *"JF"* are likely to "acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice that they generally comply with" its institutions. This assessment is done by relying on "certain assumptions specifying a reasonable human psychology and the normal conditions of human life."[43] Rawls SR plays a role here. **I will call this his "social values" argument.** The second question that has to be affirmatively answered "is whether in view of the general facts that characterize a democracy's public political culture, and in particular the fact of reasonable pluralism, the political conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus." (PL, 141) I will call this his **"overlapping consensus" argument** and I will suggest that Rawls's idea of SR also plays a role here as well (because indeed this latter question asks "how, with the same reasonable moral psychology used in answering the first question" justice as fairness can be the object of an overlapping consensus (PL, 143).[44]

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[40] See "Fairness to Goodness" in *Collected Papers*. "We should not speak of fairness to conceptions of the good, but of fairness to moral persons with a capacity for adopting these conceptions and caring about the conditions under which they are formed" (CP, 279).
[41] "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *Collected Papers,* 314.
[42] My emphasis. (PL 143n)
[43] *Political Liberalism, 141, 142.*
[44] Compare to JFR, 190.

The role of RawlsSR in the "Social Values Argument" for Stability

> *A perfectly just society should be part of an ideal that rational human beings could desire more than anything else once they had full knowledge and experience of what it was. The content of the principles of justice, the way in which they were derived, and the stages of moral development show how in "JF" such an interpretation is possible. (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 418)*

> *With the constant assurance expressed by these principles, persons will develop a secure sense of their own worth that forms the basis for the love of humankind (TJ, 438)*

The parties have chosen principles that must not only rule the basic structure but must be publicly known and affirmed in doing so. To publicly affirm principles for the basic structure, citizens, in effect, adopt certain political values (whether or not those values are central to their identities is another question). **What are the probable psychological and motivational effects of the general public's adopting those values or "standards"?**[45] For a society to be well ordered it must be the case that citizens' cooperation within these institutions will give rise to "a corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them."[46] In this argument Rawls mainly wants to show that "JF" fits with sound "principles of moral psychology", but to do this he admits he will "have to take up some rather speculative psychological questions."[47]

Rawls presents a view of moral development "designed to fit the theory of justice" (TJ, 404), but at the same time one that bears similarity to broadly accepted theories of moral

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[45] TJ, 398.

[46] Ibid. Rawls says, "[o]ne conception of justice is more stable than the other if the sense of justice that it tends to generate s stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly."

[47] TJ, 399. Rawls continues, "In this context stability means that however institutions are changed, they still remain just or approximately so, as adjustments are made in view of new social circumstances. The inevitable deviations from justice are effectively corrected or held within tolerable bounds by forces within the system. Among these forces I assume that the sense of justice shared by members of the community has a fundamental role. To some degree, then, **moral sentiments are necessary** to insure that the basic structure is stable with respect to justice" (TJ, 401).

development found in McDougall, Piaget, and Kohlberg. Following Kohlberg,[48] Rawls uses a three-stage sequence of moral development in order to argue that *"JF"* would create a supportive and self-reinforcing cycle. Unconditional love prepares children for seeing themselves as worthwhile participants in future associations; good associational experiences prepare young people for appreciating ideals of justice; the experience of those ideals in the form of mutual respect in their political community[49] strengthens their **self-respect** and in turn their kindness toward their own children.

Rawls posits three psychological laws (tendencies), which are as follows[50]: (1) "given that family institutions express their love by caring for his good, then the child, recognizing their evident love of him, comes to love them. (2) "given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by acquiring attachments in accord with the first law, and given that a social arrangement is just and publicly known by all to be just, then this person develops ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others in the association as they, with evident intention, comply with their duties and obligations, and live up to the ideals of their station." (3) "given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by his forming attachments in accord with the first two laws, and given that a society's institutions are just and are publicly known to be just, then this person acquires the corresponding sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for

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[48] Carol Gilligan's groundbreaking re-thinking of this three-stage development was to come later (*In a Different Voice, 1981)*. Rawls's conjectures about the stable moral development of citizens under "JF" certainly take on a different appearance post-Gilligan. Rawls's claims would, in my view, have to measure up to Gilligan's findings that moral development need not hinge on a contract-view of justice and might well hinge on the universalization of a care perspective. So, moral development toward a stable acceptance of society under "JF" would require healthy experiences of answering to asymmetrical needs and having one's needs answered at the associational stage of friendship, not just healthy experiences of fair-play and symmetrical reciprocity. This means that classrooms, teams, fundraisers, theater groups, churches, and neighborly relations, which present young people with opportunities to notice each other's particular needs and to be inclusive and attentive—that these opportunities would find reflection and at the political level. Fairness would look different from the care-perspective and so we would want evidence that the sense of justice that citizens experience that allows them to embrace "JF" would be able to live up to that.

[49] Rawls comments that the absence of arbitrary authority should reduce the amount of suffering from "oppressive conscience" – here he must be drawing, conveniently, from Freud—though perhaps not recognizing that the arbitrary authority that most shapes conscience is likely that experienced in the family, outside of the law.

[50] Potentially helpful to our understanding of Rawlsian SR is the distinction he makes between moral sentiments, (moral) attitudes, and moral feelings (TJ, 420-425) as well as the connection between moral and natural feelings (TJ 425f). This suggests that for Rawls to call something an attitude he is referring to a behavioral disposition that must itself be explained in reference to some moral sentiment.

whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these arrangements."[51] Whereas in a Hobbesian state the mechanism for achieving stability is the belief in the sovereign's efficacy, "[n]ow it is evident how relations of friendship and mutual trust, and the public knowledge of a common and normally effective sense of justice, bring about the same result." Furthermore, Rawls continues, there is an "inherent stability" in "JF", which "is a consequence of the reciprocal relation between the three psych laws."[52] Rawls adds, "it seems that **with a firmer assurance of one's own worth** and a livelier capacity for fellow feeling brought about by more favorable conditions for the first law, the effects governed by the other two laws should be similarly enhanced. Conversely, persons who have developed a regulative sense of justice and are **confident in their self-esteem[53]** are more likely to care for their children with manifest intention…" (my emphasis). Or, as he puts it later,

> The resulting sense of justice is stronger the more these three elements are realized. The first enlivens the **sense of our own worth** strengthening the tendency to answer in kind, the second presents the moral conception so that it can be readily understood, and the third displays the adherence to it as attractive. The most stable conception of justice therefore, is presumably one that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in **affirmation of the self**. (TJ 436, my emphasis) [54]

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[51] TJ 429-30.

[52] Rawls links stronger attachments to then a stronger sense of justice, but Eva Kittay (*Love's Labor*) and others suggest that if your stronger attachment is in fact to someone who justice is not designed to serve then there is no reason for 2 to lead to 3. We want 2 to lead to 3. We need to understand how strong attachments are formed—it is not always directly reciprocal, but from experiencing how much someone needs you and depends on you and how responsive they are to your care (which gives you a sense of accomplishment). This is more complex than the idea of reciprocity that Rawls suggests in the second law.

[53] Because (1) the priority of liberty, etc. (JFR, §29) strengthens self-esteem [i.e. RawlsSR] (by showing unconditional concern and treating us as ends), it leads to a closer affiliation with persons and institutions by way of their enhanced tendency to answer in kind. (See TJ 437)

[54] The experience of someone caring "unconditionally" for us gives us a firm sense of our own worth (beyond any contingent role we might play or achievement we might make)—the psychologically primitive experience of believing in our fundamental worth as moral persons (Kantian). Then the experience of cooperating with friends and associates on terms that are fair in relation to that social practice, and being treated like a peer and appreciated by the others for our contribution, this gives us a ground for self-esteem—for a feeling that we are capable of setting and accomplishing goals. Then when we see that the society we are living in has just publicly recognized institutions that are meant to be equally for the sake of all, we form a different kind of self-ideal, based on playing our role as a citizen and being just, and our manifest intention to do so is a ground for another kind of self-esteem and self-respect.

For the Rawls of TJ, the support *"JF"* gives to RawlsSR seems to turn upon two important transitions. First, from the love one receives in the family to the friendship one makes in mutually supportive and affirming associations. Were healthy associations with peers less reliable or less available, the requisite moral learning would be stunted. Once reciprocity is experienced and enjoyed, this nascent sense of justice is carried over into the realm of social cooperation among strangers, requiring institutions and laws. Were the political life that one discovered there less supportive, and less a reflection of positive experiences of reciprocity, one would be less likely to be sincerely cooperative and "loyal" to the political system. It is the loyalty to the system of justice that reinforces for everyone the worth of that system by allowing it to work effectively. When the system works effectively, people feel more secure and self-confident. The love they feel for the wider world, in turn, gives a stable foundation to the love they give to their dependents.[55]

The role of RawlsSR in the "overlapping consensus argument" for stability[56]

Key to the idea of "overlapping consensus" is that political values can be held to "outweigh" the values that are the subject of controversy or irresolvable disagreement.[57] Reasonable people with reasonable conceptions of the good endorse *"JF"* (or whichever liberal conception is legitimated in their well-ordered-society) and agree that divisive topics (such as abortion), important as they are, are still less important than the aims of the social union of social unions. This consensus over political values is the product of the ongoing success of those values. Rawls thus holds that over time it could come to seem that we owe our good lives to the basic institutions of society and so we would give moral priority to those institutions with their

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[55] Although the arguments in this section draw upon the "thick" theory of the good that Rawls was forced to reject in favor of political liberalism's freestanding conception of justice, Rawls will continue to consider similar ideas in the sections of PL called "the moral powers of citizens." There, Rawls stresses the idea that political values could be thought likely to be internalized as very great values by those living under "JF", and that such a thought would make parties more likely to accept "JF".

[56] Overlapping consensus (OC) in effect replaces the idea of "congruence" between the right and the good. However, as Rawls emphasizes in his introduction to PL, this one change in his theory demanded a set of other changes and new concepts.

[57] *JFR, 51.*

restrictions on reasons and their democratic procedures. In doing so, we would make society more stable by avoiding the politicization of moral cleavage between different groups.

In this context in PL, RawlsSR is deployed in relation to arguments from cooperative virtues tied to the importance Rawls gives to the idea of Overlapping Consensus. "JF" is to be chosen over Utilitarianism because the first moral power requires an environment where the cooperative virtues prevail in the public domain (our institutions, public reason, etc.).[58] If the distribution of primary goods is not conducive to RawlsSR then it will not be conducive to the cooperative virtues (for reasons of psychology and sociology).[59] If it is not conducive to the cooperative virtues then it will not be conducive to a sense of justice (for reasons of sociology).[60]

Are the self-concepts and self-ideals likely to be generated by the political conception ("JF") going to work in its favor? Or will the institutional, legal, and other arrangements that realize a political conception in turn shape citizens' attitudes in ways that undermine their support for that very arrangement? One way to address this question is to try to imagine what set of morally motivating beliefs and ideals is suited for "JF" and then to ask whether "JF" would be likely to produce those beliefs. Rawls conceives of the moral psychology that he gives to citizens as "philosophical" rather than "psychological." Although he must stay within the bounds of what empirical psychology indicates is realistic, these are very wide bounds. Within them it is a philosophical question what self-shaping ideals we, or the parties in the "Original Position", would endorse. RawlsSR—involving a motivating belief about the worth of one's moral personhood together with and a motivating belief about one's efficacy—is what Rawls relies upon to pick out those ideals (such as duties of civility) that we would rationally want promoted by our political conception. The political virtues and the ideals of citizenship include (a)

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[58] The political and civic virtues that "JF" is thought to endorse are more consistent with the aims of social cooperation (and the idea of citizens as free and equal), than are those of U, once the issue of publicity is taken seriously into account.

[59] (In a weird way this is also saying that if the primary goods are not conducive to the second moral power then they won't be conducive to the first, if they aren't conducive to rationality then they won't be conducive to reasonableness. But it is not possible to make that move directly, since what counts as "reasonable" depends on what political conception is chosen.)

[60] The link between SR and the second moral power is even more intimate—for it is impossible to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good in any genuine sense if one thinks of oneself as unworthy of fair social cooperation and unworthy (because unable?) to be an advancer of the doctrine or values that one endorses

accepting the burdens of judgment (b) respecting the bounds of public reason (c) being willing to offer nonpublic reasons in the appropriate context.[61] These ideals are thought to be helpful for each person in her aims to advance her reasonable conception of the good, creating grounds for achievement and (motivating) shame, quasi-public "standards" of behavior, and beliefs that would allegedly strengthen, not weaken RawlsSR.[62] Rawls wants to show that a political liberal conception could be stable (and so, could be just), despite worries that the freedom of citizens to express their views could lead to strife among those with conflicting conceptions of the good. Rawls thinks that preserving RawlsSR is essential to this aim, for reasons quite similar to those offered in TJ. He must therefore show that his conception of "public reason" is itself conducive to RawlsSR.

Using RawlsSR as his theoretical tether, Rawls concludes that "justice as fairness" is likely to generate, as much as any political principles could be expected to, political harmony between people and groups living together under a modern constitutional democracy with incommensurable conceptions of the good.

1.2.5 Subsection conclusion: reflecting on RawlsSR

Rawls's theory is so intricately laid out, and the argument has so many reinforcing components, that it can be a challenge to generalize about it without doing so at the expense of correct interpretation. Nevertheless, what I see is essentially this: There is some relation to self

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[61] I will return to this in Chapter 8. Rawls explains that only certain kinds of reasons are permissible in public reason (vs. reasoning in the 'background culture'). Rawls's solution to this potential problem—one that would affect the stability argument in terms relevant to citizens' SR—is to widen the idea of public reason to include the circumspect uses of nonpublic reasons such as witnessing, declaration, and reasoning from conjecture. These forms of reason each in their own way serve two purposes. First, they make it more possible for a wider range of reasonable arguments to rise up from the background culture for debate on the constitutional essentials and issues of basic justice. Second, they "express" in different ways respect and self-respect, building confidence and trust (mutual respect) between citizens. Although civil disobedience is not, strictly speaking, part of the ideal theory for the WOS, the role of civil disobedience is also justified in reference to mutual respect and self-respect. (See Boxill, "Self-respect and Protest").

[62] SR requires not only a plurality of associations, but also a civic identity that can itself be the source of a dignified status and assurances that one's identity as a citizen is affirmed and respected by one's co-citizens. Rawls argues that it is possible for this to come about under "JF", and this is important to his argument for stability. (T 388 – attitude of citizens is to be nonjudgmental; PL 314 –same ; "JF" 190 political values are great values [also find stuff on republicanism]; "JF" 200 – stability and SR).

that ideal liberal theory must both presuppose and promote. Rawls ends up calling this "self-respect" and for him it amounts to self-confidence under two different views—the self as a moral equal and the self as a practical agent. At face value this seems uncontroversial. We all agree that it is important to believe in our moral worth and to believe that we can get things done. Yet, as Rawls's critics would point out, we need to take care in how we articulate and understand our political liberal conception of self-respect. First of all, we have to be able to defend the idea that SR is as crucially important as we claim (both immanently in terms of the theory we are using, and absolutely, in terms of our actual lives). Secondly, assuming we can defend the importance of the self-relation(s) we have singled out, we have to understand them well enough to formulate an account of how to achieve those self-relations.[63]

Let me take a moment to talk about these worries in a more down-to-earth way. We want our ideal of justice to be a powerful ideal that really captures our best hopes about what social cooperation can bring about. I believe Rawls is right to make principles of justice answerable to citizens' needs for self-respect. This is the right move, even if those needs are complicated, difficult to predict, and partly dependent on intimacies beyond the reach of any politics—as they surely are. But, does "justice as fairness" answer to this need in a way that resonates with our experiences? Many people experience self-alienation that they attribute to conflicts between the various associational dimensions of their lives. Tradeoffs that may seem reasonable become disastrous when, in order to make the tradeoff, one must humiliate oneself, isolate oneself, or fail according to one's own fundamental standards. Has Rawls done enough to assure parties in the original position that such tradeoffs are to be taken seriously in terms of the social bases of self-respect? I have two kinds of cases particularly in mind. Both concern the social bases of self-respect for people whose conception of the good involves their connection to those who are "margins" of political liberalism. Let's imagine two such instances:

> **Rebecca and Tyler[64]:** Rebecca is struggling financially and occupied every spare
> minute with seeking and inventing ways to stimulate and enrich the daily life of her
> cognitively impaired adult son, Tyler. Without a large network of caring friends and family,
> Tyler really does depend upon his mother's effort to create a safe and stimulating
> environment for him. He loves his mom, but often feels frustrated and bored. It can be

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[63] For example, it is one thing to say that we must believe in our moral personhood, and quite another thing to understand what such a belief consists in and what factors normally generate or impact it.

[64] This example is fictional (it is part of a more detailed scenario that I do not include here). I mean to connect it with the "dependency" critique of Rawlsian Liberalism; specifically that found in the work of Eva Kittay.

frightening when she is not able to be there for him, since the other people don't seem to really love him. Rebecca, often lonely and bored herself, and wracked with guilt and disappointment at her inability to make both of their lives truly good.[65]

Destiny[66]**:** Destiny is torn between a community that she values deeply and wants to protect, and a desire to engage with liberal public discourse as a valid partner. Let's call her community "Seekers" and their doctrine and practices "Seekerism." Illiberal Seeker practices do sometimes go too far in her opinion, but the public doesn't seem to understand why they do what they do. While sometimes exceptions are made for Seekers, it is made clear to Seekers that they are merely objects of toleration. They have a reputation for backwardness and a poor understanding of justice. Destiny wants to live in solidarity with Seekers, but she also wants Seekerism to be responsive to certain issues of fairness. Yet, it seems that, for a community whose thinking is treated as outside the bounds of liberalism, what it means to "be" a Seeker is becoming increasingly traditional, and indifferent to criticism, inside or out. Destiny is finding it increasingly difficult to have her perspective heard in either domain.

It is not clear how RawlsSR (which remains conceptually vague) is supported for individuals like Rebecca and Destiny. They must reject opportunities open to the free and equal in order to serve and protect a marginalized group or member of the polity, or they must neglect those who sustain their soul in order to live in a reasonable and rational way. Rawls's answer could of course be that this worry is the product of our unjust society and that such tradeoffs are reduced dramatically in the well-ordered society. Moreover, he might argue, *"JF"* at least does nothing systematically that would increase or encourage such tradeoffs. My worry is that Rawls's claims about the support for SBSR may obscure issues of self-relation that need to be carefully considered. The remainder of this chapter explores these worries, which call out for a reconsideration of the sorts of "respect" that are involved in "self-respect."

1.3 Questioning Rawls's idea of "self-respect"

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[65] Of course we know that such relationships are often full of joy and stimulation for the caregiver and the child. I am trying to describe a certain kind of vulnerability, however.

[66] This example is fictional. I mean to connect it to aspects of the "public reason" debate that emerged in connection to Rawls. See Habermas, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason."

Worries about RawlsSR have turned on the issue of its ambiguity and the implications therein. I want to look at some of the earlier critiques in broad strokes and then to focus in greater detail on Robin Dillon's effort to rethink self-respect in light of issues with RawlsSR.

1.3.1 Background: Early critiques of Rawls's ambiguous SR and related work on Respect

Readers of Rawls lost no time in noticing that Rawls was utilizing essentially two different attitudes under his term "self-respect." Perhaps this was due to the political and moral climate in the U.S. context, as civil rights and liberation movements had placed great emphasis on achieving pride and self-respect in order to combat oppression and on pointing out losses to self-respect as the telltale signs of oppression.[67] The meaning of self-respect was being thought about—not just as a duty or a virtue, but also as a right and a good and something precious a person could be deprived of.

Rawls's account of self-respect thus raised a range of concerns. Was it psychologically plausible? Was it internally coherent and consistent to his theory? Were its implications being fully appreciated in the interpretation of distributive justice? To leverage these concerns, meanings had to be articulated for the concepts of respect and self-respect that best corresponded to the elements of RawlsSR. At one extreme, Robert Nozick read RawlsSR in terms of personal pride, rejecting Rawls's view that "JF" supports "self-esteem":

> People generally judge themselves by how they fall along the most important dimensions in which they *differ* from others. People do not gain self-esteem from their common human capacities by comparing themselves to animals who lack them…Nor do people gain or maintain self-esteem by considering that they possess the right to vote for political leaders, though when the franchise was not widely distributed things may have been different.[68]

If the feeling of being special and exceptional is the primary good that must be supported, then equality is not a very compelling answer, according to Nozick. Laurence Thomas took a different approach, but likewise understood Rawls to mean by self-confidence a kind of esteem or pride.

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[67] From the libertarian right there was pushback against the idea that we are each entitled to feel good about ourselves.
[68] Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia,* 243.

Reflecting on the black consciousness movement, Thomas argued that although *"JF"* may not give equal support to high self-appraisals in one's occupation, what really mattered most was self-confidence and pride in one's moral personhood—something Thomas believed was supported by "JF". If anything, Thomas criticized Rawls for raising self-esteem in one's personal abilities to be on par with pride in one's moral standing. Only the latter was truly essential to justice.[69]

> There is a sense of worth which every person is justified in having in virtue of the fact that he or she is a [person]. [P]erson's performances, moral or otherwise, do not in any way constitute the fact that one is a person. Self-respect is this sense of worth (as in desert).[70]

Stephen Massey took this general distinction between a self-respect defined by *valuing one's moral equality* and one defined by *valuing one's culturally/historically relative merits* and translated it into a conceptual distinction between "objective" and "subjective" self-respect.[71] Objective self-respect was a correct belief in one's true moral worth. Subjective self-respect was simply a belief in one's worth according to whatever criteria one happened to find salient. Where Thomas had defended a theory of justice that privileged the sense of valuing oneself as an equal, Massey, by contrast, argued that such a concept of self-respect was too morally circular to be the basis for Rawls's claim about the special importance of self-respect (as the "most important primary good"). If self-respect was understood most centrally as the belief in one's own equality and rights, then such a moral notion could not in turn be used to explain the importance of having those rights (as Rawls would be doing if RawlsSR were taken as an 'objective' notion).[72] Yet, Massey also agreed that a subjectively-based self-valuing fails as a "most important" primary good, since we don't have reason to see it connecting or reinforcing the other elements of Rawls's system in such a crucial way. Why would "an entirely psychological" phenomenon be

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[69] "If James's formula for SE is correct, then offhand the inevitable conclusion seems to be that equally high SE among all persons is not possible given that the following propositions are true: (i) the social institutions among which we live influence the ends which we come to value, (ii) these institutions place a comparatively greater value upon many ends which, as it happens, only the well-endowed can successfully pursue, and therefore (iii) not all persons come to aspire towards those ends which are within their reach." (Thomas, 259)

[70] Thomas, "Rawlsian Self-Respect and The Black Consciousness Movement," 264.
[71] Massey, "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?"

[72] Massey, 209.

more important than health or any other potential primary good, when it comes to the overall effect of having it?[73]

The concerns just mentioned would themselves come to seem like they were based on flawed assumptions about concepts of respect and self-respect. This is due in part to the impact of Stephen Darwall's 1977 article "Two Kinds of Respect for Persons" (which I will discuss at length in the next chapter). Darwall pointed out that there is a need to disambiguate between two concepts and phenomena of respect "for" a person. On the one hand, there is respecting someone when we find their moral character to meet a high standard. This he called "appraisal respect" (AR). On the other hand, there is the kind of respect that is given when one acts appropriately in light of some important characteristic of the person—in this case morally valuable characteristic—and that he termed "recognition respect" (RR). In a nutshell, *appraisal respect* is a judgment about someone's moral merit or value and is a narrow species of esteem, while *recognition respect* involves a way of behaving toward someone (or something), such that *recognition-respect for persons* is a narrow form of correct normative behavior. So, while appraisals of character need not require a particular kind of behavior on the part of the one appraising, recognition of personhood-status involves meeting a behavioral standard toward the object of respect. Importantly, this meeting of normative requirements in our treatment of moral persons need not be accompanied by any belief in the person's individual merit. Picking up on this distinction, David Sachs—a close colleague of Rawls's—offered an account of the difference between self-respect and self-esteem.[74] Here Sachs argued that, likewise, high regard for oneself is something conceptually quite independent from one's affirmative response to the fact that one deserves fair treatment. As Thomas had argued, but now at a more conceptually clear register, Sachs implies that the morally important kind of self-respect—the kind that justice would be concerned to support—is the kind that involves a person's believing themselves to be and *treating themselves as* a moral equal, regardless of how they happen to feel about their own merits.

The upshot of these discussions was to shift the interpretation of RawlsSR. No longer was Rawls necessarily to be taken to be referring to a primary good of high self-appraisal—

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[73] Massey, 210-211.
[74] Sachs, "How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem."

whether neutral or moral (though self-esteem was term that he had at first employed interchangeably with self-respect). Now RawlsSR could be considered as possibly referring to a different phenomenon all together, that of responding to value with *appropriate treatment*.[75] As just mentioned, such a view at first seemed to vindicate the preference given in discussions of self-respect as responding appropriately to oneself as a bearer of rights and equal moral standing. Philosophers were quite comfortable, after all, in seeing self-respect as the equivalent to defending one's rights and demanding fair and equal treatment or somewhat closer to Kant's own view, to refusing to appear to others as less-than-equal and refusing to be servile to others. There seemed to be little question that "JF" supported such an attitude, given the public acceptance of the principles of justice and the ideals of mutual respect and of citizenship it expounded.[76]

But, with the idea of recognition respect there also emerged new questions about the dimensions of self-respect worthy of our political and moral attention. Thomas Hill, known for a Kantian view of self-respect, turned his attention to what he saw as a non-moral but important kind of recognition self-respect—treating oneself appropriately in light of one's own personal standards.[77] Looking at examples of autonomously chosen self-demeaning behavior Hill claims that this sort of missing self-respect is not the kind based on standards of moral right, nor does it pertain to a failure to satisfy one's desires. Instead there are norms and expectations of self-respect that we attach to each person in view of their own closely-held or professed values. These, he writes, are "[t]he sorts of personal standards…typically seen as inescapably a part of oneself."[78] This reconsideration of the importance of personal standards suggested that there may be politically important normative constraints on self-treatment beyond those associated with

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[75] In *Political Liberalism,* Rawls notes his response to Sachs when he edited his terms and excised "self-esteem" from later discussions of "JF." He writes "…I now realize, thanks to David Sachs that self-esteem and self-respect are different ideas. I should have selected one term as appropriate and stuck with it, style be damned" (PL, 404n39).

[76] When consulting Rawls's notes on Sachs's article in the Rawls Papers at the Harvard Archive, it seems that Rawls may have relied too readily on Sachs to assure himself that he could avoid ambiguity by simply "choosing" one term. What Rawls seems to have conceded was that there is a conceptual difference between an attitude toward oneself in view of institutionally important features of one's self and an attitude toward oneself in view of traits one can be pleased and displeased with. In choosing the term "self-respect" after considering Sachs's view, Rawls implies that no further investigation is needed into what constitutes self-respect and that it is self-respect (as Sachs outlines it) that he prefers to invoke in his own theory.

[77] Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered."

[78] Ibid., 22.

demanding equal respect from others. If so, then we might need to review RawlsSR and consider whether or not it really does draw upon the best account of self-respect.

1.3.2   Dillon's Intervention

It was Robin Dillon who most fully brought this new approach and its implications into focus. Starting with her 1987 dissertation "Self-Respect and Justice," Dillon began working to reinterpret self-respect. This effort also began as an attempt to critically grapple with RawlsSR. Previous theorists had criticized and engaged with RawlsSR in terms of a distinction between objective (normative) moral respect for one's own equality and agency and subjective (non-normative) appraisals of one's personal merits. Most often (as seen above) the assumption was that one must choose one or the other idea of self-respect in order to render Rawls's account consistent. Hueing to Darwall's distinction, Dillon arrived at a different view—one allowing that the ambiguous components of RawlsSR (beliefs in moral personhood and in efficacy) might both be theoretically (and really) essential for justice.[79] While recognition self-respect remained linked to concepts of moral personhood, appraisal self-respect (which she called "evaluative self-respect") was also a moral and normative concept. Though it may have been a subset of "esteem,"[80] *evaluative self-respect* (ESR) was strictly limited to the sense of measuring up to a self-ideal.[81] While theorists had understood the importance Rawls placed on moral recognition respect, they were confused about the other concept at work.[82] The personal confidence

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[79] See Dillon, "Self-Respect and Justice," 13-14, 31.

[80] It is precisely in this idea that ESR is a "subset" of esteem that there is the opportunity for significant confusion. What Dillon's analysis suggests is that ESR is really a kind of recognition respect (just not for persons). "Kantian" recognition respect involves attitudes and treatments of people insofar as they are seen as rational and potentially reasonable, and thus equal in autonomy. "Evaluative" recognition respect involves attitudes and treatments of people in view of their agentic achievements in fulfilling some ideal of a "good" person (where achievement can be taken in a wide sense, not necessarily excellence or superior action, but meeting some threshold relevant to some standard).

[81] ESR involves comparative judgments, but Dillon's account of it suggests something other than, say, Nozick's idea that self-esteem is a zero-sum game. She writes, "the comparison is not with other persons: being able to respect oneself does not depend on how well or poorly others are doing. Rather, ESR involves the judgment that one is or is becoming the kind of person one ought to be and thinks one ought to be" ("Self-Respect and Justice, 67). Dillon continues, "[a]n individual's self-ideal and hence her ESR is bound up with what is essential to her identity (ibid., 70).

[82] Dillon disagrees with L. Thomas's way of distinguishing between SE and SR. (79) Thomas's view is unsatisfactory (a) because KSR in his view is limited to believing one has rights; (b) his account of SE is way too

described in the account of RawlsSR was not about self-esteem in general[83]; rather, it was about our confidence specifically that we are capable of living up to our highest self-ideals, to the "tie that binds one's past, present, and future experiences into one's life: one's life."[84] The contrast was not between some "purely psychological" feeling of self-satisfaction and moral self-respect (as Massey had claimed); rather, it was between two morally important and interconnected attitudes. One was the attitude of "recognizing" the status of moral personhood (the moral powers) and the other was the attitude of properly evaluating and appreciating the (moral) worth of one's performances. These were thought to be interconnected attitudes because a person's self-ideal ought to include behaving correctly with regard to their moral status. In other words, ESR should be taken as something semi-objective (not merely psychological), and geared into a community's idea of what constitutes a good person.[85] Thus, Rawls's statements about self-respect imply two things. First, one must have the wherewithal protect and nurture one's basic autonomy (two moral powers) and second, one must be able to live up to, and to know that one lives up to, the standards that are central to one's self-ideal. The first, Dillon termed Kantian self-respect (KSR) and the second, as mentioned above, Evaluative self-respect (ESR). [86] On Dillon's analysis, a concept or conception of self-respect is defined in terms of the object it has in mind. The object of KSR is the person (moral status), and ESR's object is whatever is involved in one's

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narrow, based only on accomplishment and taken from William James, and doesn't distinguish normative from descriptive claims (81) and his idea of derivative SE does not capture the "totality of experiences" of SE (82). Nor is Thomas's SE the same as Dillon's ESR "for in the first place, there is a difference between a person's successes or accomplishments and the kind of person she is" (character traits)

[83] While ESR is about things that a person puts effort into, things related to their character and merit, the sources of self-esteem involve "physical attractiveness, material possessions and economic status, social status and group membership, power and prowess, purely natural talents and abilities, competences and competent performances, virtue, and perhaps most importantly, how others react to us." *We can see that some of these things may have to do with merit, while others clearly do not.* SE is wider than ESR, it includes what belongs to ESR ("Self-Respect and Justice," 77).

[84] Dillon, "Self-Respect and Justice," 70.

[85] "The virtues and other excellences provide the framework within which self-evaluation must take place, the parameters within which an appropriate self-ideal…must be developed" (ibid., 140).

[86] Later in this dissertation I will try to disambiguate the facets of respect that are often either artificially isolated from each other or collapsed into each other. The "attitude" we are talking about with ESR is really not simply a judgment of measuring up – it is a whole way of relating to oneself that makes it reasonable to think one has measured up. Likewise, the attitude we are talking about with KSR is not simply one of believing one has basic moral worth, but one of upholding the grounds for others' proper response (recognition) of that worth.

effort to live up to morally salient standards.[87] While there are many species of self-esteem that focus on this or that trait or particular merit—and do so purely in terms of a person's subjective sense of self-satisfaction—ESR, like KSR, is concerned with the "objective" worthiness of the whole human being. Having a good feeling about oneself is merely one part, and not even the most necessary part of having ESR and KSR. And while it is not yet clear what else is involved in these ways of "recognizing" our worth, lacking (or having a weak) ability to affirm oneself in either of these two ways will be hugely problematic.[88]

Momentarily setting aside other complications, Dillon's normative view of ESR opens up an avenue for defending Rawls against Massey's critique (mentioned above).[89] While subjective self-esteem may have abhorrent grounds or be too arbitrary to treat as such an important primary good (imagine someone who is pleased with their ability to deceive others), there is nevertheless something independently valuable about setting and living up to standards. The well-grounded belief that one lives up to standards always implies accountability and justification to some relevant audience. Regardless of the content (the interpretation one gives to "good" person), it might be hugely important, from the "Original Position", to support people in the value they place upon living up to standards that are important to them. By contrast, unexamined feelings of satisfaction with one's agentic achievements--regardless of what one really has done--are hardly worth supporting and are in any case highly unstable, as such feelings often depend on actively ignoring the facts.[90] While there is neither a reason nor a way to distribute support for un-interrogated self-confidence, there may be objective ways to assess and support a person's

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[87] Dillon writes, "attitudes with different grounds are ipso facto different attitudes" claiming that "[t]he ground for KSR is being a person; the ground for ESR is being the kind of person that compares favorably with one's appropriate self-ideal; the ground for SE is having valuable features in virtue of which persons win social approval, esteem, and admiration" ("Self-Respect and Justice," 88).

[88] In Dillon's words, "a person lacks KSR when she fails to appreciate properly the fact that she is a person and so has certain basic rights and responsibilities…failures of belief and failures of action…" (ibid., 56). And, "lacking ESR involves the judgment that one is not worthy of ER—the respect of others as well as one's own—because one is not the kind of person one ought to be…." (ibid., 64).

[89] See "Self-Respect and Justice," 143, 148.

[90] It may not be reasonable to support someone's mere feeling of satisfaction in being a chef, which could be delusional in terms of living up to shared standards of cooking; but it is quite reasonable to want to support someone in meriting self-satisfaction as a chef--since that implies that they have paid attention to and achieved the standards that make it good (from some social point of view) to be a chef.

efficacious relationship to her standards. This implies that so-called subjective, morally thin, self-respect might well be workable as a primary good.[91] However, on Dillon's analysis it seemed that Rawls did not himself realize the importance of these distinctions or fulfill their demands in his theory.

> Because SR is an ambiguous concept, appealing to it also seems to allow for an interpretation along the lines that Rawls gives: SR as a morally neutral PG that it is rational to want whatever else one wants, simply because it is essential to successfully carrying out one's rational plan of life, whatever its specific content. Rawls is thus entrapped by the ambiguity of SR, ostensibly using a non-moral concept while letting the hidden moral concept do all the work of justifying the theory…(1987:267)

Even though Rawls implies, as he ought, a version of self-respect that gives importance to how we approach our personal standards (the efficacy element I have mentioned) Rawls gives poorly justified favoritism to Kantian (recognition) self-respect. As Dillon (1987) sees it, Rawls gives only anemic support to ESR and much more robust support to KSR, while claiming that "JF" convincingly supports both. It seems that he imagined that citizens would base their self-ideals on this very Kantian conception of the person, despite reasonable pluralism and despite the possibility that there might be truer or better concepts of personhood. The self-confidence in one's own (morally salient) personal efficacy is treated as part of an attitude toward self that must be protected and supported "at almost any cost." Yet, Rawls leaves only the impression that

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[91] As early as her dissertation, Dillon invites readers to contemplate the question of what it might mean to recognition-respect oneself "as" someone with standards of their own. (Cynthia Stark tries to work some of this out in her 1993 dissertation. See Stark, "Securing Self-Respect."). It seems that having personal/community-rooted standards is something universal about people that is even incorporated in some ways into the Kantian idea of a person (this is why we must aim at our own perfection). It is surely an idea implied by the ability to form and revise a determinate conception of the good. And yet, the question is what can we find *independent* of actual success in achieving the standards (the particular belief and conception of the good) that will support a person's being and becoming the sort of person who will figure out how to achieve those standards. To have the right attitude toward one's standards seems to depend in large part on what those standards are. If not, then it depends on a metaphysically thick view of the moral person whom the standards themselves must fit and honor. So, a person whose standard is perfection might be incredibly hard on themselves and their children; another person, whose standard is happiness, might tend to favor opportunities for play and relaxation. ESR for one would require the social supports for an attitude of toughness toward oneself; ESR in another might require the social supports for recognizing and avoiding pain. On the one hand, beyond what Rawls already gives for the primary goods, it's hard to see what social supports we could offer that would be relevant to the different self-ideals; on the other hand, we could identify social supports if we settled on what's the "right" way to treat oneself. Is it better to focus on what makes one happy or on what might make one tough? Once we choose, however, we are committing parties tacitly to a preference for one conception of healthy selfhood over another.

one's self-ideal is secure if it is primarily focused on *the standards of* securing equal status.[92]

Dillon reflects that, given the nature of ESR, more than Kantian self-valuing would be required to achieve ESR:

> We would need to examine more explicitly than Rawls does in any of his writings the connection between the principles and the various social bases of ESR; and that requires finding out what the social bases are—what people need to live flourishing and worthwhile lives that their appropriate self-ideals express. (276)

Dillon's critical approach to Rawls hinges on questions of how the two kinds of self-respect (and thus the two kinds of respect) might be related (causally, if not conceptually). And how that relationship itself relates to justice. Implied in subsequent writings is that the conception we have of moral personhood (what she takes to be the "object" of recognition self-respect) is going to have an impact on how we engage and evaluate our self-ideals. The (warranted) positive or negative evaluations may in turn influence our motivation to do our part in the justice project. If, for example, a conception of the moral person is too androcentric—reflecting culturally sedimented prejudices favoring so-called masculine "virtues" of independence, self-sufficiency, and combat, then this will come into conflict with those lives that express so-called feminine virtues.[93] It becomes impossible to live up to a self-ideal that is so

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[92] In other research I have tried to understand these difficulties in Rawls through the lens of Rousseau's theory of *amour-propre*. (See Rousseau, *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, especially the following: *The Second Discourse, Emile, Julie, Confessions*, and *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*.) Rousseau hit upon a "solution" to the self-love problem that had so troubled 17th century quasi-Augustinian French moral theory. Rousseau realized that our selfish desires for preeminence and superiority, while products of our language, technological development, and oppression, could be "tamed" if a status could be found that each person could take pride in without needing to do so at the cost of another. Of course that status was the status of equal citizen and subject to the general will and the pride was in "man's estate." All the while, however, Rousseau continued to struggle with how the content of our lives was to fill the "form" of equality. In works like *Julie* and in *Confessions* he focused on the role of friendship and the commitments to self-ideals that only those who love us can really hold us to. Without some way to live expansively and in and through these exclusive relationships, equality would be impossible to sustain. People need more than the mere idea of their equality, they deeply need a sense of limited control over their material environment—the manageable sense of power over nature (efficacy) and they need to feel they are seen and can connect with particular individuals who cherish them and need them (intimacy). Rawls, in his lectures on moral philosophy, touches upon amour-propre, but it does not seem that he was all that self-conscious about parallels between his own attempt to answer the Hobbesian riddle and the attempts made by Rousseau in his own "theodicy" of self-love.

[93] Dillon develops these ideas in "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect."

internally conflicted. To be feminine is to fail to act like an "equal" person, and to act like an equal is to fail to be a good woman.[94]

Dillon argues for the importance of offering support not just to the belief in moral worth on the basis of rationality, but of offering support for a sense of worth in one's particular standpoint and relationships. For all its achievements, Kantian liberalism had a distorted view of the morally weighty aspects of personhood, which itself gave rise to a distorted view of what it might mean to be a good person or a good citizen. Advancing ideas found in feminist ethics, Dillon suggests that justice would need to support the whole person – not just the aspect of the person that could be an equal, but the one that needed to be of worth as a particular.[95] The intrinsic worth of human beings seems to call for a certain kind of recognition or treatment, and for Dillon in this early work and elsewhere, the question is primarily what sort of treatment does moral personhood demand? Dillon's responses to the apparent limits of Kantian political theory have been hands-on attempts to describe phenomena related to self-respect in order to forge a richer normative view of what self-respect and respect for others requires.

1.3.3 Difficulties for the "expanded moral personhood" approach

Consider the difficulties already suggested with finding direct means for institutional support for each person's self-ideal. One practical worry is this "self-efficacy"[96] could be impossible to systematically support by *any* system of justice, given the many contingencies upon which such beliefs do rest. The most that any system can do is to show that it at least does not make it much *harder* for individuals to realize a sense of valuable self-efficacy. Rawls might thereby justifiably argue that "JF" does the best a theory can do by supporting KSR in a way that

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[94] While this particular prejudice is not so stark today, the difference continues to play out on the terrain of dependency work.

[95] For example, in "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect" DILLON writes, "… nothing is irrelevant to [recognition] self-respect. It thus becomes possible to say that one's life has value in all its everyday ordinariness-in the monotony, grime, inadequacy, and despair as well as in the shining moments of achievement. It becomes possible to believe that one's very prosaic self is worthy of respect, deserves attention: one's own and others' alike."

[96] Let's also assume, at least for now, a kind of equivalence between the "self-efficacy" type of self-confidence in RawlsSR and Dillon's ESR. In other words, let's hold that the important sort of self-confidence for the parties in the "Original Position" is a sense that one is going to be able to act in worthy ways in relation to one's self-ideal.

does not itself undermine ESR.[97] Rawls could argue that "JF" is at least superior to Utilitarianism and Perfectionism because it works so actively to offer citizens grounds from which to confidently defend a sense of moral equality based on the most minimal actualization of one's two moral powers. As my analysis of RawlsSR in the first part of this chapter suggests, Rawls at least seems to think that parties ought to focus on shared access to goods that can be equally distributed and clearly spelled out, for this produces in turn a clearer sense of equal status and equal moral standing.[98] But, should placing value on one's moral equality really take priority over developing a sense of self-efficacy, from the point of view of the "Original Position"?

One possible answer is to argue, as Dillon seems to, for a richer conception of the moral person, as a way to elevate the importance of ESR in our political thinking.[99] Let's call the concern with a correct account of fundamental human virtues and needs the "expanded moral personhood" approach. This approach makes sense as part of the work we must do to revise our moral ideals in our ethical and philosophical cultures. But how can such an approach be fitted into the constraints of reasonable pluralism of "JF," much less those of Political Liberalism? PL doubles down on the thin conception of the moral person that appeared in TJ, and seems to have good reasons for doing so. How could a more robust conception of personhood (one that sees us as fragile and relationally autonomous, embodied subjects of history) be built into (or imposed upon) a contractarian or otherwise liberal theory of justice for which we are seeking overlapping consensus?[100] If reverence for the vulnerable and particular (situated) aspects of being alive could not be derived from the idea of the two moral powers, then how could a theory like "justice as fairness" be brought to account for them, except in an ad-hoc way?[101] This would make "JF"

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[97] It is this assumption that I am trying to investigate, at least indirectly. The idea is that for the kinds of citizens I've identified (Rebecca and Destiny) it might be the case that there is a real conflict between the public expression of the Kantian ideal and the sense that each has that they can successfully engage a plan of life that is worth carrying out.

[98] See Colin Bird, "Status, Identity, and Respect."

[99] Roughly, by "moral person" I mean here the status meant to empower those aspects of our being in view of which we are thought to have fundamental claims on one another. Things about us that are often treated as "inviolable" grounds for political rights and legal protections (not just the reasons we deserve a certain treatment, but the features of our being that the treatment must serve and protect).

[100] My thought is that perhaps such a concept can be uncovered and is in fact implied in Rawls's thought.

[101] I'm trying to say that I don't quite see how the parties can be presumed to value human uniqueness and give preference to the relationships that express it, since this is a particular interpretation of what is morally important about us. Kantian reverence for the moral law within is at least not an ad hoc assumption but is closely related to the possibility of agreeing to fair terms of cooperation. But if this tacit valuing of the two moral powers (valuing them

open to accusations of importing a particular moral view not necessitated by the basic idea of social cooperation (conceptualized in terms of contract theory).[102]

Instead of starting with an "expanded moral personhood" approach, I think that moral personhood (moral worth) must be conceptually disentangled from the very concept of recognition respect before we can really understand what role SR can play in political liberal theory. In doing this disentangling, Dillon's concerns—shared by many[103]—are crucial to keep in mind. Many of us want to see a liberal vision of the self that is less marred by the myth of the free, equal, and symmetrical actor; we are concerned that the insights of feminist care ethics, for instance, get taken up and taken seriously by Rawlsian liberalism. We want theorists to have a richer and more real awareness of the various ways of relating to oneself that might reasonably be called "self-respect"—and along with those all the ways of relating to oneself that might be considered failures of self-respect. We want to foster a better attunement to the moral worth we each have, and with that attunement, a finer ability to notice where our ability to engage our own moral worth is not well supported. Is there a morally "thin" basis on which to incorporate this account of human dignity into Rawls's system? If one cannot be found, then perhaps we can say so much the worse for Rawls's theory, but I think that would be a premature judgment.

1.4 Reviving the need to investigate self-respect for political liberalism

It is perplexing to try to bridge the gap between our efforts to decide what we value and our efforts to decide what justice requires under a plurality of values. It seems quite natural and logical to debate what we want self-respect to mean from the point of view of our beliefs about moral personhood, and yet the goal for liberalism is not to enshrine in a political theory the best or right moral beliefs. Rather, it is to capture or construct a set of principles for negotiating social

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highest by default of the theory) is too morally thick, then how much moreso would be a richer conception of the person that includes history, biology, natural care, etc. If we are looking for a solution to the Kantian prejudice in Rawls, and we want to remain true to some of the main ideas of his theory (as sound ideas of liberalism, related to reasonable pluralism, etc.) then we want some other kind of solution.

[102] If Rawls had to walk back his own Kantianism, could he then replace it with an equally robust feminist conception of personhood without incurring the same theoretic difficulties?

[103] I mean to say that I also share these concerns. I believe these concerns animate feminist theory, care ethics, disability studies, post-colonial theory insofar as they try to engage with Rawls's liberalism.

cooperation that preserves (does not interfere with) diverse beliefs and commitments, one that honors and dignifies the intention among diverse people to cooperate with each other. It is at the stage of concrete participation—the polity's active interpretation of these shared principles-- that we want to introduce these fuller moral values and try to persuade each other of them. This might suggest that Rawls's vague approach—or that of any other political theory[104]--is desirable, leaving much up to interpretation and debate in the "real" world, where it matters. However, this doesn't seem satisfactory either. To see why we might want to worry about unresolved questions in the support given to RawlsSR, let's return to the images of "Rebecca and Tyler" and "Destiny" from earlier in the chapter. In both cases it seems as if the individual's effort to secure confidence in her moral equality is compromised by, if not at odds with, the equally important effort to secure confidence in her efficacy in connection to her self-ideal. Notice that Rebecca and Tyler's case resonates with the "dependency critique" of Rawls's theory. [105] It seems to me that this critique can be related to the apparent paradox I just asserted. Destiny's case resonates with the "public reason debate" and related communitarian critiques of Rawls; likewise, I see a connection between these critiques and this potential conflict in the SBSR that I've outlined here.

Dependency critique and SBSR: In a pluralistic society we know that there will be people who cannot take on the responsibilities of rational choice, due to cognitive disability or mental illness. Because the principles of social cooperation are based on the idea of citizens as free, equal, reasonable, and rational, then justice for those who are not "reasonable" or "rational" is parasitical upon justice for fully cooperating members of the community. This puts caregivers and mentally disabled citizens in a precarious position. It is easy to imagine that in a society more just than our own, we would still find a lack of resources for disabled citizens to experience their lives in meaningful ways. The effort caregivers take to make up for this lack in turn can be frustrating to many of their other goals and in itself very hard to achieve. How are the social

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[104] I say this because there are a number of theories in which self-respect has a place, and yet is not carefully explained. I believe this is the case, for example, in the capabilities approach taken by Nussbaum and Sen. See Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice* and Sen, *Development as Freedom.*

[105] There is a large and growing literature that falls into this category of "Dependency Critique." See for example essays in Carlson and Kittay (eds.) *Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy*. Also see Kittay, "Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality," and essays in idem (ed). *The Subject of Care,* Nancy Hirschmann, *The Subject of Liberty*, and essays in Virginia Held (ed), *Justice and Care.*

bases of self-respect met for these citizens?[106] Is it enough that they are publicly treated as equals and is it enough that they are free to associate with whom they please and that they have fair equality of opportunity?

Public Reason debate and the SBSR: In a pluralistic society we know there will likely be people who identify as parts of stricter, less liberal associations. We often think of these as traditional religious communities, for example. The reputation of such groups is likely to be questionable, despite everyone's acknowledgement that they are free to do what they do. There will be debate as to where the line is between illiberal internal actions and actions that impinge upon the rights of community members. While such debates need to take place, there is, at the same time, a restriction on the reasons one can use to defend one's practice. Some communities will choose to isolate themselves defensively against the wider political judgment of their inner relations. What happens to members of those communities who want to have feet in both worlds so to speak? How are social bases of self-respect met for these citizens? Is it enough that they are publicly treated as equals and is it enough that they are free to associate and dis-associate with whom they please and that the state will protect them in the face of abuse within their community? [107]

Are the challenges faced by mentally disabled citizens and their families, and the challenges faced by some religious citizens, just part of their life journey, as would be the challenges each of us faces when we are sometimes ill, or the challenges of pursuing a difficult career in a competitive environment, going through a divorce, losing a house in a fire, parenting a huge family, having friends who are addicted to drugs, crime in one's neighborhood, etc. In other words, what do we owe each other as citizens when it comes to the unequal demands and variation in our dependency relations? Is that any different than what we owe each other as citizens when it comes to variations in luck and talent? When we look at cases like these, we see

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[106] Moreover, how are we to handle the claim that self-respect is not something accessible to people with severe cognitive impairments?

[107] Destiny: Torn between a community that she values deeply and wants to protect, and a desire to engage with liberal public discourse as a valid partner. Illiberal practices within the community do sometimes go too far in her opinion, but there seems to be no ground for negotiation. To translate their reasons for the practices into public terms would really be to lose the very meaning behind the practices, rooted as they are in spiritual authority and tradition. Destiny has no way to constructively approach the conflict between her community and the ideals of the liberal state.

that the idea of free choice of occupation and rational plan of life—bulwarks for ESR in Rawls's system—obscure a more alienated reality. This alienation seeps under and around the stable framework offered by Rawls. The associative dimensions seem unable to support efficacy and the public rights to be taken as a moral equal on the basis of two moral powers seems like a bait and switch.[108] A plan that cannot be well-executed starts to look irrational and irrational planning escapes the boundaries of what the distribution of goods is designed to protect. Suddenly, citizens who on paper look like they are very nicely supported by a liberal state turn out to be left in the lurch, struggling with resentment and the threat of impending shame, all the while not believed to have reasonable grounds for those moral emotions. Citizens whose ideals and identities have been forged by commitment to marginalized members of the polity[109] are left to their own devices when that commitment ends up conflicting with their own rational good as a practical agent. They cannot seem to do anything that will secure a better position for themselves in terms of egalitarian social cooperation without undermining their core relationships.

But I pause. It's fair to ask, are people so dependent upon the justness of social institutions that their confidence will crumble if circumstances are a bit unfair? Of course not. I would argue, however, that this adaptability and resilience is actually a reason to reconsider whether the focus should truly be on *feelings of valuing oneself*. In other words, we can imagine that our caregiver and our religious citizen could turn out to be confident in just the ways that are so essential to "JF". Most people, in fact, do not require a great deal of support to believe they count as equal citizens and they do believe that under the right circumstances they would be personally efficacious. Most know what it is to be included on the roster of the state as a citizen and they know what it is to be appreciated by their associates. But, as the "recognition respect" concept implies, this "confidence" is at best only part of what self-respect requires.[110] Our beliefs in our own power and moral importance must correspond with the actual social leverage that we pursue and achieve. Rawls, I think, believes that he has given all citizens this leverage. All that

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[108] Or at the very least, cold comfort. This pertains to my worry that KSR is not just insufficient for ESR (as Dillon suggests) but that a certain way of delivering KSR might in some cases (Rebecca's and Tylers, and Destiny's) undermine ESR.

[109] Or citizens with disabilities who are made to feel useless, even as they are told that they are intrinsically valuable.

[110] Because it involves behavior.

might undermine it would be the psychological harm of adopting the wrong attitude toward one's own ideals and abilities. The capstone to all that Rawls offers would be the attitude toward self that would drive a person to take advantage of their existing opportunities. Unfortunately, for the types of citizens just mentioned it does not seem that simple. [111]

Consider Rebecca, whose only real option is to devote the bulk of her time to the task of creating conditions for Tyler to flourish. While in society it is thought that we support each other's conditions for flourishing through the exchange of our labor for pay and through the safety net, for those responsible for a lifetime of care for someone, the exchange becomes asymmetrical in the extreme. What if Rebecca does not find herself embraced by a community of friends and family willing to share in her labor? It's easy to imagine that those who know her may add insult to injury when they praise her "selflessness" and "altruism" in caring for someone who has every right to be cared for. How precarious are her social bases for self-respect according to the Rawlsian model? Is Rawlsian liberalism really conducive to the sorts of communities that will support Rebecca? Is Rawls's idea of the moral person conducive to anything but a rueful confidence in deserving personhood-respect just for reaching a threshold that her child did not reach?

Now, consider Destiny. Assertions about the religious rights of her people further alienate her from the mainstream, though her presence is tolerated and she is given the "respect" due to all citizens. Yet, in the public perception, shaped by shared civic ideals, Destiny's community are cast as pariahs who use liberal freedoms in order to have the "right" to take away the freedom of their own members. Those members who stay and endure the shameful treatment are thought to be manipulated and self-deceiving. If Destiny wants to move with relative ease in the wider society she may need to distance herself from her communal identity; if she wants to embrace that identity she will have to give up on any notions that she is truly a functionally equal citizen.

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[111] In each case we can see a worrying lack of social bases for self-respect and it is far from clear whether "JF" would be able to ameliorate these vulnerabilities. "JF" protects Rebecca and Destiny's conviction that, as a person with two moral powers, they have a claim on their fellow citizens by its public statements of the difference principle and its ideals of mutual respect (ideals of citizens) but how are these actually going to be met under these circumstances?

Is Rawlsian liberalism really doing all it can to support her self-respect under these circumstances?

It seems that for those in Rebecca's position or in Destiny's position, it will not suffice that one happens to have a reasonable and determinate conception of the good, together with the capacity to refine that conception. Nor does it seem to suffice that one knows one is a moral or civil equal. Nor does it suffice to know that one's lesser or greater resources are not a reflection of one's lesser or greater political worth. Nor does it suffice to know that one is free to change one's associations. To really support (i.e. give social bases for) the SR of Rebecca and Destiny, the arrangement of institutions should give them reasons to value *being-the-particular-agent-each-one-is* in serving their conception of the good. This is what I think "JF" constructs as the proper standing one should have in relation to one's conception of the good: *one's own way* of contributing to the good is part of what makes it good (dignifies it). I conjecture that this is "normative" self-respect that parties in the "Original Position" would identify as a fundamental good.[112] But if this is so, what concept of respect is it grounded in—and is that concept consistent with what we can do in political liberal theory? [113] Dillon, it seems to me, takes an important step by calling attention to both the distinctness and connections between moral self-appraisals and appropriate responses to moral standing (one's own and that of others). I am interested in bringing this insight to bear upon how we conceptualize *recognition respect* itself. The right conception of recognition respect should help us to appreciate the two-way street between having a secure belief in one's moral standing and having a secure belief in one's ability to make good things happen. While this may sound counterintuitive, I think that the impasse in how liberalism deals with non-Kantian morally salient self-ideals might be overcome if we theorize recognition

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[112] Considering this is only "normative" relative to "JF", and not necessarily deeply or universally moral, there need not be a particular concept of the moral person for this RawlsSR to answer to.

[113] Colin Bird has argued that this is just not what a "right" to respect requires. A right to respect must pass the reckoning test. (See Bird, "Status, Identity, and Respect"). Respect, he contends, is a relation to someone who is reckonable. We cannot be owed/have rights with regard to our uniqueness without destroying democratic equality, insofar as uniqueness is reckonable at all. In another sense, uniqueness is by definition opaque and beyond the universal naming we do. Yet, bird's criticism does not quite dispense with the challenge Dillon poses. Her claim is not that we have rights to be protected by others in our individuality, but that SR involves my attention to all that is morally important about my person and so social bases must support my attention to my uniqueness and vulnerability. We should be treated, via PGs as if our individual excellence and close relationships are important to us, which may indeed be different from saying that our CG is important to us.

respect in a way that is objective, structured, and morally thin. With a carefully elaborated idea of recognition respect in hand, we might even be able to make Rawls's theory answer better to some of its deeper promises. The first step in all this will be to *look again* at the pros and cons of Stephen Darwall's famous distinction between "appraisal" and "recognition."

Chapter 2 -- Darwall's Distinction and the Recognition Concept of Respect

2.1 Chapter Introduction

The most influential recent approach to the conceptual analysis of respect has been that of Stephen Darwall, who argued that there are two kinds of respect: "Appraisal Respect" and "Recognition Respect."[114] In this chapter I present the "appraisal/recognition" distinction and argue that it falls unacceptably short of what is needed to guide a conceptualization of respect for political theory. While Darwall's argument is suitable as a defense of Kantian notions of *equal* respect for persons, the notion of recognition respect remains vague, if not obscure. I argue that Darwall's account of recognition respect (which I will be calling DRR) lacks clarity in two ways: **first, in terms of what the "object" is in a subject-object respect relation. Second in terms of the role of appraisals in identifying important "facts" about an entity. Furthermore, it is important for us to understand why respect is something that we would presume everyone to want.** DRR, as I will argue, offers little to help us distinguish conceptually between treatments called "respect" that merely "use" their object and "favor" their object. If this view is unsatisfactory then we must find a coherent concept of respect as a response to value that preserves the integrity of the respected object. [115] That will be the aim of the chapters that follow.

2.2 "Appraisal respect" and "recognition respect"

> *This is not a matter of political correctness. This is a matter of understanding just what it is that makes us strong. The world respects us not just for our arsenal. It*

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[114] Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," 1977.

[115] I mean unsatisfactory for grounding a politically crucial concept of respect for individualistic political liberalism.

respects us for our diversity and our openness, and the way we respect every faith. – Barack Obama, January 2016 State of the Union Address

In the quote above, President Obama is using the word "respect" to suggest different kinds of response. The conceptual difference between these two types of response is explained by Stephen Darwall in his influential article, "Two Kinds of Respect." According to Darwall, "**appraisal respect**" **(AR)** consists in "an attitude of positive appraisal of" a person "either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit."[116] This positive or negative assessment of an individual's character or character traits contrasts with the subject-object relationship that characterizes "recognition respect". "**Recognition respect**" **(RR)** consists in "giving appropriate consideration or recognition to some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do." The above quote uses the term respect in ways that perfectly capture the ambiguities that Darwall seeks to clarify. The U.S. is militarily strong, thus eliciting consideration appropriate to such power (deference, obedience, etc.) – RR in view of its military power. The U.S. is also diverse and open, eliciting AR from those who value such openness. Furthermore, The U.S. RR's all religions, meaning the U.S. treats religions in a certain protective way appropriate to the moral standing of citizens. However innocent it may seem in the context of Obama's State of the Union Address, we know that the weaving together of these two senses of respect can lead to misunderstanding. Let us consider the following scene and the discussion that ensues:

> Officer Carol approaches the car window. As Avery rolls the window down the young officer asks for his license and explains that he's driving with an expired inspection sticker. Avery produces his license, and along with that a glare of disgust. Officer Carol is calm when she explains the requirements and the cost of the ticket. As a matter of procedure she asks Avery, who looks something like her grandfather, why he has allowed the sticker to expire. Avery says, "Young lady, just give me the ticket and stop wasting my time." "Alright Sir," Carol responds blankly, giving Avery the ticket from her clipboard. From across the car, Avery's wife, Bernice, leans over. "We're sorry, officer. Have a nice day." The officer nods at Bernice and returns to her motorcycle. The couple pulls back onto the freeway.
>
> "Avery. At your age don't you know we should respect officers of the law?"
>
> "Do what you like, Bernice. Not me. That young woman does not get an iota of my respect. She's lucky I went along with her as nicely as I did. I don't see why anyone should look up to cops, Bernice."
>
> "I'm *not* saying you should be looking up to her like she's somebody special. I'm saying that there's a way we are supposed to treat her because she is an officer of the law and that's what she is. We are law-

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[116] "Two Kinds of Respect," 38.

abiding citizens and she is an officer of the law. If you don't like it, you should find a different way to deal with it."

This imagined encounter marks a disagreement that might take many paths before the couple understands each other, and before one or the other could hope to have offered the better argument. Happily, the disagreeing couple has already taken the first step toward mutual understanding. Bernice has made it clear to Avery that she is not asking Avery to esteem or admire Officer Carol. Bernice just wants Avery to *treat* Officer Carol in a certain way, namely with respect. The initial misunderstanding arises because of the ambiguous way the term "respect" is commonly deployed. In the English language and beyond, one word unites in our minds at least two conceptually distinct responses to our practical-moral environment: (1) we respond to some object[117] by forming a positive or negative *opinion about* its moral-ethical value, (2) we respond to some object by treating it "appropriately" as deemed by some set of rules or standards. So, in our example, Bernice seems eager to convince Avery that he owes *recognition respect* to the officer. Her frustration is about Avery's refusal to give recognition respect, while she is not making any particular demands on Avery to give *appraisal respect*. She indicates to Avery that his own speculations about how much admiration the officer deserves is beside the point.

This reflects Darwall's conceptual claim that RR does *not* refer to a specific scale of worth, in fact "any fact which is something that one ought to take into account in deliberation" can be an "object" of respect.[118] This is important because it tells us that demands for respect do not hinge on convincing others that they must personally positively value the "object" they are asked to respect. Bernice can coherently demand that Avery respect the officer without having to make a case for why Avery should feel admiration or appreciation for her either as a good officer or simply because she is an officer.[119]

According to Darwall, there are fundamental differences between AR and RR. (For Darwall this is important in how we understand "respect for persons" theories.) AR normally

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[117] The term "object" is an awkward one for a relation that is ultimately about living things. I use it just in a formal way here.

[118] "Two Kinds of Respect," 39-40.
[119] It may be that there is something Bernice must convince Avery to value about the fact that she is an officer, but at least direct appreciation is not needed.

arises from the thoughts about some rational being's (some person's) excellence. It is simply a judgment about how that person rates on a scale or according to a standard of moral character that we apply to people. Very different is the attitude of RR that arises from noticing that someone *is* a rational being. This second attitude—the one with which Respect for Persons theories ought to explicitly concern themeslves—concerns what we think we are supposed to do *because of* the "fact" that the entity is a rational being (a "person"). Although Darwall is concerned with confusions around "respect for persons," the attitudes of appraisal for someone versus RR for them carry over into other moral and nonmoral domains, as Darwall occasionally indicates. We can easily see, as in the example above, that even though Bernice and Avery are not debating Carol's personhood, this distinction still applies. There is a difference between admiring Carol's performance as an officer and believing that the "fact" that she is an officer constrains what we should do in relation to her.

Though the distinction is easy to grasp, it may help to offer further examples. As already mentioned Darwall holds appraisal respect to be "an attitude that admits of degree."[120] He continues, "when one person is said to be more highly respected than someone else, the attitude is appraisal respect."[121] So, statements like the following are instances of AR:

1. We have total respect for her as an engineer. (We believe she is a competent and good engineer)
2. We respected his effort to win, even though he lost. (We appreciate, admire his efforts.)
3. Jane is so trustworthy and kind. I don't see why her mother has so little respect for her. (Mother should admire or appreciate Jane for her good character traits)
4. I definitely respect the Oilers' coaching more than that of the Texans. (The Oilers' coaches are better.)[122]

In these examples we see the subject (the appraiser) assessing and judging the object to have achieved some *degree*, negative or positive, on a scale of worth—and the specific scale employed is that of character excellence. Such degrees of excellence support notions of ranking. How has the object measured up compared to expectations and standards? How highly do we value it, given its rankable skills, character traits, etc.?

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[120] "Two Kinds of Respect," 44.
[121] Ibid., 45.
[122] My examples.

The following are instances of RR:

1. The way to respect these engineers is to at least read their report.
2. The contest was designed to respect the losers by giving them helpful feedback that might improve their performance.
3. As a person who has always proved trustworthy, Jane's privacy should be respected by her mother.
4. The coach got the best performances out of his players because he respected them as human beings, giving them needed rest and family leave, while still demanding great things of them.[123]

Darwall gives us to understand that, in contrast to AR, RR is expressed in the way we constrain or shape our actions in relation to the object of respect. When we RR things we see them in a certain way: as bearing the sorts of facts or features that give rise to restrictions on actions connected with those things. Thus, RR involves a different kind of regard than does AR. While AR regards objects in view of what ranking conclusion might be drawn, RR regards objects in terms of how they determine and limit our actions. While it's common to think of the "degree" of AR we give to things, it hardly makes sense, Darwall maintains, to treat RR as conferring something to a *degree*. RR just is the appropriate response, so the "attitude" of RR just is the intention to give that response. Anything less shows a lack of respect, and anything more is normatively superfluous.[124]

By focusing on "moral RR," Darwall sets his sights less on conceptualizing RR in general than on explaining the conceptual bases for claims that "all" persons "deserve" respect. In view of this focus, Darwall draws two significant conclusions. The first—as we've already seen—is that moral/political respect-for-persons theories logically imply a recognition conception of respect.[125] For Darwall, the "crucial point" is that when we discuss the respect to which persons "as" persons are "entitled," what we need to know is "what sort of consideration the fact of being a person requires."[126] When we discuss the *degree* of respect (moral admiration) to which some person or other is entitled, what we want to know is whether or not she measures

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[123] My examples.

[124] As Darwall observes, "you can be a better or worse respecter of persons, but you can't give "more" or "less" respect to them…"

[125] After all, such theories are about what we should *do* toward others and not what we have reason to admire in them.

[126] "Two Kinds of Respect," 38.

up to the relevant scale of value.[127] Thus, there is nothing odd or contradictory in statements to the effect: "I've lost all respect for Carol as a person" and "I will always respect Carol as a person." These normally just mean: "I find nothing about Carol's character worth esteeming" and "I have every intention to treat appropriately those features in Carol that make her a moral person."

The second insight of Darwall's is that though these two concepts of respect are independent of one another, there is indeed a dynamic moral connection between the grounds for moral esteem (AR) and practices of recognition respect. Practices of RR prove to be essential both to excellence of character and to the constitution/enforcement of moral status (institution of morality). This implies that RR is doubly relevant to liberal democracy. When we RR things we engage in the practices through which we become excellent. If one wants to deserve admiration for one's tennis-playing or one's moral character, then one ought to give RR to the pertinent facts about tennis or to the pertinent facts about moral persons. Institutions, thus--such as the institution of tennis or the institution of morality-- provide us with coherent standards for appraising one another's character.

Darwall's account of RR and AR and their relationship is spare, elegant, and intuitively plausible. Darwall offers a conceptual account that seems both to "describe" and to guide our relations to our normative environment.[128] Darwall helps to make plain that there is no *conceptual* reason in the structure of RR-ing something that requires that we RR it *for* or *because of* its distinguishing features. This could make logically defensible the central political value that "all people deserve respect." For Darwall (1977) and for many who have followed this line of thought, recognition respect is the concept of a disposition to respond to some facts or features in the "appropriate" way, regardless of whatever "evaluative" judgments might have caused one to arrive at this disposition. Bernice respects Carol as an officer just by the fact that Bernice thinks

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[127] I will be questioning this, because knowing how some fact constrains us often involves knowing how the values associated with that fact "rank" in comparison to values associated with other constraining facts. In other words, while appraisal as such does not include the conception of what we ought to do, RR as such must include some relation to the ranked importance of values at least as well as to what I will later call the "credit" we give to the entity in possession of "the fact."

[128] Downie and Telfer in *Respect for Persons* make the same point even more clearly, but in doing so commit themselves more inescapably to Kantian principles.

that Carol's being an officer is an important fact that Bernice intends to respond to "appropriately."

Darwall's distinction has been fruitful for writers concerned with respect-for-persons theories and grappling with the array of respect statements in ordinary language. This is because the distinction can map onto the many varieties or "senses" of respect that we find in everyday language.[129] In this vein, both Stephen Hudson and Robin Dillon have written influentially on "senses" of respect.[130] Hudson identified four: "Evaluative," "Directive," "Institutional," and "Obstacle Respect," to which Dillon added a fifth: "Care Respect." Hudson says that there are various conceptions of RR and that any argument about respecting persons needs to be clear on which conception it is using. He looks at Obstacle, Directive, and Institution respect[131] and concludes that "Institution Respect" is the conception implied by respect-for-persons theories in the literature.[132] Hudson suggests that the respect which takes its object as a feature of an institution will, thus, be a kind of respect with its own internal limits and standards. We must therefore keep our arguments consistent with this institutional way of seeing the human being when we make claims about everyone's moral or political right to respect. If Bernice and Avery availed themselves of Hudson's account of respect, they would have the benefit of seeing Officer Carol as someone in a position to receive Institution Respect. Insofar as Institution Respect is the backbone of all moral respect for persons (the "institution" of moral laws requires the symmetrical positioning of those agents who can obey and put themselves under the moral law), we can see why Carol might be inclined to righteously claim that Avery ought to be institution-respectful as some aspect of moral virtue.

Dillon argues that there is another important implication in the literature of respect for persons. This is the universal condition of vulnerability and the concomitant need for loving care. As such, objects of respect, when considered moral persons, are to be seen as standing in need of

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[129] I will be returning to closer analyses of these senses in chapter three, but it is useful for the ensuing discussion to enumerate them briefly here.

[130] Stephen Hudson, "The Nature of Respect;" Robin Dillon, "Respect and Care."

[131] Evaluative respect is not considered to be a form of RR.

[132] Evaluative respect is rejected on the grounds that it fails to explain equal rights, etc. Directive respect is rejected for being too descriptive and not normative. Obstacle respect is rejected for the absence of positive valuing of the object of respect.

relationships that treat them as full individuals and not as abstract features or role-players in some given institution.[133] Though Dillon rightly insists that this vulnerability is a universal feature of human life, the upshot of her account is that respect (proper acknowledgment and treatment) of people is something that requires careful attention to particularities of their lives. Thus, by identifying another sort of object of respect (the vulnerable human being as such), Dillon supports respect for persons theories that are more in line with approaches to justice that ground rights in particular features of identity. If Bernice and Avery avail themselves of Dillon's argument, Bernice can claim that Avery ought to pay attention to and be considerate of Carol's particular individuality (e.g. her feelings) for reasons that parallel why Avery ought to pay attention to Carol's legitimate social standing.[134]

One thing is certain, and Darwall's distinction makes clear why. In neither case does Avery's duty to respect Carol require Avery's high appraisal for Carol as an individual or for Carol's job or role. This has implications beyond explanations for Avery's motivation. This frees (and perhaps obliges) Avery to "show" due consideration to Carol (as procedurally legitimated role-player in the state or as an individual with particular limitations, aspirations, and feelings) without implying that he is himself expressing such a high appraisal. In other words, Avery is no longer putting himself into contradiction by giving considerate treatment to someone in view of features of their role or person that he also wants to critique and holds in low esteem.

This taxonomical work has given further support to Darwall's contention that respect for persons need not be assumed to involve comparative rankings that express comparative judgments. Lists of respect statements such as "Respect the speed limit," "Respect your opponent's backhand," "Respect my advice," "Respect the judge," and "Respect the environment" help make lucid to us that when we talk about "respecting" something we are often not talking about admiration or gratitude. When you "obstacle respect" someone's temper or pain it means you think that is an important fact worth your dealings with them. When you "institution respect" the judge or show respect for the flag you are seeing these individuals or objects (e.g. a flag) as features or symbols of some institution that require certain behaviors from you. You obey or conform to the object out of a sense that it is important to some broader set of

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[133] See Dillon, "Respect and Care," 116-119.
[134] I.e., because these are basic moral features of Carol's being/human dignity.

concerns that you do so -- not because of any preference or admiration for the object itself. When you merely "directive respect" the speed limit or the place settings, you act in ways that maintain order--an order that relies on people paying attention to certain things. And when you "care respect" your skin it means that you act in accord with standards involved in protecting it from damage.[135]

Hudson and Dillon were not alone in developing theoretical claims on the basis of Darwall's distinction and account of RR (DRR). Another account that deserves mention is the one given by Colin Bird in "Status, Identity, and Respect." Beginning with the basic distinction between AR and RR, Bird asks what sort of recognition respect can we all have the right to. Using Darwall's conception of RR, Bird argues that (political/democratic) respect for persons must be limited to the granting of status on the basis of universal "features" alone. RR for moral equals in a society must be limited to neutral statuses and not particularistic-identity features. For Bird, we should not be so quick to dismiss obstacle respect as the morally salient type of respect. Here Bird seems to be seeing obstacle respect in terms of what we might call "egalitarian prudence." The essence of ethical respect is to acknowledge and cooperate with the power another has over one's actions and the best reasons to give up one's own freedom is in the interest of that freedom. Were Bernice and Avery to adopt Bird's application of DRR, Avery might refute Bernice's claims that he ought to consider the "fact" that Officer Carol is—for instance—female, and that women have historically been discriminated against in positions of power. Instead, Avery would only be morally required to cooperate with a status that Carol occupies in an identity-neutral way. Avery's commitment to Carol's personhood would not extend so far as to make him give her special entitlements designed to advance her identity-group interests.

Thanks to Darwall, it becomes clear to us that respect can be something given and demanded on a basis independent of the respecter's valuing appraisals. And it turns out there are quite a variety of species of "respect" that fit the bill – where the warrant is independent from the respecter's personal appraisal of the object. In turn, theorists have tried to identify the kinds of (ontological or relational) standing that command respect independently not only of ranking

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[135] Care respect for skin is Dillon's example.

appraisals but of the respecter's prudential concerns.[136] Yet, we are left wondering how Bernice and Avery are going to resolve their disagreement about what it means to respect Carol, the Officer. [137] After all, it is not really Carol's moral personhood that the two of them are arguing about. Avery is not trying to deprive Carol of her basic political rights, nor is he assaulting or abusing her person. But the interaction is still important to all involved—it seems relevant that they debate the question of corrosive versus constructive ways of treating one another and debate those in terms of "respect." So, having I hope conveyed what is insightful about Darwall's approach—especially as it has helped others articulate basic convictions about universally warranted "moral" respect, I will now argue that this conception is ultimately inadequate if we want to mobilize conceptions of respect in political theory (for example, Rawls's use of self-respect). My claim will be that Darwall's account and those that depend upon it do not give us the purchase needed for such an understanding.[138]

2.3 Problems with Darwall's account

Darwall's definition of recognition respect (DRR) as "consideration of some fact or feature of an object when determining what to do" is offered as the basic concept of recognition respect (RR)

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[136] One candidate has been institutional standing that might be interpreted in a communitarian or a liberal way. Another has been the standing of uniqueness or individuality itself. Yet another has been equal moral standing understood in symmetrical contractual terms (with their implications of circumstances of justice, threat, and the concomitant need to preserve my freedom by permitting yours.)

[137] More importantly we are left unsure how to situate the daily debates over "respect" in relation to our political ideals. Respect, we believe, is something practically and morally intrinsic to a just democratic society, whether the theory of justice is Rawlsian, communitarian, or to the right of these. How a theory conceptualizes respect arguably gives us reasons to feel more confident or more suspicious of that theory. And the concepts of respect that plausibly operate within our accepted principles of justice will give us reasons to accept or reject alleged respect claims, morally weighty as they are, in our everyday discourse.

[138] Both in this early work that we are focused on (1977) and in his more recent rethinking of respect found in *Second Person Standpoint* (2004). When Darwall describes respect as "a fitting response to dignity [or authority]" (119-120), he moves away from the too-general but more logically consistent idea that "Moral" RR is just an sub-category of all RR. In any case none of the problems I address here are resolved in that later work. If anything they are exacerbated. In the 1977 argument about the difference between RR and AR, Darwall is arguing that esteeming persons is different from respecting them because the former expresses a judgment of comparative worth and the latter is a considerate or appropriate response to a judgment of a 'fact' or feature'. On this too-broad but logically workable view, we can take him to mean that moral RR is a response to a fact or feature that is independent of its agentic exercise (such as capacities for rationality, etc.) only if the moral system itself picks out such features as the ground of moral worth.

from which, presumably, a theory of respect might be obtained.[139] While Darwall's distinction is useful for certain purposes (those mentioned in the previous section), it is an insufficient and misleading basis for a theory of respect. The crux of the problem is what I'll term DRR's **"moral consideration"** assumption. Unpacked, this assumption reveals two related problems: the **"object-of-respect"** problem and the **"appraisal"** problem.

2.3.1 DRR and the "Moral Consideration" Problem

Darwall's main interest in his famous article was with what he calls *Moral* RR[140]. An entity deserves "moral" RR insofar as "some fact or feature is an appropriate object of consideration if inappropriate consideration or weighing of that fact or feature would result in behavior that is morally wrong." In this section I will argue that the clarity we need about the concept of respect cannot be achieved by passing the buck from general respect to moral respect. I will show that DRR is misleadingly vague and this vagueness is obscured by the move from general respect to moral respect. I will begin by examining the drawbacks of Darwall's "subject-centered" and attitude-focused conceptualization.

Consider these statements:

> Whatever else went wrong, at least they were appropriately cared for.
>
> Whatever else went wrong, at least they were appropriately punished.
>
> Whatever else went wrong, at least they were appropriately respected.

A useful normative concept will provide, at least implicitly, standards and criteria of action (or perhaps attitude).[141] We might even say that a good normative concept can be falsified. If I have a concept of what "care" is, then I can make use of this concept to evaluate when I have actually given care, when I have given it to the right being, in the right way, in view of overarching or more urgent values, rights, and goods, etc. It can be possible not only that I can

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[139] From now on I will use the term "respect" and "recognition respect" interchangeably, and if necessary I will indicate that I mean "respect" in the appraisal sense.

[140] Which we might think of as a species of Institution Respect.

[141] Values exist in dynamic relationship to practices (See Raz, *The Practice of Value*)

"attempt" but fail to care (I set out to care, but go about it clumsily), but that I might actually do what counts as "care," but do it in ways that diminish the value of caring or diminish other important values. In other words, I can "successfully" care "inappropriately." We have ways of conceptualizing care that distinguish a specific caring act and cared-for result within our broader moral and practical concerns. Caring, thereby, becomes a genuine "player" in our moral discourse and not a truism or a platitude. If I can care inappropriately then I can also care appropriately, if care can be unjust, it can also be just. The appropriateness of my care adds information in terms of the overall value of my act from some evaluative point of view.

I am seeking this level of specificity and play for recognition respect. Let's consider DRR (Darwall's Recognition Respect) to be our definition of respect. Compared with care and punishment, what does the word "appropriate" add to respect as DRR? If we are correct to understand DRR to define respect as "appropriate consideration" then it would evidently be redundant, for respect is by definition appropriate.[142] Care as well as punishment, can be done in ways that are incorrect for the given context. An inappropriate punishment still involves actions that are at least subjectively believed to harm the "guilty" party.[143] Care can be given to the wrong object or in the wrong way relative to other priorities. So, here we have a basic problem with DRR: it generalizes the concept "respect" to the point where "respect" contains no standards of its own. If respect is by definition the right way to perceive (consider, or "see") someone in the given context, then it cannot be subjected to analysis at a practical level. Any claim about respect devolves into a claim about what are the right things to notice about the object, and one would simply have to turn to broader ethical rules or value systems for an answer. The concept of "respect" could offer no "internal" practical guidance in the way concepts of care and punishment do.

Of course it is more fair to DRR to say that "appropriate consideration" actually means noticing the features of the object that one *ought* to consider *when deciding what to do.* While there may be no way to identify "practices" of respect independent of the moral commitments of those evaluating the situation, it seems like Darwall and others at least take it that the "attitude"

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[142] As I'll argue below, in fact such phrases do invite us to imagine concrete practices in our ordinary thinking about respect. But taking DRR on board, such imaginings seem less viable.

[143] There are various practices and standards for punishment that are within our conceptual grasp. Likewise with care

of respect is a specific sort of action-determining attitude toward its object.[144] According to DRR, we have the attitude of RR whenever some fact about something or someone strikes us as an important one to reckon with. For instance, people who see what facts about tennis are essential to the value of the game—thus important to be reckoned with—are people who have DRR for the game of tennis.[145] DRR can be further specified as a kind of action-shaping attention the subject pays to the object. Someone who DRRs something is going to give it "proper" weight in her decisions.

But problems persist. What standards, given DRR, determine whether we "regard" the object respectfully (with intentions to respect it)? There are innumerable kinds and qualities of "appropriate" action-guiding attention one can direct toward things. **Let us further specify DRR as attention directed to the "appropriate feature" of the thing in light of the relevant system of values that the respecter wants her actions to advance.** Might this allow us to tease out the elusive imminent standards of respect as well as why we value it for democracy? While "appropriate" attention is always and only "appropriate" relative to some set of aims or values, still there is something that it is to be deliberately squaring one's attentiveness with some set or system of values. For example, let us say that the practice of tennis is constructed with a certain kind of excellence in mind. Those standards pick out (dictate) what makes an object in the field of that practice important (worth paying attention to). RR, then, would involve making one's sense of what is important (tennis) consistent with how one treats certain objects (tennis players, tennis rackets). But such an explanation does not really take us as far as we'd like to go. Ultimately it is either a platitude or a mistake to say that we value people paying attention to that to which they ought to attend. Either the "ought" here is subjective and the value is nothing but moral consistency. Yet, I certainly do not value a fascist's success in paying attention to the facts that are important to the aims of fascism. Or, the "ought" is universal and we are faced with a platitude. One response to my concern might be that we need not endorse the value system of an individual who is being respectful in order to value the considerate "way of seeing" that she is

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[144] On Darwall's account respect is an agent-regarding (conduct-regarding) concept that describes a certain disposition an agent might have toward an object (loosely conceived as a fact or feature of something). If we want to identify some acts as respectful and some as disrespectful we would need to concern ourselves chiefly with the agent's intentions or apparent intentions.

[145] As such, they might deserve our ethical esteem (Darwall's example).

engaging in order to relate the object to the system of values in the "right" way. But this response is weak. There is no "way of seeing" capable of cutting across so many different evaluative domains that we could call it an attitude of respect. That fact is what justifies the efforts of Dillon, Hudson, and others to offer a taxonomy of "recognition respect" in the first place.

If RR is DRR then it is just what we are doing when we do what is "appropriate"—i.e., contextually fitting. What then explains the moral and political value placed on *respect* as something other people ought to "give" each other and themselves and something we have the right to be materially and socially *able* to give and receive? What do we mean when we say we want to teach children to be "respectful" people? On DRR this amounts to saying that we want our children to pay attention to the right things so you can treat things right. But isn't this an empty truism? Wouldn't the real work be in determining the standards for when something calls for "respect" and how to give it "respect?" Furthermore, wouldn't the "right" each deserves or the "good" each has reason to desire pertain to treatment and not the fact that someone chose it because it was deemed "appropriate" from some evaluative point of view?

Theorists have turned to our given democratic-liberal moral framework in order to locate the specific "way of seeing" someone or something that counts as respecting it in ways that we think are morally right and good. But in this case all the work seems to be done by the concept of the moral standing of the object and not by any notion of what it means to respect something.[146] On this approach, the moral quality of the object will tell us what "respect" requires. Thus, if the moral quality of persons is that we are symmetrical and equal, this should tell us what "way" we ought to be looking at and accounting for each other. I am not satisfied with this approach and would like to try something a little different. Rather than centering the concept of respect on the *subject's*[147] attitude and intentions and beliefs about the moral worth of the object (as Darwall does), what happens if we try to conceptualize respect from the *object's*[148] "point of view"?

The Object's point of view and DRR: what does the respected gain by being respected?

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[146] Compare to Cranor, "Limitations on Respect-for-Persons Theories."
[147] the respecter = the "subject"
[148] The respected = the "object"

If we anchor our conceptualization of respect to the "respected," rather than almost exclusively to the "respecter" then we might see ourselves as trying to answer the following question: What does everyone want or have reason to want, when it comes to action-determining consideration by another? Maybe "respect" is rightly limited to being the sort of action-guiding consideration given to an object that the object has good reason to want from another.

The good of influence: Being related to as an obstacle "worthy" of attention

One possible answer to the question of why "being respected (DRR)" is so important to people might be that we all want more influence on the thoughts of others. Such an answer would actually be consistent with an extremely general conception of RR (such as DRR). Colin Bird suggests such an interpretation in "Status, Identity, and Respect."[149] Bird follows Darwall's lead in thinking of respect in terms of "recognition" of important facts and features. Bird alludes to what is "reckonable" and "reckonworthy" as those facts and features of things that we ignore at our own peril, thus connecting reasons of respect to hierarchical social roots.[150]

Respect, we might conclude, is valuable to people because it creates relative power of the respected over the respecter (literally, the respected is ranked as the sort of thing that the respecter cannot ignore). So, let's imagine RR as a response to whatever it is about someone that, if ignored, would threaten the values of the respecter. Now, while this is a highly subjective and subject- centered definition, it might still ground an account of why we (in the role of "object" of respect) desire to have others' respect. And it might do so without forcing us to stray from the elegant simplicity of DRR. When you give some fact or feature about me consideration in relation to your plans, then you allow it (the fact) and thus *me* (the locus of the fact) to constrain your actions and influence the shape of your plans. In effect, thanks to some fact about me that is salient from the point of view of your plans, I have exercised influence over your agency. I have

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[149] I will discuss other useful aspects of Bird's approach later, but for the moment I want to just draw attention to one implied idea.

[150] Though in Bird's case in the service of a more Kantian ideal... In his disagreement with those who would cite cultural identity as an important "feature," Bird implies that personhood respect can only be deployed in relation to facts that can be meaningfully translated into nonheirarchical treatment.

"forced" you to "reckon" with me. As Bird notes, this view of respect is closely aligned to the "sense" called "obstacle respect." DRR thus might be broadly characterized as a (subjective) norm-preserving response to some feature of another that it would be hazardous to ignore. People, it is believed, naturally desire (and profit from) power and influence, so it might make sense that being "obstacle respected" is something we demand and desire from others. Ironically, the "good" of respect might be the good of being taken for an obstacle.

I hope it is clear, though, that such an idea falls apart the moment we start to take it seriously. The so-called good of influence unacceptably stretches of the meanings of the word "power" and "influence." Even if there is psychological truth to the basic desire to "matter" in the scheme of others' plans, there have to be limits to the way one would (have good reason to) want to matter. It makes little sense, for example, that I want to you to see my cleverness as standing in your way, when "reckoning" with such a fact could easily mean carrying out an especially elaborate plan to deceive me or to neutralize and destroy that very feature about me (or even to destroy me, period.). I may well prefer that you ignore me completely rather than focus on me in this way.[151] At bottom, what makes obstacle respect an insufficient guide is that it is far too neutral about the effect of the respecter's actions on the respected. The only alternative, then, seems to be to insist on limiting respect's meaning to a way of relating to an object that, whatever else, must advance its interests from a point of view that it has good reason to endorse.

The good of being valued: being related to as having good-making characteristics

We want to consider again whether DRR (Darwall's subject-centered concept of RR) can be cashed out in object-centered terms. So, rather than claiming that everyone has good reason to want to be influential we will here consider that everyone might have a good reason to have

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[151] My knowledge of my boss's bad temper constrains me just insofar as I want to avoid an unpleasant encounter with him. If I want to avoid an unpleasant encounter with him because such an encounter is distracting to me, that does not seem like an example of me respecting my boss. If, on the other hand, I see the unpleasant encounter as potentially distracting to him, on a day when he really needs to concentrate or if I see it as undermining our shared aims, then perhaps we are talking about the kind of respect people have a reason to want and demand. Obviously it is not the simple fact of my being constrained that gives respect its value for the respected (whether we are speaking of objective or subjective value). It is how that constraint relates the respected to additional values that the respected has a reason to endorse.

features that are treated as valuable. To telegraph a bit. In this subsection I will argue that splitting RR into valuing and value-neutral conceptions is somewhat question-begging and that it raises some difficult issues with regard to the fundamental distinction between appraisal and recognition respect.[152]

Let's reiterate the standing criticism I have of DRR: prescriptive reasoning is extremely broad--it is anything that one "ought" to do given that one has a certain goal. If one wants to win the war, one ought to drop more bombs.[153] In the normative "space" of winning a war, then, there will be things that we ought to respond to in a certain way, and such things would require our attention. If I want to win the war I ought to respect my opponent's recon capabilities. Such an example fits squarely within DRR. A given prescriptive context gives us reasons to pay attention to certain features and facts about certain objects, persons, and situations. Similarly, a practice of torture might pick out what is worth paying attention to in order to achieve the "good" of torture. According to DRRs logic, not only is the attitude of respect *morally* neutral (to say a relation of respect has occurred is not to say anything about whether or not it ought to have occurred morally speaking[154]) but it is profoundly vague.[155] But perhaps we will have some success in seeing DRR as a primary concept if we can see it availing us with a more limited conception of respect as value-enhancing (sustaining) treatment.

Consider this statement:

> Danny knew he would be respecting professional tennis players by voting to continue to allow cat-gut rackets in the game.[156] Cat-gut rackets are known to afford the best playing in a skilled player. Danny appreciated that fact when he cast his vote.

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[152] If we could find a good way to take DRR as the basic standard, then it might be wise to do so, given its influence. If DRR continues to be unhelpful, though, then we want to move on to other ways to conceptualize RR.

[153] So, out of "respect" for the war, one must drop more bombs? One should respect the bombs by using them to end the war?

[154] Assuming that we want to live morally successful lives (quite an assumption), then it is easy to imagine wanting no part (as subject or object) in certain relations of respect.

[155] This is why Stephen Hudson and Robin Dillon worked to disambiguate RR via a taxonomy of "senses" of respect, an approach that is helpful in many ways, but not in the ways I believe that it is intended for, as I'll discuss later in the dissertation.

[156] Although he could not care less about the manufacturers who stood to gain.

In this example we can analyze respect as a relation consisting of the following elements[157]:

    (a) A value/priority-determining context (institution, value system, goal)

    (b) an entity "about which" there is a

    (c) fact or feature that is <u>positively valued by</u> the *evaluative point of view*

    (d) a practical way of managing the "valued" fact or feature in the service of the *evaluative point of view*,

    (e) a subject able to appreciate or understand a-d and carry out d.

So, (a) the practice of tennis manifests goods for some under certain conditions. The conditions under which this practice manifests goods have given rise to certain standards in the treatment of others. Hypothetically, one such condition is that when players (b) are allowed to use cat-gut rackets, higher quality tennis ensues (c). There is the possibility of allowing cat-gut rackets, despite some objections to their ethicality (d) and Danny understands all this and Danny is being asked to vote on whether or not to ban the use of cat-gut rackets (e). We might say that in a situation like this Danny is engaged in "Valuing" DRR.[158] He has taken a fact about players to be valuable from the point of view of tennis, and has acted in ways that would preserve this value. Danny is indeed disposed to preserve the values of the game of tennis, and thus "respects" the players as "able to play a good game with cat gut rackets" by voting against the proposed ban on those rackets.[159]

"Valuing" DRR suggests that we conceptualize respect as practical consideration for the normatively *valuable* features or facts of an object. This sort of "consideration" is to be determined by those sharing the relevant normative point of view, and its proper object is anything bearing "features" that such a point of view would prefer to maintain (rather than

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[157] This list of elements of respect is influenced by Carl Cranor's "Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons." The phrase "evaluative point of view" is taken from Cranor, who abbreviates it to be "e-pov."
[158] For a discussion of "valuing" types of respect see Dillon, "Respect" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
[159] We are tempted to say Danny "respects" tennis. But in our context it would be a misnomer. Danny preserves the value of tennis by "respecting" the capacity of players to use cat-gut rackets. The very entwinement of these ideas will later be unpacked.

neutralize or destroy).[160] So, in this case, we recognition-respect a person "as" a moral person whenever we preserve or support the valuable features of persons (their rationality, for example). Following this same construction, we recognition-respect someone "as" a construction worker whenever we preserve or support the features about them that are valuable to construction work. Here, it seems, we are progressing toward a clearer conception of RR.[161]

Yet, even with the restriction of "valuing" a similar problem persists that we found with obstacle respect. At some very general level, I am in the same sort of relation when, in considering how to torture her I "respect the fact that she is a trained soldier" as when, in considering how to employ her I respect her "as" a trained soldier. In other words, as a torturer I might really value the information that a trained soldier might be able to give me, and thus act in ways that enhance such a value. Just as, as the employer I might, more innocuously, think it is a good thing, for purposes of the job requirements, that my employee is a trained soldier (and thus constrain myself to maintain the goodness of that good thing). "Valuing" DRR remains unhelpfully vague. If a relation of respect involves some situation of importance and objects (facts, features, entities) caught up in that situation (due to the fact that they offer something of value from some point of view), it remains entirely unclear under DRR what the primary relation is. Is it between the subject and the practice/goal/good or is it between the subject and the "important" feature? Must the subject value the practice/goal/good that picks out the feature as an important one? Must the subject value the integrity of the object that is getting her attention? What does it really mean for the subject (the respecter) to "appreciate" the importance of the facts, features, or values in the relation? These questions move us to identify two main problems for DRR: the object-of-respect problem and the appraisal problem, to which I now turn.

2.3.2 Two problems that DRR fails to address

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[160] For instance, Darwall offers, "RR for persons then is identical with RR for the moral requirements that are placed on one by the existence of other persons" ("Two Kinds of Respect," 45), thus implying that it is outside the scope of the concept of respect to tell us what is or is not appropriate (i.e. respectful for us to do.)

[161] This is because it is far easier to imagine it being a prima facie good to have some feature about oneself enabled to retain its value from someone's evaluative point of view.

The "object of respect" problem: the importance of preserving integrity

Consider the many "objects" of respect that are implied in ordinary conversation. We ask that people respect each other's feelings, values, rank, talents, place in society, expertise, hopes, limitations, commitments. We ask each other to respect traditions, officials, nature, persons, arrangements, relationships, and facts. We ask each other to respect someone/something "as" a teacher, lover, citizen, veteran, mother, believer, and expert; a work of art, a product of nature, a symbol of freedom. The "object" of respect in these various statements is not at all clear. When we are asked to respect another's feelings are we being asked to treat her *feelings* as the "object" of respect, or to treat *her* as an object of respect *by* acting in a certain way in response to her feelings? Do we give a certain treatment to her because she has feelings and we value her "for" having feelings? Or do we give her some treatment because she has feelings and we value her independently of this fact? Or do we value human feelings independently of who has them, such that something's having feelings authorizes us to treat it a certain way for the sake of how that treatment actuates the feelings? When we ask for respect for "types" of things—such as traditions or persons, are we to take the object that dictates our treatment as the specific entity that turns out to fall into that category, or the general category itself? When Bernice requests respect be given to "that woman" (Carol) "as" an "officer of the law," what should the aim of respect be assessed in reference to? Is it "Carol" that should receive RR in her capacity to act as an "officer of the law"? Is it "the capacity of people to take on being an officer of the law" that should receive RR, *through* the medium of Carol?

Darwall's emphasis on respect as an "attitude" obscures this problem--a problem of figuring out what sort of relational structure might define RR. It is easy enough to broadly construe the person with a respectful disposition or attitude as one who has noticed the proper importance of something and acted in ways consistent with her appreciation of that importance. From the respecter's cognitive and psychological point of view, she (the respecter) can experience herself as dutifully (or pragmatically) following norms whether she is cleaning up a campsite, punishing a child, or supporting a voting rights initiative. Yet, such attentions are extremely diverse both in their relevance to the object and in the ways the respecter is called upon to think about and interact with the object.

It is not unusual for us to speak in ways that are ambiguous about "objects" of attention or interest. Take, for example, the statement, "Josh was the object of Hosana's rage." What does it mean to be the "object" of another's rage? Josh might be the person, the thought of whom is causing Hosana's feelings or actions of rage, He could be the passive outlet or recipient of rage, He could be the person she has in mind as wishing she could harm with her rage. The answer, similar to respect will depend in part on whether we are thinking of raging as actions that are normally explained in terms of certain beliefs and feelings, the actual having of those feelings, whether or not anything is in mind, or the having meaning-laden/performative feelings that target or are about something. But it seems to me that it is very different to be in a relation by which one (the object of rage in this case) is "the explanation for it" or by which one is "the direct recipient of it" or by which one is "the mental/symbolic target for it." Perhaps, enraged with something quite apart from Josh, Josh nevertheless becomes the object-as-outlet for her rage. Perhaps, while never acting directly on Josh, her rage against him drives Hosana to act out toward others, or perhaps, while punishing Josh was the true aim of Hosana's action, someone else was her fixation and received her direct enraged attention. In ordinary language this ambiguity points to the rich complexity of our experiences, but if we were to claim that laws should be designed to protect people from being the objects of another's rage, then we want a clearer concept. So, perhaps we'd be inclined to say, for those purposes, that the object of "rage" is the one who experiences the other's rage (and not necessarily the one that the rage was mentally about).

DRR makes no such commitment to the notion of respect's proper "object." Consider the options avaialble to us for discerning the object of DRR. If a potential DRR relation implies (as listed above) that there is (a) some evaluative point of view, (b) facts or features about something (c) that make a difference to the aims of that evaluative point of view, (d) a way to respond to such facts and features, (e) and a person capable of so responding; then we can formulate something like (e) relates in (a) good-ways (d), to (c)'s (b).   So, if one says, in the spirit of DRR, that recognition respect is a relation between a subject (the respecter) and an object (the respected) that treats "it" as important from/to some evaluative point of view, then what is being done to "it"? Is it being mentally prioritized? Is it being given some privilege? Values, for example, cannot be the recipients of privilege or advantage, for values are not entities that have interests of their own, except metaphorically the "interest" in carrying on in the minds of those

with interests of their own. Similarly, "facts," are also things that exist in the minds of people in reference to real things. Features, insofar as they belong to some object (beauty, a quick temper, historical importance) can, as we've shown, be designated by an "evaluative point of view" as worthy of neutralization and destruction, not just augmentation and protection.

While we would say that a person *respects the fullness of her hair by brushing it daily*, we would not say that she *respects her tangled hair by conditioning it*. Rather, we'd say she respects "the fact that" her hair tangles easily by conditioning it. In the first example, she clearly values the feature of her hair (presumably for its contribution to some higher values), while in the second case she disvalues the tangles but values the knowledge she has about them. We might say that to be the recipient of DRR is to be "made use of" in a way that draws you into the orbit of some set of values. The hair is being marshalled for the sake of the value of health, and the facts (the knowledge of the facts) is being marshalled for that same purpose.[162]

I want to bring up a third way of receiving DRR: *the hairstylist respects his client "as" someone who has thick, easily tangling hair.* How is this statement different from the stylist respecting the fullness of the hair or respecting the fact that it tangles easily? Well, because the focus is on the entity about whom these are features. As such, the stylist motivated by the value of a healthy appearance, would take into account not just the appearance of the hair, but the way having this or that hairstyle is going to fit into the client's life. It is not the hair, in this case, that is the primary "carrier" of the values, it is the entity whose hair it is. It seems that a political theory of respect and self-respect would be focused on the positive place of entities--not mere facts and features about them-- in the orbit of important values. This fits easily with our intuition about the value of respect in the lives of those who receive it—yet the literature on respect as yet lacks to tools for properly bringing out this basic notion in part because of ambiguity around the object.

Everything said about respect suggests that there is certainly some sense in which it is, as Dillon says, object-dictated. There is some way in which the kind of respect we all have reason to want is a kind whereby our own features and existence "dictate" what others ought to do in

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[162] In casting respect as a relationship between a subject and an object, based on valued features of the object, it could be that we are closer than we think to discovering what makes respect a guiding (not redundant) mode of practical reasoning

relation to us. Two slightly different meanings might be implied when we say respect is object-dictated. One is uncontroversial – respect is the kind of activity (or even attitude) that cannot be said to exist except as it relates to a proper understanding of its object. Contrast this with happiness. You are happy just because you feel happy. You certainly are not respectful just because you feel respectful. This will be discussed at length later, but logically it means that respect is a relational concept where some facts or other that are the focus of the action "dictate" or constrain the possible responses. What writers have tended to say is that we all want to be respected "as" persons, human beings, citizens, and other already-honored identities. But what I will be saying is more basic. We want to be respected "as" entities, not as knowledge-objects or symbols. There is a certain process of "respect" for entities under various descriptions that is fundamentally different than respect for facts (the fact of tangling) or dependent features (thickness of hair). To render an entity good-making from some evaluative point of view, involves a different way of relating to it than is involved in marshalling facts or making features resonant. Entities, we will presume, have integrity-interests that can be imputed to them and respecting an entity "as" one with potentially good-making features involves responding to the way the whole most successfully supports the part.Yet, as we will see, identifying "entities" as the object of the sort of RR we are concerned with is far from saying that RR for entities already obviously does something in the interests of the entity.[163]

While there may well be contexts in which a theory of respect could be "about" facts, features, values, etc., any theory of respect would have to explore the subject (respecter)-object (respected) *relation* and not just the *beliefs* of a subject (respecter). On some accounts of respect, the "object" can be many different things and need not have an organic unity. It is a metaphorical object of attention or focus—something "about" the "power" or "importance" of the institution, ideal, value, or symbol must be "taken into account" by the respecter. Now, this diversity of objects might get worked up into various conceptions of RR. Such an approach would take it that a conception of respect is specified by the sort of "object" being respected. For instance, if the object is a "person" then we have ourselves a conception of the treatment owed to beings whose

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[163] On the view implied so far, I have been respected "as" a woman, for example, if there is a set of values "femininity," such that my butch affect is an affront to those values, and someone comes along to neutralize my butch affect by forcing me to wear feminine clothes to work. This issue awaits a more precise theorization of RR for entities, to come later in the dissertation.

value is that they are rational, or individual, or unique, or caring (it all depends what you think a moral person is). My contention is that this is not quite the right approach—though it is a tempting approach.[164] Yes, respect is object-dictated in the first sense (respect requires some kind of attention to and knowledge about the object), but the theory we are looking for must rest on a concept of respect's object as being an "entity" whose "most valuable" features are not already independently fixed (say by a noumenal realm). When we RR, we are not responding to what is cosmically/universally important about the object (however much we might like to think that is what we are doing); rather, we are dealing *in a certain way* with an entity who is reckonable (and visible to us) in terms of some historically contingent system of values that we happen to be familiar with. It seems that there is no way to "discover" such entities as themselves "commanding" respect apart from appraising their connection to systems of values, and so this opens up the next problem to be discussed.

The Appraisal Problem

DRR makes it easy to overlook the complex role of appraisals and standards for any relation of recognition respect (for entities). When, as DRR suggests, one is simply responding appropriately to a fact or feature about something, one need not carry any positive judgment about the fact, the feature or the entity bearing them. Much less need one's action be construed as an "expression" of such a positive personal evaluation. We can be dogged respecters of all people, while there might be only a few whom we actually admire or approve of. Let me restate that it is fine and good to distinguish between judgments of approval (AR/moral esteem) and attitudes/activities of respect (RR), but the success of Darwall's distinction has led to two related conceptual problems. **First, DRR has led to the mistaken view that there is a fundamental difference between practices that utilize comparative evaluations and practices that utilize "universal" and non-relative facts about people. Second, DRR fails to differentiate among**

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[164] It is not the right approach because it only works if we treat RR in a most generic way, as doing the appropriate thing in view of the object. So the most appropriate thing to do in connection with people is to abide by their rights and treat them with care; the most appropriate thing to do in connection with a table setting is to not disrupt it. Appropriate can only be cashed out through a pre-defined sense of what the "ultimate purpose" of the object is. If you don't know the purpose of humans, or can't agree upon it, then you won't know what it means to respect them. Surely, we don't know what to do in connection with a table that is set if we lack the cultural knowledge about it, but having some knowledge about the object is not the same as knowing its ultimate purpose.

ways of valuing and relating to things that are "important" from some evaluative point of view.[165]

Misinterpretations and misapplications of Darwall's Distinction

DRR has led to the mistaken view that there is a sharp line between practices that respond to comparative evaluations and practices that respond to recognition of facts about people. [166] According to DRR properly interpreted, acts of DRR *can* be grounded in comparative evaluations. Yet theorists have confusingly taken the association between RR and Kantian moral personhood to imply that any action toward a person that can be explained as arising from a comparative evaluation is called AR, while action explained by universal givens about people or legally set statuses is RR.

What a conceptualization of respect must help us to better understand is the role appraisals do play in the practical reasoning and action that constitutes a respect relation between a subject and an object. Eager to employ Darwall's distinction, theorists fail to notice that the narrow characterization of AR loses its appropriateness when it migrates from Darwall's limited task in his article, to the more ambitious efforts to deal with political claims about what counts as

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[165] Just as, in the section above, the discussion of the object problem led to a hypothesis that respecting entities is quite different from respecting facts--and the former is the kind that people want for themselves--the ensuing discussion of appraisal will lead to the hypothesis that recognition respect (for entities) is a kind of treatment that is inescapably socially symbolic and "reputational"--despite being purposed for something other than ranking. This makes it extremely tricky to separate practices of respect from the idea that the objects of respect have appraisable worth.

[166] For example, in *The Honor Code,* Kwame Appiah uses Darwall's distinction to distinguish between competitive and "peer" honor. The honor one wins through competition is thought to be appraisal or esteem, while peer honor is a recognition from equals of one's worth as a peer (14). On my view there is no logically obvious reason why only equally "shared" honors or other sorts of universal facts would be what defines RR, while comparative excellences would not be. There is a difference in judging someone "worthy" of x treatment and judging them to be good--these two are independent, but there is no limit to the sorts of judgments that can make someone worthy of some treatment--it seems arbitrary at best to say that objective/indelible facts about things are the grounds that make it possible to DRR them. First, it's just not true -- take personhood. Kant's account offers not that the "fact" of being rational is concretely the grounds for respect, but, rather, the fact that we impute rationality to others that so grounds their worthiness for respect. Or, to take another example, the fact that I love something is fair grounds for its candidacy as an object of RR just as long as there is some evaluative point of view through which that fact gives something reckonable importance. Is there a way to treat Matthew-as-loved-by me that would make this fact more likely to bring him into the orbit of x-good?

respect.[167] The point should rather have been that a theory of (RR) for persons would always be answerable to appraisals, and thus to judgments of appraisal--not identical to those judgments. If morally important forms of respect are not grounded in comparative evaluations then it is because such evaluations are not instrumental to the realization of the core values of the moral view--that would be the true debate and not whether or not the theorist confuses esteeming with respecting.[168]

The worry is that a certain logic attaches itself to esteem-responses which would be antithetical to the moral meaning of RR. Esteem is often expressed by some form of deference to the agent as the one who can bring about what is valued. Naturally, each agent has unique capacities, so those who are "better" or "better suited" for bringing out what is valued (in a given historical context) will "deserve/warrant" higher priority in the positive attention we give to the value-relevant features. There is as yet no "fact" about people that is shared equally and threshold concepts suffer from being somewhat arbitrarily applied.

Evaluative judgments give me "information" that can then lead to a variety of prescriptions. So, it is not inconsistent to esteem or admire someone (to "grant" the fact of their excellence), while deciding that, *given their excellence*, the best course of action given our aims, toward them is to undermine them. There is nothing in making the esteeming judgment that itself makes the appraiser *responsible* toward the thing or person who is appraised. There is nothing in an object's giving itself over to our comparative, standards-based evaluation that is equivalent to

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[167] Writers imply two mutually exclusive assumptions: (a) that there is conceptual unity in the various practices/objects and attitudes that go by the name "respect," and (b) that different practices/objects of respect demarcate different concepts (which happen to both be called "respect" in English). While both (a) and (b) can be true: It can be true that *some of* the various "senses" of respect are conceptually unified *and* it can be true that *some practices called respect* refer actually to different concepts; they cannot be true of the same two ways of using the term respect.

[168] The reason that "recognition respect" for "persons" excludes interpersonal comparisons is because the concept of personhood itself is predicated on locating some value that is shared across humanity, as a basis for moral equality. The concept of respect may have a role in the construction of the status "person," but an explanation for that role cannot be found in the circular way in which Darwall invokes "personhood" as if it were itself an ontological feature or fact requiring a response independently of some prior evaluation (see chapter 4). See also Honneth's interpretation of Darwall in Struggle for Recognition. Honneth writes, "In both cases, human beings are respected because of certain traits. In the first case, however, this is a matter of the general features that makes them persons at all, whereas in the second case, it is a matter of the particular characteristics that distinguish them from other persons. For this reason, the central question for legal recognition is how to define this constitutive quality of persons, while the question for social esteem is the constitution of the evaluative frame of reference within which the 'worth' of charascteristic traits can be measured" (112-113).

its warranting any particular treatment. Finding that something ranks poorly can be a reason to give it more care and attention (think about failing students). The point is that an additional perspective is always implied when we move from a ranking evaluation to a prescription or norm. While our evaluations of things may reveal reasons to treat them in certain ways, evaluations themselves are not justified or grounded in their connection to such reasons. There must be some additional kind of reasoning that bridges the gap between something's winning axiological approval and the approver's practical commitments to act on that basis. Again, DRR is hampered by its focus on "attitude" at the expense of emphasizing actions and practices (and resulting states of affairs).

Perhaps we can get somewhere if we think more carefully about what it means to make ranking appraisals. We should appreciate that there are multiple senses of "ranking." Let me call them "identity," "prescriptive," and "identity-prescriptive". An identity ranking describes where someone is in relation to the criteria. It labels and identifies the object as first, second, third (the company ranks lowest in profits). A "prescriptive" ranking says what should have priority at a practical level, it labels an action as something to do first, second, third (the company should be the first one to be restructured). There is no necessary relationship between a "top" descriptive ranking and a "top" prescriptive ranking. Identity-prescriptive ranking gives some sort of action priority on the basis of meeting some ranked threshold. The company is ranked lowest for profits, so it's our top priority for restructuring. Observe that the reasons to rank something are often quite different from the aesthetic or moral value we find in them. Cleaning your room ranks low when you have a dissertation to finish: prescriptive. Nothing ranks higher than a clean room: descriptive.[169] The very same values or facts, by and large, can serve as grounds for the ranking judgment as can be the grounds for the respectful orientation.

It follows that we cannot pick out some acts as respectful and some as merely esteeming by simply tracing back to the motivating judgment of the act. (i.e. it's just not true that when the prescription is based on non-relative features it's RR and when it's based on ranked features it's ER) The feeling or belief that something "deserves" some treatment is something that can be equally said of feelings of esteem, approval, or so-called recognition. Moreover, if we are going

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[169] Thus, the more appropriate comparison would be between the structure of practices instituting and expressing ranking judgments in general and the very different orientation of practices that intend to respect their object.

to limit the object of respect to being an "entity" and limit the treatment that counts as respect to treatment that at least preserves the entity's "integrity" (something which must be unpacked) then the entanglement between notions of "deserving" some positive response and being "worthy" and being "appreciated" or well-appraised -- is even more of a basic entanglement of concepts whose separation is forced and artificial.

We can see how easy it is to move from a comparative judgment to DRR by thinking about this example: That Josh happens to like me best is not thought to be a ground from which he can know how to respect me. But consider this: Josh values the fact that there are things Josh can enjoy treating as superior, Josh enjoys treating the things "he likes best" as superior. Josh likes me best. This fact about me puts me in an important position for Josh's value to be actualized. For Josh, therefore, the fact that he likes me best places a constraint on how he acts in relation to me. The moment he feels differently about me, he is no longer so constrained. His opinion of me is the decisive matter, rather than some indelible objective fact about my person.

I want to say that DRR has obscured this otherwise obvious point: There is no self-evident reason why statuses based on comparative evaluations would not be themselves "grounds" for RR.[170] As long as the status itself allows for the related values to be better realized it can turn out to be an "important" fact about someone that they have excelled in something. What is valued is not the fact that someone did worse than them, or that they themselves could have done worse, but having surpassed the requirements for adequacy and performed above average marks them out as a particularly good candidate for certain kinds of (RR) treatment. RR is not constituted by appreciative judgments, but public expressions of appreciation, for example, often play a significant role in the activity of RR-ing someone. It is not likely that we can even explain respect's logic without reference to values, and thus to appraisals.[171]

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[170] I am trying here to think about RR simpliciter as a prima facie good for an entity, distinct from personhood respect as good for that entity.

[171] Again this points to the problem of a "consideration" view of RR. Something tells us that if I give someone an award only in order for them to know that I think they are the best, that's quite a different motivation for giving someone the award/praise in order that the publicity of the award might help them receive the benefits and opportunities that they deserve due to their special talents. Identical actions, but in the sense that the action of public praise shows our admiration and "respect" for the actor, it's closer to the latter reasons. Otherwise it shows only our admiration of him. So, just because a treatment is "appropriate" to the given situation does not make it definable in terms of respect. It is fully appropriate to the meaning of admiration that one would want to share those feelings by way of praise. It also can be appropriate to interpret those admiring judgments as giving one reasons to relate in

Carl Cranor argues that personhood is itself a ranked position: it's a high/highest-priority status that we give only to certain beings that are capable of responding in a certain way to the world.[172] But setting personhood aside, any reckon-worthy trait that relates the entity in a positive way to the scheme of values, must have some priority--isn't the point that we are to pay attention to it, and our attention is limited? So, certain things "warrant" our respect, under certain conditions--i.e. relating them positively to a scheme of values has some non-negligible priority relative to the other ways we might interact with things. For example, someone might appreciate that not stepping on bugs respects them (in the grand scheme of things it allows them to do their part in the universe), and yet have no inclination to avoid stepping on bugs, given the competing concerns. Now, clearly the judgment of something as worthy is separable in practice from the treatment of that thing in accord with the judged worth.

Yet, we want a concept of respect that does clarify how RR both utilizes and limits our practices of ranking and our responses to ranking judgments. To see why more thought on the subject is needed, let's turn the earlier example around: Josh values the fact that there are things Josh (or anyone) can enjoy treating as superior, Josh enjoys treating those he "likes" as superior to those he does not like (by giving those he likes special privileges and treatment that is denied to those who he does not like). Treating what he likes best as superior depends on there being some who can be treated as inferior (those he does not like best). Josh does not like me. Perversely, this fact about me puts me in an "important" position for Josh's value (of treating someone as superior) to be actualized. Josh, thus, it would seem on this view that Josh "respects" me by treating me as an inferior to Anna, who he likes best. By treating me as inferior, Josh is making it possible for me to participate in the actualization of the value of preferential treatment. This surely seems bizarre and wrong as an example of respect, but we need to know why.[173]

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other ways. That someone seems to deserve admiration might make them a rival you want to harm or, in the right context, it might give you reasons to try to respect them in certain ways.

[172] Cranor, "Limitations on Respect-for-Persons Theories."

[173] The point I'm trying to make with this strange scenario is that a person could use very flimsy "facts" pertaining to their own view of another as grounds for status to give to that other person. So, for instance, slavers might have imagined that subordinated slaves had an important "status" in the chain of relations—the status of being the inferior that would allow another to be the superior. The sadist might think that the masochist should be honored to have himself demeaned, for it brings the masochist into the larger project of the sado-masochistic relation. Likewise, the perverse character of Josh might think that it honors me to be some part of his scheme of hierarchies. My comparative inferiority allows him to choose, appreciate, and enjoy his "favorite."

What is "important" in the relation of respect?

This leads us to the second, tricky, evaluation problem. As a conduct/subject-focused concept, DRR leaves us open to several general notions of RR, among which it would seem to be arbitrary to choose. Each notion implies a different way for the subject to conform their actions to "values." The first two DRR notions I'll discuss are what I'll call Institution-framed and Respecter-framed. Compare these two respect scenarios:

> INSTITUTION FRAMED: Clarissa respects herself as a model by doing what is necessary to maintain a very thin appearance. [DRR 1]

> RESPECTER FRAMED: Clarissa loves looking thin, so she respects herself "as" a thin-looking person by never wearing oversized clothes. [DRR 2]

Is one of these attitudes (DRR1 or DRR2) more paradigmatic of RR? DRR1 directs us to think that RR is a response to norms: the subject acts toward some fact or feature in ways that somehow cooperate with those norms (institution respect). DRR2, alternatively, suggests that RR is the giving of careful value-guided (i.e. "appropriate") consideration or attention to some fact or feature of an object.[174] In the first instance some institution of value determines what is appropriate. In the second case, the goodness of the object itself determines what is appropriate. This is problematic for using DRR as a way to theorize RR.

The respectful agent under DRR1 is cooperating with systems of norms in how they respond to some fact or feature. The attitude here is one of intending to cooperate with some system of norms in how one relates to some fact or feature about some object. Having a respectful disposition would involve both intending to and knowing how to do so. What are the "reasons of RR" under DRR1? They are the reasons people have for wanting to cooperate with systems of norms. They could value how the norms work and what they intentionally produce (system-valuers). They could fear the failure of the system that might come about through non-cooperation (system-fearers). They could value something likely to come to them from appearing to value the system of norms (opportunists). They could indirectly value/fear the

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[174] While it appears that DRR1 is broader, in fact DRR2 cannot be subsumed in it, and vice versa.

system of norms by valuing the way that system is connected to other things they directly value (collateral valuers/fearers). For example, the supermodel respects herself "as" a model by respecting (DRR1) her body "as" a thin body, for, though she questions the system of constructing beauty in a certain way, she collaterally values what being part of the system does for her.

The respectful agent under DRR2 is *not* constrained by the demand of conserving an existing system of norms. She is not consciously bound to an institution, whatever one might say about broader "institutions" constructing ideas about beauty. All that is needed to consider someone a respecter in DRR2 terms is that they have identified something that they have reason to think is important "about" the object which, at the same time, has a kind of importance that depends on how various features of the object are treated. So, Clarissa treats her body a certain way because she personally values looking thin--for its own sake. There is no "system" per se, to which the DRR2 respecter connects her intention. Instead, what renders the response "appropriate" is that she takes the fact or feature itself to be "important," full stop. In such a case, compliance with given norms is contingent upon the individual's beliefs that the norms are well-suited for the personal "standard" that she wants to actualize in her relating to some object. Clarissa's own values are, in this case, more directly connected to the objects she identifies as warranting attention.[175]

Must the respecter (as such) respond to values "as" instituted and shared, or might she also more simply respond just to her own values "as" subjectively *hers*? In the latter case, no legitimization of those values is required as part of the respecter determining how she "ought" to relate to the object.[176] All values are social or at least socially interpreted, but we need a theory

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[175] There are several quite different ways the subject in a DRR relation might relate to the values that "dictate" the appropriateness of her response to the fact or feature. Whose values determine what is the appropriate response? Her own values, as in (c) or Intitutional values, (b)?

[176] Ironically, Darwall might have missed the deeper reason that we sometimes choose to use the AR term instead of using the word "esteem." Why do we sometimes find ourselves saying, "I hold her moral character in high esteem," and at other times, "I have the deepest respect for her"? What difference of meaning or intention might be connoted in these different word choices? Perhaps the AR statement does not simply indicate an appraisal of character; rather it might be a way of communicatively marking out of the object for RR. This would be a rhetorical act that, in a sense, attempts to bridge an evaluative judgment and an intention to RR the entity. The speaker may well *explain* her statement in terms of her belief that, on the basis of the standards the person has lived up to, she is a deserving candidate for the subject's and others' RR. Not of course, as a "person," but in some area in which distinguishing status is appropriate—such as, as a "moral authority" or "morally wise person" or "morally reliable person" whom

of respect (a conception of RR) that can tell us where "respect" locates the respecter and respected in the space of values. My hypothesis is that both must be caught up not only in their own interaction as it appears at face-value, but in its effect on social symbolism ("social symbolism" will be discussed in the next chapter). While the agent can be constrained to attend in certain ways to an object just in view of what she appreciates about the object, this is not really "respect" for the object. Nor, however, does it seem that the object is respected just as long as the agent is constrained by shared norms in how she treats it. In fact, it may really be misleading to focus so much on how her own values "constrain" the agent (is she endorsing an institution or pursuing a personal desire?).

We might, rather, focus on the *object's relation to values* as what constrains the agent. Strictly speaking, DRR need not be understood as subject-focused (an outgrowth of a certain attitude). Let's try again to approach basic RR (DRR) as a relation defined more by how the object is treated than by the beliefs of the respecter and see if that gets us any additional clarity on how the respecter deploys values (whether her own or others' values). [177] [178]

Is Respect "for" Values?

Can we dissolve the worry about respect as subject- or object- focused by saying instead that it is "value-focused"? To say this would be to say, roughly, that the aim of RR is to advance values regardless of who appreciates those values and regardless of who is positioned to disclose them. This approach is suggested by Joseph Raz. According to Raz, values give us reasons.[179] So,

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we RR by treating them in ways that support their occupation of this status. I think you can just as easily say I hold her in the highest esteem. I have the deepest respect for her moral character.

[177] If the "fact/feature" plays a positive role, must the DRR respecter (as such) try to "support" or "secure" the feature in its positive role in relation to *institutional* or *personal* values? If the fact/feature/object poses a potential threat, must the DRR respecter (as such) do what is necessary to neutralize that threat? When the DRR treats something as "important," in what sense is the important thing being prioritized?

[178] We grant "personhood" status to create this fellowship, rendering ourselves moral equals through and through. But personhood is by far not the only status we ought to be concerned with respecting. If anything, the analysis of self-respect brings this out. Other valued roles, identities, and statuses may give rise to aims of respect that cannot be fulfilled by instituting "equality" or "impartiality." We will be looking for a way of understanding rank-independence that also at the same time makes room for valuing appreciation of entities in positions of difference.

[179] See *Value, Respect, and Attachment*.

respect, in preserving values (practices and valuers), preserves the very ground of practical reasoning. Setting aside for now Kantian attempts to refute the dependency of valuers on values, let us say that our ways of relating to the world and its objects are explained in terms of the (usually complex) values that we are pursuing.[180] The reason respect is not entirely morally neutral, despite the fact that there are very "unworthy" objects out there from a moral standpoint, is because we ought to value a priori any practice geared toward preserving values.

There is much to be said for Raz's approach, and the theory I develop in these chapters is influenced by it, but I think that, at least under the interpretation I've just advanced, this is not the best route. Such an idea is easily as broad and diffuse as what we find in DRR. Any judgment at all that picks out some fact or feature as "important" from some practical standpoint will be able to explain that importance in terms of the role the feature plays in the realization of values. Any relation to an object could be "respectful" from the point of view of some constellation of values. But some values are wrong and their wrongness gives us a reason to reject those values as providing standards of action. Either this ambiguity proves that respect has to be relegated to a parasitic[181] notion without anything but rhetorical value in our public discourse or we need to understand a more precise way respect "contributes" and guides our action. DRR itself unavoidably implies that respect is a response to values. But, again, I must ask how, precisely, does the object of respect figure in this response to value?

Valuing the contribution of the Object?

Thus far it has been unclear what we are to make of our destructive, negating "respect" claims. We have not yet explained how it is that promoting values by "respecting" dangers is conceptually different from promoting values by "respecting" entities. We want these to be different because we do not want to commit ourselves to a logic that would "respect" something

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[180] For the Kantian side of that debate see Korsgaard, "The Dependence of Value on Humanity."

[181] This is just another way of saying that respect would falsely seem to contribute to moral discourse, but that in fact it's meaning is siphoned off from other moral assumptions. At its worst it distracts us from noticing what moral commitments we have (we think we are just asking for "respect"—something everyone wants, but what we are really asking for, for instance, is to be treated as superior on the basis of some metaphysical idea of our worth (as King, man, human, wealthy person). At best, it doesn't obscure our underlying values, but focuses our attention on moments of responsibility and opportunity for engaging those values.

by destroying it or neutralizing its power. While it seems we should resist the idea that a respecter must personally cherish and value the "object" she respects, it seems at least as wrong that we should allow that a respecter can have contempt for the object she "respects." [182]

While remaining open to the possibility that a real relation of respect might involve a respecter who does not personally value the institution, the idea is that the object of respect is picked out (by the norms, say) for the things that make it valuable (not dangerous) to the institution. Let's say that "valuing" types of respect can be further divided into (a) those that *center* on practices (if you will, institutions of value) and only value the object (the entity) as something capable of augmenting the institution, and (b) those that center on institutions of value and think of the object as a kind of *intrinsic contributor*. What I mean by "intrinsic contributor" is one who not only makes a difference to how an institution actualizes values, but one who is, in some way, intrinsic to or part of the "point" of the institution--part of what makes it valuable at all. Let's call type (a) "object" as "institutional means" and (b) "object" as "institutional end".[183] In valuing (rather than purely prudential or descriptive) cases of RR, what might be the difference in how appraisals of value guide the respecter's response to the "facts" and "features" of (a) the object-as-means as compared to (b) the object-as-end? DRR only tells us that the respect relation is not exclusively about expressing the judgment of high evaluation. It says nothing about how our provisional and conditional appraisals of the object vis. the institution inform our perception of its important "features."

Perhaps Darwall's tennis-player example can help reveal the issues of vagueness and equivocation that concern me here. Darwall's tennis player example is used to show that respect is relative to the standards of a given practice, but how does respect relate the object to the practice? Tennis has different elements which each have their "role" in making it a good game.

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[182] As Eva Kittay pointed out to me, contempt for the respected would probably be an oxymoron. However, depending on what one understands by "contempt" it might be possible to have contempt for someone personally and still be committed to respecting them "as" a human being. I have contempt for Donald Trump and yet there are limits to what I will do in response to that contempt. If Kant is correct that the moral law within makes even the most contemptable person free to change and do good, then there will be important "facts" about people that warrant treating them in ways that keep open the possibility that they will change. Will such a relation end up counting as respect?

[183] Here Shelly Kagan's idea of intrinsic worth might be helpful. In "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," Kagan argues that someone or something can have intrinsic value through the way in which they contribute to other things of value. Their value does not have to be completely self-contained and independent of other values to be "intrinsic."

There are the rules, the players, the audience, the skills/form, the material court, the immaterial broadcast, etc. From the perspective of valuing tennis, one should not interfere with and one should try--when one is able-- to increase the effectiveness of all these elements (these, we might say, become relevant facts and features of tennis). If you are someone who regularly acts in ways that increases the effectiveness of these features of the game, you demonstrate respect for[184] the object "the tennis game." You treat "tennis" in its particulars as something important enough to constrain your actions. But not only that, you limit your actions to those that would increase the likelihood that tennis will be valued by others.[185]

Notice, moreover, that the very actions that support the valuableness of tennis seem to preserve and support the features of tennis "as" good-making features. So, you "respect" the particulars themselves--the players "as" tennis players, the rules "as" the rules of tennis, the court "as" a tennis court. This means that you enable and empower each of these elements to be as good as it can be in accord with the standards of goodness set by the way the practice of tennis is valued. Your actions increase the chances that those who value tennis will see the value of tennis as comprising—perhaps irreducibly—the "health" of each element. Thus, it seems that just by being a participant in a practice (a player, a racket, a court, a member of the audience) one is in a position to be recognition respected from the point of view of the value of tennis. The respecter gives additional legitimacy to the role-players in and through supporting the value of the game. If we look at this and probably many other examples, we are struck by a sort of harmony between parts and whole.[186] Any participant in the game of tennis would obviously desire to be RR "as" such. To know "how" to empower the participants one needs only to know how to empower their participation itself. Or so it appears.

But what if we change the example from tennis to bull fighting? By what means could we recognition respect the bull "as" an element of the bullfight? By what means could we respect the gladiator "as" an element in the cultural form whose value his body helps to realize? By what

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[184] The cultural "object" tennis--or perhaps more accurately--the "object" of this or that actual tennis match (instances of the cultural object) even if you yourself don't think much of the game.

[185] See Raz, *The Practice of Value*.

[186] The human value of tennis (part) vis. human values (whole) and the value of playing a role in the practice of tennis (part) vis. one's own larger value set (whole).

means could we respect the victim of a ritual killing in her role in that practice? In each of these cases a key (and often admired) element is an entity that is literally destroyed by the practice that it participates in. As much as someone might "worship" the bull in a bullfight, the bull really is an object as institutional means, not an object as institutional end. What might conceptually allow us to draw a line between a conception of respect "for" objects-as-means and a conception of respect for objects-as-ends?[187] It seems like these two alleged conceptions would place quite different demands on the respecter and are fulfilled by different criteria.

One response would be to bite the bullet and agree that respect is truly for the sake of values, not primarily for the various participants in values (Raz). On this view it would not matter that some objects are destroyed by the very practices that they make valuable. As long as your action toward them preserves their power to play their value-making role, you have respected "them" (for the sake of the values). Respect, on this view, is a relation between subject and object whereby the subject helps secure the "usefulness" of the object to and for a system of values. To be "properly used" is thus to be respected![188] If so, this concession has the unfortunate relativistic result I am trying to avoid. I think a different approach to respect is still available that might work for my purposes.[189]

2.3 Chapter Conclusion: Proposing an Empowerment Concept of Respect

We want a coherent concept of *respect as a response to value* that preserves the *integrity* of the respected object. That will be the aim of the chapters that follow. I will be calling this concept **"Empowerment Respect" (EMPR).** What sort of relation, going by the term "respect" is so vital to the "respected" that it can be thought to be a prima facie good to have it and it can be thought to be good, too, from the perspective of liberalism and democracy? What sort of

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[187] Without too hastily committing ourselves to a Kantian conception of personhood for example.

[188] On this view, respecting objects would still involve not interfering with and helping if possible with their "appropriate" destruction. The relation, while it would be "between" the subject (respecter) and the object (respected) would be dictated completely outside of that relation.

[189] Those purposes being to locate a concept or conception of respect that is right for political liberalism.

relation can take the "self" as its object in such a way that we can safely consider it to be "perhaps the most important primary good"?

      If DRR does not point us in the direction of such a theory, its shortcomings begin to. The two problems--the object problem and the appraisal problem result in two hypothetical constraints. The following two constraints are derived in response to DRR purposefully narrow the scope of what can be contained in a relation of RR. What we will be looking for is a definition of RR that can make sense out of these two constraints. (1) Only entities that are value-reckonable can be objects of RR; and (2) Only actions that preserve the "integrity" of the entity can count as respectful actions. If respect were for the sake of its object, then constraint (1) would not be needed. If respect were for the sake of values, constraint (2) would not be needed. What then is respect "for"? What does this relation aim to achieve, such that it constrains us in both of these ways at once? My hypothesis is that respect's aim is *normative* empowerment for the entity.[190] *Respect is a relation in which the respecter does what there is reason to believe would secure and sustain the entity's ongoing ability to make a positive difference to a normative system.*

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[190] Object of respect = entity.

Chapter 3 -- Toward a Concept of Empowerment Respect

3.1 Chapter introduction

Let me start this chapter by offering again a provisional definition of Empowerment Respect (EMPR): *EMPR is a relation in which the respecter does what there is reason to believe will secure and sustain the entity's ability to make a positive difference to a normative system.* The aim of this chapter is to sharpen this provisional definition and to see if even more precise conceptual boundaries might be drawn. To do this I will discuss two features of respect and I will then ask how we might think of those features in terms of the structure of respect as a "relational" concept.

In the previous chapter I argued that DRR (Recognition Respect as conceived by Stephen Darwall) is not an adequate foundation for a political liberal theory of respect. Two vague areas stood in need of clarification. **First, what limits are there on what can be an "object" of respect? Second, in what precise sense is respect a response to value?** On the first issue I argued that there is a conceptual difference between "relations with entities" and "relations with facts." I concluded that a coherent account of RR for the political context needs to conceptualize the object of respect as an "entity" and not, say, a "value" or a "fact" or a "feature." Complicating this, I also claimed that RR, while being "for" entities, is not strictly speaking "for the sake of" entities. RR picks out entities that are thought to reckonably influence values or to be reckonably value-relevant. **I thus claimed that the object of respect is an entity that is "value-reckonable."** Yet, why would RR be "for" entities unless there was something about the integrity-conditions of the entity upon which the values depended? Conditions of RR, thus, presuppose that RR gives reasons to preserve, rather than attack, the entity's integrity conditions.

On the second issue, I asked: If RR need not be driven by a desire to do good for the entity, yet must at least be driven by a need to preserve its integrity for the sake of some system of values, then how exactly is RR "valuing" the entity? This called for a critical revisiting of Darwall's distinction between appraisal and recognition "respect." To think it to be an intrinsically good thing to give recognition respect to an entity (as opposed to a prudentially good thing) would involve some minimal approval of the entity's ongoing power to relate themselves positively to the relevant system of values. What is the nature of this "approval"?

I concluded that objects of respect are entities and that respecting entities somehow involves (cannot exclude) giving them influence in domains of value, and preserving their integrity. Respect ought to be thought of as a relation by which the respected secures greater influence on values without sacrificing integrity. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how such ideas might be specified so as to structure and limit a concept of RR which I will call Empowerment Respect (EMPR). The first step is to consider what it means for a concept to be "relational." In the first part of this chapter I will discuss relational concepts and argue that RR (EMPR), like care, is a "treatment" relation. (I push the comparison with concepts and theories of care because it is my view that respect and care are probably our most important and dynamic political concepts. I also think they are irreducible to one another.) Given this understanding of respect as a relation of "treatment," I will in the second part of the chapter specify two defining features of this treatment: uptake dependence and social symbolism.

3.2 Respect as a Relational Concept

I've proposed that, to be "respecting" of the entity, the action must, in some way—somewhere down the line—square with the entity's own objective interests. At the same time, the focus of or "reasons of" respectful action need not be (and usually are not) the entity's own flourishing, happiness, freedom, or security. There is, thus, a curious and dynamical interplay between what constitutes respect as a "relationship" or relational concept, what constitutes respect as a response to historical values, and what constitutes respect as entity-benefiting treatment.[191] I will be arguing that respect requires that the respecter's action achieve a limited though complex result: a value-disclosing position for the entity (normative power for the entity). But to what extent must the respecter know or believe that this is what they are doing? Respect is clearly a relation of some sort, but what sort? Whose values, whose intentions matter?

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[191] I will compare EMPR to concepts of care developed by care ethicists, to show that Empowerment Respect is relational in multiple ways, and most importantly that it is a kind of treatment. One reason that I want to advance comparisons between respect and care is my belief that respect and care are probably our most important and dynamic political concepts.

In which way is Empowerment Respect relational?

The way a concept "relates" its subject and object is going to tell us something about *how* the concept gives us reasons—what must we be concerned with in order to achieve it? [192] So to know if I've achieved the descriptive relation of being "next door to" Martha, I merely need to know where Martha is relative to me. To know whether I am Martha's neighbor, it is not enough to know that she happens to physically be in the apartment next door. I need to know something about both of our social identities with regard to the apartments we inhabit. If I "adore" Martha, then the relation is true just in case there is a "Martha" that is the object of my feelings. Now, take a relation such as "searching" as in "I am searching for Martha;" this relation is true not just based on where I happen to be relative to Martha, or what our relative social identities are, or how I happen to feel about Martha, but it depends on an action I am taking relative to her. I am searching for her. And yet, it's fine, conceptually, if I never find her. All that is needed to make it true is that I am sincerely taking actions to try to find her. (When Elmer says "yesterday I hunted rabbits" we need only inquire whether or not he took up the aim of routing out some rabbits; we don't need to know if he succeeded in catching any.) Finally, if I claim that I "healed" Martha, for that to be true it would be the case that Martha was healed because of something I did. This relation must involve a change that the subject brings about in the object. (So, if the fire heats the water, that is similar to my healing Martha.)

Respect is not any of these sorts of relations just described. It is more complex. In being Martha's "respecter" I need to bring about some sort of change (or make some sort of difference) in her situation – so it's more like healing her than like searching for her. And yet, I also need to have some sort of belief about Martha or intentions toward her. I could heal her by accident, but I intend to find her when I search for her. More importantly, just as there has to be *somebody (some willing person) searching for Martha if we are to say that she was searched for, there has to be somebody, some willing person respecting Martha, if we are to say she has been respected*. So, respect is the kind of thing that must be undertaken with some kind of generally "respectful"

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[192] For example, if we are debating whether or not someone acted from "envy," we'd look to the concept of envy to help us sort out what we are talking trying to assess. The concept would guide us to focus on the feelings and beliefs of the agent: does he have (his own) reasons for thinking that the allegedly "envied" person has humiliatingly more of something that he wants? Does the action reflect the related desire to cut down or punish the opponent for the pain that they have (inadvertently) inflicted?

intention toward the respected entity and that intention is not itself sufficient. The intention also needs to result in something regarding the respected. Somehow it seems even better—somehow the respect is more perfectly achieved—if Martha knows that *someone* has respected her. Yet, her knowledge of being respected by me or anyone on this or that day, in this or that way, does not seem to be essential. It seems that for someone capable of thinking about respect; however, it is important that they are respected by those who can form such intentions about them. So, if Martha was treated respectfully by everyone she knew, but somehow she never thought anyone ever considered her as someone to be respected—and so never realized that the good things that were happening to her were the result of intentions to respect her—well, that would seem to diminish the value of all those acts.[193] Martha would probably suffer under the belief that she was not anyone's object of respect. Let's say that, like care, respect is a "treatment relation" and that part of the meaning and value of respect involves the fact that it is being done intentionally. This will mean that "respecting" – doing it and receiving it – must be accounted for both in terms of intentions and in terms of effects--such that the intentionality of the act becomes *part of* or essential to the effect that defines the act. This conjecture echoes the claims of care ethicist Virginia Held, who (along with other care ethicists), has argued that the concept of care is relational in precisely this way. Held writes,

> Care is a practice involving the work of care-giving and the standards by which the practices of care can be evaluated. Care must concern itself with the effectiveness of its efforts to meet needs, but also with the motives with which care is provided. It seeks good caring relations...The caregiver may be trying to form a relation or must imagine a relation… (Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 37)

One is not truly cared for if, say, during a treatment, one's point of view is ignored, one is treated as a nuisance or burden, etc.[194] Goods of care can be delivered in ambiguous and imperfect ways, but standards of care: the fullest completion of care cannot be reached when the

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[193] But is this completely true? Respect (EMPR) seems to be more like torture, for example, than it is like hunting (pardon the violence of these examples). But if that were strictly the case, then an entity could only fully "receive" respect if they were themselves capable of thinking about the intentions of others. I don't think that is true, for I think that non-rational and non-self-conscious entities can receive (and warrant) respect. Certain relations can only take place among self-aware reasoners. Respect is *not* like this. But if respect is not like this, care is surely not either. Perhaps returning to this comparison between respect and care will help with understanding a treatment relation that does not depend on the object's full consciousness of the subject's intentions.

[194] In care ethics we see how the type of treatment received—not just the results of the treatment—are part of what it is to be in a relation of care.

care giver does not act as if they care "about" the cared-for. What makes care valuable—from an ethical and political point of view—is partly the lessons it teaches us, the standards it brings, how we interact on the basis of vulnerability. One reason it is of value to be cared for by another, rather than just healed by an indifferent nature, is because the modes of interaction of care create valuable bonds and moments of mutual recognition that are of independent value to the health and wellbeing of the individual body and mind.

But is it the same with respect (EMPR)? In arguing for an "empowerment" concept of respect, I'm claiming, in part, that **respect is "about" *somebody* helping to get you, the object (an entity), into a value-disclosing position**.

Compare these (fictional) statements.

> At the press conference Moses finally respected his engineering partners by giving them public credit for their creative contributions to the project. Thanks to Moses's long-overdue gesture, his younger collaborators are now in a better position to influence future aspects of city planning.

> At the press conference, Moses announced his great respect for those property owners who had sacrificed precious farmland for the creation of beautiful public parks and parkways, announcing that they deserved the utmost gratitude from the city for their contribution. The farmers who had had no choice but to give up the land found such public acknowledgment to be cold comfort—in fact, it added insult to injury that he would frame the situation in such "uplifting" moral terms.

Most readers would agree that only the first of these two statements approaches what respect requires. While it is nice to be thanked and "appreciated," the question is what such public statements "do" that would count as genuine respect. In both statements there is an attitude of "crediting" (appreciation), but this attitude does not provide the causal force that makes the difference between respect and hypocrisy. This simply reinforces what we already know: as a relational concept, respect is not simply a relation of belief or judgment "about" the object. The respecter's accountable action is somehow a cause of some opportunity that the respected is in a position to (and does) take up. Intentions seem important, especially because the "opportunity" reflects the respecter's correct judgment of what would get positively taken up by the respected. Respect thus implies a standard of action.

If respect is relational in the way being discussed, then the "aim" of respect must somehow be fundamentally tied to having "someone" respected by you. Obviously there are

many instances where the experience of being respected hinges on the respected's beliefs *about the respecter's beliefs*. Yet you can, it seems, do the respectful thing in ways that do not involve the respected taking up your action "as" *your/someone's* action. But, why then is *"respect"* a prima facie good for the respected and not, rather, the outcomes that respect brings? If there are non-intentional ways one can be put into a certain desirable "relational" state (healed, tickled), then the concept of getting put into that state would seem to be independent of any feelings, expectations, attitudes or experiences characteristic between those who (believe they) are intentionally put into that state and those who intentionally put them there. The experiences, expectations, etc. that relate to the intention and knowledge of intention are perhaps added onto, rather than definitive of, the concept of being put into that state. Healing can be brought about in non-intentional ways, but is often valued as a way of being connected to someone (the healer and the healed). It is good not only that I am well, but that *you* made me well. The fact that your intentional efforts were the cause of my wellness establishes a new and positive bond between us.[195]

Why require that there be an agent who is "deliberately" doing the respecting? Consider this agent-dependent formulation of Empowerment Respect: Empowerment Respect is a relation in which an entity enjoys some (higher) degree of normative power thanks to the actions of some agent. To test this idea, let's imagine an alternative formulation. Instead of "thanks to the actions of some agent" why can't we just say, *respect is any series of events that leads to increased normative power for the entity*? So, a storm destroys a village but leaves the church untouched. As a result the villagers feel even more strongly that the church is a sacred site. The storm has caused the church to be more likely to be engaged with and made to disclose value by the inhabitants. Should we say that the storm literally (and not just metaphorically) "respected" the church (or the villagers as worshippers)? If that does not make sense, then what essential thing is provided by the fact that respect is coming from an agent. I have already claimed that an agent can be respectful without having very robust pro-beliefs about the respected. But if respect is not centrally or essentially an "expression" of the agent's beliefs about the importance of the respected object, then what role is the agency playing?

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[195] I may come to value you and bring you into my orbit in a different way because you/it healed me. We are connected by virtue of the fact that you healed me.

Perhaps, though, I'm asking the question in the wrong way. Care Ethicists who maintain that the ideal of care involves interpersonal connection of a certain kind do not thereby claim that being a virtuous caregiver depends upon the recipient of care knowing that these are your intentions. Rather, they say that what guides the virtuous caregiver is an idea that, more generally, care is an experience of having *people—n*ot nature, not machines—respond in a certain way to your needs. To receive "care" on this view is distinct from receiving a cure. One experiences having one's needs addressed by agents. Caring at first seems to be like healing, discussed above. There are caring ways to interact with someone, but there are lots of ways to actively give care, such that the completion of that care need not include the other's awareness that *someone is concerned about their wellbeing.* Care is surely seeking the well-being of the cared for but, as Nel Noddings early insisted, this seeking takes place in the context of human connection.[196] Care is thus a compound and complex concept: it is about *using interpersonal relations to bring about wellbeing*. Though there are myriad practices of care, there is no care without a *carer*, and for good reason.[197] The caregiver is or as such becomes a skilled presence in the person's life through a narratively meaningful duration, such that her reliable presence is itself a reason to believe one is more secure in one's exposure to the world (the carer helps the cared for to safely expose more of itself to the world).

EMPR, it seems to me, parallels care in the ways discussed above. Care is not just about addressing the needs of a vulnerable being, but about how *relationships* can help the cared for to be more safely exposed to the world. A respect relation (and a desire for respect) is about how this efficacious position for the respected is brought about by people who mean to do so. This means that respect involves trust in human ways of handling things. We might say that caring relations both require and produce trust in how we handle vulnerability; respectful relations, by

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[196] See Noddings, *Caring*.

[197] Care requires at least either distanced action with mutual knowledge of intentions or direct interaction with (at least) one-sided intentions—such that standards of care must include beliefs and attitudes – and is ultimately one by which the carer is herself (by her attitudes and beliefs about the cared-for) an additional reason for the cared-for to feel more secure in having her needs fulfilled.

comparison, require and produce trust in how we handle the freedom, power, and authority that social norms create.[198]

What we are seeing, then, is that empowerment respect is a complex relation in which the respecter acts in ways that sustain or help to bring about the respected's disclosure of value.

3.3 Uptake Dependence and Social Symbolism

As a treatment relation, the truth of claims of EMPR (the standards by which we determine if this relation is occurring) depend on multiple factors. We have to look both at how the object is affected by the subject as well as the extent to which this effect might depend upon the shared understanding of the subject's intentions. In response to this, I will develop two more specific ideas about RR's characteristics. Let's say these are two "constraints" on EMPR: **uptake-dependence** and **social symbolism.** "Uptake-dependence" states that whether or not RR has happened depends on its impact on the object. That is, RR is a (qualified) "success" concept. [199] "Social symbolism" states that an action is only to be categorized as "RR" (EMPR) when the activity is symbolically self-affirming. In other words, to be respecting an entity, one must take an action that is "received" in a certain way by the entity *and* one's act, so taken up, must "express" social legitimacy. Put together, these theses help to explain some of our deeper intuitions about the boundaries of respect claims. I will use the example of Carol, Bernice, and

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[198] This subtle point may appear either to be hair-splitting, or to seem like common sense requiring no further explanation. But something that is commonplace in our lives is not, for that reason simple or easy to deploy at the theoretical level.

[199] There is a plethora of writing on "respect" that talks about the meaning of respect (always fitted to personhood and the right to equal standing) still treats respect just as an attitude. Ian Carter, for example, defines respect as "a substantive moral attitude that involves abstaining from looking behind the exteriors of people present to us as moral agents" (Carter, "Respect and the Basis of Equality"). Carter's concept of respect seems specifically designed as a concept for how to respond to the idea of equal human dignity. All the discussions of respect-for-persons begin with the assumption that respect = appropriate attitude/treatment and that we are looking to find out what is the appropriate way to see (and thus to treat?) human beings as moral equals. I'm theorizing that what might make respect a useful concept is to go in a different direction and ask what relation between attitude treatment and outcome produces the results of "being respected." Attitude is one component, but unless we settle on what "being respected" is like, we can't locate attitudes, treatments, and causally related states of affairs. This is why it's important to start thinking about respect as a relational concept that is more like care. Ironically, once we see what respect is "doing" for its object, we no longer need to proceed in such an ad hoc way in terms of making respect a circular artifact of the moral definition of the object. Moreover, we don't need to artificially cordon off "evaluative and individual" properties from those that are pseudo universal.

Avery to suggest that in a respect relation (as opposed to other kinds of relations like care) the entity's good-making integrity is "preserved" and "protected" in ways that are also at the same time socially symbolic.[200] The dual requirements of uptake-dependence and social symbolism mean that true relations of RR must do more than generate "rank." Comparatively privileged standing (rank) is not necessarily respectful treatment. This has implications for purely symbolic statuses like "moral person".

3.3.1 Uptake Dependence and the standards the respecter must meet

Despite their efforts, they failed to respect her physical condition.

This policy failed to respect teachers' ability to tell right from wrong.

You won't respect the power of the opera by listening to it on even the best headphones.

I know you're trying, but you can't do that and respect the trust in our relationship.

You think you are respecting your dog's instincts, but those instincts were warped long ago.

Ordinary language is a fickle friend when it comes to theorizing respect. One reason, of course, is because we use the word respect to mean different things. But another, more important reason, is that when we talk about respect we compress a complex relation into a shorthand that indicates the elements of that relation that we want to highlight. The shorthand is wonderfully succinct and evocative, *and* particularly good at *obscuring* the idea that the object of respect is an entity. In the examples above, what is evoked is some kind of failure to do what would have been necessary to respect the *entity*[201]: the *person* with the atypical body, the *teachers* with sound moral judgment, the opera known to be powerful, the relationship characterized by trust, the dog whose instincts are warped.

While some work is needed to locate the "object" of respect in our typical respect claims, one thing that is easy to see is that attempts to respect things can--and often do--fall short. Why

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[200] This means (a) that respect is not only a relation between a subject and an object, but respect is a relation between a subject and an object *and* those who might encounter the object in the future and (b)respect-practices are sensitive to the perceived relative social positions of respecter and respected.

[201] Loosely understood as something with its own integrity conditions.

is it that the "respecter's" intentions--so often framed by genuine appreciation and a desire to promote an entity's connection to values--frequently fail to meet their target (fail to achieve such a connection)? We may act deferentially in ways that the other person finds insulting, we may provide services that the other person cannot engage with. We may be frightening when we mean just to be firm. We communicate low expectations when we only mean to be flexible. We may handle something with care and nevertheless break it. We may execute our end of the bargain perfectly well, except for sending the beneficiary the message that it was an act of charity rather than duty. Abstractly speaking, something has failed to go through. If respect called upon us to simply to do what to us seems consistent with an appreciative seeing of the other, then these failures would not be so much a part of our discourse. Respect would be simpler.

But why should respect be simple? With other concepts we readily accept that there is a qualitative difference between effort and achievement. It's valuable to try to give care, but it's hardly the same thing as achieving the end of having someone cared for. It's valuable to seek justice, but it's hardly the same thing as winning the court case. However, when one reviews the literature on respect, it often seems as if the sole thing that matters is that the respecter has made up his or her mind in the right sort of way. To act from a "sense" of the other's importance is, on this subtle set of assumptions, what it really means to be respectful. What is involved in the formation of an intention to be respectful is surely worthy of study, but it is merely part--and not even always the prime part--of a more complex and dynamic relation.

Carol's Uptake and the Disagreement between Bernice and Avery

Bernice wants Officer Carol to be respected by Avery. Let's credit Bernice's request as being about RR for Carol. As I'll argue, assumptions about Carol's potential "reception" of Avery's act guide the logic of Bernice's request that Avery "respect" Officer Carol by behaving deferentially. To start, let's review the imagined dialogue between Bernice and Avery, which I repeat here for convenience.

> Officer Carol approaches the car window. As Avery rolls the window down the young officer asks for his license and explains that he's driving with an expired inspection sticker. Avery produces his license, and along with that a glare of disgust. Officer Carol is calm when she explains the requirements and the cost of the ticket. As a matter of procedure she asks Avery, who looks something like her grandfather, why he has

allowed the sticker to expire. Avery says, "Young lady, just give me the ticket and stop wasting my time."
"Alright Sir," Carol responds blankly, giving Avery the ticket from her clipboard. From across the car, Avery's
wife, Bernice, leans over. "We're sorry, officer. Have a nice day." The officer nods at Bernice and returns to
her motorcycle. The couple pulls back onto the freeway.

"Avery. At your age don't you know we should respect officers of the law?"

"Do what you like, Bernice. Not me. That young woman does not get an iota of my respect. She's lucky I
went along with her as nicely as I did....I don't see why anyone should look up to cops, Bernice."

"I'm *not* saying you should be looking up to her like she's somebody special. I'm saying that there's a way we
are supposed to treat her because she is an officer of the law and that's what she is. We are law-abiding
citizens and she is an officer of the law. If you don't like it, you should find a different way to deal with it."

As a couple, it would not be unusual to argue in order to justify evaluative judgments about
other people's worth or character. But, as we've established, this is not what is at stake for
Bernice, and she tells Avery as much. What Bernice wants from Avery is that he engage with a
certain sort of reasoning that does not depend on his personal approval of Carol. Now their
conversation can turn to the matter of what might justify or fail to justify Avery's *treatment* of
the officer.[202]

Bernice has asked Avery to behave in a certain way toward Carol. If Avery is to know
whether Bernice's demand on him is justified, he needs to understand how Bernice connects
Carol's being an officer to things that are of value. Let's imagine that Avery asks Bernice *why*
she wants to respect officers of the law. Her response might be, "I give respect to officers of the
law because of the role they play in maintaining public peace." Bernice's claim is that she
knows a peace-relevant fact about the person (entity) Carol. That fact is that Carol is an officer of
the law. Carol's being an officer gives Bernice, on Bernice's view, a way of reckoning with
Carol such as to promote Carol's own capacity to contribute to the value of public peace. Let's
say Avery agrees that what makes someone a "contributor to the maintenance of peace" thereby
becomes a thing about them, other things equal, one would want to help to preserve. Bernice
will have to convince Avery that (i) being an officer *does* give some people (socially-contingent)
opportunities to contribute to peace, (ii) that Carol is the kind of person such that treating her in

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[202] Bernice makes it clear that she is not concerned with whether Avery admires or esteems Officer Carol. According
to Bernice, the "fact" that someone is an officer of the law means that they warrant a certain kind of *treatment*. Thus,
in accord with Darwall's distinction, she criticizes Avery for his failure to RR the officer by his actions, rather than
(simply) his failure to properly appraise or esteem her. Avery, on the other hand, has readied himself to defend his
negative *appraisal* of the officer[#] (and implied in his self-defense is the idea that his negative appraisal justifies the
negative treatment).

certain ways will (iii) help solidify these officer-based opportunities, and that (iv) Avery is in a position to successfully engage in such treatment make a difference to Carol's status as an officer being useful for public peace, and finally (v) that Avery himself has no overriding reason not to so engage.[203] This is a tall order indeed.

Bernice's claim that Officer Carol warrants Avery's respect hinges on the connection Bernice makes between the "fact or feature," Officer Carol the individual, officers the type, and her and Avery's relation to them. When she makes a claim about what warrants RR she enters a space of practical reasoning which is not "complete" unless she arrives at a notion of what, in her own case, the specific treatment counting as "respectful" should be. If "contributing to the maintenance of peace" is not what being an officer of law helps one to do, then Carol's being an officer gives Avery no grounds *from the value of peace* to respect Carol. Bernice will fail to convince Avery based on (i). But, let's imagine that Avery agrees with (i). Crucially, Avery will need to be convinced jointly of (ii) and (iii). This is where "uptake dependence" comes in.

There is something that it is for an officer to be "recognized" as an officer, we might say. Giving respect (RR), like giving care, help, punishment, or instruction is something that advances some desired state of affairs. What state of affairs are we aiming bring about when we give RR? Recall my provisional definition of respect for entities: *Respect is a relation in which the respecter does what there is reason to believe would secure and sustain the entity's ability to make a positive difference to the normative system.* To know that Bernice is aiming at this for Carol is to at least have a basis for beginning to assess the plausibility of Bernice's notions of what practices respect Carol. Bernice, in this case, simply wants Avery to be polite and deferential toward Carol. What is it about being polite that helps make "being an officer" the kind of thing that can make one a contributor to peace?[204] This, I am maintaining, is close to the same thing as asking, What is it about being polite to them that "respects" people "as" Officers? Avery might look at the evidence and argue against Bernice that deferential treatment of officers

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[203] (v) is not part of what would make conditions for RR possible, but is part of Avery's decision-making process and part of what might make it reasonable for him to RR Carol.

[204] We shouldn't be so fast to assume a tight connection between the "reasons" to give respect, the "facts or features," and the "aims" of respect. If to respect is akin to care, destruction or some other treatment-term, then you can surely try *and succeed* in doing x to y's even if you are in the dark about what y's are and even if your reasons for wanting to do x are mistaken.

reinforces a culture of arrogance and violence on their part—that this politeness does exactly the opposite of supporting their officer-based potential to advance the value of peace. In this case, Avery would be disagreeing with (iii)—the specific norm of treatment that Bernice thinks achieves the aim of respect in general for people who are officers. Another way for Avery to disagree with (iii) is on the basis of typical integrity conditions. Roughly speaking, a person cannot be considered a candidate for the "taking up" of the respectful act if doing so is likely to be destabilizing or destructive of their basic well-being. The source of the entity's capacity to *be* productively responsive to others' value-relevant actions must at least be preserved. It's hard to imagine how "politeness" would pose any such risk to Carol, but opportunities for heroism often do. The idea of the uptake constraint is that the entity is able to take advantage of the act of respect in a manner that is consistent with her core identity and needs. The greater the conflicts and tradeoffs required from the entity in order to capitalize on the respectful act, the more reason we have to question whether or not the practice of respect is sufficiently respectful.

But, let's now imagine that Avery agrees with Bernice's understanding of (iii). He agrees that in a broad context, the role or status of officer is such that to be polite to someone who is an officer is to help that individual to contribute to the value of public peace. However, Avery knows something Bernice does not know. He knows that Carol lacks the features that make such a treatment relevant in her case. Carol is a cyborg who records infractions and interactions with community members while enforcing laws. Communications go through her to some central office. She has no agency and she is not programmed to be affected in her abilities by politeness or rudeness[205].[206] If--as a cyborg-- Officer Carol is not the kind of entity that can be put in the RR state of affairs (thus unaffected by any imaginable RR treatment, assuming there are such entities) then in this case Bernice's request that Avery respect Carol loses its purchase.[207] However nice the intentions, efforts to "respect" someone are mere efforts, nothing more, unless

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[205] Think about all the automated voice phone interfaces that we get so frustrated with and are "rude" to, when in fact nobody is there to "receive" our rude response.

[206] Alternatively, Carol has a psychological disorder that causes her to have a dissociative reaction to anything that hints at insincerity (such as ritual politeness).

[207] If--as someone with an atypical psychic disorder--Carol would be harmed by typical gestures, then the same follows.

there is evidence that our actions are being received in the desired way *by the particular entity we are engaging*.

In summary, Bernice's beliefs about Carol's "respectability" are justified by justifying a constellation of beliefs that hang together: the value of public peace, a practice that contributes to it, roles required for that practice, people who play those roles, practices that tend to empower people to play those roles in the peace-promoting way, an opportunity to *successfully* engage such a practice vis-a-vis existing individuals or an individual. Focusing on the entity's reception of the allegedly respectful act helps us to be more precise in how we analyze respectful intentions and interactions.

Empowerment Respect is prospective[208] and "facts" and "features" are value-neutral

Uptake Dependence dovetails naturally with another idea: that EMPR is prospective, not retrospective. This, in turn, invites us to rethink what are the "facts" and "features" that give warrant to respect, as I will now try to explain.

While we often think that respect becomes "warranted" on the basis of what an entity has done or who they have shown themselves to be, the justificatory grounds for respect are *prospective* and actually depend more on what will sustain the entity as a value-contributor over time. What the past and present gives us is knowledge about their potentially reckonable features and the potentially important facts about their lives going forward. When we take seriously that the relation of respect is state-focused and *prospective*, this makes us think differently about the different reasons "facts" and "features" become worth reckoning with in a respect-relation. DRR (Darwall's Recognition Respect) implies that the important "fact" is itself the focus of our respectful attention, but if this is so, then it is so in an ambiguous way. An attitude-focused, respecter-focused concept of respect takes the valuing respecter to notice a "valuable" fact or feature about someone and to want to respond to that fact in "appropriate" ways. This would be divided off from the person who "obstacle respects" something by trying to respond in the "appropriate" ways to the features that make it dangerous. But when we focus on the idea that

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[208] Eva Kittay suggested the terminology "prospective"

respect must do a particular kind of thing for its entity (empower it in relation to a system of values) then this way of dividing things up loses its usefulness.

In order to avoid having a negative impact on the object/entity in view of the important facts about it, RR demands we take into "consideration" potentially numerous features of the object's existence and *not simply the "valued feature."*[209] For example, a child's capacity to use her imagination in play might be a feature about that child which we feel we ought to develop and support. To do so, we arrange our actions and environment with a focus on whatever it is that might help the child feel safe to playfully use her imagination. Yet, in order to do *that* we have to give "due" consideration to what she finds stressful and inhibiting. It might be the case that Opie would enjoy playing on the same park structures as most other kids her age, but that Opie differs from many in having a particular phobia of enclosed spaces. To respect Opie "as" a child with a potentially playful imagination we might have to address her phobia either directly or indirectly. The "fact" about Opie that gives her the potential to participate in valued practices is the fact that she, like many children, takes pleasure in using her imagination. The "fact" that we must address directly, however, is the fact that she has a phobia of enclosed play-spaces.

If the correct expression of a value judgment always sufficed for respecting entities, then perhaps the "valued" feature could directly determine what it is we do in order to give respect to an entity. So, we would honor-respect a great actor by honor-respecting her performances through awards, distribution, etc. But this slippage between giving "RR" to an entity and giving "respect" to the "feature" is unfortunate. A "feature" is not the recipient who responds to the action, an entity is. To truly RR the great actor, an appropriately situated respecter may need to "honor" his performances, grant him privacy, or give cultural space to the traditions of his craft. Wanting to RR the actor may give one reasons to do the things just mentioned, as means to the aim of RR for that actor. But we are not in the same conceptual sense "respecting" the feature of "privacy" or the "craft" or the "legendary performance." The prospective nature of respect forces us to attend to the entire "system," not as a means to the end of "honoring" some valued feature, but as the very setting and structure through which such a feature has its value and its existence. The point I want to make here—and this is in a way the heart of the "uptake dependency

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[209] The "practical dictates" are determined by the aims of respect, which is something that will be clarified in the conceptualization I am trying to offer.

thesis"—is that the person doing the RR-ing (EMPR), in so-doing, needs to pay attention to *more* than the valued *fact or feature* of the entity—the feature for which the entity has come to "warrant" RR. In order to practice RR, your actions have to relate to the relevant details of the particular entity's context. The "uptake" of RR is uptake by an entity whose various capacities interact in specific ways with the treatment they are given. [210]

"Uptake dependence" suggests that RR claims turn at least as much on the would-be respecter's efficacy as on her intentions and her "attitude" in reference to the alleged object. When the respecter acts only indirectly or does not knowingly engage with the "respected" entity, the action may well count as respectful inasmuch as the actor has really done something *that advances the normative power of* that entity. A person might develop habits and general principled ways of acting that communicate and support the good-making power of certain others. A lawmaker might "respect" immigrants in the passage of a law that is about wages, without explicitly considering immigrants as such. Likewise, a lawmaker who appreciates the issues facing immigrants may, in a certain instance, fail to respect her immigrant constituents by passing a law of which she did not fully understand the implications. There is worth in actions that fulfill the aims of respect just as there is worth in aiming to be respectful.[211] Yet, in neither case would we readily grant to the agent the title "respecter." A person does not seem to quite deserve the title "respecter" when their act succeeds by happenstance; nor do they seem to deserve the credit of respecting when their good intentions miss their mark. [212] The point of the "uptake" constraint is not that we should limit our view of RR to the respecter's efficacious

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[210] The "uptake" constraint says that a theory of RR must connect the "importance" of the fact or feature *to an* entity of which it merely *a* fact or feature. Thus, aims of RR must comprehend and determine which other facts and features are relevant in the relationship between the respecter and the object of respect.

[211] The *communicated valuing attitude*—the communication to others that entity X "deserves" respect— is sometimes what matters the most and advances the aims of respect most directly in a given context.

[212] There's a tricky issue here. Logically, failing to be respectful does not mean that one has been "disrespectful" if by disrespectful we mean to invert the definition: *doing those things one has reason to believe will undermine the entity's ability to make a positive difference to the system of values*. One may fail to act in a way that helps without necessarily acting in a way that hurts. However, when we talk about the socially symbolic nature of respect--the triangulation between the respecter and respected and other potential respecters, then it is all too easy for a mere failure to respect to become something that actually undermines. Negligence in respect may transform into disrespect if that negligence itself is taken up at a symbolic level as "justified." This is how well-meaning individuals might be accused of disrespect and required to do something to reverse the symbolic chain of events of their negligent or merely ignorant action.

behavior, absent their intentions. Rather, the point is to show that we cannot adequately conceptualize respect if we limit ourselves to discussions of the respecter's "way of seeing" the respected.

3.3.2 Social Symbolism

When thinking about the idea that the respecter must be effective and not just well-meaning, there is some uncertainty about the necessary agentic status of the respecter. When considering respect as an attitude or disposition it is quite easy to know that only people—and rational people—can be respecters. Only they can have the requisite beliefs. But when we shift our point of view to seeing respect as a dynamic relation and focusing on the reception of acts by the respected entity, it becomes harder to insist that the respecter must be a rational person—or even a person at all. Yet, at the same time, agency and belief matters and is somehow required in a respect relation. I tangled with such questions in the section on relational concepts above and now it's time to return for another round. After all, we often see institutions, economies, laws, practices, architecture, and public symbols as "respectful" or "disrespectful" of those they effect. It makes some sense to see these structures as human "actions" and yet we know that the "law" or "economy" itself does not have beliefs about those it affects. Let's assume, taking EMPR as a treatment relation, that insofar as non-humans can be respecters it is because of an implicit tie to accountable people. As we know, the material of our social environment has been fashioned in ways that undermine the normative power of many who share that environment. When steps are not openly taken to amend such institutions, we call the institutions disrespectful as a way of calling those with the power to change the institutions disrespectful. But who are the agents that "create" a city with its physical "norms." This ambiguity is itself a sign of an important aspect of EMPR: the social symbolism involved in its acts. Acts of RR are conceptually—not just empirically—bound up with reputational and symbolic practices. Claims about respect are, at the same time, claims about the propriety of the relative situations of the respecter and the respected. I'll turn again to Bernice and Avery in order to talk about the socially symbolic aims of EMPR.

Bernice implies that there are some things about Carol that dictate how Avery ought to have treated her. As a police officer, Carol has a potential role in the preservation of social peace,

and such a position constrains Avery to treat Carol respectfully so as to actualize that potential.[213] But it's not simply Carol's identity or bare facts about her that determine this, it's just as much Avery's identity and facts about him that make Bernice find Avery's gestures disrespectful. Were Avery a three-year old child, someone from another culture, or even the commanding officer (in some contexts), the meaning of his gestures would be different. But if his gestures must be chosen in accord with the receptivity of the entity (Carol), then why would the same gesture from different people make such a difference? [214]

Respect has a complexity that is only partly captured in the receptivity of the object to some form of treatment. Practices of respect seem to be tailored to the situation of both respecter and respected *relative* to a community of who might view the relation or its symbolic products as legitimate and meaningful. The "success" of EMPR depends on a variety of different respecters doing their part, and often doing *different types of things*, depending on their own relative power and position or status. While any relation is infused with social meaning and shaped by differences in status in those relating, the teacher and the caregiver can theoretically know what they should do without inquiring into how their action will play on a symbolic level. (The case might be different with the enforcer of punishment). Additionally, few are in a position to punish, care for, or instruct a given individual. When you pass someone on the street or meet them in the marketplace you are not generally in a position to "fail" as their caregiver or teacher. Yet it seems that one is always in a situation in which one might succeed or fail to respect those one interacts with, at least as long as one's own actions are capable of being normatively visible to other potential interactors.

Despite its drawbacks, DRR seems to correctly imply social relativity when it makes reference to the notion of appropriateness. In order to fulfill the aims of respect all that may be needed is to find out what, in one's given social environment, counts as and communicates

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[213] If Carol was Avery's thirteen-year old daughter, perhaps Avery would be obliged to give her *loving* or *disciplining* treatment. If Carol was a cyclist in an accident, perhaps Avery would have been obliged to give her *caring* treatment.

[214] Intuitively our paradigm cases of "respect" involve the cooperation we give to people in desirable positions of status and disrespect is thought literally to de-grade individuals. The type of fact is whatever fact is pertinent to an individual's social power and as such symbolism matters essentially to RR. An act of respect is not complete if it does not free the individual to actually do something; but it is equally incomplete if it is symbolically insular.

"proper" acknowledgment from someone like oneself to/of the object. RR is somehow about acknowledging objects/entities in a way that has been agreed upon, and thus is socially *proper*. The aims of respect are such that, in some contexts, to publicly or interpersonally acknowledge another under some positive description, or as belonging to some acceptable group, *is* all one needs to do to respect her. The proverbial tip of the hat is sometimes all that respect requires. In other contexts much more is called for before respect's aims are satisfied. What is respect, such that it is *relative* in this way, while at the same time being tethered to the concrete requirements of entities and situations as described above? Two answers suggest themselves—respect is relative for psychological and cooperative reasons.

Psychological

F*or some entities*—namely, most humans, the aims of respect are shaped by the entity's own expectations about how they ought to be treated "as…" (in terms of the place they occupy). Social human beings have a psychological reality such that their beliefs about how others see them are among the things that those who want to respect them must practically consider. In view of this, it might seem as if the aims of respect can be achieved on a more objective, less socially complex basis for entities who do not take actions based on their thoughts about the thoughts of other.[215] Nonliving, complex things, such as artifacts and institutions could, one might argue, be treated in accord with more straightforward objective considerations.

Cooperative

There is a problem with relying too much on a psychological assumption to explain the importance of social symbolism. Social symbolism is often bitterly contested on behalf of non-reflective entities for good reason. We want the best possible social standing for the beings who we care about and our ability to get that for them may be hampered by expressive harms. In any case, there is something basic that connects "respect" for self-conscious (and/or relationship-

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[215] I am obliquely borrowing from Lovejoy, *Reflections on Human Nature*.

conscious) living beings and other non-sentient "participants" in our world. Both types of entities can be seen as constitutive of important values, such that what is called for is a treatment that supports the power of the place from which they do their good "work."   In addition to doing something "concrete" for the entity's capacity to contribute to a particular value domain, the respecter's actions must not detract from the way the respected entity and other potential interactors with her "see" her (as worthy of interacting with). **An action is minimally respectful (or not disrespectful) if it preserves the integrity and does not detract from the reputation of the person addressed. An action is robustly respectful if, while being integrity-preserving, it advances particular ways in which the agent might contribute and also does this in a way that is reputation enhancing**. [216]

The achievement of respect is a social achievement comprising numerous discrete actions on the part of many. When practices of respect are compared to other practices this claim reveals itself to be more a matter of degree than kind. All practices are social and since no entity is purely independent any state of affairs is going to "depend" on what a number of people and things are doing. In the case of caregiving, individuals can experience direct giving and uptake in ways that are less speculative and subtle. Despite the social nature of the practice, care is a practice that is *practiced* intimately. Respect can be practiced at a distance. I think one of the strengths of my conceptualization is that it at least fits with the longstanding intuition that respect sometimes even requires separation and distance—the distance afforded by notions of "identity," "role," and "status." This is true even when it is motivated by love and practiced as a component of healthy intimacy.

Social Symbolism and the question of Rank

The relation of respect is one that attends to reputational concerns; but, it does so primarily as a means to a greater end. As such, EMPR is not theoretically reducible to symbolic

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[216] For example, the child wins a science-fair award thanks to the parent's over-involvement. Teachers and other students suspect the project was, as so many are, done with a substantial amount of help, so the student is not seen as having done anything truly exceptional. On the one hand the child did learn a lot working with the parent, but on the other hand the child's reputation is not enhanced by winning this award.

"acts," least of all to those that (merely) institute rank. In what follows I will try to explain the way comparative ranking (in and of itself) is not of particular importance to EMPR—despite the importance of social symbolism. What is EMPR such that we must admit that rank is sometimes an effective way to achieve its aims? My discussion below involves returning again to Darwall's distinction between appraisal and recognition. An important distinction between expressions of appraisal and acts of recognition respect might come down to this: If you want to respect an entity it is not enough (nor is it always necessary) to make them into a symbol of excellence. In fact, to merely make a symbol of success out of someone is to possibly disrespect them. (Shirley Temple's pint-sized academy award, for instance? Or, more disturbingly, the use of Native American identity as symbols of a fighting spirit in sports teams).

The grounds for ranking are facts/features that are attributed to the object relative to other objects about whom those "ranking" features are not attributed. There many reasons to "rank" objects on a scale (of priority or value, etc.). For instance, we might rank doctors in order to be sure we don't see a quack, or we might rank styles of music in order to have a little argumentative fun with our friends. But when it comes to RR, our "responsibility" to exercise comparative judgments toward an entity in order to decide how they might rank relative to one another dissolves the moment the rank order is shown not to serve the relevant values. Our responsibility to RR an entity combines interest in the promotion of values and the judgment that the entity has a power (potential), of itself, to promote those values, independent of my ranking judgments. In the first case it is the ranking judgment that promotes the values. The entity's role is interchangeable as one who happens to satisfy the standards. In the case of EMPR it is the activity of the entity itself that promotes and constitutes the values. This brings the focus of RR much closer to our loose idea of a being's "intrinsic" worth—which commands active attention regardless of the status of any other entity (i.e. regardless of relative status.)

We cannot overlook that how an entity compares or rates can be a reason to give it a specific *rank*. **We cannot overlook that the giving of "rank" can be either (and usually both) a way to express and reinforce standards and values or/and a way to empower the entity to actualize and constitute those values.** Ranking "symbolically" promotes kinds of excellence, but it also is a way to "respect" (support the place of) the entity "as" a doer of the things one may do when they have ranked standing. Would not many instances of RR, then, and perhaps the

most paradigmatic (personhood status, rights) be grounded in *ranking* appraisals of the sort: good, better, best, rather than in the appreciation of something non-relative about the entity? Could this imply a *collapse* in the AR/RR distinction? I think not. RR—with its prospective orientation—approaches the "fact" of achievement in a very different way than does (retrospective) appraisal. Instead, respect is a *response* to something's being or having the potential to be successful "in" a rank (as in a place). When someone's respect-worthiness is (appropriately) responded to through the social practices of placing a person in a rank, this is done not to "express" the society's evaluative discernment, but instead to create social power for the entity on the basis of its own evident potential to use that power.

The facts or features in virtue of which the entity warrants RR do not logically depend on her evidence that she is herself a capable respecter of those facts or features.[217] It is often said that all people "deserve" respect (RR) "as" human beings on the basis of their rationality. When someone is thought to not to deserve a desirable treatment, the implication is that *they* in particular might have *failed* to measure up. It is no surprise that everyday language strikes "appraisal" notes that are dissonant to the conceptual boundaries of RR. Contrary to what the word "deserve" conjures, RR can be comfortably rooted in the less shifting aspects of identity— those aspects of identity that all things of a class or species share, rather than those that differentiate them from one another and that allow each to be described in different ways over time. Interpersonal comparisons and measures of achievement can be logically excised from conceptions and principles of respect for persons and other objects, our suggestive vocabulary notwithstanding. My *esteem* for my colleague's earning power is logically contingent on how his earning power compares, and thus on how he ranks among other similar agents. In contrast, my intention to RR him "as a colleague aiming to maximize his earning power" in no way directly depends on his own success or comparative talents in this area. It may not even depend on his capable pursuit or appropriate prioritization of those intentions himself! Such RR, if it is owed at all, is logically owed to all of my colleagues in view of the belief that their role includes (or allows for) their interest in maximize their earning power.[218] Whatever the aim and value of

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[217] This contrasts with what I take to be aspects of Cranor's account of respect in "Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons."

[218] His capabilities may suggest he would do well in a role that others would not be able to take advantage of.

"respect," it is not dependent upon maintaining distinctions between or elevating some individuals. Thus, kinds of good-making/value-advancing treatment (respect) can be given from anyone *to* anyone; they work well precisely because they generate equality among those involved.

This may sound like it runs contrary to the uptake-thesis, but it does not. How we act toward someone becomes respectful in virtue of how that act relates them to the practices that they have reason to value. Depending on a person's abilities and situations, there are going to be concretely different ways of relating to them respectfully. To take an example that overlaps with respect, it's easy to see that a child's right to an education is not contingent on how easy it will be to educate them. It merely has to be possible to educate the child, and under quite a broad conception of education. But, simply acknowledging that "right" is not sufficient to being the child's educator. If the child is very difficult to educate, one is still not their educator just because one has that intention. The intention is worth as much as the actual effort. One must search for the methods that will truly help the child to learn. The acts that will count as teaching acts for that child will depend on what you have good reason to believe will actually help the child learn. On the one side you have a universal status that is not conditional upon proving one's abilities (student), and on the other side you have a success relation (teaching) that is conditional upon several factors, including the efforts of the would-be teacher.

The kinds of activities on our part that can likely *achieve* the aims of RR for an "ill-tempered" officer may be different from the kinds of activities on our part that will likely achieve the aims of RR for a "timid" officer, a "new" officer, a "seasoned" officer, and so on. It is not that, in the case of Officer Carol, respect is owed her "as" a "seasoned officer" (though RR may be warranted to some people on such a basis as well, given certain conditions), but that if it is good or right to RR officers of the law "as such," then it is good or right to do so independently of their being "new" or "seasoned," "calm" or "quick tempered." The aim holds across these distinctions, but the treatment itself may vary depending on whether the officer is "ill-tempered" or "timid," but the aim of RR is justified (as long as some treatment will plausibly do the trick) across such cases.

While RR is not based on ranking judgments, sometimes we give someone a special rank as a way of RR-ing them. We must not be too quick to collapse all statuses that express

comparative rank into acts of mere appraisal. The aims of RR may well advance and inscribe hierarchical relations, and the effort to give RR to an entity under one aspect may end up succeeding at the *expense* of that entity's being recognized under another aspect. But RR is also a politically crucial way of relating that can advance political-moral equality, under various ways of understanding that broad ideal. To understand this, we first have to accept that there is nothing intrinsically immoral or even inegalitarian about utilizing mechanisms of rank. EMPR is not opposed to there being institutional positions that are better or worse relative to some specified social value. The thesis ultimately says only this: it is *not the organizing aim of RR to* treat entities in ways that establish and implicate them in *hierarchies* of value. RR, I am arguing, can be conceived as aiming to empower entities relative how they might contribute (in self-actualizing ways) to specific domains of value. It would be a perversion of this idea to foster shame and inferiority and arrogance and superiority complexes. Thus, granting someone a status defined by its relative advantages (of authority, for instance) cannot be in the spirit of EMPR, though it can, in some specific instance be a way to EMPR an individual (by disrespecting another).

3.3.3 Combining the uptake and social symbolism constraints

Given uptake dependence, wouldn't *more* (i.e., more highly prioritized) RR be due some entity that has proven it can do "its own part well" versus an untried entity or an entity that has tended to be impervious to attempts to RR it? In other words, if Officer Carol deserves RR "as" an officer, couldn't it nevertheless be true that some additional fact or feature about officer Carol—that she is ill-tempered or a lazy worker—might legitimately undo our basis for giving *her* the RR thought to be due to "those whose jobs help to maintain social order"? At present I can only offer a tentative answer to this concern. Let us assume that no matter what a human being does or is, "as" human, she always warrants a certain kind of RR from everyone whose actions are known to affect her (including herself).[219] As long as the entity remains within a certain scope of the particular RR-warranting identity—Officer, Woman, Human, Mother,

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[219] By a certain "kind" of RR I mean that only certain aspects of what being "a person/a good person" depends on are the focal point for the aims of RR.

Tennis Player—then, assuming there is some generalizable fact or feature connected to such identities, we have in each case an "equal" basis, and perhaps an equally weighty reason to RR anyone who is capable of occupying the identity. [220]

The uptake and the social symbolism constraints in addition suggest this: Nothing is pre-ordained for a particular practice of respect. Respect, rather, becomes possible under certain conditions that are not fully under any one authority. The person who might be an object of respect cannot single-handedly determine which features about her, or which of her kinds of identity, warrant respect. Nor does she have the exclusive power to decide which actions, under this or that description, should be considered practically appropriate *ways* of respecting her "as" this or that. She is but one particularly relevant voice. How she might be respectable (and respected) depends on how she is prepared to respond to certain kinds of treatment and also on how such treatment (together with her response) is legible to others symbolically.

Why does Bernice want Officer Carol to get "respected" by Avery? What situation makes sense out of Bernice's demand that Avery *respect* Carol, rather than, say, teach or care for Carol? I have suggested that "RR" conditions—which validate at least the discussion about respect are two. First, that Carol can "take up" the respectful treatment. Second, Avery is in a position such that the way he acts toward Carol has no negative social symbolism. To this first condition, Carol can potentially use certain dimensions of her own situation, without forfeit of her basic agency (integrity) to (a) advance a value that is directly or indirectly important to Bernice (which she thinks Avery has reason to endorse). Officer Carol's capacity for engagement with the values at stake must be actually able to be affected in some positive way. I wanted to show that the only way it makes sense for Bernice to demand this treatment on Avery's part because she thinks he has a "role" in it, not that she thinks he can make *all* the difference. If he could make all the

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[220] An apparently contrary intuition says it makes no sense to treat people the same who are engaged at different levels with their potentially good "place" in the world. This does not pose a problem for my claim. The kinds of activities on our part that can likely *achieve* the aims of RR for an "ill-tempered" officer may be different from the kinds of activities on our part that will likely achieve the aims of RR for a "timid" officer, a "new" officer, a "seasoned" officer, and so on. It is not that, in the case of Officer Carol, respect is owed her "as" a "seasoned officer" (though RR may be warranted to some people on such a basis as well, given certain conditions), but that if it is good or right to RR officers of the law "as such," then it is good or right to do so independently of their being "new" or "seasoned," "calm" or "quick tempered." The aim holds across these distinctions, but the treatment itself may vary depending on whether the officer is "ill-tempered" or "timid," but the aim of RR is justified (as long as some treatment will plausibly do the trick) across such cases.

difference, then the *uptake* would not be a considered a constraint on RR. What the social symbolism constraint speaks to is the near impossibility of tracing a direct line from any particular respectful act to the "result" of being normatively empowered. The entity receiving respect won't instantly or automatically "make good" on the support she's been given. As such, social knowledge and guesswork and the institution of provisional norms will be centrally important for the respecter, who, nevertheless has responsibilities beyond "following" those norms. Ironically, most instances of disrespect do not leave obvious tracks behind them. Properly speaking, disrespect is a very subtle harm capable of nearly erasing its tracks. To put it differently, in negating the worth of an entity's "place," disrespect often undermines slowly—imperceptibly (the entity never has an adequate setting to reveal the good she in particular could have made of her position).

3.4 Chapter Conclusion: What is "empowerment"?

Having thought about respect (EMPR) as a relation requiring engagement from the object (entity), a relation sensitive to socially relative and symbolic means, and yet whose aim necessarily goes beyond mere ranking and reputational effects, we can start to see how we might understand "empowerment." When we say that the respecter must actually do things that empower the entity in value-relevant ways, we are saying that the respecter must give or support the entity's **capacity for positive influence.** Influence on *what*? Here we can begin to see, as well, the variations on a theme that has led to so many uses of the term respect. The respected desires the capacity to positively influence practices and relationships that are objectively valuable.[221]

What the entity "wants" from the respecter is that the latter take part in an invariably social process of making a world that is hospitable to the entity "as…" When there is a disagreement between two groups of citizens, about what is required in order for group B to "respect" group A, the way such a disagreement gets untangled is through carefully addressing why and how the actions of group B *influence* the worth of group A's place in the world. The

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[221] By "objectively" valuable I just mean worth valuing also from the respected's point of view. Somehow the values are positively related to the respected's objective interests.

analogy of place is helpful if we consider it spatially. The worth of the room I work in—the space that becomes a place for me—is affected (made better or less-well suited to being a place for me) by construction going on outside, buildings going up around, shadows cast and noises made. If there is a disagreement with my neighbors in terms of "respect" for me, it will be carried on in terms of how they can justify these indirect intrusions, either as needed for reasons that override my need to be respected as a writer, or as not likely to undermine me in my place in the ways that I claim. The respecter confuses this with the desire of the respected to influence *him*. If there is something about me that "forces" you to act a certain way, then arguably I have "influenced" you. That, however, is seldom the sort of influence that those seeking respect desire. Instead, they want real power to do good. I'm going to be calling this **"normative power."** The respecter (EMPR) seeks normative power for her object. The power to (self-preservingly) do good often depends greatly on one's social standing relative to others. When *and only when* you act in ways that that help the entity be better positioned to do good, do you respect them.

The ideas that emerged in chapter two have become more concrete here. First, if respect is "for" entities and is integrity-preserving, then RR must be "uptake dependent." This means that for any particular "attention" or "consideration" to count as respectful it will have to be received by the object in the right way (in a normatively or socially empowering way). In other words, a theory of respect will need some standards for how respect is *received* in order to have standards for how it might be given. Second, RR is not the kind of relation that takes place privately or exclusively between the subject and the entity. Instead, because respect is a response to practices of value--to seeing an entity as valuable from a shared and normatively coherent point of view--respect always involves reputational concerns--symbolic concerns--as a layer under or over the immediate interaction. Acts of respect "say" things to the world "about" the object that is being provisionally empowered. Provisional and situational empowerment is offered as a part of an ideal whole--not merely as something incidental.[222] Just as the personal,

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[222] Below I will explore Empowerment as a process and asks what we might mean by "full or robust EMPR" in comparison to instances of minimal or weak EMPR. EMPR carries with it certain standards, so that there is perhaps an ideal of EMPR that will be useful to keep in mind. An ideal that can only be understood as a dynamic relational process. Perhaps we should see EMPR as a meta-practice that embraces a fact about human existence: the fact that we are able to disclose practice-dependent values in large part because others have given us a reason to be confident that, when the time comes, someone will engage our action (our participation) in the right way, and extend its meaning and life

familiar, trust between the cared for and caregiver is part of what it means to be fully cared for, the mutual-authority/social confidence between respecter and respected is part of what it is to be "fully" respected.

We can begin to see respect (EMPR) as a kind of treatment that pursues specific aims that are often connected with but are nevertheless different from the aims of care—to take arguably the most important normative "partner" in our constellation of political values. If the respecter takes up a relationship that sustains the respected's confidence in the social world, and in doing so, does things that the caregiver would also do for those whom they cherish, the respecter is still not simply fulfilling the aims the carer. The empowerment respecter may defy the agenda of the caregiver, and even when acting in accord with care, may not, as an individual, be counted on to be attuned to the complex needs of the entity, as the caregiver might be. If the respecter gives the respected a reason to have confidence in the human world is not *because* the respecter is personally invested in the success of the respected's personal projects or values. It's only necessary (though not sufficient) to the title of "respecter" that the agent who has acted respectfully would affirm and endorse their own behavior in light of the fact that it advances the power of the respected.

Chapter 4 -- Beyond "Senses" of Respect: EMPR as a Response to the Intersection of Intrinsic and Institutional Worth

4.1 Chapter Introduction

There are many senses in which the term respect is used, but is there a core idea to be found in one or more of these senses that might guide us in our thinking about EMPR? Symbols, feelings, traditions, values, facts, persons, relationships, accomplishments, rules, selves, and dangers are among the things we speak about respecting. And out of "respect" for something or someone, we may find ourselves doing diverse sorts of things: In our public references to them we give them deserved praise or credit or refuse to denigrate or gossip about them. If they order or advise us to do something, we do it. If shared norms hold that someone in our "position" should conduct ourselves in a certain way around someone in their "position," we act accordingly. If we can avoid disrupting their harmonious standing in our/their environment, we avoid it. If we can strengthen the connections that make the entity an object of others' love and cherishing, we do that. Do these different "objects" of respect and different ways of respecting the same "object" express distinct aims and dispositions—diverse *concepts*—of respect? Or might they be understood as various ways to achieve the same basic aim and various expressions of the same basic disposition--in other words, are they different conceptions of the a single concept?

The promiscuity of uses of the term "respect"—both in the behaviors that are described as respectful and in the objects that warrant respect—discourages a unified conceptualization. I'll argue, however, that EMPR is potentially unifying. **Empowerment Respect is about how we help each other to stably occupy worthwhile value-disclosing positions.** In making my way toward this "empowerment" conception of respect (RR), I've provisionally defined it as *a relation in which the respecter does what there is reason to believe will secure and sustain the entity's ability to make a positive difference to a normative system*. I've drawn out some further implications of seeing respect in this way. First, that respect is "uptake dependent" and second that it is "socially symbolic." In this chapter I consider the various "senses" of respect in light of the above criteria. This allows me to identify an apparent conceptual divide that my concept might be able to synthesize. The divide is between so-called Institutional and so-called Care or

"cherishing" views of respect. The synthesis is made possible, I'll argue, by seeing respect as a distinct response to situations in which there is an intersection between a creditable entity and a valuable institution.

4.2 Dillon's and Hudson's Senses of Respect

As discussed briefly in Chapter Two, philosophers Stephen Hudson and Robin Dillon have grouped respect statements according to several different apparent "senses" or attitudes that are conveyed.[223] These types are categorized as "Evaluative Respect (ER), "Obstacle Respect" (OR), "Directive Respect" (DR), "Institution Respect" (IR), and "Care Respect" (CR). Bear with me as I offer a more detailed review of the meanings of these "senses" of respect.

According to Hudson, **evaluative respect (ER)** is "like esteeming x: it carries with it the commitment of having reasons…and these reasons will be what the person takes to be facts about x in virtue of which x merits the person's E-respect." Similar to Darwall's account of appraisal-respect, ER is at work in statements like "I have great respect for Sam's ethic of hard work."[224] But it also seems to be involved in statements such as "her contribution deserves to be honored and respected with a promotion." **Directive respect (DR)** is in play when "one's intentional behavior conforms or fails to conform to the directive." In other words, DR is "more or less synonymous with 'follows or observes'." For example, "Sam respected the speed limit." Other examples might be "AIDS does not respect borders" or "we respected the doctor's advice

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[223] Stephen Hudson was not searching for a unified concept of respect; rather, he was trying to locate among ordinary uses the "sense" that best captures the normative standards found in respect-for-persons claims. Hudson argued that the "institutional" sense of respect seemed (rather than the others) to be the normative relation implied by such claims. Neither was Dillon looking for a "master" concept. Apparently satisfied with Darwall's basic distinction, she has been interested in calling our attention to a dimension of "recognition" respectful action typically overlooked by an individualistic tradition valuing self-sufficiency. Similarly focused on respect for persons theories, Dillon has argued that caring ways of seeing people (seeing them as unique and vulnerable individuals who depend on others) was an equally important normative stance as seeing them as rights-holders (institutional actors). I bring up both conclusions because my effort to find a unifying standard and concept of respect will require a reconsideration of both institutional (universalizing) and particular (individualizing) "ways of seeing." I will be arguing that respect (empowerment respect) is a way of seeing and treating someone at the intersection of their individual and institutional identity. Respect makes institutional identity more individually empowering and it makes the individual have greater purchase on institutional action.

[224] Hudson, 73.

to the letter." [225] **Obstacle respect (OR)** applies to objects of respect which are "barriers or blocks in the path of agents" which must be "overcome, bypassed, or receive some appropriate treatment if the agent is to complete the task or attain the goal…" For example, Sam showed healthy respect for his boss's short temper."[226] Or, "They ought to have respected the level of skill required to scale that mountain." **Institutional respect (IR)**, according to Hudson, "relates to objects of respect that are social institutions, practices, offices, positions, or persons or things which represent such items." For example, "Sam makes sure to respect senior citizens" or "the fifth graders were taught the importance of respecting the flag," or "employees must respect the authority of the manager." Robin Dillon has tended to accept these first four categories, but has argued for the inclusion of a fifth, Care Respect.[227] As a "sense" of respect, Dillon describes CR in following way: **Care respect (CR)** "is attention to and appreciation of individuals in the richness of their concrete particularity." It includes seeking to promote the object's wellbeing and trying to understand it in its own terms. When we respect things that are regarded this way, we act or forbear to act out of benevolent concern for them. This sense of respect is captured in the way people speak of a "deep respect" for nature, art, and individuals.[228]

Both philosophers use this taxonomic approach to try to identify which of the "senses" of respect might plausibly drive theories of respect for persons. Different meanings given to ordinary uses of "respect" reflect significantly different ways of seeing their object. Their question is what way of seeing human beings is implied (or should be adhered to) when we talk of moral and political equality, equal dignity, and so on.[229] Hudson argued that ranking

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[225] AIDS respects no boundaries taken from Bird, "Status, Identity, and Respect," 210. Also mentioned by Dillon in "Respect."

[226] Hudson, 74.

[227] Dillon, "Respect and Care," 124.

[228] Along with DR, OR, and IR, CR is thought to be a form of recognition respect because it is "dictated" by the object. Recall, in esteeming something we are not accountable per se for what we do, but in recognition respect—according to Darwall and Dillon—we may "have" a respectful disposition, but that disposition can only get explained as a disposition to act in certain ways, should the occasion arise.

[229] My analysis will at least imply that there are real logical difficulties here – or at least serious issues of equivocation. For both Hudson and Dillon equate behaviors with ways of seeing that only sometimes "explain" those behaviors. The behavior itself (the practical sort of action associated with that way of seeing) ends up mistakenly taken as the right behavior for "expressing" true respect. The other behaviors, as such, are dismissed without examining the wide variety of contexts that might make them choice-worthy for reasons of "moral" respect.
      While the activities classed as instances of ER are said to be examples of RR broadly construed. On the other hand, each "sense" was suggested as possibly conceptually distinct. Discussions of these different senses did not arrive at any conclusions about whether different concepts were at work or merely different conceptions of RR.

judgments (ER), mere descriptive obedience (DR), and fear (OR) are not indicative of what theorists mean when they theorize respect for persons. Rather, theorists seem to be talking about Institutional Respect (IR), because they are asking us to see human beings in terms of given roles and statuses (in this case equal) and with regard to shared norms and not personal interests. Robin Dillon would later argue that seeing people as institutional role-players is important but incomplete as "respect" would go. She therefore introduced what she calls "Care Respect" (and elsewhere "cherishing"), as a way of seeing that speaks to the way respect requires attention to each person's unique attributes and situation.

Noticing the various "ways of seeing" that get picked up and expressed as "respect" in the English language is an important part of trying to elucidate a workable concept of respect. While it is not the express purpose of his paper, Hudson's argument directs attention to the idea that we need a concept for the way[230] we treat things in reference to the power or value of their institutional standing. Likewise, Dillon directs us to consider our need for a concept for the way we treat things in reference to the power and value of their uniqueness. Neither writer has the aim of explaining why such very different practices and attitudes—and others besides—would be marshaled in order to "respect" someone. What if a solid experiential, practical, and concept-worthy thread unites *certain* instances of being honored, repaired, promoted, and cooperated with, such that they can reasonably be considered the same time of thing: EMPR?

4.3 Locating instances of EMPR within the various "Senses" of Respect

Presently, I will discuss each of the senses mentioned above. For each sense of respect I will evaluate a short list of examples in order to consider which, if any, conform to the criteria suggested by the constraints of "uptake dependence" and "social symbolism." Those statements that conform to both criteria (constraints) will then be grouped together for further consideration. What makes EMPR distinct is how it picks out from the various usages those that have real ethical importance for the respected entity.

Perhaps the criteria of uptake-dependence and social-relativity that I have described, can come to our aid in determining how we might make "sense" out of these diverse "senses" of respect.

[230] By "way of treating" I mean the practices and attitudes involved—and their standards, virtues, etc.

4.3.1 Evaluative Respect (ER) as EMPR

Of the senses of respect described, ER would seem easy to dismiss as having a share in a unified concept of respect. Darwall's account of Appraisal Respect as detailed in chapter 2, spells out why that is. After all, when we respect someone we are doing something more and other than expressing our opinion of their worth. But since there were reasons to find Darwall's distinction misleading, let's begin again by looking at several statements that are the type philosophers commonly categorize as examples of "evaluative" respect and ask which if any of these seems to involve both uptake dependence and social symbolism.

ER1 Shelia privately had great respect for Sam's playing, though she'd scarcely mention that to anyone.

ER2 Whoever hacked that company has my respect. Someone had to take them down.

ER3 They paid respect to her lifetime of achievements by posthumously awarding her the Oscar.

ER4 The boss's year-end address praised Olivia for her hard work. Given all she'd done that year, anything less would have been disrespectful.

Assuming that a concept of respect must at least involve both uptake dependence and social symbolism, how do these statements rate? The first two examples are misfits. In statement ER1 we have someone whose admiration is private—it has no bearing on the symbolic power or reputation of the entity. Furthermore, the feeling lacks any concrete connection to the person she admires and does not depend on that person's uptake. In statement ER2 the admiration may be stated publicly, but the object of admiration is not known—again, whatever kind of "respect" this is, it is not uptake dependent. In statement ER3 we have powerful social symbolism at work for the entity, but there's a problem: the entity is not alive.

Statement ER4 is socially symbolic. Olivia's "currency" so-to-speak is increased by the action of her boss. It is also easy to imagine that Olivia might positively take up such praise, as it occurs in a context in which she is active. ER4, thus, seems to fulfill the criteria, despite being (at least apparently) an example of "evaluative respect." This suggests what may be obvious—that

many actions expressive of another's worth are not *mere* judgments or even mere *expressions* of judgments. In some contexts these actions alter the normative environment for their object. **They "improve" what it is like to be that *kind* of object.**[231]

4.3.2 Obstacle Respect (OR) as EMPR

Let's now consider "obstacle respect." Does treating something like an obstacle ever enhance what it is like to be that sort of thing? Obstacle Respect, too, has been rejected in the literature as a way of seeing its object in terms of a moral kind of RR. However, it has also been noticed that "obstacle" respect captures the original spirit of the current moral conceptions of personhood respect.[232] What do the following examples suggest?

> **OR1** Sam showed healthy respect for his boss's thirst for revenge by taking extra precautions to hide the fact that he was interviewing for other jobs.
>
> **OR2** The climbers will not make it to the top unless they respect the storm and halt their climbing until it's over.[233]
>
> **OR3** Brian respected his friend's fragile emotional state by only talking about light matters.
>
> **OR4** The family respected Olivia's limits in the kitchen by asking her to provide music and not food for the party.

Statements OR1 and OR2 are not uptake dependent in the right way. Surely they are consequence or outcome-dependent in design, but what happens "to" the object or to what it's like to "be" the object is not intrinsically important. The design is to avoid harm that would come from carelessness with regard to the dangerous element.[234] The object of the caution does not

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[231] This formulation of the "aim" of EMPR is meant just to be an everyday language variation and not a new or different idea. EMPR involves a relationship between a respected entity and some agent of respect whereby the agent's act advances the normative power of an entity in such a way that the act is likely to improve what it is like to be that "kind" of entity (situated as it is).
[232] Bird, "Status, Identity, and Respect," 211-212.
[233] This example adapted from Dillon, "Respect."
[234] One way to notice that uptake-dependence is not at issue is that the effort made in the name of caution is often thought to be adequate to saying that someone "obstacle respected" another. For instance: the sailors respected the strength of the coming storm by turning back as soon as they found out about it. Sadly, though, the storm traveled faster than they, and their boat was destroyed.

need to become in any way better off as a result of the act. What happens to the boss as a result of avoiding being the object of his revenge is not the sense of "respecting" an entity that we are looking for. Obstacle respect as found in statements OR1 and OR2 truly is about the respecter and not the respected. Nevertheless, one can see the "family resemblance" to respect (EMPR): there is often social symbolism at work in such statements. The object's reputation is maintained or enhanced as something dangerous and to be feared. Along these lines, in terms of the idea of deference or obedience there is a resemblance: the object seems to "command" the behavior. The obstacle "respecter" is compelled to preserve this commanding reputation (though having such a reputation may do nothing for the object-as-valued or as able to disclose values and not dis-values).

Statement OR3 is intriguing. The suggestion is that the consideration is for avoiding a harm to the object by treating some feature of the object as if it were an obstacle (and not something we can change at will or directly engage).[235] I question whether there is a socially symbolic element here. This seems like an act of caring for a friend's well-being. Here the important thing is the frame of mind of the caring friend, which is in this case guided by the idea of avoiding some well-being-damaging trigger. The entity's fragile emotions threaten that well-being, and so the friend wants to keep that threat at bay. The uptake of the fragile friend matters fundamentally, but on the face of it I do not see how the sad friend's symbolic standing is at stake in this context. [236]

Statement OR4 perhaps operates on both planes: the implied "obstacle" is both an obstacle for the family and for Olivia herself. If she is pressured to cook—something we are given to believe she is bad at and has no interest in being good at—then the event will come off less well. But more importantly, Olivia will not have a proper chance to make a contribution she

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[235] Yet, the connotation is ambiguous – we may be "respecting" his feelings in order to instrumentalize him (so that he can carry on his duties to our advantage) or we may be doing so because his carrying on his duties is somehow morally important, or important to him (and not only to us). By design the idea is to contribute to Sam's capacity to fulfill his duties (so the action is focused on an outcome for Sam, rather than for the agent). This goes to show that "uptake" can be negative or positive. The action need not cause an obviously positive uptake so long as we have reason to believe that the action was well-chosen to avoid an action that would have resulted in negative uptake.

[236] Things would be different if there was a rule instituted that was precisely about a general possibility of fragility in a population. This would be something like "trigger warning" policies in classrooms. While I'm not sure that these are respectful policies, when enacted they at least meet the minimal criteria being discussed here.

can feel good about. This sort of concern with obstacles that are obstacles to another's success seems closer to satisfying the criteria of social symbolism.

This analysis suggests that while seeing someone "as" an obstacle is not what EMPR is about, it may sometimes serve a person's interests (in being valuable and doing well) to have aspects of them seen as dangers and obstacles. On the one hand we have the caring gestures of those who are trying to protect our interests as part of their own interest (care and friendship). On the other hand, we have something mixed. Those engaged in a shared endeavor trying to protect the value of that endeavor and the value to the person of their role in it. It is the latter that seems closer to me to a distinct idea of RR (EMPR).

4.3.3 Directive Respect (DR) as EMPR

Directive Respect's reputation has been slight. This is because writers have assumed that respect requires intentions on the part of the respecter and directive respect does not seem to require that. Are all the examples like this? Let's take a look:

DR1 The children chose playmates in ways neatly respecting traditional gender divisions.

DR2 Respecting the terms of the divorce agreement, Liza remained in town with her daughter.[237]

DR3 They respected the order of events suggested by the event planner by starting with the speech, followed by a cocktail break, and concluding with the award ceremony.

DR4 Olivia was put in charge of finding the most ethical contractors. We absolutely must respect her advice on the matter.

Statement DR1 implies activity on the symbolic level. The activity preserves gender divisions. But there is no entity here. "Gender divisions" is not a thing with actual integrity conditions, but an idea or a pattern with an ephemeral existence[238]. Moreover, the implication is

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[237] Example taken partially from Dillon, "Respect."
[238] "Ephemeral" is not quite right. I just mean that norms themselves, patterns, kinds of thought are not really independent of those who think them in the way that a book or a painting, for instance, is physically independent and has its integrity conditions.

that the children had no conscious grasp of what they were doing. Directive Respect does not require an agent making conscious action, choice, or judgment on behalf of the respecter.

In DR2, Liza's respecting the terms of the agreement at least gives us an intentional respecter. It seems that she intends to follow the rules – or at least we could imagine she did. There is also an ambiguity—it might be that Liza approves of the agreement and for that reason has stayed in town. She preserves the agreement by staying in town and she preserves the idea that it is legitimate. Such examples fail uptake dependence in an interesting way: A speed limit, a border, an agreement really cease to exist if they are disregarded. They are objects that are entirely dependent upon people recognizing their existence. In a metaphoric sense, the object's entire ability to "be" and thus to "be good" depends on its being obeyed or observed by a certain number of people. These objects do not have a life and interests of their own. It hard to think of them as "taking up" anything as an agent or even a non-agentic entity might (a work of art, a tree) might.

Sometimes directive-respect statements can be read as having as their object the "authority" behind the apparent objects (the rules, etc.) Example DR3 begins to show a link between following a set of rules and the status of the author of those rules. It's easily possible that failing to follow the order of events suggested by the event planner amounts to also failing to respect her as an event planner. Example DR4 highlights this relationship. "We must respect her advice" in this context amounts to, "If we don't follow her advice it will be (in some sense) bad for her." There is some kind of ethical demand that if we want certain good outcomes for Olivia we must take her advice seriously. Uptake dependence is at work if we assume that this response is designed "for" Olivia's specific situation and abilities. It is clearly relational (and in this case role-relative); there are expectations that such a response to Olivia is both appropriate to our relationship and crucial for its future health. Finally, we can imagine a symbolic dimension that is bound up with Olivia's workplace status and how that gets communicated to outsiders.

4.3.4 Institution Respect (IR) as EMPR

Very often when we say we ought to respect someone "as…" (as a person, a wife, a flight attendant, an award winning actor, an authority) we can think of ourselves as assigning an

institutional role to the individual and demanding that others do what is necessary to preserve the value of that role. This has made institution respect an appealing paradigm for moral/personhood respect. Let's look at examples to see if there are IR statements that fail the joint criteria:

IR1 Sam makes sure to respect senior citizens by giving them seating priority. (Hudson)

IR2 The traveler was careful to respect the nation's flag by saluting it according to the local tradition.

IR3 Students respect their teachers by coming to class prepared.

IR4 The court officials respected Olivia as a defendant in the trial by not requiring her to testify.

IR1 and IR2 are both challenging to analyze. Sam means to act in a way that can be "taken up" by the senior citizens he interacts with, though it is not clear whether the "uptake" needs to be good for the particular people so-treated (those Sam sees as Senior Citizens). Of course if we knew that Sam believed that the status was necessary as a response to the moral personhood of older people, then we would infer that in some sense we are talking about uptake that is only legitimate insofar as it is good for the entity. But if all we know is that Sam thinks the status of senior citizen needs to be enforced, then Sam might want to give to senior citizens the powers and privileges that are thought to come with the title, because such powers advance some other goal—a goal that is possibly even at odds with the interests of people who have the status. Sam wants to cooperate, but we don't know yet if this cooperation benefits those with the title, or if it is more for the sake of the system in which such a category of people plays a role. [239]

Assuming that uptake does not matter here in the right way, we can see, however, that what does matter is socially symbolic: appearance of legitimacy of the treatment. Sam acts in ways that support the legitimacy of the norms around senior citizenships and the traveler (IR2) acts in ways that support the legitimacy of norms around the nation's flag. Whether or not any good comes to the senior citizen or to the flag depends on what those norms were themselves designed to do. The reality is that there is a powerful interaction between the symbolic dimensions of "group identity" and the experiences of those who are included in that group, but

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[239] An easy example to make more plain what I'm talking about is in the treatment of women that tries to confine them to a passive role out of "respect" or deference to some principle of femininity. Such treatment is not normally in the interest of "women."

we simply cannot assume that a symbolically valued group equates to empowerment of the individuals in that group. This suggests that the role and status-related statements we normally associate with "institution respect" are open for interpretation and require further analysis before we can say if uptake is a true consideration.[240]

As for IR3, while it is the group "teachers" that is the object of respect, the norm is logically linked to how the treatment is taken up by individual teachers in their role. Notice that this is different from being a senior citizen—for one's age and what often accompanies old-age is not descriptive of having any particular good-making role. Being a "senior" does not necessarily imply that one will benefit from being deferred to on the basis of a presumption of physical impairment. Being a teacher, however, does readily imply a set of goals that might be better met in certain ways. Teachers start their classes on time when the students are on time. Teachers are less distracted by classroom management when students are on time and are in turn able to focus on the skills and information that they are ready to impart to students. (One does not respect bartenders by showing up to the bar "on time.")

With example IR4 we have an individual being respected "as" the occupant of a certain institutional role. This is not much different from the third example, except that the individual is singled out, making it more possible to assess the action in terms of achieving its aims (EMPR, the aims of which we are trying to tease out). As with the teacher, we suspect that the norms applying to defendants involve the defendants' own capacities to make use of the situations the norms bring about. Relationality (role-relativity) and social symbolism are entwined with institutional action. The different participants in an institutional framework do their work not in isolation but in relation to the various roles. The fact of cooperating with those roles has symbolic power, at least for anyone who cares about the institution and the values that are operative there.

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[240] I give both examples because in one the object is people while in the other it is a thing. This thing can be taken to have integrity conditions of some kind though. A tattered flag is still a flag as long as we can recognize its appearance, but only up to a point. This is why respecting the flag as a symbol usually involves not destroying it but preserving its recognizable appearance. Yet use does destroy. Flying a flag in all kinds of weather may be the respectful thing to do in terms of symbolism, but the object, the entity, slowly loses its ability to *be* that symbol due to lack of physical protection. Of course that's fine when it comes to flags. But, say, a painting that becomes unable to be appreciated because of being overexposed, or of course more importantly, an animal or a person trotted out for symbolic value seems to be insufficient for EMPR.

In the accepted view (DRR) adapted by Hudson, many kinds of "objects" may receive IR. The only requirement is that the object can be thought to be among those things that constitute social or institutional order. Group identity categories, roles, and symbols, as well as rules (see directive respect) are major players. But when the objects are entities (things that have some kind of agentic existence due to being complex enough and vulnerable enough[241]) it becomes at least possible that the alleged IR act accounts for uptake and for variations on uptake that depend on the relative roles of the respecting agent and the one receiving the treatment. What is needed to respect a senior citizen sometimes depends on whether or not you are one yourself[242]; what is needed to respect a teacher sometimes depends on whether you are a student or a dean, what is needed to respect Olivia in her role in the judicial system is more absolute, but these rights can only be preserved by those in the proper roles themselves. Only the court officials have the power to give or deny her the ability to exercise the rights.

4.3.5 Care Respect (CR) as EMPR

Recall that Care Respect is put forward by Dillon as a sense of respect that takes as its object the features upon which its unique individual flourishing depend. Let's look at some statements that seem to fit into this category:

CR1 Respect your skin by using our specially tested night cream.[243]

CR2 The girl scouts respected the river, being sure not to leave any garbage on its banks.

CR3 If you are going to show the painting, then please respect it by lighting it carefully.

CR4 Olivia has already declared that, given her child's asthma and health concerns, she will not move with the company to Mexico City. It's really insulting for you to continue to offer her financial compensation

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[241] I am working with a narrow and a wide idea of what is an "entity." Narrowly, only things with integrity conditions that can be in relation—i.e. vulnerable/self-sustaining sentient beings—are "entities." But taken in a wider sense, an entity can be anything to which "interests" can be meaningfully imputed, even if it is not a living thing or a thing with sentience. So, I can imagine that a painting has an "interest" in being carefully handled and a cookie jar would "prefer" not to be shattered, just as a flower would "prefer" not to be trod upon.

[242] For example, it is usually not disrespectful for a senior citizen to remain seated on a crowded bus when another senior citizen climbs aboard. Another example: it is usually not disrespectful to

[243] From Dillon's example. Could be rephrased to be assimilated to obstacle respect, as in fragile emotions.

to move. Instead, if you want to respect her, you ought to ask her what can be done to help her find a good new position here in the city.

In CR1 we see someone paying attention to things that are good for skin. At first it seems as if this concern is for the skin itself, but we have no reason to assume this. Perhaps the person pampers their skin so that they can be seen as younger than they are[244]. The ambiguity here suggests that we might have a variety of reasons for paying attention to what some non-agentic thing needs to thrive. Moreover, this might just be another kind of obstacle respect. "Respect your skin's fragility" (avoid triggering breakouts and rashes) by using the night cream. This statement is uptake dependent and could also involve social symbolism in terms of how we answer to the "value" of something like skin. "Show your appreciation" for skin by treating it in ways that will allow it to flourish. CR2 works in just the same ways. There is an ideal or some standard of value connected to the river. It is thought to be important that we value certain things about it. Moreover, we must maintain its "ability" to be so valued by keeping the garbage off the banks. CR3 is only marginally different. To make it possible for others to appreciate the painting, one should preserve the painting's power to offer its insights by putting it into the conditions for having those details experienced.

CR4 is different from the others—perhaps only because the object has not just agency in an attenuated sense (as in CR 2 and CR3[245]), but real human agency. What we notice about CR4 is that Olivia's flourishing is prioritized in a way that recommends that those would "promote" her within the workplace culture (on the basis of her value as an employee) take care to think about her needs beyond that culture. Here there is no set idea about what would most advance Olivia's contribution to shared values. The idea is instead that it is important to show that you've heard her and that you are willing to adjust your expectations in accord with what she has plainly told you. Here the gesture of paying attention to an individual's extra-institutional needs is symbolically powerful. It communicates the idea that money is not a substitute for physical

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[244] One might pamper the hide of an animal one intends to turn into a handbag. The hide is not really something with agency. One can certainly bring out the handbag-good features in it, but this is not EMPR.
[245] The river and the painting are both complex objects that both exist in systems and as systems. They reveal themselves to have a kind of intrinsic worth in a way that someone's living skin does not (this is *someone's skin*, after all

health. This suggests that Olivia's importance is not derived from any one thing about her, but from how so many things about her—some impossible to categorize—harmonize to make her somebody.[246]

A concern with uptake is definitive for CR. Care-respect, of all the different types, is the most directed toward the object's specific situation, needs, and abilities for making "use" of the action of the respecter. Why, we might ask, is the word "respect" chosen for certain situations—but not *all* situations—that involve promoting an individual's unique flourishing? Why do we only sometimes find ourselves saying "if you want to respect her, then take care of her"? We don't tend to say "respect the baby by feeding it the best organic food." I think this is because less-adequate and even inadequate care is only sometimes also degrading and demeaning of the person receiving it. When it is so or when it is not fluctuates according to the symbolic status of the act. There is social symbolism at work in at least most of these examples because the activity is meant to communicate *not only* that some well-being-related "feature" of an object is important, but that the good-making social or normative power of entity is endangered when this feature is neglected.[247]?

4.4 Reformulating EMPR constraints and redefining institution respect (IR) and care respect (CR)

Much of what I've said about EMPR suggests this: To be respecting of the entity, the action must, in some way—somewhere down the line—square with the entity's own objective interests. This is at least implied by the idea that we are looking for a conception of RR that would be desirable for the entities that receive it and thus a conception that minimally does not RR the entity in ways that weaken its integrity. At the same time, the focus of or "reasons of" respectful

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[246] I am thinking about Hannah Arendt's characterization of "the who" as impossible to reduce. See Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 178-179. To bring this idea a little down to earth we might think about what neurobiologists say about consciousness. Our awake self-awareness is the result, they conjecture, from a number of neural processes going "on line" at once and together. Socially, "who-ness" might be the result of a number of "facts" about us going socially on-line (being publicly perceived) at once.

[247] On the other hand, the actions are not socially relative in the robust sense (the skin's health is maintained, the river stays clean, etc. the good is delivered regardless of who delivered it). Our ability to tend and maintain others is causally related to our own social experiences and identity, but this is quite different from the good-of-tending depending on the relative identities of the one-tending and one-tended.

action need not be (and often are not) the entity's own flourishing, happiness, freedom, or security. There is, thus, a curious interplay between what constitutes respect as a "relationship" or relational concept, what constitutes respect as a response to historical values, and what constitutes respect as entity-benefiting treatment. Here I begin to show why Empowerment respect needs to be formulated so as to distance the respecter from having the immediate intention to "promote" the entity's value, without losing hold of the idea of respect as a relational concept.

Given the failures of some instances of IR and CR to meet the conditions of EMPR, let me reformulate the two constraints on RR that are involved in the definitions we are working with:

(a) Empowerment Respect includes only those claims or actions justifiable from values independent of intrinsic/direct valuing of the entity (even if the respecter does happen also to have additional reasons of love to motivate her actions) . *This relates to the respecter's point of view: while the respecter is free to love and cherish the entity, her respectful action engages independent values and norms that govern the world she shares with the entity.* (This is parallel to the Social Symbolism constraint)

(b) Empowerment Respect includes only those claims or actions reasonably interpretable as preservative of the "integrity" or "agency" of the entity. (i.e., all claims for actions that treat entities as merely interchangeable, to be used as mere "material" are excluded.) *This relates to the respected's point of view. The norms that the respecter responds to are constrained by the idea that the respected wants to retain whatever integrity she needs for the engagements she will have reason to value.* (this is parallel to the Uptake-dependence constraint)

Can versions of CR and IR be articulated that would speak to these two constraints? I think so. I'll call one an "institutional-good" conception of respect and the other an "intrinsic-worth" conception. [248] They can be provisionally defined as follows:

An "institutional-good" conception of respect for entities would say that respect consists in advancing the entity's self-sustaining ability to promote the good of the institution. In other words, responding to opportunities that issue from the

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[248] I'm trying to offer formulations that are fitting as versions of or conceptions of EMPR

entity in her integrity, the respecter tries to direct that entity into a position to realize the good of some institution.[249]

An "intrinsic-worth" conception of respect for entities would say that respect consists in advancing the entity's role-sustaining ability to enjoy intrinsic worth. In other words, possible institutional roles are responded to as opportunities for supporting and sustaining the entity's integrity or wellbeing.[250]

I believe these are two logically bound ways of relating entities and practices: they are two faces of the coin or currency of EMPR. Moreover, under both conceptions, the main means **used by the respecter for advancing the entity are symbolic, directive, avoiding, and/or preservative.** When I look, thus, at the various "senses" of respect, what I see is that there is a way that the care and institutional perspectives are foundational to figuring out what EMPR is, but that also these same "senses" refer to different common practical means for realizing EMPR. Part of the benefit of EMPR, I hope, is that obviates the need to choose one or the other—the institutional worth or intrinsic worth—perspective as a primary ideal of respect for political liberalism.

The respectful treatments of Olivia in the examples above could be explained as successful efforts help her take or maintain an integrity-preserving position in relation to social practices that are perceived to be valuable. If one focuses on "integrity-preserving", one reaches an "intrinsic worth" conception, while if one focuses on "valuable social practices" then one reaches an "institutional worth" perspective, but my sense is that these two perspectives are or ought to be conceptually stitched together and must coexist under EMPR[251]. To explain further, let's take Olivia's respecters as motivated by the idea of preserving the "institutional good." The value they place on the institution (or practice) is what organizes their thoughts about Olivia. On this view, Olivia is "respectable" just because it is evident that she might contribute to the success of the practice or institution. Wanting to preserve the "institutional good," coworkers, bosses, family members, and so on, do what they can to arrange or support the positive

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[249] In other words, taking integrity as the limiting factor, the respecter tries to help the entity to be in a position to advance institutional goods.

[250] In other words, taking institutional roles as opportunities, the respecter tries to use institutional roles to support the entity's fundamental integrity or wellbeing.

[251] The idea of respect being worked up to be suitable for political liberal theory.

relationship between Olivia and the various practices that might be involved in (a party, a group project, a company). Another way to say this is that respecting Olivia is required in order to insure that she herself will dignify the valuable practice. On the other hand, now let's imagine Olivia's respecters to have motivations that center on the value they place on Olivia herself. These promoters of Olivia's "intrinsic worth" know Olivia. We might say they have reverence for her individuality and are attuned to how her individual life intersects with their own. On this basis, Olivia's respecter makes use of existing norms and institutional features for the sake of Olivia and perhaps even judges a practice or an institution as better or worse depending on how amenable it is to Olivia's taking a positive role in it. So the party, the state of the company, the group project has value in part because it provides a platform for Olivia—and respecting Olivia involves doing one's part to realize that potential for her.

I think that EMPR calls for a double valuing of institutional or practical norms *and* individuals situated in relation to those norms. But how can this be interpreted? Does respect keep the individual in the orbit of good practices, attending to her for the sake of institutional ideals? Does respect keep institutions correctly in the orbit of the individual, making sure they serve her needs? At bottom, respect has something to do with norms, something to do with historic and existing practices—but it also has something to do with an individual's power. How are the two things being related when EMPR is taking place?

4.5 Empowerment Respect (EMPR): shifting the focus from "features" to "contexts"

The list below repeats examples referred to in the previous sections. Here I continue to explain why each is an example of Empowerment Respect. Instead of looking to ordinary language to correlate sorts of objects with sorts of respect, I will ask how different modes of response become respectful due to different contexts. I will argue that a variety of familiar situations give rise to "circumstances of respect."[252] Different practices of EMPR can be seen as the commonly successful responses suited to these different contexts or situations. My claim is

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[252] After writing this I came across a new formulation by Diana Meyers that has some similarities. I'd like to discuss this at least in a footnote. She talks about "circumstances of respect" in an unpublished paper from 2015 about passivity and feminist theory titled, "Passivity in Theories of the Agentic Self." In conversation with her I confirmed that this is a new idea for her as well.

that the allegedly different senses of respect are not different concepts, they are arguably not even different conceptions (if what has made for the thought that these are different conceptions of RR has been that they pick out, attend to, and value different features of the object). Rather, they are different practical responses to the possibility of an entity's **normative (role-based, socially relative) empowerment.** [253]

In Chapter Two I briefly discussed the concept of respect put forward by Joseph Raz. There I argued briefly that Raz mistakes respect's proper object. At least there is some confusion on this point. Here, however, I want to offer that Raz's approach to respect is on the right track. This is because Raz links respect directly to concrete practices and to what it means to be a "valuer." Raz's way of tackling respect allows us to see it as a concept with an independent set of standards, rather than as one that is purely a reflection of the moral view being endorsed. The standards in a given instance are set by asking how the treatment actively relates the entity to the practice in such a way as to free her to play a value-disclosing role. As Raz suggests, a role is not bound to "follow" the institution with which it is historically associated. A role only requires some organized practice and a way to be authorized to act in relation to that practice. To have the right to a role means to be authorized to take it on, but that's not enough for respect. Respect involves deeper cooperation with the roles we are authorized to take on. With this provisionally in mind, let's look yet again at the "Olivia" examples that met the criteria discussed in the previous subsections:

> **ER 4** Her coworkers insisted that Olivia was owed the employee of the month award for her help on the project. They said it would be frankly disrespectful of the boss not to praise Olivia's contribution.

> **DR4** Olivia was put in charge of finding the most ethical contractors. We absolutely must respect her advice on the matter.

> **OR4** The family respected Olivia's limits in the kitchen by asking her to provide music and not food for the party.

> **IR4** The court officials respected Olivia as a defendant in the trial by not requiring her to testify.

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[253] Empowerment will be explained and defined below.

CR4 Olivia has already declared that, given her child's asthma and health concerns, she will not move with the company to Mexico City. It's really insulting for you to continue to offer her financial compensation to move. Instead, if you want to respect her, you ought to ask her what can be done to help her find a good new position here in the city.

The entity being respected (Olivia) is being situated so as to be institutionally "good-making," *but not only that*. It seems that the effort to help Olivia advance certain shared values is an effort that is focused on *particular* things about her (how hard she has worked, her preference for deadlines) that have an impact on how well or poorly she is able to take on the valued role. Olivia is, in each example, in a familiar practice-relevant situation, but she is in that situation in a "particular" way that reflects who she irreducibly is. We can say that in each of these examples, Olivia is in "circumstances of normative empowerment" (or "circumstances of respect") because of the way her own situation intersects with those of her coworkers, family members, or employers.[254]**She has the potential to exert influence on a valued domain or practice. This influence, however, depends on the access she has to norms (status, role, identity), which access in turn depends on the imagination and cooperation of those in a position to reckon with her on this normative level.**

I will be analyzing empowerment respect's elements in the next chapter, but let me begin by offering a meaning for "circumstances of normative empowerment." To be "normatively" empowered is to be helped to enjoy good-making engagement (efficacy) in part "thanks to" considerations given to one's social standing. To give this sort of help is a relational activity that can be engaged from a variety of situations. The ordinary uses of the word "respect" discussed above (the "senses" of respect) refer to common situations providing us with familiar opportunities to be at home in, thrive in, enjoy our good-making participation in practices. These are contexts of appraisal (ER), threat (OR), leadership (DR), institutional function (IR), and need (CR). These contexts turn out to have typical and predictable effects on someone's (or something's) ability to take on a valued role. Different types of entities (i.e. beings with integrity conditions) can find themselves in these contexts—physical objects, manmade and natural, living

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[254] Unlike the symmetry implied by Hume's circumstances of justice, I can be in a position to empower you, even if you are not at the moment in a position to empower me. See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 317 (3.2.2.16).

things, and above all, people. For example, a painting might be in an "appraisal" context for role-empowerment. If the person with the evaluative authority does not publicly highly evaluate the painting that meets the criteria for excellence, then the painting's potential to make the most out of its role as an artwork (so to speak) will remain untapped. Different practices might come into play in these contexts. For example, the context of leadership (authority) might require that the authority be consulted, or further, that the authority be obeyed.

The practices of EMPR are at least limited by the joint operation of the two constraints (uptake and symbolism) together with the idea of respect as a treatment relation. Acts of respect are not mere rituals or symbolic actions (say those that institute rank), but they are expressive. They are not inclusive of all actions that are good for the entity, but they are at least limited to those practices that the object is actually receptive to.[255] They are not constituted by positional norms and organizational standing, but they are involved in shaping such relations. Practices of respect are developed on the basis of a history of actual entities taking them up, and discarded when that story changes. For example, while it might seem that a leader does not "take up" the activity of being followed (consulted, obeyed), in fact, these are deemed acts of respect because they give a point to the leader's expertise and allow the leader to take on responsibility (to be the one whose work and judgment is made accountable to credit or criticism, who then continues to "deserve" the authority on the basis of how well or poorly they respond to positive or negative feedback). The impact of the actions must be in some way social and "between" the respecter and the respected—the practice of respect not only affects the entity here and now, but helps to "institute" the ways of seeing that make future such practices more likely. That social activity is a collaboration between the respecter and the respected, and as such must itself be shaped by their relative social positions throughout the engagement.[256]

Regarding the context of "appraisal," so-called evaluative respect (ER) is fitting when the thing being singled out as praiseworthy is granted some kind of recognizable status on that basis,

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[255] So, with appraisal (ER), we can imagine publicly praising someone posthumously and we don't really want to call that "respect" in the sense being worked out in this dissertation.

[256] In fact, insofar as the respected is a responsive and practically reasoning agent, their full participation in another's respect for them is itself an act of self-respect.

such that the granting of the expressive status has an impact on the object granted it. This can be interpreted in two different ways. By being granted the status, the entity might be able in turn to take on an institutional function--and so empowered to benefit the aims of the institution -- or with such a status the entity might have increased access to institutionally organized goods, by which she is empowered to continue to cultivate herself further according to self-relevant standards (and in such a way care for herself). In the case of obstacle respect (OR), we see again two possible interpretations that move toward either the institutional or care senses of respect.[257] Obstacle respect converges with institutional respect when the successful avoidance of the trigger would allow the potentially harmful entity to better realize institutionally important values. Obstacle respect converges with care respect when the avoidance of the trigger would allow the potentially harmful entity to enjoy more personally stable and productive circumstances. Likewise with Directive Respect (DR). Treating someone as an authority by following their advice can achieve the result of maintaining institutional order (the future legitimacy of that authority, whomever occupies it). On the other hand, following someone's directives can also be a way of participating in and increasing their personal efficacy and affirming the worth of their efforts (such as the research that went into their expertise).

Not only are we touching on what EMPR in general is, we can also begin to see how these different contexts might even pertain to the moral requirements of RR for "persons" (where "person" is the designation we give to the individual as inviolable moral entity or equal member of the moral community). These different contexts might help explain why abiding by a person's "rights" (Feinberg) is not the only practice one might need to engage in to respect someone "as" a person. Enjoyment of "personhood" status may depend upon how the individual is responded to in a variety of situations well beyond those that are legally defined as intrinsic to the status. If, for example, personhood is a status that commands us to protect one another from certain forms of deprivation (a "right" to shelter, human rights, etc.), it still may be that this protection requires, under specific circumstances, that we engage in praise of someone, obedience to their orders, care for their basic needs, avoidance of their destructive potential, or coordination with their institutional role. What respecters of persons would do in relation to an individual, to fulfill the moral duty of respecting her "as" a person, would depend on the extent to which any of these

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[257] Emphasis on what's best for the institution; emphasis on what's best for the individual

treatments (praise, avoidance, coordination) would influence the individual's enjoyment of the good-making standing of "personhood." Yet, while EMPR is often a way to do what is morally required, it is also a broader relation that can involve non-moral actions. There may be times when we know what empowerment respect requires of us without knowing whether or not it is morally right to enter into such a relation. Though it may never be intrinsically wrong to enhance the social power of another person, there may be morally wrong ways of doing so. If there are no morally right ways of doing so, then perhaps one will rightly refuse to empowerment-respect them.

Patterns of context and patterns of practice are what we are seeing. [258] What the foregone analysis suggests, however, is a fusion of institutional and care perspectives in the idea of respect. This is true not only for "personhood" respect, but for the concept of respect for entities under all sorts of descriptions and in view of countless different 'features'. Since we cannot be satisfied in choosing between institutional- and care- ways of seeing – as neither on its own encompasses what is going on with respect, we must try harder to think about this intersection. To simply offer two conceptions of EMPR as I've just done is an ad hoc solution I would like to move past. In the next chapter I will attempt a systematic account of Empowerment Respect (EMPR). I want EMPR to capture the intersection between (observantia) upholding institutions of value and cherishing the individual (reverentia).[259] Empowerment Respect's organizing principle is neither the wellbeing (or good life) of the entity, nor the hegemony of the institution with its practices. **It is, rather, to secure a position of value-disclosing engagement for the entity.** The value of the engagement is not (or not necessarily) determined by the interests, goals, or needs of the respected entity. It might not be strictly positive from her point of view, nor might it be her most favored activity or way of being. On the other hand, ongoing positive engagement depends upon and requires an integrated self (integrity), thus setting limits to how and in view of what one can or ought to respect another.

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[258] Yet we still want to know why they have converged and what it is we are trying to do when we "respect" someone. In light of this, we return to the consideration of institutional and care perspectives. The aims of supporting and preserving an institution (as if it was a living thing) and the aims of supporting and preserving a unique being (as if she were an institution).

[259] With these historical Kantian terms I gesture toward the history of respect in moral philosophy. See Feinberg, "Some Conjectures on the Concept of Respect."

Chapter 5 -- Theorizing Empowerment Respect: Elements and Process

5.1 Chapter introduction

In discussing EMPR I will sometimes use different terms to refer to what EMPR "does" for the entity respected: I will refer to EMPR as fostering an entity's "social power," "normative power," "worthwhile role", "value-disclosing position," or "good-making status." To give an anchoring definition: Empowerment respect occurs **when an agent (the respecter) is consciously doing their part to normatively empower an entity (the respected).** So, when is empowerment respect a lively possibility? And what turns that lively possibility into a reality? In other words, what are the minimal elements that place an entity in "circumstances of EMPR"? And how do those elements interact and do the work that results in normative power for the entity? This concept of EMPR invites two levels of analysis. First, its minimally necessary elements must be identified. Second, the dynamic relation that actualizes the potential of these elements must be explained. This first part of this chapter (5.2) is dedicated to the first level of analysis.[260] As other writers on respect have done, I will try here to break down EMPR into its basic elements. In the second part of this chapter (5.3) I theorize the "process" of normative empowerment.

5.2 Necessary Elements of Empowerment Respect

My claim is that respect happens when (and only when) **someone accountably acts in ways that help secure a position of value-disclosing engagement for an entity.** Empowerment Respect is about how we help each other to stably occupy worthwhile value-disclosing positions.

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[260] Theorizing respect is a back-and-forth process. Writers from Nietzsche ("only that which has no history can be defined" in *Genealogy of Morals* II) to Wittgenstein (see *The Brown Book)* have persuasively argued that it is senseless to "define" what we do not yet understand. First we need a theory of something, before we can reduce that to a definition, helpful for having us recognize instances of i. Yet a working definition (analysis) can help us to better understand something like "respect" which is, after all, not a natural concept—not a concept referring to something that exists in nature, but a normative concept—a concept related to how we want to or need to organize our own judgments and prescriptions.

From this I propose the following minimal elements. For there to be "circumstances of respect" the following must be true:

1. There is an **entity** (with integrity conditions)

2. with identifiable **capacities (characteristics) for "evaluative-point-of-view" (e-pov)- good engagement**[261]

3. There are **(integrity–preserving) ways to reckon with the entity** so as to preserve or promote its e-pov good engagement.

4. There is an accountable **"reckoner" (agent 1) who is equipped** (in terms of proximity, knowledge and competencies) **to reckon with the entity** accordingly.

5. There is an **"advocate"** (agent 2) positioned to know about the "entity" and positioned to influence agent 1 (she might be agent 1; she might be the entity herself). [262]

To put this into some context, let me turn for a moment to Carl Cranor's list of the necessary (and sufficient) elements for an attitude of respect are often turned to in the literature. About the "essential features of the attitude of respect for a person," Cranor holds that it must be the case that:

(1) R believes that P has F and that P's having F is an E-good thing.
(2) R appreciates (has knowledge and understanding of) why P's having F is an E-good thing
(3) R is disposed to rely upon and have confidence in P's having F and P's doing what is appropriate to his having F, and
(4) R is disposed to acknowledge and recognize the value of P's having F in ways appropriate to the F in question.[263]

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[261] This is such an awkward way to put it, but I take the phrase from Cranor and I find it helpful for keeping track of the idea that there are many different spaces of value, and so evaluative points of view.

[262] Implied in the existence of the epov: there are agents who, if they have the epov, would appreciate the importance of "1" and "2" (that agent could be the entity herself). The agent minimally needed is one who is either accountable to such appreciators or who is among them.

[263] "Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons," 310-311.

Cranor specifies that there must be an evaluative point of view that would lead the respecter to believe in the "importance" of the person and her feature. There is some way that the respecter needs to engage the *value* of P's having F. So, "ways of treating" something become an ability to somehow interact with the value itself.

My account differs from Cranor's in several ways. First and foremost, I am giving an account of the elements for the circumstances of possible EMPR and not the elements of an (achieved) *attitude of respect*. I am concerned with the necessary elements for an entity's *receiving* respect, while Cranor was trying to account for the necessary and sufficient elements for us to be able to call someone a respecter. Second, I do not claim that these together are *sufficient*. Rather they are the minimal necessary conditions out of which we might lay claim to respect and hope to see respect take place. Third, the respecter, on my view, has a more subtle relationship to the evaluative point of view. More precisely, there is a potential separation between those who do appreciate "P's having F to be an E-good thing" and those who act in ways that help to P actualize this potential. Fourth, the agent doing the respectful action need not know "why" the feature is important (again, we are talking about minimal conditions). Cranor draws a much tighter connection between appreciating a fact and having knowledge about the values and having the competency to do something "respectful." I make this connection much more porous.

My hope is that by looking at EMPR this way, with a focus on what needs to be in place for getting respect, we can start to distinguish between when a really potential respect is missing from some situation and when there is just some other unfortunate lack. To fix ideas, here are three hypothetical situations:

(a) Celina set up a scuba diving school on a remote island. Celina loves to teach people to appreciate the diverse life in the ocean. Because of changes in the ecosystem, due to a complex array of factors, there are now so many sharks in the waters that Celina cannot teach.

(b) Celina set up a scuba diving school on a remote island. Celina loves to teach people to appreciate the diverse life in the ocean. Bob is considering setting up his own business nearby. His business would involve the extreme sport of feeding sharks, and would attract many sharks to the area. He could set up his business right next to Celina's or on the other side of the island.

(c) There was once a woman, named Celina, who knew how to teach scuba diving. Since she passed away, there is nobody known who has that particular skill. The community regrets such a loss. Bob is considering setting up his shark-feeding sport business where Celina's used to be.

In the table below I use the examples above to show how "circumstances of respect" are met or not met in the different cases. Below I will detail the meanings of the various terms ("entity," etc.) but in the chart I offer shorthand definitions to guide the understanding of the chart:

1.An "entity"	(a being with integrity conditions and, as such, with interests of its own imputable to it).	Celina in examples a and b. *Celina does not exist in example c.*
2.with e-pov good-making capacities	characteristics that the epov could pick out that would suggest that the entity could have a valuable engagement with some epov relevant practice, etc.	Celina's knowledge of scuba diving, her desire to teach it, etc.
3.and with relevant *reckonable* characteristics that can be reckoned with in integrity-preserving ways	with some characteristics that are affected through norms in such a way as to bring about or secure (2)	Celina's reliance on safe waters – reckonable only in example (b).
4. In proximity to an agent who is practically equipped to act in accord with (3).	This agent may or may not be directly accountable to the entity or to those who share the e-pov; but this agent can be influenced by an accountable agent. (see below)	Bob, in example (b)
5. All of the above known to an "answerable agent"	There is an agent who is either accountable to the entity or accountable to those who share the e-pov, who understands and appreciates 1-4 AND who is identical to or can influence Agent 1.	Bob, in example (b)

As the chart suggests, only example B puts us in the "circumstances of respect." Not only is there a perspective—an evaluative point of view—that can see Celina as potentially engaging practice-dependent values—but there is someone—Bob—in a position to take up that perspective and act accordingly. Bob might act respectfully of Celina by choosing to set up his business on the other side of the island. In situations (a) and (c) we are not in "circumstances of respect." In situation (a) there may be many people who can appreciate what Celina has to offer,

but nobody has been identified who can make a difference. Celina has been deprived of something, but in a way that is not necessarily reckonable. In situation (c) there is an understanding of what one might have done to normatively empower Celina—but Celina no longer exists. The intentions are all there, and probably the skills to respect someone like Celina. But such an entity is missing from the circumstance.

The idea that some minimal conditions must maintain for respect to be possible is obvious enough, yet the shorthand I'm using is by itself obscure and open to too much interpretation. I will now expand on what I mean by the five elements listed.

(1) The "entity": The proper object of respect is an entity to whom interests and some kind of coherent identity can be imputed. The "entity" here is paradigmatically a *living* individual who can potentially take on a variety of roles. "Entities" on my meaning, are those who can potentially engage in practices, take actions directed by desires of their own, and interact with a made or natural environment. All sentient beings thus qualify as *possible* objects of respect. Non-sentient living things and created objects (a mountain, a painting) can take on different roles and be used in different ways, but do not really have interests of their own. Respect "for" them is metaphorical, which does not mean it is not important. For example, "they respected the flag" is really not respect "for" the flag, but rather signals (sometimes) respect on behalf of living or future persons for whom such an object might *matter*[264]. Likewise, but even more tenuously, traits, traditions, and non-concrete institutions insofar as they are "thought objects" which can play different roles in our lives, may be "encountered" "as if" they are things we might consider respecting; however, they lack "integrity conditions." Or, rather, those conditions are merely one-dimensional. The point here is that the living individual is the paradigm entity capable of receiving respect. Such individuals are the only ones that can have an actual "interest" in being treated in ways that support their "integrity conditions." I must point out that I am not limiting "respectable" entities to those who can meet a threshold of rational capacity, and thus take a "conscious" interest in their own identity, and of the use made of their existence for the sake of disclosing values. That an entity cannot have the "thought" of respect or any other concept does

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[264] I.e. because I've given a certain symbolic treatment to this piece of fabric, I've enabled some people to continue to more easily use it as a way of engaging certain practice-dependent values.

not matter. They are still capable of being respected or disrespected if the other conditions are present and if their being respected will contribute to their striving or to the maintenance of norms.[265]

(2) With identifiable capacities (characteristics) for "evaluative point of view"- good engagement

By *evaluative point of view (*e-pov)[266] I mean a point of view driven by the standards or ideals of a practice. The practice can be one that is engaged for prudential reasons, but it must be understandable outside of any one person's prudential reasons for engaging in it. It could be as broad as the "practice" of morality, if you will. Or it could be as narrow as the practice of getting a makeover. It could be as profound as the practice of mourning the dead, or as superficial as the practices of tug-of-rope. An e-pov is a practice-driven perspective.

An *e-pov*-good-making characteristic is just something about the entity—which may be only potential and not even demonstrated—that, were it cultivated or directed in a certain way, would be valuable from the evaluative point-of-view. So, for example, a certain interest in stage performance, if that characterized some individual, might be directed in such a way that they could develop skills that result in performances "intrinsically" valuable to those who value theater. Or, to take a much more familiar example, many believe that the capacity for rational thought can be cultivated and directed to result in the possession of attuned moral reasoning. The evaluative point of view of Kantian (not Kant's[267]) morality would thus identify that "feature" of

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[265] I owe the last part of this sentence to Eva Kittay.

[266] As mentioned above, I borrow the phrase and acronym from Carl Cranor , though I am not sure that I mean the same thing by it as he does. He indicates that such a point of view operates from normative structures: prudential, aesthetic, moral, etc. So an evaluative point of view is some mode of practical reason that would arrive at the conclusion, it is EPOV-good to do this and EPOV-bad to do that. I think that what I mean by EPOV is slightly different. It is some point of view that we have a reason to believe could be generally endorsed. So, some aesthetic practice or sensibility might give rise to a corresponding evaluative point of view, but simple prudence could not. Prudence as a *value* might, but not prudence as a hypothetical imperative. One cannot be a respecter by saying that "from the point of view of me getting what I happen to want" you might have something to contribute.

[267] Kant's moral theory would suggest, instead, that the "capacity" to respond in certain ways to the stipulation that one's rationality is the ground for one's morality is not itself a "feature" of the individual. Morality does not respond to an existing "moral feature" but rather creates the conditions where dormant potentialities can be activated. Moral choices become possible (and agents become moral agents) only after we create the quite artificial universal status of rational autonomy. I agree with Cynthia Stark (ref) that popular strands of Kantianism differ markedly from Kant

entities as one that is a good-making[268] characteristic (from the Kantian e-pov).[269] By a "characteristic" I mean to indicate something like Darwall's "fact or feature" (see chapter 2), if those notions are taken in an expanded sense. On my view, a characteristic something that "characterizes" the entity's relations to the world, not necessarily a "trait" that they possess. So, a characteristic of Dana might be that of being Sarah's crush (Sarah has a crush on Dana). You cannot examine Dana and discover in her this "quality." But Dana brings it about that Sara has a crush on her, at least right now.[270] A "characteristic" need not be something we associate with the individual's core self in order to be one that might underwrite the capacity for e-pov good engagement. Some fairly negative characteristic (like impatience) might still be the basis from which I might engage in some practice in an e-pov good way. There are a few characteristics about us that might be good from an e-pov, but that integrity denies we can make use of. A

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by treating morality as a response to actually existing "features" people have, rather than as an invention of a way of seeing people that makes moral agency possible.

[268] It is unorthodox to say "good-making" in the same breath as one says Kantian, but I think Kant's Doctrine of Virtue as well as the opening lines of The Groundwork allow for the idea that there are Kantian positions that might use good together with right. After all if right is prior to good, good consequences are still part of the discussion—only they are explained by principles and not the other way around.

[269]This might seem strange or counterintuitive, but an important element of respect is the formal separation of the evaluative point of view of the agent of respect and the evaluative point of view of those who "value" some activity or contribution within a practice. What matters is that there be a means of connection (see context of accountability directly below) between the agent of respect and those whose values determine the norms, such that the latter are able to give the former a reason to take an interest in their satisfaction of their values. Imagine a community of racists who highly value the ballet, but who willfully ignore evidence that a person of the race they despise possibly has the capacities to disclose values through the practice of ballet. What's good about ballet—what it brings to light it brings to light for those who love and engage ballet as an artform, which they do. Now imagine an "agent" of respect, who is less prejudiced, but who also has no particular fondness for ballet. What this agent knows, however, is that a certain person of a certain despised race has been studying ballet on their own and has a great passion for it. This agent of respect also knows that a certain kind of shoes are the best quality for someone practicing and learning ballet, and knows this by observing what other customers buy, etc. Now, when the aspiring dancer comes into the store the agent is able to play a part in the conditions for her positive participation in the art if he shares his knowledge about the similarly priced, but qualitatively different shoes. He initiates a process of empowering her as a dancer even without having any personal stake in the artform, and does so on the basis of standards and values that have emerged via the engagement in that artform by those who would completely exclude her from it.

[270] How do we distinguish this from an assumption that all objects of respect are to be treated as ends-in-themselves? I think it is a broader assumption because it is not dependent upon the object of respect having the capacity for rational autonomy (or even thought or conscious desire). Integrity (see earlier chapters) is both more than and less than autonomy. The entity as a system/agent for/of self-reproduction and self-maintenance is what is regarded as inviolable from the perspective of the respecter. The entity's own will (ability to set her own ends in the full light of shared human knowledge) might be violable under some conditions while the entity's capacity for meeting minimal physical and psychological needs at the level that would allow them to engage in the valued practices must be preserved.

cow's meat is tasty, but in order to get the cow to "engage" in ways that will bring out that good we would have to destroy the cow. This does not mean, however, that promoting *any* non-destructive characteristic is itself *sufficient* for respect. Just as we know that disrespect usually takes place well above the threshold of brute exploitation, so we should come to understand that the robustness of respect's requirements (from the relevant e-pov) correspond to the robustness of the opportunities that inhere in a given situation. What potentials need to be supported and promoted depend upon the individual's relation to the varied practices and practice-dependent values that we (the possible respecter) are in a position to influence.

(3) There are (integrity–preserving) ways to reckon with the entity so as to preserve or promote its e-pov good engagement. **(Relevant "reckonable" characteristics[271])**

Whether one is directly reckoning with the valued characteristic or something that is relevant to the valued characteristic, the reckoning (the activities that bring about the possibility for the valuable engagement) must not violate the entity's integrity conditions.[272] The following situation, as such, does not fulfill the minimal conditions for EMPR, since to exploit Dana's recklessness in order to make a scientific discovery would involve doing things that threaten her life and her mental stability (i.e. human integrity conditions):

> Dana is inclined to do anything that will give her a rush, without regard to the consequences on her body or mind. Such an attitude inclines Dana to be willing to experiment with drugs. A scientist believes that LSD-use can create as-yet unimagined mental associations that could generate new scientific metaphors. It is the joy of scientists working with these phenomena to witness people in a state of drug-induced free-association. The experimental method that makes her participation desirable is one that is very dangerous and very stimulating—and so only reckless individuals would have a "reason" (or be irrational enough) to participate.

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[271] What I'm saying here is that while what makes my good-making participation in some practice, like painting *good*, might not be directly reckonable, it could be that what would destroy that, otherwise unreckonable characteristic, is itself reckonable (my propensity to alcohol abuse), so "alcohol abusing" is a practice-relevant feature, but it is not the good-making feature. The alcoholism is reckonable – as the gallery dealer you respect me by not surrounding me with alcohol at my opening.)

[272] Notice, this is not the same as positing a moral law. Simply not killing or destroying someone or destroying their motivation is a far cry from all that we morally owe to them. Furthermore, the things we do to help another engage valuably in a practice might involve moral crimes against third parties. It just so happens, though, that EMPR involves us in a kind of moral minimum vis. the entity; even though the purpose of EMPR is not to maintain the moral order or to be morally adequate in our actions.

For some feature to become "reckonable" is for it to become part of the normative equation. How and why do some features become part of the normative equation? In some sense, "reckonability"[273] is implied in the very discovery of characteristics whose exploitation[274] is potentially consistent with an entity's integrity. Yet it is ultimately best to distinguish "reckonability" as an additional minimal condition. We can probably think of many examples in which we discover a good-making characteristic, but yet there is nothing we are in a position to do to service its potential (full respect is not possible). For example, someone with a view to promoting cyber-to-human intimacy might discover that "Barbara," an anonymous blogger, really wants to fall in love with a robot.[275] However, Barbara only knows about such relationships through science fiction books, and she does not know there are robots capable of intimacy and that there are existing practices that promote such relationships in the real world. Such people do exist, and robots really do exist, but these people do not know how to get in touch with Barbara.[276] Reckonability is difficult, because nobody can be identified who is in a position to help Barbara connect her characteristic (in this case a desire) to the relevant practices. All those who know Barbara do not know that such relationships are possible, and Barbara is anomalous in her desires, in the context of her community. Thus, from the perspective of her community no clear status can be set up for Barbara—her situation is indeed so odd. Her friends and family cannot begin to relate to her strange passion, and she hardly has the vocabulary to describe it.

The larger point is that while social reckonability is closely tied to the very same observations and encounters that result in names and descriptions, it is not a given that anything

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[273] The idea of "reckonability" is borrowed from Colin Bird ("Status, Identity, and Respect"); however, I disagree with Bird's suggestion that it is something's power to cause moral havoc is what makes it "reckon-worthy." Bird seems right that something's being "reckonworthy" is not sufficient to its being "reckonable," and in using his term I am trying to move forward with this idea, as well as with the idea that it is important to know how something might *become* reckonable—i.e. how can some features of someone become part of the normative equation?

[274] I use various words: exploit, engage, channel… I'm trying to use these neutrally.
[275] Wanting to fall in love with a robot is a potentially valuable characteristic from the point of view of those who are practicing 'post-human' values.
[276] On the issue of proximity and respect being somehow tied to our coming across the individual see Joseph Raz. I disagree with Raz that we need not respect those who we don't happen to come across. If I understand his argument it seems to me that it must be specified that certain kinds of avoidance and so-called willful-ignorance are disrespectful. For an analysis of Raz on this topic also see Green, "Two Worries about Respect for Persons," 215ff.

that can be named can be reckoned with at a given point in time. For something to be "reckonable" there has to be some social translation of experiences into norms, even if those norms are quite restricted in terms of who would recognize them and who would be in a position to act on them.

Let me say more about "norms." Given the skills and knowledge of society and the interconnection of existing ideas and practices, the "good-making" fact that is noticed about the entity can be responded to in certain rational ways. These "rational ways" are existing and potential norms. If they are codified and institutionalized at some level, the norms already exist. If they are easy to understand and translate into the existing schemes of life, then they are potential norms. So, there are powers possessed by me and those like me which can be used to condition or secure a good-making relation between this flower here and other similar flowers about-to-bloom, and these powers to engage "norms" exceed the existing norms themselves. Social life offers many patterns, roles, and ways of setting expectations and I am free to take these up and rearrange them in ways that others might find familiar, inviting, or even compelling. It is not the case that clearly established norms must already exist to secure a place for the entity. Quite the contrary. The possibility for being respected (and thus prima facie justifiability of demanding respect) only supposes that we begin imaginatively from existing norms, as they are applied to certain entities, and make a case for the plausibility of comparable norms in a new case and context. So, for example, the status of "domestic partner" can be proposed as a way to "respect" (provide value-disclosing conditions for) unmarried couples in relation to practices of co-habitation or mutual life-planning. Similarly, a quilt made in a subjugated community is seen to have the possibility of being appreciated as a form of art. While the norms for preserving and displaying quilts are not the same as those of preserving paintings, such norms—say, found in other practices—are accessible and could be exported into the practice of art-appreciation. These norms, as such, are to be the kind that the (or some similar) agent could actually follow. The point of these norms is to construct the social ground for (or deal with) the potential social obstacles to the entity's disclosure of value in the practical context under consideration.

I want to stress again that there is a distinction between what respect calls for and what morality calls for. Just because something respect-able does not mean it is ultimately respect-worthy. The possibilities for respect are broader than what law and morality will allow.

Sometimes morality requires disrespect, however much there is some loss in failing to give respect when it is possible to give it. Now let me offer a contrasting and disturbing hypothetical meant to pressure us to think about the amorality of respect (EMPR): Ralston sexually desires young children and lives in a hyper-connected world in which one can find groups of self-identified and proud pedophiles. This group believes that there is an intrinsic value to practices of pedophilia. From the point of view of these practices, Ralston's desire for young children is a genuine potential good-making (and arguably integrity-consistent) quality. Moreover, the careful thinking and advocacy of this group has, over the years, arrived at designations for those who are potential members – those who desire young children but have not yet acted on those desires. "P-Virgins," they are called, should be treated in certain ways, geared to enabling them to disclose the values of cross-generational sexuality. They should, whenever possible, be exposed to positive images of active pedophiles and pedophilic relations. They should be kept informed about any legal loopholes that would make their actions less dangerous to them in terms of arrest. Etc… Those who "owe" the "P-Virgins" this treatment would, from that EPOV, be anyone in a position to promote these images and spread this information, even if, ethically speaking, only other members of the P-club would be thought to have a reason to take on this EPOV (the rest of us reject their values and believe that the actualization of those values is deeply harmful to children and to society). In refusing to participate in the norms suggested by the P-club, we do diminish their power, and we hamper a constellation of dreams, though in this case, disrespecting P's it is the morally right thing to do.

(4) There is an agent (agent 1) who is equipped (in terms of proximity, knowledge and competencies) to reckon with the entity accordingly. (agent equipped to act accordingly)

There must be someone (or some institution) in the position to make a positive difference to the entity's e-pov good engagement. They would be doing this by reckoning with the entity in the available practical ways. And yet, this "reckoner" need not really be the conscious, deliberate agent of respect. The reckoner may simply be in the right place at the right time, without even knowing or appreciating the valued practice or the entity it affects. Minimally, this reckoner just has the power to put the entity into the good-making position. If there is yet another agent who in turn has the power to educate or influence the "reckoner" then we still do have the ingredients, so to say, for respect to be realized. It needs to be the case that someone saw to it that the entity

received the respectful treatment—and that "someone" might even deserve the title, respecter for her ability to act at a distance. If there is such a one, capable of appreciating the potential of the situation, and all the other elements are there, then we have circumstances of respect. If we look upon such a situation and see that no respect took place, we have the right to seek an account from those involved.

(5) There is an accountable agent (agent 2) positioned to know about the "entity" and positioned to influence agent 1 (she might be agent 1).

Who must be accountable to whom for us to be able to say that respect is taking place? It must be the case that there is some accountability between agents in a potential respect relation. There are those who share the e-pov value; there is the entity that can be seen as having the capacity to engage valuably; there is agent in a position to reckon with that possibility. Some one of these has to be able to hold some other of these to account for EMPR to be normative in the way we think it is.

One takeaway from looking at the "circumstances of respect" is the realization that, as a respecter, you do not unfurl the other's normative empowerment whole-cloth out of your own disposition. When you respect me "as…", you do not in a single gesture or act realize or create my freedom to disclose values. Rather, you play a *facilitating* role that involves you in a process; your role is one that requires your accountability more than it requires your deep understanding.

5.3 The Process of Empowerment -- Section Introduction

A relation of treatment, EMPR cannot be sufficiently explained just by discussing its elements. Now I want to try to use the elements minimally necessary for EMPR to work up a fuller account. Doing this involves seeing how the elements are activated in a process of practice-specific empowerment. Relationships of EMPR must be actualized within a "process" of normative empowerment that they help to bring about and maintain.[277] This process itself can be broken down into stages or moments. In the subsections that follow, I will use fictional examples

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[277] Normative empowerment is an ongoing process whereby meaningful engagement in socially legible practices is secured for the entity.

to lay out a detailed account of the process through which respect takes place. This account might be helpful for how we understand the attitude of respect.

5.3.1 Empowerment as a process: main ideas

The process of normative empowerment is the "theater" in which relations of respect occur. In this process there are three connected but distinct stages where the potential respecter can positively influence the social power of the respected: **Crediting, Reckoning, and Accounting.** As the following example unfolds, we will see Rudy, the respecter of Emily, relating to Emily through these stages that together constitute the process of empowering her in a specific practice.

> Rudy notices Emily, who seldom speaks during meetings, has had her hand up for a long time. Rudy thinks that Emily probably has something she wants to say to the group. Rudy has just raised his hand and the department chair calls on him immediately. He senses that it would be good if Emily had a chance to speak before she gives up; so, instead of voicing his concern he tells the chair that he saw Emily was waiting. The chair notices, thanks him, and calls on Emily. Emily offers her comment, and the meeting adjourns. Afterwards, a colleague approaches Rudy to thank him for being so respectful of Emily. They wonder if this will encourage her to present her ideas more often. Perhaps, the colleague offers, the chair could be encouraged to learn all the faculty's names—since he seems to have a habit of not "noticing" faculty who haven't personally made it onto his radar.

The story above contains all the "elements" (detailed above) needed for a respect relation to be possible. Roughly speaking, the story above could be mapped onto the above-listed elements of respect as follows:

1. There is an **entity** (with integrity conditions) EMILY

2. with identifiable **capacities (characteristics) for e-pov good engagement** PERSPECTIVE TO SHARE WITH FACULTY ON MATTERS OF SHARED INTEREST – MORE PERSPECTIVES MAKE THE MEETINGS MORE PRODUCTUCTIVE AND WORTHWHILE

3. There are **(integrity–preserving) ways to reckon with the entity** so as to preserve or promote its e-pov good engagement. CALL ON HER / CALL ATTENTION TO HER DESIRE TO TALK / GIVE HER A TURN

4. There is an accountable **"reckoner" (agent 1) who is equipped** (in terms of proximity, knowledge and competencies) **to reckon with the entity** accordingly.

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THE CHAIR OF THE DEPARTMENT/ THOSE WHO CAN GET THE
CHAIR'S ATTENTION / THOSE WHO WILL ACTIVELY LISTEN TO
WHAT SHE HAS TO SAY

5. There is an **"advocate"** (agent 2) positioned to know about the "entity" and
positioned to influence agent 1 (she might be agent 1; she might be the entity
herself). RUDY

We can reveal the interaction of these elements through how we imagine this story. So, as
we imagine it, all are participating in the "practice" of the faculty meeting. There may be various
opinions among the faculty about the usefulness of such meetings, but there are at least some
who value the meetings and see them as a chance for hearing new ideas and building solidarity.
Emily has the capacity to formulate and share her ideas, and so she could theoretically become
one of the agents that make it a good thing to have meetings. Emily's shyness, which could stand
in the way of her participation, is something that the culture has a general awareness of in people
and informal ways of handling. For example, shy people are given extra encouragement and time
to speak. When shy people speak, an extra effort is made to warmly receive the effort. Happily,
there are simple norms already in place that instruct people to raise their hand to make known
their desire to talk, advising those whose job it is to moderate the meeting to call on hands by
some transparent democratic method. Further norms are in place to "pass" one's opportunity to
talk over to someone considered to have a special stake in or special knowledge helpful to the
discussion. So we see, there are ways to "reckon" with someone in Emily's position.[278] In fact,
that is partly why we can identify and call it a "position." In this example we have a room full of
accountable agents who might be able to do this reckoning. They might not have reasons of their
own to engage these norms on behalf of Emily, but they could if they wanted to or were
convinced to. Rudy, doesn't always think faculty meetings are worthwhile, but he still recognizes
that it might be a good thing for Emily to participate more actively, so he is in a position to
witness that there has been a failure to include Emily, if an opportunity is passed over. In this
particular narrative, Rudy takes the situation into his own hands by utilizing available norms to

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[278] Differently positioned faculty have different norms available to them for reckoning with Emily's shyness and her
interest in contributing to the meeting.

call attention to Emily. (He becomes both the advocate and the reckoner, but the two roles need not be played by the same person).

5.3.2 Organizing the elements into the three stages

How exactly do all these elements take flight and generate relations of respect? This process does not permit absolute closure, yet involves many small successes. The elements of EMPR are organized into three mutually influencing, but practically independent stages[279]: first, an (A) "appreciative" or "crediting" stage, second, (B) a stage of "reckoning," and third (C) a stage of "accountability" or "reflection." I will describe these stages (moments) in the process of normative empowerment. I will argue that these moments feed into one another and that the process can "begin" at any of the three stages. Each stage involves a way of seeing the entity. Though such a way of seeing is not sufficient for respect, I will, for the sake of simplicity, call someone who engages the process at any one of these stages a "respecter."[280]

Crediting

This is the normative space of "appreciating" what the entity is and *could be* for the practice. A practical context provides the lens through which this appreciating takes place. So the entity is seen as a potentially good-making role-player in some specific practical context[281]. It's not enough that she simply be seen to be beneficial for the practice. She has to be seen as having integrity conditions – i.e. things about her that cannot be violated without destroying what makes her an individual. It has to be believed that what makes her valuable (from the point of view of the practice) is in some way valuable only if she remains psychologically and physically intact.[282] So, in sum, the entity is seen as respect-*worthy*. Another way to say this is that she is

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[279] I arrange the stages in the most natural order for "robust," but an important point is that they could contingently occur in any order. And once in process, reflections at (3) can change the reckoning that takes place at (2), etc.

[280] Though I have been and will continue to argue that being a respecter of someone requires more.
[281] How specific? I'm not clear on that. I have in mind everything from democratic citizenship and parenting (broad categories) to figure skating, stamp collecting, hiking, apologizing, and kissing.
[282] Remaining intact is not the same as flourishing. The caregiver wants her to flourish.

seen as worth reckoning with; however, at this stage we don't necessarily know how to reckon with her. This stage could generate the entire process of empowerment because it could produce in the appreciators an interest and curiosity to find out how to bring the entity into the orbit of the practice (stage 2). They need not love and cherish her for her own sake, nor need they subscribe to the view that she has inalienable rights or is sacred as an individual; however, their understanding that *her good is bound up with and inseparable from her integrity* may well teach them to love her and find her inviolable (leading to advocacy for on her behalf in areas beyond this specific practice as well as leading to additional motivation to reflect on whether or not she was successfully normatively empowered by the actions taken—stage 3).

Minimally, crediting requires:

    (1)   beliefs that there are entities with specific integrity conditions

Together with one or both of the following:

    (2)   the idea that such entities, as such, could do some good
    (3)   the desire, should it be possible, to facilitate them in doing some good

Reckoning

This is the normative space in which a "reckoner" facilitates a socially legible good-making interaction between the entity and the practice/values. At this stage the entity is seen as reckon-*able*. There are tools available for reckoning with her in practice-relevant ways and there are people who are capable of doing so. At this stage the entity enjoys social supports that enable her to disclose values in a particular practice. At this stage it is not necessary that the reckoners already know or appreciate the value of what they are doing. Nor is it necessarily the case that the method of reckoning is itself moral, just, or fair to all involved (though it is a kind of reckoning that preserves the entities integrity-conditions). It may be that the reckon-able entity was born into an environment that is socially stratified in a way that is advantageous to her (relative to this practice). It may be that the reckoners act from habit, rather than from any reasons of value—they may not even particularly value her. But at this stage what is produced are experiences and--we might say--experimental evidence about what *works*. There is proof that

such a person *can* be situated so as to engage well with such a practice as that.[283] It's possible that the norms through which she is reckoned (given various rights or space or help, etc.) were designed to serve a different institution or practice—let's call it practice A, but now it becomes possible for those who value practice B to see the value of the entity for practice B. Simply the happenstance of efficacy in reckoning with the entity has given way to the possibility of appreciating her from the B-point of view (stage 1). Also, these norms of reckoning can become objects of critique and reflection (stage 3).

Ideally, the reckoners are also respecters. The respecter-as-reckoner identifies the conditions under which this entity can use its power to make a positive difference to the shared values. The "conditions" are grasped in some detail, in terms of practice- and integrity-relevant features or facts about the entity's situation. The respecter-reckoner identifies the areas in which she may either bring about or get in the way of those "good-making" conditions. She identifies those actions or practices that can be taken up under various circumstances. She recognizes herself to be in a situation that might empower the entity, and is able to act according to the practices she correctly identified. I will return to this when discussing the attitude of EMPR, but we can say that at the "reckoning" stage the *respecter* locates the relevant norms, procedures, or modes of acting that can actualize or play a part in actualizing that good-making position. The respecter figures out what he in particular can do, from the positions available to him, and does those things in ways that make him open to public scrutiny and accountability.

Minimally, the reckoning stage requires:

> (1)   that there really is such an entity to whom these beliefs reasonably apply,

together with one or more of the following:

> (2)   that there is a concrete valued characteristic that is relatable to some variety of practices

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[283] There are probably numerous examples in stories of living with and caring for people with disabilities, where some mode of interaction is used for some unrelated purpose and slowly the individual is revealed to have something to offer that was relevant to a totally other arena that nobody noticed before. Being interacted with in that way "unveiled" potentials that had been hidden, and now this way of interacting becomes a norm for reaching those potentials.

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(3)   that there is a concrete worthwhile practice that could include such an entity

(4)   that the reckoner has some influence over the connection of the entity to the characteristic and/or the practice

(5)   That the respecter takes the action that facilitates the connection

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Accounting/Reflecting

At this stage there are those prepared to advocate on behalf of the entity. They may not themselves be in a position to properly reckon with her in specific practice-relevant ways and they may not even share the perspective that can see and appreciate her value to the particular practice under review. What they do see, though, is someone who deserves to be normatively empowered. They therefore may rate or measure the value of the practice according to whether it excludes her as a good-making agent.[284] What worth is this practice if it renders the entity she cares about invisible? It's not enough that there is an advocate who cares about the power of the entity—this advocate must himself be in a position to make his concerns legible to the wider community.

What sorts of things does he bring to the community's attention? It may be that there are certain norms that are being consciously relied upon to support the good-making position of the entity, but that there is evidence that these norms are not succeeding from the perspective of the entity's own fundamental and salient interests. The advocate-critic may ask those involved to reflect on the broader values and concerns within which their practice is situated. The advocate may merely affirm that things are working well and try to explain why they are working well, so as to help assure the continued successful empowerment. The advocate makes the reckoners and the appreciators accountable to the entity for their attitudes, beliefs, and actions toward her.[285]

The way the "accounting" stage can activate the other stages of the process is by calling attention to the entity. The advocate can make those who engage in a certain practice aware, perhaps for the first time, of someone they have ignored. This awareness might give rise to an

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[284] This "deserving" may be qualified by such phrases as "whenever it is morally permissible to do so" – or it may be an absolute claim that the advocate wants to make that the entity always be empowered, by any means necessary.

[285] Appreciators are capable of advocating on behalf of their practice-related values, but their advocacy by itself is not sufficient for "starting" the process of empowerment for the entity.

appreciation of the entity's e-pov good-making capacities/features. The advocate might at first be the only one truly concerned with the entity's integrity conditions and yet might put political pressure on practitioners to limit the "opportunities" they seek for the entity to those that are integrity-preserving. This demand may fold into activities at the reckoning stage. The advocate may demand a proliferation of integrity-preserving encounters between the entity and others, not even concerned with what other "purpose" those encounters will serve. This is just reckoning for the sake of reckoning. The reason to do so is because it creates evidence and experience that can reveal new potentials in the entity and give practitioners reasons to value the entity. Those who have claimed not to know how to "deal" with the entity may become much more innovative under the right amount of political pressure.

We mostly imagine that an advocate is also going to be an appreciator and a reckoner. No doubt she is ready to see the value the entity might bring to any situation. No doubt she wants to help the entity to disclose important values through practices. But maybe the advocate doesn't yet see what specific values the entity could reveal. Maybe all the advocate can do is to demand visibility and attention for the entity. Maybe all the advocate can presently do is demand basic justice or fair treatment for the entity without any notion of the individual who will emerge from this treatment[286].

At the "accounting" stage, stock is taken of the potential-respected's position and the forces maintaining it or undermining it. The beliefs of the appreciators and the activities of the reckoners "toward" the respected's "worthwhile" value-disclosing position, is assessed in terms of how it fits with the entity's fundamental interests. As needed, norms are adjusted, new responsibilities are articulated, and new characteristics relevant to the practice are identified.

The accounting stage requires the following:

(1)   Someone who cares about the entity (an advocate)

(2)   and who is attuned to different issues in the
        community, vis the visibility of the entity (in other

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[286] This advocate, arguably, is positioned to give care, but is not yet herself able to empower the entity she so cares about. We must keep in mind that I am not thinking of any general state of being "empowered;" rather, I'm thinking that we are only normatively empowered through and in relation to existing practices.

words, the advocate must be able to formulate a critique or a concern pertinent to the entity's normative power.)

(3)   The advocate must be able to use channels for holding appreciators and reckoners accountable

5.3.3 Becoming a respecter

Normative empowerment does not need much to be weakly engaged and sputtering along. But, when it is at its most "robust" the process is such that the agents at the different stages are all consciously cooperating on behalf of the entity's normative power.[287] All are attuned to each other's efforts and willing to reflect upon and try to improve the role they play. As such, all can be said to be actively respecting the entity.

Four roles: Appreciator, Reckoner, Advocate, Respected

Empowerment Respect is a relation taking place within a dynamic process. All parties--the advocates, the respected, the purveyors of the E-POV (appreciators), and the reckoner are involved together in achieving normative power for the entity. It's how they work together to achieve it that constitutes relationships of EMPR.[288] The process of EMPR relies on the responsiveness of these diverse players (not always different people[289]). How do the parties

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[287] They may not all be independently committed to the goal of making sure that the entity is empowered, but they are aware of the positive role they are playing for the respected and they are glad to be playing that role. They would prefer, all things equal, to do things in a way that empowers the entity.

[288] Here I am bringing these roles back to the constraint of uptake. I said that respect was a relation of treatment, but I also said it was only partially a success term—or it's a success term in a particularly ambiguous way. Seeing the roles as players at different stages of a three-stage process helps us to see why. I cannot successfully respect E if you are not also doing your part to empower her.

[289] What I mean is that one and the same person can be the entity, who is her own advocate, who has an e-pov because she values certain practices and sees that she could contribute without harming her own integrity, and who reckons successfully with herself in ways that allow her to bring out the good in those practices. This would be a fullest kind of **self-respect**.

engage one another? What skills, beliefs, desires, and competencies must those involved bring into this complex interaction in order to sustain the "respected" in a good-making position? Let's look at each of these stages in more detail to see how various beliefs, abilities, etc. put a person in that role.

Efficacious "appreciation"

To be a respecter-as-appreciator is to be more than passively or luckily involved. One must help to *drive* the process of normative empowerment. This would seem to require:

> (1) The respecter believes that the entity has value disclosing characteristics and that engaging those characteristics would not be destructive of the entity's integrity conditions.

> (2) The respecter believes that there are values that the entity might disclose if only the entity were able to engage in certain practices in ways that take the entity's characteristics into account. The respecter is aware of at least one practice through which the entity's characteristic could be rendered value-disclosing.

> (3) The respecter believes that if there were a way for her to concretely use norms to help situate the entity in this positive, integrity preserving way in relation to the practice, then the respecter would have a reason to do so.[290]

> (4) The respecter has an active orientation to the opportunities, should they arise, for her to affect the entity in e-pov/practice-relevant ways.

Now, recall the meeting with Emily imagined above. Emily seldom speaks during meetings and has had her hand up for a long time and Rudy had struggled to support Emily's chance to speak. Now, imagine Goldy, Hannah, Iphegne and Joseph, at the same meeting with Emily. Each of them, in the imagined accounts that follow, lacks one or more of these elements that are part of the "crediting" stage, putting them at a disadvantage when it comes to respecting Emily. In lacking one or more of the elements the way they do, we can see why "paternalism," "enmity," "practical ignorance," and "practical apathy" are not conducive to EMPR.

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[290] Allowing that there might be other overriding reasons not to do so.

(1) Goldy thinks that Emily has mental health issues and is going to share very sensitive personal information with the group. Goldy thinks that this is about some sexual relation between Emily and a student, and that this will create a rift in the department that will not soon recover from and that Emily above all is about to hurt herself. Goldy, thus, does not share Rudy's point of view of (1). (paternalism)[291]

(2) Hannah really dislikes Emily. While Hannah believes Emily's contribution might be worthwhile to Emily and to the meeting, it is just for that reason that Hannah does not think it would be good to help. Hannah knows well what would help, as well as what is in her power to do. She's more than willing to take action, but the action she wants to take would be anything that would undermine Emily's contribution or disturb Emily's integrity. (enmity)

(3) Like Ronny, Iphegne, Emily's office-mate appreciates Emily's having something to say, as well as her being shy. Iphegne wants to help, but she's quite new to the department and it is her very first meeting. Iphegne is motivated to act, but she does not know the protocol. Would it backfire to essentially suggest that the Chair call on Emily? Is that done around here? (practical ignorance)

(4) Joseph has seen it before. Shy people at meetings whose good ideas never get a hearing. He knows how he might handle it, and he believes it is good to do so. But he's tired, and bored, and simply doesn't feel like being that person today. (practical apathy)

Each of these four individuals lack an element that would put them in the mental position of readiness to offer respectful action. This does not necessarily make them "disrespectful" of Emily. (Disrespect will be discussed in a later chapter). They are, however, not in a position to be respectful to her unless something changes in their understanding of the facts or in their personal values.

Efficacious "Reckoning"

At this stage we have the following moments:

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[291] She does not think that Emily's capacity to present her ideas in ways that will disclose the values the practice of the meeting ideally wants to disclose. Nor does she think that letting Emily speak is going to be integrity-preserving for Emily. However, Goldy does believe that were circumstances different, it would be good—in accord with Goldy's own conception of the good, and EPOV-good, to promote Emily's capacity to share her ideas, and she otherwise share's the other stages. Because of problems with Goldy's understanding of Emily and the situation at 1, Goldy is unable to "reckon" with Emily in ways that make Emily a discloser of EPOV values. This does not mean that she disrespects Emily in general, but in this context she is not in a position to respect her. This is, however, not to say that the minimally necessary conditions of respect's possibility do not hold, only that these conditions are not realized, due to certain details that the process itself might transform.

(5) The respecter-as-reckoner finds herself a situation where she knows what concrete things she can do to help actualize or at least maintain the Practice-relevant-valuable potential of the Entity (the respected).

(6) The respecter-as-reckoner "successfully" executes those actions, avoiding obstacles or managing them. She acts in ways that make the world more hospitable to the entity's engagement with the practice-relevant-values.

Consider two more faculty who are engaged with the meeting: Kahlila and Loren. These two faculty members appreciate the situation from the E-POV and understand the sorts of circumstances that are in their control, but they lack what they need to be respecters-as-reckoners. Kahlila does not find herself in a situation where there are norms that apply to her. She is in a traffic jam on her way to the meeting and is in no position to act (5). Loren is texting Kahlila during the meeting to see if she has any questions he can raise on her behalf. Sitting right next to Emily, he notices that Emily is being ignored by the Chair and he shares Ronny's attitude. In response, he utilizes his power to be encouraging to Emily by trying to get the chair's attention with a gesture. But when the Chair sees Loren, it reminds her that his committee was slated to present some information to the group. Instead of calling on him, the Chair discusses that committee for several minutes, during which time Emily gives up. There is absolutely nothing wrong with what Loren did, but it did not lead to the end he had hoped (6). [292]

Efficacious "Accounting"

This stage has to do with accountability and critique and to be an advocate-as-respecter one needs to do the following

(7) The advocate-as-respecter makes her feelings and concern on behalf of the entity "public." She presents those concerns deliberately to those who could be held to account.

(8) The advocate-as-respecter is able to be part of a social learning process, changing her approach according to success or failure and being willing to revise some of her own assumptions about the entity.

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[292] I.e. there was no opportunity for Emily to take up his act.

Finally, let's turn to Mordecai. (7) Mordecai is quite nervous that Hannah, Emily's nemesis, who is sitting a few rows in front of him, will turn around and see him advocating for Emily. He has professional reasons not to want to get on Hannah's bad side. Instead of publicly giving his speaking time to Emily he gestures from the back row. Nobody but the Chair notices. The Chair is his pal, and humors him by calling on Emily. Emily thus has an opportunity to share her ideas but Mordecai's secretive gesture has offered scant opportunity for the faculty to make a connection to the normative issues. Without (7) there cannot easily be (8), unless, however, there is someone else who does publicly what Mordecai was too nervous to do. That brings us to (8) Now, imagine Ronny taking further action beyond the meeting. Ronny would like to meet with a couple of faculty to talk about what is required to get the quieter members of the faculty, like Hannah, more involved. But nobody can schedule a meeting. Everyone understands that there is an issue here, but nobody—not even Emily—wants to undertake the departmental "processing" that would be needed to develop better meeting norms.

Efficacious reception of/receptivity to respectful acts

As has been discussed, the respected, to be respected, has to take up the acts in their intended way. What if Emily refused to do so? What if for some reason she refused the opportunity to speak that she was offered? What if she used that opportunity to do something outrageous that stigmatized her among her fellow faculty? What if she never raised her hand at all, or never showed up to a meeting? Some entities so constituted as to be predictable in terms of their receptivity to certain sorts of "respectful" or "empowering" acts. Arguably, humans are not quite so predictable. So it seems that Emily herself must play a role in order that all the others who are trying to empower her can succeed.

Yet, I've thus far suggested that the onus is on the respecters for figuring out how to generate and sustain normative power for the entity. Or, it might be better to say that they are never "off the hook," even if the entity is fighting them every step of the way. Yet even this statement is confusing, for I am not meaning to say that one is necessarily morally required to support another's normative power. The moral requirement is a separate question. I simply mean

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this in terms of a hypothetical imperative. If one does happen to wish to be someone's respecter, one cannot earn that title *except* by *succeeding* in empowering them (in the complex way just discussed). It doesn't matter that they make your job difficult, there is no honorary or consolation title of respecter.

Let me set aside for the moment the role of the respected. I do this because, unlike the other role-players, the respected is not necessarily a rational or accountable agent. In a moment I will, however, talk about what it means to do the "work" of the respected. When the respected is accountable as such, then this issue is taken up as a matter of self-respect, as will be done in chapter 7.

Heuristic worries: The incompleteness of the process of EMP

This way of looking at the "moments" of an empowerment process might be discouraging. How can a process of empowerment ever be sustained? But there is a more optimistic way to view this. Ronny, who, according to our story cares a lot about Emily's having a good value-disclosing position, might be able to discern the political situation he is in. He might be able to better advocate for Emily, knowing who appreciates or does not appreciate her potential, who knows and doesn't know how to act, and what the challenges are for changing the culture of the department. Also, the original example is one in which the process is being sustained. We can imagine everyone but Hannah, Joseph, and Mordecai taking an interest in talking about the issue. We can imagine Goldy contributing her disturbing point of view in a constructive way, adding further wrinkles to the aim of getting faculty to bring out the best in and for the department. We can imagine Emily learning how to advocate for herself, dispelling misconceptions about her as well as about what might help shy people contribute. Ronny didn't have to get it exactly right the first time; nobody had to get it exactly right, as long as the process was kept in motion.

My claim is that the ideal of full respect involves the mutually reinforcing work of the three stages of this process. This "full" dynamic of normative empowerment, however, does not entail the complete satisfaction of the parties involved. The advocates for the respected entity, the respecter in her relationship to those practices she has reason to affirm, the community's

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developed understanding of causal relations and effective norms, may exhibit an awkward fit. The point is that the normative imagination of the participants is active. Agents are effectively working together to make practices more suitable to the possibility of the entity engaging and disclosing values.

It does not matter, conceptually, what triggers the process or where it begins. Does it begin with someone's sincere intention to respect? Does it begin in some entirely unrelated behavior that is publicly evaluated? Does it begin with a complaint, a moment of appreciation, an accident? Does it begin with a bitter conflict of values, with a desire to cooperate? Once in motion, what we are looking for is an agent who eventually becomes concerned and responsible for her role in the success of this dynamic. [293] In the following subsections I will discuss a new way to think about the "attitude" of EMPR based on the process just detailed. Following that, I will offer an account of "practices" of EMPR that help us to think anew about the "senses" of respect[294].

5.4 The attitude connected with full respect

I've been suggesting that to be a self-affirmed "respecter" is surely not the same as happening to do something that a respecter would do. For example, there is a difference between happening to not step on the flowers one did not even notice, avoiding stepping on them because they might be full of thorns (obstacle respect), and knowingly avoiding stepping on them, so as not to crush them—so that one might return to with one's goat to eat them, and not crushing the flowers because you want them to be there to make themselves enjoyed. This latter captures an intention to normatively empower the flowers. However, perhaps this intention is in no need of further beliefs (such as beliefs that flowers are in-themselves good) to count as "respect." You may want the flowers to be able to make themselves enjoyed because you want your son to enjoy the flowers (to improve his mood), or because the enjoyment of flowers on your property will raise the property value, or because you detest flowers and you want to punish yourself by

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[293] As I will later argue, the fundamental good that Empowerment Respect does for the respected is to make the respected the focus of such an ongoing process.

[294] As discussed in the chapter dedicated to the topic of the senses of respect.

permitting them to persist and torment you. Are there any necessary beliefs behind wanting to preserve flowers' ability to elicit engagement and enjoyment?

I've presented EMPR as a complex success concept. EMPR, while it might be owed unconditionally, is *conditional* on the uptake of the object.[295] This is not the same as saying that an object only warrants respect when it fills us with confidence that it is destined for good things. On the contrary, I think that an entity can leave us quite uncertain about what values it might determine itself to disclose, while nevertheless showing us that, under certain "cooperation-dependent/social" conditions, it will be in a better position to disclose them.[296] **Given the oblique way Empowerment respect stands as a response to value and worthiness, it is misleading to treat the beliefs and intentions of the respecter as the thing that, if "analyzed" will reveal what respect requires.[297]** At best such an approach is "productively" circular, describing relations among normative ideas taken for granted as valid. At worst it privileges the mentality of the respecter, at the expense of the objects purported to warrant respect (or, if you will, at the expense of the relationship that constitutes respect for someone). Nevertheless, it is probably useful to offer an attitude-centered account of Empowerment respect, provided this "part" is not taken for conceptual whole.

5.4.1 Necessary components of the attitude of EMPR

The following are the essential features for saying that someone has a robust "attitude" or "disposition" of EMPR with regard to a particular entity or type of entity. As such, a robust attitude of respect is an intention to take responsibility for the process of normative

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[295] Cranor might suggest that this ability for uptake or potential to respond appropriately to the treatment is itself the "condition"—thus there can be no unconditional duty to respect someone. Cranor, however, thought of the issue of uptake differently from me, as telling us that the object must "earn" the possibility of its being respected by already having shown what it is capable of doing. Moreover, the "necessary" elements of respect offered by Cranor were the necessary elements for considering an attitude to be one of respect. In contrast to Cranor

[296] By way of analogy to loving-care. An infant might leave us uncertain about what in particular will make it happy, and yet suggest to us certain engagement/interactive-dependent conditions under which something might make it happy (play with the infant, notice how it is responding).

[297] I am trying to show that respect is much harder to simply attribute to an individual actor and their attitude.

empowerment at every stage. Let's consider, then, the process of EMP from the point of view of the person who wants to initiate and sustain it:

(1) **The Crediting Attitude –** The respecter believes that the entity can be characterized in certain ways ("the features") and that their being interacted with on the basis of "the features" could be good for them, insofar as it frees them to better disclose certain value. The respecter's interpretation of where the entity stands in relation to engaging those values is mostly a factual assessment and not itself a valuing assessment. Knowing what the respecter knows about the entity's integrity conditions, she believes she has no reason to find that attention to F would be destructive for the entity.

(2) **The Reckoning-M Attitude (motivation)** The respecter believes that she has no overriding reason to be against the values that the entity might disclose. The respecter prefers the entity's disclosure of values to its non-disclosure. Thus, the respecter believes that her attention to the entity in virtue of the practice-relevant features would be in accord with the respecter's own values and conception of the good.

 (3) **The Reckoning-C Attitude (competency)** The respecter's fact-based assessments involve an understanding of the circumstances that are under her own control that make a difference to "the features" being an EPOV-good thing for the entity to have. The respecter has reasonable confidence in how to respond to practice-specific circumstances in ways that would help the entity utilize its F in EPOV good ways.

(4) **The attitude of Accountability** The respecter has an active orientation to her power to affect the entity in practice-relevant ways. R thinks of herself as accountable to the stakeholders—to those who share the EPOV and to those who might cherish the Entity. If the entity should be respected in these ways, those who are most intimately acquainted with the entity and those whose lives are most bound up with the practice should approve the action. The respecter is concerned to have the correct view of the situation, both in terms of her own values and in terms of the facts.

Together, these beliefs and dispositions amount to a robust attitude of respect. As already emphasized, notice how these "singly necessary and jointly sufficient" elements for an "attitude" of EMPR do not rest on the sort of "confidence" in the entity that Cranor thinks we must have if we want "principles" of respect. The "confidence" is there in a loose sense, but it is a

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responsibility shared between the entity, the practice, the stakeholders, and the respecter herself. The respecter is taking a leap of faith: this entity could be a constitutive contributor to this practice—an intrinsically important discloser of values[298]. Evidence about the practice, the norms that ground its constitutive interactions, the reasons it is valued, and the existing and/or potential characteristics of the entity suggests that certain features are good bases for such a positive relation, and that such a relation can be conceived and created through formal or informal statuses (normative power).

All the hopeful-respecter can do is to pull together the intention and competency to act on the evidence and elicit new and better and more precise evidence from those in a position to give it. Failure of uptake is not proof that the entity is not "worthy" of respect, but that the respecter needs to go back to the drawing board, having misunderstood something along the way. When the e-pov-relevant feature is itself a developed skill or personality trait it may make sense to "reward" or "support" it on the condition that it continues to manifest. The respecter has enough experience to know that the entity and the practice can be responsive in predictable ways. The respecter has enough experience to know to whom she must justify her actions in order for them to have a degree of normative force.

5.4.2 What is <u>not</u> necessary for an attitude of respect: the respecter need not be certain about the values she promotes

The respecter has enough experience to how to connect her actions to the possible criticisms of the relevant stakeholders. She will usually be one of them. When we consider these elements of a respecter's attitude we can notice not only the very minimal sort of "confidence" required, negating Cranor's worries that, for instance, respect cannot be offered on the basis of a universally shared non-agentic trait. But there is also another suggestion. That some valuing is going on in an attitude of respect. The valuing going on, however, need not be a direct intrinsic valuing of the entity. Nor need it be an intrinsic valuing of the e-pov-supplying practice. Instead, it seems that the respecter must only "intrinsically" (i.e. not merely instrumentally or modus vivendi-style) value one of the following: the entity's integrity, the entity's self-disclosure, the

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[298] This entity could, under the right circumstances, disclose values in and through how they are related to this practice

continued existence of the practice, the values disclosed by the practice. Of course the respecter might have an attitude supported by more robust valuing. She might, for example, love and cherish the entity *and* find the practice to be intrinsically valuable to her, and thus, want very much for the entity to be able to thrive while advancing the values of that practice. Parents often adopt a disposition of respecting their children from this confluence of evaluations. But it is enough that the respecter finds that it would be a better thing for some practice to continue to exist. The respecter may not have a stake in the entity's integrity, but her attitude only makes sense if she at least sees the integrity as necessary to the engagement she seeks to support. In a general sense, the respecter takes the entity as something she prefers to sustain in its integrity, and this preference guides her assessment of e-pov-relevant features that make respect possible. But another, perhaps colder, way of looking at it is just to say that EMPR describes a situation in which the e-pov relevant features that statuses are made to promote are also, at the same time, integrity-consistent. Insofar as the agent brings about such normative power for the entity, she is respecting her, regardless of whether or not the agent thinks it is morally important that she do so.

My point is that the agent of Empowerment Respect is not necessarily responding to their own values. Not only may the respecter be uncertain about the intrinsic importance of the respected in the respecter's scheme of values and aims, but the respecter may not even know or understand why the practical engagement of the respected is valuable to others:

Consider this narrative:

> Though Juliana well knew that her colleagues had fundamentalist views and reservations about her "lifestyle" and though she wanted very much for these views to change and for her colleagues to embrace sexual diversity, Juliana felt she had finally been shown some respect. This year the invitation to participate in the work-life-balance conference expressly included panels on gay and lesbian families as well as on caregiving responsibilities outside of the "norm." Finally she and her spouse could participate on their own terms and not have to contort their stories to fit a heterosexual model that would be heard by their fellow employees.

> It seemed like a minor miracle, because she knew that nobody on the organizing committee shared pro-gay values. She didn't even think that they personally liked her all that much. How, then, had they managed this act of respect? Perhaps they were motivated by a fear of being sued—or perhaps they were curious about the new topics that would be discussed. They might not have even been thinking specifically about *her* when they planned the conference. It almost didn't matter. The fact was, they had managed it, because now she was free and energized to contribute.

Juliana's positive uptake of the reckoning of her peers depends in part on her own beliefs about their beliefs (symbolic dimension). If she senses that this action was intended to be a means to a disrespectful end—for example, to make fun of her or discredit her—she would hardly be able to participate with any confidence in the event.[299] But we can also imagine Juliana to continue to hold the view that the action was respectful of her even though she lacks evidence about the ultimate aims of her colleagues. So the respecter's intentions only matter to a certain extent, it seems. While Juliana, in the example above, has reasons to prefer a situation in which her colleagues love and adore, admire, appreciate, cherish her and celebrate her –her interest in being normatively empowered in the context of a company conference can be met by the simple gestures detailed in the example.

5.4.3 Bernice's and Avery's Attitudes toward Carol seen through the lens of EMPR

I want to return once again to Bernice and Avery in order to discuss how variations in the attitude of respect play into the process of normative empowerment. In this example, we had a police officer, Carol, approach the vehicle of a retired couple, Bernice and Avery. Avery was rude to the officer and Bernice was polite. When the officer leaves, Bernice confronts Avery about his rudeness (which she considers "disrespect"). Avery attempts to justify his behavior on the grounds of his moral disapproval of the LAPD. He claims it would have been wrong, even self-disrespecting if he had treated the officer with less than contempt. I will show how Bernice's response to the situation (her interest in respecting Carol "as" an Officer and her concern with Avery's attitude) maps onto the three-stage process. Avery's attitude toward officer Carol is more vexed because Avery interprets the relevant values differently than Bernice does.

Bernice Successfully Respects Carol "as" an Officer

Crediting stage

Bernice sees Carol as a potential cooperator-in-value. Let's imagine that the value is not policing per-se, but is public safety. Together, as Bernice sees it, Carol and

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[299] The "for example…." phrasing is from Eva Kittay.

the community Carol serves, participate in certain practices and norms of public safety. Now, Bernice has some positive feelings about the practices themselves. While nobody enjoys being pulled over in a traffic stop, Bernice does see the practice as valuable and she has some ideas about that. Let's imagine that when Bernice sees Officer Carol, she makes certain positive assumptions about the officer's qualifications for engaging this practice of public safety in a valuable way. Carol is deemed "reckon*worthy*," and Bernice is willing (has reasons that she herself affirms) to do what she can do to support Carol in the relevant contexts.

Reckoning stage

The encounter itself avails Bernice of the opportunities to put her desire into action. There are fairly well-known ways of reckoning with police officers when one happens to have an interaction with them. Even more particular and well-understood to Bernice are the ways one is supposed to act during a traffic stop. Of course, many act deferentially during a traffic stop in order to avoid an altercation with the officer, or out of fear, but this is not Bernice's motivation. Bernice simply finds it quite natural that she would address the officer in a formal way, cooperate readily, put out her cigarette and take off her sunglasses, and be friendly with the officer. These practices create efficiency during the traffic stop. Friendliness tells the officer that they may easily chat with the civilian and therein get more information about the community. So, for Bernice, Carol is "reckonable," from the particular e-pov of the practice of policing as part of preserving the peace. Moreover, Bernice has the competency needed to do what she takes to be her part.[300] She executes her intention without clumsiness or misunderstanding between herself or others involved. Yet, while she is doing all this her husband is reckoning with Officer Carol in a quite different way—being deliberately rude and demonstrating that he

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[300] She knows, for instance, that she is supposed to put out her cigarette. Bernice thinks not only about the legal expectations (such as what counts as cooperating vs resisting an officer), but she also knows about the expressive power of her acts and how that would possibly impact the officer's sense of her own legitimacy, the officer's opinion about people who look like Bernice and Avery, and so on. If she hurt the officer's pride, then the officer might be tempted to do something that brings out the dis-values of policing, rather than its potential values.

does not value the role Carol is playing in the community.

Accounting stage

Bernice pays her respect (so to speak) openly in front of her husband. She does
not hide from him the fact that she intends to be deferential to Officer Carol. Alone in the
car, she confronts him for his rudeness while defending her own action. She is not
precisely Officer Carol's advocate in the strictest sense, but she does become more of one
as she tries to show Avery what she thinks is the error of his ways. She begins by
defending the practice of policing, but when Avery points out the violence of that
practice as conducted by the LAPD, she reconsiders. Then she sees her politeness in view
of a kind of benefit of the doubt she gives to Officer Carol. She has no reason to think
that Officer Carol misuses her role, and, like anyone, Officer Carol is susceptible to
reacting irrationally to insults. Why tempt her to become worse than she might be? In
this way by holding Avery accountable and hearing his account, Bernice is able to review
and revise her assessment of the relation she bears to Carol. Bernice becomes an advocate
who is looking for ways to improve or make good on the initial insight of Carol's
"reckon-worthiness" in light of the imperfections and failures of the situation. Efforts of
justification presuppose shared values or the possibility of uncovering shared values.
Discussions of EMPR cannot even get off the ground without making reference to the (e-
pov) "worth" of the entity's trait, situation, or practice. Nor, however, can discussions of
EMPR get traction without reference to the regulating and limiting aspects of the entity's
integrity conditions. Bernice, thus, is charged with justifying both why she thinks it is
good to have "good" officers *and* why she thinks it would be good for someone like
Carol to be free to be a "good" officer.[301]

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[301] Carol is thought to deserve Bernice's effort of empowerment due to assumed facts about Carol that, if true, allow
Carol to advance practices and values that Bernice believes we have reason to advance. Carol is presumed to affirm
the value of policing by having chosen it as a profession, and to be both willing and able to respond in peace-
preserving ways to cooperative patterns of behavior. Moreover, Bernice believes policing can bring out good things
in the people who do the policing. Given the freedom to interpret the standards and values of "good" policing,
individuals can uncover and disclose values that were not already anticipated in the norms of the practice. This is an
important part of her argument to Avery. Carol is not just a means to the end of the well-functioning institution of
law enforcement. The practices of law enforcement are a means to an end of Carol's being a well-functioning person

Avery's Account (the importance of answering for a "refusal" to respect)

Avery's impasse and his sincere disagreement with Bernice illustrates the special way respect combines a concern with the individual and a concern with specific values or practices of value. Avery's situation is surely challenging. He would be supporting someone's engagement with a practice that undermined his own normative power. While Avery could do just what Bernice does, and in doing so support Carol's normative power as an officer, it would arguably be self-disrespecting for him to do so. There is not a clear set of norms by which Avery can signal to Officer Carol his disapproval of her practice, such that those very same signals would be empowering to her in some relevant way. Bernice and Avery seem to agree that we ought to find a way to respect people—for in respecting people you give allow them a positive place in the orbit of what you care about. Unfortunately, Carol's situation is not reckonable to Avery in terms of the values he wants to promote. In the end, what Bernice and Avery must acknowledge is not only their disagreement about the value of the practice of policing, but the difficult situation this creates for Avery. The meeting between Avery and Officer Carol creates an apparent dilemma for Avery. He simply does not believe there is a good reason for *anyone* dealing with the LAPD to value the practice of policing. The LAPD, for Avery, has shown the tendency for the practice of policing to destroy things, not to disclose values.[52] Avery's inability to see a good-making possibility in Officer Carol's role is not only Avery's problem. It is also Bernice's problem and implicates her as someone who wants to respect Carol. This is because, as someone close to Avery, Bernice has special access to what makes him tick. If Bernice fails to give him convincing reasons to value the practice of policing, then who on earth will succeed? Bernice could have done more for Carol's standing if she could have recruited Avery, but her arguments lacked the persuasive force to do so.

What she was able to do, though, was to get Avery to see that his response to Carol fell short of an ideal that he himself would agree to. Both Carol and Avery take this

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of integrity. So, Bernice would claim, not only is there something wrong about deliberately missing an opportunity to advance the institutional aim (peace through policing), but there is something equally wrong about missing an opportunity to advance the "individual" aim (Carol as unique and willing participant in the constitution of this practice). Justifying actions from "reasons" of EMPR means, as I've been arguing, showing oneself to be, together with the entity, at the intersection between individual and institutional goodness.

"unreckonability" to be a loss. A significant and distinct value underwrites their debate -- the "value" of respecting and normatively empowering people: It is good to find ways to give individuals a decisive role or position in what we believe is valuable (or what we believe they have good reasons to value). Avery does not share Bernice's view that there are important values that depend on the practice of policing. But Avery does think that people have powers to do good that should be supported whenever plausible, and not wasted or undermined for no good reason. Both Avery and Bernice are concerned to do their part to find a way to normatively empower Carol. This is a crucial component or part of the process of giving respect to oneself and others.

5.5 Chapter Conclusion

Seeing respect as rooted in a process of empowerment—a process bigger than any one person— helps to explain many of our intuitions, such as why respect can be experienced through or thanks to respecters who are not fully aware of what they are doing. Seeing respect as a process also helps to explain why deliberate acts of respect may remain incomplete if they are merely singular acts. With a schema for the process of EMP I was able to re-think what it might mean to have a respectful attitude or disposition. To be respectful of someone involves not just "appreciating" things about them, not just working to "advance" things about them, but ultimately a willingness to publicly stand for these actions and to render one's own actions accessible as norms for others. Empowerment Respect can now be seen as something other than a conception of recognition respect. As respecters we are dynamically involved in a process that is too complex to be reduced to either an act of "recognition" or an attitude of appreciation. The next chapter will build both upon the idea of respectfulness and the idea of practices of respect by giving an account of respect as a "freestanding" value.

Chapter 6 -- The Value of Empowerment Respect

6.1 Chapter Introduction

In this chapter I treat EMPR as a freestanding value and continue to consider attitudes, competencies, and practices[302] involved in giving empowerment respect and receiving empowerment respect well. If one values EMPR, then one presumably wants to see practices of EMPR flourish. One wants to maximize the success between the relation of EMPR (the shared agency between subjects and entities that drives normative empowerment) and the process of fostering valuable engagements with socially legible practices (Normative Empowerment). A person who wants to be EMP-respectful would want to become good at giving and receiving EMPR. We might call these skills the "excellences" of EMPR. Another way to explore the implications of EMPR as a freestanding value is to look at various versions of its "opposite." In this chapter I delineate different failures to EMPR. Some of these are failures that may still partly advance the process of EMPR (given a little luck), so the term *disrespect* in this chapter is reserved for a kind of relation that really aims to block or destroy normative empowerment for the disrespected entity. Finally, there may be some situations in which we are technically in circumstances of respect with another, but such that acting respectfully would violate the value of EMPR itself. Such situations suggest a possible way of logically tying EMPR to EMP-Self-Respect. This chapter hopes to lay useful ground for my consideration in chapter seven of the definitions, value, and institutional grounds of empowerment self-respect.

6.2 The Freestanding Value of Respect

In this section I argue that we can consider EMPR a freestanding value and I compare the freestanding value of EMPR to the freestanding value of Care. One reason EMPR is a freestanding value is because it generates the very attitudes that are necessary for it. When we relate to someone in ways that support her normative power we often help to create a situation in which others can see better what she is capable of. It is when one has this basic moral appreciation of the other's active potential that one takes the first step toward forming an

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[302] I'm not sure that "practices" is the right word to use here. I'm not sure it's okay to say that there are "practices" of respect, since respect is about helping others to engage valuably with practices.

intention to respect her. Such intentions are crucial in the long run, even if empowerment can sometimes occur without them.

6.2.1 The "thin" moral metaphysics of valuing EMPR

What does it mean to find respect (EMPR) *valuable*? Empowerment respect as I've been describing it is about helping others to disclose values and engage meaningfully in social practices.[303] But if we often disagree about the intrinsic worth of what we humans disclose, and if we likewise tend to disagree about the worth of existing social practices, is it still plausible to consider EMPR a freestanding value, independent of these disagreements? My answer may well be open to debate, but I believe that the underlying evaluative assumption required for valuing EMPR is simple enough to make it a freestanding value. To hold "being respectful" as a prima facie good way to treat someone, we make one assumption: *it is better for someone to be an active agent of value than for them to be neutral with regard to the value.*[304] This is an assumption about the value of belonging and inclusion, but does not dictate which practices or normative communities the respecter identifies as worthy of expansion. Someone who values being EMP-respectful need only believe that it is better for any entity that it can expand what we value than that it makes no difference to, or a negative difference to what we value.[305] I concede that there is something thinly metaphysical in this: the idea that if something exists, we ought to help it to be of positive relevance to what we value. Yet I think that while it is obvious that not everyone thinks this way, still such a way of seeing could be affirmed as part of numerous moral outlooks. This is true in spite of the fact that normative empowerment in any particular case might be the ethically wrong choice[306]. Giving someone "access" to a domain of value might

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[303] Respect is a relation. Strictly speaking, Empowerment Respect is a relation between a respecter and respected whereby the respecter is a productive agent in one or more of the entity's processes of normative empowerment. The process requires respecters, but no single agent is fully "in charge" of the process. Empowerment respect is the relation that is discovered as a causal factor in the process of normative empowerment. Respecting, we might say, is what one is doing when one is engaged in that process.

[304] Recall that the relation of respect is flexible in terms of the respecter's own values. It is possible that people only have good reason to promote an entity's engagement in practices that they (the respecter) can themselves see as potentially valuable from their (limited) point of view.

[305] It is better when the value domain is relevant to an active agent than when it is irrelevant.
[306] From some conception's point of view.

turn out to be giving access to a vandal. Or, less dramatically but more importantly, what a fellow participant in a practice might think is an improvement to a practice might strike the respecter, who worked hard to ensure their opportunity and influence in that very practice, as its degradation.[307] We can have differences of opinion about what discloses value and we can also fall victim to the respect failings or even the disrespect (see below) of someone who we took care to respect. But the fact that our respectfulness might cause us harm is not a reason to reject EMPR as a value. All of the same can be said about love. Love is a "universal" value and different cultures may have different ways of explaining what love is. To value love you only need to think that on balance the world is better when people try to love and try to be loved, even if such efforts sometimes have disappointing or even tragic results.

Furthermore, the fact that I require a moral point of view or some evaluative criteria to help me to determine what to respect and how to respect things does not change the freestanding nature of EMPR.[308] We may need some kind of coherent evaluative outlook to deploy the intention to EMPR, but we do not need to know what moral system anyone ascribes to in order to wish for people to be EMP-respectful people. EMPR as specified in this dissertation even suggests it may be reasonable to prefer to be given respect from an evaluative point of view that one otherwise finds distasteful over being ignored by that point of view[309]. One may disagree with the values one is being positioned to engage, but the process of EMPR is such that even misdirected attempts at respect broaden one's opportunities and protect one from important harms (something I will discuss below).[310]

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[307] Think of scandalous architectural renovations, etc.

[308] The "objects" I focus on may be what we think of as moral beings (depending on one's criteria for moral personhood), but the normative empowerment of a moral being, an agent, a subject of a life, is not of itself a morally good or bad endeavor. Whether or not one asks for something morally acceptable in demanding this or that form of respect depends on the ethical context or the application of a broader moral theory. An ethical theory, or some other criteria, allows us to arrive at conclusions about what we most value or what must never be done. We attempt to justify our claims to and for respect in reference to how such acts fit with our moral priorities.

[309] Officer Carol, for example, might not like Avery's anarchistic values, but she might prefer that he has anarchistic reasons to reckon preservingly with her than that treat her as a nonentity or invisible.

[310] For example, one may not identify as female or believe in the gender system, but it would be preferable to be respected "as" a female by those who subscribe to such a system than to be treated as if one lacked any recognizable identity. It's better to have a bathroom one can use, even if the sign on the door seems wrong to you, than to be denied entry.

Not only is "Empowerment respect" plausibly a freestanding value. It is possibly a morally *central* value for liberal and pluralistic democratic societies. As a value of connection and inclusion it says: I'd rather you, who I share this space with, have real power to determine, shape, and advance the things that matter to me. If there is a way for me to bring that about, I will try to do so. I'd rather that you were among those whose agency is intrinsically valuable to my conception of the good, than that my conception of the good would be impervious to your influence. I will return to this idea in chapter eight when I discuss how EMPR directs us to think about personhood status under political liberalism.[311]

EMPR may be a freestanding value and a politically crucial one to promote – but that is not the same as saying that it is an automatic or instinctive value (like the value of staying alive, of being cared for, of having intimate relationships). It's easy to see that other forces might dissuade us from engaging this value of respect. For example, it may be less threatening to you that some people have no part at all in what you value than that they have some real power to shape those practices—even for the good! I may sometimes prefer to risk an adversarial relationship to someone, taking pleasure in disrespecting them—in excluding them from any positions that "matter" positively to my values. After all, with their inclusion comes a risk: they might transform my cherished practices to disclose values in ways I can neither control nor fully anticipate. Empowerment Respect, indeed, hangs on the edge of an existential risk that the respecter is willing to take, and perhaps it is risky for the respected as well. There are risks in being seen, appreciated, given opportunities, status, roles, and protection. One becomes more connected to others, more indebted to them, more responsible to them and more answerable to them. The value of respect is a particular value in part because of that risk and the loss of control it implies. To prefer to respect someone and to prefer their attempts (from their *e-pov*) at respecting you, you must allow them a share of power in what you care about on the one hand (as the respecter), and an infiltration into your space of selfhood on the other hand (as the respected).

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[311] Moreover, EMPR can be seen as a value that makes sense out of basic human rights discourses. One of the results of the language of human dignity and human rights is to encourage us to see one another as "worth betting on" when it comes to supporting each other in positions from which we can impact upon each other's valued practices. To insist that each person has a status that guarantees them food, shelter, literacy, sexual independence, and so on, is to insist that each person have what is needed for a public existence.

EMPR treats this optimistic appreciation of agency (in the power of the respected to shape values) as a primitive. I am not just talking about the agency of persons. I am talking about the agency of entities in general. **It is when we have this basic moral appreciation of the other's active potential that we take the first step toward forming an intention to respect her.** This appreciation does not require the respecter to cherish the respected's uniqueness. All the respecter is appreciating is that an entity's "unique" features (her situation) are the tools available to her—tools that could be used to advance a practice or values that the respecter thinks are worthwhile. This is a kind of faith in the good-making potential inherent in another's unique situation. This indirect way of valuing someone "as" an individual is only a starting point in the process of helping to normatively empower them. To be part of respecting someone, such a moment of appreciation must be translated into an awareness of relevant reckonable features of the individual or of her environment. To be respecting someone we must know not only that her uniqueness has the potential to contribute to what we think is worthwhile, but also that our actions can thus empower her without disrupting, denigrating, or weakening her integrity.

If we value EMPR, must we be sure of which values we want to help people to freely engage and advance? Not necessarily. In general, EMPR helps people to be advancers of values through practices—we work to position them to bring out what is good about, or the point of, certain practices—whatever that might be.[312] We are enabling them to disclose a "good-making" self through the medium of the practical relations that are available to them.[313] At the same time, we often have certain values in mind, and make use of our knowledge about what tends to instantiate that value. We see that the model's porcelain skin makes her an ideal advancer of the value of youthful beauty and by supporting her connection to the practice of modeling we

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[312] What I mean here is that there is often only a loose relationship between the activities that organize a 'practice' and the values that those activities are thought to bring about. We might not be sure whether somesuch practice really brings out certain values anymore that it once did (discipline, elegance, friendship, etc.), but we might still assume that if a person is given the space to engage with the practice they will reveal values through it, perhaps creatively.

[313] There are practices or institutions or value-systems that we view as so morally wrong that we have overriding reasons to shut them down, even if, in doing so, some practitioners will lose the role-relative opportunities they had to disclose values. For example, ISIS, as an umbrella institution, might assign different roles to its members. One might be assigned the role of a nurse. As a nurse among one's fellows one has a chance to achieve tremendous things. Destroying ISIS may also destroy the person's chance to be a nurse, as they lack the pedigree to do it in another context.

promote *her power* to promote this value.[314] What needs to be in place is some connection between an accessible practice and the possibility (or history) of values disclosed through it. These values give it a point, but it is possibly just as much the case that the practice gives a point to the values. In other words, one must care about the entity in the ordinary sense of the word, though one may not be a (cherisher) caregiver to the entity. A respecter might commence by having "thin" intentions, related primarily to wanting to see the practice properly sustained and engaged. A respecter might also have (and ideally would come to have) "thick" intentions, wanting to see the respected positively related to the practice for the respected's own sake.

Think about the way Avery was unable to respect Officer Carol. Through his conversation with Bernice he expressed a notion that respect is always preferable if it is possible. Let's call this "Avery's Ideal." Avery's ideal—perhaps a meta-ethical ideal—would have him encourage, whenever possible, participation in his concrete ideals from other agents. He lacked normative and imaginative resources for doing this in his encounter with Carol. Granted, this "meta-ideal" (the value of respecting entities) is not a "necessary" value—it's not a component of practical reasoning itself. But, it is a rational value for non-egoistic conceptions of the good life, especially among those who believe in irreducible and equal human dignity. In other words, by Avery's response to Bernice's complaint, we can see that Avery "values" respect, though he has failed to respect Officer Carol. Avery can be said to value respect because he prefers a situation in which Carol is well-positioned to contribute to practices that Avery values over a situation in which Carol's existence is neutral, lacking a position to either contribute to or damage such practices. Avery's problem is that he does not see a way to well-position Carol. In contrast, someone who does not value respect (or being a respectful person, etc.) would be primarily concerned with "neutralizing" Carol.

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[314] Throughout the dissertation I attempt to offer examples of EMPR that are not in line with my own values. While I have nothing strictly against modeling, I see it in connection to the oppression of women and would not go out of my way to promote someone's efforts to be a model. I might, however, refuse to sabotage someone's efforts to be a model and I might appreciate that she experiences something really positive in such work, setting aside how it might later backfire. In any case, how I responded to her possibility of engaging these values of modeling would depend on my specific relationship to her. If she could be empowered in some other way by being criticized or challenged, then criticism could itself be an instance of me respecting her—not "as" a model—but "as" someone who is capable of revising her conception of the good.

6.2.2 Connections between the value of Care and the value of EMPR [315]

Assuming that it is possible to look at EMPR independently of particular moral systems, how does the universal value of EMPR differ from the universal value of Care? My contention here is that Ethics of Care and Ethics of Empowerment Respect work hand in glove: If the goods of getting respected centrally involve developing stronger reasonable confidence in the one's potential to be important to various legible social practices[316], the goods of care centrally involve stronger reasonable confidence in one's integrity and the lovability and productive permeability of oneself—ones' most basic sense of worth and connectedness as a living being. In a successful caring relation, the carer readies the cared-for to engage the world around her—not only the "institutional" and "social" world, but the "world" of her own body and emotions and irreducible needs. The carer may also take on many tasks related to normative empowerment, but he does so in direct concern with the life story of the cared-for. The carer is someone who acts in ways designed to nurture the cared-for's integrity at those moments when the cared-for requires (or merely might benefit from) a surrogate self. The carer must support the cared-for's bodily and emotional system and protect the cared-for in the face of threat. The carer defends the cared-for against potentially destructive engagements and models trustworthiness. Compare this to respect. A carer typically interacts directly with the individual—and care is "completed" in and through the relation (as well as in and through the observed health of the cared-for). Respect, in contrast involves activities that triangulate between the respected individual and the world in ways that frequently (if not typically) do not require "face-to-face" engagement and are not as easy to mark as complete. Moreover, as I've been arguing throughout the dissertation, less emotional investment is required of most respecters than is required of carers. In a successful respect relation, the respecter often does small things to *ready existing practices for the individual*,

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[315] My comments on the meaning of Care are informed by my study of various texts in care ethics (primarily Kittay, Held, Ruddick, and Noddings); however, I think that the comments here are most closely in line with Eva Kittay's *Love's Labor*.

[316] The goods of respect for a person with severe cognitive impairments may involve their caregiver's developing stronger reasonable confidence (trust) in the worldly place of the cognitively impaired loved one. Respect for entities in a strong dependency relationship is going to be entwined but not identical. I think we can distinguish between acts where the caregiver is the object of a third party's respect and where the non-rational person is the object of the respect. When a non-rational person is the object of respect, the good of trust is still appropriate. First of all, trust in the world will often be directly experienced by the person who is not fully rational, but even when it is not likely that the disabled person can have beliefs about the reliability and trustworthiness of their environment, still that confidence is psychologically experienced by the caregiver on behalf of the cared-for. The energy that such a confidence adds is added to **both** of their lives, even if the cared for never experienced any judgment as complex

making a relevant space where the (already functioning) individual might meaningfully enter. The respecter also helps to preserve the places that are meaningfully occupied by the entity, thereby helping to sustain the individual in her occupation of good roles. A world worth investing in is one that allows you to disclose values, so the respecter helps others to engage and develop what "we" value about our institutions and practices.[317]

It is obvious that care and respect are different but closely related. For example, if there is no uptake (by the entity) of otherwise reasonably respectful acts, this failure of uptake may point to possible failures in relations of care. Support for good practices of caregiving should be one of the main ways we make EMPR more possible for each other. Such support is itself a form of EMPR—for people "as" caregivers. One might wonder, how, as a pluralistic society, we decide what practices we want to use state resources to empower people in.[318] State promotion of successful practices related to dependency are of chief importance because of how integral they are to anyone's future success in their realization of their conception of the good. The value of EMPR itself recommends a focus on practices of care. This is because an individual whose integrity is compromised and unsupported will not be an easy one to find a way to respect. When we normatively empower caregivers and receivers as such, we lay the ground for people to have the integrity enabling them to engage coherently in practice-dependent values.

EMPR may suggest we prioritize how we include one another in practices of care, but the inverse is true as well. Someone who has been widely and deeply disrespected (see sections below) may be harder to care for.[319] Care Ethics thus has obvious reasons to be concerned with how respect is conceptualized. A polity's failure to find ways to normatively empower the prospective cared-for (and thus to foster circumstances of respect for such a one) reflects ongoing failures to respect the carer herself: she may, for instance, have lacked sufficient

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[317] The so-called lowering of standards can be a red-herring complaint, masking a desire to exclude. Yet, in the context of EMPR the changing of standards or criteria for inclusion within a practice has to be fully grasped as enabling important values to emerge, and thus it "lowers" nothing. Example: women and people of color in philosophy – when great ideas are questioned as to whether what the person is doing is **really** philosophy.

[318] In a state such as ours that "respects" no religion, meaning, gives special treatment to no religion over another in order to respect religious practitioners equally?

[319] I do not mean that they are harder to love--though that is a possibility. I mean that their wellbeing as an entity is harder to maintain (straining the integrity conditions of the caregiver).

political influence as an advocate for her dependent due to failures to EMPR as a participant in public political discourse. Society will not listen to her and learn her knowledge about the loved one. The carer on her own can *perhaps* provide for the needs of the bare human being, but without EMPR given to herself and her charge, she would be hard-pressed to provide for the "athlete" or the "artist" or the "student" that her charge might become. It is difficult to sustain an effective relation of care with an otherwise disengaged (isolated, socially neglected) human being. The caregiver meets basic integrity needs, the needs of a functioning body and a basic psychological responsiveness to care. But these needs are relative to who the individual is, what she uses her body to do, the sorts of reality that grounds her, who she wants to love and to be able to trust. The limits and needs of her cultural, social, relational body and mind are tested and discovered only through her engagement with humanly interpreted standards, practices, and environments. This is why the carer must demand "respect" for herself and her charge and must demand that non-intimates make the world (institutions, practices) meaningfully accessible to the cared for.[320] As respecters, we see the caring relation as one that our future values depend on.

6.3 Achieving Respect: ideals of giving and receiving in a respect relation

When we value EMPR, we prioritize helping entities (and oneself) attain value-disclosing statuses and roles.[321] Earlier I discussed the process of empowerment and sketched its usefulness as a heuristic. Now, given the complexities of that process, let's ask if there are character traits or

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[320] Consider this quote from a recent NYTIMES opinion piece. A father of a young woman with Downs is writing to express worry about the threat de vos poses to IDEA. Notice at the end of the quote how he mark a difference between what he does as a parent and what he is doing in this letter:

> *This positive description is not intended to inspire. Yes, she is sweet, but also has non-sweet moments. The author stipulates to the existence of said moments, but feels no need to describe them for "balance." Despite his numerous positive encounters with persons with Down syndrome, the author explicitly rejects the contention that they share a single, winning "personality," or the underlying assumption that any one can represent all the others. Though the author has strong opinions on a range of social issues, he declines to weaponize his daughter in their service. Laura is not an example in an argument. She is not a success story. She is not a story at all. She is a person, and by describing her, the author does not speak "for" her, but intends to suggest what she is like and raise questions about the world she enters. This work is related to, yet different from, his work as a parent, which is to help her find, in every sense, her place.* ("I don't speak for Laura" (in *New York Times,* January 27, 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/opinion/i-dont-speak-for-laura.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region&_r=0)

[321] Including forms of protection for their capabilities.

practice-relative virtues that should be cultivated (either individually or culturally) if one wants to be a respecter and if one wants to receive respectful treatment. How do these both relate to the particular situation of self-respect?

6.3.1 The work of the respecter

Being a respecter means *deliberately* contributing to another agent's worthwhile access to one or more practices. *One takes the contribution one is making to the normative empowerment of the other as a decisive reason for one's action*, even if there are also other good reasons to act the same way. The respecter contributes to and wants to keep contributing to the respected's ability to set practical standards, dictate norms, and influence the values brought about by practical engagement. The respecter purposefully makes the respected more likely to be paid attention to, listened to, obeyed "as" legitimate, valuable, or constitutive of some good or good-making practice. The abiding respecter of someone (or some entity) is one who has a track record of doing this and who is sensitive to and motivated by opportunities to normatively empower the entity.

There seem to be many possible ways of acting respectfully on this account and any notion that there are set "practices" of respect should be qualified and advanced with caution. Yet it is easy to see why the intention to normatively empower someone would so often be realized through conventions already associated with respectfulness; such as, deferential modes of address, listening, giving someone physical space, arranging for physical access, public acknowledgment of achievements, protection of privacy, equal and fair allocation of resources, holding up one's end of a contract, etc.

To be respectful (to be the respecter in a respect relation), one must have some influence on how a practice is engaged in and interpreted, either as one who is engaging with it, or as one who is in a position to regulate it and influence it from the outside. In other words, the capacity to be respectful requires a bit of positioning and moral luck (I use "moral luck" loosely, for we must keep in mind that respectfulness is not synonymous with moral goodness.) For example, the tourist who is far out of her cultural element has limited ways of being respectful in a context she poorly understands (though many chances act in disrespectful ways). The respecter must

have epistemic and prudential skills. She must (correctly) see/understand, from some evaluative point of view (some set of beliefs about what makes something good), the potential positive and/or negative impact that this practice would have on the capacity of some entity to do/be *e-pov* good. For example, she must know that uninterrupted study is an effective way to for her roommate prepare for an exam she has the next day *and* that inviting noisy friends over is going to distract her roommate and interrupt her study. The respecter chooses to interact with the practice in a way that promotes the entity, or to interact with the entity in a way that promotes her, relative to that practice. **EMPR triangulates respecters, entities, and practices. The work of the respecter is to develop stronger competencies in areas of Crediting, Reckoning, and Accountability.**

The respecter's virtues are wide-ranging. He knows when to be discreet, when to give space and make himself scarce; he knows when to be a loud and irritating advocate; he knows how to direct his curiosity so that he learns about the hidden strengths (and vulnerabilities) in those around him[322]; he knows how to be expansive in his engagements, but also how to avoid overreaching. The dispositional respecter discerns among the values that practices share, the histories through which they live their texture, the reasons one would have for wanting to engage them, and the reasons one might be indifferent to them. She knows when she can make a difference to how someone is seen and appreciated; she knows how previously ignored characteristics can be employed to reveal new values in an old practice. She knows when the spirit of the law requires that its letter be observed, and when it does not. She also knows when she has failed to respect and does not conflate her good reasons for failing with the absence of respectability in those she has failed. She knows that her respecting actions are not mere expressions of her preferences, they are prescriptions for anyone in a similar situation—regardless of that person's preferences. She knows that the work of respect is the largely the work of helping others to see that values-for-someone are important to disclose, even if they are not values-for-me. And that profound and valuable somebodies can be disclosed through the most shallow and/or "undignified" of practices.[323]

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[322] Such curiosity is not itself virtuous and can be used against people, of course.

[323] Examples will be subjective and historically particular. Undignified practices might be the handling of money, "dirty" work of all kinds, prostitution, spying, tabloid journalism, drug dealing. Of course this makes things difficult

How we reckon with someone depends on how we are positioned relative to them. The work of respect involves being attuned to one's particular powers to have an impact on the standing of the other. A Doctor respects her patient in terms of "time" by relating to the practice of seeing patients in a way that minimizes wait-time. This way, going to the doctor is less likely to conflict with other good things the person might do. The connection between patient, doctor, and practice gives her many ways to respect or disrespect the patient. The friend is in a personal relationship with their friend, who they care about. The practices of friendship can help the friend succeed or can be a crutch for the friend. Out of respect for her friend as an artist, the friend tells her the truth about the painting. Out of kindness she might have done the opposite. The reason "respect" was at issue, though, was because of the specific role of assessment in friendships and intimate relationships. A stranger would not be considered disrespectful to not tell the person the "truth" about their painting. Friendship practices include ways of being kind, ways of being honest and forthright, etc. How we make use of the "rules" of the practice will have an impact on the "best efforts" of the other.

A lot is open to interpretation with this idea of "best efforts." Certainly it is individually and culturally subjective what a best effort is. (What should count as an achievement in a given area of life?) Best efforts are those effortful, self-organizing ways of being and acting that disclose the highest values in certain areas of life. Given "what" we are—our talents, capacities, social situations and other commitments—some of our "best efforts" will not disclose values in certain areas. But an important feature of respect is that there is a burden to at least try to re-imagine practices in ways that would accommodate very different sets of "givens." **Indeed, respecters work with what is "given" on the assumption that the "given" has great potential. This, I think, is what is behind the idea "look again" (re-specter) Go ahead, take another close look at what is "given" to you in my appearance. Do not dismiss me as I am.**

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for the one who wants to be a respecter (recall Avery's aversion to respecting Carol as a police officer). If one cannot see any worthwhile values arising from some practice then there is nothing that one has reason to do as far as promoting someone in it. However, the value of self-realization is available in such a vast array of practices for those involved that we might actually find vanishingly few practices that are entirely lacking in value. As such, the one who wants to respect must assess the moral worth of helping someone use the norms of a given practice for their self-realization (or for other values).

But respecters also have to discern the difference between "givens" that are part of the integrity of the individual and "givens" that are symptomatic of being overlooked and maltreated. Yet even the latter ought to be dealt with as part of who this person really is right now. Respecting them requires dealing with them as they are. A shy, traumatized person may be so as a result of disrespect and injustice, but that does not mean that those features of their current identity can or should be ignored or suppressed. Instead, the respecter tries to work sensitively with the individual to find long-term valuable ways to make the practice open to such features, such that they might be used as stepping-stones to positive transformation, where such transformation seems desirable.

Respect is the relation whereby one agent makes a positive difference to another agent's ability to set the standard, dictate the norm, or influence the way values are engaged in the practice, etc. As mentioned, the respecter makes the respected more likely to be paid attention to, listened to, obeyed "as" legitimate, valuable, or constitutive of some good or good-making practice. This is why respect can take so many apparently distinct forms. This is also why so many ways of acting can appear to be intentional respect when they are really something else (expressions of cherishing, institutional conformity). The respecter must hold, however subtly, that the normative power of the respected[324] is in-itself important. Sometimes the respecter does this through "direct action"—simply conforming to given expectations that compose the existing normative power of the respected's role or title. Sometimes the respecter must create a role or title or work actively against degrading conditions for the respected.[325]

6.3.2 The work of the respected and self-respect: commanding and responding to attention

The "responsibilities" of those on the receiving end of respectful treatment are more open-ended. For instance, those respected may not have the kind of rational agency required to be in relations of accountability and reason-giving so constitutive of the role of the respecter. Yet

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[324] In some specific area of life, domain, practice… or perhaps in general (though there is no such thing as "general" normative empowerment except to say that it is being normatively empowered in a number of important areas of social practice and disempowered in few-to-none.

[325] This is a hypothetical "must" -- i.e., if you intend to be a respecter of E, then you "must" do X.

the respected is a hard worker. They work in taking up and transforming a constellation of small actions into real normative power—real engagement of practices and disclosure of values. They do the work required to get the attention of others and they often work to get that attention translate into actually empowering treatment. In describing the work of receiving respect it will become evident that for rational agents it is all-but inseparable from self-respect. This work is one of the ways people with the capacity to be intentional respecters act *self*-respectingly.[326] The respected's leverage, her access, her ability to engage or to refuse to engage, her ability to transform the practices she is part of and disclose values "in her way" is something only she can actuate. This is true even if "she" is not the kind of entity that we normally think of as an ethically responsible agent (respect can be received by entities other than moral persons).

Let us look at the work of the respected from the point of view of the three stages of relation between the respected entity and the respecter. At the "crediting" stage, the entity must make herself somehow recognizable to the prospective respecter. She cannot abscond or hide herself.[327] She, in some cases, must "take" credit. She must find a way to make herself loved and cherished by someone who is already "respectable" in order to have an advocate who might "translate" her existence into something others can appreciate. She must (a practical but not necessarily a moral must) elicit the care and advocacy that brings her value-influencing presence to the attention of those who operate in that space of value. She must present herself in such a way that the relevant features get noticed. She must participate in making herself appear to be "relevant" to people's values. This participation may be extremely minimal and not willed or

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[326] In fact, inasmuch as she is held responsible for the successful uptake of good efforts and the successful directing of people's attention, we consider her to be held responsible precisely in her role as a self-respecter. (self-respect awaits a more detailed treatment in chapter 7.)

[327] These observations apply to agents who can be held responsible for their actions. Someone who is comatose, for example, cannot actively reveal who they are. Nevertheless, common sense can tell us that it would be disrespectful of the comatose person to treat them in ways that obscure their importance or worth as a human being. There are different ways to interpret this, of course. Moreover, any person who has a chance of recovering back into consciousness has a claim to our efforts to ensure as much as possible that this recovery takes place and that the person re-enters a world that is ready to receive him. This would mean access to rehabilitation and the chance to re-enter healthy family relations. In the case in which there is no chance that the individual will recover consciousness, but that they might nevertheless be having mental experiences, we are not really in circumstances of respect with them, but we are still able to give care and to imagine what might make that person's mental experiences good ones, and to try to care for them in that way. At a stretch, we might say that insofar as the life of that person puts them into a practice of family relation, tradition, and memorialization, then in keeping them well-cared for one normatively empowers them to be embraced as part of the family circle. The holidays may be conducted near and around the comatose person, whose being alive makes a difference to the meaning of all the family relationships.

conscious. But if she seems bent on dissolution and sinking into oblivion, and if she seems fully encompassed by the flattest of identities and explanations, if she seems to exist against and in spite of the practices that are valued in the society, she is likely not to awaken any desire or even the thought of respecting her. This does not mean that she is not owed any respect. On the contrary, she probably has many claims that are going unnoticed. The point is that she owes it to herself to do what she can to get those claims noticed. Similarly, if such a desire to respect her has already been awakened, she is better off treating those potential respecters as allies and remaining in proximity to them.

In terms of reckoning, it helps if the entity allows itself to be given a "home" and a "name"—even if temporary, in concrete practices and traditions. It helps if she is not just a human being, not just a creature, but one that demonstrates a certain engagement with things. All the better if this engagement already proves fruitful and valuable. It helps as well if she engages in activities that are comparable to practices with their attendant roles and role-preserving norms. Ants appear to us to build massive structures. We hesitate before trampling the ant heap because we can recognize in it an effort. If someone has acted to support a worthwhile status for the respected, the respected may have reasons to refuse to "make good" on the respecter's efforts, but the respected would have to do so advisedly and with a clarity of purpose. Above all, the self-respecting reasons for the rejection of opportunities must be communicated to any who would be tempted to underestimate her. Engaging the practices one is positioned to engage in such a way that values are disclosed is one of the best ways to respond to well-executed respectful reckoning. The entity becomes living proof that there is a point to respecting things, and especially to respecting her. Of course such engagement and disclosure might happen in spite of the disrespectful or clumsy actions of some, or it might happen by chance, in the absence of any supportive norms. While this might help the entity get the attention needed for the future development of social supports, it might also encourage misunderstanding. The respected appears more self-sufficient than they are.[328]

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[328] The entity is in a better position to be respected if she can express and make it clear that her success was not conditioned by their way of relating to her (disrespectfully). E.g. someone with a neglected childhood does not have that to thank for the character that they built up that in turn allowed for great success.

At the public accounting stage, it certainly helps if the entity is among those to whom the respecter is thought accountable, and if the entity is able to reflect carefully and articulately on the pros and cons of the norms of status in which she is entangled. It helps if she shares values and aims with those other stakeholders who care perhaps more about her impact on the practice than about the practice's impact on her. Respect really does require accountability to the integrity interests of the entity, even when the entity is not a member of the moral community—yet sometimes the respected entity, or her rational advocates, must work to get this seen.

Now we begin to see at least one of the ways an understanding of self-respect emerges from a concept of EMPR. How we respond to the respect others offer to us (or deny from us) is, in rational persons, a matter of self-respect.[329] When the entity is a moral agent capable of respecting others she is also (at least potentially) capable of respecting herself[330] and if she is in circumstances of respect with herself she is thus accountable for the use she makes of the tools of respect at her disposal *with regard to herself*. When she is not respectfully engaged with by others, they deny her not only their support in her efforts to disclose values. They also deny her an opportunity to do the "work" of taking up respectful-reckoning (the work of the respected). At this point it may be advisable to take up the work of the *respecter* in relation to herself and to act *from self*-respect to complain, protest, and withdraw participation in certain "demeaning" practices.[331] When she has been respectfully reckoned with, as already said, it would seem to be a matter of self-respect that she evidence to others that there was indeed a point in doing so. The respected needs to put on view or have put on view what is at stake for her in being "part of" this

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[329] I actually want to say something different from what this suggests. In the next chapter I'll talk about how we think of "selfhood" and that reflecting on ourselves (as rational people do) is only one important dimension of being a self. There are selves (entities that take an active interest in their own existence) who lack the power of reflecting as we understand it (do not develop the needed concepts, etc.). Yet, they are still hard at work "being" a self and standing up for themselves (you might say), by acting in consideration of their bodily boundaries and by relating to others with emotions that invite individuation and reflection upon their identity in the minds of others. As such, these non-reflective "selves" participate quite actively in their own empowerment and should be credited with some kind of self-respect. They "reckon" successfully with facts about themselves that matter to their ability to engage important values that they have reason to care about. They act respectfully toward themselves though they have not developed a conscious (reflective) intention to do so. They love, though they have not developed a conscious intention to do so. The difference, I suppose, is important, but more narrow than we may at first think: a non-rational being can act self-respectingly (and act respectfully of others) and reliably so. They cannot justify their actions in language or understand a request for justification, so that makes it difficult to say that they are "respecters" in the sense we are talking about here.

[330] Extenuating circumstances may make it so that one is not in circumstances of respect with oneself.

[331] See Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest."

system of value and being empowered to "contribute" to it. It is in her interest to look out for those who want to be vigilant in the name of the values and practices she has a stake in, as part of the social process of critique and re-evaluation of values. Violent, coercive, and disrespectful actions taken in the effort to sustain practices that are essential to her self-disclosure may backfire by discouraging society from supporting her in ways that are connected to disclosing values through that practice.[332]

The work of the respected is to proliferate the ways and reasons there are to constructively engage with her. The more she is engaged with, the more ways there will be to empower her.[333] It is not enough to inspire an abstract sentiment that she is respectworthy (say, as a sentient being). It is much better and more to the point that she is respect*able*, and respectable in ways that have social priority. The respected does best if she is drawn to those roles that are also the important ones to others, but also if those roles that most expand her engagement with the world *become* the important ones.

Before moving on, I want to make a few more comments about the relation between taking up respect (doing the work of the respected) and respecting oneself. For those who can conceive of responsibilities to self and can be held accountable for their actions, the reception of EMPR treatment is bound up with the demands of self-respect. Self-respect[334] may at times require the rejection of someone's well-formed attempt to EMPR, but the rejection must itself be a considered choice that balances various interests the self has in normative power across different domains.[335] For example, a promotion might be turned down because of an intention to lead a less-stressful life—which at least on its face seems a self-respecting choice. On the other hand a promotion might be turned down out of fear of failure, which does not seem to be a self-respecting choice. The presumption, I want to suggest, is in favor of critically and creatively *taking up* the efforts made to EMPR, which is something that requires effort on the part of the

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[332] This allows for an argument against arrogance.

[333] And of course the more ways there might be to fail to do so, to be disrespectful. But I would offer that the more one is meaningfully involved in, the less the disappointing behavior of others matters. One has many avenues of power and engagement.

[334] Not the attitude of self-satisfaction, but actual engagement with the self at the level of circumstances of respect.

[335] Self-respect has not yet been defined. This will be discussed in the next chapter. Or should I go ahead and define it and defend my definition?

respected. Furthermore, there are norms and practices that agents at times have available to them to redress others' failures to respect them. To "protest" against such failures clearly takes work. Often this work is an avenue for self-respect, if not what self-respect requires. A worker who crosses a picket line may have reasons to believe that participation in the strike will diminish her normative power, rather than enhance it. Her action may be consistent with self-respect while being somewhat disrespectful of her striking peers. We cannot say that she disrespects herself just because she refuses to make the sacrifice for the sake of workers. Rather, her relation to her own normative power has to be considered in terms of how her choices unfold and how she responds to change. If the strike succeeds in spite of her crossing the picket like, she may come to realize the benefits she owes to her coworkers and to rethink the value of her self-protecting choice. She may see that practices of solidarity and political intervention would be better ways for her to respect herself than individual protectionism. I will return to the topic of self-respect in the next chapter. Now I want to consider more closely ideas of failures to respect.

6.4 When Respect Fails

The paradigmatic practices of respect are often grasped most lucidly in their absence. I speak of practices that designate rights, reward merits, preserve fragility, honor attachments, foster skills, and promote autonomy. The reason these are paradigms is because it has proved so effective, historically, to see entities in these terms.[336] Effective, worthwhile social standing (status) seems, at least for human beings, often to be based on seeing people as having rights, measuring up to standards, being vulnerable, as being involved in identity-forming practices and relations, and as making use of an independent body and mind. But the creation of statuses and the identification of relevant features upon which to base the (formal or informal) norms that compose the status, as well as the subtle shifts in how these are interpreted—above all with regard to the relationships, learned competencies, and relative ranks thought necessary to actualize them—is itself a dynamic social endeavor in which we participate as individuals in our relations with one another. That is why understanding the elements and process of empowerment is not reducible to the current understandings we have of the "morally important" aspects of the

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[336] The terms loosely captured in Hudson's and Dillon's "senses" of respect.

objects we respect. So, understanding "disrespect"—respect's constant reference point—is also going to require a more formal or morally neutral approach. The process of empowerment helps to distinguish between blatantly disrespecting activities and shortfalls in the ability to successfully respect.

6.4.1 Failure of Respect and Disrespect in relation to the "process" of respect

As far as what we are familiar with, what are the sorts of things that give rise to accusations of disrespect? Such accusations generally coincide with the stages of the process I described. (I) They fail to see the potential engager of values who is standing in front of them. In the place of an entity with promising integrity conditions they see an obstacle, nobody, or material that they are free to use up. (II) They fail to adjust, create, re-interpret, or simply apply effective norms or otherwise reckon with the potential to secure worthwhile standing for the individual. (III) They fail to see that standing is only secured in and through social agreement and they do their acts in secrecy, in privacy and without accountability to the stakeholders. They care only that their conscience is clean, but not that they actually endorsed a standing that could be genuinely and effectively "taken up" by the actual entities it allegedly is open to.[337]

I described three stages of the process of empowerment: Crediting, Reckoning and Accounting and briefly alluded to what the disrespecter does that shows a failure at each distinct stage. Now, what is the difference between failing to "credit" someone, failing to properly "reckon" with them, and failing to be "accountable" to/for the goodness/badness of their position? People can fail to meet the mark when it comes to respecting us. These failures are dangerous but at least in theory open to correction. The various failures of EMPR hurt in

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[337] Note that disrespect may be the best choice under certain circumstances. We must keep in mind that so-called failures of respect are sometimes only moral failures from a morally warped or misguided point of view (one can fail to secure the social standing of someone who plans to use that standing to do what from their point of view is good but from yours is great evil). Even if they are sometimes for the good, these basic levels of disrespect are recognizable as "disrespect" to anyone whose world view leads them to believe that there is such a thing as a status "intrinsically" worth somebody's having it. In other words, we can agree that the morally right thing to do was to disrespect the demagogue, while also acknowledging that our action was disrespectful. Because of the freestanding value of EMPR, anytime we must be disrespectful to be moral, we incur a loss. Just as, in a more extreme case, it is a loss to kill someone in self-defense, even if one is morally right in killing them.

different ways—self-confidence might be damaged, a practice might be accidentally given a "bad name," the needed skills might be badly taught, potentialities may go unrecognized. Combined, however, failures in the three areas amount to the most damaging kind of disrespect. When we see all three failures combined we have reason to believe that we are looking at more than a *failure to respect*—more than just problems in the circumstances of respect or in the competencies of the respecters. Rather, we are seeing deliberate or systematic disrespect deserving of resentment and relentless self-defense.

6.4.2 Practicalities of Failures in Respect

You are a white woman in the US in 1950. Every time you enter a building a man will open the door for you. Men and women alike are careful to not to speak of certain matters to you, you are protected from engaging in combat. Much of this is thought to be done in order to respect you "as" a woman…. You are paraplegic. You never hear anybody complain of any pain or ailment. People always declare it "inspiring" that you've shown up… You are an African American medievalist. People seem to think that the way to honor you is to invite you to speak on the civil rights movement. In each case, one might say "If this is respect, who needs it?"

This section describes different kinds of failures of respect in terms of situations in which there are presumably circumstances of respect, but one of the three phases of the process is not activated. I call these different forms of "false respect" in order to distinguish them from active and intentional disrespect.

Reckoning and Accountability without Crediting (requires sincerity) resulting in "behavioral false-respecting"

To be accountably reckoned with, and yet misrecognized[338] and underappreciated is often something we are willing to live with. It is the idea captured by Nina Simone's "Mississippi Goddamn," when she sings "You don't have to live next to me. Just give me my equality!" We can imagine Simone lowering the moral bar for her fellow white Americans: *I'm not asking you*

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[338] In the Hegelian sense of "recognition." See Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*.

to affirm what's good about me, I'm just asking that you abide by the law and let me go my way. This is what is known as "toleration." Citizens harboring prejudices would prefer an orderly society in which all cooperate to insure each other's legal rights. And so to that extent they *do* cooperate. Often such cooperation is a vast improvement over what has gone before. Moreover, after being the target of hateful disrespect (see below), who is to say that the recipients of this failed version of respect do not themselves prefer to be left alone, rather than engaged, by fellow citizens who seem hopelessly ignorant, if not downright stupid. Nina Simone is more than willing to not associate with these people and merely wants to be able to trust that the law motivates them sufficiently to not stand in her way.

This failure of respecting seems to be what Darwall would have us call a failure of appraisal—a failure to properly value Simone. My theory of EMPR, however, suggests that we can incorporate appraisals into our thinking and evaluation of respect while maintaining the idea that respect is fundamentally about concrete contributions to the entity's normative power. Returning to Darwall's distinction, there would be no action necessitated by the appraisal. To think poorly of someone does not mean one *must* treat them poorly. A person's high or low estimation of another are insufficient as reasons for action, but certainly are factors we turn to as we try to explain and predict their actions. One could perhaps hope to remain unscathed by the not-acted-upon low estimation of one's legally abiding peers. Yet we know full well that there is no such thing as a completely harmless devaluation of someone. This is a dormant situation that could turn bad for Simone if those who devalue her have any kind of power or if they are in positions that utilize instinctive, rather than rational decision-making (e.g. implicit bias resulting in getting a "bad" impression of a job candidate who is highly qualified).

To further analyze this type of false respect, I will set aside the notion of unconscious bias and look at the quasi-respect relation between a "respectable" entity[339] and someone who sincerely, but wrongly, lacks confidence in that entity's respectability. For example, we can think about attitudes about women's and girls' education. Imagine citizens in a society in which women have only recently been given access to higher education. Prior to that, only men received formal education. Imagine that there are people in that society who sincerely continue

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[339] I.e. one who can be normatively empowered in a certain context—the circumstances of respect exist objectively.

to lack confidence[340] about the potential of women to become academically skilled. They simply think their evidence (their authorities, memories, beliefs about a corrupt world, etc.) tells them that women don't benefit from formal education. For instance, such a person may believe that the work of the home requires simple education that can be achieved best in the home by female relatives, and that formal and institutional education produces neurotic individuals who can no longer do what they are best suited for. If we are being charitable with such ignorant failed respecters, we will say that they mistake the unnatural effects of political subjugation for natural causes, and then they treat "human nature" as providing reasons for unequal access to certain goods in society. Yet, the point in this case is that the person "behaviorally" respects women by going along with the legal rules regarding girls' newly instituted rights to education. Perhaps they do this because they believe that God works in mysterious ways and invests authorities with powers to make laws that must be obeyed. We might say that the girls who are now going to school in their society are lucky to have neighbors willing to "respect" their legal rights as such. Yet, this is "false behavioral respecting." If the laws were to change to reflect the ignorant citizens' beliefs, then these same citizens would have every reason, subjectively, to discontinue their "respectful" treatment of the devalued group.[341] The behavioral quasi-respect may be sufficient to sustain the desirable legal status that affords the opportunities; the ignorant citizens may be vastly outnumbered and marginal. But, from the point of view of the ignorant citizen's "role" in the normative empowerment of the girls, what we see is false respect.[342] An authentic relation of respect cannot get off the ground until the respecter "credits" the entity. If the respecter does not believe in the practical possibility of what they are doing, then they are unable to use their agency to respond to shortcomings in the practical areas and in the areas of accountability. The citizen who believes that women cannot really thrive with formal education

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[340] By "sincerely" I mean that they are to some degree open to "contrary evidence" that would change their views and they believe that their own judgment against women's capacity to learn is not malicious or misogynist but is just their judgment based on their experience of women and girls.

[341] We want to know who we can rely on (you might say that self-respect requires this much scrutiny about the thoughts of others). If someone does not think there is any particular value in your being supported in a certain status (like the person who behaviorally respects the judge), they are likely, if they ever get power, to use that power in ways that are not respectful.

[342] The hope, of course, would be that laws necessitating certain kinds of respectful behavior would reveal the worth or purpose of the respectful behavior. Women who are respected under the law become visible to themselves and to many others who had previously underestimated their capabilities or who had feared what might happen to them (the men) if women had equal opportunity.

will sometimes, sadly, have no interest in critically assessing how successful the laws are or in carefully understanding how well he or she is doing in obeying and executing those laws correctly.

This merely behavioral respect (by "behavioral respect" I mean participation in the process of normative empowerment that is not motivated by a belief in the entity's respectability and/or respect-worthiness) is perhaps the most innocuous form of "false respect" in the short term, but it might be severely damaging in the long term. What saves behavioral respect from being out and out hateful disrespect is the presence of accountability. The ignorant citizen at least when pressed believes they owe everyone, including, in our example, women, an explanation as to why they lack confidence in them in this or that domain. They are willing to answer for their prejudices. It seems likely that, if their accountability is sincere, there can be effective pressure to shift their perception and this might eventually lead to a correction in their appraisal and to genuine and robust respect.

Crediting and accountability without reckoning (requires sincerity), resulting in "wishful false-respect."

Let's turn again to Bernice, Avery, and Carol: Avery believed he had two options in responding to Carol: tacitly support her choice to be a police officer (by cooperating politely) or to work to undermine the status of police officer (by giving signs of contempt). Avery believes that he was rude to the officer in full light of the idea that, behind the badge (so to speak) one finds a unique individual. Bernice maintains that Avery is not just harming the "officer"—he could be harming the individual by directing this contempt toward her, and that doing so is wrong. Avery agrees that Carol the individual should be empowered to contribute to the good of a free society of self-determining individuals, but he does not think that treating her as an officer expects to be treated is the way to do achieve this goal. In fact, he thinks that making his rejection of her choice known to her is in its way "respectful" because he is treating her as if she is accountable to the very same values and aims as he is—the aims she claims to be protecting on behalf of the people of Los Angeles. He's not allowing her to remain tenacious and self-deluding; he is weakening her grip on the belief that being an Officer in the LAPD is a good

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thing to be. He's helping foster her doubt, which will be the first step for her to discover a better way to be.

Bernice, as we imagine her, is dubious that her husband's rudeness can be cashed out as an act of respect and moral consideration. What, she asks, could the officer have learned from the interaction, except that there are rude men out there—something she probably knew already? We can imagine Bernice asking Avery if he seriously thinks that interaction would provoke sincere reflection on Officer Carol's part. Avery, if he is being honest with himself, would have to concede Bernice's point: if anything, his rudeness would be interpreted in ways that would feed the officer's natural desire to affirm her own superior judgment over that of her detractors. We can imagine then, that thanks to Bernice's prodding, Avery acknowledges that he is partly accountable for the absence of meaningful ways to interact with Officer Carol. His taking of accountability implies that he will be mindful when expressing his anger and frustration toward another person's "culture." Avery's inability to figure out how to respect Officer Carol is a factor of his limited access to "individual" Carol, on the one hand, and "institutional" Carol, on the other. He is neither an intimate nor is he powerful himself. A mayor, for instance, would likely have the power to take actions that open new ways of being an officer, and might thus be considered insincere in 'crediting' and 'being accountable' without reckoning.

There are not only instances when one feels unable to respectfully reckon with someone. There are also instances when one appreciates their worth, is willing to be accountable to one's role, but one's manner of reckoning is immanently wrong from the relevant evaluative point of view. An example of this sort of poor reckoning looks like respect. This happens when one promotes an entity in ways that undermine her participation in more basic "friendly" practices. Basic practices are those practices that an entity would have an overriding reason to want to participate in, assuming that they also want to participate in the practice for which you are promoting them. If you promote an entity in some other domain in a way that significantly weakens their access to the mechanisms of the more basic domain, then you have failed to successfully respect them even if your motive was to enhance their power in a particular domain. (For example, to help a great surgeon secure the status of Chief surgeon, when securing that status would require creating a rift in the surgical department undermining the quality of work done there. The prospective Chief surgeon shares the *e-pov* centering on successful outcomes for

patients and would not be better able to engage and disclose the values of working in a great department by being the head of a destroyed one.)

Crediting and Reckoning without Accountability (requires efficacy) resulting in "dictatorial" false-respect ("dictatorial respect")

For this type of respect failure (dictatorial respect) I like to think of Robert Moses as an example. Here is someone who saw how parks and other features could liberate middle class new Yorkers from a discouraging urban environment. He knew how to fulfill this agenda—based on the ideals of helping New Yorkers to engage the city in ways that would make good on its promise and be good as well for them. But Moses considered his judgment absolutely superior. He held himself accountable to nobody concrete who was actually going to live with the realizations of his plans. When those plans worked, it was no thanks to any such consultation on his part. When they did not work for those they displaced or for the priorities of public-transportation committed New Yorkers, this was treated as a formality. No adjustments to his thinking were made and he bulldozed his way on.

The example of this is someone who acts sincerely from a righteous position that they do not think they need to account for. The arrogant person, for example, who wants to empower those in her circle, may well serve them in the short-term, but fails to respect (falsely respects) them insofar as her representations of her own actions to the world are impervious to the opinions of others. The missed opportunity is that of showing that there are many—not just the self-interested jerk—who have reasons to support entities in these ways. This is a dead-end, or worse, failure in respect. It ends with the "author" who does not see themselves as accountable to any community, much less to those who might cherish and love the entity. This kind of "respect" is not morally catching. The agent succeeds in creating situations that expand others' possibilities for engaging in values, but does so in a way that cannot (or should not) be modelled and repeated. At its worst, the agent's good work inspires backlash from those who are legitimately resentful that their own experience and point of view was not considered or consulted. Furthermore, if the reckoning does happen to go wrong, who is there to pick up the pieces? If it could be better, how is this ever assessed or noticed? As with the other kinds of false respect that

I will mention, this one involves a failure to make the successful act part of the "process" of normative empowerment.

The person truly interested in being part of the process of normative empowerment for the entity would tend to react in certain ways to difficulties at stage 1, 2, or 3. Assuming that the necessary elements exist for respect, when the person is having trouble seeing even the potential of a worthwhile status for the entity, she is going to listen to those who see things differently. When she sees that potential, but cannot see how she can personally reckon with the entity in the given context, she may consider (a) if she really fully understands the context, or (b) if she might put herself into a new context in which she would be able to reckon with the entity. If she is having trouble publicizing her respectful action—perhaps out of fear of running afoul of her community, or otherwise having trouble finding a way to make her action "legible" for purposes of accountability, she can consider unusual ways (art, anonymity) of representing her action as a candidate for normative legitimacy. But such a person—one who becomes aware of dimensions of respect that she seems to not have access to giving—and who wants to truly understand if there is something she has overlooked—is someone who values respect itself.

6.4.3 Disrespect

If the absence of circumstances of respect means that respect is not possible, and if the poor response to circumstances of respect is a failure of respect (false respect), then disrespect is the true opposite of respect. Let's define it, thus, as a systematic attempt to dis-empower the entity in some domain of value[343]. The disrespecter uses the means available to her to try to sever the connection between a valuable practice and an agent who would otherwise be able to engage and realize those values. The disrespecter may have good reasons to be disrespectful, but her action does, from some point of view, offend. Rarely is it the case that the "valuable practice" is thoroughly repugnant[344]. One may, for example, agree that certain valuable attributes are

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[343] I'd like to distinguish between someone wanting to disempower the demagogue in his demagoguery capacities and someone wanting to do whatever they can to humiliate and disempower someone in any domain they might be in. One is an attempt to shut down someone's power to do (what one sees as) bad things, the other is one's attempt to destroy the person (what we'd assume could only be motivated by hate).

[344] Repugnant acts/practices: torture, slavery, rape, humiliation.

cultivated in teenagers who play football, and yet know that the right thing to do is to prevent your eager teen from playing. The teen may not have another clear practice that he is ready to enthusiastically engage and you have used your considerable influence as his parent to prevent him, rather than support him, in engaging values that are important to a lot of people. Disrespect, is always going to be offensive from at least two perspectives: from the perspective of those who seek to advance the thwarted value and from the perspective of those who think the entity should be free to valuably engage the relevant practice. The parent who values EMPR should regret the necessity of acting disrespectfully toward their child (EMP disrespect). Someone who rejoices in the fact that their child has been kept from engaging in important values is someone who is being hatefully disrespecting.

Let's consider how disrespect relates to hatred. In a way, to hate someone is to believe either that they sully everything they touch—in which case you do not want them to get anywhere near the things you value; or it is to believe that they deserve existential punishment—they do not deserve to be appreciated, to be happy, to discover things. In which case you want to prevent them from doing anything that they might do well. One can also have nothing in particular against an individual, but utterly detest their culture and the practices that they personally have access to. While you are in the circumstances of respect in relation to them, you do not see it that way. As far as you are concerned there is no way to respect them and on top of that it is your duty to marginalize their way of life. This latter sort of disrespect becomes more institutional and systematic. It cannot be pinned on hatred of the entity, but nobody in the disrespecter's own moral community is stepping forward to hold the disrespecter accountable, to change their views, to help them to see that they have reasons to want to see you engaged in these practices that they don't happen to value.

What is the difference between disrespect and violence? Disrespect often increases the possibility of the entity becoming the target of violence. It does this by diminishing the ethical visibility of the entity for others. Eventually the entity might appear to be a mere object of consumption, whose integrity conditions are not considered when "extracting" value from them. The following are paradigms of disrespect that would shape practices of disrespect.

STIGMA - discrediting, shaming, disqualifying through traits and identity
itself, pre-practical

ISOLATION - isolating acts, lack of access, contradiction between practices

FAILURE - non-cooperation, sabotage, thwarting acts

It would be wrong to overlook disrespect as a defense against worse evils. Certain attempts to sever the connection between some individual and some e-pov valued practice can be undertaken "for the sake of" the individual's well-being and reputation. While one could never be a hateful disrespecter out of care for the entity, one might be an institutional disrespecter in an effort to destroy institutions that one believes are evil. For those who have wanted to put an end to dueling, enslavement, prostitution, cults, abortion, and so forth—it would seem to be a lesser of evils to set out to destroy (rather than merely refrain from supporting) practices that are parts of people's identities. One way to do this is to stigmatize those involved in the practice, another way is to make the practice ineffective—deprive it of what it relies upon to disclose its e-pov values (failure), and yet another way to attack it is to create a situation where anyone who chooses it is forced to reject other practices that are equally important to them (isolation). The faster you make it shameful, pointless, or otherwise painful for people to engage in that practice, the better.

But, from the perspective of those offended, disrespect diminishes and blocks engagement with good practices. In so doing it shrinks the world to which the disrespected entity has access. What the value of EMPR suggests is that we have an interest in using our circumstances to build more complex and meaningful integration of relationships and practices. To find a practice despicable is not immediately to know what to do about it. The stakes are high when one is considering tactics of stigmatization, isolation, and failure. To borrow from Rousseau's discourse on self-love, EMPR is expansive for both respecter and respected—even when there are bumps along the way. Disrespect contracts involvement and builds a fortress around the values that the disrespecter thinks she is protecting. Even when disrespect is "justified" as an act of self-defense, it carries this burden.

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6.5 Unreasonable Respect (what cannot logically be respected)

Are there any situations (where circumstances of respect exist) that we can identify as those where valuing EMPR itself recommends that one deny giving EMPR? It seems like any entity we encounter (and many a one distant from us) could be put into some "circumstance of respect" in relation to ourselves, if they are not already so situated. Yet this is not to say that any feature or fact about an entity could be a basis for respect from a specific *e-pov* (valued practice). For any feature, any situation, we can affix a status, a role, capable of serving some obscure value. But we cannot, for all that, transform the integrity conditions of the entity we are concerned with respecting. Those conditions at the very least set the limit on how "creative" we might be in devising circumstances of respect. There are perhaps some forms of unreasonableness that are not conducive to respect working: the individual should not be EMP-respected if every fiber of their character is determined toward destroying anything that others consider good. I.e. the one whose aim and "good" is to destroy whatever others think is good, is fundamentally unreasonable, not just from the moral point of view, but from the narrower conceptual point of view of the "point" of respect. There is no way to respect them because their "best effort" from their point of view and from your point of view are in total and irreconcilable contradiction. But this is quite an extreme fantasy that perhaps applies to nobody.

An individual fails (from the value of EMPR) to be respect-able only in specific contexts and moments in time. When there is literally no way to promote them without undermining the value of EMPR itself. Assuming that all humans "deserve" respect, the most un-respectable[345] individuals can, and should, be "held" in a process resembling respect. This means there is an ongoing effort to look for sustaining and constructive ways to bring about good-making standing for them.

Certain "roles" cannot be harnessed to allow the respected to disclose values. For instance, it is impossible to respect someone "as" a self-destroyer. Yet we have (and still do) empower people as killers. Their role in some practice is engaged in and through their ability to kill, and some have respected them by facilitating that (morally questionable) connection. They disclose the good of some practice (military) through killing and we help them to be better and

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[345] Those who are nihilistic, destructive, evil, psychotic, depressed. (Who may well be respect-worthy but are not reckonable in certain contexts.)

more able killers. This may well be a controversial way to look at the values engaged by the military. While few in the military value killing in itself, it is having the "courage" to kill your enemy that one actualizes the aims of protecting one's country from existential threats.[346] But what if respecting them "as" killers requires that we do something that disables them "as humans"? Now we have a case against EMPR for the "killer" as such, from the point of view of respect. This requires us to show how "playing well the role" of "moral equal" to other humans is foundational to disclosing the good in a wide variety of practices, including even the practice that values their killing. This might not be an easy thing to prove, but at least we see that the logic of respect does suggest a way of choosing between better and worse ways of respecting people without labeling the worse ways "disrespect."[347] Likewise this logic of EMPR may help us to choose between better and worse kinds of failing to respect without (arguably) labeling the better ways 'respectful.'

6.6 The Burdened Virtues of Resisting Disrespect[348]

From 2008-2012 Donald Trump perpetrated a false rumor that Barack Obama may not have been born in the United States. The spreading of the rumor, massaging the country's racist fears and assumptions, was an act of disrespect of the first African American to be nominated by a major party for highest office, and an act failing to respect U.S. citizens of color. The rumor asked people to entertain questions of "Americanness" that would never have been entertained of any recent white candidates. Responding to the rumor created a dilemma, since responding to it would mean treating it with some legitimacy. This well-known example of disrespect, and the many efforts made to shut it down, captures, I think, some aspect of the "burdened" virtues of resisting disrespect.

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[346] This view comes from a number of conversations I've had with a student who is a proud former marine.
[347] Recall, it may have been better, in the end, for the worker to participate in the strike, but it was not self-disrespecting for her to choose the lesser opportunity for normative power.

[348] The idea of a "burdened virtue" I get from Lisa Tessman's eponymous book. This section draws variously and indirectly from the ideas of Tessman, Boxill, Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham City Jail," commentary on shame in Dillon's edited volume *Character, Dignity, and Self-Respect*, Goffman's *Stigma*, Rousseau's autobiographical writings, and obliquely the history of the disability rights movement as told recently by Lennard Davis in *Enabling Acts* as well as Axel Honneth's work.

Belief that one has been disrespected (whether through false respect/failure to respect or deliberate disrespect) involves a few judgments (1) that one is (or would be) in an objectively worse position than one might have been (2) thanks to the choices of someone, (3) and no proportionate effort is being made by that person to ameliorate the situation. If we value EMPR, it would seem that we would want to limit disrespect and failures of respect in general. The burden of proof would be on the prospective disrespecter to show that on balance what they are doing is more important than what the value of EMPR does. As we know, the effort to *combat and discourage* disrespect comes with its own burdens. It utilizes powerful emotions involved in taking seriously the point of view of those who fail to respect us. We have to act as if the disrespecter's choices make a difference to us (sometimes it is easier to say "who cares" and to pretend they don't exist), which means we have to acknowledge their power in our lives. To acknowledge another's power is also to give them a little bit of additional power they might not have otherwise had in the eyes of those watching, and, more importantly, it is to give them an even greater "presence" in our lives. For example, when women complain about Donald Trump's disrespectful fat-shaming comments, they have no choice but to call more attention to those repugnant ideas and to the person who is promoting those ideas. That itself can feel painful and humiliating. Instead of staying focused on what brings us joy and excitement, we have to turn our attention to mechanisms in the culture that reward disrespectful speech, and we have to try to throw a wrench into those gears of disrespect.

Disrespect is treatment that some have reason to believe is both denigrating and unwarranted. The indignation that motivates us to combat disrespect need not be on our own behalf—and yet in some sense it is probably always connected to our effort to promote our values and to foster the kind of world we want to live in. In the case of the "birther" controversy (as the rumor about Obama's origin was termed in the popular press), people were angered by the disrespect shown to Barack Obama and to anyone of color who might dare to think of themselves as fully "American." From the point of view of those who value the electoral process (intelligent debates, the self-clarification of political missions, etc.) this was also disrespectful. How are we to engage valuably in the electoral process when there is so much meaningless static?[349] Disrespect is a powerful weapon precisely because of the fragility of value-disclosing

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[349]Though in many cases there will be room to argue that such "unwarranted" action is warranted from a different point of view (the political contest would not be available to television audiences except for payments from

conditions. In many ways entities—especially those with robustly protected integrity—are resilient and can take numerous paths around the obstacles that failures of respect bring. Still, an individual's ability to "advance" values depends on other people, and ourselves, in a wide variety of highly fallible material and psychological ways. The proliferation of valid and reasonable evaluative points of view also means that people will often feel disrespected by those who do mean well, not by those as thoughtless as Donald Trump. What are the right ways to respond to failures of respect? What are the right ways to respond to outright disrespect?

There are three emotions we commonly associate with the experience of being disrespected: **Indignation, Shame**, and **Resentment**. These moral emotions are vitally important, but they are certainly not the only ones that the experience of being disrespected might produce. There are non-moral emotions such as self-indifference, hopelessness and rage. But, ironically enough, there are still others: feelings of clarity about one's own importance, solidarity with people who are similarly "out of place," contemplativeness about human power and interdependence, and curiosity about how to make things better. None of us is perfectly respected. The luckiest, most loved, accepted, protected, and self-respecting of us occasionally find ourselves jostled about, used, misunderstood, overlooked, misplaced, unsupported by those operating in our social environment. We can be grateful to be among the lucky but also careful not to give an inch to patterns of disrespect when we become aware of them.

Those who find that they are often disrespected—sometimes by those who do not mean to and sometimes by those who intend to—have powerful reasons to use symbolic techniques and public anger to create tension and help to change the way their condition is perceived. Self-respect may even sometimes demand such efforts whenever they stand a reasonable chance of fostering solidarity, group pride, and/or concrete legal and social change. But it is extremely hard work. The disrespected person (more likely, group) is "forcing" her way into places where she is literally not welcome. *She has to stake her claim to place and at the same time preserve what is valuable about that place.*

Combatting failures of respect can require the use of techniques of *disrespect.* We might well say that we have a "right" or even a "duty" to *disrespect* those who knowingly inhabit a role

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advertisers who depend upon controversy), the actions remain "disrespectful" as long as the EPOV-defining perspectives have validity (even if it supports the TV-system and all who work for it, still it is disrespectful!).

or position that relies on the "disrespected-ness" of others. In any event, when someone seems particularly culpable in their failures of respect or seems to have deliberately traded on disrespect,[350] we may want to create a **crisis of humiliation** for them. We might want to morally shock them with an intolerable image of themselves as seen through the eyes of certain others. Shaming seems to us to be the appropriate response (at least as appropriate as guilt-inducement) to culpable failures of respect and disrespect.[351] When someone is shamed for having been disrespectful, this gets them to redirect their thoughts toward existential questions of how well and sincerely they embrace and pursue the right values. Yet, it is obvious, if we value EMPR, there are moral burdens to "shaming" the disrespecter.[352] Even if humiliating them results in their genuine *humility* and reconsideration of their values (rather than resentment, rage, denial, or other reactionary responses), they do this outside of any relation of respect with us. How can one be trusted to play an active part in supporting the good-making engagement of someone who one once tried to socially destroy?

Assuming that the disrespected person[353] is self-respecting, she will usually strive to reveal the moral and epistemic mistakes involved in her sub-par treatment. But she also must protect herself from future abuse. There is a tension between the role of educating others and the desire to withdraw from them. Parallel to this there is a tension between creating more mutual responsibility with fallible others for her place in the world, and looking for situations in which she can be more independent and self-reliant—if able to do less also as a result of this relative isolation. Rousseau comes to mind, having explored these issues directly and indirectly with searing passion and intelligence. Rousseau felt acutely the failures of people to respect one another. With regard to himself—if we are to trust his autobiographical statements—he felt it in terms of the effort of his compatriots to encase him and control him in different ways. They wanted him to be a *philosophe*, they wanted him to be a scandal, they wanted him to be Parisian. They would be more than happy to elevate him socially, if only he would laughingly acknowledge himself to be a complicated hypocrite, like all intellectuals. Out of paranoia or out

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[350] Culpable because they could have recognized their capacity, could have known the right thing to do, or could have at least answered to the situation.
[351] See Nussbaum's fascinating arguments against "shaming" legal punishments in *Hiding from Humanity*.
[352] This can be related to similar tensions in Political Liberalism over the idea of unreasonable plans of life. Or see these tensions in Rawls's *Law of Peoples*.
[353] There is no objective measure for when someone is "disrespected." Whether it is by failures or outright disrespect the result is still that the person is disrespected—until at least the issue begins to be addressed.

of righteous indignation (and probably a bit of both) Rousseau retreated to become a "solitary walker." He thought no longer in terms of peers and friends, but in terms of the sweet revenge of being happy, being fulfilled, having an expansive sense of his own existence while they fretted away their time competing with one another. EMPR would suggest that Rousseau's approach was understandable, but a kind of defeat of the value of EMPR. Rousseau appears to be someone who overcame the pain of resentment, but at the price of self-induced social isolation.

Disagreements with those on whom we rely for status and place in the world (which is to say, potentially anyone with whom we are in "circumstances of respect") are usually not resolved without expending emotional energy and locating other social resources capable of helping us to reframe the possibilities of "reckoning" that are available among us. There's also something that is difficult for someone battling disrespect to hold onto: humility. Fierce self-confidence is often important, at the loss of the subtle pleasures and privileges of self-doubt. To protect one's self from social neglect and injustice one has to know quite well the boundaries of who one is protecting. One has to become a very solid "self." There are other ways of being a self that are available to those who have more reason to trust in having good access to their social environment.

6.7 Chapter Conclusion

I've argued that there is a freestanding value of respect. To commit to this value, however, is to ask ourselves to be open-minded (though not naïve) about evaluating ways of treating others that we may not morally approve. In the process of talking about the value of respect, and the work that we who value respect would want to do, I've had a chance to say a few things about self-respect. The next chapter of the dissertation focuses on an Empowerment Concept of Self-Respect in order to see how such a concept can help us to understand the relationship of the value of EMPR to the primary goods of Rawls's "justice as fairness."

Chapter 7 -- Empowerment Self-Respect (EMP-SR)

Martin Luther King, Jr. was killed because he realized the only way the blacks were to win their rights as citizens was not to seek mere survival but full success, full citizenship… With the incorporation of the blacks into national life, not only were blacks free to offer their full creative contribution to society, but the whites were challenged to reconsider the roles by which they lived. The longest and most deeply suppressed of all groups refuses to learn from history. In order to win our right to self-respect and equality, we must first assert our full existence and then its strength. -- Harvey Milk[354]

Man is so plastic a being, that one can even conceive of the day when a thoroughly self-respecting citizen will crawl about on all fours, sporting a tail of brightly colored feathers as a sign of conformity to the order he lives in. --
Czeslaw Milosz[355]

7.1 Chapter Introduction

In the previous chapter I touched upon the way that self-respect emerges out of respect. Let me begin this chapter with a few un-theoretical words about the political-moral importance given to the linkage between respect and self-respect.[356] This will seem like a departure from the

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[354] Harvey Milk statement, 1978, Harvey Milk Papers Collection, San Francisco Public Library. Quote found at - http://cedar.wwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1207&context=wwuet

[355] *The Captive Mind.*

[356] Conceptualizing self-respect raises interesting questions about its causal relation to its parent concept: respect. One interesting question is whether being self-respecting conduces to respecting others. An even stronger version of this is to ask whether one must be a self-respecter before one can respect others. Another is whether being generally respected by others conduces to self-respect. A stronger version of this is to ask whether someone who is not respected by others could ever be able to respect themselves. The importance of self-respect would be enhanced if we could link it to respect for others—then, of course it is in all of our interest to promote self-respect in others (doing so is always a way of being respectful, but there are also many other ways). Likewise, making sure that people get respected by others would become all the more important if self-respect could not occur otherwise. In rehearsing these questions we must be careful, though, to acknowledge that they have been asked and answered under different conceptual frameworks than EMPR. A third question that I do not recall seeing in the literature is this: does self-respect require a developed capacity for respecting at least certain others? It may be worthwhile to keep an eye on what our analysis of EMP-SR suggests about these questions. The convergence of self-promotion and promotion of others is of course a political ideal for communitarians and liberals alike. Does an EMPR and an EMP-SR conception allow us to form reasonable expectations about the likelihood of such a convergence in a Rawlsian just society?

conceptual boundaries I've been trying so hard to set for EMPR, but it is necessary to come up for air for a moment in order to see where we might need to dive back down. When we think about the historical demands for respect and we look at the documents of those demands found in our social justice movements, it is undeniable that there is a tie between the politics of respect and the need for self-respect.

It is self-respect, we are told, that moves us to stand up for our rights; while repeated and systematic disrespect can be so demeaning that we no longer believe we have any important claims on others. In other words, self-respect is spoken of as an engine of change[357] and as also the thing whose loss is most indicative of an epoch of injustice (social death arguments). Self-respect—conceived of as good boundaries, ideals, and habits, and a stable sense of one's own absolute and relative worth—might be testified to as the "reason" one was able to succeed against unjust adversity. It might be testified to as the thing one was fighting to keep—as something endangered—whose fragility itself motivated someone to fight back. So, in order to "keep" self-respect, people might protest and resist what it would otherwise seem prudent to give in to. Or, if we see someone who is abjectly lacking in self-respect we might tend to ask who is responsible for this? In this sense, the missing self-respect is thought to take the form of wanton behavior[358], of passively accepting or even irrationally provoking unfair or even violent treatment from others, or maybe self-neglect that seems to evince depression and hopelessness. This much is clear from our common discourse: having self-respect is linked to actively advancing and protecting what one cares about; lacking self-respect is linked to floundering and failing to stand for something or failing to stand with those allegedly cares about.[359] This much more is clear: some sorts of disrespect make it harder to be self-respecting and some sorts of self-respect encourage respect from others.

But there is something else is also painfully clear (see Appiah's Honor Code and Sen on violence): when our values conflict and our identities clash, it is likely that our views of what self-respect requires will clash as well. What we think we might be proud of or ashamed of—

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[357] See Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*.
[358] See Dillon, "How to Lose Your Self-Respect."
[359] And sometimes it is linked to putting all one's eggs in a bad basket: caring with abandon about the wrong thing or person.

what our identities are built upon—orient us in ways that give us a reason to hold tightly to those identities, even when it will look both irrational and immoral to do so (see Vance). In the face of this, the liberal philosophical temptation is to assert that violent and immoral acts of "self-respect" cannot exist, because self-respect is a morally good thing and it cannot be achieved by doing morally bad things. If self-respect is a good thing, then, this thinking goes, we must find out how to show why these violent and immoral routes to self-respect are confused and are actually corrosive of self-respect. A proper appreciation of selfhood should create the moral insight to realize that the right way to treat oneself is to make oneself an upstanding member of the true moral community. My claim is that this approach risks missing what is politically crucial about self-respect. There is something especially intolerable about pressure to weaken one's own chances/ability to valuably engage with practices one cares about. People will do immoral things in their attempt to push back against this pressure—and the aim of achieving normative power will give them reasons to do these things. This fact must somehow be faced at the level of theory. While I cannot here advance a full argument for this claim, I can show that at least when it comes to Rawls's political theory, there is some hope that the relation of self-respect can be treated as the morally important, but dangerously malleable thing it is. My theory of EMPR allows me to work up a conception of self-respect (EMP-SR) that I think can be helpful in the Rawlsian context and beyond.

In this chapter I explain and analyze empowerment self-respect. My primary purposes are, first, to lay out, in the simplest possible terms, what empowerment self-respect is—and how to understand it as a "type" of empowerment respect more generally; and, second, to argue against reducing (or we might say elevating) self-respect to where it converges with autonomy. In other words, it is important not to mistake self-respecting actions with the subset of actions concerned with "securing" one's self-respect. I argue that empowerment self-respect should be understood not only in the moral and meta-ethical terms of what (the possibility of) self-respect "requires" (of those actions that we do to protect our very chance of being self-respecters). Instead, it is important to see empowerment self-respect in terms of myriad possibilities for advancing one's normative power which are not in-themselves "necessary" for one's own autonomy or for the moral good of the community.

7.2 Empowerment Self-Respect

What is Empowerment self-respect? Simply, empowerment self-respect is **a relation where an individual does what supports her own normative power.** Recall that normative power is the power to valuably engage a given practice. EMP-SR is nothing other than EMPR toward one's own self. Any way of relating to one's own self that makes one an active agent in the process of one's empowerment is a self-respecting way of dealing with one's own self.[360] Thus, techniques of self-respectful reckoning may include expressions of affirmation that build confidence, activities that coordinate oneself with institutional schemes, skills-building and character building activities, and the nurturing of personal ties. And EMP-SR, like our commonsense understanding of SR, is also understood in reference to what actions it prohibits, in a given context. Even if it is not always clear which actions exemplify self-respect in a situation, it can often be understood which choices would be self-undermining and self-disrespecting from some practical perspective (e.g. practical perspective such as artistry, citizenship, parenting, self-care).[361] Only a very few actions can be characterized by-definition, or even by rule-of-thumb as respectful or disrespectful of oneself. Instead, EMP-SR offers a way of thinking about and discussing empowerment "in situ." [362] Rather than balkanizing different ways of dealing with oneself into different "conceptions" of self-respect, EMP-SR asks us to see the different levels at which we relate to ourselves as major thruways of normative empowerment in our self-to-self relations. These thruways feed into and out of the normative neighborhoods of crediting, reckoning, and accounting. Another way to say this is that we can identify common "levers" of self-respect. Under the right circumstances the reflexive relation allows us to leverage our experience of self-awareness, our considered preferences for specific statuses, and our given capabilities to maintain and expand our possibilities of valuable engagement with given practices. None of these spaces—the reflective, the social, the material—

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[360] Just as, in a given historical moment, there are a variety of ways of reckoning with others that will likely empower them to engage valuably in practices, so, in a given historical moment, there are a variety of available ways of dealing with one's own self.

[361] And at times the reverse may be true: it may be easier to know what would be an exemplary self-respecting act than to know what would pass over the line into a failure of self-respect.

[362] Compare to Forst, *Contexts of Justice*.

is necessarily more important than the others; rather, contexts *make* various levels of self-relation more or less critical to one's own normative empowerment.

Giving importance to self-respect in a political theory recommends against reducing self-respect to those actions that preserve moral integrity in one's own self.[363] Similarly, we must keep in mind that self-respect (EMP-SR) is not the equivalent of being a good person and upholding the good.[364] The question is *not* how to make everyone prefer their own moral goodness above all else. The question is how to reduce or neutralize conflicts between paths for valuable engagement in practices.[365] That includes but is not limited to the paths for valuable engagement in the "practice" of moral personhood. Drawing upon the concept of EMPR that I've developed in the preceding chapters, I want to make the case that we can claim great political importance for self-respect without subordinating it to or conflating it with our moral ideal of human dignity—but we must walk a fine line in order to do so. I think this is a fine line worth balancing upon, for it makes self-respect, like EMPR a "freestanding" moral term with its own value, but also with its own limitations.

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[363] Like EMPR, the circumstances that make it possible to normatively empower oneself are not themselves sufficient reason to do so. (Nor is lacking those circumstances a sufficient reason to think one does not "deserve" to be in a relation of respect with oneself.) (Furthermore with SR-as- "appropriate treatment" writers like Dillon and Honneth identified more than just standing for one's rights. It would be equally important to protect one's personal standards and basic sense of worth.)

[364] On its face I am not offering a Kantian account of self-respect.

[365] Consider this passage from Dillon's HTLYSR: "The *Arrogant* has an exaggerated sense of her worth and of what she is due: she demands more consideration than is appropriate, arrogates to herself a higher status than is rightly hers. So where [Recognition]-self-respect is about knowing one's place in the moral community, arrogance is a matter of not knowing or (more likely) not being honest about what one is and where one belongs. The Arrogant, like the Servile, has a distorted view of the shape of the moral community. We might say she credits herself with too much fundamental interpersonal worth; in this way her sense of worth is as deformed as that of the Servile. We can thus identify a continuum of attitudes or beliefs about one's interpersonal worth, with servility lying toward one end and arrogance toward the other. But while the servile suffers from a lack of self-respect, it does not seem quite right to say that the Arrogant has too much self-respect. For this suggests that she has too much of a good thing, whereas the point is that she hasn't got the good thing—the correct understanding of the shape of the moral community and of her place in it—in the first place. It also suggests that self-respect is not intrinsically good; but it is hard to see how recognition of one's moral worth and status could not be intrinsically good. Self-respect is often identified as a sense of worth. Yet it would seem that not every sense of worth is R-self-respect, but only an appropriate sense of worth, or, to change modes, a sense of worth that works properly. We may thus understand R-self-respect as the mean between the extremes of servility and arrogance." 127-128 footnote p. 137 "…R-self-respect poses no threat to the ability of others to value themselves appropriately, **since it is the recognition of how one actually stands vis-à-vis others, while arrogance is a threat because it lies about one's interpersonal standing..."** [my emphasis] Notice the way Dillon collapses recognition respect into respect for oneself as a moral equal.

7.3 Details – Giving an account of EMP-SR from EMP-R

In order to move from the general concept of EMPR to the more specific type of EMPR known as Empowerment *Self-Respect*, we have to adjust the various parts of the account: the circumstances, the elements, the way the process is entered, the agentic roles, the attitudes, and the "practices/levers"—and see what self-respect looks like once we have done so. Does it look familiar? Are the variety of so-called types and senses of self-respect accounted for? Do we get a sufficiently nuanced picture of who is "responsible" for self-respect? Above all, can we begin to see, at the right level of generality, what social resources ground self-respect?

7.3.1 Circumstances of EMP-SR

> **Kelly** had no idea that what she did for fun could be called dancing. Never had she seen a dancer in a wheelchair. She didn't bother to try out for the highschool play because all of the parts involved dancing—she just assumed that there were some natural limitations due to her not being like other kids. It's too bad the school counselor never bothered to reach out to Kelly and give her role models or talk to her about the social model of disability.

> **Chrissy** was passionate about dance and had learned from an early age that her creative talents could be put to good use when she was the first wheelchair user to dance in the highschool dance troupe. But when she became part of an experimental dance group as lighting engineer she insisted on staying on the sidelines, even when invited to contribute ideas beyond her area of expertise. She never brought up the possibility that the troupe could choreograph a dance that might include a dancer like herself, because that would have reminded everyone that she was different from them.

> **Martin** believes strongly that his mother should get the burial that she wished for. As a dutiful and loyal son, he would be ashamed to let her down. Yet somewhere along the line she must have misplaced her will. Martin has no idea what it was she wanted, though she alluded to it many times she never spelled it out to him. What will the rest of the family think? What kind of son will he be if, at the very end, he cannot honor her as she wanted? It's too bad that his Aunt didn't bother to come forward with the will, which was actually in her possession.

The three above examples (Kelly, Chrissy, and Martin) raise thoughts for us about what self-respect requires. We feel sorry for Kelly that she does not know that she deserves better. We wonder what is going on with Chrissy that she would deny herself opportunities she knows she deserves, and we feel Martin is in a terrible bind and we worry about his ability to forgive himself for circumstances that are not fully in his control. In the first case we might say that we wish Kelly could have seen herself differently, because then she would have stood up for herself.

But we hardly think of her as someone who we would criticize for failing to respect herself. In the third case we wish that Martin had the tools he needed to make good on his intentions. The desire is there, but there's no way to see it through. It is only in the second case that we really think that Chrissy was in a position to do something for herself, had the tools to do it, and yet for some reason refused.

Yet in the first case, and even in the third, we could tell a story where someone close to the situation had the knowledge that Kelly or Martin would have needed. Kelly and Martin both might have become well-equipped to step up to the practices at hand and engage them valuably, if only others had done their part. Self-respect in these particular cases was "theoretically" possible, and yet depended on something outside of the control of the potential self-respecter.

Earlier in the dissertation I described the minimal conditions for thinking that "respect" is a live (as opposed to 'remote') possibility. A person should not be blamed for failing to respect in situations in which they were not in circumstances of respect. Since EMPR pertains to how we help to situate one another to engage valuably in existing practices, there are times when two individuals are just not positioned to be in relations of respect with one another vis. some particular practice. On the other hand, there might be times when an individual wrongly believes that she is not in circumstances of respect with another, due to her own inattention to facts readily available to her.[366] Retrospectively, we imagine that things could have been different for the neglected entity. It is important, moving forward to figure out what went wrong. Respecters respond to entities, not to "non-entities." Insofar as people purposefully try to make others morally invisible—and succeed in doing so—what they have deprived the "other" of is, among other things, even the possibility of being in a respect relation. Disrespect may surely be used as a tool for achieving this nefarious aim, but active disrespect leaves tracks that lead us back to the fact that someone in fact had an existence that pressed upon and influenced shared values. So, as with EMPR, the bare possibility of self-respect taking place requires a few minimal conditions. There has to be someone with integrity conditions and *e-pov*-good "characteristics" who is

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[366] More complexly, circumstances of respect can hold even when the potential respecter, through no fault of their own, is not informed about what she could have done to promote the potential respected. In cases like this, there are people who know about the possible connection between respecter and respected but who choose not to educate the potential respecter. In this case these third parties are the ones with more direct responsibility for whether or not a relation of respect has been actualized. Yet to avoid infinite regress, circumstances of respect requires this connection between those knowledgeable and the prospective respecter to be a close and meaningful connection.

also—at the same time—capable of knowing this about herself *and* capable of acting on this knowledge.[367]

7.3.2 Crediting, Reckoning, and Accounting

Respect is the relation of engaging one's own self in a way that will promote, rather than detract from, one's ability to disclose values though practices. Yet, as the examples above suggest, we are never simply partnered with ourselves (in a simple one-on-one relation). Instead this relation takes place on the "stage" of a more complex and ongoing process of social/normative empowerment—usually relating to a specific set of values or practices. As I argued earlier, the main moments of that process are crediting, reckoning, and accounting. It is when one's relation with oneself can be seen as a positive part of this ongoing process that we really can say one is respecting oneself. Yet, one may not fully know "what" one is doing at first. One may enter through any of several doors.

Crediting: When one enters into a process of one's own normative empowerment by "crediting" oneself, that means that one relates to one's possible engagements as someone who understands one's own integrity conditions in a certain way. One understands that though one's power is limited to whatever maintains bodily and emotional integrity, that as such an integrated being one really can have an impact on some given practice, as seen from some evaluative point of view.

Reckoning: When you enter into a process of normative empowerment as a "reckoner" with yourself (even one who has not as yet "credited" herself sufficiently), you identify conditions under which you could use your powers to make a positive difference to shared values. You grasp the practicalities in some detail. You can tell that you are in a situation that

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[367] By "capable" I only mean that she really has access to this knowledge about herself and access to knowing how to get into the position to act upon it, not that she has actually accessed it or gotten into the proper position to act. To have "access" means that there are—at minimum—those she is in contact with who are actively able (to avoid infinite regress) to inform her and teach her. Here already, in the circumstances of self-respect, we see that it is possible that the self may not be one immediately ethically accountable. Some agent in the mix could bring it about that self-respect is engaged, either because there is an entity who would do so if she had the knowledge or because there is an entity who would do so if circumstances were right and there is another agent who could be influenced to make those circumstances right.

might give you access to valuable engagement in a practice and you know how to get yourself closer to that possibility, if not through the door entirely. You know about the relevant norms and procedures that could help you to actualize your good-making position. You have figured out what to do and you've acted accordingly.

Accounting: When you enter into a process of normative empowerment as someone who is "accountable," you have the moral orientation of defending yourself against incursions on your normative power. But, additionally, you are taking on the role of being responsive to those besides yourself who are advocates for you and/or for the relevant practice. You openly reflect upon your previous actions (or inactions) in light of beliefs about the importance of your integrity conditions and the values that might be engaged by you through the practice. Whether for the sake of the advocates or for the sake of your future normative power, you take stock of the current possibilities and responsibility for your own future role.

These three "entry points" reflect back on how we understand circumstances of self-respect. You are in circumstances of self-respect relative to some evaluative point of view whenever you are in a situation where *either* your power to credit yourself, reckon with yourself, or account for your own relation to yourself can itself find a place in a process that leads to your normative empowerment. You might fail to credit yourself, reckon with yourself, or account for your relation to yourself, when doing so would have meaningfully shaped what others could also do for you. These would be **failures of self-respect**. **Self-disrespect** could be thought of as your effort to make it impossible to credit yourself, reckon with yourself, or be accountable for your relation to yourself.

7.3.3 Agents involved in self-respect

Previously, I identified **four agentic roles** in the process of empowerment: respected, reckoner, advocate, and appreciator (practitioner with an evaluative point of view in a 'practical' community). While respect is often most directly a relationship between respected and reckoner, responsibility in the process of empowerment also falls upon advocates and practitioners (appreciators) as well. Circumstances of respect become actual partly due to the decisions made by advocates and practitioners. It is no different with self-respect, except that here we can be sure

that the respected is also a moral agent, since she must be the same person as the respecter and the respecter must be a moral agent.[368]

7.3.4 Supports for self-respect

The focus for supporting someone's entry into a process of normative empowerment depends on which door one is entering through: crediting, reckoning, or accounting.

As a self-creditor Kelly (in the example above) must believe that she has value-disclosing characteristics and that engaging in those would not be destructive to her integrity conditions. She might not have one particular practice in mind, but a general belief that her characteristics might connect her to what is valuable through different specific practices. It follows to reason that if we want to help Kelly credit herself we need to help her to see herself in this way. This might involve helping her to come to the right sort of understanding about what her integrity conditions are, where her vulnerabilities are, and what sort of powers she has to engage values in general. Here we see that Kelly's so-called "basal"[369] or "trait" self-esteem is an important factor.[370] Her general confidence that there are good things she can do, given the right opportunities. She needs access to some evaluative points of view in the light of which she can see herself making a worthwhile contribution. What would undermine her entry into the process of normative empowerment for herself would be to make her disgusted with herself or ashamed of herself on some very basic level or to make the standards for considering oneself powerful to be so ridiculously stringent that, just because she is not totally self-sufficient she believes she has no contribution to make. It could also be undermining simply to contribute to confusing her about where the boundaries of her own bodily and emotional well-being end and those of another begin.

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[368] For example: The advocate (Kelly's father) might be reminding Kelly (respecter) about her strengths and abilities and her priorities (for reckoning with Kelly the respected), or her valuable characteristics (for warranting her own respect)… The practical community has to provide circumstances and feedback and norms that can ultimately be put into play through the advocate and the active respecter.

[369] Dillon's term.

[370] See Morris Rosenberg, *Conceiving the Self,* on the difference between state and trait self-esteem.

As a self-reckoner Kelly must actually find herself in situations to which social knowledge and norms might be applied. She must have the education to know what the social expectations and norms are that are relevant to the practices she has access to. She must know how to do the things that can help situate *her* to valuably engage the practice. In other words, she must, either through rule of thumb or through self-knowledge, know how the existing norms serve or do not serve her own person when it comes to the particularities of who she is as she enters into socially legible practices. She could use help—access to examples and role models— in making the connection between who she knows herself to be and what other people similar to herself have gone through when utilizing the existing norms and procedures. She must really do those things and do them minimally well. She needs not only knowledge but the sorts of skills and abilities that are needed to carry out her judgments. Support for this comes through having safe and low-stakes opportunities for trial and error and in having access to statuses that are commensurate with her skill level. Her actions must actually expand and strengthen her valuable engagement with practices. To be supported in all these concrete ways involves much more than supporting her self-esteem and even more than supporting her efficacy, it involves having others who are competent enough to take up her actions and do what was expected, to socially realize the point of the role she had agreed to play. Clearly, among other things, it would be undermining to do things that put her at a greater distance to practices she has reason to care about, to offer an educational program that deprives her of the efficacies she would normally need, and to make it difficult for her to learn from examples and trial and error.

As accountable for her relation to herself, Kelly must learn to advocate for herself. To do this well, she needs trusted intimates who can affirm and challenge her self-understanding. Kelly is accountable to more people than just herself. Her actions should not be hidden from those who have a stake in her life or from those who have a stake in the practices and values with which she is engaging. It should be transparent to the stakeholders what Kelly intended to do and her reasons for doing it. This is so that everyone can move forward on Kelly's behalf and at the same time on behalf of the valued practice concerned. To support this possibility, Kelly has to feel that it is safe for her actions and reasons to be known to others, that in being transparent she is not opening herself to ridicule or harmful retaliation. She must also have relationships with stakeholders in the first place. How can Kelly be accountable if there is nobody who demands accountability from her? Kelly must be able to make moral demands on others and she must have

ways of pressuring and influencing them. But she must also be ready to take responsibility. Kelly must evaluate her own past efforts and consider whether her actions had the intended results. She must make herself part of a social learning process in order to find out how she might see herself and understand her own value and what to do normatively empower herself in the practices she has reason to care about. She is supported in this if her voice is taken seriously and if she is able to have safe and mutually considerate discourse with people who can appreciate what she values.

7.3.5 Supporting self-respecting attitudes requires supporting self-respecting actions

Of course Kelly's self-respect builds upon her positive and constructive beliefs about herself (crediting disposition or attitude), and her sense that there are some practices she is morally free to engage in (the motivation to empoweringly reckon with a practical situation). As well she needs to believe that she has the skills that she in fact has, and have confidence in general in her ability to carry out her plans (self-efficacy). Finally, in terms of attitude or disposition, Kelly's self-respect would be built upon a belief that it makes sense to give an account of oneself to others and to change one's mind in response to compelling or persuasive reasoning from others. While it is crucially important to support these general attitudes in a person so that she may be more likely to respect herself, attitude is but one component. She also needs to have material and social supports that are important independently of how they might also contribute to her attitude. The supports mentioned above: education, exposure to examples, trial and error, access to stakeholders, access to valuable practices, and more, are part of what we need to provide in order to firmly ground her EMP-SR.

7.3.6 Common "levers" of self-respect

I have alluded to the idea that the senses of respect[371] fit quite naturally into EMPR as approaches to reckoning that tend to be effective in the process of normative empowerment. I also suggested that, possibly in connection with these senses, there are conceptual levers that seem to have been effective in making empowerment happen. For example, "autonomy" is a

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[371] Institution, Evaluative, Directive, Obstacle, Care.

concept that we focus on in certain circumstances of respect. It is a recognizable idea in view of which we might select certain technical ways of reckoning with the respected. Similarly with "rights" or "merits/skills" or "vulnerability" or "personal attachments." Now the question is, how does the self-respecter use these and other levers of empowerment? To help us imagine an answer, I offer another story:

> The couple wanted to start a life together, a life that would be celebrated by their friends, family, and coworkers, and a life in which they would do all the important things together—like buying a house, dealing with illness, maybe even raising children. Their journey began simply when they demanded what they thought was their legal right to marry. When the state came back and told them that they did not measure up to the intellectual requirements to be legally married, then they found lawyers to help them to establish that this was a misuse of legal principles. They were intelligent enough to do major life activities and intelligent enough to set up their lives to get the help they needed, so they were surely intelligent enough to have a social-legal contractual bond that made them officially each other's family. When they won their battle and achieved the status of married couple they found that their struggles were not quite over. They needed to shift their focus to their particular needs and how they would be a couple maybe different from the typical couple. They needed at least one person to live with them and to help them to decide many things without taking advantage of them. They weren't always sure how to treat each other and sometimes needed some supervision just in case they became impulsive or confused. Above all they wanted to find ways to rely on each other and not just on these other people. Being dependent upon each other would be very meaningful and they wanted each to have that meaning in the other's life—of being a companion who could help you see the beauty in things. After all they went through to get married, it would have been self-disrespecting for them to have a miserable marriage or to simply be roommates with no influence on one another. Sometimes other people made it hard for them to make something out of their marriage, like when a health aid refused to inform one of them about the nature of the other's illness, or when someone who was supposed to help them make financial decisions ended up stealing from them. Another difficulty was just the pressure to have children and the sense that, at their age, they were just pretending to be married because other people their age were raising young children.

If we try to put ourselves into this story, we see how these levers might be used for the sake of normative power. We cannot give ourselves **"rights"** (say, to legal marriage) pertaining to and attaching to **"status"** (independent adult) but we can demand them and defend them—and this is a common mode of self-respect. Others cannot guarantee that we act in accord with high or adequate **standards** (**merit**) (being kind and responsive to each other's needs), but here we have power not only to strive but to re-define what counts as meritorious (what does it mean to have a good marriage?). Our limitations and the **fragility** of some of our relations (our intellectual limitations and occasional impulsiveness) is something that we should respond to in ways that keep those limitations from interfering with our aims. When we actually do **engage** in practices (make love, fulfill commitments) we should do so in ways that keep those practices alive and

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relevant to us and to others. Sometimes, at extremes, it is important to focus on one's **autonomy**, meaning to choose actions that interpret autonomy in ways that help us to disclose the values we care about (build trusting advisory relationships, take care of one's health). In these cases we must insist on doing things we can be held accountable for and also making choices that are meaningfully our own choices—even when doing so involves giving someone else some authority to decide on our behalf.[372]

In the story above, we are presented with a self-respecting couple (two individuals, each self-respecting as a member of the couple). To engage in a legible practice of family/marriage with one another, they (know that) they need rights, they (know that) they need to be seen as meriting the status for those rights, they (know that) they need also to engage the practice in valuable ways, living up to personal and social standards, which means they need to take care of their particular circumstances and vulnerabilities, as well as manage what it means to me morally responsible for their choices in terms of how they maintain their coupled lives. Both members of the couple *know* they need to make certain claims upon others and that they need to act according to certain standards. They also have some idea about how to do those things (through law, language, and action). So, we would find it oddly self-disrespecting if they were to opt out of such obvious roles in their own empowerment process.

Being an enduringly "self-respecting" person is a work-in-progress. We can see it play out when the person adeptly influences their situation in ways that conduce to their normative power. This may involve fighting for their rights and communicating their dignity to others, or it may involve pursuing a project with single-minded focus, or making the various threads of one's life mutually strengthening when one has the opportunity to do so. A lively self-respecter has a track record of showing people how to better respect her. She proudly stands by what she thinks is valuable and she does what she can to welcome others to appreciate that value.

7.4 Further considerations: What difference does Reflexivity make to EMPR?

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[372] This does not mean that our aim in each case is to get our rights, increase our merit, protect our autonomy, not aggravate our fragility, etc. The idea is that these are common ways we protect our relation to our practices[372]. By focusing on them we make our situations more legible to other people. In turn, we may be able to pressure or inspire others to meet our demands.

This subsection explores two main issues that make self-respect a bit different from respect for others. First, do we have reason to assume that self-respect is easy to support? That the attitudes that would tend toward it and the competencies needed to engage respectfully with oneself are almost natural for us? If so, that would make the analysis of self-respect have a different political and practical role than does the analysis of EMPR. Second, do we really want our concept of self-respect to retain the moral neutrality that we tried to give to our concept of EMPR? How should we think about the "self" that self-respect is trying to advance? Third, what are the implications of thoughts-as-actions for a theory of self-respect? Are thoughts so damaging that it is wrong to think that a relation of self-respect might sometimes coexist with "unhealthy" thoughts about oneself?

7.4.1 Do we really need much from others to support EMP-SR?[373]

Wouldn't the reflexive relationship *itself* normally make it highly *likely* that the individual will already have the respect-advancing attitudes and competencies regarding her own person? Wouldn't it be much more likely, for example, that a person would be good at respecting their own self than that they would succeed in giving respect to almost anyone else? An affirmative answer to this question is implied in "human-nature" driven contract theories (not necessarily Rawls's) and other theories that rest on psychological claims about self-interestedness. Such theories view the individual as naturally and necessarily motivated by self-love—and what needs to be guarded against is the tendency to promote oneself at the expense of others. Yet, just as often it has been pointed out that people are quite prone to misunderstanding their own needs—especially when they are forced to see themselves through the distorting lenses of oppression. These two theses—the one that we are natural self-promoters and the other that

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[373] This section is in part a response to Colin Bird, "Self-Respect and the Respect of Others," which suggests that since self-respect does not always require respect from others, we ought to hesitate to making respect from others (non-humiliation, etc) into a necessary basis for self-respect. My view is that there is something wrong with his argument. While it is important to bring up the idea that there are ideals of self out there that do not require much outside support, the burden of proof is really upon the theorist to convince us that it would be feasible or advisable to raise a society of stoics. For a stoic, little is needed to ground their self-respect; but for the neglected, tortured, imprisoned Stoic there are also very narrow life options, very few practices that can be richly engaged in ways that are expansive and influential on other people.

we are easily confused about our interests—are not mutually exclusive. [374] One can hold as Rousseau seems to have, that there is a human tendency toward "self-love" that in the right environment will direct one to truly empowering choices and—at the same time—that most or all modern environments are not suitable for giving proper direction to this self-love. [375] A third and important thesis rejects the idea that people are driven by injustice to irrational self-destructiveness. Instead, this thesis holds that people remain quite reasonable in their responses to compromising situations. Often it's the situation that's irrational, not the individual who tries to cope with it. At other times the situation is itself misinterpreted in a tragic light by a colonizing mindset that misses the important values enjoyed by those participating in "irrational" and "demeaning" activities. [376] This thesis suggests that people are inventive and opportunistic when it comes to their moral, symbolic, and linguistic environment, and usually are making the best out of a bad situation—rather than being naively self-destructive.

Taking in these three views of human nature and vulnerability to our complex social environments, are we safe in assuming that at least in a "decent" society[377], it would be easier to successfully (EMP) respect oneself than it would to respect a stranger?[378] Yes and no. We may succeed far more often, but when we fail the ramifications can be huge. Why is that? Because, when we fail to respect ourselves we risk scrambling the signals that others so heavily rely upon for knowing how to respect us. Put a doctor or a lay-person together with an injured man and the doctor is more likely to be able to fix the injury—but take the surgeon and the lay person over a lifetime. The surgeon is more likely to "cause" someone's death. We are that surgeon with regard to our own selves—we have a lifetime of chances to screw up. What I mean is that any

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[374] To the extent that there is a deep philosophical disagreement driving these different views of self-regard, I believe it is an agreement between those who consider human nature to be a stable limit and check on various artificial forms of life and those who think that human nature lacks the power to save us from environments that contradict its impulses. One says that people have built-in attunements and preferences for their own flourishing, and these attunements evolved to work quite well in the civilized world. The other says that complex civilization creates ideas and illusions that the human species did not particularly evolve to cope with psychologically.

[375] When faced with institutional, status-based, moral life, people become dangerously malleable in their perceptions of what is in their own best interest.

[376] See Khader, *Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment*.
[377] See Margalit, *The Decent Society*.

[378] By "easier" I mean that there are fewer obstacles—epistemic and practical—to successfully promoting one's own normative power.

single choice we make will be more likely to reverberate through whole process of normative empowerment concerning ourselves. Thankfully, these screw-ups can be remedied (see Dillon on self-forgiveness and SR). The point is that EMPR helps to show why self-respect has to be taken seriously as something that must be supported—and from an angle other than the intrinsic value of autonomy. This view allows for a vision of human nature that sees individual integrity and a workable sense of "self" as more resilient in the face of contradictions than other views imply.[379]

Context is required to develop a conception of EMP-SR suitable for a particular situation, but the following generalizations seem correct: There are three main sorts of acts that amount to failures of self-respect: Self-stigmatization[380], self-isolation[381], and practical-self-sabotage[382]. When one does these things "by accident" on the way to doing other things, then we might say that these are **failures of self-respect**. When one sets out to do these things to oneself or does them out of a sort of deliberate carelessness, then that is **self-*disrespect***. Different feelings and beliefs might accompany these actions. When one feels disgust at the thought of one's identity and rejects it while still inhabiting it, we are in the space of self-stigmatization. One can only act in the world "as…" if one is to be legible in some way to others and oneself. It is sometimes deeply self-respecting and wonderfully radical and socially transforming and progressive to turn these expectations inside out, to reclaim a stigmatized identity, or to refuse an identity.[383] It is when one hates oneself that we are in real trouble.[384] On the "outside" though, this rejection manifests as a deep ambivalence or indifference to one's role in things, to a refusal to participate, etc. A discredited identity can only sully what it touches.

A person might be self-accepting of their most salient inhabited identities, but act in ways that cut them off from people who should matter to them. Allowing yourself to be continually misunderstood by others, or carelessly failing to EMPR those whose participation in shared practices would be beneficial, anything one does that discourages others from taking an interest in one's own projects—even when this does not itself result in a failed engagement—is an act of

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[379] This does not keep contradiction-forcing deprivations from being unjust. See Fraser, *Redistribution or Recognition*?
[380] Corresponds to failure at the level of crediting/appreciation
[381] Corresponds to failures at the level of accountability/advocacy
[382] Corresponds to failures at the level of reckoning.
[383] See Goffman and see Hunt.
[384] See the section below on self-disempowering beliefs and feelings.

self-disrespect at a general level. Lastly, even if one accepts one's salient identities and is good at keeping one's efforts in the sights of others and creating spaces of mutual relevance, one may still act in ways that sabotage the link between short term and longer-term goals. Failing can be very productive, and while failure itself is not self-disrespecting, it is self-disrespecting to head full-speed down dead-end paths, where the most one's friends can do in the end is to pick up the pieces. The self-disrespect[385] domino effect is such that disrespecting oneself in any one of these ways creates a higher chance of coming to disrespect oneself in the other two ways. One may find that one is no longer in the circumstances of self-respect, when one once was. Even if one wants to do something that is not a dead-end or to cultivate good relationships one no longer has the resources to do so. Even if one wants to accept oneself, one no longer has access to evidence that puts who one is into a positive light. No intimates to testify on one's behalf, no contributions to point to.

Clearly, institutions and individuals can contribute to making a person act in self-stigmatizing, self-isolating, or dead-end ways— for example, through temptation (short term benefits for such behavior) or through ignorance about options. We then can say that they are not contributing to —and are in fact detracting from—your bases of self-respect. It is a failure of EMPR to detract from another's bases of self-respect, even if that detraction does not result in their doing anything self-disrespecting.

7.4.2 The "Self" of EMP-SR

It is perhaps deceptively simple to suggest as I have that the preservation of one's own moral personhood is but one of the possible aims of self-respect. After all, Kantian theorists working on autonomy have come to understand "selfhood" as dependent in some way on honoring whatever it is that gives us our moral worth. Indeed, what gives us our moral worth might even be, on some accounts, whatever it is that makes it possible to experience oneself "as" a self. Take EMP-SR to be whatever an individual does (in given circumstances of respect) that involves her successfully in the "process" of her own normative empowerment. The reflexive nature of self-relation will normally mean that a person has quite a different presence (and

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[385] I use the term "disrespect" in a loose sense and not in the strong sense of being an intentional disrespecter.

dominance) in the process of her own normative empowerment than does almost anyone else. Therefore, actions that we take that undermine our *selves*, i.e. the reflexivity of being a self, may well be actions that short-circuit EMP-SR and destroy the very circumstances of *self-to-self* respect. So before insisting upon a broader and less morally laden idea of self-respect (as EMP-SR) it is important to at least briefly consider the reflexive relation that would constitute the "self" of self-respect.

Behind the ambiguity of "self-respect" is more than just the recognition/esteem distinction. Even if an EMPR conception can shift our understanding of the appraisal-recognition account of respect, we also must keep in mind that the "self" of self-respect is complex and contested terrain in philosophy, politics, biology, literature, and beyond. Is there a way to be philosophically responsible for this without becoming overwhelmed? My approach is to look for the notion of "self" that makes the most sense when incorporated into a theory of empowerment respect and then to ask if this idea of "self-respect" is plausible in the Rawlsian context.[386] I will lay out two prima facie plausible focal points for "self" respect: Let's call the "narrower" focus **"valuable selfhood."** That is, there is some political value in the "relationship" between a rational being *and* their own person. That version of self-respect is captured in this passage:

> (a) How could she live with herself if she won, knowing she'd taken the drugs? Her self-respect required that she take herself out of the competition, for if she was a cheater, she'd no longer recognize herself at all.

 What's being promoted is the power to engage the world "as" a self. This might mean, for example, that what's intrinsically important is that we have the power to engage in practices that preserve, rather than threaten, our coherent sense of who we are. The second and "wider" focus I will call **"factual selfhood."** Here is an example to illustrate it:

> (b) No chef worthy of the name would use that cheap salted butter when they could get their hands on this. The chefs who work for us insist on being supplied with high quality ingredients. I'm a self-respecting restauranteur, which is why I only hire self-respecting chefs.

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[386] In order to settle—even provisionally—on what liberal political theory should mean with its references to self-respect I must show why EMPR is the right heuristic anchor for Rawlsian liberal claims utilizing the term "*self*-respect." Whatever "respect" normally means, it might mean something quite different when coupled with the loaded idea of "self." Even assuming it means roughly same thing—efforts to normatively empower ones own person—can liberal claims utilizing notions of the selfhood stand up under the pressure of their own alleged metaphysical neutrality?

In this case, I'm trying to empower a human being who happens to be me. Empowering me "as" a self is only one of the many ways I might be engaged to empower me. In example (b) above, the restauranteur is engaged in empowering herself "as" a restauranteur, and while we can imagine that she takes personal pride in her abilities, we can also imagine that her motivation need not be her own moral integrity, but something more mundane like success in her profession. She might be proud of this success, but we can easily imagine that her orientation to her reflexive self does not hinge upon living up to these professional standards.[387]

Many people reading these examples may sense a difference in urgency. On the one hand we have someone whose reflexive relation to themselves is at stake, while on the other hand we just have someone who wants to succeed at a particular non-moral practice. We seem to have a practice of moral personhood (honesty) compared to a non-moral practice (food culture). This might tempt us to say that the kind of self-respect we should focus on supporting is the former, while the latter can safely be left to sort itself out. I think this would be a mistaken reduction of self-respect to a moral mode.

For example, let us consider this claim: *Martha failed to respect herself when she ghost-wrote that terrible man's autobiography.* How precisely did she fail herself? Well, those focused on "valuable selfhood" might contend that she went against her own core values and made it harder to live with herself.[388] But, let's say she is quite proud of her choice because it allowed her to put all her children through college. Moreover, this caused her to change her idea of her core values. Martha was glad she did not risk their financial security for the sake of her political principles. On this basis, because Martha's relationship to her (ideal of) herself is secure, she has not disrespected herself (here, it is the loss of the motivation for self-relation—the loss of moral self-esteem—that is to be guarded against). The point I'm driving at here is not one of moral self-esteem itself. The point is that when one believes that one is living up to one's self-ideal then one does not have one's reflexive self in danger. If one has moral self-esteem, then it would seem that one's reflexive self is secure. But there is more to being a normatively empowered self than the security of trusting in one's own judgment. Reducing self-respect to actions that support one's own self-trust does not fit with so well with empowerment respect. We cannot judge

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[387] See Thomas Hill for a similar idea ("Self-Respect Reconsidered," 22).
[388] See Arendt on Socrates' need to maintain himself as two-in-one in Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations."

Martha's act simply by how she experiences it internally with regard to her own self-image. Surely if the act destroyed her constructive self-image we'd have to question, from an empowerment-perspective, whether it was self-respecting; but the defining standard is not limited to her security or comfort in her own skin. The aim of EMPR describes a different standard for judging acts as self-respecting—though one equally in line with common sense: *how did Martha's choice to ghost-write the autobiography affect her legible identity, her possibility of taking future valuable actions, others' ability to know how to empower her to do valuable things, and so on.* Did Martha make it, on the whole, harder for herself to engage with specific valuable practices? In evaluating the respectfulness of someone's choices with regard to her own self, EMPR asks us to look at how those choices support her power to be involved in values that she has reason to care about. Those "values" extend well beyond the value of one's own conscience or one's own sense of moral worth, however important these may be.

Many rightly maintain that self-respect is a particularly important "kind" of respect, but we must remind ourselves that the self is not an object—it is not an entity.[389] And it is the entity who is the focus and the recipient of any "type" of EMPR. Selfhood is a relation and dimension of life for *some* entities—and of course it is a relation that is central to maintaining the entity's own experience of physical and emotional (and spatial and temporal) one-ness or integrity.[390] Thus, EMP-self-respect ought not to be thought of as EMPR for the self as if the self was a discrete and independent entity (a stance subtly implied by those who conflate selfhood with moral personhood). Instead EMPR is a relation of respect where the one who receives respect is one's own person.

Even when its focus is on "valuable selfhood," EMP-SR remains a relation that bears upon other relations. Self-respect shares this with other special relations of respect. For example, if I want to respect Olivia "as" a sister, my main focus may be to empower her to be a good sister. But if I am her sister, that aim will often enough call on me to use our sisterhood itself to help to bring about her normative power "as…" a chef, a mother, an athlete, a friend, an

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[389] Selfhood is an emergent property.

[390] But we can't forget that integrity can be posited for people and other entities for whom a sense of self is not among their psychological tools.

appreciator of sunsets, etc. If I fail to make our sisterly relationship a support for other things that matter to Olivia, then I reduce the value of that sisterhood *for* Olivia. Olivia, my sister, is the one who engages valuably with the relevant practices—she is a vibrant human being who also happens to be my sister; but, clearly, her practical engagements are a tapestry strengthened by her various relations, not the least of which is "sisterhood." It is the same with one's own self. The one empowered by my "self-respect" is the human being (in this case, me) who is better able to engage valuably in certain practices thanks to actions affirmatively taken (in this case) by me. If I want a strong and healthy relationship with me, I need to treat myself not just as a valuable self, but as a valuable mother, citizen, and television-watcher.[391]

Let's think briefly about some possible dimensions of "being" a self. One of those dimensions is the "reflective."[392] Those of us who are *self*-conscious, live with an awareness of a relationship so intimate, so intense, so "inescapable" that it deserves a name as much as sisterhood or marriage does. We relate to our own person as, we might say, *the only one who is able to relate to us "as" our own person*[393]. Sometimes respect for my person requires that I take the actions needed to preserve that particular sort of intimacy. This is what people are referring to, I believe, when they talk about losing moral esteem for themselves and why we bind this up in the vocabulary of respect.[394] As essential as this relationship of trust with one's own reflective nature is, that is but one possible avenue for self-respect. This is because reflectiveness is but one mode of being a self. The "self" is also one's own physical body and the sensations and desires one feels as sources of urgency. The "self" is one's social position, one's legible identity, one's cultural tastes, one's language—one's avenues for making sense of one's own person and being "somebody".[395]

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[391] It matters (to me) that the relationship I have with myself is strengthened by my own competence and good-will in favor of my social power and fundamental interests.

[392] Seigel, *The Idea of the Self. Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century*, See chapter 1.

[393] The only one who is able to relate to us as "the one who knows what it's like to be me"

[394] It is what Socrates is talking about—and what Hannah Arendt discusses—about the need we have to be able to think and converse with ourselves as a trusted witness and judge to our deeds and beliefs.

[395] These ideas are essentially taken from Seigel. Similar tripartite selfhood can of course be found in Plato – the reflexive self is the "reasoned" and the bodily self is the "appetitive" and the social self is the prideful. The problem with these modalities is that it is easy to confuse them with the corresponding modality of individual human

A conception of EMP-SR is going to be broadly concerned with how one's own actions, moral or otherwise, advance one's ability to disclose values through practices (one's normative power). Self-respecting acts are those that *support* one's own normative power – one's power to act in the world, to engage with valuable practices, and to validate and create values together with others.[396] If self-respect is important (more important than other "kinds" of respect) then it is because there is something important about *my success* in empowering my own person. While it is tempting to hone in on the special experience of self-identification (and the moral self-esteem indicative of a satisfactory "sense" of self), EMPR helps to show that we are better off taking a broader approach to reflexivity and its political importance. As appealing as might be to hold that the political value of self-respect is rooted in the value we place on selfhood, this is ultimately too narrow a ground, ignoring the various ways there are of "being" reflexively one's own.

7.4.3 EMP-SR and Disempowering Thoughts

A point carried over from EMPR to EMP-SR was that one can be in circumstances of respect with another even if the prospective respecter does not value the prospective object of respect. You can EMPR those you do not think highly of (though it's unlikely you can EMPR those for whom you have contempt). For example, the person who helps to maintain the moment of silence of a prayer is, by that very action, respecting those who are engaging in the prayer, *regardless* of the thoughts running through her head about the futility of praying. This behavior really does help those in prayer, though the person helping might not make themselves fully

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existence. What would make the body a modality of selfhood is just that aspect of being a body that can be "read" as responding to and for itself or as driving a way of relating that coordinates its different biological functions into some system of survival that establishes the desires that individuate the entity. A social modality of selfhood is that social, historical, cultural aspect of identity creation that, again, ties into the subject's agency or "subjectivity" or how their thoughts of themselves become part of what animates their existence. Reflexive relation is at the bottom of all of these, but not necessarily self-conscious (as in conscious of "having" a self). So, the bodies of sentient beings put them into some kind of reflexive relation; social life creates another kind of reflexive relation; and reflecting on the experience of "being" one's own self gives rise to another sort of reflexive relation (of autonomy, for instance).

[396] As I noted earlier, it is not really necessary that the entity be rational in order to be able to act respectfully toward herself. Rationality does seem to be necessary for someone to value EMPR and be an intentional self-respecter—someone for whom being self-respecting (EMPR) is part of their own self-ideal.

available in the process of empowerment for religious individuals. *But* the sufficiency of merely "behavioral" respect does not hold when it comes to self-respect. While EMP-SR does not require that the agent to have primarily *lively (strong, passionate)* pro-self feelings, it severely hampers the process of normative empowerment when the individual's mind is dominated by self-dismissing or self-loathing thoughts. After all, it *hurts* to hear oneself constantly berated and insulted. Others might be able to hide such thoughts from you and behave respectfully toward you (at least for a time), but you cannot but be the audience to your own thoughts. It undermines one's motivation and it confuses one's judgment to listen to self-insults, even when the self takes no action expressive of those thoughts.

I've just said that a person's own thoughts can do unique harm to their engagement in the process of empowerment. No doubt such thoughts can derail self-respect, but I want to argue that one can contribute to one's own normative empowerment even while under this mental strain. For example, imagine someone who is so angry at themselves that they almost don't care what happens to them. They've betrayed someone or failed in some unconscionable way, or they harbor an inexplicable deep psychological animosity toward their own person. But this same person feels a debt of loyalty to their friends and family and, as a rule they are able to conduct themselves in ways that keep important doors open to them so as not to cause these loved-one's misery. My contention is that such a person who continues to conduct themselves in ways that keep doors open is acting with self-respect. Even if they do it "for the sake of" friends and family, so long as they are deliberately behaving in normatively empowering ways toward themselves they are really in a relation, however tenuous, of respect with themselves.[397] Their respect for themselves is on shakier ground than it would be if they had the *pro-self* feelings (and to be dispositional self-respecters those feelings must be developed), but this self-respect is a possibility for them in spite of the missing *pro-self* feelings. As with EMPR, all that is required is that there is a perspective accessible to the respecter that would see the entity respected in an affirming and positive light in relation to the practice for which they might be empowered. The prospective-respecter may not have adopted this perspective, but from the outside we can see that it is available to her and legible to her...essentially it is "up to her" to adopt it or to go along

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[397] In this I think I agree with David Sachs, that self-respect and self-esteem are separable, though he is not careful to allow that self-respecting acts can include much more than acting in accord with one's equal moral standing.

with those who have. Insofar as she keeps that possibility open, she is respecting herself though she might also (at least for a time) detest herself.

If antipathy for self can coexist (at least for a time) with EMP-SR, it is also true that self-love can coexist and even contribute to failures of EMP-SR. Compare these -

> I feel total apathy about my own future and nothing really gives me pleasure, but I know that if I really let myself go it will hurt a lot of people who rely on me. For their sake I strive to meet my responsibilities and I keep doing the things I used to love.

> All I could think about was how free I would feel. I just wanted to taste the wind in my teeth and nothing else really mattered. Screw my boss. Screw helmets. It was exhilarating, it was pure joy, it was the happiness I knew I deserved. And then I woke up in the hospital and out of a job.

There is an important link between the feeling of oneself as valuable and good and one's basic capacity to empower oneself. But, just as with other-esteem and other-respect, it is not a *necessary* link. There are people who feel great about themselves and fail when it comes to EMP-SR; there are people who feel pretty terrible about themselves but who understand what must be done to insure the vitality of their social position. Think about the depressed person who takes the steps needed to get help, or the constitutionally self-depreciating person who drives herself hard and enjoys many aspects of her achievements. Think, in contrast, about the person who is satisfied and at ease with themselves, but who acts recklessly and fails to pay attention to issues that might really affect them in the future. Just as David Sachs observed, the ease with which we can come up with such examples tells of a meaningful separation between actions that normatively empower oneself and the positive feelings that may or may not accompany such actions.[398] We might say, with the two examples just mentioned, that in the first case the feelings are missing but the ideas of worth are operative in the decision-making. In the second case the feelings are there, but they are not attached to the right ideas—the person intellectually misses what it would be consistent for them to do, given their own hopes and dreams. But these are not symmetrical cases. In the first case the person really does give respect to herself; in the second case the person who loves himself, nevertheless fails to respect himself. Someone who wants to experience exhilarating adventures should want to do this without messing up their lives.

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[398] Sachs, "The Difference Between Self-Respect and Self-Esteem."

Doubtless, neither situation is ideal. One does not want self-confidence at the price of ignorance, nor does one want to settle for responsibility toward self without the feelings of joy and love—or at least basic approval—for oneself. What we hope for people is that they find nurturing and expansive ways to pursue their goals and meet their commitments. We hope that any decent person can actually *enjoy* feeling like a good and decent person when they have done good and decent things.

Can self-"humiliation" be empowering?

Periods of self-doubt can be transformative or they can be wasteful. Pro-self beliefs and feelings are so important for our possibility of disclosing values and participating in the world, but such reflexive attitudes work in subtle ways that are certainly difficult to pin down. On the one hand it seems that only the most extreme (and uncommon) cases of self-alienation[399] are easy to recognize as dis-empowering for the self. No good can come of these feelings and thoughts and one must only try to wait them out. But what about people who cultivate a kind of "hatred" and "shame" about their human nature and sinfulness? I am thinking about Augustinian Christians who took self-loathing to particularly fabulous heights. We may not relate to their values, but we must acknowledge that negative beliefs about the self were part of their process of engaging with what they cared about. Some who want above all to focus on helping others and to focus on non-material goods will cultivate a kind of contempt for their desires, divorce themselves from those desires, and achieve monastic virtues.

Self-ideals, doubt, and EMP-SR

We know that with dear friends there are times when being disruptive to the friend's self-ideal can be challenging in a good way. It might be just what they need. Or it can be cruel. It is challenging in a good way if it feeds productively into the process of normative empowerment— disclosing more of our potential to those with whom we interact; cruel if it feeds into a cycle of

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[399] In some cases we might say the biochemical is political. Depression and other situations that are characterized by cruel thoughts toward oneself or apathy about oneself might be mental illnesses; however, there are links between illness and the stress of having low status (see Marmot, *Status Syndrome*).

isolation, stigma, or failure. If we are going to push our friend (or our fellow citizen) out of the metaphorical helicopter and challenge them to let go of longstanding ideals, we ought to make sure they have a parachute. The process of normative empowerment depends upon there being specific practices and values with which people reasonably want to engage. The most salient practices will be the ones most closely tied to our self-image. These are the areas in which it will really be a blow if we are excluded or if we fail (whether due to a lack of social support or to our own choices). But it is also possible to experience failure in a positive way and to leave practices behind when they no longer spark our imagination. People get divorced, change careers, and leave religions. How can failure and radical self-review be handled in an empowering way? Modern ("Western") relations to /notions of/experiences of self may be more psychologically taxing than they were during earlier times. Many of us (see Taylor) experience the "self" as something we uniquely forge and are responsible for—even if we intellectually believe otherwise (see Freud)! We want to and need to take responsibility and credit for "who" we are, but we also know that who we are is a product of many things outside of our control—and we are not quite clear about how to balance these two facts. This puts many of us in a difficult position, facing some kind of historically-produced contradiction in our one of our deepest experiences. One might find it useful to cultivate a certain "persona" because doing so allows one to have the joy of participating in a valuable endeavor. But that persona—or mask—might be in deep conflict with an equally important aspect of oneself. A politician becomes a joyfully adept competitor, but knows they are starving a tender and trusting part of themselves. This sort of conflict may, with luck or effort, be faced to the point of reaching a higher resolution and a deeper and more powerful sense of what one cares about, or it might drag someone into disorganized denial and what we sometimes call "inauthenticity"—leading them to react in a shortsighted way to the problems they face, and suffer from failures to carefully protect their core interests.

The self-respecter has an additional responsibility that is only perhaps shared by those closest to her. While others may intersect with us only in one particular context – perhaps at school or at our child's parties or when we are driving around town—it is different with ourselves. With ourselves we must keep in mind that the way we "see" ourselves over here is going to have an impact on how we advocate for ourselves over there. The way we reckon with ourselves there is going to influence how we see and reckon with ourselves here. So, while it's true that the self-respecter should not be thought of as focused only on the value of "selfhood" it

is also true that to be fully self-respecting one must avoid contradictions in one's various modes of engaging with practices. One must find ways of crediting, reckoning, and accounting for oneself in one practice that do not impinge on the ways one will need to credit, reckon with, and account for oneself in another practice. One must find ways of engaging one practice that do not denigrate one's engagement with another practice. And when one advocates for oneself especially, one must make it clear that one wants support that will free one of such conflicts as much as possible.

7.5 Conclusion

Does the identity of the respecter with the respected result in any difference in how we conceive of the *process* of empowerment in which the self-respecter is engaged? Even when we take into account the different role that beliefs and thoughts play for the self, I don't think there is a difference. EMP-SR just is a species of EMPR. It is the same process: The respecter must give credit to the entity—must recognize her as able to participate and to disclose values, the respecter must become aware of a chance to support this ability and must reckon with such a chance in a competent way that really does enhance or maintain the normative power of the individual. The respecter must be willing to review and critique and take accountability for how she has seen and interpreted the respected's situation, and to do this "publicly" in a way that makes the respected more legible to others. At every stage the respecter will not be a lone agent. The self-respecter interacts with institutions in which there are other agents, listens to other points of view, observes other respecters and hones skills relevant to helping secure herself a valuable place.

Just being one's own respecter does not cut out the need for the "middle man" of shared accountability for norms, witnesses of those close to you, and evidence of success. EMP-SR demands that we take our judgment to be fallible with regard to our own best possibilities for engagement in the world. If, at times, we seem to be the "authority" on how best to empower ourselves, we are still accountable to others for this self-treatment. We are accountable both within and beyond respect's central aims and contexts. Beyond those aims, we are accountable to those concerned with our happiness, and aspects of our lives that overlap with but are not

identical to normative power. Across "competing" circumstances of respect, as well, we are accountable to those who do not share our priorities with regard to which kinds of empowerment we seek. We may see ourselves as making an innocuous tradeoff of social power in one context for the sake of another, but they might see this as a mistake in broader terms and to them the tradeoff might be a regrettably demeaning compromise that we should not make.[400]

Despite the complications, we can see that EMPR for others will usually involve concern with their self-respect. If the individual cannot see herself engaging in anything worthwhile, is unwilling or unable to reckon with herself in empowering ways, and refuses to or is unable to advocate that others respect her, then obviously something has gone terribly wrong. But something has also gone wrong if she has to strain to see herself engaging in something worthwhile, or if the ways she does reckon with her standing are shameful to her, or if she must pay a huge personal cost to advocate for herself. In the next chapter we will turn back to Rawls's "justice as fairness" and consider what EMPR and EMP-SR imply, when it comes to how "justice as fairness" supports self-respect.

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[400] And even from within specific circumstances of respect, as a participant in respecting ourselves "as…", we are accountable to those who also want to see us respected "as…" , but who interpret the situation differently…..For instance, an elder relative may think that we shortchange ourselves when we cultivate an important relationship in a direction that causes us to give up a nascent career pursuit. The relative may have a perspective that sees how well situated we were to make something out of that nascent opportunity—and how we were at the perfect moment in our lives to do so. They may believe from experience that we are passing up something singular, while we see things much less seriously, caught up as we are in youthful dreaming.

Chapter 8 – Empowerment Self-Respect and "Justice as Fairness"

8.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter finally returns us to Rawls and RawlsSR. Rawls claims that self-respect is a fundamental need and that the social bases of self-respect is the main or "most important" primary good. Rawls argues that his politically liberal conception of justice, *justice as fairness* (*"JF"*),[401] is preferable to utilitarian and other liberal conceptions in part because *"JF"* uniquely secures self-respect through the two principles and their publicity. It is perhaps the frightening possibility expressed by Milosz (quoted in chapter 7) that makes the role of self-respect in a Rawlsian theory justice so crucial, and yet so difficult to pin down. We are plastic, but we are also brittle. We can adapt to standards and self-ideals that would astonish our former selves (for better or worse), we can *revise* our conception of the good to suit changing circumstances or a particular political order. But, really, when we know life through a select fragile number of relationships and learned practices and habits, what distortions can we undergo and still hope to emerge a "self-respecting" citizen?

This dissertation's search for a consistent concept and theory of respect was partly motivated by a desire to make the discussions of self-respect themselves less ad-hoc and morally circular by giving them a basis in a robustly worked-up concept of respect. My hope was that a deep dive into the conceptualization of respect for entities might bring up new resources that could help us connect the various dimensions of respect and a corresponding conception of self-respect. What emerged was an account of Empowerment Respect, the process of Empowerment, and a related conception of EMP-SR. Perhaps if RawlsSR is understood under an empowerment

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[401] "[O]ne practicable aim of justice as fairness is to provide an acceptable philosophical and moral basis for democratic institutions and thus to address the question of how the claims of liberty and equality are to be understood" (JFR, 5). Justice as fairness presents itself as a possible focus of a reasonable overlapping consensus (JFR, 12).

conception, it can be used more decisively in applications of the theory and, moreover, seen as evidence and expression of *"JF"* at its best.

To replace RawlsSR with EMP-SR (or, if preferred, to think of RawlsSR "as" EMP-SR) involves a subtle shift in thinking, but one that I think is needed. Securing self-respect is not to be equated with securing basic self-confidence either in our moral personhood or in our efficacy. Rather, we will be trying to secure for one another, the kinds of relations that give us normative power in the practices we care about.[402] Whether or not such an alteration in Rawls's theory turns out to be truly workable in Rawls's framework, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.[403] But, I do believe that the attempt to face up to the complexity of respect and self-respect has potentially constructive implications for Rawls's theory. As Rawls maintains, "JF"'s definition of moral personhood and its idea and ideal of public reason are to guide our conception of the "good" or "ideal" citizen. My understanding of self-respect offers a point of view from which we can see that the honorable status of "citizen" should be revisited with some skepticism. It seems that, in certain key cases, a weakening in the SBSR occurs precisely at the intersection of "citizen" and "individual" under standard Rawlsian liberalism. Vulnerabilities in the SBSR are more visible under an Empowerment conception, than under simple RawlsSR. When we accept this vulnerability for what it is, we find we have pretty good reasons to alter our interpretation of "JF." What follows is a brief sketch of the direction in which I would like to take these ideas.

8.2 Replacing RawlsSR with EMP-SR

> *The social bases of self-respect are those aspects of basic institutions that are normally essential if citizens are to appreciate their own potential, know how to reckon with it, and be effective advocates on their own behalf, all in the context of democracy and reasonable pluralism.* [404]

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[402] To the extent that our success in securing our normative power (our ability to engage valuably in socially legible practices) is enhanced by (or even depends on) psychological factors, then social institutions ought, other things equal, to advance such outcomes, together with the other outcomes that contribute to our success. Likewise social institutions must avoid giving rise to the barriers, social, psychological, and material, to each of us playing a normatively empowering role in our own lives.

[403] I want to suggest ways it seems workable, but I understand that it would require another book to lay this out and defend it properly.

[404] This statement playfully transforms Rawls's from (*Collected Papers*, 366)

EMPR is a complex and dynamic account of respect that is also morally neutral. It does not presuppose any particular set of values or concept of personhood and yet it does have a structure that allows us to recognize aspects of practices that contradict the process of normative empowerment. The adaptation of Rawls's quote with which this subsection begins shows that some level of specificity can be delivered by EMP-SR. Let's revisit RawlsSR and ask how we would evaluate Rawls's arguments about supporting SR when we consider it in this way as an empowerment conception. Does it leave us with the same blind spots about Rebecca and Destiny? Or does it invite some different interpretation of the results of the "original position," one that might help PL address these difficult issues?

In chapter one I presented two examples of people who do not seem to be well-served in terms of the SB of RawlsSR. First, there was Rebecca, the mother and guardian of Tyler, an adult with severe cognitive disabilities. Second, there was Destiny, a citizen with strong affiliations to a religious group with illiberal interpretations of morality and justice. As we imagine them, both Rebecca and Destiny face choices that are, on the surface, personal and independent of their lives as citizens. If we are trying to ground their sense of moral equality and their belief that they can achieve good things, it might not stand out that they are poorly supported in being able to hold these beliefs. Yet, even when considering Rebecca and Destiny from an unreconstructed Rawlsian point of view, there were serious doubts. The doubts seemed to resonate with Robin Dillon's claims about the special nature of Estimative Self-Respect. Yet, it was hard to see how moral self-appraisals—shaped by so many specific relationships and histories—could be protected without veering into territory too morally thick for political liberalism.[405]

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[405] If we think that Rebecca and Destiny are cornered into making choices that undermine their self-respect, those choices seem awfully hard to disentangle from the very freedoms and liberties that are themselves essential supports for RawlsSR. But what happens when we imagine we are seeking the social bases for EMP-SR? In both cases the social bases of SR that Rawls offers, while vague in their support for Rawls SR, are more clearly inadequate for EMP-SR. a person who can be isolated in her plan of life and subject to failure and possibly stigma just in doing something most would be expected to do. What we were looking for was an account of respect that could help us to appreciate both the range and the limits of activities and attitudes that might be required in the name of SR. EMPR shifted the focus from respect as a way of seeing the other (and the self) to respect as a way of being engaged with the other (the self). There are many sorts of relations and respect had to be a particular kind that nevertheless takes many forms. We argued that we ought to think of respect as a way of engaging with someone with a view to supporting or enhancing their normative power. Normative power meant the power to valuably engage in practices

8.2.1 Supporting EMP-SR for Rebecca

Let's try to imagine Rebecca in Rawls's well-ordered society, where institutions are constrained by the demand that they at least support each person's capacity to develop discernment in their plans of life and a sense of reciprocal justice. The economic and legal system is meant to maximize the distribution of goods useful to people who have two moral powers, with the highest possible "minimum" for the least advantaged. So, Rebecca should have stronger claims on education, healthcare, and other opportunities than what we are currently used to seeing in the U.S. context of the 21st century. And as we are at liberty, so is Rebecca, to move about and associate with whom she pleases, to speak her mind, and so on. Yet, as Eva Kittay and others have argued, someone like Rebecca hasn't any particularly strong grounds for claiming that her fellow citizens maximize social support *for her son*, so that he may live in a way that expands his horizons and reveals his humanity.[406] After all, Tyler is not seen as a "contributor" and his perspective seems to be missing from the arrangements we agree to in the "original position." Even while taking at face value Rawls's vague RawlsSR it seemed plausible that Rebecca has less stable supports for SR, given the marginality of Tyler to the justice project, and yet it was hard to make a clear case about it. EMP-SR allows us to see the unjust distribution for Rebecca and Tyler more clearly and also, I think, to see the potential validity of what would otherwise seem to be a pretty radical way to address it. Let me explain.

Rebecca's "reckoning" problem

that the individual cares about or has some strong reason to care about. So this sort of engagement with the other (and the self) requires attunement at the level of valuing (appreciation, reputation), at the level of reckoning (observantia, fulfilling duties related to station) and at the level of accounting (reflecting on the outcome responsibly and initiating changes). Moreover, the self-respecter doesn't just appreciate her value over here, reckon with her concrete roles over there , and take account of consequences yonder. Her self-appraisal finds expression in related kinds of reckoning and she is able to reflectively account for impacts on her values as affected by those very self-appraisals and roles. To sever the possibility of a productive dynamic in these three domains is to harm her in the bases of EMP-SR.

[406] Furthermore, Kittay points out that we need a way to empower someone like Tyler for his own sake and not for Rebecca's sake.

With Rebecca we see that the full embrace of citizenship would imply favoring plans that preserve flexibility, grounded in cooperation with empowered others. But to choose to care for someone who lacks protection is neither a flexible nor a promising arrangement. It seems that such a choice is a failure of SR from the perspective of various domains. One is choosing isolation over connection, failure over success, stigma over acceptance – all for the sake of one practice—parenting. If this were an idiosyncratic choice or the product of poor deliberation we would level those criticisms against the accountable parent and her influential intimates. But instead we don't seem to find anyone who would be in a good position to empower the parent. If only her child was less disabled, then she'd be more free to reap the benefits of this just society. This limits Rebecca to quite a fragmented participation in her own normative power. Her intentions to parent are valued, and nobody blames her personally for failing. She is expected to forgive herself for being unable to contribute fully. Which basically amounts to no solution at all. Nonjudgmental fellow citizens do not thereby support your EMP-SR. Troubled by Rebecca's frustrated attempts to care for Tyler and for herself, we can see that Rawls's putting off of issues of disability actually undermines a primary part of his theory. We can see that this really is an issue of SBSR and not simply of personal luck when we see the threats of stigma, isolation, and failure that arise from the political justification of Tyler's status as a charity case. His status as a charity case is directly related to the idea that the two moral powers are the aim of political personhood status.

We can assume that Rebecca is involved in several practices she has reason to care about. As we know, she cares for Tyler, but before that she pursued things of great interest to her, that required dedication and skill on her part. We can expect that she cares about certain friendships, about certain causes of justice, about certain features of the natural environment, and that she wants as much as possible for these various cares to cohere. But her most salient relationship is to Tyler. All the other activities are only valuable as long as they don't take away from that relationship. To go to a rally, for example, and really engage in what is valuable about that rally, requires that she find care for Tyler. The more stressful it is to find that care, the more tenuous that care is, and the more financially punishing it is, the less it will seem "worth" it for Rebecca to engage in things she once found valuable. Rebecca could, of course, choose to "do it all" at a frantic and stretched pace; however, this will lower quality of her engagement with the practices she values – and make her essentially less valuable to those very practices. Rebecca often has to

turn down invitations and opportunities. The narrower her life becomes, the less associational support she can tap, the fewer connections to the world she and Tyler have, the less secure Tyler's life is, the more worried Rebecca is that she is failing Tyler, and so on. EMPR allows us to see what Rebecca and Tyler are deprived of when Tyler is considered to have only marginal and conditional claims on his fellow citizens. Much more can be said about the specialness of these kinds of relationships and why it is important to focus on them particularly when talking about justice, but let me move on to the idea of the demands this puts on *"JF"*.

We can see that there may be many practical domains in which Rebecca would be in a good position to act self-respectingly (EMP-SR). For example, let's say she enjoys birdwatching. She has some ideas about this valuable practice and she knows that she is capable in theory of honoring it (bringing out good things in it for herself and others). She knows the specific procedures that are appropriate to bird-watching and she has a critical sensibility that allows her to critically reflect on her role in the practice and the social understanding of the practice, once she has had time to participate. But with birdwatching, as with any other practice outside of the home that she might want to be involved in, she cannot get into the position to really engage it. She needs time, she needs patience, and she needs psychological security to be able to focus her attention on doing what a "good" birdwatcher does. The range of what *she* can self-respectingly engage is narrowed by the poor options available to Tyler for his care. Let me put it a different way. EMP-SR reveals its connection to EMPR. Rebecca's fellow citizens, as such, are in circumstances of respect with her. They can use law, entitlements, rights, etc. to make it easier, rather than harder, for Rebecca to care well for Tyler (according to standards that Rebecca has reason to agree with). But their understanding of justice—a system of social cooperation that expresses the mutual respect of moral reasoners—casts this possibility as an act of charity, rather than an act of true respect (EMPR) for Rebecca and Tyler as citizens.

Making Tyler politically visible

With an EMPR and EMPR-SR view we can more readily see that parties in the "Original Position" should worry seriously about the relation between disability (severe physical and cognitive) and the social bases of self-respect. Some additional assurance or change must be

made that would be acceptable, or else the parties will not choose "JF". "JF" is most strongly characterized by the priority of the first over the second principle, together with Fair Equality of Opportunity. Can this be interpreted in ways that leave it recognizable while improving it in relation to Rebecca's expectations?

Is there an answer to the lower SBSR for Rebecca that is not ad-hoc? Let me sketch a possibility. "Justice as fairness" needs a "wall" between the concept of the moral person in the "Original Position" and that of the moral person to be served by justice. Each actual person should be seen as being represented by someone intent upon making sure their charge is *seen* as a legitimate subject of justice (fully moral in the sense of status). This allows that, incapacitated by depression or mental disability, cognitive impairment or even sever physical impairment, justice must come out so that my representative can put me forward as deserving of an equal effort[407] of normative empowerment through the institutions we share. My passport to deserving to be served by the institutions cannot be that I *demonstrate the capacity* for (or once had) the two moral powers; rather, the passport is simply that I would perish if I was not included[408]. My representative would first choose that I would have the means *normally central* to normative power – and those means are indeed the developed two moral powers. The reason for this is that it is far easier to get uptake and fit into various practices when one can abide by fair terms of cooperation (thus win trust and be seen as reliable) and when one can adopt and express one's idea of the good life and adapt it to various circumstances. So the two moral powers remain important, but their protection must be interpreted in a way that fulfills this proviso: any human being ruled over by these laws has a right to benefitting from them "on her own cognitive terms." At the legislative or perhaps even the constitutional stage, then, institutions that otherwise protect the two moral powers, must be further interpreted so as to be inclusive of those lacking them— not as an afterthought, but as a rule of justice itself.

Again, this rule of justice would be derived, on my argument, from the importance of securing social bases for self-respect. Certain kinds of dependency relations put us at an unreasonable risk for losses in self-respect, under JF as it is typically conceived. When our

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[407] Not necessarily equal results.

[408] By contrast, most animals neither particularly want to be included in our community nor would they die if they were not included. This is a very rough formulation and there is probably a better way to put it.

"choice" to take care of another (or even of oneself) must be one that increases our own stigma, isolation, and failure, we are actually failing to EMP-SR ourselves. We are doing things that make it harder for us to disclose values through practices. Very often we should be held personally responsible for those choices. The person who respects us would enter into the process of normative empowerment by advising us to change course, by constructively criticizing our self-destructive choice, or by increasing our sense of shame at that choice in order to motivate us to change our ways. (Think about interventions into drug addiction.) But imagine someone doing this to Rebecca? We are rightly disgusted by the thought of someone *criticizing* Rebecca for choosing to care for her son. The basic structure of our society sends a damaging and disrespectful mixed message here. Family is good, loyalty is good, unconditional love is good… as long as it's for the right sort of person.

Now imagine, by contrast, that the public political culture was committed (in the public acceptance of political liberalism in some form) to the idea that Tyler must be empowered by our institutions—even though the ways we "reckon" with Tyler might be much harder to understand. Now it is Rebecca and those who love Tyler—or even a state representative for Tyler—who have at their disposal public reasons (thus legitimated grounds) for insisting that Tyler himself receive EMPR. Tyler must be related to in ways that support his capacity to engage valuably in the practices that he has reason to care about. It is no longer enough to espouse appreciation for Tyler's special uniqueness or to refuse to blame Rebecca should Tyler or Rebecca flounder. Now Rebecca has a clear claim of justice upon her fellow citizens that they work to imagine a meaningful role Tyler can play in the practices he has reason to value. Moreover, with this claim of justice Rebecca has new ways to respect herself. With meaningful social support in Tyler's care, she must now must be accountable for whether or not she is pursuing the range of things that matter to her, and whether or not she is taking good enough care of herself. With meaningful political equality for Tyler, she also can fight on his behalf and be seen as expressing the highest values of a citizen in doing so, rather than the values of an interest group.

Whatever the merits of my particular proposal, the larger point is this. By making EMP-SR important as an ideal and as a primary good, Rawlsian theorists commit themselves to examining even basic aspects of the theory. Namely, how the idea of the moral person itself might influence EMP-SR. The loss of supports for EMP-SR for Rebecca is traceable,

paradoxically, to the disproportionate emphasis Rawls gives to the two moral powers. It is not right to treat the preference for the fullest possible development of these moral powers as justification for which kinds of citizens we support and which ones we treat as marginal to justice.

8.2.2 Supporting EMP-SR for Destiny[409]

In Destiny's case, there is an unmet need to have her religious experience converge with her desire to be a participating liberal citizen. Destiny is free to carry on, if she is willing to submit to the constraints upon girls that are part of her religious practice. She faces some threats as a minor that she might be removed from her community, which, rather than creating leverage for her within that community, create an urgent incentive to comply with their norms so as not to call attention to the punitive practices that would result from sinfulness on her part. The legal protection that the state gives to Destiny may be appropriate, but it is justified in terms that do

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[409] A version of Destiny's story: Destiny, a devout "Seeker," had been immersed in a Seekerist community since she was adopted at two. She was deeply proud of her people's traditions and felt at home with most of their rituals and practices. She grew up with the message that Seekers were not modern and were basically out of place in the liberal society that tolerated their existence. Destiny's education met the standards for public curricula and she had a chance, growing up, to get to know people outside of her religious community. But, as Destiny got older, she started to see that her idea of duty, family, and role was marginal and even shocking to those on the outside. As a the youngest female of her siblings, Destiny believed that she was fated to carry on the tradition through poverty (total economic dependence on the community) and leadership in meditation, and that her sexual purity must be maintained for her lifetime. Should she for any reason stray from this role, the community expected her to undergo a very dangerous rite of penitence—two weeks in solitary confinement with only water to drink. She had known other girls, especially those in their teens, to go through this "voluntary" rite. While some chose to leave the community, those who did the rite would occasionally die. Their deaths marked them as a kind of re-born saint and kept their memory clean in the eyes of the community, so for many it was a gamble worth taking.
     When fellow citizens determined that this practice was putting too many teenage Seekers at risk, social services started to take young female Seekers away from family members and put them into non-Seekerist homes. This outraged the community, which doubled-down and raised the purity standards for youngest daughters—as if to show the outside world that they would not be intimidated.
     Caught in the middle of this conflict, Destiny wanted both to defend her people and the beauty of their beliefs and she wanted to protect youngest daughters from the worst aspects of their role. But she had no avenue by which to constructively approach this conflict. The strict limitations on girls was considered indefensible in the wider culture, and yet was protected as part of freedom of religion. Any public was talk of how to constrain this freedom of religion in relation to its worst effects on girls. The beliefs about the spiritual meaning of youngest daughters were thought to be obscure and inaccessible to the wider citizenry—the vast majority—who were deciding about where to draw the line. Destiny's assertions about the religious rights of her people further alienated her from the mainstream citizenry. She and other activist Seekerists were cast as pariahs who wanted to use the liberal system to advance views harmful to women and girls. If Destiny wanted to move with relative ease in the wider society she would need to distance herself from Seekerism and if she wanted to pursue a Seeker identity she would have to give up any notions that she might also be a mainstream citizen.

not resonate with her community. Here there is public judgment and discouragement. If a practice or tone of a religious community downplays or even contradicts the political value of moral equality then that community's moral reasoning is assumed to be worth little.

Both the conception of "who" the system must protect and who we must try to be if we are to be good citizens are in Rawls's theory effectively roadblocks rather than bridges. Rawls wants to create a situation in which my being a good citizen is part and parcel of my reasonable notion of being a good human being (according to my conception of the good). This is a worthy goal for a theory of justice, but to come close to fulfilling it we need to treat it not as a fait accompli within the theory, but as a tension that citizens are going to have to negotiate and pay attention to when trying to give one another justice and respect "as" fellow citizens.

Concerned about Destiny's frustrated attempts to find connections between her religious and civic identities, we can see that Rawls's idea of public reason, intended to be a way to respect all citizens, rather would tempt those of the mainstream to dismiss the views of religious minorities, and even to find such citizens morally blameworthy for trying to impose their religious views onto legislative and constitutional discourse. There is something in this requirement for "translating" one's reasons into public reasons that burdens the religious citizen in a way that weakens her SBSR.

Destiny's "accounting/advocacy" problem

Destiny sees her religious practice shrinking and part of why it is shrinking is because the main symbolic rite has been deemed illegal and illiberal. Practitioners have been unable to justify their practice using the terms of public reason and the majority see it as anti-democratic and barbaric. This has led to denigration in civil society, as practitioners have been shunned and considered bad citizens for wanting to violate the rights of their young people. But, from the "inside" the situation feels much different. Destiny recalls the pride and transcendent feelings that she had when she had gone through the rite. Her sense of place and identity was so strong and vivid. Now, to maintain that sense she must isolate herself and only associate with fellow practitioners – and many leave the faith because they cannot stand not feeling accepted. This isolation has severely hampered her prospects for learning skills that could eventually help her

community (scholars and medical doctors are needed, as are those who speak multiple languages, etc.) She is also increasingly vulnerable to stricter gendered interpretations of her religion by those prideful members who have the authority and who have defiantly rejected the liberal culture in which they live. How worrying, from the "Original Position", to recognize that this does happen – religious practices go through painful changes, and sometimes die off—and cultural differences that seemed translatable can sometimes become remote.

Destiny's role in her own empowerment seems to be short circuited in the area of the public perception and willingness to understand her religious point of view. To be accountable to this issue, Rawlsian liberalism needs to seriously revisit one of its apparently minor ideas (already mentioned in chapter 1): "reasoning from conjecture." Destiny needs for her fellow citizens to be equipped to explore *her* moral reasoning with her. A bit of background is needed to make my proposal understandable. [410]

In his discussion of the public reason and the ideal of democratic citizenship, Rawls depicts what he calls the "paradox of public reason":

> [W]hy should citizens in discussing and voting on the most fundamental political questions honor the limits of public reason? How can it be either reasonable or rational, when basic matters are at stake, for citizens to appeal only to a public conception of justice and not to the whole truth as they see it? Surely the most fundamental questions should be settled by appealing to the most important truths, yet these may far transcend public reason![411]

This paradox points to the role that comprehensive doctrines play in people's lives. In a free society, people hold comprehensive doctrines *because* they provide the best or truest answers to the most profound and far-reaching questions—questions about who we want to be and how we think the world should be.[412] Since the political principles and public political culture extend into all areas of life shaping the moral character of citizens, determining who may

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[410] "Some might say that the limits of public reason apply only in official forums and so only to legislators, say, when they speak on the floor of parliament, or to the executive and the judiciary in their public acts and decisions…But this does not go far enough." (*Political Liberalism*, 217. Hereafter cited as PL.)

[411] PL, 216.

[412] A comprehensive doctrine helps us sort out what we should expect from other people, what actions are acceptable, and what actions are unacceptable, what is the ground of moral obligation, and what core beliefs determine how all the other values are given order and priority.

live and die under various circumstances, influencing the future of the planet earth, and institutionalizing important social relations it would seem to follow that comprehensive doctrines will want to have the last word when matters of great political importance are at stake.

But Rawls argues that he can dissolve this paradox. Rawls's two-part solution to the paradox is remarkably straightforward. The first part draws on the assumed capacities and powers of citizens as free and equal and "reasonable" and "rational" persons who accept the fact of reasonable pluralism. It is assumed at the outset of *PL* that those seeking an overlapping consensus already believe in the importance of fulfilling the criterion of reciprocity. Persons so construed would as a matter of course accept that they cannot give those who they want to cooperate with reasons that those individuals and groups cannot reasonably accept.[413] The second part of the "solution" of the paradox conjectures that persons so construed would also find political values to be "very great values and not easily overridden."

> Thus, when the political conception is supported by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the paradox of public reason disappears. The union of the duty of civility with the great values of the political yields the ideal of citizens governing themselves in the way that each thinks the others might reasonably be expected to accept…Citizens affirm the ideal of public reason, not as a result of political compromise, as in a modus vivendi, but from within their own reasonable doctrines.[414]

From whatever angle we consider it, the psychological and social conditions that motivate citizens of a democratic constitutional culture to seek overlapping consensus presuppose moral motivations that would give a very high priority to the duty of civility, as an injunction against defying the democratic principle of legitimacy. Insofar as the political conception fits into one's comprehensive doctrine then one is ultimately following the dictates of the latter by following the dictates of the former.

But there is a second articulation of this paradox—or a dimension of it—that is not as well answered by this reasoning. Let us call the paradox just discussed the "easy paradox" and the one we are about to talk about the "hard paradox." In "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," Rawls raises this question: "How is it possible—or is it—for those of faith, as well as the

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[413] PL, 219.
[414] Ibid., 218.

nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?" (CP, 589). This is a much more interesting question[415], because it is not simply asking why reasonable people would, generally speaking, refrain from using the truth-claims of their comprehensive doctrines to coerce one another. Instead it asks how it is possible to support a constitutional regime regulated by public reason if what public reason allows (or disallows) inadvertently disadvantages—even threatens the survival of—one's comprehensive doctrine. How can a reasonable comprehensive doctrine knowingly incorporate a "module" (to use Rawls's image) that—even if only under certain contingent conditions—undermines the doctrine itself?

This question would not seem to be directly related to public reason, but it is arguably the other face of the "easy paradox" in this sense: that citizens only agree sincerely and wholeheartedly to support a political conception—and thereby to use its guidelines of legitimacy—because it allows for a cooperative life in which mutual respect can be shown between people with various conceptions of the good—respect shown to one another *as* citizens with a sense of justice and *as* people with a determinate conception of the good. Rawls might remind us that it is not the job of a political conception to guarantee respect to individuals' engagements with any particular conception of the good, but to respect *individuals* "as" engagers who are capable of revising and transforming their conceptions of the good.[416] But a more intellectually honest answer would have to take into account psychological factors that render this solution doubtable.

In response to the "hard paradox." Rawls offers a couple of statements, both of which seem to be more question-begging than question-resolving. First he says,

> [w]hile no one is expected to put his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine in
> danger, we must each give up forever the hope of changing the constitution so as
> to establish our religion's hegemony, or of qualifying our obligations so as to
> ensure its influence and success. To retain such hopes and aims would be
> inconsistent with the idea of equal basic liberties for all free and equal citizens.[417]

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[415] And one that Habermas quotes on at least a couple of occasions.
[416] See, for example, PL, 185-6. Also see *Justice as Fairness* §7.4, 93.
[417] *Collected Papers,* 590.

How does this answer the question? It merely says what the good citizen would do, but not how one remains a good citizen (so to speak) under such enormous pressure or threat to one's identity. Furthermore, a satisfactory answer to the question must address precisely this political phenomenon: *that a waning doctrine is often experienced as an endangered doctrine*. How can citizens fulfill their duty of civility if doing so seems to them to endanger their doctrine? Next Rawls offers this:

> …the answer lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine's understanding and accepting that, except by endorsing a reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no other way fairly to ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens. In endorsing a constitutional democratic regime, a religious doctrine may say that such are the limits God sets to our liberty….[418]

Again, this begs the question. On what basis will someone who believes in a doctrine and identifies with a doctrinal community prioritize the "equal liberties" of nonmembers even at the expense of the continued existence of the community that seems to give the "point" to her life?[419] Perhaps it is possible, but why should we feel confident that members of (potentially reasonable) religious communities, for example, will decide that their God limits their liberty to the point of diminishing the way of life that they believe reveals his truth?

In *Political Liberalism* Rawls devotes a substantial portion of Lecture II to explaining what it means for citizens to have a "reasonable moral psychology," and how this psychology and the related moral motivation can realistically be achieved.[420] Among these he includes "(d) the capacity *and desire to be and to be seen as* "normal and fully cooperating members of society," and "(e) issuing *and* following from all of these, "a reasonable moral psychology." What concerns us here is the possibility that (d) *the desire to be and to be seen as* fully cooperating, may interfere with (e) "reasonable moral psychology" as Rawls understands it.[421] This is a complicated question, but I will try to make it as clear as brevity allows.[422] Rawls

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[418] *Collected Papers,* 590.
[419] Recall, in "The Priority of the Right over the Good," and elsewhere (in *A Theory of Justice*, *Justice as Fairness*) Rawls says "the good shows the point."

[420] See PL Lecture II, §7, "The Basis of Moral Motivation in the Person," pp. 81-88; also see Lecture IV, §6-7, 158-168.
[421] See PL, 81-82.
[422] In my opinion the question of moral motivations in Rawls needs a book and not just a few pages.

reasons, perhaps quite correctly, that a well-ordered society, regulated by principles of justice under full publicity, will actualize conception-dependent desires in its citizens for fulfilling the ideal of citizenship. This is good news from the point of view of ideal theory, as it allows us to see how citizens might form the requisite beliefs and skills for prioritizing a political conception from one generation to the next: citizens will *want* to be the kinds of people who are and are seen as reasonable and rational, who abide by the burdens of judgment, and who give one another justice across very different conceptions of the good. Citizens will *want*, as a matter of their own *self-respect (RawlsSR—i.e. self-confidence)*, to be and to be seen as fulfilling the criteria of reciprocity, including that of public reason. But Rawls acknowledges that even in a well-ordered society there will be choices—we might call them "public" choices—that are politically just, but that nevertheless sacrifice some conception of the good, or lead to its demise over time—not because it is a fundamentally unreasonable doctrine, but simply because all possibilities cannot coexist in any one place and time. Though the situation in a reasonable plurality does not amount to a zero-sum game, we cannot help but wonder whether or not, in the course of time, those reasonable citizens on the "losing side," may come to experience a weakening of their conception-dependent desires for fulfilling justice according to the principle of reciprocity (as in justice as fairness).

Rawls accepts that the identity of the individual is twofold—an identity of a "public" citizen and of a "private" member of community, so to speak. Sometimes those identities appear to be one and the same, while at other times there is dissonance and the pain that brings to the sense of a coherent self.[423] For the civically minded (as Rawls hopes most will be) the failure to be *and be seen as* a "good" citizen should also be seriously destabilizing and demoralizing. Let us think, then, about how Rawls characterizes the political virtues and the fulfillment of the duty of civility: the latter is a point of pride—the act par excellence of being a good citizen and fulfilling one's role well in relation to "owing" the others acceptable reasons (according to a standard of validity that is itself worked out in the liberal political conception). In a conflict between political principles and comprehensive doctrines, those who cannot give acceptable reasons not only suffer the problems of lacking a public voice, but also suffer the shame of failing to achieve the status of the good citizen. Such feelings would have deleterious effects on

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[423] For a discussion of this see *Justice as Fairness*, §7.4.

the moral motivations that are required of the mutual acceptance of the principle of reciprocity. If citizens can no longer wholeheartedly accept that principle then the specific moral relation that makes a freestanding conception possible is also lost.[424]

In Rawls's view, justice requires that not only public officials, but also everyday citizens, take up the "ideal of public reason," as a set of criteria guiding their public statements and arguments. Thus "citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of justice."[425] The needed disposition of citizens in a well-ordered society regulated by a liberal conception of justice is discussed as a moral "duty of civility."[426] To fulfill this duty a citizen in the voting booth, for example, ought to imagine herself as being bound to the same restrictions in public reasoning appropriate for legislators, and ask herself "what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact."[427] When one is guided by the criterion of reciprocity one limits one's reasons to reasons that the other members with different reasonable conceptions of the good (also called "reasonable doctrines") could "reasonably" accept.[428] Citizens fail to live up to the ideal of public reason and their duty of civility if they instead appeal to comprehensive doctrines or to theories that are elaborate and disputed, because in doing so they effectively ask

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[424] This is because the feature of justice as fairness that makes it freestanding is the principle of reciprocity. So long as people prioritize this principle they can achieve overlapping consensus on a political conception that does not require further foundation. As soon as reciprocity loses its special commanding significance, or is undermined by resentment, the tower of cards falls to the ground.

[425] PL, 1, 226, 241.
[426] "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in John Rawls, *Collected Papers*, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999), pp. 573-615. Hereafter cited as CP.

[427] *Collected Papers,* 577. See also ibid., 578, "Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions—were we to state them as government officials—are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons."

[428] Because of the limitations of human judgment (what Rawls calls the "burdens of judgment"), reasonable people and reasonable doctrines understand that despite what the "whole truth" may be according to the validity criteria of their own doctrines, important political matters must be decided on the basis of differently framed criteria given by one of freestanding political conceptions. Depending on which of the family of political conceptions one endorses there may be slight differences in the criteria for public reason, but Rawls gives the basic criteria as this: in making justifications on issues of political importance, citizens must limit their appeals to "presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial" (PL, 224).

that their fellow citizens be governed by laws on the basis of reasons that those citizens could quite reasonably find unacceptable.

This moral restriction on citizens and officials is, however, qualified by a "proviso," which states that citizens may "introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine…provided that, in due course, *we* give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support."[429] While *the proviso* helps establish Rawls's view of public reason as a "wide" view, its point is also to stress that in the public political culture justification must always be given exclusively in terms of a family of reasonable conceptions of justice. We can infer that the "duty of civility" for citizens who want to bring their comprehensive beliefs to bear on the public political discussion, is that they must be sincerely reconciled to the exclusive authority of public reason and must be sincerely interested in coming up with arguments that fulfill the ideal of public reason. It is by accepting *the proviso* that adherents to a doctrine publicly manifest their "commitment to constitutional democracy."[430] The *acceptance* of *the proviso* is considered the prime expression of the duty of civility. [431]

However, there is a promising but untapped dimension to Rawls's proviso. *We* are tasked with transforming nonpublic reasons into public reasons. Who is this "we"? Rawls seems to mean the collective. Part of our duties as citizens to one another is to help make each other's beliefs understandable and relatable to justice. Even though Rawls does not see it as his task to analyze the relationship between kinds of discourse in civil society and the actualization of political liberalism, he does briefly acknowledge three forms of nonpublic reason as deserving mention because he recognizes that they are particularly relevant to the idea of public reason. One is "declaration," in which, by publicly declaring their own comprehensive doctrine, citizens show "how, from our own doctrines, we can and do endorse a reasonable public political

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[429] *Collected Papers*, 584, my emphasis.
[430] Ibid., 592.
[431] Rawls suggests three kinds of benefit that come from such interjections. The first is the positive effect of deepening "[c]itizens' mutual knowledge of one another's religious and nonreligious doctrines" (CP, 592). The second and related benefit is the strengthening "for the right reasons" of citizens' commitments to their political conceptions. When citizens are able to make explicit for themselves and one another how the political conception reinforces just what the comprehensive doctrine believes to be true then they experience fuller justification, by their own lights, for holding that political conception. The third, again closely intertwined with the others, is the value of the public recognition of the "social roots of constitutional democracy" (CP, 593n52). When citizens refer to their comprehensive doctrines in arguments for basic justice and constitutional essentials they may make historical connections to doctrine or revolution, for example, that reminds the larger public of the historical development of liberal ideals.

conception of justice with its principles and ideals."[432] Rawls gives the example of how the "Parable of the Good Samaritan" (Luke 10:29-37) could be used to support a duty of mutual aid (and how the same duty could also be supported in public reason by referring to the difference principle).[433] Declaration has the political advantage of reassuring citizens and strengthening solidarity, or "civic friendship" because citizens are better able to appreciate the sincerity of each other's views, and to see those views as coming from someplace not arbitrary. The obverse of "declaration," discussed in a footnote, is "witnessing."[434] *Witnessing* is an expression of principled dissent on the part of citizens in a well-ordered society who accept the laws as being legitimate, but want to express the basis, in their own comprehensive doctrine, for their disagreement with the popular will or official judgment. Rawls gives the example of Quakers who feel compelled to bear witness to their faith-based pacifism.[435]

Somewhat different from declaration and witnessing is "reasoning from conjecture." According to Rawls, when we reason in this way "we argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people's basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a basis for public reasons." For example, a Christian citizen who supports social security because it fits with her Christian idea of neighborly love might try to persuade her Benthamite friend that, from a utilitarian standpoint, social security yields the greatest happiness to the greatest number.[436] Successful *reasoning from conjecture* strengthens the ideal of public reason by helping citizens find a legitimate public voice that is consistent with their deeply-felt convictions, convictions that are rooted in nonpublic forms of reasoning and systems of value. Declaration and witnessing reinforce the legitimacy of the political conception by introducing expressions sincere belief while affirming the authority of public reason. Reasoning from conjecture, on the other hand, calls on citizens to speak in the language of a comprehensive doctrine that is not their own. It is less an event of putting nonpublic reason into the public-political arena than it is a process of

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[432] *Collected Papers,* 594.

[433] Ibid., note 55

[434] That it is confined to a footnote should not indicate that Rawls finds "witnessing" trivial. The very same footnote also appears in *Law of Peoples.*

[435] For a less than well-ordered society, civil disobedience has an important function as well, and is similar to witnessing.

[436] This is my example, not Rawls's.

reasoning occurring in civil society which aids public reason by helping individuals see how their own doctrine is capable of supporting the conception.

Perhaps more significantly, reasoning from conjecture specifically refers to a process by which a person is not expressing her true convictions but is openly reasoning according to standards of validity of a (potentially reasonable) doctrine that she does not hold as her own.[437] In view of this, Rawls insists that *reasoning from conjecture* be used only on the condition that the conjecturer (a) discloses the fact that she does not hold that comprehensive view herself, and (b) argues sincerely and not manipulatively. In other words, one should not give what one thinks are insufficient reasons (from the point of view of the doctrine). Instead, reasoning from conjecture is limited to those situations in which one feels somewhat confident that the assertions one makes do really meet the validity-standards of the discourse in question.

In addition to strengthening civic friendship through knowledge of one another, Rawls's comments suggest that the meanings expressed by religious citizens can draw attention to crucial flaws in justice and can help us better understand the true reach of the principles of justice in a less than well-ordered society. Yet this is about all Rawls says on any of the types of nonpublic reason just described. Rawls does not take it upon himself to unpack or explore the implications for the idea of public reason that there may be such an important role played by nonpublic reason, but I believe that EMPR and EMP-SR suggest that his political liberalism needs to foreground this element and show how it might be concretely realized. Failing to do so makes many citizens vulnerable in the social bases of EMP-SR.[438] The reality is that people do feel

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[437] This is a more psychologically and cognitively complex activity than witnessing or declaration and, I hope to show, particularly fundamental—not simply "supportive" for the activity of the public use of reason.

[438] See Andrew March, *Islam and Liberal* Citizenship, 56. March argues that the practice of reasoning from conjecture can have justificatory force at the level of offering respect or recognition. March writes,

> "Arguing from multiple traditions and exhibiting openness to multiple languages in the broader public sphere is one way we extend recognition to cocitizens. Even if there are limits to toleration, we may have reasons to foster a certain attitude of respect toward the religious or philosophical traditions of fellow citizens. One of the aspects of this attitude of respect is to cultivate a preference for cultural or intellectual change from within the resources of the illiberal culture in question. The neutralization of oppressive aspects of an illiberal culture through the appeal to other values held in that culture carries the possibility of being more legitimate (particularly in the short term), more politically stable, more respectful, and therefore, of generating fewer negative side effects flowing from resentment caused by rapid, coerced cultural, moral, or intellectual change."

threatened and they do qualify their obligations under this feeling of threat. The way to bring them into the political fold, so that they might engage valuably in public discourse, is not simply to say that this is the wrong attitude for a citizen worthy of liberal constitutional democracy. Instead, the proper response is to attempt to meet them at least halfway; to have the humility to allow that one can't ask a fellow citizen to "forever give up the hope of…" the flourishing of the values that constitute their community, even if they may eventually change their relationship to those values, "in due course."

An ideal of citizenship is difficult to dispense with, as it gives citizens criteria by which they can try to preserve and cultivate certain priorities and grounds for self-criticism and accountability in public discourse over important political issues. As Rawls has it, the "duty" puts (moral) pressure on citizens to come up with acceptable reasons that argue the same cause (if differently) as their "true" reasons.[439] What I'd like to suggest is that, for reasons of EMP-SR, certain forms of nonpublic reason should be considered a continuous part of building and securing truly public reason. Rawls may have remarked "there are many nonpublic reasons but there is only one public reason," but what he means is *not* that there is a single ordering of values for public reason.[440] There can be many different orderings of value, and much potential for divisive disagreement even if everyone succeeds at fulfilling the criteria of reciprocity and even if the political "module" from which they build their arguments is freestanding. The question is, how empowered do citizens feel to find ways for social cooperation to enrich and advance their own values in the broader culture? A person needs to feel like their values contribute to the interpretation of justice, otherwise there's an artificial and stultifying divide.

This cannot be thought of in a condescending way—that some of us have the Esperanto of justice and can talk justice talk fluently, while others are hobbled and require our patience. Rather, we should think of ourselves as all fluent and all hobbled in our translations of our ideals into principles of justice. Those of us who have agreed to live in a liberal state and obey its laws must be presumed to be open to fitting those laws into their full moral lives, they must not be

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[439] Rawls at times suggests it is the individual or group putting forward the religious arguments that is responsible for this (and thus it is their duty of civility); at other times he suggests more passively that it should be done. But the idea of the proviso (as part of the duty of civility) makes little sense if it is not taken on by the group who is putting their religious reason into public discourse.

[440] See the *Commonweal* interview with Rawls in *Collected Papers*, 616-622.

presumed unable to do so and thus required to deny their full moral lives in order to be just. To make PL truly freestanding, reasoning from conjecture must be a skill that the average citizen is expected to value, akin to her duty of civility. Cultural literacy, then, becomes part of civic education, not as an add-on, but as part of what being just requires.[441] Destiny may experience tension between the traditions of her community and the public political culture of a liberal state. But we should want for those tensions to be productive and lead to interesting engagements for all involved, above all for Destiny herself.

8.2.3 Reflecting on Rebecca and Destiny

The problems of Rebecca and Destiny are so different, and yet a key aspect of their situations is shared: Destiny and Rebecca, under the prevailing interpretation of *"JF"*, have little social support for the work of keeping their personal identity and core commitments secure as they engage with practices each has reason to care about. Under RawlsSR (two kinds of self-confidence) it may look as if they are sufficiently supported and yet choose difficult relationships and commitments that undermine their confidence. Yet, something important is missed in assuming that individuals are always right to (and able to) choose the most rational plan of life. Moreover, a sense of personal value is but one element in a dynamic process by which we maintain good-making positions. Instead, it makes more sense to presuppose ongoing struggles that will be worse for some groups than for others, usually rooted in history. The SBSR would have to be thought of as something under constant negotiation—where the primary good is features of institutions that expose (render legible) and respond to vulnerabilities to EMP-SR.

Respecting someone as a fellow citizen involves recognizing the constant possibility that there will be an obstacle between who they are for their metaphysical conception and who they are politically. One of the ways we respect each other as citizens is to work together to re-interpret our political ideals so as to remove these obstacles whenever possible. And to reflect

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[441] One example of this working is found in the response to clitoridectomy. A standard view of justice would say that this practice is unjust – it violates the bodily integrity of the underage girl—and must be outlawed. There is no way to justify such a practice in public reason. Yet, if one practices reasoning from conjecture, in both directions, one can arrive at a solution that is not merely tolerable, but actually just. A minor surgical procedure that leaves a mark no worse than the piercing of ears, but carries on the rite of passage for those who want to see themselves as connected to the tradition.

carefully on our failures to remove obstacles to true inclusion, rather than treating them as inevitable collateral damage of social cooperation. The solutions we might offer Rebecca, Tyler, and Destiny in the context of political liberalism are solutions that acknowledge how heavily EMP-SR depends upon EMPR.

When we look on SR as a sort of vaguely structured attitude, as Rawls invites us to, we may forget to ask: What is the chemical agent, so to speak that transforms these beliefs about oneself into the actions of a person who is thriving both as a citizen and as someone with her own plans and self-ideals? It's not just the possession of money, freedoms, etc., it's having these in a reckonable situation—it's having avenues for transforming worse contexts into better ones. The bases of "doing" SR would be those aspects of institutions that invite one to become an agent in one's own process of turning a worse practical context into a better one. If one is set up, by the very ideal of citizen and person endorsed by one's society, to be in contradiction with what counts as reasonable loving, reasonable planning, and reasonable claiming, that is tantamount to the political system making it harder for you to "do" SR.

Looking at it under an Empowerment conception, we can see that anything promoting a sense that a citizen is less reliable as such (because, say she does not use the right methods of argument; or because her plan of life is not rational) erodes the social bases of SR that the conception of citizen offers. One should be very careful about what can be a valid ground for citizen-shaming. Anything shaming that is connected with practices that are otherwise supported is a very mixed signal that is going to create conflicts in the way people try to empower the individual and the lengths to which they will go to do so. Second, we've discovered that self-respect and respect are much better to think about as fundamentally unstable and as a signal that much work will always remain to be done to make a society well-ordered through the legislative process and through continual conversation and debate.

8.3 Conclusion

> *What we do is a symbol of what we would do. Not only can we do no more than to let an act substitute for a more splendid act, but no one can do more. This is the reconciliation.*[442]

I have tried to show that there is potential for EMPR to be useful for political liberalism, by way of how it alters our understanding of the value and primary good of self-respect in Rawls's theory. To ground EMP-SR we must be vigilant against aspects of institutions that short-circuit the process of empowerment for certain members of society. Most importantly, we must avoid putting obstacles in the path of a person's role in their own normative empowerment. I've offered that when a person's reasonable engagement with the practices she cares most about comes at the expense of her appreciating, reckoning with, or accounting for herself as citizen, then "justice as fairness" must respond. Likewise, "justice as fairness" must respond when a person's taking up of the role of free and equal citizen comes at the expense of her being able to appreciate, reckon with, or account for herself as an individual with a determinate conception of the good. Here I attempted to imagine what responses might be available, given the crucial requirement of supporting self-respect. What changes to the theory might lighten the unfair burden on Rebecca? Maybe the answer would be a shift in how we imagine the thinking in the original position. As for the "illiberal" religious citizen (Destiny), her unfair burden might be lightened if the civic ideal could itself be transformed in concrete ways. It would not be enough to pay lip-service to cultural literacy; rather, citizens would have to be prepared and encouraged to relate to the deeper logic of moral languages that are not their own.

Beyond Rawlsian political liberalism, I hope that EMPR can help us to think more dynamically about respect, whatever political theory we are working with. That is an ambitious hope. More modestly, I hope that Empowerment Respect might reframe elements in our existing understanding of recognition respect, in order that those insights (such as those of Robin Dillon) might be mobilized in new ways. I am the first to admit that Empowerment Respect thus far lacks the philosophical virtue of simplicity, but I think that up to now, respect may have suffered

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[442] Doris Lorenzen as quoted in Paul Hunt "A Critical Condition."

from a false sense of being morally self-evident. I hope that the complex account I have offered here can inform some future conceptualization that will be both illuminating and elegant.

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