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Contention and Control: Violent Protest Policing in Democratic Argentina

A Dissertation Presented

by

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Contention and Control: Violent Protest Policing in Democratic Argentina

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Beginning in 1990s, Latin American countries have witnessed a dramatic emergence in collective action by unemployed and informal workers. Yet, the rise in mobilizations was coupled with a depiction of protests as violent and dangerous by authorities and the media and was followed by high levels of police violence, control, and imprisonment of protesters. Furthermore, according to human rights groups, police were more violent and repressive at protest by marginal groups.

Drawing on an original database of newspaper reports on contentious collective action events from 1997 to 2007 and qualitative data, this research looks at the case of Argentina to address the following questions: How does protest policing work? Does it vary based on the characteristics of protesters, targets, protest tactics, claims, and level of disruptiveness? Why are some groups perceived as more threatening to authorities and thus subject to harsher police coercion? Why, when responding to a protest event, authorities and police sometimes appear to prevent violence, and negotiate, while at times react with extreme violence?

In 2001 and 2002 a political, economic, and social crisis resulted in the death of dozens of demonstrators and the emergence of new forms of organizing and policing. Thus, the case of Argentina is of particular interest because it offers an unparalleled window to examine the actions of security forces during a cycle of contentious action, and how a repertoire of protest and repression changed from before and after an economic and institutional crisis.

By analyzing the range of variations in police response to demonstrations, this dissertation comes to the following conclusions. Firstly, that in a context of increasing unemployment, informality, and precarious work, collective claim making in demand for jobs and welfare benefits is perceived as threatening to authorities. Thus, protest events with demands for work and welfare aid are subject to more and harsher policing—even when the demonstrators were not otherwise provocative.

Secondly, the results demonstrate that the relationship between politics and police is of great complexity and it cannot be assumed that police behavior is in direct response to decisions made by political leaders. Police have their own interests, understandings and prejudices of what the protests are about and who the demonstrators are, and their actions are at least partially independent from political leaders' decisions or the state's interest. This disparity between policy and police action derives from the discretionary power of the police as an institution and of individual police at protest events. Furthermore, police decision-making is not solely based on what the protesters were doing, their characteristics or the actual protest event itself, but about a historical construction that challengers to the state should be suppressed. And how this is conducted is connected to the discretionary power granted to the Argentine police.

This dissertation also found that the political sign of the provincial governor, when in opposition to the national government—the president—mattered in police responses to protest events. Finally, that the social context and specific political scenarios and dynamics are fundamental in the way authorities, police, and protesters interact and shape repressive actions. Demonstrators with no leverage over the institutions they were targeting were met with tougher, more violent responses from police whether or not they were themselves violent. For groups with structural leverage, in turn, the chances of experiencing police violence decline considerably.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	vii
List of Figures	ix
Acknowledgments	x
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
The Research Problem.....	2
Definitions.....	3
Theoretical Frame	6
Limitations of the Existing Explanations.....	10
Theoretical synthesis	15
Argentina: Collective Action Surge and Repression	15
Chapter Outline.....	21
Chapter 2: Data Collection	23
Research Questions and Aims.....	23
Part I: Quantitative Research	24
On the Use of Newspapers as Data Source	28
Part II: Qualitative Data Collection	38
Chapter 3: Protest Policing in Argentina, Brief Overview	43
3.1 Introduction.....	43
3.2 Law Enforcement in Argentina.....	45
3.3 Historical Overview of Protest Policing in Argentina.....	51
3.4 Use of violence	63
3.5 Conclusion	65
Chapter 4: When Policing Becomes Violent	67
4.1 Forms and Scale of Police Use of Violence at Protest Events in Argentina.....	69
4.2 Challengers Forms of Action	80
4.3 Demonstrators' Claims and Demands.....	96
4.4 The location of the events	103
4.5 Threat Hypothesis	115
4.6 Discussion.....	119
Chapter 5: Protest Policing and Politics	126
5.1 The Political Nature of Protest Policing	127
5.2 Protest policing and Political Factionalism.....	136
5.3 Protest Policing As A Political Resource	146
5.4 Protest Policing and (Discretionary) Power	151
5.5 Conclusion	157
Chapter 6: Contention and Variations in Control	159
6.1 Police presence at Contentious Collective Action Events	164
6.2. Who protests matters?.....	172
6.3 Demonstrators Alliances and Policing.....	177
6.4 Police Violence and Political Leverage	182
6.5 Weakness Hypothesis.....	192
6.6 Discussion.....	196

6.7 Conclusion	203
Chapter 7: Conclusions.....	205
On threat.....	207
Other Forms of Repression	213
Range of responses to protest	215
Outcomes.....	221
Future Research.....	224
Bibliography	227
Appendix A	242
Qualitative Data Collection.....	242
Appendix B	246
Newspaper Data Collection.....	246
General Guidelines for Entering Newspaper Information into Codesheets	246
Codesheet Instructions	249
Codebook for Newspaper Coding of Protests.....	252
Appendix C.....	271
Description and Summaries of Data Collected.....	271

List of Tables

Table 2.0.1: Total Events.....	28
Table 3.0.1: Security Forces Organization.....	46
Table 4.0.1: Total Events by Period	71
Table 4.0.2: Police Tactics Each Period	73
Table 4.0.3: Variation in State Forces' Action	75
Table 4.0.4. Police Presence By Demonstrators' Forms of Action Each Period	84
Table 4 0.5: Demonstrators' Tactics When Police Appeared Each Period	87
Table 4.0.6: Rate of Police Violence Against Various Forms of Action By Demonstrators....	88
Table 4.0.7: Demonstrator And Police Use of Violent Tactics. Neoliberal Period.....	91
Table 4 0.8: Demonstrator and Police Use of Violent Tactics During Crisis Period	92
Table 4.0.9: Demonstrator and Police Use of Violent Tactics During the Progressive Period	93
Table 4.0.10: Protest Forms By Property Damaged	94
Table 4.0.11: Police Tactics And Demonstrators Use of Disruptive Tactics.....	95
Table 4.0.12: Rate of Police Violence Against Various Claims By Demonstrators. Three Periods Compared.....	97
Table 4.0.13: Police Tactics And Demands For Jobs And Welfare Benefits.....	102
Table 4.0.14: Police Presence in Buenos Aires Area and All Other Regions Each Period....	104
Table 4.0.15: Police Violence in Buenos Aires Area And All Other Regions Each Period ...	105
Table 4.0.16: Police Tactics By Province During Neoliberal Period.....	109
Table 4.0.17: Police Tactics By Province During The Crisis Period.....	112
Table 4.0.18: Police Tactics By Province During The Progressive Period	113
Table 4.0.19: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of Police Violent Behavior	120
Table 5.0.1: Police Tactics By Crime Control Policies	134
Table 5.0.2: Police Tactics And Government Alliances.....	135
Table 5.0.3: Police Tactics And Alliances Each Period.....	140
Table 6.0.1: Total Number of Events, Total Police Presence, And Socioeconomic Context	162
Table 6.0.2: Contention Features When There Was Police Presence Each Period	166
Table 6.0.3: Police Tactics And Governmental Target Each Period.....	170
Table 6.0.4: Contention Features By Period When Police Appeared.....	174
Table 6.0.5: Police Tactics And Marginality	176
Table 6.0.6: Accompanying Actors When Police Appeared.....	178
Table 6.0.7: Accompanying Actors When Police Was Violent	182
Table 6.0.8: Actors Leverage And Police Tactics	186
Table 6. 0.9: Police Tactics and Actors' Leverage Each Period.....	191
Table 6.0.10: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of Police Violent Behavior	195
Table 7.0.1: Typology of State Responses To Contentious Collective Action Events	217
Table 7.0.2: Protests Outcomes By Period	222
Table C.1: Summary Of Contention Features When Police Appeared Each Period.....	271
Table C.2: Protest Events With Claims For Jobs and Welfare When Police Appeared.....	272
Table C.3: Nature of Violent Tactics Used By Protestors.....	273
Table C.4: Type Of Security Force Present Each Period.....	274
Table C.5: Frequency Distribution Of Variables Used in Logistic Regression	275

Table C.6: Variation In State Forces' Action At Protest Gatherings By Period	276
Table C.7: Protest Events And Property Damaged By Period.....	277
Table C.8: Security Forces Present in Greater Buenos Aires Area and All Other Locations	278
Table C.9: Claims For Jobs, Welfare And Other Claims By Police Tactic Each Period	280
Table C.10: Size of Demonstration By Police Tactic	281
Table C.11: Demonstrators' Tactics By Property Damaged Each Period	282
Table C.12: Demonstrators' Forms of Action By Police Tactic	283

List of Figures

Figure 1: Distribution Of Police Violence Episodes By Province	114
Figure 2: Police In Riot Gear And Mounting Horses. Buenos Aires, December 20, 2001.....	125
Figure 3: Contentious Collective Action, Political Dynamics And Repression	145
Figure 4: Police In-Action Illustrated	151
Figure 5: Campaign For Equal Rights in Security Ministry.....	284
Figure 6: Campaign For Equal Rights in Security Ministry.....	285
Figure 7: They Won't Scare Us.....	286
Figure 8: Criminalization of Poverty	287
Figure 9: Person Guilty of Genocide Lives Here.....	288

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Chapter 1: Introduction

History shows states are sometimes contradictory in their responses to protest. The same government might allow the blockade of an international bridge, but use violence to end the occupation of a factory. Similarly, authorities might ignore a massive demonstration in a capital city but send dozens of troops to prevent a small protest in a provincial town.

Furthermore, the policing of protests can be manifested with very different forms of control. From sending local town agents to prevent the blockade of a road, to ordering federal forces use tear gas and bullets against unarmed demonstrators asking for a wage increase or more employment opportunities. That was the case when teachers were on their way to block a national road in the Argentine province of Neuquén in 2007 and security forces fired rubber bullets and tear gas resulting in the killing of a teacher who was participating in the demonstration.

Why are state responses to collective action so different? For decades, social movement scholars have sought answers to why authorities react as they do to protest. Christian Davenport argues that while we do have evidence that police are more inclined to respond violently in certain circumstances -such as, with minority or outcast groups- it is still not definitively clear how they actually reach a decision to act passively or aggressively (Davenport, Soule et al. 2011, Davenport 2007). What precisely do authorities respond to, death, property damage, wildly unorthodox behavior, or the magnitude, frequency, and location of challenging activity? This question is even more problematic for scholars who study police responses to social movements in countries whose states are constantly seeking legitimacy in the eyes of the mass public.

During the 1990s, Latin American countries have witnessed a dramatic emergence in collective action by unemployed workers. Deproletarianization, state-retrenchment, and decentralization of state services are some of the processes that lie at the root of the upsurge of contention (Auyero and Moran 2007, Auyero 2002). This

surge in unemployed workers and *piquetero*¹ protest events was coupled with a depiction of protests as violent and dangerous by the media (Svampa & Pandolfi 2004). This, in turn, led to high levels of police control and imprisonment of protesters. These dynamics complicate what we already know about state responses to social movements, by creating unique and unstable relationships between the state and the general population.

Political scientists, specializing in state policy and social movements, explore the relationship between the states and challenging groups in democratic and authoritarian regimes. Conversely, sociologists, who study social movements and political processes, tend to emphasize political opportunities as an important factor that shape state responses to protest. Neither, however, has explored states that are democratic at the federal level but have less democratic administrations at the subnational level as in Argentina. This leads us to the research problem.

The Research Problem

This study, thus, seeks to explain the differential responses by state security forces to protest events. How may one account for the differences in the protest policing policies and actions of the same country? How does a state's political scenario—relationships, tensions— influence on how it responds to public protest? This research examines the case of Argentina in order to explore this relationship in greater detail, hypothesizing that politics and the characteristics of the protest and protesters influence state responses to contentious collective action. I look at the dominant explanations in the literature to examine whether police in Argentina also respond with more violence when they perceive they are threatened (Davenport 2007). I find that **police in Argentina will be more violent and repressive when responding to demonstrations in demand for jobs and welfare benefits.**

¹ Piqueteros (picketers in English) are mainly informal and unemployed workers who use roadblocks and pickets as a form of action to protest or make claims. In Argentina, the piquetero movement spread throughout the country starting in 1996/7.

In addition, this research seeks to examine variations in police tactics since **security forces, I believe, not only appear in reaction to demonstrators' behavior – to a threat– but are also pro-active and follow their own interests and agenda.** Put differently, I look at police behavior taking into account that law enforcement agents also act based on their own ideas, views, understandings, and prejudices of what the protests are about and who the demonstrators are.

Lastly, this dissertation will show **that violence increases when protest events are mainly organized and attended by actors without leverage and structural power:** people who are very vulnerable, needy, poor and generally marginalized from society because of their socio-economic condition, their ethnicity, their sexuality, identity but also because of specific relational and contextual characteristics.

Definitions

Contentious Collective Action: This study seeks to examine the policing of protests. As simple as it may sound, the concept of protests and collective action can be understood in many different forms. In this study, I will focus on contentious collective action and I adopt Charles Tilly's definition of discontinuous contentious collective action (Tilly 1986), which are “those occasions where people act together on their interests in ways that visibly and significantly affect other people's interests. Discontinuous, contentious collective action always involves third parties, often poses threats to existing distributions of power, and usually incites surveillance, intervention, and/or repression by political authorities.”

Therefore, I study protest events that were a) collective (involving more than three people), b) had the purpose of making a claim, c) that bears on someone else's interests, and d) was public.

By placing the focus on contentious events rather than social movements themselves, I sought to take into account not just organized and institutionalized action but also more spontaneous and sporadic instances of claim making.

From repression to protest policing: Charles Tilly (1978) once wrote: “repression is never a simple matter of more or less. It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression, toleration, and facilitation. (Tilly 1978: 101).” But how is repression selective? Why are state responses to collective action so different? The definition of repression, like other social concepts, is controversial.

Much of the social movement literature tends to view repression as state repression, but repression should not be limited to state action. What is more, repression may take many forms, and counter-movements, the mass media, political parties, civil society, and individual citizens are also involved (Earl 2003, 2006; Davenport 2005, 2007). Repression scholars have also identified less overt forms of repression such as “clandestine kicks and invisible elbows” as Auyero (2010) calls non-traditional forms of power, domination and violence used by state agents to control those living in the margins of society. Ferre (2005), meanwhile, talks about soft repression distinguishing different forms of it, namely ridicule, stigma and silence. All the different forms of repression –state and non-state, hard and soft– Linden and Klandermans (2006) argue, work at the same time. For the purpose of this study I adopt a definition of repression, which builds upon a consensus in the literature of protest policing regarding the main characteristics of the phenomenon. Accordingly, I define repression as *any action that is directed by state security forces to prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional collective action, including its initiation*, as Earl (2011: 263) defines it, *and that is public and observable*.²

Put simply, I study overt forms of security forces’ action to impede mobilization, harass, and intimidate activists, divide organizations and physically assault (pushing, shoving, hitting, beating), arrest, imprison and/or kill protesters and movement participants as they were reported by newspapers and the media.³ Although this study will deal specifically with repression, it is important to clarify that authorities

² For different forms of covert repression, such as surveillance, see Cunningham 2003, 2004, 2009; Irons 2006, Davenport 2005.

³ Actions such as surveillance, spying, silencing, stigma, ridicule and other forms of covert repression will be mentioned but are not part of this study.

often respond with repression and negotiation/cooptation simultaneously (Piven 1977). Put differently, repression is generally not expressed in a pure form. Depending on the context, the repression and the policing of protest events is articulated in different ways and by different variables. Furthermore, government authorities' decision to repress a protest event or a demonstrating group might involve different agencies and state powers such as the judiciary. A state prosecutor or a judge may order the arrest of demonstrators in addition to the police tactics implemented.

Likewise, I do not wish to suggest that repression⁴ is the only response to episodes of contentious collective action. Accordingly, for example, the government might be responding to repeated roadblocks in demand of more jobs by launching a new welfare program and, at the same time, have police arrest protesters who were blockading the road. This is important because the state is not a monolithic entity with unified goals and interests that result in consistent policies.

Use of violence by police: Most research on protest policing analyzes police responses to protest events by looking at the presence or absence of police, or by the number of arrests. Both of these indicators have limitations in the Argentine context. Police presence or absence is not an adequate measure of protest policing because among the government policies introduced to reduce violence at protest events during the government of Néstor Kirchner was a gradual increase of police presence in rallies and mobilizations. According to this initiative, sending more policemen to control protest events would discourage violence. Focusing on the number of arrests only, in turn, limits the possibility of examining the various forms of police action when responding to demonstrations.

Here, thus, I look at police presence and violence based on the reports of use of force by security forces during the period of my study. That is, when showing up at a demonstration, police have a wide array of tactics to perform: from standing still in silence at a corner prepared for action, to using tear gas and bullets to disperse

⁴ I will use the words repression and policing interchangeably following the way newspaper reports narrate the control of contentious collective actions.

protesters. Here we will look at all actions by police and examine in detail the occasions in which the use of legal force is exceeded.

When police engaged in any violent tactic such as using physical violence against protesters or attacking them with weapons or equipment such as guns, gas, nightsticks or riot control equipment their activity at the protest was characterized as violent. Similarly, police tactics were considered violent when the newspaper reported there was a confrontation between police and demonstrators.

It is very important to note here that police violence is not uniform or common to all security forces and/or agents in a country. There are specific institutions, agencies, agents, and police culture that might legitimate certain forms of violence but this is not extensive to all. This would be a simplistic, narrow and inadequate description of police violence. Furthermore, as Frederic (2008) showed, there are multiple actors that conform the police world. Police cannot be reduced to what they do. Police vary in terms of gender, age, life histories and hierarchies and violence cannot be considered a natural condition of any social group.

One caveat: This dissertation was built on a sample of protest events. The sample was composed of protest events in which police appeared. There are numerous other protest events in which police did not show up at the event, and even if they did, the media did not notice their presence. For that, even when I will show excessive use of force by police and arbitrary uses of violence, it is not possible to say, or conclude, that all police actions or tactics are violent, or of a violent nature.

Theoretical Frame

According to the *political process model*, social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities.⁵ McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald explain that *social*

⁵ A review of the extensive literature on political opportunities and the political process model can be consulted in Meyer 2004 and McAdam et al 1996.

movements result when expanding political opportunities are seized by people who are formally or informally organized, aggrieved, and optimistic that they can successfully redress their concerns (1996: 8). Yet scholars disagree as to what counts as a political opportunity. The political process model addresses some of the difficulties with the narrow political opportunity concept, adding social/organization and cultural factors to the latter's political ones (Goodwin 2004: 17).

Political process researchers focus on the influence of the political system on the repression and policing of protests. Research suggests that state reactions to challengers are influenced by specific characteristics of the political opportunity structure: in particular, the existing dominant culture and institutions (Della Porta 1998: 229).

Political opportunity researchers differentiate between *stable opportunities* and more *volatile opportunities*. In the case of stable opportunities, a certain style and strategy of policing develops which includes institutional –such as the police organization, law codes, and constitutional rights– as well as cultural variables –such as the conceptions of the state and citizens' rights. Besides the stable context, open or volatile opportunities also influence policing styles. That is, protest policing is also a result of the interactions of various actors and evolving “configurations of power”⁶ (della Porta 1995).

According to Davenport (2005: xvii), most of the existing literature, assumes that the political opportunity structure within democratic contexts is uniformly structured toward pacifist protest policing. That is, in democracies, authorities are less inclined to engage in aggressive and violent repressive activity. Consequently, there should be higher levels of protests. This claim, however, has been challenged and great variation has been found in democracies with stable political opportunity structures (Davenport 2007; Earl 2011). As Davenport (2007: 175) pointed out “it is not clear whether different aspects of political democracy are equally capable of reducing repressive behavior (the problem of democratic variation). And it is not clear whether

⁶ See Kriesi, H (1989) The Political Opportunity Structure of the Dutch Peace Movement. *West European Politics*, 12, 295-312.

different aspects of political democracy are equally capable of reducing repression in circumstances of varying types of political threat (the problem of conflictual variation)". Nevertheless, Davenport concluded, among other findings, that democracy generally decreases the lethality of state repression, unless there are violent threats (2007: 179-184).

Several scholars (della Porta, 1995; della Porta and Reiter 1998; McCarthy et al 1999, McPhail et al 1998), in this line, have conceptualized *styles of protest policing* in democracies. In *Policing Protest, The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, della Porta and Reiter synthesize the three most significant tactical tendencies characterizing protest policing in the 1990s as a) under enforcement of the law; b) the search to negotiate; c) large scale collection of information. Law-breaking became tolerated by police during protest events as it was considered less important than maintaining peace. Also after a wave of escalated violence during the 1960s and 1970s, complicated procedures of negotiation emerged; and the gathering of information and surveillance of protesters by police increased in 1990s (Della Porta and Reiter 1998: 6-7).

Meanwhile, and mainly for the United States, McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy (McPhail, Schweingruber et al. 1998) talk about *public order management systems* (POMS) and they focus on more general changes in levels of repression over time. The authors explained the escalated force and negotiated management models of protest policing. For the escalated force policing style, any show of force or violence by the protestors was met with overwhelming force in return (McPhail et al., 1998). This philosophy was dominant in the 1960s and 1970s in the USA and was based on what David Schweingruber calls mob sociology (Schweingruber 2000). Under this style of policing, law enforcement relies primarily on violence, arrests, and other forms of coercion when engaging with demonstrators.

As a response to the increasing violence during protest events in this period, a new style of policing came to dominate responses to protest. The negotiated management strategy emerged based on greater cooperation between police and demonstrators and an effort to avoid violence. The new approach called for the protection of free speech rights, toleration of community disruption, ongoing

communication between police and demonstrators, avoidance of arrests, and limiting the use of force to situations where violence is occurring. This approach is currently in place in many parts of the USA and Western Europe today.

In addition to the styles of protest policing, existing work on the study of protest repression have focused on the reactive measures. That is, aside from policing styles, there are certain features of protests, which are expected to result in different degrees of repression: the level of violence and disruptiveness, the conflict's intensity, the variety of protest strategies (Davenport 1995b; Tilly 1978). For this line of research, the more threatening a movement or protest event is to political elites the more likely it is to be the target of protest control (Earl 2003; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; Earl 2006). That is, police are more likely to act (and to act in an aggressive manner) when protests are violent, numerous, directly challenging political authorities, organized and using multiple and innovative tactics. It is not clear how these reactions by police combine with the policing styles but Davenport (Davenport 2007) states that this *threat approach*, which focuses on the characteristics of the protest, is the dominant approach to repression, and a review of the literature seems to confirm it (Davenport, Soule and Armstrong 2011; Davenport 1995b; Earl 2003; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003).

In contrast to this strand, scholars focusing on the protest to explain policing have also argued for the *weakness approach* to protest control. According to this school, repression might be dangerous for power holders because elites risk public ridicule if they fail in their repressive attempts (Gamson 1975). Thus, power holders will only repress movements that they think will collapse under pressure. Another set of variables that have been discussed in the literature on repression pertain to the actual demonstrators. How does the race, gender, ethnicity or income level of protesters impact repression? Which groups are considered more threatening and why? Davenport et al (2011) examine the impact of protesters' race on police response. The authors find that, with variations over time, African American protest events are more likely than white protest events to draw police presence and that once at events, police are more likely to take action at African American protest events. Stockdill (1996) and Wood (2007) also find that minorities are subject to harsher repression. Stockdill's study of the impact of repression on the AIDS movement (1996) is consistent with a *combined*

approach to threat and weakness which indicates that severe repression is more likely when a movement or protest event is highly threatening and primarily composed of socially marginalized participants. Stockdill found that repression has served to undermine collective action targeting the AIDS crisis. However, Stockdill's study focused on the effects of repression on participants and not on what explains repression.

Organizational and neo-institutional theorists agree that the *agencies and actors engaged on the frontlines of repressive decision-making* and implementation are critical. It is police officers, military personnel, state bureaucratic officials and prosecutors –the actors most proximate to the enforcement of protest control– that are highlighted in explanations. These actors are influenced by their own unique institutional positions and the overall logics of their institutions. Earl and Soule (2006) elaborate what they call the blue approach to control. They examine not what elites see as threatening but what police agencies and officers are likely to find threatening. In other words, what matters is what the agents in the street perceive as threatening. They argue that this “peculiar institutional characteristic of the police structures protest control” (Earl, J and Soule, S 2006:149). Cunningham's (Cunningham 2003) work on the FBI's covert counterintelligence program, COINTELPRO, shows how the internal organizational structure of the FBI decisively shaped FBI action toward the New Left and toward white “hate groups” such as the KKK. For this approach, organizational and institutional features –resources, tactics, structure– of policing structures play a significant role in the structuring the form and pattern of repressive activity (Cunningham 2003:210). Clearly, as it happens in Argentina, the lack of resources and adequate training in police organizations may have an impact in the policing of protests and has to be taken into account.

Limitations of the Existing Explanations

Although vast and varied, the literature on repression and protest policing is incomplete. In what follows, I briefly identify some of these limitations to the models of protest policing presented above.

Characteristics of the protesters: Except for the aforementioned studies, the literature on repression has not focused much attention on the *features of the protesters* to explain repression. Do protesters themselves –aside from what tactics they use, how many they are, or whether they are violent– have an impact on the characteristics of repression? What characteristics of the protesters, if any, have an influence on police action and policing styles? As was mentioned earlier, Davenport, Soule et al (2011) found evidence that supports a bias in police action based on the race of demonstrators. Does repression vary based on the gender, ethnicity, or income level of the protesters? This is important because the actions of police might not be a response to the actions of protesters. The criminalization of the poor and police violence (and often state agencies’ violence) towards the poor or other marginal groups should not surprise us if is replicated during protests. I will measure whether the marginality of protesters also matters and might shape police perceptions. Marginality understood as a result of rising inequality in the context of overall economic advancement –and not necessarily economic backwardness (Sassen 1991; Wacquant 2008); deproletarianization; temporary and unprotected jobs; the retrenchment and disarticulation of the welfare state; and territorial stigmatization. Here I include groups who not necessarily constitute a social class in the traditional sense. For example, minority groups –ethnic, religious– and groups that for different reasons are subject to institutional discrimination and violence such as LGBT people.⁷ Aside from marginality, are other characteristics of protesters subject to harsher police violence?

Characteristics of the target: Auyero and Moran (2007) found evidence that suggests researchers should also pay attention to the *claims and target* of the protests. In the 2001 looting episodes of Argentina, police ignored looting episodes at small stores but was present to protect large supermarket chains. The authors argued that the state decided to use its resources to control looting episodes that could affect large and

⁷ I will provide a more detailed and exhaustive definition of marginality and marginal actors in the research chapter 2.

powerful corporations while ignoring small stores. Why? Intuitively, one would think that large supermarket chains were more heavily guarded because more people would be interested in looting them. Yet, this was not the case. What then made state forces ignore small stores and direct police to protect large chain supermarkets? Did the size of the target (such as small or large supermarkets) influence state forces presence or absence? Was it the location of the supermarkets? Auyero & Moran explained this absence of police at small stores with the type of target selected for looting and its association with powerful economic and political interests. In other words, the state responded to the looting episodes with the political decision of protecting large and powerful corporations and ignoring small stores.

The example above provides support for the threat hypothesis. Since the possibility of demonstrators looting large chain supermarkets posed a threat to economic elites –and therefore to authorities–, the state decided to send state forces to protect these supermarkets. However, and given the characteristics of the looters (mostly poor, unemployed, and marginal groups) this case also showed support for a threat and weakness approach combined. According to this school protests that are both weak and threatening are the most likely to be repressed (Earl 2003: 54). Although when the threatened group has little power, the state does not care. Earl (2011: 266) argued that researchers must attend to those being threatened –elites and/or control agents. In centralized policing systems common in Western Europe (della Porta 1995, Wisler and Kriesi 1998) threat to elites are clearly important. However, others argue that in more decentralized policing structures, threats to the repressive actors –police, for example– matter more than threats to political elites (Waddington 1998). This approach needs further investigation to illuminate whether certain claims, characteristics of demonstrators, and some targets are subject to more violent policing.

Characteristics of policing agencies and structures: Studies on protest policing that focus on police argue that security forces are influenced by their own unique institutional positions and the overall logics of their institutions. In the Latin American context, the characteristics of policing agencies and structures needs to be

examined in the light of its history of authoritarian governments and militarization of police. That is, the policing of protests in contemporary Argentina need be studied taking into account the *historical traditions, roles, and functions of security forces* and how they have traditionally dealt with demonstrations.

Is the form of protest policing (with use of violent force for some, and doing nothing for others) administered based on stereotypes that police officers have about disorders and disordered behavior? State forces might actually police differently, or with different degrees, groups, individuals, with whom they anticipate difficulty. Who are these groups or individuals? Generalizations about people with certain skin color, who live in certain neighborhoods, and so on, might be associated with an historical definition of public disorder and violence. What do policing agents perceive as threatening?

In addition, as the policing styles theories indicate, knowing about how police mobilize during major events is very useful. Yet, in a context of constant mobilizations, scarce resources, and uneven democratic practices it is difficult to differentiate between protest policing strategies without taking into account regional differences that affect state security forces. Thus, in the Latin American context, a different type of protest policing model is in place and needs to be theorized.

Political dynamics: As was mentioned earlier, the political process model takes into account how political opportunities shape protest policing. However, the explanations provided do not pay much attention to variations in protest policing according to local political dynamics and diverse local social contexts. In Argentina, the way politics is organized and practiced across the country varies greatly. There is a great degree of disparity in the way democratic institutions operate, and in many provinces, there is still a persistence of less democratic, authoritarian practices (Behrend 2011, Gibson 2005). The provincial states are composed of diverse agents and institutions, which are not always democratic. It is not uncommon to read about human rights violations and excessive police violence in some provinces. For example, until 2004, the authoritarian Juarista regime in the province of Santiago del Estero

controlled a repressive intelligence system known as the D-2 (Directorate of Information). The D2 reported directly to the governor and operated under the direction of the provincial chief of police who was accused of participating in the detention, torture and disappearance of local residents during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. When the D2 was dismantled in 2004, over forty thousand secret files on the activities of politicians, judges, journalists and ordinary citizens were found (*Página 12*, March 4th, 2004).⁸ As Edward Gibson said “the founding years of Argentina’s new national democracy were a golden age for Argentina’s subnational authoritarian regimes” (2005:123). How do these less democratic regimes shape protest-policing practices in a democratic country?

Contentious collective action takes place in response or as a result of political decisions and larger structural phenomena. It is important to examine how protest policing can vary from the national level to these subnational regions. Also, based on political alliances between local and federal authorities. How protest policing varies when local and national governments are not from opposing political parties or from divisions in the same ruling party.

In *Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina* (2007), Auyero pointed to the intersections of everyday politics and political violence. At the December 2001 looting episodes, the author found that the episodes of collective violence were not spontaneous but the result of a complex scenario in which members of the police and political brokers were involved. In a similar fashion, police violence in response to contentious collective action events needs to be examined in the light of what Auyero calls the grey zone. Protest policing research needs to account for the interactions between police and political authorities, between police and protesters, and between protesters and political authorities.

⁸ For a detailed description of intelligence policing in Santiago del Estero see: Román Margaría and Celeste Schnyder, « La política bajo sospecha. Regularidades y reformulaciones de la vigilancia política en Argentina: la policía de Santiago del Estero », *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos* [Online], Current issues, Online since 11 June 2015, connection on 10 October 2015: <http://nuevomundo.revues.org/68129>

Theoretical synthesis

The present study will adopt an integrative approach. Rather than trying to show how one of the above theories explains a state's response to contentious collective action by itself, I will attempt to show how these different models should come together, and assist us in forming a fuller understanding of protest policing. By drawing on the political process model, I will focus on the political and social context but also on the different characteristics of the protest, the protesters, the target, the state institutions, and the police organizations.

When looking at protest policing policies, it is important to also pay attention to what Ann Swidler (Swidler 1986) names "habits" and "sensibilities". I take these to mean that much of what actors do is determined by their past experience and by the ways in which they are used to act. States, police and security forces, which have carried certain policies in the past, would therefore be more likely to employ similar measures later on, often regardless of the past success of these policies or of external pressures to change their behaviors.

Similarly, just as traditions, common sense, material artifacts, idioms, rituals, new routines, know-how, identities, discourse, and speech genres also constrain and enable collective actions in different ways (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 24), they constrain and enable the policing of demonstrations. Thus, I will combine all these approaches to explain the policing of protest in Argentina.

Argentina: Collective Action Surge and Repression

Most of the research on the policing of protests has favored studies of North American and European cases (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl and Soule 2006; Davenport, Soule, et al 2011; McPhail and Schweingruber 1998; Soule and Davenport 2009; Fillieule and Jobard 1998, Rafail 2010). This is surprising since countries in other parts of the world have witnessed massive protests and opportunities

to study security forces' involvement. Since the 1990s several forms of protests have emerged in Latin America and few studies address the policing of these events. Some scholars in Latin America are conducting research on what is becoming known as the criminalization of protests.⁹ According to this line of research, as a result of neoliberal policies, nation states in the region are strengthening their institutional repressive system with the goal of controlling social protests. This is mainly displayed by judicial decisions to imprison activists for participating in demonstrations and hence preventing them from taking part in new events. That is, protesters are detained on allegations such as “preventing the free movement of people”,¹⁰ “threatening the security of the state” or “excessive coercion” and trials do not take place so they are kept in prison for long periods of time.

In Argentina, the shift toward neoliberalism began during the dictatorship of 1976-1983 but it was deepened during the administration of Carlos Menem in the 1990s. Some of the reforms implemented included the privatization of state-owned companies, the liberalization of commerce, a flexibilization of labor markets, and the decentralization of the education and health services to the provincial administrations. As a result of these policies, a “wave of transgressive political contention” spread throughout Argentina where a “heterogeneous mass of unemployed and otherwise disadvantaged citizens developed alternative means of dissent and organizations”

⁹ For a conceptualization of the criminalization of protests see *Criminalización de la protesta y de los movimientos sociales*. Inst. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Rede Social de Justiça e Directos Humanos, 2008. In Latin America: Algranati, C., Seoane, J., & Taddei, E., 2004. Los movimientos sociales en América Latina frente al libre comercio y la criminalización de la protesta. *Observatorio Social de América Latina, Buenos Aires, 14*. Murillo, S. 2004. El Nuevo Pacto Social, la criminalización de los movimientos sociales y la ideología de la seguridad. *Revista Osal, 14*, 261-273. Murillo, Susana. "El Nuevo Pacto Social, la criminalización de los movimientos sociales y la ideología de la seguridad." *Revista Osal 14* (2004): 261-273. In Argentina: Svampa, M., & Pandolfi, C. Las vías de la criminalización de la protesta en Argentina. *Observatorio Social de América Latina, 5*, 14, 2004; Artese, M. Criminalización de la protesta en Argentina. Una construcción de lo delictivo más allá de la esfera jurídica. *América Latina Hoy, 52*, 2010. Korol, Claudia & Longo, R. *Argentina, criminalización de la pobreza y de la protesta social* - Editorial: El Colectivo, América Libre, 2009.

¹⁰In the 1990s the picket and road blockade were among the main protest tactics by *piqueteros* and unemployed workers. This protest form was characterized as detrimental to democratic institutions and the normal functioning of the economy since it prevented the normal development of daily life. It was believed that these tactics generated “a conflict of rights between the right to petition and the right to free movement. From the beginning the judicial power showed strong opposition to these forms of protest by setting very questionable trials and without much reflexivity sentence in favor of the right to free movement” (Svampa and Pandolfi 2004: 287).

(Villalon 2007).

Thus, during the 1990s, informal workers, *piqueteros*, and unemployed – marginalized groups– became active organizers of collective actions. Different scholars (Auyero 2002, Schuster and Pereyra 2001, Svampa and Pereyra 2003) argued that the increase in unemployment and precarious work conditions resulted in a reduction in union organizing and demanding to the state. This decline in union organizing gave rise to an upsurge of new actors and movements: such as unemployed workers and *piqueteros*.

One reason for the mobilization of traditionally non-active groups, Candelaria Garay (2007) argued, is that workfare programs favored common interests and identities on the part of unemployed workers, allowing them to overcome barriers to collective action. That is, traditional explanations account for the upsurge in marginal groups' collective action in Argentina by pointing to a context of deprivation, lack of labor union support to the unemployed and growing dissatisfaction with partisan clientelist practices that manipulated access to social benefits. Garay, in turn, offered a policy centered argument to explain this outbreak in informal workers and unemployed collective action, which includes two elements: 1) the features of the policy design that encouraged collective action and (2) state responses to policy demands.

For Garay, state responses to demands for workfare benefits generated a pattern of protest and negotiation that strengthened unemployed groups. In her own words: “when the state responded to protests with workfare benefit provisions, it triggered further demands, which presented the national state with the choice of either confronting demands or acquiescing to them ... state responses led to a pattern of state-group interaction characterized by protest for and negotiation of workfare benefits. This pattern fostered coordinated action among otherwise isolated unemployed and informal poor workers around a common policy goal and identity vis-à-vis the state. Furthermore, it allowed them to gain crucial allies, particularly opposition unions, and to consolidate their organizations as key actors through access to material resources and members” (303). At the same time, authorities and the media started depicting *piqueteros* and unemployed groups as violent, accusing them of commencing

disturbances and even robberies, and lootings (Rodriguez 2004; Svampa 2004). This, in turn, led to high levels of police control and imprisonment of protesters during the 1990s.

According to Argentine human rights organization CELS, beginning in 1996 there has been an increase in the number of state-led repressive actions against different forms of collective action. Thousands of protesters have been prosecuted and criminally charged for their participation in demonstrations (CELS 2003). Also during protests events, several people have died, and others were seriously injured. Police brutality during detention has also been reported. This police violence at protest events, CELS reported, was followed by a disproportioned use of coercion by the different security forces at the national and provincial level. What's more, in many cases the federal justice ordered the repressive actions, and as Auyero (2010) described, the "visible fists" of the state¹¹ did not act alone.¹² Clandestine kicks and invisible elbows have also been active in the state's control and discouragement of collective actions. For example, the city of Buenos Aires, a few years ago saw the emergence of "tasks forces" which were civilians recruited to use threat and violence to evict people squatting in parks, sleeping on the streets or occupying buildings.¹³ What Auyero dubbed invisible elbows or covert forms of repression can take many other forms: from infiltration of intelligence officers in social movement organizations, to anonymous threats to movement leaders, and extreme auditing of books and the general functioning of organizations and activists.

¹¹ By visible fists Auyero (2010) made reference to open, visible repression of protests and collective action.

¹² In Auyero's words: the visible fists have "openly repressed protests organized by the unemployed, persistently criminalized contentious collective action, dramatically increased the prison population, engaged in high levels of police violence against poor youth, deployed military-style forces such as the National Guard to occupy and rein in certain destitute (and highly stigmatized) urban areas under the guise of 'safety', and sharply increased the number of evictions carried out by state agents on private and public property (2011: 4).

¹³ The name of the group is UCEP (Unidad de Control de Espacio Público) and it's a dependency of the Public Spaces Ministry of the Buenos Aires City created by decree 1232/08. For further information on UCEP see: <http://www.diarioperfil.com.ar/edimp/0313/articulo.php?art=11084&ed=0313#sigue>; <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/3-121364-2009-03-12.html>; <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/ultimas/20-162997-2011-02-24.html>

Based on publications and legislations that guide protest policing in contemporary Argentina, police seemed to favor some type of *negotiated management* approach to demonstrations. The protocol “Police Action in Public Demonstrations” (Actuación Policial en Manifestaciones Públicas) states that since 2003, the Argentine government fosters a “no repression of protests” policy.¹⁴ According to Interior Ministry Resolution 2021 published in 2005:

“The National Government, as part of its policies in Human Rights matters, since May 25, 2003, has been guaranteeing the free exercise of the constitutional rights of meeting and petitioning before authorities... That the policy endorsed by the National Government of maintaining the delicate yet necessary balance between social protests and the rights of all other citizens has become public knowledge. That, consequently, within the powers of the State, and under this framework, all the directives issued by such a concept have always been aimed at preventing repression of any social protest.¹⁵

Events in different parts of the country, however, indicate that this policy was unevenly enforced across the country. In the past year (2014), for instance, police forces in the City of Buenos Aires, the province of Córdoba, Formosa, and La Rioja used extremely violent forms of action to end very different protest events. In the City of Buenos Aires, the conflict that began with plans by the Mayor to build a civic center in land that is currently occupied by a psychiatric hospital. Groups of state workers, legislators, hospital workers and journalists resisted the beginning of demolition and were heavily repressed, resulting in 60 people injured and 8 arrested. Earlier, a court order had sentenced to stop construction works on those grounds.¹⁶ In Córdoba, police violently repressed several protest events in 2013/14 against the opening of a seeds plant by Monsanto agrochemical international company. During a sit-in, several demonstrators were wounded and hospitalized after local police used rubber bullets and

¹⁴ In 2004 President Néstor Kirchner ordered the federal police not to carry arms during demonstrations in order to avoid confrontations with protesters, Orden Del Día Interna or ODI (*Internal Order of the Day*) numbers 126, 163, and 184.

¹⁵ Argentina Interior Ministry Resolution 2021/2005:
<http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/110000-114999/111364/norma.htm>

¹⁶ Newspapers *Clarín*, *La Nación*, *Página 12*, publication *Cosecha Roja* April 25th-30th 2013.
<http://cosecharoja.org/borda-la-trama-judicial-tras-la-represion/>

tear gas to end the protest.¹⁷ In the northern province of Formosa, people from the aboriginal community Qom have been repeatedly attacked and threatened by thugs and state forces. The violence came while the Qom population protested for the right to their land that provincial authorities seek to use to build agro industrial complexes. Since 2010, Qom leaders have been protesting against violence by authorities and police, and have filed actions in court accusing authorities and police of killing activists under pretexts of confrontation, and intimidating the families of victims not to denounce police illegal use of violence.¹⁸ Similarly, in May 2013, in the city of Famatina, province of La Rioja, local police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse an assembly protesting mining works, resulting in 15 people severely injured and 5 arrested.¹⁹

Like the aforementioned events indicate, the use of violence at protest events by security forces is not uncommon in different parts of Argentina. Again, protest-policing theories must account for historical traditions of the security forces and subnational political dynamics. In democratic Argentina, some provincial governments adopt escalated force policies in repression; additionally, local elites have motivations and alliances that might also influence the degree of violence and toleration of protests, as

¹⁷ Periodicals *Paco Urondo*, *FM Salta Capital*, *Argenpress*, *RNMA* September 30th, 2013, November 29th 2013, February 21st 2014, <http://www.argenpress.info/2014/02/argentina-cordoba-brutal-represion.html> , <http://www.fmcapitalsalta.com/noticias/5912/cordoba-represion-y-detenciones-en-el-barrio-malvi.html>, <http://www.rnma.org.ar/noticias/18-nacionales/1753-rnma>

¹⁸ Newspapers *Infobae*, *Perfil*, *Clarín*. The attacks and persecution to the Qom have been reported in the news from different angles since their community suffers from extreme poverty, lack of health services and education in addition to the repression of their actions. See reports from 2010, 2013, and 2014: <http://opinion.infobae.com/diego-rojas/2013/05/10/formosa-el-autoritarismo-k-de-gildo-contra-los-qom/>, <http://www.perfil.com/politica/A-un-ano-de-la-represion-a-los-qom-en-Formosa-no-cambio-nada-20111117-0014.html>, <http://www.iprofesional.com/notas/161543-El-Gobierno-recibi-a-los-QOM-tras-la-represin-y-muerte-de-un-indgena-en-Chaco>, <http://opinion.infobae.com/diego-rojas/2013/05/10/formosa-el-autoritarismo-k-de-gildo-contra-los-qom/> , <http://www.perfil.com/politica/A-un-ano-de-la-represion-a-los-qom-en-Formosa-no-cambio-nada-20111117-0014.html>, <http://www.iprofesional.com/notas/161543-El-Gobierno-recibi-a-los-QOM-tras-la-represin-y-muerte-de-un-indgena-en-Chaco>

¹⁹ Newspaper Pagina 12, May 11th, 2013: <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/ultimas/20-219799-2013-05-11.html>, Newspaper Clarín, May 12th, 2013: http://www.clarin.com/politica/vez-represion-Famatina-heridos-detenido_0_917908287.html , Newspaper La Nación, May 11, 2013 <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1581095-dura-represion-policia-contra-ambientalistas-en-famatina>,

well as the resources and protest policing capacities they hold. In this Project, I will seek to explain the policing of protests in Argentina between 1997 and 2007.

Chapter Outline

This dissertation is divided in six chapters and a conclusion. Chapter two will discuss the research problem, methods, and data employed in this dissertation. I will describe the rationale for studying protest policing in Argentina between 1997-2007 using both quantitative and qualitative methods. I look at security forces response to protest events to address the following question: Why, when responding to a protest event, authorities and police sometimes react with violence while other times appear and do nothing? The analytic goal is to explain the range of variations in police response to demonstrations. I argue that the differences in response are explained by a) the character of protesters, and b) by political contexts and specific political dynamics.

Chapter Three will provide a brief outline of the history of law enforcement and protest repression in Argentina. Although military and police are separated spheres, in this chapter I describe how Argentina's police have had a strong tendency to militarization, which is manifested in their tactics towards protest events.

Chapter Four will report on the first series of analyses, which focus on police use of violence at protest events. In this chapter I test one of the main theories in the repression literature that the use of violent tactics and radical goals by demonstrators will lead to harsher responses by police. Findings will indicate that the use of excessive violence by police was not a result of the violent actions by the demonstrators involved in the protest event but rather a response to demands for jobs and welfare benefits.

Chapter Five will present the political context and dynamics that characterized a case of violent repression, showing the interconnections between police behavior, authorities, and everyday politics. In this chapter I will also show the militarized nature and discretionary power of police and how these play during demonstrations.

Chapter Six will discuss the hypothesis that police will be more violent at protest events composed of marginal actors. The results will show no support that the condition of marginality in protesters predict violent police tactics. Instead, the data will show that it is protesters' lack of political leverage towards the institutions they are targeting what triggers more violence by police. This provides support for the weakness theory, which suggests that weak groups (in this case actors who lack political leverage) are subject to harsher repression.

The Conclusion summarizes the dissertation's main arguments and proposes avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Data Collection

For this study two styles of data collection were used. Quantitative data was first gathered to survey the protest events attended by police in a period of time. This information then led the way to developing the document analysis and interview protocol to further understand details about the characteristics of the protest events and the actors involved in their policing during specific case studies.

By using quantitative data, interviews, and document analysis, the data collection became more thorough and detailed. In addition, it allowed for triangulation of the data.

Research Questions and Aims

This research is aimed at explaining the use of violence by state forces in the response to protest events. I examine why some protest events in democratic Argentina are responded with violence by state forces. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the literature on protest policing and repression has looked at different factors that operate in police response to protests. Yet, there are still questions that remain unanswered. First, I test a dominant theory in the literature on protest policing, which argues that police respond more harshly when, among other factors, demonstrators are violent, numerous, and present radical goals (Davenport 2007). In other words, I seek to answer the question: is the use of violence by state forces related to the use of violence, the tactics, or the goals and targets by demonstrators? How? In order to address this issue, it is important to understand the specific political opportunity structures and cycles of protest in which the events take place. Hence, I examine the level of threat posed to the authorities and police by demonstrators to explain why governments resort to violence (Davenport 2007, Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Gartner and Regan 1996). Second, this dissertation seeks to study police conduct in connection to political dynamics. That is, variations in police response point out that police not only appear in reaction to demonstrators' behavior –to a threat–, but are also conditioned by

configurations of power, actors' relationships and exchanges. Furthermore, police also follow their own and others' interests and agenda.

Lastly, based on prior research (Piven and Cloward 1978; Soule and Davenport 2009) I hypothesize that police in Argentina will be more violent and repressive at protest events composed of actors with specific characteristics. Thus, I then look at marginal actors in particular and then turn the attention to the actors' leverage to analyze if they are subject to harsher policing.

These main aims of the research were approached first through quantitative hypothesis testing to note large differences between the control of protests by police using different approaches and forms of action. Then, the second stage of the research involved a qualitative analysis that further explored the themes and findings of the quantitative portion of the study.

Part I: Quantitative Research

The primary sources of data are reports on “public collective action events” drawn from daily editions of Argentine *Clarín* newspaper from 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2007²⁰. In the following section I will detail the rationale for selecting *Clarín* newspaper and the years mentioned before, for now, it is important to mention that by placing the focus on contentious events rather than social movements themselves, we sought to take into account not just organized and institutionalized action but also more spontaneous and sporadic events of claim making.

(i) Coding Data from Clarín

Quantitative data collection and coding took place in three separate stages. In the **first stage** a research team at Stony Brook University systematically collected contentious events in Argentina from 1997 to 2007 from newspaper reports from *Clarín*. The unit of analysis was the actual collective action event itself. We followed

²⁰ These data are drawn from a major protest event data Collection Project directed by Javier Auyero, Michael Schwartz and Timothy Moran and funded by the National Science Foundation (Project 0739217).

Charles Tilly's definition of discontinuous contentious collective action (Tilly 1986). For that, to select an event from the newspaper it was understood that it had to be a) collective (more than three people), b) with the purpose of making a claim c) that bears on someone else's interests, and d) is public.

In this first stage, the team created an original template (see appendix) in which to register all episodes of collective action that appear in the printed version of the entire newspaper. All sections of *Clarín* were scanned for events except for "last minute" or "breaking news" (*Ultimo Momento*) that appear in the digital version of the newspaper to avoid double coding of the same event –in case it appeared the following day in the newspaper's printed edition. There was no sampling of days to avoid possible bias and undercounting of events.

Following Tilly's (1986) criteria, we did not consider continuous events as more than one event. For instance, when researchers read about the occupation of an oil company building that lasted four days, we counted that protest as *one* event, and not four. Another criterion followed was that if a newspaper article described several protests within the same story, each of these protests was considered separate events. This is the case in which different people gather at the same time in different places. These are different contentious gatherings. Example: one news report about different groups of people carrying out pickets in Mendoza, a strike in Jujuy and a land occupation in Neuquén (three provinces in Argentina). These are three separate gatherings and therefore were coded separately. We made an exception to this rule when two protests took place at the same time in two different places but were coordinated by the same group of people (not same organization but the same persons), have the same target, and same claims. For example, a group of taxi drivers organize a blockade in two different corners of the same city. This was considered to be one event.²¹

²¹ The major protest forms recorded were rallies, demonstrations, marches, pickets and more discreet activities such as petitions or letter writing campaigns.

The **second stage** involved coding the content of these events from the template sheets. All the text recorded in the template sheet was transformed into variables, which were recorded as numbers in an Excel file. Variables were not coded with reference to predefined closed category systems, but on the basis of open-ended code lists that could be extended each time a new actor, action, issue, target and, so on, appeared. This coding step was designed to retain as much as possible of the original qualitative content of events (Koopmans and Statham 1999, Ruud Koopmans; Statham, P; Giugni, P; Passy, F 2005: 263). Data collected included information on the protest (constitution, form, number of participants), tactics used, claims made, the target of the event, police action, injuries, arrests, deaths that occurred during the event, and other consequences of the event.

Since the general data set only contained partial information on police activity, in a **third stage** I selected a sample of events –all of which had police response reported– and re coded them with additional information. I recoded 343 events with police presence in 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2007. The years were chosen because they represent three key moments of Argentina’s political process.

The three moments under study reflect different economic, political and social contexts that allow for a clear differentiation in the analysis of each period (1997/8; 2001/2, and 2006/7). The crisis of 2001-2002 with the downfall of Fernando De la Rúa’s government and Duhalde’s transition administration marked a watershed in Argentine history that significantly changed the political culture and organizational dynamics of contentious collective action and the nature of policing. After the 2001 rebellion new ways of expressing claims emerged giving way to new forms of popular resistance and forms of challenging the government. This, in turn, led to new forms of administering policing and state forces to respond to protest events. The 2001-2002 can thus be summarized as a phase that expresses “a peak of contention (...) characterized by the appearance of various innovations in the repertoire of contention and the engagement of other sectors of the population in the process” (Villalon, 2007: 143).

I chose between three and four years before and after the crisis and rebellion to make a clear differentiation in the analysis of each period. The 2001/2 cycles of

contention and crisis cannot be understood without taking into consideration the political and economic changes of the 1990s that transformed the country. In 1997 and 1998 during the Peronist (PJ) administration of Carlos Menem (1989-1999), the government implemented neoliberal adjustment policies which led to a “wave of transgressive political contention that spread throughout Argentina where a “heterogeneous mass of unemployed and otherwise disadvantaged citizens developed alternative means of dissent and organizations” (Villalon, 2007: 139.).

Lastly, the 2006-2007 period –about four years after the crisis– during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner’s more left-leaning government were characterized by economic growth and progressive social policies in favor of minorities and human rights group. Nevertheless, poverty levels and unemployment rates remained at high levels during this period and the expansion of the workforce also led to an increase in union activity starting in 2003 (Svampa and Mateos 2004).

As Lesley Wood argued “policing strategies have been repeatedly transformed by waves or cycles of protest” (2014: 43) thus looking at contention and protest policing in these three very different moments will allow assessment on what characteristics of protest policing are stable and which are dynamic, dependent on other contextual shifts and influenced by the ongoing interactions amongst police and protesters, as well as amongst protesters and amongst police (Wood 2014).

The additional coding included details such as the specific police force that responded to the protest (whether provincial, federal, and/or specific anti-riot or special units), the number of agents, the type of action taken by police, the weapons or equipment police used (such as special hydrant water cars, horses, sound devices, etcetera) and socio-economic and political information about the period of the events such as poverty, unemployment rates, and political alliances between different levels of government. The data was then analyzed using SPSS.

Table 2.0.1: Total Events

Table 2.1: Total Number Of Events With And Without State Forces Involvement And Violent Tactics By Period²²				
Protest Events	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>De la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Total (%)
Total number of events in which state forces were involved	60 (13%)	164 (9%)	119 (8%)	343 (9%)
Total number of events in which state forces used violent tactics*	40 (9%)	113 (6%)	74 (7%)	227 (6%)
Total number of events in which protesters used violent tactics**	15 (3%)	64 (4%)	39 (3%)	118 (3%)
Total number of events	469 100%	1749 100%	1520 100%	N=3758 100%

Note: *Violent tactics by security forces included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, and arrests. **Violent tactics by demonstrators included all events in which there were episodes of lootings, attacks to buildings or persons with weapons, rocks, and episodes in which protesters used bombs, firecrackers or set up fires.

Source: Protest data are from author's dataset and event database by SUNY Stony Brook Center for the Study of Contentious Politics of Latin America

On the Use of Newspapers as Data Source

A long tradition in the collective action literature has demonstrated the usefulness of newspaper archives for the collection of event data (Earl et al. 2003; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1982; Olzak 1989, 1992; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1995). However, many studies have also assessed the drawbacks of using newspaper reports as data for analysis of contentious politics (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Davenport 2009;

²² 1997: 175 events, 1998: 294 events, 2001: 635 events, 2002: 1114 events, 2006: 701 events, and 2007: 819 events.

Koopmans and Statham 1999; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999; Olzak 1989; Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992; Snyder and Kelly 1977).

A common criticism of newspaper data collection catalogs of events is that these rely on indexes elaborated by a Publisher or a private source to identify articles on protest events. As Earl et al (2003) mentioned indexing does not generate either the total population of protest events reported in newspapers or a representative sample. Rather, it produces a sample of newspaper accounts that is structured according to the indexing methodology (68). We avoided this issue by not using an index or sampling of days. Instead, we read every daily issue of *Clarín* in order to scan, select, and categorize articles and events of interest. This method allowed us to identify contentious collective action events in articles not necessarily focused or reporting on collective actions, social movements, or even protests. For instance, an article on the default of the Argentine peso to the dollar in the finance section of the newspaper only included one paragraph discussing a pot-banging rally and march against a bank. In an index based data collection scheme, this article would most likely be missed. However, following the data collection scheme used here, this article was identified and coded.

In addition, *Clarín* has all of its newspapers online starting in 1997. The “upper limit” of the year 2007 responds to the goal of producing up-to-date information about the phenomenon under study. Let us turn now to the problems entailed by the “selection” and “description” biases and how they relate to this study.

Any news item may be affected by description biases since they are narrated through the reporters’ schemes of perception but are also subject to editorial decisions that are influenced by corporate and state interests.²³ As Davenport (2009: xii) states “sources matter,” thus we decided to use *Clarín* to reduce some description biases since, during the period of this study, this newspaper was the most widely read daily in Argentina.²⁴

²³ For a discussion on news’ reporting when covering radical or fringe elements see Bagdikian 2000, Gitlin 1980, Herman & Chomsky 1988, Lee & Solomon 1990, Ryan 1991

²⁴ According to the IVC (Instituto Verificador de Circulaciones) www.ivc.org.ar *Clarín* sells around 300.000 copies from Monday to Saturday, and around 613.000 on Sundays while *La Nación* –the second

Other criticisms center on newspaper's selective reporting of events ("selection bias"), for example urban bias, and their erroneous reporting of information on events covered (the "description bias" mentioned earlier). Some scholars also discuss the so-called "researcher bias" which is introduced through coding and data entry errors.²⁵ To reduce the possibilities of incurring in this common problem, in addition to reading all the newspapers in search for protest events, I also conducted a keyword search on every edition of the newspaper chosen. In the search, I looked for the words: *protest, rebellion, repression, tear gas, (rubber, plastic, etc.-) bullets, police violence, policing, and confrontation*. Additionally, I also conducted a Factiva²⁶ search using different keyword combinations to examine whether I was including all relevant events of protest policing in Argentina during the period of my study. When an event not included in the *Clarín* dataset appeared in the Factiva search, I searched again in *Clarín* to include it, from *Clarín*, if I had missed it. I did not find any events on Factiva that had not been reported by *Clarín*.²⁷

A problem not always recognized and discussed in the literature that uses newspaper data in event catalogs is the fact that reported news are only a sample of the total population of protest events. To qualify as "newsworthy" a situation has to typically adjust to one or more of the following features: it has to be *notorious* (with famous speakers or leaders or with actions or objects that are "trendy"); *consequential* (the actions taken may or will have an impact on other actors); *extraordinary* (the actions are noteworthy because of the tactics used, the numbers of people involved or the public interest in the topic); and culturally resonant ("actors, actions, events illustrate, highlight or emphasize that which is widely familiar") (McCarthy, McPhail et al. 1996). Besides this, events that challenge corporate interests are usually underrepresented in the news (Gamson et al 1992).

largest national daily— sells an average of 161.395 from Monday to Saturday and an average of 328.066 on Sundays.

²⁵ For a discussion on researcher bias see Franzosi.R 1987 The Press as a Source of Sociohistorical Data. *Hist. Methods* 20:5-16

²⁶ Factiva's search covers thousands of media sources all over the world and in different languages. I conducted the search in both English and Spanish filtering by date range, country, and specific keywords.

²⁷ For some specific events I also read and analyzed information provided by other national or regional newspapers. This information was part of the more qualitative data used.

According to the specialized literature, the use of national newspapers is recommended when trying to develop an accurate profile of the contentious collective actions that took place in a given country, as was the case of this dissertation. The main problem with using a national newspaper is that “a nationally published newspaper inherently tends to apply the criterion of ‘nationwide relevance’ for covering protests. Thus the large majority of protests to be found in regional and local newspapers will be missed” (Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992). This problem of selection bias is especially pertinent to one of the aims of this work, since local conflicts of protest do not always reach the pages of a national newspaper, and in the cases they do, it might be because the conflict escalated to unprecedented proportions. This “geographical” or “scope” problem that affects the selection bias is also reinforced by the under-representation of demonstrations with small amounts of people involved. Another problem researchers found with national newspapers is the proximity effect on reporting such that the closer the protest event to the news source, the more likely a report on the protest event (McCarthy et al. 1996). In other words, some events, it is argued, are seen as more newsworthy by the press, and thus are more likely to be reported. The factors that influence judgment of an event’s newsworthiness include the proximity of the event to the news agency, the size of the event, the intensity of the event, violence at the event, sponsorship by social movement organizations, or the use of sound equipment (Earl, Martin et al. 2003).

Nevertheless, in favor of using a national newspaper to create the events catalogue, it is argued that all protest events taking place away from the urban centers will be covered (or not covered) by the newspaper in similar fashion. In their article on *Methodological Issues in Collecting Protest Event Data*, Rucht and Neidhardt (1999) provide strong theoretical reasons that suggest the use of national newspapers is a good choice for collecting protest event data. Among them they mention that only mass coverage will matter to political elites and will have potential relevance for policy making. In their own words: “if our interest lies in analyzing protest that are potentially relevant for social and political change, there is good reason to focus only on those events that are, or can be, registered by the wider public” (1999:76).

In order to control for selection bias problems that result from using one national newspaper, I also searched for news items using the Factiva engine mentioned earlier that includes not only national newspapers but also news wires and local sources. To further control for selectivity and reporting problems, for the years 2006 and 2007, I also checked and compared the data drawn from *Clarín* with the dataset constructed by the Observatorio Social de America Latina –OSAL (Social Observatory of Latin America).²⁸ CELS and CORREPI human rights groups also collect data related to police violence and from those sources I was also able to compare and check any missing events. As a result of these searches I found that all events that appeared in the Factiva and OSAL searches had also been reported by *Clarín* newspaper. However, on specific events, the OSAL dataset had more detailed information on the repressive actions than the newspaper so I completed my dataset using this material as well.

In addition to the newspaper data, I also used contextual data in this stage, which was obtained from Indec (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, *National Institute of Statistics and Census*) and Ministerio de Trabajo (*Labor Ministry*).

(ii) Variables and Operationalization

Closer to the design of the current study, Christian Davenport, Sarah Soule and David Armstrong II (2011) looked at the impact of protesters' race on police response in the United States between 1960 and 1990. This study makes an important contribution toward connecting repression with the identity of the protesters. However, looking at the impact of protesters race on police response is very specific to the United States' context since racial categories are not applicable –in the same way– all over the world. Although it is often true that minorities are subject to more severe and cruel forms of police violence, in Argentina for example, the color of a person's skin is not pondered –at least formally– as an identity descriptor. This does not mean that racism is

²⁸ OSAL, Observatorio Social de América Latina (<http://www.clacso.org.ar/institucional/1h3.php>). Since the year 2000 it publishes a report on social movement and conflict events in several countries of Latin America. For Argentina in the year 2006, OSAL collected newspaper data from *Clarín*, *Página 12*, *Crónica* and *La Nación* dailies and presented the information on a day-by-day text summary of events.

not at play. On the contrary, other forms of racism and discrimination operate, as race is not considered a usable category.

Additionally, other identities (imposed or invented by the members of the group) should be examined in detail. Second, Davenport et al's study does not contemplate the current demonization of protest events, which may be an important aspect to consider. I believe this is connected to the interactions between authorities and protesters, and between police, elites and protesters. That is, I will also look at how policing is shaped by these interactions. Finally, Davenport, Soule and Armstrong's study is limited to the United States and the policing of protest events may be quite different in other parts of the world.

(iii) Dependent Variable

Taking all the above into consideration, the *dependent variable* here seeks to measure several types of protest policing at protest events. Although protest policing can be operationalized in different ways, for the Argentine context, and during the period of this study, it was necessary to contemplate an ample array of dimensions for dealing with protests. Hence, the dependent variable was constructed based on the actually observed forms of police action in Argentina between 1997 and 2007. These forms of action or police tactics were:

- Police appeared but takes no action
- Police appeared, displayed preventive tactics and took limited visible action (display barricades, divert traffic, etc.)
- Police made arrests
- Police made arrests and used violence.
- Police made evictions (from building and/or roadblocks) and people were injured or there were reports of violence.
- Police used of physical force: pushing, hitting, shoving, kicking, pulling hair
- Police used weapons: gas, rubber bullets, fire, pepper spray
- Police used a combination of physical force, weapons, equipment, arrests, and people were wounded.
- Police engaged in a confrontation (this could be between protesters and authorities or between protesters and police). No reports on who started it. The confrontation involved violence by both parties engaged in the

incident such that police fired tear gas and protesters responded by throwing bricks and stones at them.

- Judge ordered raid, forceful eviction of land, property or any occupied area. Threat of force or arrests to dissolve a protest, destroy land occupation, demand something from demonstrators. For example, police used sound dispersal weapons to disperse rally). *Event: 20070819 road blocks ended.*

These observed tactics were combined one more time, resulting in a four-category dependent variable. The four categories are: (1) appear at event, (2) making arrests, (3) using physical force, weapons and arrests, and (4) participate in violent confrontations.

It is important to point out that confrontations involve police using violence such as weapons and physical force but, on these occasions, the newspaper also reported that demonstrators were using violent or confrontational tactics, hence the label of confrontation. However, it is not possible to know who started the confrontation, was it a counterdemonstrator trying to provoke disorder? Was it one rebellious activist? Was it an angry police officer that provoked a spat? Or were (government) paid thugs sent to create disorder and chaos? Newspaper reports of confrontations refer to what Auyero (2007) calls the gray zone of clandestinity. That is, an area where the boundaries between authorities or police and the suspected perpetrators of violence blurs.

The **dependent variable** was also operationalized as dichotomous, capturing whether *police did use violence (=1) or not (=0)*. If police conducted any of the following tactics: made evictions, used physical force, used weapons, people were wounded, engaged in a confrontation or/and there was a threat of force then police did use violence (=1). Police did not use violence (=0) when they appeared at the event and did nothing, or appeared at the event and took limited actions such as divert traffic, block roads or display barricades. When police made arrests, it was coded as not using violence since more brutal or extreme forms of violence –generally outside of the law– are considered.

(iv) Independent Variables

One of the aims of this dissertation is to explain on what occasions state forces use violent tactics at protest events. Several factors may influence police behavior. For that, I divided the independent variables used in the analysis in four groups. These include protest and protestor characteristics; situational threats; social-economic and contextual indicators; and security forces tactics.

The indicators that measure protest characteristics include the elements of a contentious collective action event that are not related to situational attributes. These traits include aspects such as social-demographic qualities of protesting groups, race, gender and other identity characteristics that may be perceived as threatening and thus trigger differential repression, independent of situation threats (Davenport, Soule and Armstrong 2011). In this study I include the following measures of protest characteristic: First, the size of a protest event, measured by the number of participants. Second, I assess whether unions are reported to be present (=1) or not (=0). Given the history of Argentina, the presence of unions may trigger different responses from authorities and police. Third, one of the hypotheses in this study is that police and authorities are more likely to use violence and harsher tactics at protests composed of marginal demonstrators. Thus, to measure this I include a variable on marginality in which the actors, the activists taking part in the protest, are very vulnerable, needy, and poor people –often from poor neighborhoods or shantytowns. These actors often appear in the news as unemployed, pickets, cardboard collectors, squatters, day laborers (*changarines*), or from neighborhoods that can be characterized as marginalized. This has been characterized as economic marginality using newspaper wording and double checking with INDEC data such that the variable included people who are labeled by the newspaper as shanty town inhabitants or from very poor areas without running water, sewer systems, and payment roads. Also among marginality I included ethnic marginality. That is when the actors mentioned in the newspaper belong to immigrant groups from the poorest bordering countries; to indigenous communities; or to groups

that are racially stigmatized. A third component is sexual marginality when the actors belong to a LGBT group. There are other types of marginality such as when protesters belong to a group of patients with stigmatized diseases such as AIDS, alcoholism, drug addiction; when protesters are handicapped or have malformations; and other types of marginalization conditions. Thus, among “marginal” I specifically include people who have temporary, informal, and unprotected jobs (cardboard collectors, street vendors, squatters); piqueteros, people who suffer territorial stigmatization and groups –ethnic, religious, minorities– that for different reasons are subject to institutional discrimination and violence such as LGBT groups, aboriginals, disabled, and victims of violence. This variable is also coded 1 for presence of marginal actors or 0 for absence of any group with these characteristics.

Three measures are used for situational threats: These are related to demonstrators’ behavior during the protest event that may influence police action. Tactics are an important aspect to consider since these may be perceived as threatening by police and thus increase the probability of repression (Earl and Soule 2006). First, I include a dummy variable indicating whether protestors engage in violent tactics or actions (No=0 / Yes=1). Violent tactics include the use of weapons or physical violence, but also breaking the law during a protest event such as sitting in and shouting at a space that was out of bounds for demonstrators. Second, property damage indicates whether demonstrators (or some other actor) destroyed or *damaged public or private property* (cars, buildings, parks, etcetera) during the event. This was also a dummy variable coded No=0 / Yes=1. In addition the target of the protest event and the political message put forward by protestors has been shown to be predictive of police response in some settings. Thus, the third and fourth variables measure the claims and target of the protest event.

Socio-economic and contextual indicators: This dissertation also discusses the relationships between protest policing and political factionalism. Here I include a dummy variable that measures whether the provincial government is allied to the national government or the president (No=0 / Yes=1). Also included in the analysis is a variable that measures whether each province implemented iron fist or *mano dura* policies to combat crime in their jurisdiction. This variable was also coded as Yes=1,

No=0 when each provincial administration ascribed to the broken windows or zero tolerance policy²⁹ and implemented more severe punishments to small crimes, gave more power to police agents, and other similar tactics.

One measure of security forces tactics was also used as independent variable. I use an indicator for whether *arrests* took place during the event (Yes=1, No=0) to analyze police response at protest events. Although arrests are also a display of police force, it is different from other forms of force or violence. Arrests require the intervention of a judge and the justice system so this response to a protest event has a different impact and consequences for police and authorities. Arrests was coded as a dichotomous and coded as Yes=1, No=0.

In addition to the newspaper data, I also collected other sources data. Let's turn the attention to it.

²⁹ The main notion of the broken window theory is that small crimes can make way for larger crimes. If the "petty" criminals are often overlooked and given tacit permission to do what they want, their level of criminality might escalate to more serious offenses. Adams, Joan (2006), *The "Broken Windows" Theory*.

Part II: Qualitative Data Collection

Quantitative studies do not allow the researcher to explore what Auyero (Auyero 2007) defines as the gray zone of clandestinity. The notion of the gray zone refers to the domains between insurgents, state agents (including police), and party activists that are deeply intertwined. In other words, the boundaries between the “protest side” and the “repression side” or between institutional and non-institutionalized politics (Auyero 2007: 20) are not always that clear. Thus, to understand these aspects of protest policing and repression, and the possible participation of state forces or agents in the direct promotion of mobilization and /or the perpetration of collective violence I utilize qualitative research methods. In addition, the use of qualitative research allowed me to scrutinize key moments of repression in the protest cycle –when repression was directed to specific groups.

Thus, in addition to the newspaper protest event data discussed earlier, this dissertation employs a case study format, which allows for several other data sources. I analyze police resolutions and other internal regulations (*circulares*) of policing organizations; reports and analyses by social movements, publications from human rights organizations, court transcripts and my own field-notes from the December 19-20 court trial, Parliamentary debates from both the Upper and the Lower Houses of Congress, and other sources such as the OSAL database mentioned above. In addition, I also review public videos, which display the interactions between demonstrators and authorities during the period of this study. I look at when and how authorities ordered the use of violent policing methods, and how police use different tactics against protesters (from displaying barricades, use of special weapons and gear, to pushing, arresting, dispersing, beating demonstrators).

I also conducted twenty in-depth interviews with security experts, police chiefs, politicians, human rights organizations staff and activists, state prosecutors, journalists, state agents at the security ministry, and academics. In addition, I visited police training institutions, human rights and SMO offices, participated at group meetings at these institutions, and attended several press conferences and rallies³⁰ on police repression. I

³⁰ At the rallies and protest events I sought to observe the interactions between protesters and police.

also took part in a police-training workshop in which human rights issues were introduced to agents.

Interviews lasted an average of one and a half hour and were conducted in Spanish at a number of different locations, but typically took place at cafés and restaurants. The interviews were semi structured. I had a set of themes or areas³¹ to cover with the subject but I was also open to letting the conversation flow. I was particularly interested in allowing for the emergence of opinions, the description of events and situations not previously contemplated, and the invitation to access documents, data, and other sources of information otherwise difficult to find.

The use of these different sources of data will allow me to triangulate views, information and journalistic accounts to achieve a more comprehensive representation of the policing of protests in Argentina.

(v) On Investigating Police and Policing

According to Marcelo Saín, a renowned scholar on police studies, the academic world and the social sciences in particular have held a belief that police are repressive corrupt apparatuses with absolutely no possibility for transformation (2008). Following that reasoning, if the social researcher dedicates time and resources to the study of the police institution, she is proving it with an importance that it does not deserve. Furthermore, police have traditionally been considered an actor of less significance; their actions and behaviors are often considered repulsive, and there are few –if any– records or archives documenting their actions. These prejudices and blindness on police were of particular bearing in Argentina (Saín 2010:40-43). Put differently, the study of police –as an intellectual object of the social sciences– was not considered attractive. Furthermore, as Sabina Frederic pointed out, the social sciences are generally associated to a “progressive” line of thought, which is contrary to the military and police perspectives. Thus, scholars who study the police were often compelled to take a

³¹ Please see Appendix for list of subject areas

political and ideological stance, which not always allowed for an analytic distance in their productions (Frederic 2009: 8). Nevertheless, numerous scholars have, in recent years, begun publishing and conducting investigation on the police institution in Argentina.

In general, as Saín notes, the members of the police institution, and those at the top in particular, reject any kind of inquiry, inspection or exam from any political, social, journalistic, or academic stance external to them (2010:31). Among the reasons for this, the author mentioned the concealment of institutional practices characterized by abuse, illegalities in the use of force (tortures, executions, disappearance of people, etc.), institutional corruption and the regulation by police of criminal activities of high profitability (2010: 32). Several other scholars (Reiner 2000, Vitale 2005, Hinton 2006) have also reported on the difficulties of interviewing police officials so I was not surprised to find resistance accessing police.

Furthermore, a person's own identity, life history, experiences, and personality also have an impact on the possibilities of *gaining –or inhibiting– access* to a field site. As an Argentine middle class female social scientist conducting research in my own country I encountered serious difficulties trying to interview active and former police agents (officers, chiefs, cadets, etc.), as well as accessing police records and archives. It soon became clear to me that I lacked the appropriate capital (Bourdieu 1984) and body dispositions to be able to build trust and conduct the qualitative portion of my research. My education, my networks of trust, my political perspective, and even the way I dress and my image came out as unsympathetic (even hostile) to security forces staff. Thus, I first sought to gain access through fellow academics and journalists but this did not yield good result since police were hesitant about my intentions. The following phone conversation with an active police chief in Buenos Aires illustrates the point:

Fernanda: Hello ..., my name is FP and I'm a doctoral student... (interrupted)

Police chief: Who are you? Who gave you my number? *Do you know who I am?*
(very emphatic)

Fernanda: Yes, of course Sir. That's precisely why I'm calling you. I'm interested in... (interrupted)

Police chief: (very angry and with a loud voice) I asked you who gave you this number?

Fernanda: a journalist

Police chief: who?

Fernanda: A press reporter from...

He hanged up.

I couldn't say the name of the person who had given me the police officer's phone number. This did not ease him and our brief conversation ended there. I tried calling again a few more times but we never spoke again. Hence, I tried other ways of accessing police. Since I was more interested in officials from former administrations, I decided to ask friends and acquaintances to introduce me to their friends who could have worked or had been involved with police institutions and could give a good word of who I am. Through this informal channel I was able to interview past and present officials.

Although I guaranteed absolute anonymity to all interviewees, only a handful of the interviews were tape-recorded since most subjects directly declined having the interview recorded or told me that they were uncomfortable with it. Based on this experience, when I interviewed police I decided not to tape record any conversation. I believe this was a good decision since once the interviews started, I felt they enjoyed talking about their past experiences and details of their job.

One of the interviewees was reluctant to give any details about his job and his experience at the Security Ministry until he accepted my suggestion of walking away from his office (and building). We started walking and ended at a café where he finally seemed to forget his initial hesitation and spoke freely for over two hours.

Many of the interviews were more like informal conversations yet I was able to take notes, which I elaborated, expanded and revised, at the end of each interview.

There was another important caveat I had to contemplate when conducting qualitative research on state security forces. For the same reasons I did not have the appropriate capital to gain access, I also had strong prejudices against security forces. Before starting this investigation, I had the belief that security forces in general, and

police in particular, engrained all the negative traits (brutally violent, dishonest, destructive, arbitrary, and etcetera) of which they are often accused. Because of this I tried to take a distance and reflect on my research. I sought, and was allowed, –albeit expected– to ask rather basic questions about the functioning of security forces in Argentina, the institutional culture of the forces, their training, and the institution in general that could seem obvious to my subjects. And I was pleasantly surprised to have met and interviewed great men and women working in policing.

Chapter 3: Protest Policing in Argentina, Brief Overview

“From 1976 to 1983, Washington supported a devastating military dictatorship in Argentina that ran all branches of government, outlawed elections, and encouraged school and business leaders to provide information on subversive people. The administration took control of the police, banned political and union organizations, and tried to eliminate all oppositional elements in the country through harassment, torture, and murder. Journalists, students, and union members faced a particularly large amount of bloody repression, thus ridding the nation of a whole generation of social movement leaders. As was the case in other Latin American countries, the threat of communism and armed guerrilla movements was used as an excuse for Argentina's dictatorial crackdowns. Hundreds of torture camps and prisons were created. Many of the dead were put into mass graves or thrown out of places into the ocean. Five hundred babies of the murdered were given to torturers' families and the assets of the dead totaling in the tens of millions of dollars, were all divided up among the perpetrators of the nightmare. Thirty thousand people were killed in Argentina's repression.”
— Benjamin Dangl³²

3.1 Introduction

A march in the city of Buenos Aires, a student sit-in or rally in the province of Córdoba, a roadblock in the Patagonian province of Neuquén, and a state agents strike in the northern province of Jujuy are regular newspaper appearances in present-day Argentina where union activists, students, teachers, pensioners, movement and political party advocates organize some form of demonstration every day, and in both cities and rural areas. All of them, designed to bring about some form of social change. As I write this, a local newspaper reports in its headline that there were 12 pickets a day during the

³² Dangl, Benjamin (2007) *The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia*, AK Press, p 27.

month of January alone –one of the least “contentious” months of the year since most state offices are closed for summer break.³³

Most of these protests are held with a certain degree of organization (from both the state and demonstrators) and end peacefully after negotiations or talks with state authorities or whoever the target of the claim is. Nonetheless, state forces –with different degrees of coercion and use of force– are often present at protest events. What state forces do during protest events and the way they do this has varied throughout the history of the country. Yet, police in Argentina have a long history of using excessive violence, especially when confronting social protest (Bonner 2002). In this chapter I will outline a brief history of police presence at protest events in Argentina.

According to human rights organization CELS –since the end of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship– the number of protest began to increase significantly in 1996. Also since then, police killed dozens of people during protests, thousands have been seriously injured and thousands more arrested also during demonstrations. Those arrested have sometimes reported being tortured by police (CELS 2003).

The year 1996 coincides with the emergence of what became known as the *piquetero* movement: informal and unemployed workers who began to protest in large numbers by staging pickets and roadblocks throughout Argentina. The appearance and rise of the *piquetero* movement resulted in the formation of national level unemployed federations and fronts composed of hundreds of community associations (Garay 2007)

This upsurge in mobilization took place during the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms by the administration of President Carlos Menem (1989-1999). These reforms had a great impact in the working class and poor, including an increase in unemployment rates and poverty. Candelaria Garay (2007) argued that the surge in collective action was related to neoliberal policies and the introduction of a national workfare program, *Plan Trabajar*, created in 1996 to demonstrate public concern on the issue of unemployment. This program’s features and design encouraged collective action.

³³ La Nación, January 30, 2014, “En la ciudad hubo 12 piquetes por día en el mes de enero”
<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1659705-en-la-ciudad-hubo-12-piquetes-por-dia-durante-el-mes-de-enero>

Thus, since 1996, protests by *piqueteros* –among other groups– continued and have faced different levels of policing and control. As Michelle Bonner lays it out: “legally, the right to protest in Argentina is guaranteed in the Constitution under article 14, the right to “petition authorities”. There are also regulations and laws that stipulate that the use of firearms and force by security forces to manage protests should be used as a last resort, after all other methods have been exhausted. However, police continue to manage protests in much the same way as they have since the dictatorship” (Bonner 2012: 2).

In contemporary Argentina, police forces and the military have clearly differentiated functions and roles. While the former is mainly concerned with domestic security, the latter is in charge of international conflicts. Nevertheless, given the country’s history of military coups, police has been frequently viewed –by scholars and lay audiences– as an extension of the military and thus not worthy of much academic attention (Saín 2008, Kalmanowiecki 2000). It was thought that by narrowing military autonomy and power, arbitrary state violence would also be controlled (Kalmanowiecki 2000: 38). Capricious or excessive police violence was not analyzed much, and given that there was no political intervention, the police were left almost untouched until a decade after the dictatorship had ended (Saín 2008, Hinton 2005). Thus, police violence continued after the democratic transition, directed at, particularly, socio-economic problems such as poverty, social unrest, and crime (Saín 2004, pp. 4–5).

In this chapter we will look at the historical forms of managing protest by police and its political use, to understand correlations with the present time. Also, how the institutional separation between the military and police evolved during the years.

3.2 Law Enforcement in Argentina

As a federal and republican country, Argentina is divided into 23 provinces and a federal district: the Buenos Aires City. Each province has its own constitution and

organizes its authorities. Provincial states have political and judicial autonomy. In light of this, each province and the City of Buenos Aires may organize their own police, judicial and penitentiary systems and have authority in matters of budget and financing. In addition, at least five national agencies perform *internal police activities* at present in Argentina. Here I will briefly describe these institutions and their connection to protest policing.

In combination, there is also a federal level or jurisdiction. Within the federal level are the **Policía Federal Argentina** (PFA-Argentine Federal Police), **the Prefectura Naval** (Naval Prefecture), **the Gendarmería Nacional** (Border Patrol) and since 2005 the **Policía de Seguridad Aeroportuaria** (Airport Security Police). The four federal forces are a branch of the Ministry of Security, and they operate all throughout Argentina.

Table 3.0.1: Security Forces Organization

Table 3.1: Security Forces Organization by Level of Government 1997-2007	
Level of government	Forms of police organization
Federal - National	Policía Federal Argentina (Argentine Federal Police) Gendarmería Nacional (Border Guard) Prefectura Naval (Maritime Police) and, Policía de Seguridad Aeroportuaria (Airport Security Police) created in 2005, and replacing the Aeronautical Police, which historically depended on the Argentine Air Force.
Provincial (23 provinces and 1 district)	Each province has its own police, judicial, and penitentiary systems. There are 24 provincial law enforcement agencies.

The type of police force that shows up at a demonstration or contentious collective action event will depend on the territorial jurisdiction of the force and the level of threat perceived. On occasions, when a collective claim-making event is perceived to be out of control, political authorities may decide to call on the federal police or the border guard. Nevertheless, the functions of each force at the federal and provincial level are as follows:

At the Federal level, the **Argentine Federal Police** (Policía Federal Argentina, PFA) is the largest force in the country, it was created in 1943,³⁴ and its main duties were of national security and criminal investigation, this defined as auxiliary to the judiciary (Article 1, Law Decree No. 333 1958).³⁵ The Federal Police has delegations in each province and also functioned as local police in the City of Buenos Aires.³⁶ Yet, its main functions are the national level with both intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities. In the provincial territories, the Federal Police is in charge of the prevention and control of federal crime (drug trafficking, smuggling, organized crime among other felonies that affect the national interest), and work in collaboration with the federal justice system. As Guillermina Seri described “the Federal Police is an armed civilian institution that responds to the national executive power through the Ministry of Interior” (2005: 424).

The **Border Guard** (Gendarmería Nacional)³⁷ is a federal force in charge of guarding the borders and the national territories. Although the Border Guard, or

³⁴ The Federal Police was formally created in 1943 based on the Capital Police that operated in the City of Buenos Aires from 1880 until that year. The Capital Police was not formally national but, due to its dependency on the federal government, had the capacity to intervene throughout the territory on matters that threatened the security of the state (Kalmanowiecki 2000)

³⁵ The main federal police regulations: the Law No. Decree 333 (Ley Orgánica de la Policía Federal [Organic Law of the Federal Police] 1958) was sanctioned under de facto President General Pedro Aramburu (1955–1955) and the Ley para el Personal de la Policía Federal Argentina (Law for the Personnel of the Argentine Police; 1979) was sanctioned under the de facto presidency of Rafael Videla (1976–1981) (Oliveira and Tiscornia 1997, p. 61)

³⁶ After the approval of the legislation 26.288, and the subsequent 2.894, a police force for the City of Buenos Aires was created: the Metropolitan police. Currently, in 2014, the PFA functions as local police in the City of Buenos Aires in collaboration with the Metropolitana police.

³⁷ The National Legislation 19349 provides the characteristics of this force (<http://www.gendarmeria.gob.ar/archivos/653ley19349.pdf>) which is also part of the Interior Security System regulated by legislation number 24.059. For further information on the *gendarmería* visit <http://www.gendarmeria.gob.ar/>

Gendarmerie, is primarily a frontier guard, it also fulfills other roles. It is part of the Security Ministry and it is considered an intermediary force because of its military character. It is defined as a civilian “security force of a military nature”³⁸ (regulation 19349) with capacity to respond to threats, crises, and contingencies both inside the country and as support in operations of foreign policy.

Many border guard agents have been recently (2010-2014) appointed to hold policing functions at shantytowns and at protest events.³⁹ Until then, for the National Border Guard to intervene in protest events, a provincial government—in need of its mediation—had to request the federal government to grant permission and send troops to the province in question.⁴⁰ Yet, the Border Guard fulfilled this function in several instances. In 2001, for example, upon the request of a judge, the Border Guard cleared a roadblock in the town of General Mosconi in the province of Salta, and since 2003 it has been conducting police functions in several shantytowns of the Buenos Aires province. The Border Guard also avoided confrontation during a protest event by negotiating an end to a demonstration in Gualeguaychú, Entre Ríos 2006 (Grupo de Estudio sobre Policías y Fuerzas de Seguridad CAS-IDES 2012).

The *Maritime Police* or Coast Guard (Prefectura Naval), in turn, is a national level force that according to legislation 18.398 has police functions connected to the control of waterways. The Maritime Police until 2011 was mainly in charge of guarding the coasts, ports, and water vessels but with decree 864/11 its functions were expanded to include “the restitution of order and public peacefulness”. The *Airport Security Police* (Policía de Seguridad Aeroportuaria) is in charge of all internal security matters at airports. It is also in charge of the security related to the control of organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and smuggling.

Therefore, each security force has its detailed characteristics, functions and jurisdiction. Yet, in practice there is an overlap of forces during certain events, and at

³⁸ <http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/institucional/index.html> and legislation 19349 that regulates its organization <http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/historia/ley19349.pdf>, accessed May 19th 2014.

³⁹ <http://www.taringa.net/posts/noticias/8135370/6-000-gendarmes-a-las-villas-miserias.html>

⁴⁰ This trend changed in 2010 when the government stationed Border Guard and other federal forces in shantytowns of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires.

specific jurisdictions. For example, a march and rally in the Buenos Aires City might be patrolled by the Federal Police, the local Metropolitana police but also by border guard agents, and coast guard police.

At the provincial level, each of the 24 local areas (23 provinces and the City of Buenos Aires) has responsibility over public security in their jurisdiction. Thus, each province has its own security organization and policies, which results in an atomization of security policies and lack of continuity in policies. For example, while some provincial administrations advocate for democratic, non-violent police regulations and actions others might hold iron fist and zero tolerance policies. In addition, policies might change from province to province or with administrations in the same province.

The largest and most important police force is those belonging to the province of Buenos Aires. It is known as “the *bonaerense*” and employs nearly 80.000 agents.⁴¹ Although each province has its own system and policies, most of them share similar structures to the Federal Police.⁴²

On issues of Federal security, the provincial police work together with the Federal police.⁴³ According to the legislation 24.059 of the Interior Security (1991) in severe situations of public vulnerability or disasters, the governor of the affected province might call for the police forces and security forces of the National State. For that, a Crisis Committee is created. The committee may request assistance from the ministry of defense (and call on the military forces) to provide support for internal security issues.⁴⁴ A Crisis Committee is not formed often but only in response to a major crisis such as when there is a “natural” catastrophe (earthquake, flooding, etc.) or violent riots that cannot be controlled with local security forces.

⁴¹ Another important factor in the Buenos Aires province police force is the demographic and territorial extension it covers.

⁴² Also common to Police officers from both the Federal and Provincial forces are accusations of crime, corruption, bribery, human trafficking, vehicle theft, and excessive violence.

<http://www.latercera.com/noticia/mundo/2013/12/678-555762-9-como-son-los-cuerpos-policiales-provinciales-de-argentina.shtml>

⁴³ Scholars argue (Waldmann p121) that federal police is generally more efficient than provincial police.

⁴⁴ This does not imply the use of combat elements in the domestic field.

The control of protests used to be a jurisdiction of the police in charge of guarding that territory: provincial police when it occurred at the province, maritime police when the demonstration was at the coast, the border guard when it involved frontier territories and federal police in the City of Buenos Aires. As presented here, police work seemed quite organized by legislations, territories of operation, and other institutions. Yet, the reality of Argentine policing is more complex than this formal division of functions among agencies, which, in addition has been changing since the beginning of the 21st century. As mentioned above, there are different forces that have the capacity to operate in the same territory. In the City of Buenos Aires, for instance, since 2010 Federal Police function in combination with the recently created Policía Metropolitana (Metropolitan Police) and, on specific situations, the border and coast guard. An event in the city of Las Heras in the province of Santa Cruz in 2006 may illustrate how provincial police and other forces may operate in the same territory:

Starting in 2005, oil workers in Las Heras went on strike in demand of better pay and an increase in the minimum taxation exemption. The workers blockaded roads and occupied company facilities to make their claims, receiving strong support from the community. Although they able to win some of their demands, on February 2006 a leader of the petrol workers was detained and hundreds of demonstrators marched to the local police station to demand his release. It is unclear how it started but there was a confrontation between police and protesters that ended with several people injured and an officer that was shot died hours later. It was then that the provincial government requested help from the federal government. As a result, federal authorities arrived to Las Heras with federal police and border guard agents and carried out mass arrests. The combined forces treated the community –of 9300 people– as a military zone. That is the Argentina Security law stipulates that security is a faculty of the provincial government. The provinces have their own police and the provincial government regulates, determines how to manage, and finance their own security forces. The national frame law (legislation 24059) establishes minimum procedures for coordinated actions among forces. On occasions, such as during the uprising in Las Heras that combined people wounded, a dead police officer, workers on strike, roadblocks and the police paralyzed and infuriated ready for retaliation, the provincial government may

request the federal government to send federal forces (border guard, coast guard and federal police) to operate in the province.

Furthermore, as Laura Kalmanowiecki argued: the complexity of Argentine policing is greater when it comes “to a central activity in the maintenance of public order: intelligence. In this area a large number of agencies overlap and duplicate. Information about the intelligence community is relatively scarce, however in as much as secrecy has been its hallmark” (Kalmanowiecki 1996, 35).

In 2001, the legislation 25520 created the National Intelligence System. The national intelligence system comprises several organizations⁴⁵all of which are directly subordinated to the president. Yet, the provinces also have their intelligence agencies subordinated to the governor and police forces have an intelligence division. All in all, and despite of the Intelligence legislation, the work and activities of intelligence divisions is very complex, and quite obscure. Thus, for the purpose of this research, the policing of protests will be analyzed without a deep analysis of intelligence activities. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that large amounts of information are collected by government agencies with regards to protesters, their organizations, and activities. The discussion of the history of protest policing below will help understand this issue.

3.3 Historical Overview of Protest Policing in Argentina

There isn't much written about the history of protest policing in Argentina and the bits and pieces that exist are incomplete. Here I will briefly narrate the history of the policing of protests since the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.

Sociologist and historian Laura Kalmanowiecki argued that during the nineteenth century policing was understood very broadly, connoting both the protection of the security of the state as well as the welfare of the inhabitants. The same public officials at this time were in charge of the most diverse tasks: such as the apprehension

⁴⁵ The Secretaría de Inteligencia (Intelligence Secretariat); Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence School); Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales (Judiciary Observations Agency); Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal (National Agency of Criminal Intelligence); and Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Estratégica Militar (National Agency of Military Strategy).

of common criminals, surveillance of political suspects, and inspection of commercial establishments. Yet, state security was the priority, so the militarization of the embryonic police forces was a regular practice at moments of political and social upheaval (2000:198). Put differently, from its formation, the main function of police was to maintain order and protect the state and not to guarantee citizens' rights and obligations. As Martin Andersen puts it: "in practice this meant that those holding power positions had more influence over the guardians of order than the people in whose name –in theory– they acted" (2002: 21).

Between 1820 and 1870s, the Argentine modernization process was accompanied by the use of the coercive powers of police and courts to protect property, maintain public order, and provide a disciplined work force (Blackwelder and Johnson 1982; Szuchman 1984; Szuchman 2006). This meant that the government took the responsibility of security, but also of disciplining the population by enforcing contracts and labor obligations and by the enactment of laws regulating moral and social behavior. By 1880 the supremacy of the national state was established. The country had become a dynamic capitalist society with a large number of European immigrants. The city of Buenos Aires was federalized and made the national capital, "effectively consolidating the monopoly of legitimate violence in the hands of the federal army and the police. The Buenos Aires city police thus became the Federal Capital Police (*Policía de la Capital*), directly subordinate to the president through the minister of the interior... Economic growth, state building, and more vigorous central governments brought about a need to adjust the police forces to the new and normalized order" (Kalmanowiecki 2000: 198). This Capital Police formally had jurisdiction in the capital city but due to the city's central role in national affairs, its police was entrusted with security of the state and in addition to local, it also acquired national policing functions. The next twenty years saw the rapid professionalization and expansion of police both in the capital and the Province of Buenos Aires. In addition to increasing institutional power, the police drew closer to the military, which was also undergoing a rapid expansion and consolidation of political power (Rodriguez 2000).

Most scholarly articles agree that while the police defend a community against threats from within, the army is thought as defending a community against threats

outside itself. But, as Kalmanowiecki states “this definition presents problems when studying policing in Latin America inasmuch as the army and the police there have been deeply intertwined from the onset of state formation, and the functional differentiation of the two institutions has often been blurred” (1995: 45). Nonetheless, in Argentina, the creation of the capital police in 1880 led to a specification of policing activities and police acquired its definite organization. During the nineteenth century, police forces developed to combat crime and maintain public order. “Propertied classes commended the police for their imposition of discipline and social control on the native classes. Also, as in the United States, the development of the police was a response of urban elites to the increase number of immigrants in fast-growing Buenos Aires” (Kalmanowiecki 1995:75). The police were “domestic missionaries” designed to impose new kinds of social control on the new working class. However, the expansion and reorganization of the police forces in Argentina did not become a reality until the elites became threatened by the growth of industrial conflict, the expansion of anarchism, and the struggle of the middle classes for incorporation in the political arena. According to historians, the Capital Police was the first modern police department to develop in Argentina where policemen, as bureaucratic agents, became instruments of the state.

Anthropologist Mariana Galvani, states that the intellectuals of the time had diagnosed that Argentine society was ill and that this was the consequence of “bad immigrants”, “strange bodies” and “troublesome foreigners”.⁴⁶ Thus, security forces had the task of disciplining those who caused disorder (Galvani 2007: 33). In line with this, historian José Luis Romero (1994:46-47)⁴⁷ shows that the growing working class was then starting to demand better working conditions and would express their discontent through repeated labor strikes. The activists at the forefront of the

⁴⁶ At the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century Argentina had one the highest percentages of immigrants among the countries and regions of the world (Australia, New Zeland, USA, Canada, Uruguay and the south of Brazil) that were considered empty and in need of European inhabitants. In 1914, 30% of the residents in Argentina were foreigners, and 12% of these were Italians. In the USA, the number of foreign residents reached a peak of 14.5% in 1910. (Di Tella Torcuato 1998. *Sociología de los Procesos Políticos*, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1988, cap xii, pp339-357). Unlike in the USA, the immigrant population in Argentina had a very active role in the creation of workers unions and labor movements.

⁴⁷ Romero, Jose Luis. *Breve Historia de la Argentina*, 1994, Eudeba. Buenos Aires.

movements were most of the time working class foreigners who brought new ideas and language from their home countries. At the beginning, local traditional elites were indifferent to their claims. At most, they considered immigrants to be ungrateful in face of the hospitality offered by the country. Yet, the protests and workers discontent increased throughout the years, coinciding with repeated economic and political crises.

Soon, local elites began witnessing the appearance of “dark, fierce and dangerous masses, with no bonds to local society that attacked in the shadow and invaded the spheres until then reserved to Argentines” (Galvani: 33-35). Buenos Aires was a city under the threat of dangerous classes. In response to this fear of social unrest and resistance, there was a considerable increase in police resources and personnel. During the first decade of the 20th century, authorities sought to discipline this alien mass and force all immigrants to become Argentine. Those that wanted to keep their nationality were easily deported. This was facilitated by the approval in 1902 of the *Residency Law* (Ley de Residencia 4144) that gave the executive branch, permission to deport any foreigner who “disrupted public order”. That is, any foreigner whose conduct posed a threat to national security or disturbed order could be expelled from the country. In addition, any foreigner who could be suspected of the latter could also be prohibited from entering Argentina.⁴⁸ The residency law encoded the widespread theory of “contamination” by immigrants (Rodríguez 2000). Similarly, in 1910 after a bomb exploded in Buenos Aires main theatre and opera house (the Teatro Colón) a more comprehensive law was enacted: the *Social Defense Law* (Ley de Defensa Social 7029). This measure prohibited the entrance of anarchists into the country and provided police with a regulation to deal with “outside agitators”. Thus, after the federalization of the Argentine nation in 1880, police structures were rationalized and these legislations served to define police actions in the first decades of the twentieth centuries since police were the crucial enforcers of these repressive measures.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ In 1905, the police of Buenos Aires, Río de Janeiro (Brazil), Santiago (Chile), and Montevideo (Uruguay) signed an agreement which included the extradition of union workers, also defined as dangerous people: “workers’ union agitators that disrupt with violence or force the freedom to work or to attack property...” (Quoted in Andersen 2002: 386).

⁴⁹ The actual number of people directly affected by these laws was relatively small. Nonetheless, as Rodríguez argued, they had a very important impact on the nations’ political culture. The creation of

Foreign workers took to the streets to protest these measures but both “army and police ruthlessly smothered” protesters (Romero 1994: 50). According to Kalmanowiecki elites and sectors of the police pressed to expand legislation in order to squash any source of labor unrest, public demonstrations, or anarchism (2000: 201). According to many, the growing anarchist movement was the main threat to Argentine “civilization”⁵⁰ at the turn of the century. Anarchists were widely seen as criminal and hence the main targets of repressive laws (Rodríguez 2000: 301). Thus, as early as 1906, the police organization was restructured to mainly promote order and protect the state. Colonel Ramón L. Falcón was appointed chief of police and he established a basic police organization that varied little until the creation of the Federal Police in 1943. Falcón introduced military’s strict discipline and hierarchies in the police institution that prevailed until the 1940s (Andersen 2002: 22-23). Under Falcón, the government expanded the scope of anarchist surveillance and persecution; in the search for order and social peace, the use of coercive measures towards working classes prevailed (Kalmanowiecki 2000: 201, Andersen 2002: 48-50). For example, on May 1st 1909, an anarchist workers movement held a march and rally in Buenos Aires that was severely repressed. Police appeared in horses and used swords and bullets to break up the protest, as a result twelve people were killed and hundreds wounded (Romero 1994). The repression did not result in the taming of contention or the decrease in protest events (Moore 1998). Far from that, police violence led to a sequence of general strikes and massive mobilizations by workers. In addition, the police developed a tradition of repressive and violent treatment of activists and poor people. This crystallized into the systematic use of torture against common criminals after the first

these laws sent a powerful disciplinary message to the entire population. They defined— with the backing of the law— the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Moreover, the laws reinforced the growing nativist sentiment and provided legitimacy for the means of repression by state (Rodríguez 2000:298)

⁵⁰ As Rodriguez (2000) explained, in Argentina’s twentieth century legislative discourse, “civilization” was characteristic of national elites and was associated with the “national”. In contrast, anarchism – associated with the unruly– implied foreignness, invasion, and threats to national stability and growth. Many feared that the Argentine masses could unleash riot and terror at the instigation of foreign anarchists. Also, immigration was widely accepted as one of the main factors in Argentina’s rising criminality.

military coup in 1930 (Chevigny 1995: 185).

In 1916, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) –a party standing for the defense of middle class rights, with Hipólito Yrigoyen as leader– won elections. In spite of its democratization ideas, the government still responded to labor conflict with large-scale repression. As an example, in 1919 a general strike started by steel workers of Buenos Aires was violently repressed. The episode became known as the Tragic Week (*Semana Trágica*), and this time both police and emergent task forces (or paramilitary squads) attacked workers. These shock squads (*grupos de choque*) were said to be organized by private factory owners and elites that wanted the end of protests at all costs (Andersen 2002). The squads worked along police and were made up of civilian volunteers called to break demonstrations. According to Alain Rouquié these were initially called private organizations of social defense and aimed at organizing the resistance against working class demands, which were considered subversive (Rouquié 1978: 141-145). These associations functioned providing factory’s management with professional strikebreakers or counterdemonstrators. The *Liga Patriótica* (Patriotic League) is worthy of mention because it emerged during the violent episodes of January 1919. During the confrontations between steel workers and security forces, upper class families formed armed groups to support police in their fight against the challenging workers. Residents from the wealthiest neighborhoods spread rumors that “Russian agitators, revolutionary agents of the Soviet seeking to take power”, fostered the riots. No evidence was ever presented to support the claim but bourgoise paramilitary militia was created to defend the country from communists, and the red wave coming from overseas. They attacked union headquarters, and social movement organizations; workers’ libraries and printing house were looted, and all agitators – Jewish Russians in particularly– were persecuted. An “anticommunism without communists” and an anti-Semitic activism erupted in Argentina. This civilian task force –that received weapons from the police and met at the Navy Center to receive some military instructions– became the *Liga Patriótica* [Patriotic League]⁵¹ (Rouquié 1978: 145). The *Liga Patriótica*’s political believes, its methods and affinities soon found the support of the

⁵¹ The Patriotic League defined itself as an “association of armed pacific citizens” that guards to protect society and defend it against the “exotic plague. It is anti-socialist and xenophobic (Rouquié 1978: 146)

military which would accompany, in different ways, these emergent civilian task forces that operated in Argentina. In different forms and with changing relationships to police and the military, paramilitary task forces kept operating throughout Argentina's history.

The multiplication and increase in workers' mobilization and strikes during this period (1914-1921) in Argentina was contemporary to a wave of contention in Europe and other parts of the Americas. During this time protests increased because unemployment was growing as the local industry was shrinking. Train, steel, port, municipality workers went on strike and were violently repressed by the Argentine government (Romero 1994: 50-52). Argentina's elites feared the spread of revolutionary ideas –stemming from the Russian revolution– among the local working class (Rouquié 1978). Thus, local bourgeoisies demanded more punitive measures and repression towards demonstrators, and the UCR government of Irigoyen often acted accordingly. The UCR did not abolish the repressive legislations passed during past administrations (the residence law, for example) and police violence against challengers to the state continued.

Police, the construction of who “disrupts order”

Working class immigrants who fought for better working conditions were perceived as criminals who disturbed society (Kalmanoweicki 2000, Rodríguez 2000, and Seri 2011). That is, workers who organized at factories or at work places to stage a protest or a strike were considered criminals and police violently repressed them. Police imprisoned any suspect indiscriminately and used brutal violence arbitrarily. Accordingly, police tactics ranged from imprisonment to torture (Chevigny 1995). However, as Julia Rodríguez documented, during the first decades of the twentieth century, criminology in Argentina had achieved the status of a mature science, and police began to heavily rely on it. Criminologists played a role in pushing for a new criminal code, judicial and civil reforms, and legal aspects of certain social problems, which they considered, fell within their domain. The guiding spirit of these reforms was the concept of social defense interpreted by one criminologist in 1913 as the “initiative

to segregate permanently from society those being whose presence constitutes a threat to public safety, taking in consideration secondarily the seriousness of the crimes committed (Rodríguez 2000: 275-280).” Thus, drawing on French scholars, criminologists developed an elaborate classificatory system of the “dangerous” groups and individuals who posed a threat to the nation. These classifications tended to be objectivized in people who were “scientifically” proven as threatening. “In 1920, police kept a registry with mixed photographs and particular marks that composed what was called the “indicator” and the “individualizer” that would help identify crime professionals. The list consisted of 413 persons distributed in 24 activities or criminal specialties. Among the criminal fields were anarchists and terrorists, strike instigators, union and rabble-rousers” (Rodríguez and Zappietro, Quoted in Galvani 2007, page 34 no page or year found).

Thus, during the first decades of the 20th century, based on this classificatory scheme of people, police identified suspects and criminals. Foreigners, anarchists and other “criminals” who participated in protest events were surveilled, identified, classified, detained and punished by police to “protect the nation”. Strikers and demonstrators were crime professionals and police forces had the task of “correcting” them.

Politics and the militarization of police

Peter Waldmann (2003: 119) argues that the institutional separation between domestic and external security forces in Europe was initially carried out to allow more flexibility when putting down internal strikes and revolts. Police methods would admit more diverse forms of calming a massive protest than bringing in the military. Many states in Latin America followed this institutional division but often, the separation was truncated or not fully done. It was difficult to determine who was the external enemy and who was only a political rival. Citing Mansilla (1996: 149) Waldmann adds “the enduring influence of the military is also manifested in the exaggerated importance that many police officers assign to weapons and weaponry, and in the authoritarian and

repressive behavior they exhibit in front of the citizenry. And, in last instance, in the purely hierarchical organization of its institution.

Scholars agree that Argentine police force can be characterized by a strong tendency to militarization (Galvani 2007, Waldmann 1996, Kalmanowiecki 2000). For decades, police force had military hierarchies and often time military officers were in charge of the police. This was the case during the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. During this period, the basic structure of the police organization varied little (Kalmanowiecki 2000). Between 1930 and 1945, twelve different chiefs of police led the force. Eleven of these were military officers and one was a civilian (Andersen 2002, Rouquié 1978). During this time, Argentina went through a period (1930-1943) that historians have labeled the Infamous Decade (*Década Infame*), a succession of military coups and administrations that resulted in the rise to power of Juan Domingo Perón. The period was characterized by an important migration of rural workers and landowners from the provinces to Buenos Aires, who took jobs in an incipient industry, forming a new working class.⁵² The expansion of the working class went hand in hand with extreme government repression and a harsher stance on protest events and all types of mobilizations. Severe measures were implemented towards all “subversive” movements. Anarchist and communist organizations were dissolved and their leaders imprisoned in mass and deported to their home countries. The military government created a special police agency to fight communism that soon extended the persecution to all communists, socialist, and any challenger to the state. As an example of this extreme police violence, in 1931 an anarchist found guilty of forging money and stealing was sentenced to death and executed. All in all, political police during this period prohibited strikes and mobilizations (Rouquié 1978: 223-225).

As was mentioned earlier, the Federal Police Force was created in 1943 as an agency subordinated to the President. It became part of the Interior Ministry the following year, and took the name of Policía Federal Argentina (Argentine Police Force), as it is known today, in 1945. In 1946, Juan Domingo Perón became

⁵² The massive rural exodus was mainly in response to the great depression, the Second World War and other socioeconomic factors of the time such as changes in the form of production and an expansion in the service industry.

Argentina's president. It was during his tenure that Argentina began a major expansion of the welfare state that included the creation of many state agencies, the extension of public pension coverage, the development of healthcare programs within the social security system, the expansion of housing policy, and the development of public infrastructure in health and education (Isuani 2010). Police agents across the nation benefited from these reforms and legislations such as a reduction in the number of working hours, the implementation of a pension system for police forces and the creation of parks and other recreational centers for the family and members of the force. Scholars argue that all the social benefits that police forces received during this period made them loyal to Perón. When Perón was president in the 1950s, the police defended Peronist unions and supporters. In Kalmanowicki's words "During Perón's government, the entire police force was 'Peronized' and was instrumental in support of Perón's efforts at conciliation of labor and capital. Repression was used against the political opposition and against any attempt at labor autonomy" (1995:43).

In 1955 yet another military uprising ended Perón's second presidential term. With the coup all police that had any connection with Perón were also removed, and among the first measures of the brand new military government was to replace all chiefs of police, once again, with military personnel. Police forces were transformed into quasi-military organizations (Seri 2005: 425). After the coup, state repression reversed and this time, the target became all Peronist unions and supporters (Andersen, 2002: 143–168). The new military government sought to proscribe and eliminate all Peronist support and thus imprisoned and attacked all unions and workers who supported the previous Peronist administration.

After the military overthrew Perón in 1955 and proscribed Peronism, police forces were transformed into quasi-military organizations. Members of the military were appointed as police chiefs. This destitution of police chiefs was repeated with every military uprising in the country, thus emphasizing the military character of the force. It was only during democratic periods that police chiefs were actual members of the police institution (Galvani 2007: 40). Andersen mentioned that between 1955 and 1973, "11 chiefs of the Federal Police were military" and only one a civilian. As a result, most police officers think of themselves as non-civilians still today (2002: 168).

The cold war era also fostered the militarization of policing with the introduction of the concept of “internal enemy” inspired in the National Security Doctrine. French and American training in counterinsurgency prepared the terrain for the complete involvement of the Argentinean police in practices of state terror (Seri 2011: 425).

In *Understanding Police Work* Anneke Osse argued that the militarization of police may show itself in aspects such as the hierarchical system in use, the police culture, the training aspects, personnel policies, living quarters of police officers and the operational tactics used (2006, 64). Scholars have shown that many of these features were characteristic of Argentine police since its conception. Thus, the rules and regulations, the organization, the institutional culture and all of police practice have been influenced by military molds since its beginning (Galvani 2007, Saín 2002, Sozzo 2005, CELS-HRW 1998). In 1998 Human Rights Watch and CELS published the results of an investigation on police violence in Argentina. The report presented a recommendation for the professionalization of the police force and the implementation of a respect for human rights among its members. According to the text, this required an end to all militarization of police training and culture since this fostered police brutality. In Argentina, among the regulations that promoted excessive and arbitrary police violence, the report states “the assimilation of the military principal into the police organization has brought confusion into security tasks where a ‘war against crime’ that characterizes suspects as ‘enemies’ is contrary to the rule of law”(CELS HRW 1998: 10). Furthermore, the military influenced the constitution of police forces in the country, which held similar characteristics to the military organization: hierarchical structures –superior and subordinate staff–, training methods, promotions, and punishment system. For example, the report noted that lack of proper hygiene, disrespect, not properly saluting a superior, smoking or making jokes while in presence of superior are all offenses worthy of a ten day imprisonment punishment (1998: 33, 40).

In addition, this militarization of police gave way to a series of illegal and corporate practices of the institution. “Militarization is not only about bringing army staff to carry out police work, or carrying out police work from the army. Militarization is about impregnating the police institution with the values, the discipline, the symbols,

bureaucracy and other elements of the army. Frequently, the forces of public order are seen as part of the armed forces. This is because the defense of public order is seen as a basic function for national defense. From this perspective, national security is identified with the security of dominant regime. The military structure is very handy for those in power that, also, confuse police and military tasks. However, the idea of understanding police work as a war with the enemy within (marginal, subversive people and outcasts) is quite common. It is widely spread among ample layers of society idea that police tasks are nothing more than a specialization of military tasks” (Manuel Martín Fernández, *La profesión de policía, Siglo XXI*, 1990 cited in Galvani, Mariana 2007: 42).⁵³

Mariana Galvani argued the militarization of Argentine police became more explicit and was expanded during the military dictatorship of 1976-1983. During this period, the police acquired a growing amount of autonomy and impunity. Bonner explained that police were entitled to execute persons suspected of participating in subversive activity (2008) and contentious collective action was rare and frowned upon. Most groups met and operated in the shadow until after the return of electoral democracy in 1983. Yet, police brutality existed before and continued well into the 1990s. According to Casarvilla (2000) during the administration of Carlos Menem (1989-1999), immigrants from neighboring countries –mainly Bolivia, Paraguay, and Perú– that arrived in Argentina to work or meet family were, once again, constituted as a threat, as a “dangerous class”, and as the cause of rising unemployment and crime. Some sectors of society and politicians attributed socio-economic problems to immigrants instead of state policies. This narrative –that not only involved immigrants but also other marginal actors– was replicated by the media legitimizing police action based on social and institutional prejudices.

⁵³ In addition, a common and legitimate practice of police officers during the first half of the 20th century was the use of torture to eliminate opponents of the regime and impose terror. In *Historia de la tortura y orden represivo en la Argentina*, Ricardo Rodríguez Molas (in Galvani) showed that workers, students, politicians, and opposing military leaders were victims of torture. Also in this period, the use of tear gas began and police created a unit called “Special Section” (1934) with the goal of combatting Marxism, radicalism (name of the local Social Democratic Party), among other “suspicious doctrines”.

In December 2001, the repression of protest events resulted in the imprisonment, injury and death of dozens of protesters. Bonner (2009) reasoned that “key public officials responded to the repression of social protest by justifying it as necessary because the protesters represented a “threat to democracy” or by arguing that they had told the police *what* to do (e.g., remove the protesters) but that it was up to the police *how* they did it”.

3.4 Use of violence

As was mentioned earlier, use of police violence in Argentina –on all occasions, including protest events– can be traced back to the constitution of the force. “The historical role of the police in Argentina has been to defend the country from the ‘enemy within’ through the use of repression. The ‘enemy within’ the police has had to combat has included anarchists, Radical Party members, Communists, anti-Peronists, Peronists and vaguely defined ‘subversives’ or ‘terrorists’. The definition of who the ‘enemy within’ is has consistently been established by the government in power” (Bonner 2008: 227). The government in power, in turn, might vary and have ample differences from the federal to the local level.

Due to Argentina’s federated organization, some security institutions are subordinated to the national government, and then each province has its own force. Nonetheless, police violence is an issue extended throughout all levels of government and forces.

CELS Human Rights organization, in its 2003 report, stated that systematic abuses and serious violations to human rights were a characteristic feature of Argentina’s public security forces. The report presented several cases that illustrate the systematic use of violence by security forces throughout the country and how it is articulated at the different levels. In all cases researchers found a disproportionate use of force by police during protests: “This irrational use of force has been analyzed in the case of both lethal force and other forms of coercion (such as the arbitrary use of tear gas, illegitimate detentions, abuse and maltreatment of protesters inside and outside of

detention centers” (CELS 2003: 156).

Some episodes of excessive use of violence by security forces have been known to take place after the protest event ended or before it started; this last one with the goal of scaring or intimidating activists and their supporters. During interviews activists mentioned forceful and illegal entries to SMO offices, threats, torture, and surveillance. The report by CELS argues that the use of violence by police does not aim at dispersing rallies through warning –when there is a risk to people. Far from that, CELS stated that by 2002, “the actions by security forces increase violent conditions exponentially and often times this extends well beyond the territorial space where the protest takes place and the period of time the protest lasted” (CELS 2003, 160).

In the report, CELS argued that lack of specifications in legislations and deficient institutional controls were among the reasons for excessive use of violence by security forces.

The current Law of Internal Security (24059) does not provide specific criteria on the circumstances and events that authorize security forces to use coercion –and in what degrees. This regulation also does not indicate the form that repression by security forces may take: from using tear gas, to rubber bullets, etc. Regulations are also deficient with regards to police agents’ faculties during potential conflicts at protest events. The 1958 Organic Police Legislation (6580) currently prevailing, states in its article 97 that: *officers of the Federal Police should use force every time it is necessary to maintain order, guarantee security, prevent crime and in any other act of legitimate exercise*⁵⁴.

In all the text of the legislation there are no other specifications as to what it means “to use force every time that it is necessary” or how much force, in what degree, or what type of force. Similarly, it states that force may be used in “any act of legitimate exercise”, which are these acts? It is not specified. This article provides an important discretionary power to the police. The actual police have the legal authority,

⁵⁴ In Spanish: Artículo 97.- Los funcionarios de la Policía Federal deben hacer uso de la fuerza cada vez que sea necesario para mantener el orden, garantizar la seguridad, impedir la perpetración del delito y en todo otro acto de legítimo ejercicio.

the power, to decide what is considered an act worthy of repression and also, what degree of force to use.

The following article, 98⁵⁵, states: “*the employment of coercive means will be conditioned on the particular circumstances of each case and in the indispensable form to assure the enforcement of the law.*” Again, there are no specifications as to what circumstances, or what cases require coercive measures and what forms of coercion. Both articles of the regulation leave police with an important degree of discretion.

Other factors can account for police violence during periods of electoral democracy, including poor police training, lack of proper rest/sleep, government and police corruption, and ineffective police oversight. In her article *State Discourses, Police Violence and Democratization in Argentina*, Michelle Bonner states that state actors contribute to the persistence of police violence by failing to articulate a clear and consistent democratic role for the police. She argues that state discourses can “reveal the level of commitment state actors have to democratic policing and the limits of that commitment. State discourses also suggest the level of support police officers are likely to receive from the state if they comply with or ignore new policies and laws aimed at changing their practices... state discourses can affect policy outcomes by holding police verbally accountable to minimum standards of democratic policing” (Bonner 2009 p227). I will delve into police violence at protest events in the following chapters.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I presented an overview of Argentina’s history of protest policing. Although since 1983 police have been subordinated to the democratic government, it is still militarized, corrupt, hierarchical, and perceived as anachronistic,

⁵⁵ In Spanish: Artículo 98.- El empleo de los medios de coerción estará condicionado a las circunstancias particulares de cada caso y en la medida indispensable para asegurar el cumplimiento de la ley.

uneducated and untrustworthy. In addition, police often used ruthless violence during protest events. In Mariana Galvani's words:

“The repression exerted by police during the 2001 economic and political crisis –that resulted in 37 people killed by police– cannot be explained as an excess of the officers involved. It needs to be analyzed in the historic frame that constitutes the police institution and in the way that being a policeman is constructed” (2007: 47).

Police reforms toward greater legality, community policing styles and managerial improvement, have failed. The reforms were started in the 1990s but were reversed a decade later preserving their authoritarian style (Hathazy 2013) and Argentina continues to have a highly corrupt, and violent police force. It was this institution with its specific history, legal prejudices, militarized history, intolerance to dissent, and vertical structure that confronted the people who took to the streets between the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century.

During this period, new social movement groups and new forms of action emerged throughout the region, and together with it, human rights groups (CELS 2003, CORREPI 2012) report an expansion of repression. In the following chapters I will analyze the actions and tactics of Argentina's security forces in response to contentious collective action events and social movement groups between 1997 and 2007.

Chapter 4: When Policing Becomes Violent

In spite of regular elections, freedom of speech, and clear democratization policies, between 1997 and 2007, human rights groups in Argentina protested against an increase in police violence against civilians (CELS 1998, 2002; CORREPI 2007). From tortures against suspects in police custody, to *gatillo fácil*⁵⁶ (trigger – happy) deaths, police harassment of youth, or persecution of challengers to the government, there have been serious accusations of state violence during successive administrations.

Yet, in Argentina, there are no official statistics on police use of violence – either for physical force or discharging weapons. As of 2014, the Ministry of Security, in charge of the design and implementation of public policies related to domestic security, did not publish systematic information on any police activity. This extended to such basic information as citizens killed or wounded as a result of police action (CELS 2001). This lack of information has been correlated with an absence of policies aimed at problematizing police violence.⁵⁷

During the 1990s and 2000s, human rights groups CELS and CORREPI began collecting information from newspapers to create an archive of police violence cases. Although this constituted advancement, these data only covered parts of the country and did not differentiate the use of violence by police at protest events.

In this chapter I present the results of the first systematic survey of police use of violence at protest events in Argentina, focused on three important moments in post – dictatorship history: 1997-1998; 2001-2002; and 2006-2007. My purpose is (1) to examine its characteristics and changing patterns, and (2) test a dominant theory in the literature on protest policing, which argues that police respond more harshly when (among other factors) demonstrators are violent (Davenport 2007). According to this

⁵⁶ *Gatillo fácil*, (easy trigger or trigger happy in English) is the term used by the media and society to describe police irresponsible use of lethal weapons and violence.

⁵⁷ Since 2012, several state agencies and human rights groups joined forces to create the *Campaña Contra la Violencia Institucional* (Campaign Against Institutional Violence) that aims at controlling state forces at the territorial level. Lawyers, students, and volunteers work at the community level to denounce police maltreatment, train youth on their rights, and organize workshops among other activities at the community level. For further information visit: <http://www.contralaviolencia.com.ar>

threat theory, given the historical interactions between protesters and police (Earl, Soule, McCarthy 2003) large protest attendance, radical claims, and disruptive or violent tactics increase the likelihood of protest policing more than small attendance and pacific protest events.

This leads us to the following testable hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS – Police are more likely to use violent⁵⁸ tactics where violent protest tactics and radical goal are deployed.

In other words, in this section I seek to answer the question: is the use of violence by state forces in response to a contentious collective action event related to the use of violence and radical goals by demonstrators? How? This question brings about several lines of research. Social movements scholars have looked at the social, economic, ethnic, and race inequalities that are not redressed through institutional avenues, and are consequently transformed into repertoires of action aimed at redressing this grievance (Tilly 1978, 1986). These repertoires and performances emerge during specific political opportunity structures and cycles of protest (Tarrow 1994: 282). Political scientists interested in democracy have long been interested in the use of violence in dealing with political opposition. Scholars have examined the level of threat posed to the government by challengers to explain why governments resort to violence (Davenport 2007, Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Gartner and Regan 1996). Here I examine both research lines to understand when protest policing becomes violent within the context of democracy. But before analyzing the theoretical arguments in light of the Argentine data, I describe the characteristics of protest policing violence in Argentina.

⁵⁸ Police violence here was defined as any violent tactics used by state forces such as attacking protesters, pushing or beating demonstrators, or usage of equipment such as guns, tear gas, nightsticks, or riot control equipment. Arrests *per se* were not coded as police violence. Arrests were coded as violent tactics when other forms of police coercion or force accompanied them.

4.1 Forms and Scale of Police Use of Violence at Protest Events in Argentina

The period between 1997 and 2007 was characterized by hundreds of protests and public demonstrations on the streets, parks, bridges and both private and public places of Argentina. Most of the actions by demonstrators were peaceful and did not end up with disruptions or violence. As was reported in Chapter 2, the number of contentious collective actions in which police presence was reported was 12.8% in 1997/8, during the Neoliberal period, 9.4% in the 2001/2 Crisis, and 7.8% in the progressive 2006/7 era. Police appearance at protest events declines in the first decade of the twenty first century, yet, the number of collective-claim making actions remains high during the three periods. Let's see why police presence declines when there are more contentious events.

Table 4.1⁵⁹ records police presence at contentious collective action events in Argentina during 1997/1998, 2001/2, and 2006/7. The three moments under study (Neoliberal pre-crisis, crisis, and post crisis progressive periods) reflect different economic, political and social contexts that allow for a clear differentiation in the analysis of each period. During the Peronist (PJ) administration of Carlos Menem (1989 – 1999) Argentina's government implemented neoliberal economic adjustment policies such as the privatization of state companies, reduction in welfare benefits, incentives and tax breaks to foreign capital, the dismantling of public health systems and education, and restrictions to workers' rights (McSherry 1997; Villalón 2007; Auyero and Morán 2007, Hinton 2006). All these measures were carried out with limited parliamentary debate and largely through executive decree. Although the economy still

⁵⁹ The table presented here does not record covert forms of policing, which human rights groups and different actors in the Argentine society have increasingly started to complain about as of 2011. In 2013 there was a case that attracted media attention because a long time member of a human rights organization was discovered to be an under covered police chief (Agencia Walsh: May 11th, 2014). He had been infiltrating the organization for about eleven years (see Chapter 7, Conclusions, for more information).

showed growth figures, a marginalization process began in large sectors of the workforce as both private sector and state jobs were eliminated⁶⁰ and poverty levels increased.

The downfall of Fernando De la Rúa's government, the crisis of 2001-2002, and Duhalde's transition administration significantly changed the political culture and organizational dynamics of both contentious collective action and the nature of protest policing. New forms of action, and the diffusion of protests across the country were characteristic of the period, conforming what social movement theorists have called a cycle of contention (Tarrow 1994). As Villalón points out "unemployment, poverty, corruption, and clientelism not only fostered popular resistance but also became objects of contention. Besides employment and welfare benefits, one of the central demands of the protesters was an end to the public policies and perverse political practices that repressed them" (2007:142).

Lastly, about four years after the crisis –during the 2006-2007 period of Néstor Kirchner's left-leaning government– Argentina was in the midst of a period of economic growth and progressive social policies in favor of minorities and human rights groups. Soon after taking office, in 2003, Kirchner implemented a set of human rights policies, exemplified by the expulsion of like removing military and police officials connected to the 1976 – 83 dictatorship from the government.

⁶⁰ In the Greater Buenos Aires area, for example, unemployment increased from 6.3% in 1988 to 20.2% in 1995, INDEC (National Institute of Statistics and Census)

Table 4.0.1: Total Events by Period

Table 4.1: Total number of events with and without state forces involvement and violent tactics by period ⁶¹				
Protest Events	Neoliberal	Crisis	Progressive	Total
	<i>Menem</i>	<i>De la Rúa</i>	<i>Kirchner</i>	
	1997/8	2001/2	2006/7	
Total events with police presence	13%	9%	8%	9%
Total events without police presence	87%	91%	92%	91%
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of contentious collective action events	469	1749	1520	3758
Chi – square = 10.76. P=< 0.05.				
<p><i>Note:</i> *Police violence at protest events here includes violent evictions, use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, and arrests.</p> <p>**Events without police violence include events in which police appear but have no interaction with protesters. It involves watching the events unfold from a distance, displaying force. See appendix C for more details.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Protest data are from author’s dataset and event database by SUNY Stony Brook Center for the Study of Contentious Politics of Latin America</p>				

There are several important points to make from the data. First, the highest number of protest events occurred during the Crisis period. During this period, the number of demonstrations went up almost 400%, from 469 in the Neoliberal pre – crisis period to 1749 during the crisis. The Crisis years correspond to the peak of the institutional crisis that affected Argentina—and the peak of the corresponding protester cycle—discussed above. The number of protest events did not drop substantially after the crisis and was still very high (1520 events) during the progressive administration in 2006/7. The number of protest events from the Crisis to the Progressive era only **fell by 13.09%**. Put differently, the number of demonstrations did not substantially decline during the non – crisis Kirchner administration. Contentious collective action as a way of expressing grievances and making claims instead remained—high in Argentina. Put differently, although the 2001/2 Crisis coincides with Sidney Tarrow’s definition⁶² of a

⁶¹ 1997: 175 events, 1998: 294 events, 2001: 635 events, 2002: 1114 events, 2006: 701 events, and 2007: 819 events.

⁶² Sidney Tarrow explains that cycles of collective action are characterized by a number of common

cycle of collective action,⁶³ protesting –in its different forms– remained as a viable tactic for Argentinians after the crisis.⁶⁴ The large numbers of collective claim making actions –in its different forms– remained very high during the three periods and were not limited to the Crisis cycle of protest. We will discuss this later.

Second, the table (4.1) shows that police did not appear at protest events the large majority of times, 91%. Even during the neoliberal administration of Menem in the late 1990s –with the implementation of iron fist policies and more aggressive policing regulations– police was largely not present at protest events. This means that the modal state response to protest events was to actually ignore it. That is, in spite of expectations about tougher police action during the 1997/8 neoliberal administration of Carlos Menem, the police appeared only 13% of the time, only marginally higher than in the crisis (9%) and post-crisis periods (8%).

features, which include: heightened conflict, broad sectorial and geographic extension, the appearance of new social movement organizations, and the empowerment of old ones. The creation of new “master frames” of meaning; a combination of organized and non- organized participants; and sequences of intensified interaction between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution” (Tarrow 1993: 282-286).

⁶³ Among the scholarly and journalistic works on the 2001 crisis are: Emilio Cafassi, *Olla presión. Cacerolazos, piquetes y asambleas sobre fuego argentino* (Buenos Aires, 2002); Raúl Frakin, *Cosecharás tu siembre* (Buenos Aires, 2002); Javier Auyero, *The Political Makings of the 2001 Lootings in Argentina*; Bonasso, *El palacio y la Calle*; Camaraso, *Días de Furia* (Buenos Aires 2002)

⁶⁴ One might think that this is due to a newspaper bias since most of the data was gathered from *Clarín* newspaper but, according to a study on protest events by Schuster and his colleagues (2006), the mean number of protest events between 1989 and 2003 was of 376 each year with a decline starting in 1998. Thus, Schuster’s study confirms that claim making as a form of action in Argentina is not limited to a cycle of protests but was high before and after it.

Third, although police presence was significantly higher during the Neoliberal period and declined during the Crisis (from 13% to 9% respectively) it did not continue to decline in the following years under the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (police was present at 8% of the events in 2006/7). I expected to find a considerable plunge in police attendance during the administration of Kirchner since after he took office in 2003 the president made the protection of human rights one of his main causes. On the contrary, during the 1990s, both national and provincial administrations prioritized adjustment policies that led to an increase in unemployment and poverty. Although welfare plans were delivered, there was an upsurge in protests and general contention, and human rights were not assumed as state policies. Thus, just as tougher policing was expected during the 1997/8 Neoliberal administration of Carlos Menem, protest policing was expected to change after the introduction of progressive, democratic protest policing policies in 2003. Yet, police during the Progressive 2006/7 era appeared at protest events in similar percentages as in 2001/2, the Crisis years (8% presence in 2006/7 and 9% in 2001/2).

Table 4.0.2: Police Tactics Each Period

Table 4.2: Total Police Tactics by period				
Protest Events	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>De la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Total
Police present, not violent*	9%	3%	3%	3%
Police present and violent **	4%	6%	5%	6%
Police not present	87%	90%	92%	91%
Total number of contentious collective action events	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	469	1749	1520	3758
<i>Note:</i> *Events without police violence include events in which police appear but have no interaction with protesters. It involves watching the events unfold from a distance, displaying force. See appendix C for more details. **Police violence at protest events here includes violent evictions, use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, and arrests. <i>Source:</i> Protest data are from author's dataset and event database by SUNY Stony Brook Center for the Study of Contentious Politics of Latin America				

The presence of police may be a useful indicator of government concern regarding the threat constituted by demonstrations, but it is at best an imperfect measure of police violence. Police might appear at a protest event and watch as the events unfold, but have no interaction with demonstrators. Table 4.2 above shows police appearances and use of violence by period. When we look at all protest events, police use violence at only a small percentage of demonstrations in every period (4%, 6% and 5%). These figures show that when police appeared, they did not use coercion at every demonstration as it is often believed.

The findings thus guided me to ask: *how likely are police to be violent when they attend a protest event?* Table 4.3 below shows the different police tactics when security forces appeared at demonstrations during the three periods. As the table (4.3) shows, **police were violent most of the time (66%) when they appeared – that is, when they were sent by superiors to monitor protest.** And, contrary to most impressionistic accounts, during the neoliberal period of 1997 and 1998, the police propensity to violence was not any higher than during subsequent periods (67%, 69%, 62%). In all three periods, police were violent two thirds of the time. This suggests that on the ground police behavior did not change along with policies during this ten – year period. Put differently, the result is indicative that despite state policy changes, the behavior of police officers on the ground remained the same. In 2006 and 2007, after three years of resolutions, policies and state directives introducing democratic policing practices during demonstrations, police maintained the same propensity for violence when attending protest events. Again, showing a difference between policy level decisions and on the ground policing.

The data shows that government policies against repression introduced during a democratic administration did not modify decade’s long street practices of brutality. As was described in Chapter 3, the use of coercion by police was common throughout Argentina’s history of protest policing. One of police’s most important roles is the protection of the state and, as social policy professor Peter Waddington argued, “what places the state more directly in jeopardy is mass dissent” (1999: 65). Collective claim making actions targeting the government were thus, often perceived as a threat to the state and suppressed. In democratic governments, citizens have the right to organize,

assemble, and protest. Accordingly, the more Progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner in 2003 and subsequent years endorsed democratic protest policing policies. As we will see later, individual officers, however, had discretion on the street and police brutality continued.

Table 4.0.3: Variation in State Forces' Action

Table 4.3: Variation in State Forces' Action by Year				
Security Forces' Action	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>del Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Total
Non-Violent Tactics*	33%	31%	38%	34%
<i>Appear and do nothing</i>	20%	14%	18%	16%
<i>Display force</i>	12%	15%	17%	15%
<i>Threat</i>	1%	3%	3%	3%
Violent Tactics	67%	69%	62%	66%
<i>Make arrests</i>	10%	15%	18%	15%
<i>Make evictions</i>	7%	3%	7%	5%
<i>Use of physical force</i>	-	4%	1%	2%
<i>Use of weapons</i>	17%	4%	2%	6%
<i>Violent methods combined</i>	26%	32%	28%	30%
<i>Confrontation</i>	7%	10%	8%	9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	60	164	119	343
Chi Square = 29.253, $p < .05$				
Notes: *Police showed up at the protest event but had minimal or no interaction with protesters. For example, police appeared at the event and stood still at a corner watching the event unfold. Or police appeared and displayed force with barriers, hydrant water tanks, vehicles and animals or used microphones to alert demonstrators of the consequence of their actions. For a detailed description of each tactic, see Appendix C, table 6.				

The breakdown by type of violence in Table 4.3 demonstrates that there are significant differences in the type of tactic used by the police during the three periods. As was mentioned earlier, the propensity to use violence was high all the years. During the Neoliberal period, the use of weapons by police was high (17%). This number drops in the subsequent periods, yet the combination of violent methods in response to protest events increases (26%, 32% and 28%). Again, showing that democratic policies are not reflected on the street.

It is important to point out that during the 1990s, although several years had passed since the 1976-1983 military dictatorship, police abuses and illegal practices were frequent (Kalmanowiecki 2000). Thus, I had expected to find significantly larger numbers of violent police tactics during demonstrations in the Neoliberal period. Yet, the data demonstrate that the use of weapons and physical coercion by police was still high during the left-leaning, progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner in 2006/7.

Recall that between 1989 and 1999 Argentina's national government implemented a series of economic adjustment measures decentralizing public services (such as health and education systems) from the federal to the provincial administrations. These policies had devastating results for large sectors of the populations, who started or increased mobilizations and protest events aimed at ameliorating these problems (Svampa and Pereyra 2003, Auyero 2002). The government may have responded to this upsurge with covert repression such as surveillance, stigmatization of certain groups among other tactics and less open coercion.⁶⁵

Consider the occasions when police appeared, but did not engage in violent repression (34% over the three periods). These cases, in addition to passive observation, included diverting traffic, blocking streets or avenues, or setting up barriers to make displays of force.⁶⁶ They might also have involved preventing demonstrators from exercising new forms of action, such traveling from one place to another. Again, when looking at the three periods, these tactics were used in similar manner during the different administrations. There seems to be a trend by which police, during the three administrations, behaved in similar ways. Nevertheless, it is possible to see that during the Progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner, among the non-violent tactics the displays of force were higher than in the two preceding periods (12%, 15%, and 17%). Displays of force involve police appearing during the collective claim making action to

⁶⁵ The use of violence by police, as was mentioned above, was a common practice during the period and hence, likely not uncommon for newspapers to omit details of police behavior. Furthermore, human rights group and the media were not as observant (or careful examiners) of police abuse at the time and only reported spectacular incidents. For that, it is also possible that violent police tactics during demonstrations in this period were higher than the data here shows

⁶⁶ See Appendix C for a detailed breakdown

set up barricades, bring hydrant trucks and other armored fighting vehicles. On occasions, there is also aerial surveillance, mounted police on horses, police dogs and agents wearing riot gear such as masks, helmets and shields.

Police and demonstrator interactions are not always controlled by political officials. The more Progressive administration of Kirchner sent fewer police to patrol demonstrations (8% against 13% in the Neoliberal and 9% during the crisis), and non-repression policies were introduced. Nonetheless, violent police behavior on the ground continued. A police chief explained to me that during the Kirchner administration political authorities had been clear in ordering riot police to avoid violence and confrontations with protesters. According to the police chief, “this is easier said than done.”⁶⁷ Most agents –particularly the younger ones– had heard and read about human rights and formally know how they should behave. Nevertheless, police felt as if human rights did not apply to them: “Who respects my rights?” he said that younger officers uttered. According to Argentine anthropologist Garriga Zucal, police not only did not consider themselves violent but contrary to that, believe they are subject to social violence. Police stressed that they are constantly subject to bureaucratic violence because their salaries are miserable, their labor conditions are extremely dangerous, and they suffer from social dishonor as a result of the last military dictatorship (Garriga Zucal 2010).

When newspapers mentioned confrontations, they often made explicit reference to protesters and police both using violent tactics. *Clarín* coverage of an event in May 1998, for example, described the confrontation by detailing that police fired tear gas and rubber bullets to demonstrators, who replied with a “rain of stones” at police.⁶⁸ Reports of confrontations were often times accompanied by some implication of who was to blame for the violence. In reporting a protest event in the province of Neuquén in 2001, *Clarín* stated:

The 380 workers laid off due to the closure of the tile factory Zanón, resulted in tension in the city of Neuquén.... The laid off

⁶⁷ Interview with Police Chief, Buenos Aires, September 2014.

⁶⁸ *Clarín*, May 22, 1998 “Córdoba: 30 heridos en una marcha con incidentes”.
<http://edant.clarin.com/diario/1998/05/22/t-02601d.htm>

workers gathered outside the provincial Government House to protest the closure of the factory. They burnt the dismissal letters and sang songs in opposition to the measure. Police surveilled everything that was happening from about 100 meters. At noon, state employees showed their support to the laid off workers and started to arrive to the Government's House. That's when the confrontation between police and demonstrators started.... While the demonstrators were throwing stones and parts of tiles against the police, police responded with rubber bullets and tear gas. Of the nine wounded, seven were demonstrators...⁶⁹ (*Clarín*, December 2, 2001)

In this report, the newspaper report attributes the initiation of violence to the protestors, but it provides no detailed description of the event or a thorough contextual narrative. Why would the laid off workers, or the state workers who were showing their support, throw rocks at police? Sociologist Abby Peterson (2006) explained the difficulty in determining who is responsible for the violence and its escalation on the occasions it occurs. As the report by newspaper *Clarín* showed, responsibility is most readily assigned to protesters. But activists are not the sole actors in riots, however instrumental they may be to its outbreak. Violence arises from interaction between protesters and responding authorities. Research since the 1960s suggests that police authorities often bear a major part of the responsibility (Peterson 2006, 52). Yet, *who started* the riot –whether protesters, police or counterdemonstrators– *does not matter*.

The use of force by police in response to demonstrations has been a common practice throughout Argentina's history. As was described in Chapter 3, both military governments and democratic administrations have fostered iron fist policies towards crime and any social movements or contentious actions against the state. This extended practice of using violence to dissolve a mobilization or end a protest event only began to be seriously questioned during the administration of Nestor Kirchner in 2003, after the 2001/2002 crisis.

⁶⁹ *Clarín*, December 2, 2001 "Neuquén: cierre fabril con incidentes".
<http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2001/12/02/p-02901.htm>

In December 2001, police killed 39 people⁷⁰ during different riots across the country leaving a mark in the country's history. The killings took place during a democratic government while protesters were making claims for food, housing, employment and a change in institutions. People were exercising their right to demonstrate, to make demands to the government, and state security forces killed them. This was inadmissible to government officials, and political leaders from all parties. Yet, a few months later in 2002, police killed two more people during a protest event.⁷¹ In the aftermath of the police violence, dozens of protest events against repression were held all over the country, and acting President Eduardo Duhalde was forced to advance presidential elections to an earlier date. Thus, one of the first announcements by the newly elected president (Néstor Kirchner) was to declare that he would put an end to police violence and the repression of protest events. As we will see later, this government's proposal was translated into different policies but not necessarily all evenly implemented. As the data here shows, in spite of these policies, the use of violent tactics by police remained.

What explains the use of violence? Often times, police claim that demonstrators' forms of action lead to violence, and thus state forces must respond accordingly –with coercion and force– to pacify the situation. Put differently, police believed they needed to be prepared to respond to violent demonstrations with more violence. As Robert Reiner narrates in his description of British policing “Altogether in the 1981 riots levels of injury unknown for years in English disorders were inflicted on both police and civilians by boot, brick, fist, truncheon and petrol bomb. The immediate response of Conservative politicians and police was to call for tougher tactics, equipment and legal powers for police.... The government agreed to the use of water cannon, CS gas and plastic bullets if chief constables wanted them” (Reiner 2000:67 – 68). With civilian authority's approval, police believed they should respond to protesters' violence with coercion.

⁷⁰ La Nación newspaper, December 18 2002, “Los muertos que dejó el estallido social”
<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1433346-los-muertos-que-dejo-el-estallido-social>

⁷¹ In June 2002, police killed Mariano Kosteki and Darío Santillan during a protest event in the Buenos Aires district of Avellaneda.

In Argentina, when police appeared, they were likely —two-thirds of the time— to use violent tactics (Table 4.2). As we shall see, these include a great many occasions when demonstrators were non-violent; as well as situations in which police did not use force while protesters were violent.⁷² During an informal conversation about police tactics, a policeman told me “*sometimes people confuse police brutality. It is not that we beat a person, but we have to ‘reduce’ certain subjects to avoid further escalations*”.⁷³ For this policeman the use of violent tactics could dissuade protesters from an escalation or further violence. The exercise of violence is thus used by police as a form of authority, as a social control device. Coercion, from this perspective, is an efficient means used to correct, to put back order. We turn now, to a consideration of the types of action by protesters that must be “reduced” into order “to avoid further escalation.”

4.2 Challengers Forms of Action

Social movements’ scholar Doug McAdam stressed that “lacking institutional power, challengers must devise protesting techniques that offset their powerlessness” (1983: 754). One of these techniques that emerged in the late 1990s and became increasingly popular during and after the 2001/2 crises in Argentina was the *escrache* (exposing or unmasking). The *escrache* was a public exposition of people accused of having committed serious human rights violations, or public figures that had been involved in corruption scandals that had gone unpunished. It involved groups of people who would meet outside the offices, homes, or daily locations of suspected criminals to publicly denounce their actions. Demonstrators held banners, painted graffiti, distributed flyers with the names of persons and accusations such as “Corrupt!” “Thief!” “Assassin!” “Enough impunity!” “We want justice!” On some occasions,

⁷² These occasions might be part of what Auyero (2007) calls the gray zone of clandestinity; a blurry area in which police –state agents– and demonstrators’ interactions are not so well defined. That is, in some circumstances or events, the actions by police might be conducive to allow or incite demonstrators’ violence in order to justify some other political decision, but I will discuss this further in the following sections.

⁷³ Interview with policeman, Buenos Aires, September 2014.

protestors spit and threw eggs at their target. This type of demonstration had been used before. As sociologist Roberta Villalón explained,

“What was new, was its use against politicians and members of the government (such as the president and the ministers of economy, labor, health, and domestic security), judges (accused of being partisan rather than impartial), policemen (usually in connection with arbitrary repression of protests), businessmen (generally from national and international firms involved in corruption cases or massive layoffs), and representatives of multilateral agencies (for example, delegations of the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank)” (Villalón 2007, 148).

Although *escraches* were non-violent forms of action, they could be considered disruptive, and many of the times that police showed up at one of these demonstrations, the protesters were severely repressed (63%).

Another non-violent form of action analyzed was the *tomas (building takeovers)* of public buildings and spaces *and ocupaciones (land occupations)*. The takeover tactic became popular among workers, students, unemployed, homeless people and indigenous minorities. Workers from different industries would lock themselves into factories, banks, or institutions where they worked, demanding higher salaries or working conditions. For students, ‘taking over schools or universities’ was a performance used to protest education policies, reject the appointment of a new chair, oppose the implementation of a new educational plan, or show solidarity for a larger societal cause. Even unemployed workers used this tactic in demand of jobs, food or subsidies by taking over public offices. Building takeovers or building occupations were a frequent form of protest during all the periods analyzed in this project.

Land occupations had a different dynamic. As Auyero (2010) points out, after decades of neoliberal policies in Argentina, with increasing levels of unemployment, and informal jobs, rising numbers of the population began living in precarious settlements in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. Poor people made them their homes in abandoned buildings or lands. State lands would become squatter settlements.

A report from the Housing Committee of the Buenos Aires City Legislature⁷⁴ reported that in 2006 between 170,000 and 200,000 people inhabited properties in an irregular fashion. (These numbers did not include people who sought a place to stay for the night, lived in hotels, pensions, or shantytowns.) According to Argentine scholar María Cristina Cravino's estimates (2006), in 2006, 10 per cent of the population of Buenos Aires' metropolitan area now lived in informal settlements (cited in Auyero 2010: 5). Indigenous minorities also took over lands, whether they considered it their own or to protest the construction of an industrial facility that would pollute the environment.

Sit-ins involved the partial occupation of a space –such as a bank– and demonstrators often remained occupying the space until their demands were met or were forced to leave by police. During sit-ins –unlike take overs or land occupations that involve protesters occupying the entire building, institution or park– protesters allow “businesses” to continue as usual. The main difference is that during a sit-in, demonstrators either sit or stand to generate some discomfort in passersby, workers, or the administrators/owners of an institution. An example will illustrate this form of action: In April 2007 (*Clarín*, April 6, 2007), a group of environmental activists chained themselves to the entrance of the Buenos Aires City ferryboats port. The protesters in Argentina wanted to complain about the building of a pulp mill in Uruguay that would pollute the river that separates the two countries. The sit-in was intended to attract the attention of tourists and passersby, but the ferryboat terminal was still functioning. Sit-ins, like marches and other forms of action, involved people walking with posters and signing songs but sometimes they also included other performances. Protesters held sit-ins inside banks and government offices demanding the release of their savings account, the payment of back wages, or a change in policy or legislation.

The piquet (picketing) –or *roadblock*– was yet another form of action that attracted police attention during the cycle of contention examined in this study. The *piquete* of Cultral–Co and Plaza Huincul (Neuquén province) in 1996, and the

⁷⁴ Reported in *La Nación* newspaper, June 4, 2006 <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/811748-casi-200000-personas-en-casas-tomadas>

roadblocks and upheavals in General Mosconi and Tartagal (Salta province) since 1997 have been identified as the two ‘model’ experiences that shaped later mobilization processes. In these oil towns dependent on the state petroleum company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the dismantling of the past developmental model affected virtually entire local communities: the privatization of YPF meant the loss of jobs (direct and indirect), but also the dismantling of an entire parallel welfare state (Auyero 2004, Svampa and Pereyra 2003, Wolff 2007).

Piquets rapidly spread across all of Argentina (Svampa and Pereyra 2003). The piquet consisted of blocking the main roads or access routes to cities by burning tires and parking vehicles to complete the barrier. Protesters would hold banners, sing songs and bring their families to the roadblock. Sometimes, the piquet would include a soup kitchen. Initially, the participants of the roadblocks were mostly “displaced workers, informal laborers, and underemployed and unemployed people—mostly low-income, nonunionized, and institutionally unprotected” (Villalón 2007, 148). The composition of the crowds during roadblocks changed as this form of action became widespread across the country and economic sectors. Soon, university students, state workers, and other actors were also staging pickets. Table 4.4 below shows the main forms of actions by demonstrators during protest events attended by police in 1997/8, 2001/2, and 2006/7.

Table 4.0.4. Police Presence By Demonstrators' Forms of Action Each Period

Table 4.4: Police Presence By Demonstrators' Forms Of Action Each Period					
Features of Protest Events	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>De la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Sub-totals	N
Roadblock	22%	13%	17%	16%	55
Strike	7%	1%	6%	4%	12
March	35%	30%	22%	28%	96
Rally	7%	2%	7%	4%	15
<i>Escrache</i>	3%	7%	12%	8%	27
Building Take Over	15%	6%	12%	10%	33
Land Occupation	2%	2%	8%	4%	13
Pot-banging	–	6%	1%	3%	11
Petition Sign	2%	1%	1%	1%	4
Sit-in	–	5%	7%	5%	17
Confrontation	3%	5%	3%	4%	15
Lootings	–	16%	–	8%	26
Other Forms	5%	6%	5%	5%	19
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	–
N	60	164	119	–	343
Chi-square 75.067 p<0.001					
Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.					
Notes. All values are percentages, except as indicated. Percentages are subject to rounding error.					

As Table 4.4 above shows, there was an important variation in the forms of the protests attended by police. For example, as the literature has documented, roadblocks in Argentina were first used in the late 1990s and, in the **Neoliberal period**, they were second (22%) only to marches (35%) among demonstrations attracting a police presence. Building take overs also received a large number of police presence (15%) during this period. All other forms of action –both disruptive and conventional–did not receive large numbers of police appearances.

During the country's institutional and economic **Crisis period (2001-2)**, the contention landscape was not much different. Police appeared mostly during marches and roadblocks. However, police attended looting episodes, a form of protest that was inexistent in during the Neoliberal era. These occurred mainly in December of 2001 when, at the peak of protests involving blockaded roads throughout the country and continuous rallies at Plaza de Mayo, a wave of *food riots* or lootings took place in certain locales.⁷⁵ What is noteworthy is that they attracted police at a time when innumerable other protests did not. Although they had different inner dynamics,⁷⁶ the majority involved some kind of violence. Yet, during a cycle of protests, as collective action expert sociologist Ralph Turner said,

“Looting is not primarily a means of acquiring property, as it is normally viewed in disaster situations; breaking store windows and burning buildings is not merely a perverted form of amusement or immoral vengeance like the usual vandalism and arson... All are expressions of outrage against injustice of sufficient magnitude and duration to render the resort to such exceptional means of communication understandable to the observer” (Turner 1969:816).

As the table shows, police attended pot-banging events almost exclusively during the 2001/2 Crisis period. Pot banging actions were characterized by people banging pots and pans to make loud noise during the protest event. These so-called *cacerolazos* (in Spanish) were a performance within marches, sit-ins and rallies that were increasingly used in December of 2001, usually when people would enter banks and make loud noises to demand the cashing of their savings. *Cacerolazos* started as a

⁷⁵ With regards to looting episodes reported in newspapers and repressed by police, Auyero and Moran (2007) found that in 2001 most of the episodes (a third) occurred in Buenos Aires. “Another 20 per cent occurred in Santa Fe ... Around ten per cent each occurred in the two southern states of Neuquén and Rio Negro and the northern state of Tucumán, and the remaining 49 episodes were scattered over seven other provinces” (Auyero and Moran 2007).

⁷⁶ In their article on food riots during Argentina's 2001 crisis, Auyero and Moran (2007) argued, “attacks on supermarkets and stores had different degrees of mass participation and police action, and the targets of the looting crowds were also diverse” (Auyero and Moran 2007:7). Furthermore, in “Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina”, Auyero (2007) describes a set of clandestine connections between brokers, repressive forces, and residents that not only count in routine politics but also in extraordinary forms of collective action (such as food riots). In other words, when analyzing episodes of collective violence, such as food lootings, it is important to consider the “relational underpinnings and interactive dynamics of the episodes identifying the mechanisms (and their sequence) at work and the (possible) connections between perpetrators of damage and authorities and/or established political actors” (2007:155).

spontaneous middle class reaction to the government's decision of placing restrictions on cash withdrawals (this became known as the *corralito* banking restrictions) and was then performed during other claim making moments.

During the **Progressive** period police again appeared at marches (22%) and roadblocks (17%) or pickets, though the dominance of marches had declined quite dramatically, from more than a third (35%) to less than a fourth (22%) of all mobilizations of police. Building takeovers, which had attracted the police less often during the crisis (6%) returned to prominence (12%), along with the newly developed Escrache (12%).⁷⁷ Other forms that had been given less attention in previous periods also attracted substantial police attention included Land occupations (8%) and sit-ins (7%). The large numbers of police presence at land occupations is connected to the growing population of squatter settlements in the country, which resulted in complaints from neighbors and, on occasions, alleged owners of the buildings or lands. Also, land occupations and disputes –as we will discuss in the following chapter– often have a political or clientelistic motivation as well.

Table 4.5 below summarizes demonstrators' use of violent and non-violent tactics when police appeared at protest events in the three periods.

⁷⁷ As mentioned earlier, the *escrache* was a public exposition of people accused of having committed crimes or that had been involved in corruption scandals that had gone unpunished.

Table 4 0.5: Demonstrators' Tactics When Police Appeared Each Period

Table 4.5: Demonstrators' Tactics By Period When Police Appeared				
	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>De la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Totals
Demonstrators' Use of Violent Tactics*	13%	54%	33%	100%
Demonstrators Use of Non-Violent Tactics	20%	44%	36%	100%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	60	164	119	343
Chi Square: NS				
Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.				
Notes. All values are percentages, except as indicated. Percentages are subject to rounding error.				
*Demonstrators' use of violent tactics includes throwing rocks, breaking windows, other violations and destruction of private property, and setting up fires. On occasions, a confrontational form of action might also include violence such as a rally in which some participants threw rocks at a building.				

The table 4.5 above shows the appearance of police when demonstrators used violent and non-violent tactics. We see that demonstrators' use of violence was very low before (13%) and after (33%) the Crisis of 2001 and 2002. Protesters violence was only reported in over half of the events (54%) during the crisis, which, as was mentioned earlier involved looting episodes and other forms of outrage. The table, however, does not present information of what police actually did or how they acted at the demonstration. In addition to appearing, as we saw earlier, police often use violence to disperse or end a demonstration. In the light of this, it is important to analyze when state forces used some form of coercion or force in response to a demonstration, and to determine if this use of violence was largely animated by student violence.

It is important to highlight here that use of violence by police is very different from police appearing at the protest event. ⁷⁸ The table (4.6) below shows police use of

⁷⁸ In addition to showing up at the demonstration, police have a wide array of tactics at their disposal. In this analysis, I defined police action as violent when it involved physical force against protesters

violent tactics while demonstrators were performing different forms of collective claim making actions in each period.

Table 4.0.6: Rate of Police Violence Against Various Forms of Action By Demonstrators.

Table 4.6: Rate Of Police Violence Against Various Forms Of Action By Demonstrators. Three Periods Compared					
Forms of Action	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>De la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	All periods	N
Roadblock	85%	59%	55%	64%	35
Strike	75%	–	71%	67%	8
March	52%	61%	65%	60%	58
Rally	75%	33%	37%	47%	7
<i>Escrache</i>	100%	64%	57%	63%	17
Building Take Over	78%	90%	57%	72%	24
Land Occupation	100%	100%	100%	100%	13
Pot Banging	–	60%	100%	64%	7
Petition - Sign	–	50%	–	50%	2
Sit-in	–	75%	66%	65%	11
Confrontation	50%	89%	25%	67%	10
Lootings	–	89%	–	89%	23
Other Forms	0%	60%	100%	63%	12
Total	67%	69%	62%	66%	–
N	40	113	74	–	227
Chi Square: NS					
Note: N= total number of protests with police violence. Police tactics included: violent evictions, use of physical force, use of weapons, and arrests.					

Table 4.6 shows the rate of police use of violent tactics while demonstrators were performing different forms of collective claim making actions in each period. Police use of violence against particular types of demonstrations varied across the periods, but the overall rate of police violence was quite consistent. Most notably, the expectations of softer policing once the Neoliberal period ended if disconfirmed. The

(pushing, hitting, physical eviction etc.); when military equipment and weapons (guns, gas, nightsticks or riot control equipment) were used; when demonstrators were wounded; or when the police threatened or engaged in a physical confrontation I considered that police did not use violence when security forces appeared at the event and did nothing, or appeared at the event and took controlled actions such as diverting traffic, blocking roads or positioning barricades.

very high rate of violent response during the Neoliberal Period (67%) was maintained during the Crisis (69%), and declined modestly (62%) during the Progressive period.

During the **Neoliberal** administration, police used violence in response to 40 of the 60 events (67%). It stands out that roadblocks (which were numerous during this period) almost always attracted violent repression—they were subjected to police violence 85% of the time. This almost inevitable violent police action during roadblocks reflects the criminalization of these forms of protest in the 1990s analyzed above. *Piqueteros* and other actors participating in road blockades or picket lines—particularly informal and unemployed workers—were charged with causing disturbances and preventing the free circulation of traffic and other crimes. This criminalization resulted in the forceful arrest of large numbers of demonstrators and the imprisonment of leaders and movement participants (Artese 2009, Svampa and Pereyra 2003). Also, during this period, police were ruthless during building takeovers (78%) and used violence in response to every land occupation (100%) and *escraches* (100%).

In 2001 and 2002, during the **Crisis period**, police responded with violence in 113 of the 164 episodes (69%) essentially the same rate as during the **Neoliberal period**, though there were some shifts in the rate of violence against various tactics. Thus, despite the expectations that police violence would decline after the end of the Neoliberal period, the rate of violence against marches ticked upward (from 52% to 61%), and the respond to building takeovers became significantly more violent (78% to 90%). On the other hand, the rate against roadblocks dropped substantially (from 85% to 59%).

During the more **Progressive** administration of Néstor Kirchner in 2006 and 2007 police were violent at 74 of the 119 demonstrations they attended a rate of 62%, and comparable to the two earlier periods. The profile is quite similar to the Crisis period, with rates of violence against particular tactics varying only slightly, particularly the most frequent protest types (roadblocks, 55%, marches 65%). A noteworthy exception was building takeovers, which attracted police violence 90% of the time during the crisis, and just a little over half the time (57%) under Kirchner. All

noteworthy was the consistently high rate of violence against land occupations and pot banging (100%) during an administration that promised a decline in police violence.

All in all, during the three periods the use of violence by police was seen when protesters were using conventional forms of action –such as marching– and during more confrontational performances such as road blockades. Grouping demonstrators’ tactics into violent⁷⁹ and non-violent forms of action yields a similar result.

For example, during the Neoliberal period, the data shows that there is no relationship between the action of protesters and police tactics. In other words, the use of violence by demonstrators does not indicate whether police will use violent tactics or not. There is a tendency, however, by which 67% of the time in which protesters were demonstrating peacefully, police used violent tactics (See table 4.7 below). Furthermore, in only 15 of 60 events (25%) protesters used some form of violence.

⁷⁹ Demonstrators’ uses of violent forms of action include throwing rocks, breaking windows and other violations and destruction of private property, and setting up fires.

Table 4.0.7: Demonstrator And Police Use of Violent Tactics. Neoliberal Period.

Table 4.7: Demonstrator And Police Use Of Violent Tactics During The Neoliberal Administration Of Carlos Menem (1997 And 1998)			
Protesters Forms of Action			
Police Tactics	Non Violent Forms	Violent Forms**	Total
Non – Violent Tactics	33%	33%	33%
Violent Tactics*	67%	67%	67%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	45	15	60
Chi Square: NS			
<p>Note: *In this table, violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests. **Demonstrators' use of violent tactics includes throwing rocks, breaking windows and other private properties, and setting up fires. These violent actions by protesters were reported during a march, rally, building take over and other claim-making performances.</p> <p>Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p>			

The percentage of events where police used violence when demonstrators were peaceful was essentially the same (62%) in 2001 and 2002 (see table 4.8 below). During the **Crisis Period**, the data indicates that on most of the occasions in which demonstrators used some form of violent tactic, police was also violent. That is, on 80% of the time in which protesters acted violently, police was also violent. Yet, when demonstrators were protesting peacefully, police also used violent tactics with high frequency (62%). These data confirms the tendency seen during the neoliberal period that indistinctively of the form of action taken by demonstrators, police respond with violence most of the time.

Table 4 0.8: Demonstrator and Police Use of Violent Tactics During Crisis Period

Table 4.8: Demonstrator And Police Use Of Violent Tactics During The Crisis Period (Administrations Of De La Rúa And Duhalde - 2001 And 2002)			
	Protesters Forms of Action		
Police Tactics	Non Violent Forms	Violent Forms	Total
Non – Violent Tactics	38%	20%	31%
Violent Tactics	62%	80%	69%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	100	64	164
Chi Square= 5.698, p<0.05			
Note: *In this table, violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests. Demonstrators’ use of violent tactics includes throwing rocks, breaking windows and other private properties, and setting up fires.			
Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.			

The tendency shown in 1997 and 1998, and confirmed in 2001 and 2002, is maintained almost ten years later in 2006 and 2007. As table 4.9 below shows, during the “progressive” period of Néstor Kirchner, demonstrators’ use of disruptive or more conventional tactics did not have an impact on police behavior. **Police used violence whether or not the demonstrators were using violent tactics.** In spite of expectations regarding more democratic policing after the crisis and during the progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner, the data suggests that police tend to behave violently in spite of policy changes. As was mentioned earlier, changes at the policy level—such as the introduction of democratic policing protocols— were not enacted by the rank-and-file of police.

Table 4.0.9: Demonstrator and Police Use of Violent Tactics During the Progressive Period

Table 4.9: Demonstrator And Police Use Of Violent Tactics During The Progressive Period (Administration Of Néstor Kirchner - 2006 And 2007)			
	Protesters Forms of Action		
Police Tactics	Non Violent Forms	Violent Forms	Total
Non – Violent Tactics	40%	33%	38%
Violent Tactics	60%	67%	62%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	80	39	119
Chi Square= 0.496, p NS			
Note: *In this table, violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests. Demonstrators’ use of violent tactics includes throwing rocks, breaking windows and other private properties, and setting up fires.			
Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.			

In 45% of the events when police appeared, *Clarín* reported that property was damaged.⁸⁰ This varied from damaged vehicles to broken windows in stores or painted graffiti in public buildings. From the newspaper reports, except during looting scenarios, it is not clear whether the damage was caused by demonstrators alone, as a result of police action in suppressing the protest, or as result of confrontations with police and not an action started by demonstrators.⁸¹

⁸⁰ See appendix C, table 7, for a breakdown of the events in which property was damaged by period.

⁸¹ Acts of vandalism, criminality and savagery at protests is often said to be part of the tactics by counterdemonstrators or paid thugs who seek to create disorders in an otherwise pacific protest. These disturbances can then justify police use of violent tactics to “bring back order”.

Table 4.0.10: Protest Forms By Property Damaged

Table 4.10: Protest Forms By Property Damaged⁸²			
	<i>Protest forms</i>		
<i>Property</i>	Non-Violent Forms	Use of Violent Forms	Total
No property damaged	71%	19%	51%
Property damaged	29%	81%	49%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	140	87	227
Chi square 56.233, p<0.001			
Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.			

Table 4.10 above shows that property was reported damaged in 49% of all the episodes in which police used some form of violence when they appeared. Moreover, when protesters were using violent forms, property was damaged or destroyed 81% of the time. That is, violent tactics by demonstrators and property damage appear together with high frequency when police chose to use force. Nevertheless, when protesters were not using violent forms, property was damaged on 29% of the time in which police was violent. In other words, property that appeared damaged during –or after– a peaceful protest event could also be the result of common criminals who take advantage of the demonstration to act. Interestingly, on 71% of the events in which no property was reported damaged and protesters were demonstrating peacefully, police used violence. Yet, property damage was most likely when both police and demonstrators were violent. This supports the argument that most of the damage occurs as a result of violent confrontations. Thus, there is a connection between property damaged, violent tactics by demonstrators, and use of violent tactics by police.

Police coercion can also be examined in correlation with protesters use of confrontational or disruptive tactics. Put differently, police violence could be

⁸² See Appendix C, table 11, for a breakdown of property damaged and demonstrators’ use of violent tactics by period.

responsive—not to protesters’ use of violent tactics or when there was property damage—but when the form of protest chosen was confrontational and/or disruptive. Following Earl and Soule (2011), I operationalized confrontational (or disruptive) tactics as occupations, obstructions, blockades, forced entries, lootings, meeting disruption, and physical and verbal attacks. Conventional-, non-confrontational, forms of protest include rallies, marches, legal actions, assemblies, strikes, and sit-ins. Table 4.11 reports police tactics when confrontational or conventional tactics by demonstrators were used.

Table 4.0.11: Police Tactics And Demonstrators Use of Disruptive Tactics

Table 4.11: Police Tactics And Demonstrators Use Of Disruptive Tactics⁸³			
	<i>Protest forms</i>		
<i>Police Tactics</i>	Conventional Forms	Disruptive Forms	Total
Non – Violent	39%	29%	34%
Violent*	61%	72%	66%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%
<i>N</i>	171	172	343
Chi square: 4.381 p<0.05			
Note: *In this table, police use of violence included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests.			
Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.			

Table 4.11 shows that protestor disruption is associated with coercive police response, though the strength of the relationship is modest. That is, police responded with violence 72% of the times when protestors were disruptive, and 61% of the time when faced with a non-confrontational tactic.

Taken together, these patterns of police violence provide significant evidence to show that peaceful demonstrations are highly likely to be repressed, just as violent ones. Violence by police is not correlated with protesters use of violent tactics –only

⁸³ See appendix C, table 12 , for a detailed summary of protest forms by police tactics.

with disruptive tactics. In this way, the first part of the hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this chapter is largely disconfirmed: *police are no more likely to use violent tactics when violent protest tactics are used.*

The second part of the hypothesis refers to demonstrators' radical goals. According to the hypothesis, the events characterized by greater police violence, should also be characterized by demonstrators' radical goals. Thus, let's see whether protesters' radical claims were associated with police violence.

4.3 Demonstrators' Claims and Demands

Although the claims made in the protests analyzed here were not representative of all the issues and grievances in Argentina during the three periods studied, by focusing on those with police presence we can assess whether police response varies when the demonstrators raise different demands. Different varieties of claims predominated during the three periods under study. We begin this analysis with Table 4.12, which shows the rate of police use of violent tactics while demonstrators were making different claims in each period.⁸⁴ As was mentioned earlier, police use of violence against particular types of demonstrations varied across the periods, but the overall rate of police violence was quite consistent (67% in Neoliberal period, 69% during Crisis period, and 62% during Progressive period).

⁸⁴ Please see Appendix for a full list of claims.

Table 4.0.12: Rate of Police Violence Against Various Claims By Demonstrators. Three Periods Compared.

Table 4.12: Rate Of Police Violence Against Various Claims By Demonstrators. Three Periods Compared					
Claim	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>De la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	All periods	N
Jobs – Employment	71%	88%	100%	86%	60
Education	62%	50%	52%	54%	21
Justice	50%	60%	67%	63%	10
Welfare benefits	86%	75%	83%	78%	52
Human Rights	62%	0%	0%	33%	5
Misc. social issues	43%	62%	57%	56%	19
Police Brutality	60%	55%	62%	58%	28
Against Government	100%	62%	62%	64%	27
Environmental	–	–	22%	42%	5
Total	67%	69%	62%	66%	–
N	40	113	74	–	227
Chi-square 32.045, p<0.001					
<i>Source:</i> Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.					

During the **Neo-liberal period (1997-1998)**, demands for jobs, employment and welfare benefits, as the table 4.12 above shows, were most of the times met with police violence (71%, 86%).⁸⁵ Education claims and human rights demands were also responded with police coercion. In those years, the government was analyzing and debating collective memory matters such as what to do with concentration camps, monuments, and other remnants of the 1976-83 military dictatorship. For example, on January 8th, 1998, the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo (Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo)⁸⁶ held a march and rally to protest plans by the government to demolish one of the buildings in which the military kept and tortured people. Over 150 police agents in riot gear appeared at the demonstration with hydrant trucks, helicopters, water cannons,

⁸⁵ The request for jobs and employment were the top demands in all the periods analyzed, but this claim reached a peak of 35% in 1997-1998. Similarly, welfare benefits came second in the list of claims when there was police presence, reaching a peak of 29% in 2001/2.

⁸⁶ The “Mothers of Plaza de Mayo” is an Argentine social movement organization composed of mothers of youth who were *disappeared* during the military dictatorship of 1976-1983. They organized while trying to learn what happened to their children and began marching around the Plaza de Mayo square in Buenos Aires in 1977 in public defiance of the government’s state terrorism (See http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madres_de_Plaza_de_Mayo for further information)

and also on motorbikes holding tear gas pistols. There was no violence reported but demonstrators, the newspaper reports, were uneasy with the large deployment of security forces (*Clarín*, “Movilización de las Madres”, January 9th, 1998). The demonstration by the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo was about human rights issues, which were often times (62%) subject to police brutality during this period. As the table shows, police appeared to monitor protests for human rights but did not use violence during the subsequent crisis and progressive periods.

During the **Crisis period (2001 and 2002)**, police were more likely to be violent when the demands were for jobs (88%) and welfare benefits (75%). Again, demands for jobs during this period can be explained by the alarming characteristics of the socioeconomic context of the time. The unemployment rate was 17.3% in 2001 and reached a peak of 19.6% in 2002. Similarly, the poverty rate was 37.1% in 2001 and 55.2% in 2002. Also during this period, police use of force was high during protests demanding miscellaneous social issues (62%) and complaining against the government (62%). As was mentioned above, the demand for a different form of government and a change in all authorities was a common and widely repeated slogan during this period. So, this demand was likely *not* perceived as a very radical claim by either police or authorities. The “away / out with them all” slogan, was painted in graffiti, chanted in songs, and shouted at every march and demonstration.⁸⁷

In the **Progressive period** of Néstor Kirchner, 2006 and 2007, police used violence in response to all demands for jobs (100%). Police were also highly likely to use coercion when the demands were for welfare benefits (83%). During this period, unemployment –although still high– was at the 9.5% and 9.2% rate (2006 and 2007 respectively) and poverty at the 29.15% in 2006 and 22% in 2007. The socioeconomic context was thus improving with respect to 2001 and 2002. Thus, it is possible that police was less tolerant at events characterized by demands other than jobs and welfare

⁸⁷ For details on the widespread use of the “away with them all” slogan during 2001 and 2002 see *Página 12*, February 4th, 2002 <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-1495-2002-02-04.html> The “away with them all” chant was accompanied by songs and other public manifestations of anger against the government and public officials during rallies, demonstrations and neighborhood assemblies.

benefits and acted more violently at those.⁸⁸ Interestingly, demands for the environment did not attract violent police responses. It is possible that problems such as deforestation, pollution and inefficient use of non-renewable resources, pollution from paper mills, which are hazards to Argentina's biodiversity, did not pose a threat to authorities or police. Following Christian Davenport (2007), environmental claims are not threatening and hence the costs of repression are too high. Although there was police presence during environmental protests, police violence was minimal.

In essence, there was a high variability in the issues or grievances that mattered to authorities and police in the different periods. Environmental claims, for example, were not reported –or attended by police– during the Neoliberal period, but this changed when the more progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner was in office. Specifically in the progressive period, a conflict over the construction of a paper mill in Uruguay –due to the ecological danger it presented– escalated, and different federal and provincial forces appeared at the protests held.⁸⁹ Demonstrators in the Argentine city of Gualeguaychú that borders with the town of Fray Bentos in Uruguay blockaded the international bridge connecting the two countries during 45 days. The protests started in 2005 and intensified during 2006 and 2007, were numerous and involved diverse forms of action, yet police presence and action was generally not violent and did not involve coercion.

According to the law of Coercive Responsiveness (Davenport 2007) governing authorities “should respond with repression to behavior that threatens the political system, government personnel, the economy, or the lives, beliefs, and livelihoods of those within their territorial jurisdiction (Davenport 2007, 7).” Davenport explains that according to this law, when there is a threat to the status quo, authorities employ some

⁸⁸ See Appendix table 9, for a distribution of police presence at protest events characterized by demands for Jobs and welfare benefits.

⁸⁹ The feud between Argentina and Uruguay was unprecedented. Proceedings were brought before the International Court of Justice as a case formally named Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (*Argentina v. Uruguay*, vol I, February 2007). It ruled that, although Uruguay failed to inform Argentina of the operations, it did not pollute the river, so closing the pulp mill would be unjustified. The conflict ended in 2010, during the presidencies of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Argentina) and José Mujica (Uruguay), with the establishment of a joint coordination of the activities in the river. For more information see <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?&case=135&code=au&p3=1>, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uruguay_River_pulp_mill_dispute#cite_note-1

form of repressive action to counter or eliminate the threat. In this line, scholars have found that when challengers seek to displace current political leaders and/or the political–economic system, authorities are more likely to respond to dissent with repression. This should probably explain that in the 2001/2 cycle of protests, police appeared at protests that demanded a change in government. A common slogan during demonstrations in 2001/2 was *Que se Vayan Todos* (Away with them all). This slogan was pronounced at every protest event and shouted at politicians and authorities. On December 20th, 2001, Argentina’s President Fernando de La Rúa resigned as a result of the riots. Nonetheless, police was highly likely to use coercion when the demands were not a direct threat to the political system.

Overall, the claims for jobs and welfare benefits were the most frequent demands when police used violence in response to a protest event in the three periods. These demands include issues such as the creation of jobs, improvement of working conditions, payment of late wages, and the implementation and expansion of social and welfare benefits for those living in poverty or marginal conditions. Jobs, employment and better work conditions were among the most important grievances of the three periods. When we look at the unemployment and poverty rates of the time,⁹⁰ it is clear that these issues top all the claims, and this coincides with what scholars (Villalón 2007) point out as the concrete demands of the cycle. This finding, however, does not coincide with the law of Coercive Responsiveness mentioned above. That is, the behavior that was responded with violence was not direct threats to the political system or to those within Argentina. Repression was aimed at demands for jobs and welfare benefits. It is possible, however, that authorities interpreted these claims for employment and benefits as a threat to the economic model, to the economic status quo and hence the use of coercion in response to these events.

All in all, it is important to note that none of these were radical demands.⁹¹ Social movement scholars have argued that the claims against the government could be

⁹⁰ Unemployment reached a high of 19.6% in 2002. See Chapter 6 for further details.

⁹¹ I define radical demands as those claims that advocate a complete change in society or the democratic political institutions. For example, demands that question the mode of production, the configurations of power, or democratic institutions.

considered radical or disruptive demands, and hence subject to harsher repression by police and authorities. Yet, as said earlier, the demands for a change in the government became so frequent during the 2001 and 2002 period that these cannot be considered radical.

Thus, following the above, I find no support for the second part of the hypothesis—in the way it was formulated. The events that were characterized by greater police violence were not more radical in their claims than those in which police only appeared (and did nothing) at the event. However, when grouping demands or claims associated to employment, work conditions and welfare benefits, the results differ greatly. As table 4.13 indicates, when protesters were demanding jobs, better work conditions and welfare benefits, police used violent force 82% of the time, while all other demands—including those that the coercive responsiveness hypothesis deemed most likely to attract repression—experienced police violence 56% of the time. This result indicates that the type of demand does make a difference in police reaction, but that the underlying dynamic is different from the hypothesis we are considering here.

Table 4.0.13: Police Tactics And Demands For Jobs And Welfare Benefits

Table 4.13 Police Tactics* And Demands For Jobs And Welfare Benefits			
Police Tactics	Type of Claims		
	All other claims	For jobs and welfare	Total
Not violent	44%	18%	34%
Violent	56%	82%	66%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	206	137	343
Chi – square 24.7, p<0.001			
<p>Notes: In this table, violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests.</p> <p>Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p> <p>See Appendix C for a descriptive table of police tactics by demands for jobs and welfare by year.</p>			

To better understand the high level of police violence at demonstrations that featured core economic demands,⁹² we note that the neoliberal and structural adjustment policies implemented during the 1990s—which included an escalation of poverty, unemployment, underemployment and the retrenchment of the welfare state (Auyero 2001, Auyero 2007)—negatively affected families in urban and rural areas across Argentina. To make ends meet, poor people relied on several means: “extremely low incomes (decreasing), networks of reciprocity between neighbors and relatives (increasing), underground activities (drug dealing, shoplifting, and predatory crime) (increasing) church charity and state assistance, and (increasing) problem solving through personalized political mediation” (Auyero 2001: 44). The process of adjustment and privatization deepened during the 1990s, cultivating which Auyero called *problem solving through personalized political mediation* of federal and provincial governments—more commonly called patronage or clientelist networks⁹³ (Auyero 2001, 2007).

⁹² See Appendix B for a full list of work related claims and other demands.

⁹³ “In poor and working-class neighborhoods, shantytowns, and squatter settlements throughout the country, many of the poor and the unemployed solve the pressing problems of everyday life (access to food and medicine, for example) through patronage networks that rely on brokers of the Peronist party

It is often believed that patronage networks and non-routine collective action are opposite and conflicting political phenomena, but recent studies have shown that this is not always the case (Auyero, Lapegna, Page Poma 2009). Often times, patronage and collective action intersect, interact and can become mutually overlapping. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze the connection between social movements and patronage networks but it is important to say that collective actions demanding jobs, better salaries, and welfare program was amongst the highest during the periods of this study and had an important political impact (Schuster et al 2006:33). Thus, these demands – permeated and in interaction with patronage networks – could be considered a threat to authorities. Demands for jobs and welfare have what Schuster et al call strategic institutional consequences (2006).

What other factors could explain police use of violence at protest events? We not turn our attention to the geography of police violence, to examine whether some regions or localities had more police violence at protest events, and if so, why.

4.4 The location of the events

In a study of the political origins of the 2001 looting episodes in Argentina (2006), Javier Auyero found that the spatial distribution of repressive activities was one of the key factors in the dynamics of looting. In this section we therefore consider the impact of geography on the variability of police violence and on the number of casualties (as reported by the press).

The number of events in this dataset was not evenly distributed between the Greater Buenos Aires Area (52%) and all the other regions of the country (48%). Argentina is divided in 23 provinces and one federal district, yet over one third of the population (13 million inhabitants) is concentrated in the Greater Buenos Aires Metropolitan area. The concentration of police presence in Buenos Aires is also not

(locally known as *punteros*) as key actors. Depending on the (not always legal, not always overt) support of the local, provincial, and national administrations, these problem-solving networks work as webs of resource distribution and of protections against the risks of everyday life” (Auyero 2007: 59).

evenly distributed across the three periods under study. During the **Neoliberal** period 42% of the police-presence events took place in Buenos Aires (table 4.14). This relatively modest over-representation increased significantly during the **Crisis**, with almost half (47%) of the events, and then jumped dramatically during the **Progressive** period, to almost two-thirds (63%).

Table 4.0.14: Police Presence in Buenos Aires Area and All Other Regions Each Period.

Table 4.14: Police Presence In Buenos Aires Area And All Other Regions By Period				
Location	Neoliberal Menem 1997/8	Crisis De la Rúa 2001/2	Progressive Kirchner 2006/7	Total
Buenos Aires metropolitan area	42%	47%	63%	52%
Outside Buenos Aires	58%	53%	37%	48%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	60	164	119	343
Chi —square 10.010, p<0.05				
<i>Source:</i> Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.				

To understand increasing concentration, we note the genesis of the *piquetero* movement, which started in the provinces of Neuquén and Salta, away from the country’s capital between 1996 and 1998. As was documented earlier, in its initial years, the *piquetero* movement attracted disproportionate attention from police and the media, and thus decreasing the attention to Buenos Aires. During this period, police presence at roadblocks was significantly higher (69%) in provinces outside the Buenos Aires Metropolitan area.

By the Crisis Period, *piqueteros* and their innovative demonstration strategy—road blockades, or pickets—had diffused to the rest of the country, with pickets and roadblocks common in the Buenos Aires metropolitan (Svampa 2003, 156). Finally, during the Progressive period, while pickets were still a considerable tactic, they were no longer a focal point for police action, as the tactical repertoire and key issues had shifted. Police presence, however, does not indicate what tactics were used when

responding to a demonstration or whether coercion was used. Table 4.15 shows police violence each period in the Buenos Aires area and all other areas.

Table 4.0.15: Police Violence in Buenos Aires Area And All Other Regions Each Period

Table 4.15: Police Violence In Buenos Aires Area And All Other Regions By Period					
<i>Location</i>	Neoliberal Menem 1997/8	Crisis De la Rúa 2001/2	Progressive Kirchner 2006/7	Total	N
Greater Buenos Aires Area	13%	40%	46%	100%	112
Outside Buenos Aires	22%	59%	19%	100%	115
Total	18%	49%	33%	100%	–
N	40	113	74	–	227
Chi –square 19.307, p<0.001					
Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.					

Table 4.15 displays police use of violence in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area and other regions. Looking at the **Buenos Aires area**, the data shows police coercion here was lowest during the 1997 and 1998 neoliberal period (13%) and increased in subsequent periods. **Away from Buenos Aires**, in the provinces, police violence had similar rates in the Neoliberal period (22%) and the Progressive era (19%). Police coercion outside of Buenos Aires was highest during the Crisis period (59%).

It is not a surprise that the highest levels of police coercion in Buenos Aires took place during the Kirchner administration because although overall police violence declined during this period, this was not the case for Buenos Aires. At that time the national government had implemented a “no repression” policy.⁹⁴ As CELS (2007) reported, since 2003 and until 2007, the number of persons who died in episodes that involved police officers was in decline. According to the human rights group, this reduction in police violence was a result of the national governments’ decision of reforming and controlling federal security institutions. The integral reform of security

⁹⁴ The City of Buenos Aires is one of the provinces that did not sign and implement the protocol for democratic police action launched by the National Government in 2011.

organizations—encouraged by President Kirchner—involved trying to avoid the repression of social protests. Accordingly, there was a decline in police abuses of force during protest events throughout the country. Why did these episodes remain in the City of Buenos Aires? A possible explanation for this is that the Buenos Aires City administration did not implement the democratic guidelines for police conduct at demonstrations that Kirchner was fostering. These guidelines involved that police started receiving specialized training to respect human rights and avoid unnecessary use of violence (fire arms, batons, etc.). The following example may illustrate this point:

On February 11th 2004, July 15th 2004 and on October 2nd 2006 the Federal Police published and distributed among its forces the “Orden Del Día Interna or ODI” (*Internal Order of the Day*) numbers 126, 163, and 184⁹⁵ where they announced the new rules for police staff in charge of maintaining order during concentrations of people. ODI 184 announces the approval of the “Performance Guidelines for Police Staff in charge of Public Order during Concentrations of People”, Resolution Number 03833. In its 4th article, the new rules state that among its basic principles is “the exclusion of lethal weapons for the control of public order... prevention of disturbances by means of negotiation, speech tactics to the public and dissuasive physical presence.” Articles 5 to 14 describe how police may (or not) use physical force and weapons during demonstrations and other kinds of multitudes. According to the article, physical force shall only be used in legitimate defense and no lethal fire weapons may be used. Furthermore, before resorting to force, policemen should try to negotiate with organizers or protest leaders and notify the public of the expected behavior and possible consequences of their actions. Also included in the regulation are guidelines related to the dress code of the police engaging with demonstrations, and all personnel will have to wear uniform and use identifiable vehicles. This last point is important because political factions send undercover policemen—in addition to soccer hooligans and thugs—to create chaos during protest events and thus justify violent repressive actions.

⁹⁵ The ODI (Internal Orders of the Day) for the Federal Police are announcements of mandatory knowledge for all the staff in the forces. They are published and distributed among all the its members. Among the items included in the ODI are new regulations or changes in legislations; personnel retirements, promotions or dismissals; events and ceremonies to be held; and any notification of relevance to the force.

Although the regulations mentioned above were implemented in the Federal Police, the national government encouraged provincial forces all throughout the country to enforce them. Yet, many parts of the country did not ascribe to these guidelines and continued to follow older, more conservative, authoritarian standards for police action. In the words of a former National Security Ministry Secretary “the problem is that political structures in the provinces –except for a few exceptions such as Mendoza, Córdoba and Santa Fe– are from the medieval times” (Interview, Buenos Aires, 2014).

In the City of Buenos Aires, violent policing continued. In December 2010, local and Federal police used fire weapons, tear gas and physical force to evict demonstrators squatting on a land. According to reports by the protesters and witnesses, the police entered the area with violence and did not try to negotiate or speak with the protesters. Similar situations in the City of Buenos Aires were reported in 2011, 2012 and 2013. After a violent episode of repression in 2013, local legislators asked the Security Minister of the Buenos Aires City why local police do not follow the democratic guidelines. The minister replied, “we (the Buenos Aires City government) did not sign the agreement... we do not agree with the protocol. We do not agree with the specific actions detailed in the protocol because we understand they go against the City’s Code of Civil Practice.”⁹⁶

As a former interior ministry official said during an interview:

“The brand new national government in 2003 wanted to avoid social conflicts and confrontations with picket organizations and unemployed groups, but not all administrations had this as a priority and reforming police forces is not easy. There were several attempts to reform the Federal Police and the Buenos Aires province force but these are strong institutions and were resistant to change”⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Buenos Aires City Legislative Body, Acta de la 3^o Sesión Especial (Document of the 3rd Special Session), April 27, 2013, stenographic version. <http://www.legislatura.gov.ar/vt.php>

⁹⁷ Interview with former interior ministry agent, Buenos Aires, February 2013. For a complete analysis of the reform attempts of the Buenos Aires police see: Sain, Marcelo Fabián. *Seguridad, democracia y reforma del sistema policial en la Argentina*. Vol. 620. Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2002; Sain, Marcelo Fabián, and Joachim Knoop. *La reforma policial en América Latina: Una mirada crítica desde el progresismo*. Prometeo Libros, 2010; Sain, M. (1998). *La reforma policial en la provincia de Buenos Aires. CELS: Seminario: Las Reformas Policiales en Argentina, Bs. As.*

Even within the Federal Police, the regulations enforced in 2004—and ratified in 2010 and 2011—were often times violated during demonstrations. For example, during demonstrations in 2010 and 2011, human rights reports, denounced that Federal Police Officers attended demonstrations carrying fire weapons and not wearing an uniform and without identification (CELS 2012: 117).

When looking at police tactics in each province, it is possible to see that during the **Neoliberal** period, police responded with violence in most of the provinces. Police coercion, however, was not particularly high in the urban centers: Buenos Aires City (55%), Córdoba (44%), and Mendoza (50%). As table 4.16 below indicates, in the other parts of the country, the use of violent tactics by police was significantly elevated. There were many protests in the provinces of Jujuy and Neuquén and police use of violence here was very high (Jujuy 90%, Neuquén 63%).

Recall that starting in 1996 and for several years (1997 and 1998 in particular) teachers in Neuquén and state workers in Jujuy held numerous demonstrations to protest unfulfilled promises by provincial governments of better salaries, the payment of back wages, and more jobs for the unemployed. As was mentioned above, during the 1990s the government implemented neoliberal policies that resulted in the reduction of the welfare state and the impoverishment of large portions of the population. There were notable cases in Jujuy and Neuquén where entire towns depended on state jobs and were completely abandoned with the retrenchment of the state.

Table 4.0.16: Police Tactics By Province During Neoliberal Period

Table 4.16: Police Tactics By Province During The Neoliberal Period				
Province	Non-Violent Police	Violent Police	Total	N
Ciudad de BA	45%	55%	100%	20
Buenos Aires	20%	80%	100%	5
Córdoba	56%	44%	100%	9
Jujuy	10%	90%	100%	10
Mendoza	50%	50%	100%	2
Neuquén	37%	63%	100%	8
Río Negro	–	100%	100%	2
Salta	–	100%	100%	1
Santa Fe	–	100%	100%	1
Tucumán	–	100%	100%	2
Total	33%	67%	100%	–
N	20	40	–	60

Chi Square 9.388 p<0.05

Note: In this table, *violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests.
Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.

In 2001 and 2002 —the period of the **Crisis**— police used violent tactics in response to protest events in places where police violence had not been reported in 1997 and 1998 (such as in Corrientes, Chaco, Chubut, Entre Ríos, Formosa, Santiago del Estero, Santa Cruz, San Juan, and Misiones). However, when looking into the different tactics employed by police across the country during this period, it is possible to see that security forces used combinations of force in most provinces, with a predominance of weapons, equipment, and arrests on 71% of the occasions.⁹⁸ Therefore, an analysis of the spread of police tactics during 2001 and 2002 does not point to the diffusion of an innovation (Wood 2014: 17-20, Auyero and Moran 2007: 11). As Table 4.17 below shows, in the provinces with largest numbers of protest

⁹⁸ The use of non-violent tactics by police (such as appearing and doing nothing or preventing violence) was only reported in 29% of the protest events with police appearance during 2001/2.

events, police used coercion on most of the occasions: Buenos Aires (65%), Buenos Aires City (57%), Santa Fe (70%), Córdoba (64%), and Neuquén (91%).

During the 2001 riots, 39 people were killed throughout the country. Thirteen years later, it has still not been determined who is to be blamed for the deaths. Although police violence was not particularly high in the Buenos Aires City, at least five of the deaths that took place in December of 2001, took place in the downtown area of the Buenos Aires City. The federal police at the time controlled this part of the city so the responsibility for police behavior is being attributed to national level politicians and state agents all the way to then President Fernando de la Rúa. During the oral trial for the deaths of these demonstrators, former Federal Security Minister Enrique Mathov argued that the government did not order police to evict demonstrators from the Plaza de Mayo or to repress demonstrators.⁹⁹ He also said that the deaths in the City of Buenos Aires were reported on television before he knew anything about them. He asked the chief of police at the time if he had any knowledge of these deaths and the chief of police replied that there are no deaths. With this statement, the Security Minister was denying that him, as a high —rank political authority, or the police, had any responsibility for the deaths of December 2001 in Plaza de Mayo.

The former Security Minister argued:

“It is understandable that provinces don’t want to deploy their own forces. In general, provinces prefer to have federal forces acting so I keep my own force in reserve in case there is a need at some other location... and I couldn’t determine how many officers, from which force to deploy to say Mendoza so we had to engage with Planning and Control officers who had to discuss with people in the province about what they needed...

And then we had the issue of the distances, which had to be solved and was not simple. Because if we had a Border Guard team nearby with vehicles to move to a specific place by earth that was simple. But when the security teams, the security forces, have to be transported from one point in the country to another—as it still happens today—they have to use Air Force transportations... and for that in 2001 it was required to have a Crisis Committee conformed. During that time, Security had to negotiate with the Air Force as with a third party. How

⁹⁹ The Plaza de Mayo and Obelisco squares are the locations where most rallies take place in the City of Buenos Aires. In December 19th and 20th, demonstrators were killed there.

much will it cost? Each had to use their own budget allocation but if this was not possible then we had to engage the Ministry of Economy to see where the money could come from. ... Anyway, these involved budget discussions and consultations so a call by a provincial minister requesting public force help resulted in ten or fifteen conversations. If that request came from one province, it is the job, but when 8 or 9 provinces at the same time were demanding for help on 19th and 20th of December it was a mixture of 150 conversations. I couldn't wait for the Planning Department to answer about Mendoza when I was receiving calls from Tucumán (and other provinces) I had to answer.

On December 20th, (2001) I woke in the midst of this roar... that day, December 20th, and I am probably forgetting some, I received requirements (of public security forces aid) from the provinces of Tucumán, San Juan, Tierra del Fuego, Chaco... I might be missing some.” (Mathov, December 19th and 20th 2001 trial, Buenos Aires, April 9, 2014).¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ The oral trial, which began in February 2014 and was still in course in December 2014, is the first in which a government official from a constitutional government is accused of ordering the repression of a demonstration. Put differently, it is the first time in which a democratic government has to respond for the killings of security forces under their command. The other state officials involved were the Minister of Interior who died before the oral trial began, and then President Fernando de la Rúa who was dismissed from this oral trial by a Federal Chamber but is still linked to the investigation.

Table 4.0.17: Police Tactics By Province During The Crisis Period

Table 4.17: Police Tactics By Province During The Crisis Period (2001-2002)				
Province	Non-Violent Police Tactics	Violent Police Tactics	Total	N:
Ciudad de BA	43%	57%	100%	44
Buenos Aires	35%	65%	100%	31
Catamarca	100%	–	100%	2
Córdoba	36%	64%	100%	11
Corrientes	–	100%	100%	3
Chaco	–	100%	100%	1
Chubut	–	100%	100%	6
Entre Ríos	22%	78%	100%	9
Formosa	50%	50%	100%	2
Jujuy	20%	80%	100%	5
Mendoza	–	100%	100%	5
Neuquén	9%	91%	100%	11
Río Negro	25%	75%	100%	4
Salta	–	100%	100%	6
San Juan	–	100%	100%	3
San Luis	100%	–	100%	3
Santa Cruz	–	100%	100%	1
Santa Fe	30%	70%	100%	10
Santiago del Estero	67%	33%	100%	3
Tucumán	–	100%	100%	3
Tierra del Fuego	100%	–	100%	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	–
N	51	113	–	164
Chi Square 36.635 p<0.05				
Note: In this table, *violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests. Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.				

In 2006 and 2007, during the **Progressive administration**, police use of violence at protest events saw a small decline and there were no incidents in several provinces. As was mentioned earlier, most episodes of police violence were concentrated in the Buenos Aires province and the City of Buenos Aires (63% of all episodes in these two places). That is, although police violence declined all over Argentina in 2006 and 2007 it remained high and concentrated in the province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires. In both the Buenos Aires City and the

Buenos Aires province, 70% of protest events were responded with police violence (see Table 4.18 below). Let’s recall that in the City of Buenos Aires, the guidelines for democratic policing were not endorsed.


Another explanation for higher numbers of police violence in the City of Buenos Aires is that the civilian control of police there was politically motivated to allow state forces use coercion at certain demonstrations. But, we will discuss this further in the following chapter.

Table 4.0.18: Police Tactics By Province During The Progressive Period

Table 4.18: Police Tactics By Province During The Progressive Period (2006-2007)				
Province	Non-Violent Police Tactics	Violent Police Tactics	Total	N:
Ciudad de BA	31%	69%	100%	45
Buenos Aires	30%	70%	100%	30
Córdoba	–	100%	100%	2
Corrientes	100%	–	100%	1
Chaco	50%	50%	100%	2
Chubut	–	100%	100%	1
Entre Ríos	100%	–	100%	5
Mendoza	–	100%	100%	1
Misiones	–	100%	100%	2
Neuquén	50%	50%	100%	8
Salta	–	100%	100%	3
Santa Cruz	60%	40%	100%	15
Santa Fe	100%	–	100%	1
Santiago del Estero	–	100%	100%	2
Tucumán	–	100%	100%	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	–
N	45	74	–	119
Chi Square 25.255 p<0.05				
Note: In this table, *violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests. Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.				

The image below summarizes police use of violence at protest events by region:

Figure 1: Distribution Of Police Violence Episodes By Province



Own elaboration with data from author's event catalogue, and from Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.

In the provinces of Córdoba, Mendoza, Neuquén, Salta, and Tucumán, there were episodes of police violence during the three periods. In some other provinces, security forces use of violence was only reported during the 2001 and 2002 crisis (such as Corrientes, Chubut, Entre Ríos, Formosa, and San Juan, which did not have any incidents of police violence in the other periods). In Jujuy, Río Negro and Santa Fe, police violence was highest in 1997 and 1998, continued in 2001 and 2002 but there

were no episodes in 2006 and 2007, which could be a result of the implementation of the ‘no repression’ policy by the government.

4.5 Threat Hypothesis

Considering all the information presented above, Table 4.19 below presents the results of a binary logistic regression analysis predicting the use of violent behavior by police at contentious collective action events. Violent police behavior is a dichotomous variable where 1= Yes (police used violent forms) and 0= No (police did not use violent forms or tactics). The use of violent forms by police includes any reports that state forces used brutal tactics, and abused fundamental human rights during a protest episode. These tactics include the use of weapons, equipment, or different forms of physical force (pushing, kicking, pulling hair, etc.), making forced evictions, and confrontations between police and protesters. The category for Yes (police used violent forms) does *not* include arrests unless these were accompanied by one of the brutal forms of violence mentioned above.

The seven independent variables used in the analysis are the factors that other researchers have suggested as determinants of police violence, and which we have been discussing, one at a time, in this chapter,¹⁰¹ mainly measuring what protesters do at the event.

- The first of these predictors is a dummy variable that measures when protesters *used violent tactics*. The use of violence by protesters has been shown to draw police presence and action (Davenport et al. 2011). Violent tactics included the use of weapons by demonstrators (guns, sticks, rocks, firebombs, bricks), physical or hand-to-hand violence, and combinations of these. As table 4.5 above showed, protesters used such tactics at 34% of the events.

¹⁰¹ Please see Appendix C for the frequency distribution of the variables used in the binary logistic regression.

- The second variable, also dichotomous, is an indicator of whether demonstrators destroyed or *damaged public or private property* (cars, buildings, parks, etcetera) during the event. In this dataset, damaged property appeared at about 44.6% percent of the events.¹⁰²
- The third dichotomous variable measures whether arrests took place during the event. Human rights reports in Argentina (CORREPI 2012) have shown that there is an excessive use of violence during arrests. Yet, as I showed above, the number of arrests appears to increase during 2006/7 when police use of coercion has been reported as declining. Arrests were one of several tactics employed by police when responding to a protest event. The percentages of arrests made were: 38% during the Neoliberal period, 48% during the Crisis, and 51% during the Progressive era.
- The fourth measure corresponds to the *target* of the protest event. Prior research indicates that protesters who directly target the government will be considered more threatening to state officials and thus are more likely to be policed aggressively. To measure this I include a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 when an event explicitly targets any level (local, provincial, national) or any branch of the Argentine government. In this dataset, 70.3% percent of events targeted the government.
- The fifth predictor measures the demonstrators' demands for jobs and welfare benefits. As Davenport and Soule (2009) argued, defining radical goals is sensitive to time and context. In this sense, protesting for gay rights might not have been radical in Argentina during the periods of this research (gay marriage was approved in the City of Buenos Aires in 2010) but –as was explained earlier in this chapter (section 4.3)– demands for jobs and welfare benefits are. Claims for jobs and welfare

¹⁰² It is important to highlight here that the damaged or destroyed property is most often attributed to demonstrators but it is not clear who actually did it. Actual damage could have been caused by demonstrators, by counter-demonstrators, by the police, or by confrontations involving police and demonstrators.

were 46.7% of all demands during the Neoliberal period, 48.8% during the Crisis, and 24.4% during the Progressive period.

- The sixth of these variables is a dichotomous variable that measures whether the events took place in the Buenos Aires metropolitan region or not. A frequent criticism of newspaper data collection catalogs of events is that events away from urban centers receive less media attention and are thus underrepresented. The data here showed that the number of events with police presence was not evenly distributed between the Greater Buenos Aires Area (52%) and all the other regions of the country (48%) so it was important to include this variable. During the neoliberal period, 41.7% of the events took place in Buenos Aires, 47% during the Crisis, and 63% during the Progressive period.
- The seventh variable (second model only) codes the three periods under investigation, using dichotomous codes for Neo-liberal period (1997-8) and Progressive periods (2006-7), with the Crisis Period (2001-2) the omitted category. There were 60 events in the Neoliberal period (17.5%), 164 during the Crisis, (47.8%) and 119 during the Progressive period (34.7%).
- Based on exploration of the relationship among the variables, in the second model, I include an interaction term property damage and violent tactics to assess the combined effects of these two acting in concert. In the dataset, 27% of the demonstrations involved both protester violence and property damage.

Before turning to the analysis of the logistic regression, it is important to address some of the limitations of the sample and how this may influence the regression results.

Following the threat theory, it is argued police respond to protests based on the level of threat they perceive from challengers to the status quo. Accordingly, to explain police violence, it is necessary to look at the characteristics of the protest events. The

size of the demonstration, and the presence of counter-demonstrators are often considered relevant characteristics when measuring the level of threat to a state. Although research has shown that the number of participants increases the probability of police presence and action, it does not increase the probability of police use of violent tactics—which is what I measure here. The cases analyzed in Argentina show that although larger events do attract more police, on these larger events police conduct preventive and vigilante actions rather than violent ones.¹⁰³ A possible explanation for this is that at larger protest events, police are also more careful with their actions. The media at these protest events plays a very important role and will report, denounce and condemn any excessive use of violence by police.

The literature suggests that the presence of counter-demonstrators increases the likelihood of conflict at the event,¹⁰⁴ (Davenport, Soule and Armstrong 2011; Earl 2006) but in Argentina, newspaper accounts did not report—on any of the events—their presence or absence. That is, there is no mention in any of the articles of whether counter demonstrators were present at any protest event so I did not include this variable. This does not mean that counterdemonstrators were not present but it was not possible to analyze them with the tools available.¹⁰⁵

Additionally, it is important to point out that the groups that regularly stage protest events in Argentina (such as *piqueteros*, unemployed workers, students, and unionized collectives) have their own security logistics and politics. They have all developed some kind of internal safety protocol, which allow demonstrators to protect

¹⁰³ Although there is a large proportion of missing data measuring the number of protesters (41%) it is clear in the dataset used here, that larger protest events were not subject to more aggressive or violent policing. The data shows that police used violent tactics at large protest events (of 1000 or more participants) 31% of the times.

¹⁰⁴ This is due to the hostile interactions between them (counter-demonstrators) and protesters (Davenport et al 2011: 159)

¹⁰⁵ The reporting of counterdemonstrators by newspapers changed dramatically in 2010. During that year, thugs from a railway workers union attacked a demonstration and killed a railway contractor who was protesting in demand for better work conditions and wages. Several other people were injured during the assault, which was later proved that the union had intentionally generated the violent incidents. The killing of Mariano Ferreyra was widely covered by the media.
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mariano_Ferreyra

themselves, avoid infiltrations, and confrontations with police. Some groups have appointed security leaders that surround the group wearing special clothing, caps, bracelets and/or signs. Security leaders might also use ropes to surround the group of demonstrators while walking at a march. The rope allows the group to walk together, stay close and prevents the entrance of thugs that take advantage of the protest to generate disorder. As an activist mentioned during an interview

“We stay together to avoid and prevent problems. We know each other and walk together to have control of the demonstration. But we also know that sometimes ‘they’ (referring to police or authorities) want us to look disruptive and we have to prevent any unnecessary disorder... if that happens (referring to disruptions or violence), we will sure receive the blame” (Interview with activist from Human Rights Group, 2013).

Also excluded from this analysis were protesters’ security protocols since newspapers do not provide information on these and hence are not part of the data collected here. As a result, future research on protest policing should contemplate utilizing a method that allows collecting data and analyzing protesters’ security protocols, counterdemonstrator presence, and their interaction.

4.6 Discussion

The analysis was performed with Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. In doing so, several diagnostic statistics were calculated to guard against potential violations of logistic regression assumption. First, variance inflation factors scores did not exceed a value of 2.5 for any of the variables, indicating no potential problems with multicollinearity (Allison 1999). Second, there were several outlier events so they were removed and the statistics were carried out again, presenting no problems with outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2006).

Table 4.0.19: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of Police Violent Behavior

Table 4.19: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates Of Police Violent* Behavior		
	Model 1	Model 2
Violent Tactic (1=Yes)	.032 1.033 (.013)	.811 2.249 (2.916)
Property Damaged (1=Yes)	.393 1.481 (2.262)	.803** 2.233 (6.086)
Arrests (1=Yes)	.098 1.103 (.184)	.166 1.180 (.499)
Target Government (1=Yes)	.122 1.129 (.231)	.125 1.133 (.233)
Claims for Jobs or Welfare (1=Yes)	.878*** 2.407 (13.400)	.804*** 2.235 (10.552)
Buenos Aires (1=Yes)	-.027 .973 (.014)	.063 .938 (.072)
Property Damaged by Violent tactics	—	-1.214** .297 (4.242)
Neoliberal period (1997/8 pre-crisis)	—	.580** 1.786 (3.042)
Progressive period (2006/7 post-crisis)	—	.107 .899 (.170)
-2 Log Likelihood	451.772	443.572
Chi-Square Change	19.283**	27.483***
Cox-Snell R-Square	.055	.077
Nagelkerke R-Square	.073	.103
<p>Notes: Police violent behavior here does not include making arrests. The first number is the unstandardized logistic regression coefficient, the second number is the odds ratio, and the third number is the Wald statistic. **Indicates $p < 0.05$ and ***indicates $p < 0.001$</p> <p>Source: author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p>		

As shown in table 4.19 above, a test of the full model (1) with all six independent variables against the constant only model was statistically significant, $X_2 = 451.772$, p less than .001, indicating that the predictors, as a set, reliably distinguished between police use of violence and not. The model as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model (i.e., a model with no predictors). The Nagelkerke R^2 is similar in size to the pseudo R^2 , suggesting again that this set of predictors help discriminate between police use of violence at contentious collective action events.

Let us now turn our attention to the independent variables of the first model. According to the Wald criterion, I find that one of the predictor variables was significantly related to the likelihood of police using violent behavior: claims for jobs or welfare benefits were associated with police violence. The regression coefficients for jobs are positive and significant ($b=.878$; Wald 13.400, $p < 0.001$). The odds ratio for claims for jobs and welfare indicates if a protest raised claims of this nature, the odds of police using violence against demonstrators more than doubled.

Though this first model indicates that the group of variables as a whole significantly impact on the rate of violence by police, we note that only the job claims variable is statistically significant. This pattern supports our earlier observations that other factors, while trending in the predicted direction do not have sufficient impact to be statistically significant without controlling for various other causal factors. To assess the stability of these trends, Model 2 controls for the three periods as well as measuring the significant interaction effect between property damage and protestor violence.¹⁰⁶ This second model was statistically significant ($X_2 = 443.572$, $p < 0.001$) with the Nagelkerke R^2 indicating that this set of predictors is more discriminating than Model 1.

Model 2 demonstrates that there are multiple, interacting factors determining the probability of police violence at protests.

¹⁰⁶ I tested other interaction effects as well as various other variables. The results of these other measurements are consistent with the Model displayed in Table 4.24

- First, it confirms the significance of demands for jobs and welfare benefits, with protests that raise these demands more than twice as likely to be subjected to police violence—even when the demonstrators were not otherwise provocative. Moreover, there is no greater likelihood of police violence if the protesters target the government ($B=.122$, $OR=1.13$, ns).

It is important to note that protest policing scholars have argued that demonstrators claiming radical or revolutionary goals will be considered more threatening by authorities and thus more likely to be policed aggressively (Davenport 1995; Tilly 1978; Wisler and Guigni 1999). During the period of this study, which includes the Crisis Period, one of the most popular slogans at protest events was “Que se Vayan Todos” (*Away/Out with them All*). With it, protesters demanded that all politicians, government officials, and corporate elites resign. The radical nature of the slogan was toned down when it became the recurring motto of all types of protest events, mainly those of middle class sectors who had their savings accounts frozen.

According to prior studies, the radicalness of the protest could be measured by analyzing whether the target was governmental or not. Thus, while the nature of demands has some impact on the rate of police violence, the proposition that direct threats to government provoke police violence is disconfirmed here.

As was mentioned earlier, the claims for jobs and welfare benefits, in turn, were perceived as threatening and thus included in the analysis, which confirms their significance.

- Second, we note that during Neoliberal administration of Carlos Menem, the police were significantly more likely ($b=.580$, Wald 3.042. and

p<0.05) to utilize violence, compared to both the Crisis Period and the Progressive Period. This gives substance to the interesting result above that while the police were not more likely to be sent to demonstrations (Table 4.2), there are more likely to utilize violent tactics at protests they are assigned to monitor/control. This finding confirms the observation of scholars and demonstrators that the rate of police violence was higher during the Menem administration. (Svampa and Pandolfi 2005). But it contradicts the impression that the Kirchner regime's campaign against police violence resulted in a lower rate of police violence, since there was not substantively significant decline as compared to the crisis period.

- Third, there is not great rate of police violence outside of Buenos Aires. Even when the nature and militancy of the demonstration is held constant, the police are no more likely to utilize violence outside the capital, where media attention is lower and protest-tolerance has been historically less established.
- Finally, Model 2 records a complicated relationship between protest tactics and the rate of police violence. While protests that involve either violent tactics (odds ratio 2.25) or property damage (odds ratio=2.23)—but not both—are more than twice as likely to trigger police violence than peaceful demonstrations; those that combine violence and property damage (odds ratio .40) are only modestly more likely to attract police violence. As we saw on table 4.24, the interaction term between property damage and violent tactics is negatively associated with police use of violent tactics.

All in all, the data here demonstrates that the use of violence by police was not directly—and solely—a result of the actions by the demonstrators involved in the protest. That is, the use of violent tactics by protesters (such as throwing rocks, setting up fires, using firecrackers, attacking buildings or people, etcetera) as an action

independent of others was not associated with police use of violent tactics. Similarly, demonstrations aimed at the government were not indicative of police use of violence. Perhaps, in a country with repeated economic crises and social conflicts, and where most protest events are aimed at the government, this is not perceived as a threat by authorities or police. Yet, demonstrations in demand for more jobs and welfare benefits were perceived as threatening by authorities and/or police and thus subject to harsher repression. As a leader for one of the country's umbrella unions said during an interview:

When the economy is not well... when the country's economy is at a standstill, then there are no possibilities of responding to social demands. It is very difficult to provide favorable answers to social conflict so what the government does is limit social protest. The government doesn't want any more demonstrations. As it has been happening here. First there is denial of the conflict, there is denial of poverty levels, of unemployment... but then, there is an increase, an emergence of new legislations that seek to criminalize and limit social protest (Union leader, Buenos Aires, August 2014).

Collective claim making in demand for jobs, employment and welfare benefits is not radical but is nevertheless threatening to authorities in a context of increasing unemployment, informal jobs and precarious work. Furthermore, even if high-ranking police officers or politicians oppose violence in response to protest events, the rank and file police have a certain degree of discretion, and use force anyway.

As Laura Kalmanowiecki pointed out, police in Argentina have lacked accountability, and are guided by double standards in which political criteria sometimes played a central role. In addition, political dissidents, crazy people, and criminals sprang from the same causes and required the same treatment: repression, social control, and reeducation (2000, 209 —211). Thus, considering the history of police in Argentina, the response to protest events by police might not be guided by the level of threat perceived. Or, threat should be reconsidered taking other factors—such as claims for jobs—into account. We will discuss this further in the next chapters.

Figure 2: Police In Riot Gear And Mounting Horses. Buenos Aires, December 20, 2001.



Police in riot gear and mounting horses in Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires City. December 20, 2001.
Photo by Damián Neustadt. CELS

Chapter 5: Protest Policing and Politics

You are here... You are in the school's patio, in the classroom
with your poor students, in the marches that are held and will be
organized, in future fights.

You are in the live memory... in the dreams and utopias of all
those who seek a just and dignifying life.

Carlos, you were always with just causes, in the classroom and
in the streets... Today is a special day because we distinguish
you fellow teacher, "Teacher of Life."

Carlos Fuentealba, the chalks were tainted with blood... the
same chalks will continue writing memories and demanding
justice and punishment.

Carlos Fuentealba here, now and always!¹⁰⁷

Most of the scholarship on protest policing and repression points to the reactive nature of control. That is, police appear in reaction to a threat (Davenport 2000, 2007). The size, form, or claim of the protest pose a threat to government authorities, police, or private companies and is consequently repressed. Hence, the response of authorities and police is a result of the actions that protesters take. It is the behavior of demonstrators that indicate how police will respond.

Yet, as Earl and Soule (2006) demonstrate, police institutions might have their own agenda, and historical components of police institutions, local structural dynamics, police reforms, or state authorities decisions' could also affect police conduct. For example, as Oliver (2008) pointed out reforms in 'ordinary' crime control policies may have an impact on how the police approach protest control. Similarly, political alliances or confrontations within the same government could result in changes in police behavior and protest policing.

Furthermore, protest policing is at times used as a political resource that can be distributed and used with discretion to favor and reward allies, or affect opponents. In

¹⁰⁷ Tribute to Carlos Fuentealba by CTERA teachers' union, a year after he was killed by police during a demonstration (2008).

these instances, the deployment –or not– of police forces may be used to exert power and manage *patrons'* influences in the political field. The absence of police response to certain protest events may also be associated with a lack of resources, lack of power, or an incapacity to bring back order to an out of control situation.

In this chapter, I will look at variations in the forms of protest policing. That is, when police appear at a protest gathering, what do they do? How do they act? On what occasions do police use more or less force? Additionally, this variation in police response indicates that police not only appear in reaction to a threat. After looking closely at the repression of teachers in the province of Neuquén in 2007, I will hypothesize *that protest policing is not only reactive but also often also proactive or offensive. Police conduct at protests is a result of political dynamics, and a constitutive form of being a police*, which reflects that police agents have a historical constitution and context that needs to be considered when looking at their actions.

5.1 The Political Nature of Protest Policing

Social movement scholars have found that protests develop and succeed not because they emerge to address specific issues, but rather because something in the larger political context, in addition to factors endogenous to the movements,¹⁰⁸ allows existing grievances to be heard. “These contextual dimensions, called political opportunities, include regime shifts, periods of political instability, or changes in the composition of elites that may provide an opening for social movement” (della Porta 2008: 223-224).

Political opportunities also shape the response of governments towards protests. For example, more authoritarian governments might not allow all types of social movement tactics or alliances among contesting groups. In democracies, political opportunities influence policy decisions about policing. In addition to these structural factors, there are political dynamics that also frame the way authorities reply to

¹⁰⁸ Among these factors are: organizational structure, quality of leadership, strategies developed, etc.

contentious collective action. One of these factors is connected to the political game, power, and influence struggles within the ruling actors as well as strategies to obtain resources, and maintain legitimacy. In order to examine this, let's look at variations in police response to protest events.

Protest policing or the 'policing of dissent' (Waddington 1995) responds to political decisions. Public policies related to the control, restriction, freedom and protection of demonstrations have historically varied based on contextual factors, configurations of power, political alliances or disputes, and police culture. Whether or not police 'is sent' to a demonstration involves prior discussions and negotiations. Furthermore, police have wide discretionary power while at the demonstration. Often, policemen have to decide between contradictory orders: for example, whether to follow a judge's decision to evict a roadblock or the political order of not repressing. According Argentine to anthropologist Marcela Perelman, in Argentina police generally prioritize what the judge says. "Between an internal reprisal and a trial for infringement of public duties, the internal reprisal is always better. You get to go home" (2009: 495). Yet, Perelman also showed that, on occasions, political authorities have a vested interested in a protest event or a protesting group and in spite of a judge's orders, police decide to allow the protest to continue. Police action at protest events has several layers of complexity and we will examine these below.


As was shown in Chapter 4, police only appeared in a reduced number of demonstrations (9%), yet used violence in 66% of the protest events in which they appeared. What is more, when separating arrests the data show that the use of violence¹⁰⁹ by police was the dominant tactic in the three periods (chart 5.1 below). In 1997 and 1998, during the **Neoliberal** period, police responded with some form of coercion (excluding arrests) 57% of the times they showed up at a protest event, and 10% of the times they appeared and made arrests. On 33% of the times, during this period, police appeared to control and did not use violent tactics.

Argentina, as a federal republic, has a decentralized police organization and

¹⁰⁹ Although arrests also involve the use of violent tactics, in the following charts they were separated for analytical purposes. Here *use of violence* is defined as brutal or arbitrary use of violence or coercion – arrests are not included.

each province is responsible for legislations and the organization of the security forces in its territory. In 1997 and 1998, iron fist policies were in place in most parts of the country (CELS 2002, Constantino 2013, Wacquant 2009), and as the data show, during this period police used violence on most of the occasions (57%) in which they attended a contentious collective action event. Surprisingly, the number of arrests during this period was the lowest (10%). It is for this reason that arrests cannot be considered as the sole measure of repression level.

During the 2001 and 2002 **Crisis** period –characterized by high levels of contention– the tactics used by police in response to demonstrations show similar figures to those of the neoliberal period of the 1990s (54% use of violent tactics, 31% appearances and limited action and 15% arrests).



Chi-Square NS, N=343 (1997 and 1998=60; 2001 and 2002= 164; 2006 and 2007= 119)

This tendency is maintained during the following period, the **Progressive** administration of Néstor Kirchner in 2006 and 2007. Although I expected lower percentages of violence and arrests, these numbers are still high during protest events (45% and 17% respectively).

Perhaps even more surprising is the continuation of violent police tactics during the **Progressive** Kirchner administration, which advocated the respect for human rights among state forces, and a democratic approach to protest policing. Furthermore, the noted increase in arrests during this period might be indicative of a tendency towards the criminalization of protests events—using the criminal code to restrict claim-making actions. The decline in the amount of direct violent actions by police was traded by a rise in arrests. This, for example, involves the arrest or detention of protest organizers, leaders and/or certain activists before or during a protest event and their release once the demonstration or the plight has ended. As a high rank Argentine minister said: “we will try to generate jobs and provide welfare plans from the government... but to those left out because they want to, we will respond using the criminal code.”¹¹⁰ From this perspective, dissent is equated to illegality, and thus the only legitimate form of expressing grievances and difference is through the conventional institutional channels that often times do not work for everyone. For example, minority groups –ethnic, immigrants, women, and aboriginal people– are often times not represented in the democratic process, have limited participation, and little power for social change.¹¹¹

Research on the criminalization of protests, found that when social conflict escalates, the government (and also the media and other actors) frame it as a criminal activity and both police and the courts act accordingly (Artese 2006, 2010, Rodriguez 2004). Put differently, security forces and the judiciary exert their power—using the criminal code—and limit demonstrations by accusing activists of alleged illegal actions. All these add up to other everyday forms of criminalizing dissent such as budget

¹¹⁰ See Página 12, October 26, 2003 <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-27350-2003-10-26.html>

¹¹¹ Immigrants in many countries, as of 2015, do not have the power to vote in the place where they reside; and aboriginal people –in Argentina and elsewhere– cannot solve many of their problems through voting. Thus, contentious collective actions emerge as a form of expressing claims.

restrictions to social movement organizations, evictions, activists' harassment and purposely—meticulous control of movement organizers' finances (Rodríguez 2004, Buhl & Korol 2008, Murillo 2004, Bertoni 2010, Scribano 2002). Another form of judicializing demonstrations is by accusing social movement organizations of alleged embezzlement or fraud. These accusations are often untrue or lacking evidence, and thus discarded. Nevertheless, such allegations damage an organization's reputation and present obstacles to its mobilizations efforts (Svampa and Pandolfi 2005, Rodríguez 2004, Murillo 2004).

It is important to note that between 1997 and 2003 there were no new state policies aimed at preventing or controlling police use of violence during demonstrations. In fact, there were several legislations that sought to increase police powers to fight crime. Most were not approved but still presented as bills to Congress and as statements to the media.¹¹²

We were expelled from the Buenos Aires Ministry in 1999 when the governor endorsed an iron fist (*mano dura*) discourse and policies. That was an electoral year and the governor of Buenos Aires was a candidate for the presidency.... He proclaimed a policy of 'putting bullets in all delinquents.' That was one of his slogans; his main discourse revolved around it. We were working for reform of the police, but everything was thrown away. (Interview with state prosecutor, former advisor to the Security Ministry of Buenos Aires)

Police have several functions, yet the control of protest events involves a large portion of their activities since contentious collective actions can severely disrupt public order. Thus, police devote a disproportionate amount of resources to the control of demonstrations. According to Peter Waddington

For the police, protest represents a threat to public order. First, it is

¹¹² A report by human rights CELS (2000) mentioned that in 2000 the National Lower House of Congress passed a bill that would have modified the Penal Code granting more discretionary power to the police. The bill was not approved but should it been approved, it would have allowed police to interrogate a detainee without judicial presence; make personal and vehicle requisitions based only on suspicious allegations, allowing that the only witnesses to these requisitions were the same police agents. Also presented was a bill to allow police to make forceful entries without a court order, increase the number of hours in police detention and the interrogation capacity.

designed to be disruptive, in order to attract the attention of bystanders. Secondly, violence may be a viable tactic used by protestors. Thirdly, factions may find it expedient for a variety of reasons to use militant tactics, which may catch the police off guard. Fourthly, protestors will often be supported by intellectuals who not only articulate demands but delegitimize police action (Waddington 1995: 14).

Consequently, the policing of protests are often a very relevant function of police work and this responds to political decisions. The maintenance of order in demonstrations or regulating dissent are functions of the police that vary in their implementation based on contextual factors, political decisions, police culture, and their relationships.

Police work, however, is not only about regulating and maintaining order. The complexities of the police world cannot be reduced to actions (by protestors) and response (by authorities and police). State, institutional, and police actions and contentious collective actions are profoundly connected. In his study of the looting episodes of 2001 in Argentina, Auyero (2007) found that the boundaries between the protest side (challengers, dissidents, insurgents) and the repression side (authorities, police, state actors) are not as well defined as the specialized literature suggested. Social movement scholars, Auyero argued, remain silent about “the possible participation of authorities (either elected officials or police agents) in the direct promotion of mobilization and/or the straightforward perpetration of collective violence” (2007:20). With the notion of the gray zone, the author highlights the fact that “the lines between insurgents and state agents and party activists are also dissolving in the opposite direction. Party activists and state agents (police) may accept (and sometimes encourage and direct) collective violence” (2007:20-21).

In addition to the obscure connections between state agents and challengers, few studies examined how police responses to protest events varied when iron fist or velvet glove polices in the control of ‘ordinary crime’ (Oliver 2008) were implemented. As Loïc Wacquant depicts, during the late 1990s and early 2000s many Argentine governments adopted the “zero tolerance” doctrine (in Spanish known as *mano dura* or

iron fist) which fostered a get tough approach on disorder while at the same time discharged “the same state of its responsibilities in the social and economic genesis of insecurity in order to appeal to the individual responsibility of the residents of ‘uncivil’ areas, upon whom it is now incumbent to exercise proximate social control” (2009: 19-20).

According to human rights activist and lawyer María el Carmen Verdú, starting in 1997, both the state and the media introduced a discourse that sought to legitimate state violence and repression. For Verdú, given the acceleration of social conflicts and increasing social discontent, authorities required harsh, explicit repressive measures to maintain the status quo:

“Misery and unemployment pushed a social process manifested across the country through national strikes, marches, rallies, road blockades and demonstrations in the streets that marked an evolution in the foundation of incipient forces of resistance... that was presenting signs of systematicity, permanence, continuity and organization” (Verdú 2009: 171).

In January 2000, New York City police chief *William Bratton*—the “*father of zero tolerance*”—visited *Buenos Aires*, invited by a mayoral candidate to talk and provide advice on the campaign against crime and insecurity. The principles that Bratton invoked attributed the problems of crime and insecurity to bad behavior, and not social conditions. In his opinion, therefore, police had to implement an iron fist (*La Nación* and *Clarín* January 18, 2000; *Clarín*, December 1, 1998).

Table 5.1 displays the rate of police violence when iron fist policies or other strategies were implemented at the provincial level, using the coding developed by Pamela Oliver (2008).

Table 5.0.1: Police Tactics By Crime Control Policies

Table 5.1: Police Tactics By Crime Control Policies			
Police Tactic	Crime Control Policies		Total
	Other Strategies	Iron Fist	
Non-Violent	38%	32%	34%
Violent	62%	68%	66%
Total	119 100%	224 100%	343 100%
Chi-Square: NS			
<p>Note: Each protest event in the data set was coded 1 when <i>mano dura</i> or iron fist policies were implemented or in action at the moment and place of the event. Iron fist policies here include plans, announcements and decisions that affirm the government’s determination to “get tough” on “disorder” and do not address the causes of protesters’ demands (Wacquant 2009). For example, during Carlos Ruckauf ‘s term as governor of the Buenos Aires province (1999-2002) he implemented iron fist policies that included the criminalization of protesters.¹¹³</p> <p>Source: author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p>			

The table indicates that the implementation of iron fist policies (or other approaches) in crime control did not have a statistically significant impact on the actions taken by police. In other words, the different tactics employed by police do not vary with the implementation of iron fist or velvet glove policies.

A similar result was found when analyzing provincial governors’ policies when allied or in opposition to the national president. Table 5.2 below summarizes the results of the tactics employed by police at protest events when provincial governments were in line or in opposition (lacking of alliance) to the national president.

¹¹³ See links for further information: <http://www.eldia.com.ar/ediciones/20001112/elpais11.html> , <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/1999/99-08/99-08-05/pag03.htm>

Table 5.0.2: Police Tactics And Government Alliances

Table 5.2: Police Tactics And Provincial Government Alliances			
	Provincial Government Alliances		
Police Tactic	Not Allied To President	Allied to President	Total
Non-Violent	32%	35%	34%
Violent	68%	65%	66%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	112	231	343
Chi-Square: NS			
Source: author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.			

When the provincial government was not allied to the president, police used violent tactics on 68% of the events. A similar result was found when the provincial government was an allied to the national government (65%). That is, police use of violence was the dominant tactic both when governors were in opposition or in alliance to the president. In other words, the political affiliation of the governor, or the nature of its security policies, is directly connected to police violence at protest events.

A possible explanation for this could be that the local-national dynamic needs to be analyzed in greater detail since it is not only about the political affiliation of the president and the governors at the location of violent police responses to protest events, but there are other factors that need to be accounted for.

These results demonstrate that the relationship between politics and police is of great complexity and it cannot be assumed that police behavior programs closely to decisions made by political leaders. Police, as some scholars argue, have their own interests and their actions are at least partially independent from political leaders' decisions or the state's interest. This disparity between policy and police action derives from the discretionary power of the police as an institution and of individual police at protest events. A case of protest repression that resulted in the death of schoolteacher Carlos Fuentealba in 2007 in the province of Neuquén, may illustrate this assertion.

5.2 Protest policing and Political Factionalism

On April 4th, 2007, an estimated 700 teachers in the province of Neuquén were blockading a road demanding higher salaries. Provincial riot police cleared the highway and attacked the demonstrators, using hydrant trucks, tear gas, and rubber bullets.

The governor of Neuquén, Jorge Sobisch, had ordered the provincial police to remove the protesters from the highways and the police complied using violent means (*La Nación*, April 6th, 2007).¹¹⁴ As the protesters retreated, a police officer fired a tear gas canister from a very short distance (about two meters) into the back of a car filled with teachers. Carlos Fuentealba was hit in the head and died¹¹⁵ hours after the attack at a local hospital.

During a press conference the day after the teacher died, Neuquén's deputy secretary of security explained the police officer's excessive use of force as a "mistake": "it is highly likely that (the shooting) was a police mistake. The police agent that shot the grenade of tear gas could have done something that is not allowed by the police: he could have tripped, or he could have been pushed, or he could have been shot himself" (*Página 12*/ Apr.6th 2007)

This statement constituted the first of many comments by authorities exonerating the government and the police from any institutional responsibility. This was not an instance of excessive violence to a threat; it was one individual acting erratically. As Emsley and Bessel (2000) point out, "on the odd occasion when authorities have acknowledged the role of police in the escalation of violence, it has been ascribed to the clumsy acts of individual 'rotten apples.'" Their research contradicts this logic; they conclude that "the root of many instances of disorder

¹¹⁴ *La Nación*, "Admitió Sobisch que dio la orden para que se reprimiera" Apr. 6, 2007 <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/897815-admitio-sobisch-que-dio-la-orden-para-que-se-reprimiera>; *Página12*, "Una victim de la política del garrote" Apr. 6, 2007 <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-82873-2007-04-06.html> ; *Página12*, "'El responsable es el gobernador' Apr. 8, 2007 <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-82972-2007-04-08.html>

¹¹⁵ According to newspaper reports, doctors said Fuentealba suffered brain death at 6pm (Río Negro, April 5, 2007 <http://www1.rionegro.com.ar/diario/2007/04/05/1175812141.php>)

triggered or escalated by the police is found more in the cultures and structures of police institutions than in the faults of single, undesirable individuals within the ranks” (Quoted in Peterson, Abby 2006: p54).

Teachers and much of the public did not accept this rotten apple explanation and protests escalated across the country. In response, the governor of the province held a press conference and said he had ordered the repression, but he was not to blame for police excesses (*La Nación*, Apr. 6th, 2007). For his part, the nation’s interior minister Aníbal Fernández told reporters that the national government could not interfere because “the power of policing is a provincial domain” (*La Nación*, Apr. 6th, 2007). Then president Néstor Kirchner, in turn, said that he had promoted a pacific resolution to local conflicts and condemned all types of violence.

President Kirchner, referring to the governor of Neuquén, his political opponent, said “some people want to recreate the Security Doctrine (imposed by the former military dictatorship to justify mass repression) and believe that to be a good statesman, you have to have a stick in your hand’.”¹¹⁶ The country’s president thus decided not to support the governor of Neuquén, but, at the same time, did intervene.

The media published all different perspectives of who should be held accountable for the killing (the individual policeman, a group of provincial police officers, the chief of police, the governor, or the president) but there was no examination or serious discussion about the education conflict, why teachers were protesting, and the events that led to the repression.

According to María del Carmen Verdú (2009) the teachers’ union to which Fuentelba belonged blamed the provincial governor for the repression, but did not criticize Kirchner, with whom the union had signed various contract agreements. In Verdú’s opinion “The teachers’ union bureaucracy not only was silence about President Kirchner’s responsibility, but also explicitly defended him” (Verdú 2009, 169).

The repression of the protests in Neuquén was about police wrongdoing and about iron fist policies, but also about complex political dynamics.

¹¹⁶ www.wsws.org/en/articles/2007/04/arge-a11.html

Background and context

To understand the teachers' protest and the killing of Fuentelba, it is important to place the incident in context. Earlier in 2007, the national education minister of Argentina had announced a pay hike for teachers. The salary increase was to come from then recently approved *Ley de Financiamiento Educativo* (Educational Financing Bill), which allowed the National Government to set a minimum salary for educators all over the country. The new education law, thus, required that all teachers across the country receive a standardized minimum pay, but this was not always met.

The Educational Financing Bill was considered “irresponsible” by many political figures since budget allocations for education in Argentina are a responsibility of the provincial governments, not the national administration (Parliamentary Debates at Lower and Upper House, April 2007). Furthermore, and in spite of the bill, not all teachers were getting the payment hikes, which promoted opposition and protests across the country.

One of the items of the education-financing bill established agreements between the central government and each jurisdiction in the country. The agreements would set the proportions of national and provincial investment in education, and, in 2007, only Neuquén and Salta did not sign such bilateral agreements. These measures led to an escalation of teachers' protests in the provinces that were not complying with the legislation¹¹⁷ In 2007 Salta and Neuquén—where Fuentelba was killed—were the two

¹¹⁷Argentina follows a complex fiscal co-participation scheme. According to Tommasi and Scartascini (2012) the political domination that many governors exercise over their provinces is largely based on the (exclusive political access to) financial resources provided by the peculiar federal fiscal arrangements of Argentina. . “In this logic, most provincial governments are resource hungry political units eager to extract fiscal favors from the national government. In turn, the federal government needs votes in Congress to implement nationwide economic policies. This situation creates potential gains from trades from President and Governors while congress merely serves as the “ratifier” of agreements that are struck in other more informal arenas” (Mariano Tommasi and Carlos Scartascini, Chapter 11: *How (not) to produce effective policies? Institutions and Policymaking in Latin America*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy* edited by Javier Santiso, Jeff Dayton-Johnson 2012.)

<http://www.infobae.com/2004/06/14/119234-kirchner-y-sobisch-no-llegan-un-acuerdo-la-coparticipacion>

provinces that did not sign cooperation agreements with the central government to endorse and follow the *Ley de Financiamiento Educativo*. Political opponents to the president governed both Salta and Neuquén, and the governors claimed that the national government's decision to influence provincial salary policy was in violation of federal laws. Thus, the strikes, roadblocks, rallies, marches by educators in Neuquén were also an indicator that the national government did not intervene in provincial conflicts when the local governor was in opposition.

The case of Neuquén is of particular relevance because, unlike other provinces, it is an oil rich territory and the increase in oil prices provided it with revenue that allowed it to raise teachers' salaries. Hence, the decision not to comply with the *Ley de Financiamiento Educativo* and increase salaries responded to a political choice.

Police Violence and Political Dynamics

The case of Fuentelba in Neuquén thus involves a form of protest repression that was not about the protest event itself as a threat challenging the police or political elites (Davenport 2000). In this episode, the idea of threat should be reconsidered, since the form of policing was not connected to the types of demonstrators, the number of participants, the use of confrontational tactics, or radical goals (Davenport 2007). The threat here was about political disputes; about provincial authorities opposing the national government and confronting it. Neuquén's repression was not about situational or categorical threats but about the political scenario at the time. The protest did not pose a direct threat to authorities. It was a political conflict at the national-provincial level among the ruling group, accompanied by coercive (iron fist) crime control policies by the governor that led to violent police conduct.

The profile of protest policing can be viewed through the perspective of this political dispute. Dominant security experts in Argentina claim that to act, police have autonomy from the political power (Saín 2008). Yet, there are also contesting theories who call to revise how independent from political power is actually the police. Table 5.3 below shows police tactics during protest events when governors were allied (or not) to the president during the three periods under consideration.

Table 5.0.3: Police Tactics And Alliances Each Period

Table 5.3: Police Tactics When Governors Were Allied (Or Not) To The President By Period					
Periods	Alliances	Not Violent Police	Violent Police	Total	N
Neoliberal 1997/8	Governor not Allied to President	37%	63%	100%	43
	Governor Allied to President	23%	77%	100%	17
	Total	33%	67%	100%	–
	N	20	40	–	60
Crisis 2001/2	Governor not Allied to President	25%	75%	100%	60
	Governor Allied to President	35%	65%	100%	104
	Total	31%	69%	100%	–
	N	51	113	–	164
Progressive 2006/7	Governor not Allied to President	56%	44%	100%	9
	Governor Allied to President	36%	64%	100%	110
	Total	38%	62%	100%	–
	N	45	74	–	119
Total					
	<i>Governor not Allied to President</i>	32%	68%	100%	112
	<i>Governor Allied to President</i>	35%	65%	100%	231
	Total	34%	66%	100%	–
	N	116	227	–	343
Chi-square: NS					
Note: In this table, *violent police tactics included violent evictions, police use of physical force, use of weapons, confrontations between protesters and police, threat of force, and arrests.					
Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.					

First, during the **Neoliberal** period between 1997 and 1998, when the provincial governor was formally *not* allied to the president, police were sent 43 of the 60 times (72%) to control protests. Of these occasions, police responded with violence on 63% of the events. When the president and the governor were formal allies, police used violence on 77% of the events. These findings suggest that political alliances or disputes between the president and provincial authorities at the time did not have a direct impact on the repression of protest events.

Let's recall, however, that during this period police violence was most frequent in the Buenos Aires City and metropolitan area but after those locations, police brutality was strong in a few other provinces—mainly Córdoba, Jujuy and Neuquén.¹¹⁸ In the case of Córdoba, the governor at the time was from the UCR party, traditional rival to the Peronist-Justicialista party. However, the governor of Córdoba accepted the terms of the adjustment policies recommended by the federal government, and reached agreements with then President Menem to reduce spending in his province.¹¹⁹ Thousands of workers were laid off, welfare benefits were reduced and there was an escalation of conflict and protest events in the province that were responded with police violence.

In Jujuy, although the governor was a member of the Peronist-Justicialista party currently in the presidency, the party was undergoing internal divisions and conflicts. Furthermore, the province was under a severe economic and institutional crisis and the national government was considering a federal intervention.¹²⁰ In 1998, the governor of the Jujuy province resigned.¹²¹ Felipe Sapag from the Movimiento Popular Neuquino—a provincial political party—, allied to then President Carlos Menem, governed the province of Neuquén in 1997 and 1998. Sapag and his cabinet ordered the repression of protests several times during his tenure and had an iron fist policy towards order. Let's recall that during this period, democratic policing was not a political decision either at the national or provincial level. Thus, the use of violence during demonstrations was an extended practice.

During the 2001 and 2002 **Crisis** period, as in the preceding period, police violence was high both when the governor was an allied to the national government (65%) and when they were in opposing sides (75%). Again, showing no direct

¹¹⁸ See Chapter 4 for further details.

¹¹⁹ See *Página 12*, December 17, 1999: <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/1999/99-12/99-12-17/pag13.htm>

¹²⁰ The Federal Intervention is an attribution of the Federal Government by which it takes control of a province in extreme cases. It is decided by the nation's president but has to be approved by Congress. *La Nación*, May 30, 1997 <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/69921-analiza-menem-la-intervencion-en-jujuy> , *Clarín*, May 28, 1997 <http://edant.clarin.com/diario/1997/05/28/t-00201d.htm>

¹²¹ *La Nación*, November 27, 1998 <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/119455-la-situacion-sigue-tensa-en-jujuy>

relationship between repressive policies and political alliances. It stands out that during the **Progressive** administration, when the governor was not allied to the president, police was sent out to control protests only 9 times. This means that police did not attend protest events in provinces whose authorities were not aligned with the federal government.

All in all, provincial governments, both when in alliance or in conflict with the national government, saw a high rate of violent policing at protest events in their jurisdictions. Thus, the data suggests that political alliances at the national and provincial level are a weak predictor of police repression. Other factors need to be contemplated when analyzing political dynamics and how these impact repressive actions by police.

The case of Fuentelba mentioned earlier indicates a clear and strong connection between police repression and political dynamics. Put differently, what happens in the political arena (disputes, tensions, negotiations) is intertwined with police responses to contentious actions.

An important factor to consider is that in 2007 President Néstor Kirchner had high levels of popularity, high levels of political support (drawing on governors and legislators), and reelection chances. Kirchner had also taken a human rights stance and had introduced democratic and left-leaning security policies. The governor of Neuquén, Jorge Sobisch, was in his third term as governor and when Fuentelba was killed, his popularity was in decline. He had no chances of reelection and had implemented iron fist policies in security matters.¹²²

Days after the death of Fuentelba, there was a moment of silence during the nation's parliamentary session, held to pay tribute to the deceased teacher.¹²³ Lower House of Chamber deputies took the opportunity to voice their opinions regarding protest events and their repression. Again, protest policing and the use of excessive

¹²² Sobisch ran for president in the 2007 elections. He got the third place in his province, which indicated that he had no political support. Clarín, October 29, 2007 *Sobisch perdió hasta en su provincia*: <http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2007/10/29/elpais/p-05001.htm>

¹²³ The Parliamentary Session was held on April 11th, 2007. See <http://www.diputados.gov.ar/secparl/dtaqui/versiones/index.html> for the full transcript of the session.

force by police were approached as a matter of political dynamics. Legislators who supported the president (from the Frente para la Victoria—FPV—Peronist party) blamed Neuquén’s governor for police’s conduct: “*We are getting used to having a democratic government at the national level and an autocratic government at the provincial. (FPV deputy from Santa Cruz province)*”

Other legislators, who did not blame the governor, appealed to the bad apple theory: *There are still people in the police force that have a criminal record*’ (FPV deputy from Río Negro). While opposition deputies spoke of an escalation in repression all over:

“Repression is not only taking place in Neuquén. We debate this case because the worst of barbarisms took place there, after a worker was killed when he was leaving the demonstration. But this happens in many provinces, among others, in mine... I repeat, this is happening all over the country and not just in the province of Neuquén. I wish it was only an isolated incident since then we would all unite against that governor as we have drawn a line of illegitimacy there. But, unfortunately, this is taking place all over and it is happening more often, even amongst governors of different political signs... We can’t just say that we don’t want repression; we need to remove the causes of the social conflict since these result in repression because there is no will to solve the problems.” (Left-leaning ARI party deputy from Buenos Aires province)

More specifically, the analysis of the Neuquén case adds a layer of complexity to the threat hypothesis. The level of “threat” posed by the teachers blockading the road was not the only factor associated with the type of police intervention. While a threat to authorities and police might have been in place, it is important to note that political dynamics between the governor and the president (the breakdown of an alliance or a confrontation among political leaders), were the factor that detonated the repression.

Beginning in 2003 the national government had been introducing democratic protest policing guidelines. The president’s rhetoric emphasized a “no repression” approach, which appeared in newspaper articles, speeches, legislations, and ministry resolutions. Nevertheless, in 2007, the governor of Neuquén—in clear opposition to the


national government—ordered police to remove the protesting teachers from the road. Police in Neuquén followed a political order and used hydrant water tanks, tear gas, and rubber bullets to end the protest. The low popularity of the governor, who was in clear confrontation with the president, was deepened with the killing of Fuentealba.

Some could argue that the repression of the teachers in Neuquén was a decision by the provincial administration and therefore it did not involve the nation's president or the federal 'no repression of protests' policy. President Kirchner, however, did not prevent or stop the repression in Neuquén. The president (and his cabinet members) expressed grief for the death of the teacher and, according to the governor of Neuquén, the president used the death of Fuentealba against him. In the governor's words "the President is trying to topple the only governor who confronts him" (*Perfil*, Sobisch: Kirchner es un miserable y un cobarde, April 11, 2007).

The 'no repression' policy endorsed by the Progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner was not followed in Neuquén in 2007, when provincial authorities ordered police to end a demonstration. But, the Federal Government itself did not follow the 'no repression of protests' policy in other provinces and periods. In April 2006, for example, the Federal Interior Ministry sent Federal Police officers to end a subway workers strike in the City of Buenos Aires. The demonstrators were blockading the subway railways and interrupting the train's service in demand of salary hikes. According to *Clarín*, a police chief told the strikers: "the Interior Ministry has ordered the eviction of the subway station to guarantee the freedom of movement'. And, the Infantry Guard took over the station to evict everyone..." (*Clarín*, April 13th, 2006).

The following diagram presents an illustration of the linking process between contentious collective action, political dynamics, and repression.

Figure 3: Contentious Collective Action, Political Dynamics And Repression



As the Parliamentary debate also indicated, the public condemned the violence and there was an escalation of the protests the day after the teacher was shot. There were protests all over Argentina in solidarity with the teachers and to demand an end to police brutality.

The case of Fuentelba, in addition, also serves to question the weakness explanation to protest policing. According to this theory, government actors would rather not use repression against strong actors or actors with political power. The use of coercion against these actors is likely to fail or backfire since they have the resources to resist repressive attempts, and the repression will have a high political cost.

Teachers are part of powerful unions; they are a strong actor who holds high legitimacy from the public (*La Nación*, April 6, 2007 “Pegarle a un Maestro”)¹²⁴ Teachers have political leverage. During the protests in Neuquén, police followed an order to repress the teachers and they did it with brutal violence. Police killed a teacher and the killing had a high political cost for the governor.

¹²⁴ <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/897593-pegarle-a-un-maestro>

In Argentina, given the history of political repression and persecution, the use of violence by police at protest events is always conflictive. Nonetheless, the governor of Neuquén in 2007 believed that the repression of a protest led by teachers was a viable way to end it. A possible explanation for this was the effort by government and media during the 1990s in Neuquén to demonize teachers (Klachko 2000, Artese 2006). As Matías Artese explains in his insightful analysis of the discourses related to the 1996 and 1997 protests in Neuquén, the government of the province accused teachers—one of the main actors in the protests—of being destabilizers and a threat to social order (2006: 13). Through press releases in the media, the governor and other high rank ministers' depicted protesting teachers as left-wing radicals seeking conflict rather than making legitimate claims. In addition to arresting protesters during the 1997 protests events, the government began to stigmatize the teachers and other groups participating in the demonstrations as subversives, proto-revolutionaries, and violent. This demonization of teachers served the purpose of delegitimizing their actions and their claims to justify the brutal police repression of 1997.

As Loïc Wacquant argued (2009), with repression, individuals are punished for complaining, for voicing their grievances, while the causes of the problems—poverty, low salaries—are not addressed. The heavy repression of teachers by security forces in Neuquén was also entangled by macro level political decisions, rivalries, and disputes.

5.3 Protest Policing As A Political Resource

Similar to the administration of President Kirchner between 2003 and 2007, the two period government of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner between 2007-2011 and 2011-2015 was discursively open and welcoming to social movements. Yet, on many occasion authorities repressed protest events and utilized violence to accomplish this result. We have already noted the rate of police violence when called to demonstrations did not decline during the Kirchner administrations. But open and direct coercion were not the only forms of repression used against demonstrations.

The deployment of federal police, National Guard and other forces has been

historically connected to the capacity of distributing resources, negotiating power, and influence (Kalmanowiecki 2000). In December of 2013, provincial police in Córdoba called a strike to demand better wages.¹²⁵ The strike—which the governor said was a police response to his decision to close 140 brothels that provided income to corrupt officers—led to lootings and violence.¹²⁶ The protest by police started as local claim for better salaries but it spread to all over the country and resulted in over a dozen deaths, hundreds injured, confrontations between security forces, the takeover of government offices, lootings, and arrests.

Córdoba's governor, José Manuel de la Sota, had been allied with the national administration, the PJ Peronist Party, until 2011 when he distanced himself from the president amid a funds dispute. In 2012, he established a local Peronist faction and became a political rival to the president. During 2013, Governor de la Sota complained that his province was denied its share of national resources.

In December of 2013, the looting episodes and violence unfolding in Cordoba—about 1000 kilometers away from the country's capital city—were not directly affecting the federal government. During the first hours of the revolt, the national government rejected the aid that the provincial government requested. According to Governor de la Sota, the national government denied his initial appeals for help during the lootings “we called all the cabinet ministers to request help but got no answers.”¹²⁷ The provincial administration had requested the deployment of federal police to calm the province.

The media and the public did not associate the chaos and instability in Córdoba the presidency or its political allies. It was perceived as a local, provincial problem, of Córdoba. Yet, by initially denying a plea for more police and resources,¹²⁸ the federal

¹²⁵ This account is based on coverage of the strike in the national newspapers *La Nación*, *Clarín* and *Página 12* and in the provincial newspaper *La Voz* during the week of the events .

¹²⁶ *Página 12*, December 5, 2013: <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-235047-2013-12-05.html>

¹²⁷ *La Voz*, De la Sota pidió ayuda a Cristina vía twitter; *La Voz*, Capitanich negó discriminación política hacia Córdoba durante la huelga policial, December 4, 2013 <http://www.perfil.com/sociedad/De-la-Sota-pidio-ayuda-a-Cristina-via-Twitter-20131204-0009.html>, <http://www.lavoz.com.ar/politica/capitanich-nego-discriminacion-politica-hacia-cordoba-durante-la-huelga-policial>

¹²⁸ *La Voz*, Un solo fiscal investiga policías y saqueadores, February 4th, 2014; *La Voz*, La oposición prefirió castigar la rosada, December 5th, 2013, <http://www.lavoz.com.ar/politica/la-oposicion-prefirio-castigar-la-rosada>, <http://www.lavoz.com.ar/politica/un-solo-fiscal-investiga-policias-y-saqueadores>

government was also allowing the rival provincial government to fall into a crisis and lose legitimacy. Once again, De la Sota's rivalry and lack of political support to Fernández de Kirchner was penalized with the delay in the deployment of forces.

The case of Córdoba was not an isolated event. As journalist Reynaldo Sietecase mentioned during a radio editorial on the repression of a roadblock in Buenos Aires:

“There is a double standard operating (for the Federal Government). If the roadblock affects my political interests, then I decide to repress it. If the roadblock does not affect my political interests and is affecting somebody else's, then I allow the blockade (protest) to carry on (July 7, 2014).”

In December 2013, the rapid escalation of violence in Córdoba spread to other provinces where police also went on strike to demand wage increases. According to *La Nación* (“La protesta policial con mayor alcance”, December 9, 2013), over half of Argentina's provinces had police protests within a week, and these provinces accounted for over half of the country's total population.¹²⁹ The violence resulted in 14 people dead and dozens wounded –although no official figures were reported. There were looting episodes in most provinces, and in Catamarca a confrontation between protesting police officers and Coast Guard forces that were sent to end the protest (*La Voz*, *La Gaceta*, *La Nación*, *Clarín* 9-12 December 2013).

The response varied in each province but there was a common denominator: political groups were instigating the protests.¹³⁰ Here we see in operation what Auyero et al (2009: 15) call clandestine support, events in which patronage networks secretly provide support to collective contentious actions. Although often seen by the literature

¹²⁹ Police protests started in the province of Córdoba on December 3, 2013 and spread to twenty provinces in ten days. The provinces were: La Rioja, Catamarca, Río Negro, Neuquén, Santa Fe, San Juan, Buenos Aires, Misiones, Chubut, Chaco, Tucumán, Entre Ríos, Corrientes, Jujuy, San Luis, Salta, Mendoza, La Pampa and Tierra del Fuego <http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/572541/politica/saqueos-habrian-causado-ocho-muertes-tucuman.html>

¹³⁰ *La Voz*, Testimonio del exjefe resultó clave para la detención de los 16 policías, January 17th, 2014 : <http://www.lavoz.com.ar/politica/testimonio-del-exjefe-resulta-clave-para-la-detencion-de-los-16-policias>

as separate spheres, the institutional side (state, police, party officials) were involved in the collective violence. Violence was promoted by police and local politicians who created “liberated zones”, and instigated gangs to loot and destroy private property. Numerous reports in the media supported this impression that police and gangs were coordinating the violence through social networks (*La Nación, Ámbito, El Litoral*: December 9-11, 2013).¹³¹

Federal authorities accused rival factions of the hegemonic Peronist party of coordinating the outrages. Leaders from the opposing faction, in turn, argued that the President and her allies sought to involve them in the violence and thus discredit them (*La Nación, Ámbito*: December 9, 2013).¹³² Far from accidental violent acts as a consequence of collective claim making actions, the violence was provoked and politically motivated. As the spats between political authorities show, different factions of the leading Peronist party accused each other of instigating the violence.

We noted above that Kirchner’s initial refusal to deploy security forces in the province of Córdoba, can be understood as a penalty or retaliation for Córdoba’s governor’s rivalry to the president. Since the riots and violence were politically motivated, the federal government considered it should not send federal forces to end the conflict. In the other provinces, the promotion of violence by political actors and police were similarly political and not reactive to the nature of the protest. Violence was not used as a strategy by authorities to end the protests. Collective violence was generated by actors who were seeking to improve their position in the political field. On

¹³¹*La Voz*, Saqueos y robos en supermercados de Córdoba, December 4, 2013:

<http://www.lavoz.com.ar/politica/saqueos-y-robos-en-supermercados-de-cordoba>, *El Litoral*, Las Huelgas Policiales, December 11, 2013, http://www.ellitoral.com/index.php/id_um/95675-las-huelgas-policiales, *La Gaceta*, Los saqueos habrían causado 8 muertes en Tucumán. <http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/572541/politica/saqueos-habrian-causado-ochomuertes-tucuman.html>

¹³² Federal Justice Secretary Julián Álvarez said that former police chief Salvador Baratta was coordinating the attacks. Baratta, at the time of the episodes, was councilman in the Buenos Aires provincial district of Lanús and had been elected with the president’s faction of the Peronist party (Frente para la Victoria) but had recently emigrated to the now rival faction of the party led by Sergio Massa. The former police chief, Baratta, denied the accusation and said that this was all part of a plot to involve Sergio Massa—Peronist presidential candidate of a faction rival to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner—in the violent episodes. The governor of Buenos Aires also spoke of extortion (*La Nación, ámbito*, La Política Online: December 9, 2013 <http://www.ambito.com/noticia.asp?id=719702>).

the one hand, police was demanding better wages but also the possibility of forming unions which is currently banned for the security forces in Argentina's legislation. In these instances, protest control became a resource to be distributed according to political logic and not the need for controlling protest.

The use of repression as a political resource was also illustrated in Neuquén a year prior to the violent repression that killed the teacher Fuentealba. In March 2006, teachers on strike in demand of pay hikes were blocking access to an oil distillery in Plaza Huincul when they were attacked and seriously injured by a group of counterdemonstrators allegedly from a construction workers union and the MPN (Movimiento Popular Neuquino) political party.¹³³ The counterdemonstrators were wearing smocks and yellow helmets to look like construction workers. Police officers that arrived at the location to later prevent further confrontations accused the governor of giving the order to *not* intervene during the violence. In other words, police had received an order from the higher end of the command chain of not acting¹³⁴ and they complied with the order (*La Capital*, July 4, 2013; *Telam*, June 4, 2014).

In this case, by eschewing police action against the attacking counterdemonstrators, the government was consenting or even endorsing the attacks on the teachers.¹³⁵ Police *in-action* (or police lack of response) became a political resource. The political will of the provincial government was to allow (possibly *send*)

¹³³ The MPN (Neuquén's People's Movement) is a provincial political party in the province of Neuquén, Argentina. It was founded in 1961 by Peronist leaders who had been banned from political participation by the military rulers of the time. Jorge Sobisch –leader of the MPN– was governor of the province for three periods. In 2007 he ran for president of Argentina for a faction of the Peronist party against then President Néstor Kirchner. Sobisch and his running mate Asís got third place:
<http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2007/10/29/elpais/p-05001.htm>

¹³⁴ In his ethnographic account of Córdoba's province Infantry Guard, Paul Hathazy (2004:12) explained that infantry guard officers learn about mind and body temperance as key attributes they must possess. Hence, even if they receive insults or physical attacks they must restrain from responding and only act when they receive a political command to do so.

¹³⁵ In June 2014, Jorge Sobisch, governor of Neuquén in 2006-2007 went on trial accused of abuse of authority for this episode. Sobisch was absolved due to lack of evidence:
<http://www.lacapital.com.ar/politica/El-ex-gobernador-de-Neuquen-Jorge-Sobisch-sera-sometido-a-juicio-20130704-0040.html>, <http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201404/59087-sobisch-sera-juzgado-por-la-causa-de-la-zona-liberada-en-neuquen.html>, <http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201406/66455-comenzo-en-neuquen-el-juicio-a-sobisch-por-liberar-una-zona-durante-una-proteta-docente.html>, <http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201404/57815-a-siete-anos-del-asesinato-continua-la-pelea-judicial-por-fuentealba.html>

counterdemonstrators to squash the roadblock by teachers. The teachers were the threat and by using thugs, the government was able to distance itself—and its security forces—from the violent confrontation.¹³⁶ Once again, the distinction between authorities, security forces and demonstrators becomes blurry and show the “*complex interactions that generate collective violence*” (Tilly 2003: 40 cited in Auyero 2007: 152).

Figure 4: Police In-Action Illustrated



5.4 Protest Policing and (Discretionary) Power

State agencies create legislation that defines what constitutes a crime, and police have to enforce these rules. As French sociologist Dominique Monjardet (2010) explained, the decision and the judgment of how to act when faced with a particular event is made by the policeman who executes an order and not by authorities. Often times, legislation mandates that police use discretion, including when to utilize

¹³⁶ During the late 1990s, teachers in the province of Neuquén were active organizers of marches, rallies and other strikes. They also protested along with unemployed workers in roadblocks. Although they became a threat to the government, teachers belong a historically prestigious, admired and respected occupation. Thus, dissolving a protest by teachers was not simple and was likely to be highly criticized by the community and the media. For that reason, the use of thugs allowed the government to detach itself from the attack against this legitimate actor.

violence. This discretion is not always applied in an even handed way, and their choices are often determined by prejudice and stereotypes.

It is important to note that, since 1947 and until the late 1990s, police were given de facto legislative authority to issue regulations for dealing with misdemeanors, such as loitering, obscene behavior, gambling, and public urination. These regulations were known as *edictos policiales* (police edicts) and they worked to designate not only categories of suspicious people, but also situations that were considered to fall under a pre-criminal stage as well. The edicts allowed the police to detain individuals based on appearance and determine punishment for misdemeanors—short term imprisonment, fines, and the like (Hinton 2006, 34-35). Edicts also made it easy for the police to extract bribes and point to certain individuals as “subversive elements” threatening to authorities and civil order. “The edicts were removed (in Buenos Aires) in 1996 (and replaced by the Code for Urban Public Behavior) but for years, the police persisted in gauging the potential threat posed by individuals based on appearance, socioeconomic status, and political orientation” (Hinton 2006, 35). Thus, the presence of police at protest events in the 1990s should be analyzed taking into account that police had the power to judge and arrest challengers to the state. Put differently, law enforcement agents could point and accuse people based on their looks and this gave them great discretionary power.

The police thus have the power to select and stigmatize a group of people as suspects—or inclined to disorder—and take measures based on this. Argentina’s Federal Police Guidelines and Regulations (*Ley Orgánica de la Policía Federal Argentina 1958*) state in their article 79 that “with the aim in its preventive mission, police will keep a special vigilance on persons whose background and costumes generate suspicion... of special attention will be places or locations where these people meet and carry out their operations.”¹³⁷

Here, with the goal of preventing crime, police have special attributions and have to keep special vigilance on what they consider suspicious persons. Furthermore,

¹³⁷ Decreto Nacional 6589-1958 (National Decree Number) accessed April 2014
<http://www.infojus.gov.ar/legislacion/decreto-nacional-6580-1958>
[decreto_reglamentario_ley_organica.htm?jsessionid=1g7og34bot7zj1b51a0rey76se?0&bsrc=ci](http://www.infojus.gov.ar/legislacion/decreto_reglamentario_ley_organica.htm?jsessionid=1g7og34bot7zj1b51a0rey76se?0&bsrc=ci)

there is no control or institutional revisions to what police do in light of the judgments that they make. Legislation, however, are not the reference for police work. In Latin America, police training and socialization takes place on the job. Codes of practice and formal police training are seen as formalities. “The image and professional attitude of police... are nurtured by the behavior and perceptions transmitted from father to son or from uncle to nephew. In this sense, there is a primacy of the *training in the job* approach, in connection to the permanence of certain habits and alleged proven efficiency behaviors” (Waldmann 2003: 124).

Thus, many police actions are based on social prejudice transmitted from generations of police and reproduced in the job.¹³⁸ Unlike ordinary citizens, in the police field, discrimination can become concrete actions with fatal consequences. A policeman may detain or repress someone based on prejudices. Based on extensive fieldwork, Mariana Galvani (2007) argued that for police officers, the context where people live, work, inhabit define the potentiality of crimes. And, for police, poverty-stricken neighborhoods concentrate the typology of crimes they learn in police academies (p58). Citing Erwin Goffman, Galvani claimed that police might be brutal with some groups because “the person with a stigma is not completely human” (2007: 55). Similarly, sociologist Paul Hathazy found that riot control police believe that the lack of discipline (corporal and personal) and sacrifice in some sectors of society justifies their brutal use of force. For police some people are considered less than human, a police officer told Hathazy referring to shanty town city dwellers: “they are rats... rats is what they are [why rats?].... They live in other people’s filth... they don’t do anything... and they expect things to come from above,¹³⁹ rats” (2006: 17).

In the previous chapter we saw that the characteristics of the protest not always define police responses to contentious collective action. Since police have high levels of discretionary power, their use of more or less violence is related to their constitutive essence as police. For Robert Reiner police suspicion and stereotyping are inescapable,

¹³⁸ In his ethnographic study of a police riot control-training unit in Argentina, Paul Hathazy (2006) described that 85% of officers come from police families.

¹³⁹ “To expect things from above” (*que vengan de arriba*, in Spanish), in general makes reference to the State or the government. That is, social welfare policies that provide food, housing or unemployment plans to poor and vulnerable populations.

since they are valuable tools in police work that are encouraged by training. However, “the particular categories informing them tend to be ones that reflect the structure of power in society. This serves to reproduce that structure through a pattern of implicit discrimination” (Reiner 2000: 91) Reiner cites an English field manual by David Powis, a former Metropolitan assistant commissioner where in his list of suspicious types included political radicals, intellectuals who ‘spout extremist babble’, or people in possession of a ‘your rights’ card (Powis 1977: 92 cited in Reiner 2000: 91).

“Crowd control police officers are like wild dogs. They have to be on a leash or they just attack and bite,” said Juan—a long time state employee at the Ministry of Security—during an interview (Buenos Aires, November 2013). According to Juan most police who join the different crowd control units have a special passion for violence and it’s the role of state authorities to guide and control them. Based on Juan’s interpretation, these agents do not respond to a threat but operate because it’s in their nature to do so.

Similarly, a state security officer mentioned during an interview: “To be a police agent, and not just a good one, he has to be ‘in action’.” When asked what it means to be in action, he replied that it meant “getting involved with the demonstrators by displaying strength and resources, redirecting or blockading demonstrators’ way (during a march), or making arrests or even using violent force against them”.¹⁴⁰ The perception of what constitutes a good police officer contrasts to the deficiency in training police receive and their poor work conditions. A police chief in Buenos Aires mentioned during an interview that it is not just poor training but that young cadets often find themselves extremely tired, using outdated tools, gears and, expired ammunition. During an interview, an experienced riot control officer said:

It is not uncommon for a new police agent to find himself in the field with a weapon he never used before, and what is worse, the ammunition might be expired and he does not what to do with it or does not even know this. And if he, for example, uses a tear gas explosive improperly—at a close distance or expired—it can have fatal consequences.” (Interview with police chief, 2014)

¹⁴⁰ Interview, Buenos Aires, May 23, 2013

Training deficiencies, exacerbated by a tradition of local authoritarian and iron fist policies, in addition to political disputes at the macro level, contributed to the police excesses that resulted in the killing of the teacher in Neuquén. Following sociologist Abby Peterson,

“deficiency in preparedness due to inadequate or nonexistent crowd control and riot control training, the lack of an operational strategy and a set of tactics which could control and contain unexpected situations arising in the field, the breakdown in the operative command and coordination structure which undermined the authority of senior officers in the field, as well as a police culture that readily demonized in an arbitrary manner the activists assembled in the city” (Peterson 2006: 58).

According to Hathazy riot control officers are trained to, among other things, develop an emotional disposition of serenity and self-mettle (2006:11). The author argued that this is translated –among the police– into preventing panic or simply the ability to control anger and reactions. This training, however, is not always followed. Fillieule and Jobard (1998) argued that there are differences between senior officers and the rank and file, expressed as an opposition

“between the goals of officers in command and the way the rank and file think with regard to what constitutes good protest policing. Non-intervention and a dispassionate approach are two criteria for excellence in the senior officers’ view, but their men do not consider the operation a success without some kind of physical confrontation or without having evened the score with the demonstrators’ (Fillieule and Jobard 1998: 82).

This same distinction was expressed more organically by the police chief of Buenos Aires:

All police learn about human rights and what is good policing, but they don’t always agree with the theory and don’t want to follow it. Cadets believe that human rights do not apply to them so they wonder why they should apply it to what they believe are unjustified protesters (Buenos Aires, September 2014).

For senior officers, as Fillielue and Jobard explained, the use of coercive methods against demonstrators is considered to be a last resort. Argentine anthropologist José Garrica Zucal (2010) conducted an ethnographic study at a police precinct in Buenos Aires to understand what constitutes legitimate use of violence by police. He observed that what legitimized the use of violence was what he labeled the notion of *replica* (reply). Police believe in the justified use of violent force against citizens or criminals when they are responding to violence. In Garrica Zucal's words, "the use of force by police is a defense and acts as the response to the violent behavior of a third party" (Zucal 2010, 79).

Yet, Zucal (2010) also argued that police believe that some "excesses" in their use of violence are legitimate, and not just in response to an aggression. For some police, Zucal said, the tension and the suffering as the result of a situation that had endangered an officer's life or wellbeing, justifies the use of violence over those who posed the threat. "For police, there are certain arbitrary and excessive uses of force—even when not part of a legitimate defense—that are not defined as violent" (2010: 79-81). Examples of these include situations in which a detainee tries to escape, or when a suspect insults an officer. To the eyes of security forces, there are subjects that warrant an excessive, not legal, use of force that is legitimized because these subjects violated the normal way of relating to police.

Zucal's findings thus coincide with the quantitative data on police response to protest events. According to the information reported by *Clarín*, (see chapter 4) in most of the occasions in which police used violent methods to disperse a contentious collective action event, protesters were demonstrating peacefully and did not engage in violent acts. For police, something other than demonstrators' tactics posed a threat to their wellbeing and therefore deserved a violent response. Accordingly, the use of arbitrary force by police followed one of the aspects in the notion of *replica*: certain characteristics in the protest (not a situational threat) result in police violence. Put differently, some of demonstrators' attributes—such as their race—might shape police responses to protest events (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011). According to Argentine anthropologist Marcela Perelman, "the *piquetero* appears as a subject that, unlike children, pensioners and teachers, poses a level of threat that justifies a special

procedure and the use of different types of weapons by police”. We will discuss this further in the next chapter.

Police discretionary power is also at play when officers have to decide which orders to follow. As Pelerman described, quite often police receive contradictory orders such as judge that orders the eviction of a road, while the federal government advised the no-repression of protests. At a given time and place, for example, political authorities might choose to open dialogue with a social movement organization and be more tolerant of its tactics but fail to inform justice. Police chiefs knowledgeable of this situation have to decide how to act (Pelerman 2009). Police decisions are thus based on several complex factors.

In Argentina, as in other countries, the main police mission has been to protect the State. This implied that the use of coercion to guard the state was more important than guarantying citizens’ rights and obligations (Andersen 2002:21). It could be argued that this mission of protecting the state has been transmitted from generation to generation of police, with protesters continuously understood as a threat to political elites, the state, or police. As a consequence, police decision-making is not only based on what the protesters were doing or the actual protest event itself. Police decision-making is also based on police culture, on complex political dynamics, and a historical construction that challengers to the state should be suppressed. And the way of suppressing these protesters or challenging groups has a lot to do with the discretionary power granted to the Argentine police.

5.5 Conclusion

Protest policing can take many forms and may vary at different levels of analysis: from macro structural responses that follow national level dynamics to micro level responses related to the individual police officer, his or her background, cultural capital, prejudices, and training. Citing P.A.J. Waddington, Abby Peterson argues, “if police officers are poorly trained, ill equipped and unsupervised, lacking clearly defined tactics or strategy; they may provoke as much disorder as they prevent... disorganized

forays by police officers undermine police legitimacy and incite crowds” (Peterson 2006: 57).

The case of Fuentelba showed that although police may respond to a threat, the forms and tactics employed are dependent on complex political dynamics, historical constructions, and perceptions of both the police and those challenging the government. Police also respond to an order. In hierarchical and historically militarized institutions like police agencies in Argentina, often times what happens in the street may be in response to an order, and sometimes even contradictory orders. This is not to justify police wrongdoing but to expand on the complexities of security forces responses to protest events.

And, as was mentioned earlier, police not only act in response to threats but function and act, putting into practice their own ideas, views, understandings, and prejudices of what the protests are about and who the demonstrators are.

Chapter 6: Contention and Variations in Control

In December 2001, thousands of people took to the streets of Buenos Aires to protest against the government. Rallies, roadblocks, mobilizations, and then violence and looting spread across the country. After many days of protests, 39 people had been killed, hundreds were injured, and thousands arrested. During the riots, the president resigned, with five successors withdrawing in a two-week period. The events before and after this crisis¹⁴¹ constitute what social movement scholars call a “cycle of collective action.”¹⁴²

Although it is more difficult to depict the Neoliberal 1997/8 and the Progressive 2006/7 periods as a protest cycle, in all three moments contentious collective actions were frequent across Argentina. Furthermore the three periods were characterized by high unemployment and poverty rates. As a result of the adjustment policies and market reforms introduced during the 1990s, hundreds of workers were laid off, informalization and marginalization increased and new forms of social control emerged (Salvia 2011; 2007). In this context, reports by human rights organizations claimed that starting in 1996 police violence at protest events increased (CELS 2003). What is more, scholarly and newspaper accounts found that the poor were subject to more violence by police and state institutions (CELS 2002, 2003, Artese 2006). Put differently, during periods of high levels of unemployment and poverty, and high contention, police violence at demonstrations is said to increase.

In chapter 4 I found that protest events with demands for jobs and welfare were subject to harsher repression. This raises the question about whether poor, marginal, unemployed and disadvantaged groups—regardless of what they demand—are subject to stronger policing. In this chapter I look at protest policing during episodes of contentious collective action and analyze whether security forces behavior is more violent towards certain groups. Specifically, I examine 343 episodes of contentious

¹⁴¹ Among the scholarly and journalistic works on the 2001 crisis in Argentina are: Emilio Cafassi, *Olla presión. Cacerolazos, piquetes y asambleas sobre fuego argentino* (Buenos Aires, 2002); Raúl Frakin, *Cosecharás tu siembre* (Buenos Aires, 2002); Javier Auyero, *The Political Makings of the 2001 Lootings in Argentina*; Bonasso, *El palacio y la Calle*; Camaraso, *Días de Furia* (Buenos Aires 2002)

¹⁴² See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the characteristics of a cycle of collective action.

collective action in which newspapers reported that police appeared during the three cycles of protest we are considering: 1997-1998 Neoliberal period; 2001-2002 Crisis; and 2006-2007 Progressive era. The three periods which reflect different economic, political, and social contexts of Argentina.¹⁴³

The first period examined in this research, was during the conservative administration of Carlos Menem in 1997 and 1998. At that time, Argentina was under a neoliberal and conservative government that implemented market reforms leading to severe cutbacks in the welfare state. Unemployment and poverty rates were high (14% and 25% on average), and collective claim making actions by unemployed and informal workers were surprisingly regular.

As the year 2001 was coming to an end, the country experienced an economic, political and institutional crisis that led to social unrest, as it had not seen in years. This crisis characterized the second period analyzed in this study. Unemployment and poverty rates spiked (17% and 37% respectively) while the government declared the country in recession. The following year was marked by continued social upheaval and agitation. Workers in all sectors went on continued strikes and different forms of demonstrations and collective violence spread across the country while poverty and unemployment levels continued to increase.

In 2003 Néstor Kirchner was elected president and the country took what many consider a “progressive” turn. A distinct characteristic of the Kirchner administration was that upon taking office he forged alliances with unemployed and *piquetero* organizations.

One of the first things that happened when Kirchner took office, at the beginning of 2003, was that we received an unprecedented request. My boss was asked—and he asked me—to prepare a report on protests events for the president because he was going to meet the *piquetero* leaders. And he did. After the meeting we started to collaborate with and work in coordination with different factions of the *piquetero* movement. Back then, we began working on a democratic policing of protest events

¹⁴³ See Chapter 4 for a detailed characterization of each period.

and we had high hopes for the changes that were starting to happen”
(Interview with former interior ministry employee, October 2013).

The government’s policies and alliances in favor of unemployed groups and other grassroots movements translated into forms of institutional collaboration, as the movements gained access to resources and joined the state bureaucracy. Access to the administration allowed social movement organizations to place their members in the offices and programs in charge of the issues that gave rise to the movements in the first place. During Néstor Kirchner’s mandate, the *piquetero* movement began to be considered part of the groupings allied with the government. *Piquetero* leaders joined the executive and legislative branches, and took many roles in the Ministries of Social Development, Federal Planning, and International Relations (Dinerstein, Contartese and Deledicque 2010, Lapegna 2014, Rossi 2014).

In spite of this institutional collaboration with some grassroots movements, poverty levels and unemployment rates remained at high levels during the 2006 and 2007 period (2006: 10%, 29% and 2007: 9%, 22%) and the expansion of the workforce also led to an increase in union activity starting in 2003 (Svampa and Mateos 2014).

Table 6.0.1: Total Number of Events, Total Police Presence, And Socioeconomic Context

Table 6.1: Total Number Of Events, Total Police Presence At Events, And Socioeconomic Context					
Protest events			Socioeconomic Context		
Year	Number of Protest Events	Events with state forces presence	Unemployment Rate	Poverty Rate	Economic Context
1997	175	15%	15%	26%	Growth
1998	294	11%	13%	25%	Growth
2001	635	9%	17%	37%	Recession
2002	1114	10%	20%	55%	Recession
2006	701	6%	10%	29%	Growth
2007	819	9%	9%	22%	Growth

Source: Protest data are from author’s dataset and event database by Stony Brook University, “Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America”; socioeconomic context data are from Indec at www.indec.gov.ar and from Ministerio de Trabajo at www.trabajo.gov.ar

With regards to the intensity of protests, Table 6.1 above shows that the number of contentious collective action events was very high in all the periods covered in this study. The number of demonstrations was highest in 2002 with 1114 events but these were still very high in the subsequent years. As mentioned earlier, these high levels of mobilization took place in a context of increasing poverty, unemployment and informality during the Neoliberal and Crisis periods and growth during the Progressive administration. It is important to note that while unemployment declined during the 2006/6 progressive administration it was still high, the same with the poverty rate.

The number of protest events experienced a great escalation from 1997/1998 (469 events) to 2001/2002 (1749 events), a 273% increase. The literature often links this upsurge in contention to the economic and political crisis of 2001, but unemployment and poverty rates were already high in 1997 and 1998 during the Neoliberal period. Furthermore, the number of protest events did not drop—as expected—during the administration of Néstor Kirchner when the socioeconomic context improved. That is, the number of demonstrations remained high several years

after the crisis had passed and a different government was in office. This pattern indicates that collective claim making outside the conventional institutional channels is likely not in response to a specific context of deprivation but a legitimate form of expressing grievances and making demands for Argentinians.

The government's response to protest events is also not easily linked to socioeconomic data. As Table 6.1 shows, the presence of police at protest events was low in all periods. However, state forces attendance was more numerous in the years prior to the crisis—in 1997 and 1998 during the neoliberal administration of Peronist President Carlos Menem (1989-1999). This is important because measures of police presence provide information on police policy. Security forces actions at the demonstration, in turn, provides information on both police and police discretion. The period with the lowest number of police presence at events was during the administration of Néstor Kirchner in 2006 and 2007. High numbers of police attendance during the Neoliberal period and lower numbers during the Progressive period reflect government policies. The differences in policy, however, do not result in qualitative differences in policing or what is it that police do once they are at the demonstration. As we described in earlier chapters, police discretion on the ground remained in spite of more democratic polices.

As Eduardo, national security secretary during Néstor Kirchner's administration, said in an interview,

“(the no-weapons policy for police while at demonstrations) was accompanied by the dismissal of 105 Federal Police officers who had shady resumes... this positioned the Federal Police in clear subordination to the political power. In reality, the police have always been subordinated to the political power, but what happens is that police say they respond to political decisions but then they turn around and do whatever they want. I mean, they are completely different to the Armed Forces that always obey. Police say they will obey but in the end, they do what they want and when they want to, they also manipulate the political authority” (Interview, Buenos Aires 2014)

We turn to the ongoing issue about the impact of demonstrator poverty on policing practices. Soule, Davenport and Armstrong (2011) found that the race of

protesters affect how police respond to protest events. According to Soule and colleagues, police view African American protesters as especially threatening and this threat leads to a greater probability of police violence. Similarly, Piven and Cloward argued that when lower class groups are disruptive, they are either ignored or repressed (1978: 27-28). Thus, drawing on social movements theory (Piven and Cloward 1978), on protest policing scholarship (Soule, Davenport and Armstrong 2011), and on human rights groups reports (CELS 2002, 2003, 2009; CORREPI 2012) I expected that the condition of poverty, unemployment, and marginality in protesters would affect how police respond to protest events. A hypothesis follows from these considerations:

HYPOTHESIS —Police in Argentina will be more violent and repressive at protest events composed of marginal actors.

Here, I defined marginality as a result of rising inequality and not necessarily economic backwardness (Wacquant 1999, Sassen 1991, Salvia 2011). Among “marginals” I included people who have temporary, informal, and unprotected jobs; suffer territorial stigmatization and groups—ethnic, religious, minorities—that for different reasons are subject to institutional discrimination and violence such as LGBT groups. These groups were often subject to police arbitrary detention (CORREPI 2013).

6.1 Police presence at Contentious Collective Action Events

The implementation of neoliberal reforms and economic management ideals that included the privatization of state-owned companies, reduction of state-related employment, changes in the welfare system, administrative decentralization, deregulation of economic activities, and the opening of the domestic market to foreign trade and investment got mixed results. In the short term, Argentina witnessed economic growth. But in the longer term the country experienced severe impoverishment, growing informalization and unemployment, income polarization, recession, and finally, monetary and financial stability (Villalón 2007). This spawned a

growing mass of unemployed workers who lacked institutional protection from the state, unions, or other organizations. Traditional channels did not respond to people's concerns and demands.¹⁴⁴ In this context, large numbers of impoverished people and unemployed workers began staging contentious collective actions. As described in Chapter 4, demands for jobs and welfare were among the most salient claims of the time, and the government was the main target of these claims.

Mobilizations were mainly in demand for jobs and welfare benefits but also for justice, education, human rights and other social issues that received different responses from the government.¹⁴⁵ On occasion, workfare benefits were allocated in exchange for demobilization (Garay 2007) while other times the government opted to confront protesters with repression. The descriptive table below¹⁴⁶ displays two of the characteristics of the protest events attended by police in each period: the average size of demonstrations, and the target of the claims.

¹⁴⁴ As the specialized literature has shown (Auyero 2000, Stokes 2003, O'Donnell 1997) every level of government was marred by high levels of corruption, nepotism and other inadequate practices.

¹⁴⁵ See chapter 4 for a detail of claims by period and police response.

¹⁴⁶ Please see Appendix for a summary table of the general characteristics of the protest events attended by police during the different periods of this study.

Table 6.0.2: Contention Features When There Was Police Presence Each Period

Table 6.2: Contention Features By Period When There Was Police Presence					
	Neoliberal 1997/8	Crisis 2001/2	Progressive 2006/7	Total	N
Average size of demonstration (by mean number of participants)	2790	2571	2242	100%	2534
Target					
National Government	40%	24%	35%	31%	112
Provincial Government	30%	20%	10%	19%	68
Local Gov.	3%	6%	17%	9%	29
Corporate/Priv companies	15%	32%	20%	25%	81
Security forces	5%	11%	8%	9%	28
Other (justice, unions, pol leaders, legislators)	7%	7%	9%	8%	24
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	–
<i>N</i>	60	164	119	–	343
<p>Source: Protest data are from author’s data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University’s Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p> <p>Notes. All values are percentages, except as indicated. Percentages are subject to rounding error.</p>					

The *number of participants* is an important factor to consider when analyzing authorities’ reactions to protest events. According to the protest repression literature, the number of demonstrators may also pose a threat to authorities. In this research, the number of participants when police appeared ranged from tens of thousands in episodes that took place in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan area and Neuquén, to small groups of protesters in many provinces. As shown in table 6.2 above, the mean number of participants at contentious collective action events when police appeared was around 2500 demonstrators (2790 during the Neoliberal period, 2571 during the Crisis, and 2242 during the Progressive administration). When looking at the number of security forces that appeared and took action at contentious episodes, it is not possible to associate numbers of participants with specific police responses. That is, there are no significant associations. Episodes with tens of thousands of participants had both non-violent and violent police responses. While small protest events also involved police use of violent tactics. For example, events with less than 50 participants had an average of 12% non-violent police responses, and 13% violent responses, while events with tens

of thousands numbers of demonstrators had an average of 12% non-violent police responses and 8% violent police responses. Hence, police responses are indistinct of number of participants.¹⁴⁷

Focusing in the target of the protest events, as was discussed in Chapter 4, is also important when analyzing authorities response to demonstrations, because prior research has shown that contentious events that target the government directly will be considered more threatening and thus subject to more aggressive policing. As table 6.2 above shows, during the **Neoliberal** period, in 1997 and 1998 police appeared most often when the *national* government (40%) or the *provincial* government (30%) were the focus of the target in the demonstrations. Very few demonstrations with police presence were directed to the local government (3%). During this period, although many of the privatization policies that accompanied the neoliberal reforms had already been implemented, the target of demands were not the corporations that had acquired the nationalized industries, but at the federal and provincial administrations. Given Argentina's centralized history, local administrations—municipalities—had little competence and attributions in the provision of health, education, and other services. Thus, protests, demonstrations, and all claims to the government were traditionally directed at the national government (geographically located in the City of Buenos Aires).

Together with the implementation of neoliberal policies during the 1990s, provincial governments took many responsibilities and thus became a new focus of demands. This is very clear in the case of education and health services that were transferred to the provinces with the decentralization policies implemented in the 1990s. Until 1992/3, many elementary and secondary schools depended directly from the National Ministry of Education but were then transferred to the provincial administrations. Still, many protests were aimed at the national government and police presence was high at these (Feldfever and Ivanier 2003, Rodrigo 2006, Farinetti 1999).

The changes wrought by neoliberal privatization are apparent during the **Crisis Period** data, when police appeared most often at protest events targeting corporations

¹⁴⁷ See Appendix C, table 10, for a summary table of police responses by number of protest participants.

(32%), with demonstrations aimed at national (24%) and provincial (20%) government no longer dominating police attention. Supermarkets, factories, banks—in addition to the government—were the objects of grievances. Poor and needy people demanded food from supermarket chains; middle class citizens protested the restriction to cash withdrawals from banks; train, bus, and subway riders protested the faulty functioning of transportation; and factory workers took over their workplaces to prevent their closure and create cooperatives.

State forces showed up to guard banks and finance institutions when demonstrators took to the streets in 2001 to protest against banking restrictions. Similarly, security forces were stationed at supermarket chains during the looting episodes of 2001 and 2002. Auyero and Moran (2007) found evidence that the different targets of looting activity—whether large or small supermarkets—had differential police responses.¹⁴⁸

The police also appeared (15%) when claims were directed at the security and military forces. This is connected to increasing claims for human rights issues and against police brutality during this period. Thus, in this period police showed up at events with diverse targets.

During the **Progressive** administration, in 2006 and 2007, police mainly appeared at protest events that had the government as target, while corporations (20%) and provincial governments declined (10%) as police-protected targets. Local government protection increased for local administrations (17%) targeted by protestors, reflecting the importance of local governments. Until the last decades of the twentieth century, the federal government administered resources in major areas that—as was mentioned above—were transferred to the provinces and local governments. The increasing responsibilities of the local governments included more state employees at the local level. More state employees in municipalities combined with the expansion of unions resulted in more protest events targeting these levels of government and

¹⁴⁸ Looking at corporations that oppose reform, Young and Schwartz (2014) meanwhile, found that social movements that target corporations might exert political influence by weakening these groups leverage over the government. It is possible that corporations are aware of this, and thus manage their connections to the government and authorities to control movements' and protests.

increasing policing.

Social movement scholars have argued that targeting the government is more likely to be perceived as more threatening to authorities, and thus subject to more and harsher policing. In Argentina, this tendency is amplified by the fact that—despite neoliberal reforms—that the government remains the main employer in most parts of the country. Hence, most collective claims and grievances are directed to some government office, and police are expected to control these demonstrations. As a consequence, looking at the nature of policing—or police tactics—can illuminate the aims and consequence of police intervention. We know that large numbers of police attend demonstrations against some level of government, but did they use coercion? Interestingly, both government and non-government targets were subjects of police violence. As the table (6.3) below indicates, there is no significant association between government target and police violence in any of the three periods.

Table 6.0.3: Police Tactics And Governmental Target Each Period

Table 6.3: Police Tactics And Governmental Target Each Period					
Period	Target	Non-Violent Tactics	Violent Tactics	Total	N
Neoliberal 1997/1998	Non-Government	33%	67%	100%	9
	Government	33%	67%	100%	51
	<i>Total</i>	33%	67%	100%	–
	N	20	40	–	60
Crisis 2001/2	Non-Government	30%	70%	100%	60
	Government	32%	68%	100%	104
	<i>Total</i>	31%	69%	100%	–
	N	51	113	–	164
Progressive 2006/7	Non-Government	39%	61%	100%	33
	Government	37%	63%	100%	86
	<i>Total</i>	38%	62%	100%	–
	N	45	74	–	119
Total	Non-Government	33%	67%	100%	102
	Government	34%	66%	100%	241
	<i>Total</i>	34%	66%	100%	–
	N	116	227	–	343

Chi-Square: NS

Note: Police use of violent tactics includes violent evictions, use of physical force, use of weapons, use of tear gas, rubber bullets, confrontations between protesters and police, and violent arrests. Even when arrests do not involve the use of weapons or explicit physical force, I consider that making arrests during demonstrations is a violent police tactic.

During the neoliberal administration of Carlos Menem in 1997 and 1998 police was sent to patrol protest events 85% of the times (51 of the 60 events) when the demonstration targeted the government. Moreover, in 67% of the police attended events in which activists focused on the government, security forces used violent tactics. When the target of the protest was not the government, the rate of police violence was equally high (67%). Similar results were found during the Crisis period. Here, the policing of government and non-government targets was reduced (63% and 37%). Nevertheless, both when the target was government agency and when it was not police used violent tactics in response to demonstrations (70% and 68% respectively). During the Progressive administration, the policing of demonstrations mainly occurred when the target was the government (86 of 119 or 72%). And once again, both when the

focus of the collective claim making actions was a governmental or non-governmental dependency, police mainly used violent tactics (61% and 63%).

Overall, the association between police tactics and target is not statistically significant, thus other factors need to be contemplated to analyze this complex phenomena. As I mentioned earlier, the social movements literature agrees that targeting the government is perceived as a threat by authorities and thus subject to repression. The data here does not seem to confirm this and since most collective claim making actions and demands in Argentina target some level of government, this hypothesis needs to be further analyzed contemplating other factors. For example, and as was mentioned before, it was quite frequent for demonstrations in Argentina to be vigilated and patrolled by police and intelligence agents wearing non-identificatory clothing.¹⁴⁹ Activists mentioned during conversations that they know when a protest gathering is surveilled and also that they can spot these undercover agents spying on them.

As a former student activist said during an interview “we weren’t such a large number (of demonstrators) but we could see police stationed nearby and we knew there were more police dressed in casual clothing watching us” (Interview, Buenos Aires 2012). During an organizational meeting at a SMO’s headquarters, activists mentioned that they always have the feeling of being watched and followed. So, number of participants at claim making events in Argentina is difficult to associate with a specific response by authorities and police. Both large and small gatherings were met with vigilance and police control of various types.

As the specialized literature suggests, if not the number of participants or the target, there is another common denominator that attracts police control: the characteristics of the protesters. That is, who is the people taking part in the contentious collective action event?

¹⁴⁹ This started to change during the administration of Néstor Kirchner with the implementation of democratic policing protocols. Among the regulations is the implementation of specific dress codes for police during demonstrations.

6.2. Who protests, matters?

Unemployed and informal workers are often considered an unlikely source of large-scale collective action in Latin America. As Candelaria Garay stated “lacking the work ties that have typically fostered common interests and identities, and marginalized by labor unions that have often seen in their large numbers a threat to the formal workforce, unemployed and informal workers have remained at the margins of major working-class organization and social conflict.” (2007: 302). Yet, as the data in this research shows, between 1997 and 2007 Argentina experienced thousands of protest events. Unemployed, informal workers, and marginal actors led a very large number of these protests that were met with both welfare plans and repression.

It is important to recall that after market reforms were introduced thousands of workers were laid off, and there was an increase in informal and precarious employment. Unemployment and informality reduced unions’ membership base and power (Portes and Hoffman 2003) thus many protest events were not organized by unions but by unemployed and informal workers. According to Garay, in Argentina, the national workfare program *Plan Trabajar* launched in 1996 had certain characteristics – low supply of benefits relative to demand, absence of clear criteria for the beneficiary selection, the formation of community projects and a collective identity– that encouraged collective action (Garay 2007). The program and how unemployed workers and the state interacted through it, generated the emergence of unemployed groups with great mobilization capacity.

The wave of protests thus saw the emergence of unemployed movements, fronts and federations. “Access to benefits empowered these groups... [and] their mobilization capacity made them attractive partners for opposition labor unions” (Garay 2007: 311). Although unemployed movements or fronts often organized mobilizations, police did not appear more often when organizations led the protest event (see Table 6.4). Actually, when police appeared, there were a very low number of episodes led by unions or other organizations (24%). The number of union led events with police presence was low in all three periods: 40% during the **Neoliberal** period, it dropped to 15% during the **Crisis**, and went up to 29% during the **Progressive** era.

Social movements, unions, federations and other organizations did not draw police presence. As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one possible hypothesis is that police appeared and used violent tactics at a protest event when the demonstration was composed of marginal actors.

Indeed, looking at the variations in the composition of the crowds each period (see table 6.4), marginality was important in all moments. During the **Neoliberal** period, in 1997 and 1998, when police appeared at protest events, poor, needy people (marginal) were the main actors taking part in the demonstration 23% of the times. Yet, when law enforcement appeared at a protest gathering this period, they met crowds composed of a variety of actors: teachers (13%), students (12%), activists (18%), other state workers, not teachers (13%), and non-state workers (15%). Put differently, in 1997 and 1998 when police appeared at demonstrations, marginal people and state workers (teachers and other state workers=26%) were the dominant actors of the protest. Unlike private sector workers, state workers have more job stability (Munnell and Fraenkel 2013). This means that public sector jobs have historically been more secure or less exposed to dismissals than private sector jobs. In Argentina, for example, it is very difficult to remove a state worker from his/her job so some argue that they take lower risks when participating in contentious collective action events.

Table 6.0.4: Contention Features By Period When Police Appeared

Table 6.4: Contention Features By Period When There Was Police Presence					
	Neoliberal 1997/8	Crisis 2001/2	Progressive 2006/7	Total	N
Demonstrations led by Organized Groups	40%	15%	29%	24%	81
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%	–
<i>N</i>	60	164	119	–	343
Actors involved ¹⁵⁰					
Teachers	13%	4%	12%	9%	29
Students & Youth	12%	2%	14%	8%	27
State workers (non teachers)	13%	13%	6%	11%	36
Political party members	5%	7%	3%	5%	19
SMO activists	18%	24%	34%	27%	91
Non-state workers	15%	11%	18%	14%	48
Marginals	23%	38%	13%	27%	93
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%	–
<i>N</i>	60	164	119	–	343
Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.					
Notes. All values are percentages, except as indicated. Percentages are subject to rounding error.					

During the **Crisis** period, in 2001 and 2002, when police appeared, it was poor, needy and vulnerable people (38%) together with activists (24%) that have the highest number of participation at protest events. Activists include members of political parties, social movement organization members, students, social militants, and members of community based groups among others.

In 2006 and 2007, during the **Progressive** administration, police appeared mainly when activists (social movement and other grassroots groups) were organizing collective claim making actions (34%) but other actors are also policed during this period. Non-state workers (18%) and students (14%) have a large presence when police appeared. Did police change the target of their patrolling? Was it authorities?

¹⁵⁰ Please see Chapter 4 (description and analysis of table 4.2) for a detailed consideration of protesters claims and forms of action.

All in all, demonstrations when police appeared at protest events during the three periods were mainly composed of **marginal people** and **activists**. Surprisingly – although police attendance was high at demonstrations by marginal¹⁵¹ actors– policing tactics did not involve violence. Put differently, there is no relationship between use of police violence at demonstrations and marginality (see Table 6.5 below). In other words, although policing of protest events composed of marginal actors is high, the condition of marginality did not explain the use of violence by police.

Table 6.5 below shows that the condition of marginality is not correlated with police violence. Looking at policing tactics, the table shows that police respond with violence at around 61% of the protest events composed of marginal actors, and 39% of the events composed of non-marginal actors. But when police attends a protest event and uses non-violent tactics, the percentage of marginal and non-marginal actors is almost the same as when they do use coercion. Thus, it is not possible to associate police tactics and marginality.

This is unexpected since recent studies by both academics and journalists indicate that police violence towards the poor and marginal has increased (CELS 2002, Verdu 2009, Glanc 2014).

¹⁵¹ As detailed in Chapter 2, I define marginal actors (and marginality) as the condition by which the actors, the activists taking part in the protest, are very vulnerable, needy, and poor people –often from poor neighborhoods or shantytowns. These actors often appear in the news as cardboard collectors, squatters, unemployed, day laborers (changarines), or as *villeros*, people from neighborhoods that can be characterized as marginalized.

Table 6.0.5: Police Tactics And Marginality

Table 6.5: Police Tactics And Marginality			
Protest Features	Police tactics		Total
	Non-use of Violence	Use of Violence	
Marginal protesters	60%	61%	61%
Non-marginal protesters	40%	39%	39%
Total	116 100%	227 100%	343 100%
Chi-Square = .025, p=NS			
Note: police violence here was computed including arrests.			

In its annual reports, human rights group CORREPI provides details of the people killed by police in what they define as episodes of state repression. In these, they argue that poor people are subject to more and harsher repression (CORREPI 2013). María del Carmen Verdú, a leading lawyer and activist, in a book detailing repression during the recent democratic governments of Argentina distinguishes two forms of state repression aimed at social control: selective and pre-emptive repression. Selective repression is the actions by state forces aimed at social movement organizations, social activists, union leaders and any challenger to the state with the goal of intimidating and thus reducing contention. Pre-emptive repression, in turn, are the violent actions by the state –such as easy trigger, tortures, arbitrary detentions, and harassment– over those that can potentially become challengers, claimants or oppositional forces to the state. CORREPI states that students, poor people, marginal are often subject to pre-emptive policing. Verdú narrates the case of Walter Bulacio, a high school student who was detained in 1991 during a rock concert and killed by police brutality and tortures at the precinct. The author argues that this was a clear example of pre-emptive repression, had Bulacio lived, he could have been an activist like his father who was a steel worker and years later could have participated in mobilizations an protest events making claims to the government (Verdú 2009). Buhl and Korol argue, “the poor and the non-white emerge as the possible causes of all evils and the claims for justice are accompanied by demands to reduce the qualifying age for punishing juveniles, and hard lines policies” (2008: 48).

It is possible that police violence towards the marginal is not statistically significant at protest events because violence against these groups is constant, and not necessarily during protest events. Put differently, as recent research on the criminalization of poverty has shown (Rodríguez 2004, Waquant 2009) the poor are subject to different forms of state violence, and massive incarceration. Poverty is not addressed as a social, economic or political problem but the poor are criminalized, and made invisible. Police, the judiciary and prisons deal with the poor and thus the economic and political reality is not questioned.

Auyero, Burbano de Lara and Bellomi (2013) explain that there are new, and varied forms of violence in Latin America. This violence affects the poor and most disadvantage populations in disproportionate ways, “particularly adolescents and young adults... – both as victims and as perpetrators. In the case of Argentina, and particularly the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, the increase of social and criminal violence is beyond dispute... state violence against the poor takes the form of persistent arbitrary police violence, swelling prison rates, novel territorial sieges of marginalized communities, and increasing forceful evictions” (Auyero et al 2013: 3).

If the condition of marginality does not yield heightened policing at protest events, then maybe there are certain groups that when acting together are perceived as more threatening. Let’s look at police responses when groups make collective claims with others.

6.3 Demonstrators Alliances and Policing

Collective claim making –even when there is one clear and particular demand– is often times conducted by more than one group. Common interests and claims among different actors often times result in unified large-scale collective actions. For example, students often participate in demonstrations along with teachers, and in solidarity with others’ grievances. Informal workers might forge an alliance with a specific union around a common goal. As the literature suggests, these “other” actors, their claims, and their forms of action could be threatening to police.

Accordingly, the actors leading the protest on occasions might be considered a threat by police or authorities due to their historical circumstances. Other times, it is not the main group that attracts police attention but the actors mobilizing alongside. Teachers might organize a given protest, but students and left wing activists might also be present demonstrating at the event; and these latter ones are what police take into account when deciding how to respond and control the demonstration.

The data here shows that of all the protest events attended by police, more than one actor was mentioned as participating in the protest in 91 of the 343 events. That is, in 26.5% of the events at least two actors were mentioned as taking part in the demonstration (on many occasions, there were more than three actors participating). Table 6.6 below shows the actors that were protesting along the main demonstrator when police appeared.

Table 6.0.6: Accompanying Actors When Police Appeared

Table 6.6: Accompanying Actors At Protest Events When Police Appeared				
Accompanying Actor	Periods			Total
	Neoliberal 1997/8	Crisis 2001/2	Progressive 2006/7	
Students	28%	24%	32%	26%
Peasants	1%	4%	0%	2%
Families of victims	22%	8%	14%	12%
Activists*	28%	24%	40%	29%
<i>Piqueteros</i>	6%	35%	14%	24%
Others**	13%	5%	0%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	18	51	22	91

Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.

Notes: *Activists include members of political parties, members of human rights groups, social movement organization members, social militants, and members of community based groups among others

**Other actors mentioned include members of aboriginal communities, unemployed and informal workers, squatters

As table 6.6 above shows, most of the actors that were demonstrating along the leading group when police showed up at protest events were students, activists, families of victims of repression, *piqueteros*, members of aboriginal communities and peasants. All of these actors shared a common characteristic: they lacked political leverage or the capacity to have a political influence as organized groups both during electoral times and by channeling their demands through traditional institutions. They belong to minority collectives that often have little economic power. Furthermore, many of these actors have been, at different times, stigmatized and labeled as criminals, subversives, and conflict provocateurs (Artese 2007, Bonner 2008).

Matías Artese (2007) explained that during the roadblocks in Argentina's Patagonia region in 1996-1997, *piqueteros* (many of whom were unemployed workers) were accused of violating the law and the National Constitution. Many demonstrators were judicially prosecuted and the term "*piquetero*" became a synonym of crime, vandalism, sluggishness, unjustified demands, abuse over other people's rights, paid political activism, and so on (Artese 2007, 51).

In 2002, then president of Argentina Eduardo Duhalde met with *piquetero* groups to negotiate with them. Unlike prior administrations, Duhalde acknowledged some of their demands, yet he also said "we believe that in the *piquetero* movement there is a part of authentic protest, which is becoming smaller.... and another part that is financed by extremist groups. We have been told that the finances may come from the FARC of Colombia, or in other words, from drug-trafficking." (*Página 12*, March 20th, 2002). The idea of Colombian guerrilla infiltrating Argentina's social movements continued and, was used to justify police interventions during protest events. As table 6.4 shows, *piqueteros* were secondary actors on 24% of the times in which police appeared.

The "families of victims of police repression", as the table shows, were often present along another actor, when police showed up at a protest event (12% of times on average). The groups of "families of victims" formed or joined pre-existent human rights groups that have become well known and very active collectives that not only make demands of justice but fight in other human rights causes. COFAVI (Comisión de

Familiares Víctimas Indefensas de la Violencia Social – Committee of Families Defenseless Victims of Social Violence), CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales – Center of Legal and Social Studies) and Correpi (Coordinadora contra la Represión Policial – Committee Against Police Repression), for example, are very active social movement groups that denounce institutional violence. These groups emerged during the early 1990s and were the first to de-naturalize, denounce, and question all violent actions by security forces in a democratic regime. They connect police violence with human rights violations. In this process, they also denounced the complicity –by action or omission– of the judicial system in these violent actions by police (Pita 2005, 62-63).

Yet, the actors that most frequently accompany the main protesters when police appeared were activists (29%) and students (26%). Among the group of “activists” are members and militants of political parties, members of human rights groups, social movement organization leaders, social militants, and members of community based groups. The category of “students” often times includes both university and high school youngsters.

The case of students is very interesting because, on many occasions, their claims exceed the educational field and they are identified with broader sectors of society. Students –as a group– protested (marching, blockading roads, participating in rallies, in *escraches*, in occupations) along the most diverse actors and organizations. In 1997 and 1998 university students participated in roadblocks and occupations in support of teachers demands for better and the late payment of wages; during 2001 and 2002 students were seen at marches demanding “Away with them All”, or at *escraches* denouncing a corrupt government officials, and in 2006 and 2007 students took part in rallies against police brutality.

However, what stands out the most from the data on accompanying actors when there was police presence is that, together with *piqueteros*, all the other actors that accompany the leading protester at the events –regardless of who this was– are demonstrators lacking political leverage.¹⁵² Put differently, these actors are not all

¹⁵² A group worthy of special mention is the *Movimiento Patriótico Revolucionario Quebracho* (Revolutionary Patriotic Movement *Quebracho*), a self-identified extreme left group who uses confrontational tactics. *Quebracho* has been accused of being infiltrated or with connections to the state

marginal but they all share an absence of political leverage: activists, students, families of victims, members of aboriginal communities, unemployed and informal workers, squatters, and *piqueteros*. Moreover, some of these groups might be considered a threat due to the great mobilization capacity that they have historically held. Thus, it is possible to argue that the appearance of police at these events was not a surprise since these “accompanying actors” were all considered politically and socially challenging actors to both police and state authorities. But, was police more violent when these actors were present at demonstrations?

Police was violent on 48 of 91 (53%) of the events in which students, *piqueteros*, activists and families of victims were also participating of the contentious collective action event along with other groups (see Table 6.7). The largest number of violent episodes (29%) took place when *piqueteros* were part of the demonstration. However, I did not find a statistically significant association between police tactic and the accompanying actor taking part in the protest. Police use of violent tactics was indistinct of the actors’ alliances.

intelligence agency. Thus, the group is said to appear to disrupt otherwise pacific protests and generate violence. *La Nación*, “Que se esconde detrás del grupo quebracho”, September 5th, 2004. <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/633755-que-se-esconde-detras-del-grupo-quebracho>

Table 6.0.7: Accompanying Actors When Police Was Violent

Table 6.7: Accompanying Actors When Police Was Violent			
	Police tactic		
Accompanying Actor	Not Violent	Violent	Total
Students	30%	23%	26%
Peasants	2%	2%	2%
Families of victims	14%	10%	12%
Activists*	33%	25%	29%
<i>Piqueteros</i>	19%	29%	24%
Others **	2%	10%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	43	48	91
Chi-square 4.45, NS.			
<p>Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p> <p>Note: *Activists include members of political parties, members of human rights groups, social movement organization members, social militants, and members of community based groups among others</p> <p>**Other actors mentioned include members of aboriginal communities, unemployed and informal workers, squatters</p>			

The condition of marginality and the alliances among actors to make demands to a specific target are not associated with police repression. Let's examine other characteristics of protesters.

6.4 Police Violence and Political Leverage

The literature on protest policing has identified many features of protest events that are likely to be met with diverse forms of policing. However, few studies have systematically examined the identity of the actors involved in the protest event and how this might affect police behavior. Unexpectedly, we found that the condition of marginality (poor and impoverished actors) did not result in harsher policing at

demonstrations. This is surprising since there are numerous studies that describe how the poor are discriminated, violently policed and unfairly treated by police and authorities.¹⁵³ As I explained earlier, the results show that this harsher policing and criminalization of marginal people is not expressed when these groups are demonstrating. The poor are subject to harsher policing and repression in everyday life.

Drawing on my own research, on interviews, document analysis and case studies; I looked at other factors that might influence police response at contentious collective action events. I grouped actors based on their political leverage on its own right, as a structural characteristic. By this, I mean to say the political leverage that these actors have prior to taking any specific actions or employing disruptive tactics. Following sociologist Michael Schwartz (1976) “in order to effect change, an organization must have some leverage, or power over the system it wishes to change” (130). A group’s leverage is thus, understood as the capacity to exert pressure and influence on a given structure. As a result of political leverage, the actions and claims of these actors, might also have political impact.

Leverage, however, may also be contextual or situational. That is, leverage that the actors acquire as a result of relationships, interconnections, and networks with power holders (institutions, governments, elites) may operate in a specific time and place. I therefore distinguish two types of leverage. As part of the first group of actors, those holding *acquired structural leverage*, I included certain unionized workers (with

¹⁵³ There is a growing literature on what is known as the criminalization of poverty. The term is frequently used by scholars who focus on the ordinances, legislations and selective legal enforcement targeting the poor. Others examine the massive incarceration of poor people and the policies and practices that involve the surveillance, stigmatization and regulation of the poor. For information: Rodríguez Mirtha. “El capitalismo arremete: criminalización de la pobreza”, OSAL, V, N 14 2004; Korol, Claudia. *Criminalización de la pobreza y de la protesta social*. America Libre, 2009. WACQUANT, LOÏE. "Castigar a los parias urbanos." *Antipoda. Revista de Antropología y Arqueología* 2 (2006): 59-66; Tinessa, Giulio. "Marginados, minorías e inmigrantes: criminalización de la pobreza y encarcelamiento masivo en las sociedades capitalistas avanzadas." *Miradas en Movimiento* 3 (2010): 39-68; Gustafson, Kaaryn. "The criminalization of poverty." *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (2009): 643-716.

different degrees of structural power) such as transportation workers, teachers, health workers, security forces, and military personnel. In the second group, of *contextual-situational leverage* I included certain human rights groups (such as NGOs) that question police action, security policies and crime control policies. The claims by these groups are nationally and internationally legitimate and governments in the last decade of the twentieth century and beginning of twenty-first see that they are valid causes and claims to put forward in the agenda.¹⁵⁴ Some retail vendors, and agricultural producers also have contextual leverage in the jurisdictions in which they live and function. Unemployed federations had leverage during specific configurations of power and contexts, which I will detail below.

Accordingly, I grouped actors based on their structural and contextual **political leverage—or lack of**—to examine how police responded to these two different groups. Among the actors that do not have political leverage or structural power (Schwartz 1976: 172-5) I included: students, left-wing party members, SMO activists and militants, informal workers (such as street vendors), small farmers, prostitutes, and marginalized people who do not belong to a union or a collective that provides them with group identity or spatial location where to meet and organize collective actions. Also lacking political leverage are pensioners and immigrants from neighboring countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru. As mentioned in Chapter 3, immigrants have often been blamed for Argentina's perils and criminalized on several occasions during the country's history. Diego Casavilla (2000) pointed out "the most explicit and noticeable demonizing procedure against immigrants was to associate them with criminality" (p7). Citing different newspapers and government officials, Casavilla provides examples of state and media xenophobic discourses criminalizing immigrants, such as "*illegals* are responsible for 70% of misdemeanors and 30% of drug trafficking" (p10) a statement that was later refuted by the police.

Unemployed workers and pickets during the 1990s (before they became

¹⁵⁴ During the first decade of the twentieth century, Human Rights groups such as CELS, developed the capacity to exert pressure, make complaints and have some impact in Argentina's security agenda and security and justice public policies (Perelman 2009).

organized in fronts or federations) did not have the leverage or structural power that unionized workers had. Strikes, protests and mobilizations by unemployed workers had scarce effects over the production system and did not constitute an immediate threat to authorities. But this changed over the different periods. The case of pickets and unemployed workers is special since at times they held situational leverage. For example, in 1997 and 1998, groups of jobless workers began receiving unemployment benefits,¹⁵⁵ which empowered them, helped them to grow, and forge alliances with other groups (Garay 2007).

Although some of these actors could also be considered marginal, students, youth and SMO activists most often belong to middle-upper class, and educated sectors of society, which are not marginalized. The case of students is of particular interest since they are mainly university students and, although many attend public institutions, frequently, they are privileged youth who don't need to work a full time job. Some of these youths are also volunteer activists at human rights groups and social movement organizations. In spite of their belonging to a university, a human rights group, or a social movement organization, youth—as a collectivity—in general, do not have structural leverage. Youth do not have a specific function in the productive structure, in which they could exert pressure to disrupt. Students, however, on occasions have contextual or situational structural leverage –mostly when making educational or student related demands. Student contention may disrupt an educational institution but they may not have leverage outside that particular organization.

Often, government policies and welfare plans do not reach the groups lacking structural political leverage, at least until they get strong media attention, or make alliances with more powerful actors.

¹⁵⁵ Candelaria Garay (2007) showed that total beneficiaries of workfare programs jumped from 62,000 in April 1997 to nearly 200,000 later that year (p 311).

Table 6.0.8: Actors Leverage And Police Tactics

Table 6.8: Actors Leverage And Police Tactics			
	Police tactics		
Actors	Non-Violent tactics	Violent tactics	Total
Without leverage	23%	77%	100%
With leverage	74%	26%	100%
Total	34%	66%	100%
N	116	227	343
Chi-Square = 64.3, $p < 0.001$			

Table 6.8 above shows police tactics when actors have –and do not have– political leverage. It describes the occasions in which police used violent and non-violent tactics depending on the characteristics of the actors that were demonstrating. We see that leverage is a key determinant of police violence. In situations where demonstrators have leverage, the police are violent about a quarter of the times (26%); but when the protestors do not have leverage, the police are violent almost three-quarters of the time (74%). This result, combined with our earlier null results, suggests that it is the organic power of certain groups that protects them from police violence. And it is not the vilification by the media and politicians that generates police violence; such vilification only increases police violence when the group also lacks institutional leverage.¹⁵⁶ Given Argentina’s history of repression, authorities during democratic periods seek to avoid confrontations that might result in an escalation of violence. Actors with leverage often also have great mobilization capacity and the use of violence by police could backfire. Government led violent policing, could result in an expansion of contentious actions and new coalitions of protesters. In addition, political authorities could face media and electoral punishments for their actions. Also, actors with leverage can respond to police violence by disrupting daily life in very big ways, so police do not want to provoke them.

By focusing on protesters with leverage, it is possible to see that on most of the time when these actors demonstrated and police appeared they were not met with

¹⁵⁶ Multivariate analysis confirms these first order results.

violence. Put differently, on 74% of the cases (52 of 70 events) in which protesters had leverage, police attended the event but did not use violent tactics in response to the demonstration and this is a statistically significant finding.

Noticeably, the actors that lack political leverage are subject to harsher police tactics. They do not have structural power (Schwartz 1976, Piven and Cloward 1977) or the leverage that other workers have when staging a picket or a roadblock, and often find themselves marginalized from key decision making processes. Students, for example, do not have the leverage that teachers have when striking in schools.

In the case of teachers, for example, even though their bargaining power with the government can be made difficult because—as a labor force—they are dispersed across space (Silvers 2003), their power lies in that they play a critical role in the social division of labor. In addition, they are formally integrated into the labor market and possess a formal contractual relationship with the state that provides them with relative structural power (Schwartz 1976, Piven and Cloward 1977). Thus, collective bargaining is easier. Furthermore, teachers are an actor that enters the home. Teachers' conflicts are discussed and problematized by the public, society in general. Strikes led by teachers have consequences in the workforce since one parent must stay home to watch the children. Thus, teachers are a critical actor, and when making claims are politically threatening to the government.

Following the threat theory, threatening protests are subject to more and harsher policing. Yet, teachers are threatening to political elites, but not necessarily to police. A strike—or any demonstration—by teachers can be highly disruptive to authorities. If parents have to stay home to watch their children, large sectors of the country's economy could be slowed down. This can be highly problematic for political authorities. On the ground police, however, are not directly threatened. First, teachers are not considered a violent actor, and therefore police should not expect confrontations or violence as a consequence of the contentious action. Second, most teachers in Argentina are women, and following predominant gender stereotypes, police will not feel threatened and are likely to act differently when encountering demonstration composed of mainly women. According to a police chief interviewed, one of the first

measures to reduce police violence during demonstrations was to place women police officers in the first line. “I recall that in several occasions... this was in the early 2000... police women were placed in the first line to monitor a demonstration. The idea was that women officers would be considered softer shields and thus demonstrators would not want to use violence against them” (Interview with police chief, September 2014).

Additionally, teachers hold social legitimacy and harshly repressing them would result in very negative sanctions from society. This was the case with the death of Carlos Fuentealba in Neuquén in 2007.¹⁵⁷ After police killed teacher Fuentealba, there were dozens of protest events and all kinds of mobilizations against police repression throughout the country. Fellow teachers, unions, congress members, and political elites from the entire political continuum voiced (by writing op-ed letters in newspapers, speaking in the radio, television, and so forth) their outrage and concern with the killing of Fuentealba. Consequently, as the example shows, authorities would rather negotiate with teachers before applying any kind of coercion. Considering their political leverage, political elites will seek support from teachers’ to achieve legitimacy and govern.

Like teachers, there are other actors that play a critical role in the social division of labor and have structural power (Schwartz 1976, Piven and Cloward 1977). It is not necessarily that they have large amounts of resources. These actors—often times belonging to powerful unions—when acting collectively can be considered politically threatening to the government and could delegitimize authorities. For example, there are certain workers that are grouped in particularly powerful unions that have a history of confrontation, disputes and negotiation with Argentine governments. This is the case of transportation (trucks, long distance buses, trains) and construction workers during the period of this study that have the ability to paralyze commerce and prevent workers from arriving at their jobs. These groups have political leverage, particularly since

¹⁵⁷ See Chapter 5 for a full description of the killing of school teacher Carlos Fuentealba.

2003, and when they make claims to the government, authorities listen, and often sit down to negotiate.¹⁵⁸

In 2006, teachers, along with their families, local producers and retail vendors, were part of the protests against the construction of the pulp mill in Uruguay.¹⁵⁹ Although they staged road blockades and other confrontational tactics, they were not met with police violence. The claim and the demonstrators were not a threat to authorities and police. The demonstrators, and their environmental demand were perceived as legitimate and were portrayed as rightful citizens by the media (*Clarín*, February 5, 2006).

In contrast, students, left wing militants, certain activists, informal workers and other marginal groups by their very definition undermine the government's legitimacy and both political elites and police used coercion more freely when responding to their claims. As mentioned earlier, unemployed workers and pickets varied in the leverage they held. It could be argued that *piqueteros* lack structural power or leverage because they are not part of a system and hence do not have the potential to activate and exercise their power. They are mostly unemployed workers. So, their power is not derived from the roles they play within the system. During the 1990s and early 2000, *piqueteros* were portrayed by the media as criminals, lazy and the cause of disturbances (Artese 2007). However, through their actions (staging road blocks, for example) they were capable of exerting pressure on the institutions they targeted and had a political impact. On occasions, *piqueteros* have shown the capacity of coordinating actions and blocking all the local, provincial, and national roads and thus halting the movement of people and goods. Furthermore, as Candelaria Garay explained in her study of social policy and collective action, "protest and participation in the workfare program helped groups to develop a collective identity around unemployment. That identity made protest legitimate and partly facilitated connections among otherwise disparate and geographically distant groups." (2007:307). Through the implementation of specific welfare plans unemployed workers understood they shared goals and demands and

¹⁵⁸ *Página 12*, April 11th, 2006 "El Poder de los sindicatos"
<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-75642-2006-11-04.html>

¹⁵⁹ See Chapter 4, section 4.3 for a description of the pulp mill conflict.

hence formed coalitions to coordinate joint mobilization strategies. Thus, between 1997 and 1999, the first six federations, fronts and blocs of unemployed workers and unions emerged (Garay 2007). These were powerful organized groups that had political leverage and expanded nationwide in the following years. The *piquetero* federations had developed *situational* leverage connected to the specific configuration of power characteristic of that period of time. As a result of structural adjustment policies in the region, thousands of people lost their jobs. Some of the unemployed workers got organized to demand workfare benefits and as Candelaria Garay said: “Access to benefits empowered these groups, helping them grow. Furthermore, their mobilization capacity made them attractive partners for opposition labor unions, which sought to leverage discontent against the national government. By mid-1998, two of the rising unemployed groups had forged alliances or integrated into two opposition unions” (2007:311). The groups thus developed *situational or contextual leverage* as a result of the welfare benefits they received and their capacity to block roads and disrupt order. Unemployed movements did not have what I define as *acquired political leverage*. In other socio-political and historical contexts these groups did not have the capacity to leverage against the government; they were not allied to labor unions or opposition groups but only loosely connected groups of jobless workers.

However, by 2003 the piqueteros groups were no longer a unified group and fragmented into two large factions. The media labeled them: piqueteros *blandos* and *duros* (soft and hard line). The soft line of piqueteros, also known as *oficialistas* or pro-government, took up many jobs in government and became part of the government’s party support network. Their leaders became government employees in different ministries and state agencies, and their groups became beneficiaries of resources and plans. After that, they were no longer clear challengers to the government or statu quo. On the contrary, they became public supporters of the Kirchner administration and its policies. In this case (with groups such as FTV—Luis D’Elía, Barrios de Pie, Jorge Ceballos) they received benefits and resources from the government and their capacity to protest against governmental policies was limited. The hard line *piqueteros*, those still opposing the government and not willing to sign agreements with the administration, generally lacked political leverage and structural power and were

constantly punished and disciplined by government for failing to support its policies. Their actions and claims did not have great political impact and leaders such as Raúl Castells, and Santillán were repeatedly imprisoned.

Table 6.0.9: Police Tactics and Actors' Leverage Each Period

Table 6.9: Police Tactics By Actors' Leverage Each Period					
Periods	Actors	Non-Violent Police Tactics	Violent Police Tactics	Total	N
Neoliberal 1997/8	Without Leverage	20%	80%	100%	41
	With leverage	63%	37%	100%	19
	<i>Total</i>	33%	67%	100%	–
	<i>N</i>	20	40	–	60
Crisis 2001/2	Without Leverage	25%	75%	100%	140
	With leverage	67%	33%	100%	24
	<i>Total</i>	31%	69%	100%	–
	<i>N</i>	51	113	–	164
Progressive 2006/7	Without Leverage	23%	77%	100%	92
	With leverage	89%	11%	100%	27
	<i>Total</i>	38%	62%	100%	–
	<i>N</i>	45	74	–	119
Total	<i>Total</i>	34%	66%	100%	–
	<i>N</i>	116	227	–	343
Chi Square: 64.346 p<0.001					
Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.					

The data, thus, seems to provide some support to the weakness theory of protest policing since police appear and use violence against actors with no leverage on most of the occasions (see Table 6.9 above). That is, although police uses violence in response to protests most of the time (66% of the events), police and authorities, would prefer not to use coercion against actors who may have political leverage and/or resources to resist repressive attempts. As Table 6.9 above shows, during the Neoliberal period, actors without leverage at protest events, are subject to violent police tactics 80% of the times, during the Crisis, 75% of the times and 77% of the times during the Progressive administration.

In addition, as the case of Fuentelba in the province of Neuquén described in Chapter 5 showed, the use of violence against teachers—or other actors with leverage—will likely result in additional protests, tension, and discontent in society. Accordingly, open police repression is targeted towards weaker actors—such as those without leverage and politically marginal—since there are better chances that police actions will be successful. I would also add, in the cases in which brutal force is used; there are greater probabilities that police will remain unpunished.

6.5 Weakness Hypothesis

To more formally assess these differences, I conducted a binary logistic regression analysis—the appropriate method to use when there is dichotomous dependent variable. In this case, police use of violence (1=yes, 0=no). To confirm whether protest events composed of unleveraged demonstrators were more likely than other events to be *violently policed* I included the possible determinants of violence discussed in this thesis.

The first set of variables, discussed in Chapter 4, measure protesters' actions at the event.

- The first of these predictors is a dummy variable that measures when protesters *used violent tactics* (yes=1, no=0).
- The second variable (also dichotomous) is an indicator for whether demonstrators destroyed or *damaged public or private property* (cars, buildings, parks, etcetera) during the event.
- The third measure corresponds to the *target* of the protest event. To measure this I include a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 when an event explicitly targets any level (local, provincial, national) or any branch of the Argentine government.

The next two measures are indicators of the identity and characteristics of the demonstrators.

- The fourth variable included measures the participation of protest events composed of marginal demonstrators (Yes=1, No=0). As mentioned earlier, among “marginals” I included people who have temporary, informal, and unprotected jobs; suffer territorial stigmatization and groups—ethnic, religious, minorities—that for different reasons are subject to institutional discrimination and violence such as LGBT groups.
- The fifth predictor measures whether the protesters at the event had political leverage as defined by Schwartz (1976).

The last two measures test dominant theories in the literature on protest policing,

- The sixth of these variables is a dichotomous variable that measures whether arrests took place during the event (Yes=1, No=0) to see the impact it has on police violent behavior.
- The seventh variable measures claims for jobs and welfare benefits as discussed in Chapter 4. Demands for jobs and welfare are coded 1= Yes, 0=No.

I ran a second model in which I added four independent variables and an interaction term. Given the role of unions in Argentina,

- The first variable is a dichotomous indicator that measures the presence of *unions* at the events (Yes=1). Following the case study on chapter 5,¹⁶⁰
- I also include a measure of political tension. Thus, the next variable is a dichotomous variable recording whether the provincial administration was *allied to the president* (national government). The case study presented in Chapter 5 showed that police tactics during a protest event were related to a political conflict between the national and the provincial administrations, which held different political signs and were thus confronted in terms of crime control policies.
- The third and fourth variables included are also dummy variables measuring whether the episodes took place during the 1997/8 Neoliberal period of the

¹⁶⁰ The use of violence by police, I argued in the previous chapter, is connected to political alliances, tensions and disputes between levels of government and factionalism in the same administration.

Carlos Menem presidency and the 2006/7 period of the more progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner.

- The interaction term, marginality by violent tactics, measures whether the combined effect of using violent tactics when actors are marginal is correlated with police use of brutal violence.

Before turning to the analysis of the logistic regression, it is important to remind the reader that two variables often used in the analysis of repression were not included in the analyses due to data limitations. These are presence/absence of counterdemonstrators, and size of the protest event. Please see Chapter 4 for a full explanation.

Table 6.0.10: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of Police Violent Behavior

Table 6.10: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates Of Police Violent Behavior		
	Model 1	Model 2
Violent Tactic (1=Yes)	.000 1.000 (.000)	-.579 .561 (2.612)
Property Damaged (1=Yes)	.351 1.421 (1.703)	.450 1.569 (2.575)
Targeting the Government (1=Yes)	.136 1.146 (.277)	.146 1.157 (.293)
Marginal Protesters (1=Yes)	-.344 .709 (1.894)	-.790** .454 (6.130)
Political Leverage (1=Yes)	-1.249*** .287 (16.653)	-1.382*** .251 (17.674)
Arrests	-.093 .912 (.149)	-.051 .950 (.043)
Demands for Jobs and Welfare	.777*** 2.174 (9.550)	.706** 2.026 (7.114)
Union Presences (1=Yes)		.109 1.115 (.131)
Governor Allied to President (1=Yes)		.123 1.131 (.169)
Neoliberal 1997-1998 period		.756** 2.130 (4.083)
Progressive 2006-2007 period		-.153 .858 (.275)
Marginal by Violent Tactic		1.454** 4.282 (7.344)
-2 Log Likelihood	430.100	414.744
Chi-Square Change	37.685***	52.546***
Cox-Snell R-Square	.105	.143
Nagelkerke R-Square	.140	.191
<p>Notes: The first number is the unstandardized logistic regression coefficient, the second number is the odds ratio, and the third number is the Wald statistic. * Indicates $p < 0.01$; ** indicates $p < 0.05$ and *** indicates $p < 0.001$</p> <p>Source: author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p>		

6.6 Discussion

Table 6.10 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis predicting the use of violent behavior by police at contentious collective action events. The analysis was performed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. In doing so, several diagnostic statistics were calculated to guard against potential violations of logistic regression assumption. First, variance inflation factors scores did not exceed a value of 2.5 for any of the variables, indicating no potential problems with multicollinearity (Allison 1999). Second, there were several outlier events so they were removed and the statistics were carried out again, presenting no problems with outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2006).

As shown in model 1, Table 6.10, a test of the full model with all independent variables against the constant only model was statistically significant, $X^2 = 430.100$, $p < 0.001$, indicating that the predictors, as a set, reliably distinguished police use of violence. The model as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model (i.e., a model with no predictors).

Let us now turn our attention to the independent variables. As anticipated by the contingency tables, I find that claims for more jobs and welfare benefits are statistically related to the likelihood of police using brutal tactics. The regression coefficients for jobs and welfare demands are positive and significant ($b = .777$, Wald 9.550, $p < 0.001$). This means that when protesters are making claims for jobs, better work conditions, better salaries and welfare benefits the odds for police violent response increases.

Furthermore, the data shows that actors' political leverage was significantly related to the likelihood of police using violent behavior. The regression coefficients for political leverage are negative and significant ($b = -1.249$, Wald 16.653, $p < 0.001$). Political leverage is thus negatively associated with police violence at protest events. The odds ratio suggests that groups without political leverage were as much as four times as likely to experience violent repression.

Model 1 indicates no general support for a threat explanation; that is, the forms of actions adopted by demonstrators (the tactics they use, whether they target the

government, or if property was damaged or destroyed) pose a threat to authorities and are not more likely generate a violent response from police.

As was reported in the contingency tables above, we find no support that the condition of marginality in protesters predicts violent police tactics at protest events. This indicates that the events characterized by use of violent tactics were not against marginal actors necessarily but against demonstrators that lacked political leverage.

The presence of arrests was also not significantly related to violent police tactics. This is important because, as was mentioned earlier, in the process of arresting demonstrators police are under more and more observation—and auditing—by lawyers, prosecutors, citizens and the media. In addition, each detainee enters the formal institutional channels and the case is followed up systematically. Furthermore, security forces receive human rights training—in a more systematic system in recent years, mainly after 2001/2—and know they cannot use excessive violence with pacific demonstrators. That is, in the process of arresting a demonstrator, police might be more careful, hence respectful of his or her legal rights.

As mentioned before, I found a correlation between political leverage and violence. Although this could be the norm in most of Argentina, the realities and context of each province—where political factionalism varies—can present variations in which actors are considered to have political leverage or not. The case of schoolteacher Fuentealba, who was killed by police during a roadblock in Neuquén, might indicate that in 2006-2007 the teachers of that province did not have political leverage (or the government was making efforts, as was mentioned in Chapter 5, to demonize them and hence reduce their leverage).

For that reason, **model 2 in Table 6.10** includes the predictor variable Governor Allied to President. While this predictor variable is not significant, the qualitative data presented in Chapter 5 indicated that the political sign of the provincial governor, when in opposition to the national government—the president—mattered in police responses to protest events. This model also includes the independent variable union presence, which could be intimidating to authorities or police. However, the data here indicates union presence in demonstrations is not associated with police violence. Unions,

however, have a history of violence, factionalism, and use of *grupos de choque*¹⁶¹—with the complicity of police and the judiciary—to break protest events (CELS 2012: 293-297). This grey area of the connections between unions, thugs and police requires a different type of study that could not be contemplated in this project but requires further research.

The third and fourth variables included in the second model are period measures. The first is a measure indicating that the episodes took place in the Neoliberal period (1997/8), which corresponds to the years in which structural adjustment policies were implemented and security forces violence was highest. This variable is significantly correlated with police use of violent tactics ($b=0.756$, Wald 4.083, $p<0.05$) confirming the analysis shown in previous sections. That is, in comparison with the other two periods, police was statistically significantly more brutal in 1997 and 1998. The variable for the 2006 and 2007 period is not statistically significant. This shows that the government of Carlos Menem was indeed more violent when responding to protest events. However, the more progressive administration of Néstor Kirchner was not less violent than the governments of the Crisis period in 2001 and 2002—despite Kirchner’s campaign to soften police repression. The results thus demonstrate that police culture determines what they do once they are sent to control a protest event. Consequently, the best that Kirchner’s Progressive government could get without really restructuring the police was to get police sent out to control contention less often—he could not reduce the rate of violence.

As a former National Security Ministry Secretary during Néstor Kirchner’s administration said in an interview,

“Police can negotiate, they know how to. The police chief agrees with protest leaders where they will march, where they will block a road, where they can’t set up a picket, and so on. You see... when this gets out of control is because there was a decision for it to happen. Something I learnt is that if a demonstration gets out of control and there is violence and

¹⁶¹ *Grupos de choque* are groups made up of thugs—often soccer hooligans—who are hired as counterdemonstrators to generate disorder and violence at a protest event. The group often infiltrates a protest disguised as legitimate demonstrators aiming to generate violence and confrontations with police and authorities. An otherwise pacific demonstration becomes very violent. The group of thugs are said to be protected by police who instead use violence against legitimate protesters.

police use ruthless coercion is because they wanted it to happen. Police know how much they can negotiate and with whom they can negotiate or not... ” (Interview, Buenos Aires 2014).

All in all, the inclusion of the predictor variables in Model 2 indicate that the model as a whole fits significantly better than Model 1 ($X^2=414.744$, $p<0.001$). Also included in the model is an interaction term combining violent tactics and marginal actors. That is, because the type of actors organizing the demonstration and their form of action was theoretically expected to have a combined effect in police use of violence, these were included as interaction terms in the logistic regression. The interaction term is positive and significant. The large interaction term in Model 2 records an important pattern with regard to marginal groups demonstrating. Keeping in mind that the overall rate of police violence is high (greater than 60%), we note that when marginal groups do not engage in violence, they are less likely to experience police violence than groups that are institutionally connected. On the other hand, when they do engage in violence, they are far more likely to experience police violence than non-marginals. Non-marginals, on the other hand, are less likely to experience police violence when they are themselves violent. This patterns fits with the analysis offered earlier, that marginal demonstrators are no threat when they are peaceful and therefore do not attract the (violent) attention of the police. On the other hand, institutionally powerful groups are a threat, and therefore are more likely to be subject to police violence. However, when they are themselves violent, then the police risk a huge reaction if they are violent in return. On the other hand, the marginal have no deterrent power, so when they are violent, the police feel free to use violence to suppress the disruption.

These findings support one of the strands of the repression literature that suggests that the weakness of the protesting groups (such as those composed of actors lacking political leverage) is correlated with police repression (Earl 2003; Gamson 1990). This can be exemplified with what became known as the Avellaneda Massacre (*Masacre de Avellaneda*) that took place in June 2002 amid a deep economic and institutional crisis.

During the first months of 2002, the transition government of Eduardo Duhalde¹⁶² was the target of hundreds of the most diverse collective claim making actions. Popular assemblies, soup kitchens, factories recovered by its workers, and other new forms of organizing and mobilizing expanded. Unemployed and picket movements were growing and taking major visibility. The social conflict and institutional crisis affecting the country was accompanied by demands from some sectors of society, and government, for more severe policing and repressive policies towards demonstrations.

In this context, on June 26, a massive national protest was held. There were roadblocks, marches, and rallies in different provinces. Among the demands of the different groups were the regularization of welfare plans, increase in subsidies, the introduction of reduced transportation fares for the poor, housing plans, food for soup kitchens, and the release of *piqueteros* in jail. There were also claims against the government, and its repressive and economic policies. As part of the mobilization, protesters blockaded bridges and highways that connected the Buenos Aires city (Capital Federal) with the province. Yet, the national government had warned demonstration that it would not allow “any attempts at isolating the city.”¹⁶³

Thus, authorities reacted to the event with an extraordinary display of security forces. Near the Avellaneda train station in the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area, federal and provincial police agents, their respective infantry groups, border and coast guard agents, together with specialized task forces showed up to meet the protesters.¹⁶⁴ As the protesters approached the bridge in two large groups, police blocked the passage and a confrontation erupted. Police opened fire—rubber and led bullets—and chased protesters down the streets of Avellaneda. During the shooting, police killed two young

¹⁶² After de la Rúa's resignation in December of 2001, Duhalde –until then a Peronist senator—was appointed President of Argentina by the Legislative Assembly on January 2, 2002. He had the responsibility of a transition administration until general elections were called.

¹⁶³ *La Nación*, July 1, 2002: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/410195-denuncian-a-ruckauf-atanasof-y-matzkin-por-instigacion-a-cometer-delitos>

¹⁶⁴ Reports by social movement organizations also claim that undercover agents and former police agents also showed up .

demonstrators, Maximiliano Kosteki (21) and Darío Santillán (22) Over a hundred more people were injured and over 150 arrested.

Maximiliano Kosteki was an art student who had recently began participating in the social movement organization that had organized the protest. Along with Kosteki and Santillán were more students, unemployed workers and *piqueteros*, all actors who—at the moment—lacked political leverage. Yet, news reports and the participants of the protest indicated that the groups organizing the protest were in the process of acquiring leverage. Popular assemblies, meetings within organizations, debates during roadblocks, and other forms of political activism indicated that groups lacking political leverage were in transformation. In the unemployed movement, there were numerous collectively run, democratically and horizontally¹⁶⁵ organized projects (Sitrin 2012). Picket federations and fronts were expanding geographically and in member numbers, they were becoming—more and more—a threat to the government. The government, in turn, needed to show international lending agencies that it was capable of maintaining order and a disciplined society. Thus, there was a harsh repression of the demonstration. Police responded with ruthless violence to a demonstration by actors lacking political leverage—as the weakness theory argued. It was later known that the use of violent policing tactics had been planned. The use of violence by police was justified claiming that radicalized left wing groups were seeking to question democracy and its institutions¹⁶⁶ and the national government wanted to prevent what they considered would lead to an “escalation of violence” (*La Nación*, June 28th, July 1st 2002).

This incident led then acting President Eduardo Duhalde to advance presidential elections to an earlier date; in addition, dozens of protests events against repression were held all over the country. The governor of the Buenos Aires province at the time, Felipe Solá, in turn, claimed that the provincial police had tricked him. According to

¹⁶⁵ Horizontalidad is a form of direct decision making that rejects hierarchy and Works as an ongoing process (Sitrin 2012: 3).

¹⁶⁶ *La Nación*, July 1st 2002, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/410190-delia-un-sector-de-la-izquierda-se-cree-el-elegido-para-conducir-la-revolucion>, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/410122-denunciaran-un-plan-para-desestabilizar>, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/410125-para-el-gobierno-la-prefectura-no-habria-usado-balas-de-plomo>

the governor, the police acted violently following their own discretionary agenda. Thus, the governor removed the head of the provincial police force and insisted on the civilian control of the police.¹⁶⁷ Again, the policing of the protest that ended in the Avellaneda Massacre provides support for the weakness explanation. According to the protest policing literature, weakness brings repression. For instance, “protests by marginalized groups –such as minorities, religious groups, and the poor– could be considered weaker since subordinate protesters may be perceived as less able to resist repression by police or less able to retaliate politically against repressive policing agencies” (Earl 2003:54).

In the Avellaneda Massacre, the groups lacking structural leverage suffered the most severe coercion. This case also surfaced a political dispute and rivalry among police and authorities. As an outcome of the event, authorities spoke of stricter civilian control of police.

Nevertheless, and in spite of claims for a more democratic policing, different forms of violent repression against groups with no political leverage continued. In June and July of 2002, for example, high school students in Buenos Aires began staging rallies, marches and demonstrations in different parts of the city to demand a reduced bus fare. Although neither police nor authorities were overtly involved in any repression, students were subject to physical violence, harassment, and threats by anonymous persons. A high school student was kidnapped, beaten, and his chest cut with a knife to engrave him with the initials of a paramilitary group that was in functions during the 1970s to kidnap, attack, and murder people who challenged the government. After marking his chest, they told him “you are the first falling piece of a domino, stop make claims in demand of the student fare.” A week later, on July 5th 2002, three high school students were threatened through an anonymous message. The text read, “don’t mobilize or you will have the same fate as the *piqueteros*” (in clear reference of then recently killed Dario Santillán and Maximiliano Kosteki). The threatening messages (by mail and phone), and different forms of harassment to the

¹⁶⁷ Página 12, June 29th, 2002 “Solá pasó a retiro al jefe de la bonaerense pero dejó al segundo“
<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-6950-2002-06-29.html>

students demanding a student fare continued for weeks. Human Rights organizations and left wing parties and social movements joined the students in their protests against repression.

On September 16th, 2002, police set up a large security operation with barricades, hydrant trucks, and hundreds of riot gear police armed with gas launchers during a rally to pay tribute to students that were “disappeared” during the 1976 military dictatorship while demanding a reduced bus fare.¹⁶⁸ The police did not respond with violence but was ready to use all devices against students. Again, protesting students—actors lacking political leverage—who did not engage in violent tactics, and who did not make radical claims, were the targets of policing, providing support to a weakness theory. As table 6.10 above showed, the forms of action adopted by the protesters were not correlated with police use of coercive tactics. Demonstrators’ leverage, however, predict violent police tactics.

6.7 Conclusion

Following the scholarship on protest policing one might expect that in this cycle of protests the use of violent tactics by demonstrators, the large number of people attending the events, their radical claims, or the property damaged would be important factors in determining the use of violence by police. Relatedly, recent social movement research have found support for a variation in the threat model, which suggests that protesting groups’ identity or socio-demographic characteristics may shape repressive tactics (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011). Thus, in this chapter we examined whether the condition of marginality—protesting groups mainly composed of poor, marginal and discriminated groups—would be perceived as threatening and therefore become targets of police violence.

Marginality did not appear as a condition for police violence at protest events in contemporary Argentina. Lack of political leverage did. Actors with no leverage over

¹⁶⁸ *Página 12*: September 17, 2002 “La misma lucha” <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-10299-2002-09-17.html>; *Clarín*, September 17th, 2002, Una marcha a la Plaza de Mayo recordó la Noche de los Lápices <http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2002/09/17/s-02801.htm>

the institutions they were targeting were subject to tougher, more violent responses from police during demonstrations and episodes of contentious collective action. Demonstrators' lacking structural leverage were met with violence, whether or not they were themselves violent. Although not all actors deficient in political leverage are poor or marginal, many are. Furthermore, their claims were mainly for jobs, welfare benefits and other social issues related to the lack of opportunities and deprivation affecting the urban poor in Latin America.

Political alliances or conflicts between administrations were also not significantly correlated with police violence. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, these political clashes and political contexts led authorities and police to perceive specific claims and groups as more or less threatening and use repression accordingly. Yet, these political disputes are so complex that a deeper, more detailed analysis is required to measure them.

Nevertheless, it is clear that police tactics, the use of violence by police during protest events, varies based on who is protesting as well as what is happening in the political scenario between political factions and their positions towards the protests, the claims of the groups, and authorities' agenda.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

On March 24, 2015, about 100 police and members of the National Guard used batons and fired rubber bullets to disperse a group of demonstrators that were staging a sit-in in National Route 81 in the province of Formosa. Agustín Santillán, a member of the *wichí* indigenous community that was demanding for water, housing and respect of their indigenous rights said he received five bullets.¹⁶⁹ The violence by security forces came as thousands of demonstrators in the city of Buenos Aires were staging rallies and marching to commemorate the 39th anniversary of the last military dictatorship.

As the example above illustrates, although the national government had approved in 2011 a *Protocol For The Democratic Performance Of Security Forces At Demonstrations*,¹⁷⁰ interactions between police and demonstrators throughout Argentina could still devolve into lethal violence. The 2011 document stated the criteria for provincial governments when establishing guidelines for police tactics and actions during spontaneous or programmed demonstrations. These recommendations mainly sought to avoid the unnecessary use of coercion and force by police. These were among the most important and innovative policies introduced during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007). Two distinct characteristics of the protocol and the policies introduced included the presence of a civic spokesperson and negotiator at the scene of any conflict, and the prohibition of police carrying fire weapons when attending demonstrations.

Yet, between 2010 and 2015 there were notable instances of excessive use of violence by police during protest events throughout the country, resulting in hundreds of demonstrators arrested, dozens injured, and several others dead. These are the most

¹⁶⁹Newspaper *El Comercial*, March 25th, 2015 “Ingeniero Juarez: aborígenes denuncian heridos con balas de goma en protesta”

http://www.elcomercial.com.ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=166323:ingeniero-juarez-aborigenes-denuncian-heridos-con-balas-de-goma-en-protesta&catid=22:destacada&Itemid=108

¹⁷⁰ Resolución 210/2011 Ministerio de Seguridad de la Nación (Resolution number 210/2011 National Security Ministry). Original name in Spanish: *Criterios mínimos para el desarrollo de Protocolos de actuación de los Cuerpos Policiales y Fuerzas de Seguridad Federales en manifestaciones públicas*.

dramatic symptoms of the uneven implementation of Kirchner's directive. In the provinces of Catamarca, Salta and Jujuy—which had officially adhered to the protocol for democratic policing of demonstrations—security forces nevertheless violated the requirement of no repression of protests events. In the City of Buenos Aires, which did not endorse the directive, the newly created Metropolitan police explicitly violated its guidelines, and regularly applied violent tactics to stop protest events.¹⁷¹

Thus, in most of the country a *negotiated management* style of protest policing was far from the norm. According to this approach, police response to demonstrations is based on cooperation and negotiation between police and demonstrators in an effort to avoid violence. This approach called for the protection of free speech rights, toleration of community disruption, ongoing communication between police and demonstrators, avoidance of arrests, and limiting the use of force to situations where violence was occurring (Schweingruber 2000).

It is also not possible to say that provincial governments in Argentina favor an *escalated force* model of protest policing. As Argentina is a federal country, each province has its own police regulations and has adopted different protest policing strategies. But most, at least formally, endorse the democratic policing stated in the protocol. The escalated force model was the dominant protest policing philosophy in the 1960s to the 1980s in North America. As I mentioned in the introduction, under this style police responses to protest events were characterized by the use of force. That is, any show of force or violence by the protestors was met with overwhelming force in return (McPhail et al., 1998).

Alex Vitale, in his analysis of protest policing in New York City, argued that police have rejected the negotiated management approach to policing in favor of a strict micro-management of demonstrations. He called this approach “command and control”

¹⁷¹ There were numerous cases of excessive, arbitrary police violence between 2010 and 2014 in provinces that signed the protocol for democratic policing in demonstrations. All these episodes ended with several people injured, hospitalized and even deaths were reported. To name a few relevant cases: Mariano Ferreyra (2010, City of Buenos Aires); Indoamericano park (2010, City of Buenos Aires); Environmental groups against mining (January-February 2012, Catamarca); Violent eviction of families (May 7th, 2012, City of Buenos Aires); Roadblock repressed (Salta, August 25th, 2012); Workers repressed (Jujuy, October 17th, 2012); December 2012 lootings and police violence in several parts of the country (20-21 December 2012);

to emphasize the extent to which the police attempt to micro-manage all important aspects of demonstrations in an effort to eliminate any disorderly or illegal activity during the demonstration (Vitale 2005: 287). This approach is different from the negotiated management style because it sets clear and strict guidelines on acceptable behavior with very little negotiation with protest organizers, and there is also little flexibility to changing circumstance during the course of a demonstration, and will frequently rely on high levels of confrontation and force in relation to even minor violations of the rules established for the demonstration (287).¹⁷²

In Argentina, none of these approaches dominates. As I have argued in this dissertation, the use of force by police responds to a combination of intentional political motivations by local or federal authorities and street level police' discretionary power. Unlike the *command and control style*, this is an uncoordinated and lacking of management system of policing. And while the command and control style seeks to avoid the use of force by through planning, police violence in Argentina was high in all periods (66%). Police tactics vary greatly and human rights groups as well as the media have reported episodes of illegal uses of force (such as beating protesters and using fire guns) during demonstrations.

What drives these combinations of political intentions and police discretionary power when responding to a demonstration is, as the literature argued, a threat. However, I believe the concept of threat is in need of a redefinition.

On threat

As I have argued in this dissertation, existing work on the study of protest repression agrees that some features of demonstrations are expected to result in different levels of repression: the level of violence and disruptiveness, the conflict's intensity, the variety of protest strategies (Davenport 1995; Tilly 1978). The more

¹⁷² As Vitale (2005) pointed out this style “does not represent a return to escalated force because it attempts to avoid the use of force through planning and careful management of the protest. When this fails, however, force is used.”(287)

threatening a movement or event, the more likely it is to be the target of some form of protest control. Davenport (2007) states that this *threat approach* is the dominant approach to repression. This threat can be a perception of danger for police, public officials, or corporate/social elites.

Different actors are likely to have divergent ideas of what is threatening. Earl, Soule, and McCarthy (2003) argued that police are more likely to act (and to act in an aggressive manner) when protests are organized, violent, numerous, directly challenging political authorities, and using multiple or innovative tactics. Their calculus rests on assessing the (perceived) threat to police officers. The data collected in this thesis does not allow an assessment of what was *perceived* as threatening by each actor involved in the policing and repression of protest events. However, it is possible to infer that, at their offices, far away from the demonstration, political officials might not feel all that threatened by the protesters' tactics, the number of people, and even some of the violence involved in a demonstration. Instead, for political officials the data indicate that claims for jobs and welfare plans were perceived as threatening. Although not radical in a different context, the demand for jobs and welfare in Argentina might be perceived as representing a failure in economic policies and therefore a failure of the government. Unable to provide solutions, and faced with repeated demands for jobs, unemployment plans, food, and housing, authorities might seek to suppress the expression of these grievances. One method of stopping the articulation of these politically damaging demands is to limit their expression by preventing demonstrations.

A case from 2010 may illustrate this point. On December 3rd, hundreds of families peacefully occupied several hectares of the Indoamericano Park in the Buenos Aires City neighborhood of Villa Soldati in demand of housing.¹⁷³

¹⁷³ “Indoamericano Park is an empty and abandoned lot of land located in one of the poorest parts of the city. It had been abandoned for years... The surrounding neighborhoods have the highest proportions of people living below the poverty line, with the highest recorded rates of overcrowding in the entire city. Some of these neighborhoods are extremely precarious —villas or shantytowns —where homes are built from metal sheets, wood, plastic, and other hazardous materials. Overall, an estimated half million people currently lack adequate housing in Buenos Aires; it was in this context that the decision to occupy the area was made” Repression and Police Violence at Indoamericano Park, in “Take back the streets” Repression and criminalization of protest around the world October 2013, p 23. Accessible from: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/global_protest_suppression_report_inclo.pdf

“We don’t want to create a shantytown, we want decent housing. We want the government to appear and bring water and medical assistance,” said one of the occupiers (*La Nación*, December 10th, 2010)

On December 7th, after four days continuous occupation, a Buenos Aires City judge ordered the eviction of the protestors from the site, classifying it as “unlawful trespassing.” The eviction order was issued at the request of the courts; no notice was given to those occupying the park or to the Public Defender,¹⁷⁴ and there were no attempts at negotiation or dialogue (Inclo 2013:23). Buenos Aires City authorities also refused to establish a dialogue with the occupiers. The next day, 200 Federal and 350 Metropolitan police officers entered the park and violently removed the protesters. The police action resulted in the deaths of two people, with several others wounded by lead bullets.

“Projectiles fired by the police were found across the area. The shots were not fired in isolated incidents, but were instead part of a generalized police response and reflected a level of violence that was sustained throughout the police operation. Despite the elevated level of violence, the attempted eviction failed and the occupation of the park continued” (Inclo 2013: 23).

Yet, the ordeal did not end. On December 9th, a group of men claiming to be residents of the area entered the park and attempted to violently oust the families that continued to occupy the park. These men—believed to be football hooligans hired by political rivals to evict the occupiers and create disorder¹⁷⁵ were carrying fire weapons, metal bars and sticks.

The area was transformed into a battlefield: journalists were threatened by the attackers and forced to leave the vicinity, shots were fired into the park, and ambulances were blocked from entering the area. Several people were wounded by gunshot and one man was killed. Most significantly, at no point did the security forces or the political authorities intervene to stop the violence. (Inclo 2013, *La Nación*,

¹⁷⁴ The Public Defender or Ombudsman is an independent and autonomous public advocate appointed by Congress. It is in charge of representing the interests of the public. See <http://www.dpn.gob.ar/> for more information.

¹⁷⁵ As was mentioned earlier, football hooligans or *barrasbravas* in Argentina are often hired as paid thugs in demonstrations.

Clarín, and *Página 12*, December 9th, 10th, and 11th 2010).

Buenos Aires City government officials were demanding that the President and the National Government intervene and solve the conflict, claiming the city did not have the police capacity required for an intervention:

“The President has to guarantee the security of all its citizens. We urged the president to intervene in the conflict and he did not do it” ... The Buenos Aires City police do not have the operational capacity that is necessary for an intervention” said the Buenos Aires City Security Minister on December 9th, 2010. The Buenos Aires City Mayor also said “the National Government knows perfectly well that the Metropolitan police do not have an infantry corps, which we would need to make an intervention.” He added that together with his ministers they are “trying to have the national government reconsider and provide them with support. I am sure that if this was taking place at another province, then the National Government would provide federal forces to help solve the conflict” (*La Nación*, December 10th, 2010¹⁷⁶)

Again, the National Government was using repression as a political resource. A clear opponent to the National Government, the Buenos Aires City Mayor’s request for help, for federal forces, was initially denied (or not responded). A day later, on December 11th, the National government decided to deploy the national Border Guard to the conflict area. In addition, President Kirchner announced the creation of a new Ministry of Security that would be responsible for civilian control over the federal security forces. Both national and local administrations later announced a housing plan to be implemented by both jurisdictions.

The case of the Indoamericano Park was very meaningful. On that occasion both national and City level governments worked in coordination, together to implement a repression policy... It was not either one of them but both administrations that wanted to end the land occupation at all costs. The occupation had not been organized by a political faction, or a rebellious group, or even by challengers to the

¹⁷⁶ *La Nación*, December 10, 2010: “Otro muerto tras los últimos incidentes en el parque indoamericano”: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1332170-soldati-otro-muerto-tras-los-ultimos-incidentes-en-el-parque-indoamericano>, *La Nación*, December 10th, 2010: “Macri insiste: estamos intentado que el gobierno nacional recapacite” <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1332014-macri-insiste-estamos-intentando-que-el-gobierno-nacional-recapacite>

government. It was a spontaneous mobilization by the community in which impoverished sectors of society were making claims for housing. That's when the state unified to repress. The immediate response was with brutal violence and repression. The outcome? The government did not create a Housing Ministry... they created the Security Ministry (Interview with Umbrella Union Leader for the City of Buenos Aires, August 2014).

As the Umbrella Union Leader said during the interview, the *threat* to authorities was not the violence or the tactics employed by demonstrators but their claims: housing. People in Villa Soldati were exposing their misery, their lack of housing and the government's inability to provide a solution. Thus, the response was an order by a judge to evict the occupiers. As Human Rights Group CELS argued in one of its annual reports (2011), the decision to resort to the courts and police placed the protest within the realm of criminal activity, depicting it as a "security threat." No channels of communication were opened; instead the city's judiciary authorized the repression of the demonstrators without seeking any alternative form of conflict resolution. As CELS reported "dealing with the occupation was left in the hands of the police, who immediately turned to the use of force and neither the judge or prosecutors who ordered the eviction and authorized the use of force established means to control police tactics" (2011: 148). Here, the police responded with violence. Did they feel threatened? Or was the use of violence by police a decision made by the political authorities, since they were the ones who felt threatened?

The case at Indoamericano Park concentrates several of the social problems that affect the City of Buenos Aires, including informal and precarious employment, low salaries and high costs of housing, inadequate housing policies, lack of access to a home for large numbers of the people in the city, and discrimination and exploitation of undocumented immigrants from neighboring countries. The occupants at Indoamericano Park lacked political leverage and could not negotiate with either the local or the national governments. They were a threat to authorities (due to the nature of their claims) and a threat to police because they were not docile and willing to leave the park. Furthermore, the case at the Indoamericano Park also involved *punteros* (patrons) for PRO (the Buenos Aires City political party) and for the national FPV party, which

also generated disputes (for networks, for resources and more). Both the national government (from the FPV-PJ party) and the City government (PRO) wanted to end the occupation of the Indomaericano Park, since this was a manifestation of the failures and lacks in public polices, and growing inequalities.

Furthermore, the population that was subject to violence by police at the Indoamericano Park in 2010 was, five years late, still facing housing and employment problems. Jobless and informal workers, *piqueteros* and other “marginal actors” were still struggling for better work conditions, and for welfare benefits. These groups lacked political leverage to voice their demands. What is more, they met new form of everyday violence: border guards as permanent custodians of their neighborhoods. Since 2011, with the creation of the Security Ministry, the government reinforced border guard patrols stationed in shantytowns.¹⁷⁷

An umbrella union leader with vast experience working in shantytowns –he created and runs a high school for underprivileged youth and young adults– during an interview argued,

The marginals in Argentina now live in ‘open pit jails.’ Poor people work in their poor neighborhoods, must use the medical attention provided in their neighborhoods, and children must attend those schools.... They are true ‘poverty jails’ surveilled by the border guard. The border guard is at the frontier of the neighborhood making sure that the poor don’t leave and try to use services outside the shantytowns. The children cannot attend a public school or a hospital outside the shantytown.... It’s a state policy” (Interview with umbrella union leader, August 2014).

Thus, the social, economic and political context of contemporary Argentina results in different forms of threat to authorities, political/economic elites, and police. As the literature suggests, there is a threat. Yet, this threat also seems to be an expression of inequalities and class struggles. Authorities and those in positions of

¹⁷⁷ Since 2003, the border guard has been providing police services in several shantytowns of the City of Buenos Aires and Buenos Aires province. The border guard acts in jurisdictions of the Federal and Provincial police and takes police functions. Currently, in 2014, the border guard is in charge of policing the South Belt Operation (Operativo Cinturón Sur) in the City of Buenos Aires, the Sentinel Operation (Operación Centinela) in the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area and other “operations” in poor neighborhoods and shantytowns of Buenos Aires police and Federal police. In all of these, border guard officers provide policing functions.

power feel threatened by alliances of poor, unemployed, marginalized sectors of society. In this line, repressive responses in a democracy are designed to maintain the status quo. Limitations to movement organization and citizens' mobilization are designed to maintain elites in power. These limitations include regulations and legislations that restrict and criminalize protests,¹⁷⁸ harassment of activists and movement leaders, preemptive arrests, border guard and maritime police in shantytowns and poor neighborhoods, and the government's denial of unemployment, and poverty growing indicators.¹⁷⁹

Other Forms of Repression

All during this thesis, data showed that police in Argentina responded to protest events with violence and this was not usually correlated with the use of violent tactics by demonstrators. Police violence has been condemned and criticized by all sectors of society, and the government has launched a democratic protocol for the policing of demonstrations. Parallel to this, security forces have also been carrying out other 'covert' forms of repression to control protest activity, including intelligence operations such as the surveillance and infiltration of organizations.

In November 2011, a group of progressive lawyers and human rights groups presented a formal complaint against the National Border Guard for confirming that this security force had been conducting espionage and intelligence actions on social movement organizations, union workers, students, human rights activists and other challengers to the government (*Clarín*, February 24th, 2012, March 5th and March 10th, 2013).¹⁸⁰ As result of these covert forms of repression—which are prohibited by

¹⁷⁸ *La Nación*, May 21st, 2014: "Buscan un consenso para avanzar con la regulación de los piquetes" <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1693136-buscan-un-consenso-para-avanzar-con-la-regulacion-de-los-piquetes>

¹⁷⁹ Since 2007, the government of Argentina has been accused of manipulating the data of the country's Statistic Agency (INDEC). Leading economists, consumers' group and even INDEC's own employees have accused the government of manipulating inflation figures, and INDEC has also stopped publishing poverty and indigence statistics, the calculation of which depends in part on inflation numbers. The statistics agency claims this is due to severe methodological problems.

¹⁸⁰ *Clarín*, February 24th, 2012 "Garré sobre el Proyecto X: no es un plan secreto de espionaje" http://www.clarin.com/politica/Garre-Proyecto-plan-secreto-espionaje_0_652134970.html, *Clarín*,

Argentina's legislation—the border guard had been gathering evidence to criminalize and conduct preemptive arrests on movement leaders, factory workers, students, neighborhood organizers, and left wing activists.¹⁸¹

The information collected included complete intelligence databases of activists and organizers, with their addresses, type of social activities they conducted, social movement organization in which they participated, places where they met, and information on their organizing skills and number of people they could mobilize. One of the reports included very specific information of unions, such as the names of members that belonged to the more radical faction and the more conciliatory members (*Clarín*, March 5th, 2013.) The reports, however, did not have any information that might connect the activists mentioned with any form of criminal activity. Overall, the intelligence databases did not contain any information that could be of interest to Justice thus justifying a need for spying these people.

In 2012 the chief of the border guard acknowledged the existence of the Project X (Proyecto X), a database of intelligence files on people—union, movement, and political leaders—and over 1000 organizations created through illegal surveillance and the infiltration of undercover agents in demonstrations, assemblies and other non-violent activities (*Clarín*, February 24th, 2012).¹⁸² A year later, in May 2013, human rights groups discovered that an undercover agent from the Federal Police had infiltrated a social movement organization (Agencia Walsh) over a period of eleven years. During a press conference, movement leaders said “this confirmed the existence of a structure to infiltrate and spy on grassroots organization ... and we demand that the

March 5, 2013 “Se confirma que Gendarmería espía a dirigentes sociales”

<http://www.clarin.com/gobierno/Proyecto-X-Gendarmeria-Espionaje-0-877112428.html>, *Clarín*,

March 10, 2013 “Proyecto X: Cómo espía la Gendarmería a más de mil organizaciones”

<http://www.clarin.com/zona/espio-Gendarmeria-mil-organizaciones-0-880112088.html>

¹⁸¹ In Argentina, intelligence activities are regulated by National Legislation 25.520, which in its article 4 states that intelligence gathering and policing are only permitted in the context of criminal investigations, when the people involved have broken the law, and under strict judiciary order, authorization, and control.

¹⁸² For a detailed report on the Project X see: *La Vaca*, July 13, 2013 “Proyecto X reúnen pruebas para acusar a seis trabajadores por reclamar sus derechos”

<http://www.lavaca.org/notas/criminalizacion-proyecto-x-pruebas-acusar-trabajadores/>

government release the list of organizations and people under surveillance, and that it reveal the names of all infiltrators.”

Project X and the infiltrated undercover agents demonstrate that intelligence-gathering for the control and policing of demonstrations continued through at least 2015 in Argentina. It is a complex and controversial form of protest policing that requires the synergy of different state agencies to command and control the operations. Unlike the mobilization of security forces, and their use of violent force to repress challengers of the state, this type of covert repression shows, again, that protest policing is not only reactive—in response to a threat—but also proactive. Intelligence gathering is used to control protests by criminalizing organizations, activists and protesters and hence limit their possibility of action.

Range of responses to protest

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I detailed the variety of police responses to protest events that appeared in the daily editions of *Clarín* newspaper and that made up the main database for this study. In the table below I summarize different responses to contentious collective action events drawn from the dataset, secondary sources, and observations

Table 7.0.1: Typology of State Responses To Contentious Collective Action Events

Table 7.1 Typology Of State Responses To Contentious Collective Action Events		
Form	Description	Example
Police presence and legal control (visible actions are within the law. Arrests are included)	One form in which security forces respond to protests is by displaying their strength at a demonstration (and also in anticipation of the event) with police vehicles, riot gear, dogs, horses, helicopters and other equipment that produce an intimidation effect. It could be argued that such massive displays of force could deter peaceful participants of protest events from attending. Potential demonstrators might feel reluctant to exercise their right to demonstrate for fear.	Newspapers mention the protest gathering had “strong police presence” (<i>fuerte operativo policial</i>). In addition to the appearance of numerous agents from different forces and divisions, this includes the display of special clothing, vehicles and gear in a delimited area.
Police use of violence	Riot police, National Border Guard, other specialized forces, and/or ordinary policemen appear to monitor and control a demonstration employing violent tactics. The variation in police violence ranges from pushing and forcing protesters to more brutal demonstrations of force such as firing rubber bullets or tear gas.	Newspapers often report that there was a “confrontation” (<i>enfrentamiento</i>) or a “violent exchange” between demonstrators and police. This form of presenting the incident is used to justify police brutality.
Espionage - Infiltrations	Use of state security officers as undercover agents to infiltrate demonstrations, protest events, and workers unions and movements to gather intelligence data. Officers from the National Border Guard and Federal Police have recently been “discovered” as infiltrators.	In 2011 several Human Rights Organizations (CORREPI, CeProDH, Asociación Ex Detenidos y Desaparecidos, Madres de Plaza de Mayo) presented legal actions and a public denunciation accusing the National Border Guard of conducting illegal surveillance and espionage of Kraft Foods factory workers. Border Guard agents infiltrated workers meetings disguised as fellow workers or journalists and recorded, took notes and pictures of delegates and activists planning collective actions. The claimants found that Border Guard agents had presented the government with information about who was in charge of

		leading a mobilization; who organized and directed a specific roadblock and other data. ¹⁸³
Criminalization (judicialization of protests and protesters) Pre-emptive repression	Use of the penal or criminal code to restrict protest events. According to the Encuentro, Memoria, Verdad y Justicia 2012 report ¹⁸⁴ , there are over 4000 persons in Argentina criminalized and judicialized for their active participation in social protests. The criminalization of protesters may also involve arresting and incarcerating organizers and activists before a protest event and releasing them once the protest has ended.	On the 21 st of March of 1997 around 300 people from different organizations blocked the Argentine national route 237 near the city of Bariloche in the province of Río Negro to protest salary cuts and in defense of public education. As a result of the demonstration a federal judge convicted a teacher, Marina Schifrin that had taken part in the protest to three months in prison as co-author of the crime of impeding and obstructing the normal circulation of the means of transport by earth and air. In addition, the federal judge decided that she had to abstain from participating in concentrations of people in the public sphere ¹⁸⁵ . With this decision, the Court imposed a restriction to human rights –in this case the right of gathering and making claims to authorities in association with the freedom of expression– and to democracy.
Intimidation, harassment of protesters, leaders and opposition journalists	Still in need of research and systematization, state forces have also been known for using direct threats and intimidations to repress mobilization and anyone considered a challenger to the state. These include threatening messages by email and phone. Or painted graffiti found at activists homes or organizations;	For years, residents of La Leonesa in the province of Chaco have been denouncing the health consequences of agrochemicals used in the rice plantations. In 2009, official statistics confirmed that in one decade cancer in children had tripled and newborn malformations had increased by 400 percent. Thus, the families affected invited two prominent

¹⁸³ For information on the accusation and forms in which the Border Guard operated see <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1449741-indicios-de-que-el-proyecto-x-tomaba-como-delito-las-protestas>, <http://opinion.infobae.com/myriam-bregman/2013/03/13/a-que-fines-sirve-el-espionaje-ilegal/>; <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-215708-2013-03-13.html>, http://www.clarin.com/gobierno/Proyecto_X-Gendarmeria-Espionaje_0_877112428.html

¹⁸⁴ 2012 Informe sobre Criminalización de la Protesta: Asociación de Ex-Detenidos Desaparecidos – AEDD, Asociación de Profesionales en Lucha – APEL, Centro de Abogados por los Derechos Humanos –CADHU, Centro de Profesionales por los Derechos Humanos – CEPRODH, Coordinadora Antirrepresiva por los Derechos del Pueblo – CADEP, Coordinadora contra la Represión Policial e Institucional – CORREPI, Liberpueblo

¹⁸⁵ CELS cases “Amicus curiae contra la criminalización de la protesta social – Caso Marina Schifrin”; <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/las12/13-1254-2004-06-11.html>

	<p>suspicious break-ins or damages to cars and property belonging to social movement organizers; persecutions and attacks to leaders and reporters. Harassment and intimidation may also involve the closure of organizing spaces, resource restriction to social movement organizations, or the confiscation of materials. Activists have also mentioned strict book keeping auditing as a form of coercion and intimidation.</p>	<p>scientists to give a talk on the consequences of agrochemicals, but a group of thugs attacked and threatened the participants of the talk. The scientists were also threatened and intimidated¹⁸⁶ and, for days, agrochemical companies, business chambers and some state officials discredited their work. In an open letter, the scientific community came forward to denounce this intimidation. Similarly, teachers' union reported that education workers who were supporting the complaints of the neighbors affected by the agrochemicals were attacked and threatened the days immediately after the frustrated talk by the scientists.</p>
<p>Public condemnation</p>	<p>Vilification or denigration of protests and protesters to legitimize repressive actions. That is, government and media (or through media) characterize challengers and their forms of action as violent, disruptive, in charge of commencing disturbances and even criminal acts (Rodríguez 2004) to justify imprisonment and use of violence.</p>	<p>As Artese (2006) clearly illustrates in his description of the 1997 massive teachers' protests in the province of Neuquén, the government here accused protesters of being un-stabilizers and a threat to social order. Through press releases in the media, the governor and other high rank ministers' depicted demonstrators as left-wing radicals seeking conflict rather than a legitimate claim. In addition to arresting protesters, during these protests in 1997 the government began to stigmatize the teachers and other groups participating in the demonstrations as subversives, proto-revolutionaries, and violent (Artese: 13-15). <i>"Piquetero</i> became a synonym of crime, vandalism, laziness, unjustified claims, paid political activism, pushing others rights around and so on. Protest events were socially and politically dangerous, and those who make claims and protest</p>

¹⁸⁶ <http://darioaranda.wordpress.com/2009/05/11/un-apoyo-a-la-libertad-de-investigacion/>

<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-151481-2010-08-17.html>

were positioned opposite to the interests of democracy” (Artese 2006: 17).

Gray zone of Clandestinity and use of thugs (such as soccer hooligans) to create chaos and violence

The gray zone refers to the domains between insurgents, state agents (including police), and party activists that are deeply intertwined. It refers to the boundaries between the “protest side” and the “repression side” or between institutional and non-institutionalized politics that are not always clear and actors intersect and connect in clandestinity (Auyero 2007). Thus, it involves the occasions in which state forces also take part in the direct promotion of mobilization and /or the perpetration of collective violence and repression.

Also, government officials might hire thugs (such as soccer hooligans) to detonate collective violence and legitimize repression.

The case of the Indoamericano Park in 2010 exemplifies this form of protest repression. During this episode, thugs and undercover police agents with well-known connections to the political power used violent methods to remove squatters from a land occupation.

In December 2010, in the Indoamericano Park in the City of Buenos Aires, collective violence was activated by obscure connections between government agents, police, thugs and neighbors who wanted an end to the occupation.

Outcomes

This dissertation has examined episodes of collective claim making that involved the presence and action of police. The interactions between demonstrators and police, as well as interactions with state officials, the media and other non-interested parties, yielded different outcomes. Occasionally, the grievances and claims presented were responded to by the corresponding authority and solved. On other occasions, the government made promises that it would “look into the matter” but no effective resolution was found. Other times, police used violence to end the demonstration and protesters were arrested. Most often, the protest event continued and the underlying problems remained unresolved. In many cases, therefore, another protest (probably with different or new performances) was held or scheduled to take. The table (7.2) shows the outcomes of the events by period.

Table 7.0.2: Protests Outcomes By Period

Table 7.2: Protests Outcomes By Period					
Outcome	Period			Total	N
	Neoliberal 1997/8	Crisis 2001/2	Progressive 2006/7		
Issue/claim solved positively ¹	0%	1%	2%	1%	4
Partial positive resolution ²	12%	16%	19%	17%	57
Protest continues – ongoing ³	38%	44%	37%	41%	140
Issue/claim solved negatively ⁴	22%	10%	19%	15%	51
Partial negative resolution ⁵	0%	0%	3%	1%	3
Escalation of conflict ⁶	28%	28%	21%	26%	88
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	–
N	60	164	119	–	343

Chi square 16.435, p<0.01

Note:

1. Issue solved positively means that the claim put forward by demonstrators was taken care of or the request moves forward. For example, during a teachers’ mobilization for pay hikes, the corresponding authority (such as the Education Minister) announces that education workers will receive the requested hike.
2. Partial positive resolution means that authorities answer the claim favorably, even if the issue is not totally solved. For example, authorities accept to meet with protesters and discuss possible solutions to the grievance.
3. Protest continues means that after the protest event, the protesting group is set continue with claim until further notice. Also, that there is no response from target and protesters will continue the collective claim making actions.
4. Issue solved negatively means that claim is not met and target decides to punish protesters. For example, instead of giving a salary increase, government reduces financial aid to teachers or cuts teachers’ bonus from salary for going on strike.
5. Partial negative resolution means that only a limited aspect of the grievance is addressed and the response is not favorable. For example, instead of granting teachers a salary increase, the government decides to postpone the construction of new schools.
6. Escalation of conflict means that the protest event ends with a new conflict; a division or rupture within the groups that formed an alliance to protest; or violence. Violence includes arrests, police coercion, violence by counterdemonstrators, and confrontations between protesters and authorities and protesters and police.

There are several findings to mention as a result of the contentions collective action events. First, nearly half of the protest events analyzed in this dissertation (41%) did not culminate the date in which they took place, but continued. This means that authorities –or whoever was the target of the claim– did not respond to demonstrators on the day the event took place and the protest continued. It is possible that new actions were held and different actors joined the contentious collective action episodes, and that these were held at new locations. This

number was highest during the Crisis period when 44% of the contentious actions did not find a solution.

Second, as a result of the protest events and the appearance of police, in all of the years covered by this dissertation, a large number of the contentious episodes resulted in an escalation of violence (26%): arrested demonstrators, confrontations between protesters and police, and broken or damaged property.¹⁸⁷ In these instances, collective claim making was not effective. It is particularly noteworthy that this escalation did not increase during the crisis period, and remained very high (21%) during the Kirchner administration, which set policies to de-escalate violence.

Third, there were very few episodes with a positive solution as a result, though some had a partial positive resolution such as a response by authorities to meet with demonstrators and open a dialogue. Other positive responses include a promise by political leaders to attend to the claim. Examples of these are the resignation of a politician or a police chief when protesters were demanding for justice or the end to police brutality. Another example of a positive but partial solution is the delivery of food by a supermarket chain to protesters demanding food. Lastly, a considerable number of the events were solved negatively. This number is highest during the Neoliberal period in 1997 and 1998 (22%), drops in 2001/2 (10%) but is back up in 2006/7 during the Progressive administration (19%). Undesirable results to a collective claim making event included a) government penalties such as budget cuts due to institutional instability, reduction in financial aid to social movement organizations, or workers have days on strike discounted from pay check, b) conflicts or divisions in the sector that protests, c) justice/courts force the end of the event, d) more repression. Put differently, negative resolutions included—but were not limited to—repression. As a consequence of the protest event, demonstrators were arrested, a judge order the eviction of a roadblock or the immediate end to a protest such as deployment of more or different security forces.

All in all, in addition to the outcomes of the event, did police deter protesters from organizing and participating in other events? Or, far from that, there was an increase in mobilizations and general contention? That is a question to explore with further research that

¹⁸⁷ Since the events contemplated in this dissertation all had police presence, there is a possible bias here of more violent outcomes reported.

leads to other items that can be analyzed in future investigations.

Future Research

There are several useful lines of future research seeking to address some of the limitations of this work, and extend its central ideas. First, I think future research on the study of protest policing and repression should contemplate ways of studying the forms of action, tactics, and intentions of *counterdemonstrators*. As Davenport and his colleagues have pointed out, the presence of counterdemonstrators increases the probability of conflict at an event because of the potential for hostile interactions between them and protesters. This increases the level of threat to police and, in turn, the likelihood of repression (2011). The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that counter demonstrators play a key role in the production of collective violence and repression, but without direct evidence these suggestions cannot be confirmed.

As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the use of thugs –private shock squads– by the government is not a new form of repression. Since the beginning of the twentieth century in Argentina, protests and protesters have been monitored and controlled by disguised policemen and thugs. Counterdemonstrators hired by authorities and elites to clandestinely repress workers are documented in several episodes. Groups such as the Liga Patriótica Argentina in 1919, the Legión Cívica Argentina in 1930, and other groups in the 1970s used violence to attack unions, left-wing groups, anarchists and other groups that sought progressive policy reforms or challenged the government. Similarly, during the period of this research, workers, students and activists were the targets of thugs during demonstrations. As was reported in previous chapters, on occasions, police agents allowed thugs to attack protesters. Government agents may have hired these thugs, but eluded any responsibility in the repression. The logic is that if state agents (police, judiciary) did not take part in the repression, then the government had no involvement in it. This indirection works well for progressive administrations, which are discursively opposed to any form of protest repression. According to María del Carmen Verdú, “what characterizes private repression (gangs, thugs) in Kirchner’s time is their use not as a supplement or an accessory of the formal repressive apparatus but, on occasions, as its direct replacement” (Verdú 2009: 197). During interviews, activists spoke of an “outsourcing of repression” during the Progressive administration as street gangs linked to hooliganism (*barrasbravas*) were organized

and manipulated by political brokers or union bureaucrats to generate violence or disrupt protests. The reasoning is that if those who attack protesters or initiate violence are not policemen or state security officers, then the government and the media can blame conflict provocateurs or the use of confrontational tactics by protesters as the initiators of the riot. Thus, the dynamics, consequences, and causes of this type of repression are sorely in need of further research.

Future research on the study of protest policing should also pay close attention to *diffusion* in security and policing tactics and methods. The implementation of the protocol for democratic policing in Argentina was a new innovation at the time of this research; the new developments and reactions to it that emerged in subsequent years are worthy of attention. As Wood (2014) and Saín (2008) explain—and this thesis has documented—the hierarchical structure of police organizations can resist the incorporation of innovations. “Others have argued that because police organizations remain both largely autonomous from outside actors, and bounded by their political regime, they are less likely to consider ideas from outside themselves” (Wood 2014: 18). Both democratic policing and its contrapositive, militarized protest policing, were tactics worthy of analytic attention with regard to the process of diffusion.

In the Argentine case, it will be important to look at the variation across provinces in the diffusion of innovation—militarized or democratic. Since the national government and the provincial administrations have different political configurations, negotiation, capacities, political alignments, may impact both protest policing decisions and the diffusion of innovation. And, as Behrend (2011) argued, there are subnational authoritarian regimes with small populations, limited economic structure, and ‘closed games’ in which a family, or a group of families, dominates politics in a province, controlling access to top government positions, the provincial state, the media, and business opportunities” (2011: 153). These local elites may institute idiosyncratic forms of administering protest policing. Thus, the diffusion of protest policing policies might vary based on the history of local forces and their legitimacy levels, the interactions with local elites and protesters, but also based on the way public order episodes are handled in each locality.

This connects directly to another line of future research, which is related to the *consequences or the effects of police violence and repression* on mobilization. Does the use of

violence by police decrease mobilizations, enhance mobilization, or lead to new forms of mobilization? As social movement scholars have pointed out (Hess and Martin 2006; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) the use of repression during protest events can become a transformative event either by increasing the costs of mobilizing or by leading to greater mobilization. But the studies that address this question tend to concentrate on the quantitative aspects of repression: whether protest increases or decreases. They do not address the concomitant transformation of the movement. Of particular importance is the impact of repression on the identities of the protestors and protest groups. We observed in this study that a student who was arrested for participating in a university occupation could later take part in a march of unemployed workers. We need to query the mechanisms at work here, and, in particular, whether the arrest (or other repression) was instrumental in extending the student's identity to encompass workers. Similarly, if police brutality is targeted to certain populations (such as racial minorities), how do these make sense of their identity, their race, their class to continue mobilizing? Once they know that, as part of a specific group, they are a threat to police or authorities, what drives them to continue mobilizing?

In spite of the different types of data collected in this dissertation, it is still very difficult to determine when and if the police respond to a threat directed toward them or toward the state's interest. That is, are the actions by security forces complementary or contradictory with the interests of state authorities? Previous research has established a connection between police action and government interests, with police compliant with decisions made by political leaders (della Porta and Fillieule 2004, Ayoub 2010). However, as I have shown here, that connection is far more complex, and that police actions are often expressive of their own dynamics, even when it is contradictory to government policy. Thus, although state security agents, as police officers, represent the state, it is paramount that future studies analyze in greater detail the differences between *state repression and police repression*.

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Appendix A

Qualitative Data Collection

Interviews And Informal Conversations

Year	Pseudonym	Occupation
2012	Mario	Journalist (national social conflicts and general news reporter since 1990s)
	Verónica	Researcher-activist member of human rights NGO
	Mariela	Researcher-activist member of human rights NGO
2013	Hernán	Buenos Aires province State Prosecutor (active since 1990s)
	Eduardo	Corporate Affairs and Media Manager for large supermarket chain (hipermercado) during Menem and Kirchner's administrations.
	Florencia	Volunteer activist for Human Rights Group. Former Student Activist.
	Roberto	Former National Security Ministry Secretary during Néstor Kirchner's administration
	Miguel	Former National Interior Ministry Advisor and Security Ministry Agent
	Diego	Leader of Umbrella Union and former student activist
	Gabriel	National Security Ministry agent
	Cecilia	National Security Ministry agent and NGO researcher
	Juan	Student and Volunteer activist for Human Rights Group
	2014	Eduardo 2
Julia		Journalist
Carla		Lawyer-Activist and former student activist
Ernesto		Federal Police chief and director. Former infantry officer during 1990s and 2000s
Claudio		Federal Police officer
Marcela		Federal Police agent
Guillermo		Provincial State Prosecutor and Former Provincial Secretary of Security during Menem's and Kirchner's administration
Adrián		Left wing and human rights activist

Most interviews were in-depth, open-ended interviews purposefully guided by a set of topics. Except for a few of them, most interviews were not recorded upon request of the interview subjects.

Interview topics

All interviews were conducted in Spanish. Questions were open-ended and in-depth although they also had a semi-structured or guided format to cover the relevant themes, but always leaving room for the emergence of opinions, and spontaneous reactions. I used two different guides: one for activists, protest organizers, leaders and union members and another guide for police officers, prosecutors, state agents who worked in protest control. I combined questions from both guides for journalists and academics.

Guide 1: For protesters

- ***Background information:*** time in movement, reasons to participate in movement (why did he/she joined movement or protest event), recent history of movement and relationship with other SMOs, how protest events are prepared and staged, number and type of protests attended. What violent episodes or police interactions do you recall as demonstrators or activist?
- ***General Policing Issues***
What are the ways that police control protests, ways that authorities control protests. How do police and or authorities control general dissent? On what occasion or circumstances they believe the movement is policed, observed, controlled?
- ***About police and authorities:*** opinions, thoughts, ideas regarding security forces, police officers and control agents. Types of interactions that he/she (and social movement organization) has had with security forces. Do you think police have biases towards certain demonstrators and groups? Explain. Are police more violent or use more of their discretionary power towards certain protesters?

- **Regulations:** your rights with regards to protesting; what are the laws and regulations police most often use to control demonstrators. What legislations do police /authorities use to arrest, detain protesters.
- **At protest events (during demonstrations):** describe general police procedures at protest events. When do police appear? When do other state agents appear (judges, for example). What is their mode of action when they appear? When are fences, barriers and other types of measures used? What type of actions do police initiate to control protest events. What types of police tactics do they use to end a protest event when they receive an order. On what occasions, do police resort to vehicles, weapons, dogs, horses? When do they use other violent methods? What actions do you (and movement) take to prevent violence? Do you meet with police or state officials before, during the protest to negotiate where to march or host the protest? Do police act differently if the protest is in the City's downtown or in an isolated far-away location? How?
- **Covert control:** what does police do to control you or your movement? Do you think police or authorities spy you or anyone you know in your movement? Does police seek to reduce the number of protests you stage? How? With what means? How do you resist this control? Does police keep a record of protest events? Where, who keeps this? Where or to whom do you complain or place a denunciation/complaint on police abuse?

Guide 2: For state agents, security forces staff

- **Background information:** how long he/she has been in such function, what he/she did before, type of training, how he/she joined their workplace. In what protests, events have you worked/attended and in what functions. Recent history and structure of agency where he/she works.
- **General Security and Control issues:** what are the forms in which violence is prevented during mobilizations. How do you control without inciting violent reactions? What are the specific groups or units that attend protest events and how is their training different?
- **About Protesting Groups, Social Movement Organizations:** Perceptions regarding protesters and protests. Degree of threat. Relationship between police and different protesting groups. Are demonstrators different? How? Do you keep a classification of type of people that attend protests? (Students, pensioners, human rights activists, etc). How do you prepare for a protest organized by unemployed or students and a protest by teachers? Are there specific groups that are more prone to violence than others? What

criteria determines whether a group is or might be violent or not. What are the procedures for controlling these groups?

- **Regulations:** what laws, protocols, documents, and/or regulations that regulate your work during demonstrations. How do regulations play before, during and after the demonstration?, how have regulations with regards to protest events changed since you are working in this? How are regulations different if the demonstration is planned or spontaneous? How do you learn about regulations for controlling protests and preventing violence. What do legislations say to prevent violence? What legislations regulate the gathering of information about protests and protesting groups?
- **At protest events (during demonstrations):** How do you arrive to a demonstration? When and who decides how many policemen, what rank, and what type of equipment to bring to a demonstration (from fences and barriers to dogs, horses and water tanks). What types of orders do you receive before and during the event? From whom? What actions do you take to prevent violence? Do you meet with protest organizers before the protest? How do you learn about the protest event that will be held? Once you arrive at the protest, what are the protocols, the organization of police officers? What happens if there are disturbances or if a protest event turns violent? What happens if a demonstrator attacks (pushes, throws rocks, hits,) a policeman? How differently do you prepare or plan your actions depending on the location of the protest event? What changes if the protest is in the City's downtown area or a more rural or isolated location?
- **Covert control:** what type of information do you collect about protest events, social movement organizations, protesting groups and demonstrators. How do you collect these information? Do you keep records of demonstrations? Who keeps this information?

On many occasions, interviewees did not answer questions from the complete guide. Both protesters and state agents at times refused to talk about specific themes

Appendix B

Newspaper Data Collection

1. CODEBOOK GUIDE

General Guidelines for Entering Newspaper Information into Codesheets¹⁸⁸

This section summarizes the collection and coding guidelines used in the NSF project on protest events in Argentina between 1997 and 2007. We begin by defining what is considered a protest event and how coders should introduce the information from the newspapers into the codesheets. We describe the procedures used for selecting, reading, entering the information from the daily editions of *Clarín* newspaper into the codesheets and saving the data. Finally, we summarize the procedures, definitions and rules for coding protest events in an item-by-item format.¹⁸⁹

- To consider what is an event, we use Charles Tilly's definition of discontinuous contentious collective action (please see *The Contentious French*), those occasions where people act together on their interests in ways that visibly and significantly affect other people's interests. Discontinuous, contentious collective action always involves third parties, often poses threats to existing distributions of power, and usually incites surveillance, intervention, and/or repression by political authorities.
- There has to be a minimum of three people for an event to become "collective". Example: a hunger strike of three people; a group chained to a wall claiming something. One person chained to a wall is not considered to be a protest event in our study.
- If one single newspaper article describes several protests by different actors or in different locations, each of these protests are separate events. This is the case in which different people gather at the same time in different places. They are different contentious gatherings. Example: one news report about pickets in Mendoza, Jujuy and Neuquén (three provinces in Argentina). These are three separate gatherings and therefore should be coded separately. In the comments section, the coder should mention that they are reported in the same piece of news item. The exception to this rule is when two protests take place at the same time in two different places but are coordinated by the same group of people (not same organization but the same persons), have the same target, and same claims. For example, a group of taxi drivers organize a blockade in two different corners of the same city. This is considered to be one event.

¹⁸⁸ Basic guidelines used in the NSF Project (Award 0739217) for coding newspaper information. Each item in the code sheet is explained in detail.

¹⁸⁹ This document was given and explained in detail to all the coders who participated in the project.

- All coding has to be done in Spanish.
- Coders should code all episodes of collective action that appear in the printed version of the newspaper. "Last minute" or "breaking news" (Ultimo Momento) that appear in the digital version of the newspaper are excluded. Please check all sections to be sure that you are not missing any events.
- All the coding is based on the information published in each specific newspaper. We do not imply or deduce information or make our own assumptions.
- Announcements of future/planned events or "forthcoming" events are excluded. These articles should be saved in a separate folder labeled XXXX(year) FORTHCOMING.
- When the newspaper article clearly says that the event has ended, be sure to check the box 'event closed' in the upper right corner of the form. We store events that according to the newspaper article are still open at a separate folder (OPEN EVENTS FORWARD) until they are closed. Once you close them, move the file to the coding folder. If by the end of the month you are coding, there is no information on whether the event is still going on, use your criterion to determine if you should close it or not.
- When an event/episode ends but there is a group in dissent who decides to continue with the protest, the coder should start this protest as a new event (in the comments section of the new event mention that it is connected to a prior one that has been closed). Example: group of teachers that are protesting and end protest when the government raises their salaries. A group of the teachers dissents and decides to continue protesting. The latter becomes a new event.
- The presentation of petitions or collected signatures is contentious politics. The number of people signing the petition is the number of participants in the event. Regular meetings and judicial demands are excluded.
- Every time we have no information for a specific item in the codebook, we use SD: *sin datos* (No Data) to make sure that we are not accidentally leaving the space blank. Exceptions to this rule are items 11, 15, 17, 18, and 19, which you can leave blank if not applicable.
- Coders should keep a copy of each of the newspaper articles coded in a folder labeled XXXX(year) NEWSPAPER ARTICLES.
- Coders should save all coding sheets in the folder labeled XXXX(year) CODING.
- Coders should save all other articles related to protests that may be interesting to read in the folder labeled XXXX(year) OTHER INTERESTING ARTICLES.

- If the coder finds a protest that is taking place in another country by protesters of the country you are coding, you shouldn't code it as a new event, but save the article as 'OTHER INTERESTING ARTICLES'. However, if these same groups are also protesting in the country you are coding, please be sure to mention in the COMMENTS section that they are also engaging in TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST.
- If an article mentions a protest that appears to have started before the period you are coding, you should code it and save it on a separate folder "OPEN EVENTS BACKWARDS".
- Every time the coder starts coding a new year, or a new period, the coder should first check if another coder has coded the period right before yours, and read the last two weeks of coding, as well as the "OPEN EVENTS FORWARD" folder, to be sure that you have all the necessary information to code your period. The same procedure has to be taken when you are ending a period: be sure to check the folder "OPEN EVENTS BACKWARDS" of the immediate following period, to be sure that you are not coding the same event twice. If you find one of these events, change the date of the file and do all the necessary changes to reflect the new information you have.
- In cases in which a group of people that is not part of the protest intervenes with the intention of dissolving it, the coder will have to decide whether it becomes a new protest or not, according to the following criterion: if the coder understands that the group is related to the government or police in some way, or is sent by the government or police with the purpose of breaking the protest, then you shouldn't consider it as a new protest, and provide all the information in the file (comments section or where appropriate). An example of this would be a group of people belonging to the Peronist party that is sent by the local mayor to dissolve a road blockade. Even if they are not police nor they belong to the government, it is clear that they are being sent by the state. On the contrary, if you understand that the protesters are an independent group, with a claim against protesters, you should code it as a new event, adding in the section 'connection to other events', which was the event that originated the protest. Example of this would be a group of store owners that claim that their business is being harmed by a roadblock and decide to dissolve it by force.

Codesheet Instructions

1. Code	Newspaper's Date (YYYYMMDD) Event Number (XX): starting 01, number all events for the same day. This means that on a given day there might be more than one event so there should be a number for each one.
2. Coder	Your name
3. Newspaper source	Already printed in codebook
TITLE	Copy/paste headline from newspaper exactly as it appears when you click 'save as'. If follow up articles, record all headlines here (and keep an electronic copy of all articles).
4. EVENT'S START	Record day of the week of the event's start (NOT THE DAY OF THE NEWSPAPER'S ARTICLE) If an event lasts one day, only record the day of the week and the date. If it lasts more than one day, also record end day and date. In all cases abbreviate days: L, Ma, Mi, J, V, S, D. Enter all dates as follows: DD/MM/YYYY
5. Length of Protest	Record time if specified. If newspaper only mentions number of hours, or time of the day, even if not specific, also record that (example: 'algunas horas'). <i>If no information:</i> SD (DON'T LEAVE BLANK) After completing, check one of the boxes below, according to the accuracy of the information available: Known /At least/ No more than
6. Country	Already printed in codebook
7. State/Province	If more than one province, use a separate form. Different province is considered a different event.
8. Location	Separate with commas, BIG TO SMALL: City, Town, Area, Intersection, street, specific address, building. We record from the most important or largest place to the more specific one, until we reach the specific location of the event. For example: Gran Buenos Aires, Florencio Varela, Barrio Lujan, Rivadavia 511, Municipalidad. If no information: SD (DON'T LEAVE BLANK) If more than one location, use a separate form. Use the same form only if you are sure that two events taking place in different locations are coordinated by the same group, involve the same kind of action, and are directed to the same target. If describing more than one type of action during the same event (for example: march and blockade) don't forget to mention where each of these actions took place.

9. Event/Action Description	Describe in detail what happened, what actions took place. If possible, specify in this order: WHAT, TYPE OF SITE, WHERE If describing more than one type of action during the same event (for example: march and blockade) don't forget to mention where each of these actions took place.
10. Who is Protesting	Describe who is protesting exactly as it is mentioned in the newspaper. It is important to record the newspaper's way of addressing protesters (example: piqueteros o vecinos o rebeldes).
11. Self-Definition	If those who are protesting identify themselves in a different way than the reporter AND this is mentioned in the newspaper's article, record it. (example: el diario dice: un grupo de rebeldes que se hacen llamar 'ejercito de confrontacion': in this case, you have to enter: ejercito de confrontacion). Remember that the self definition should be in the article to be included here.
12. Issue/Grievance Topic	Record the motive, theme, or issue for which protesters are claiming. You can copy and paste from the article, but be sure to be concise (only copy what's necessary, not the whole article !!!)
13. Protest Target	Are protesters addressing or aiming at a person/s or institution in particular? If that's the case, record name and position. If no specific person or institution mentioned: SD (DO NOT LEAVE BLANK)
14. Target's Responding Agent	Is someone responding to the claim? WHO (HOW) Who? Chief of police, judge, ministry, military officer, CEO. How? Record if it is through a press release, a public announcement, a media interview, presence at event, other specify. If you can't infer it from article: (sd) To be recorded here, the response has to be directly related to the event and mentioned in the newspaper.
15. Protesting Organizations or Political Parties	Record names of groups (NGOs, social movements, organizations, political parties) that are directly involved in the protest. Sometimes newspapers list groups connected to the event but that not necessarily take part in the specific event we are coding. Please record ONLY those who are taking part in the event. Use of acronyms is OK.
16. Number of Protesters	If newspaper mentions disagreement or different interpretations of the number of protesters (police says 6000, organizers say 10000), list each number and each source: NUMBER (SOURCE))

17. Connection to Other Events	Record if newspaper mentions specific connections to other events, or if the event is taking place in that day due to the significance of the day (commemoration of labor day, date of a massacre, etc.). Also mention if other events were reported in the same article (example: on June 4 one article mentions roadblocks in San Juan, Salta and Buenos Aires. These are 3 different events but we need to know if they come from the same article).
18. Immediate Outcome	Were there any immediate and direct consequences of the event after it ended? (always record according to newspaper's article). List the outcome and source of information mentioned by the newspaper (example: after teachers protest ended, government says teachers will receive a wage increase. However, union leaders say the only certainty is a scheduled meeting to discuss salary increases: Record both outcomes and specify source.)
19. Comments	Record everything that is not included but you consider relevant. PLEASE DON'T COPY THE WHOLE ARTICLE, be concise.
STATE INVOLVEMENT/VIOLENCE	Check box if no information on this section. If no information, end coding
20. Reported State Forces' Actions	From the state forces, describe who takes actions to address the event, and what type of actions they take.
21. Number of State Force Involved	Record number of state forces involved according to newspaper. Record any information the newspaper gives (example: algunos policias)
22. Number of Protesters Arrested	Record number of protesters arrested. Record any information the newspaper gives (example: algunos manifestantes)
23. Number Injured	In the box labeled Protesters, mention how many were injured and who injured them: NUMBER (i.e. police). Use same logic for State Force and Others injured. (Others: 1 passerby (police))
24. Number Killed	In the box labeled Protesters, mention how many were killed and who killed them: NUMBER (i.e. police). Use same logic for State Force and Others killed. (Others: 1 passerby (police))
25. Property Damaged	Thoroughly describe damages mentioned in article. If report says no damage, clarify: none. If no mention of damages in article but not sure if there were any, specify: SD

Codebook for Newspaper Coding of Protests

Entry	Description/Coding																						
1. Identification																							
ID # protest event	ID number of each corporation stable across all years in period sample																						
Newspaper date code	Date of newspaper coverage (YYYYMMDD) Event number (XX) starting at 01 for each day. Coded by first newspaper mention.																						
Event (s) code	For each article on this protest event: date of newspaper coverage (YYYYMMDD) Article number (XX) starting at 01 for each day.																						
2. Date and duration																							
Protest start date	YYYYMMDD																						
Protest end date	YYYYMMDD																						
Length of protest	<table> <tr> <td>1. Less than one hour</td> <td>6. Between 5 days and a week</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. More than one hour, less than one day</td> <td>7. Between 8 days and 2 weeks</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. One day (24 hours)</td> <td>8. Between 15 days and 1 month</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. More than one day (more than 24hours)</td> <td>9. More than 1 month and less than 2 months</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. Between 2 days and 4 days (less than 5days)</td> <td>10. More than 2 months</td> </tr> </table>	1. Less than one hour	6. Between 5 days and a week	2. More than one hour, less than one day	7. Between 8 days and 2 weeks	3. One day (24 hours)	8. Between 15 days and 1 month	4. More than one day (more than 24hours)	9. More than 1 month and less than 2 months	5. Between 2 days and 4 days (less than 5days)	10. More than 2 months												
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5. Between 2 days and 4 days (less than 5days)	10. More than 2 months																						
3. Geography																							
State(s) of protest event	<table> <tr> <td>001 = Ciudad de Buenos Aires</td> <td>010 = Catamarca</td> </tr> <tr> <td>006 = Buenos Aires</td> <td>018 = Corrientes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>014 = Córdoba</td> <td>026 = Chubut</td> </tr> <tr> <td>022 = Chaco</td> <td>034 = Formosa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>030 = Entre Rios</td> <td>042 = La Pampa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>038 = Jujuy</td> <td>050 = Mendoza</td> </tr> <tr> <td>046 = La Rioja</td> <td>058 = Neuquén</td> </tr> <tr> <td>054 = Misiones</td> <td>066 = Salta</td> </tr> <tr> <td>062 = Rio Negro</td> <td>074 = San Luis</td> </tr> <tr> <td>070 = San Juan</td> <td>082 = Santa Fe</td> </tr> <tr> <td>078 =Santa Cruz</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	001 = Ciudad de Buenos Aires	010 = Catamarca	006 = Buenos Aires	018 = Corrientes	014 = Córdoba	026 = Chubut	022 = Chaco	034 = Formosa	030 = Entre Rios	042 = La Pampa	038 = Jujuy	050 = Mendoza	046 = La Rioja	058 = Neuquén	054 = Misiones	066 = Salta	062 = Rio Negro	074 = San Luis	070 = San Juan	082 = Santa Fe	078 =Santa Cruz	
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078 =Santa Cruz																							

086 = Santiago del Estero
090 = Tucumán

094 = Tierra del Fuego
099 = Sin datos

Location was also coded as a dummy variable where Greater Buenos Aires area was 1 and all other locations 0¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ INDEC calls Greater Buenos Aires to the area that comprises the City of Buenos Aires and the Districts of Greater Buenos Aires (in the administrative sense, that is, 24 complete districts). For more information, please read the following document. <http://www.indec.gov.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/1/folleto%20gba.pdf>

4. Protest features: *General*

.....
Protest form: Select up to 3 categories or sub-categories in order of relevance:

1. Roadblock

corte, cortaron, [corte de ruta], [corte de calle], [corte de autopista], [corte de vías de tren], barricada, [corte de puente], [corte de camino]

2. Strike

huelga, paro, [suspension de actividades], [suspensión de actividades], [suspendieron actividades], [suspender actividades], [suspender el servicio], [suspendieron el servicio], [suspender servicio], [suspendieron servicio] cortaron abastecimiento de gas a medio país caso 242

3. March

marcha, caminata, marcharon, recorrieron, desfile, desfilaron

4. Mobilization

movilizacion, movilización, movilizaron, movilizaciones

5. Assembly

Asamblea, plenario

6. Rally (non-religious)

concentración, concentracion, acto, actos, homenaje

7. Mass (religious)

misa, peregrinacion, peregrinación, procesion, procesión

8. Public accusation of persons

escrache, escracharon, escrachó, insultar persona, insultos, insultó, insultaron, abuchear, abuchearon, abucheadado

9. Lifting of barriers

[levantamiento de barreras], [levantamiento de molinetes], [levantaron barreras], [levantaron molinetes]

10. Work by the book

[trabajo a reglamento], [trabajaron a reglamento]

11. Take over or building occupation

[toma de edificio], tomaron, ocuparon, ocupó, ocupación. Incluye la toma de los mostradores por parte de empleados de Aerolíneas; tomas de fábricas, ocupación, toma de una municipalidad, Hubo bocinazos, estallidos de petardos dentro del hall del aeropuerto

12. Take over or occupation of public space for housing

[tomaron terreno], [ocuparon terreno], [ocuparon viviendas], [piden vivienda], [tomaron parque para vivienda] resistieron el ingreso de la Policía al edificio en medio de empujones, colgaron una bandera roja y negra en el balcón y repudiaron el desalojo con cánticos contra los policías. Resistieron el desalojo.

13. Public space occupation

[ocuparon parque], acamparon, acampe, [olla popular], carpa, carpas, grupo que se presenta y ocupa la legislatura, campamento frente a casino, frente a legislatura, etc.

14. Pot banging

cacerolazo, cacerolas, ollas, corralito, suele incluir una marcha

15. Vehicle march

Caravana, bicicleteada, botes, tractores

16. Signature collection

[recoleccion de firmas], [juntaron firmas], [juntar firmas], [recolección de firmas], petitorio, petición, peticion, carta, denuncia judicial, armar frente judicial, presentar justicia, presentación de denuncia, presentación de nota, entrega de petitorio, presentación de denuncia, presentación de

nota, entrega de petitorio, presentar a justicia, denuncia judicial

17. Symbolic hug to building
[abrazo simbólico], [abrazo simbolico], abrazo

18. Press release
[comunicado de prensa], solicitada, [rueda de prensa], anuncio, [rueda de prensa], [conferencia de prensa], comunicado, presentación, presentacion, conferencia de prensa,

19. Artistic festival
[festival artístico], festival, feria, recital, música, musica, cantantes, globos, arte, muñecos, titeres, títeres, trajes, máscaras, mascarar, muestra, fotos, fotografías, fotográfica

20. Damages
destrozos, daños, violencia, armas, bombas, cascotes, rompieron vidrios, incendiarion, incendio, quemaron, rompieron, arrojaron piedras, arrojaron cascotes, arrojaron, apedrearon comisaria, apedreo, ataque a casa de políticos. Ataque a la casa de, ataque a sede del PJ, ataque a piedras a un violador (caso235)

21. Interruption of meeting
[interrupcion de sesion], interrupción, [interrupción de reunion], [interrupción de asamblea], interrupcion, interrumpieron. Los trabajadores ingresaron a legislatu (durante sesión), intentaron evitar la asamblea de la UBA

22. Hunger strike
[huelga de hambre], ayuno

23. Town uprising
pueblada

24. Mutin
motin , motín

25. Flyer distribution
volanteada, panfletos, distribuyeron, repartieron, volantes, [repartieron volanates], empapelar ciudad con carteles , pintada, afiches

26. Entrance or exit blockade

[bloqueo de entrada], [bloqueo de salida], [bloqueo de persona], [bloquearon entrada], [bloquearon salida], [bloquearon acceso], [impedir entrada], [impidieron entrada], [impidieron salida] ipidieron la salida de los legisladores. *Los manifestantes impidieron el acceso a las plantas de YPF, Vintage y Pan American, que suspendieron la producción. Impiden la entrada de camiones con basura,*

27. Vigil -
vigilia

28. Counter protest –
[contra-protesta], contraprotesta, contrarrestaron, confrontaron.

29. Protest (no further information) –
protesta, manifestación, manifestacion, manifestaron, protestaron, reclamó, reclamo, reclamaron

30. New action –
[acción novedosa], [accion novedosa], [lanzamiento de globos], [lanzaron globos], orquestazo, apagon, apagón, [abstencion de uso de celulares], [apagaron celulares]

31. Campaign, political rally or act –
[acto de campaña], acto político, electoral, elecciones

32. Surrounding of building –
[rodear edificio], [rodear casa], rodear, rodearon, [rodearon edificio], [rodearon casa]

33. Move over prohibited area – force entrance
[derrivar vallas], [avanzar por zona no permitida], [no permitido], [avanzaron por zona no permitida], [derrivaron vallas] Incluye cuando empleados, por ejemplo Aerolíneas, entran en oficinas de la empresa y así impiden que se pueda trabajar.

Irrumpieron en la legislatura. Se metieron a la fuerza. Tras superar la custodia apostada en el lugar, los manifestantes entraron...

34. Face, confront police –
[enfrentar a la policía], [enfrentaron a la policia], [enfrentaron a la policía],

[desafiaron a los policias], [desafiaron a los policías] resistencia, enfrentamiento,
35. Looting –
saquearon, saqueado, saqueo, saqueó,
robaron, rompieron, electrodomésticos
36. Throw eggs, mayonaise–
[arrojaron huevos], [arrojaron mostaza],
[arrojaron mayonesa], [arrojaron Ketchup],

[arrojando huevos], [arrojando humo],
arrojando
37. encuentro, simposio
38. sentada, encadenarse a vallas
39. [clase pública], [clases públicas]
40. other - otras, especificar

Tactics were recoded as follows:

Tactic 2

1. Roadblock, piquet; 2. Strike; 3. March; 5. Rally, 8. Escrache, 11. Occupation of building (building take over), 12. Land Occupation, 14. Pot banging, 16. Petition, signature collection, 20. Attacks to buildings, property, throwing rocks, breaking, destroying or damaging property, 26. Sit-in, 34. Confrontation, 35. Lootings, 40. Other forms.

.....

Use of Confrontational Tactics

1: Yes (if protesters used confrontational tactics). 0: No
Confrontational tactics are operationalized as forms of action by protesters that include occupations, obstructions, blockades, forced entries, physical and verbal attacks (*escraches*), and lootings.

.....

Use of Violent Tactics

1: Yes. (if protesters engaged in violence). 0: No
Violent tactics include use of weapons or physical force to attack a building (bank, home, institution, vehicle) or person by demonstrators as well as breaking the law or a specific order by authorities such as trespassing a barrier.

.....

If Violent, Nature of Tactic

- 1 – Weapons (rocks, bombs, guns, firebombs, bricks, stones);
- 2 – Physical or hand-to-hand violence (includes pushing a barrier or fence);
- 3 – Other (such as setting items or property on fire)
- 4 – Weapons and physical violence;
- 5 – Weapons and other;
- 6 – Physical and other;
- 7 – Weapons, physical, and other types of violence
- 8– Weapons and threat by wearing masks and carrying sticks.
- 9 – Breaking the law (such as trespassing barrier or ignoring demands by authority)

.....

Property Damage

1. If there was property destroyed or damaged 0. No

5. Actor

Actors protesting. Select up to 3 main categories in order of relevance.

1. Teachers - *Docentes / trabajadores de educacion publica y privada*
2. Students/youth - *Estudiantes /jovenes*
3. Health workers - *Trabajadores de la salud / hospitales publicos/profesionales de la salud*
4. Judicial workers - *Trabajadores del sistema judicial*
5. Police - *Policias*
6. Military personnel - *Militares*
7. State workers from other agencies not mentioned in previous categories - *Trabajadores de otros organismos publicos/estatales (ministerios, municipalidades, etc., no incluidos en anteriores categorías)*
8. Airline workers - *Trabajadores aeronáuticos*
9. Truck drivers – *Camioneros*
10. Long distance bus drivers - *Choferes de larga distancia*
11. Urban bus drivers - *Choferes de colectivos urbanos*
12. Train workers - *Trabajadores/choferes de empresas de trenes/ guardias ferroviarios*
13. Subway workers - *Trabajadores/choferes de empresas de subte*
14. Taxi drivers - *Taxistas*
15. Farmers/rural workers - *Campesinos/trabajadores rurales*
16. Bank workers - *Trabajadores bancarios*

17. Supermarket workers - *Trabajadores de supermercados*
19. Van drivers – *Fleteros*
21. Cardboard collectors - *Cartoneros/recicladores*
23. Pensioners – *Jubilados*
25. Large industrialists - *Grandes Industriales*
27. Large proprietors/rural producers - *Grandes propietarios/productores Rurales*
29. Retailers – *Comerciantes*
- ~~31-~~
33. Non-Organized (not a collective) Neighbors, inhabitants, families, parents - *Vecinos, familias, pobladores, padres*
35. Environmentalists - *Ambientalistas*
37. Peronists - *Militantes justicialistas*
39. UCR militants - *Militantes radicales*
41. Unemployed workers - *Desocupados*
43. Squatters - *Familias ocupantes (habitantes de asentamientos)*
45. Members of political party in power at time of publication - *Miembros del partido gobernante al momento de publicación de nota (así dice en actor), funcionarios*
47. Non-state workers - *Trabajadores no estatales (no incluidos/mencionados en anteriores categorías) Obreros, trabajadores de la construcción, albañiles, guardavidas, oiltrabajadores petroleros, trabajadores de fábricas, trabajadores de la pesca, trabajadores del subte, obreros marítimos,*
18. Garbage collectors - *Recolectores de basura*
20. Recovered factory workers - *Trabajadores de empresas recuperadas*
22. Street vendors - *Vendedores ambulantes/puesteros/artesanos*
24. Artists - *Artistas*
26. Small and medium industry workers - *Medianos y pequeños industriales*
28. Small and medium proprietors and rural producers - *Medianos y pequeños propietarios / productores rurales / campesinos*
- ~~30-~~
32. Organized Families and friends of victims - *Otros familiares y/o amigos de víctimas/damnificados (ni madres ni padres exclusivamente, osea si no especificia parentezco va ahi)*
34. Human rights activists - *Defensores de derechos humanos*
36. Left wing activists - *Militantes de izquierda, agrupaciones de izquierda*
38. Union workers - *Militantes gremiales, sindicalistas, gremialistas, el gremio*
40. O
42. Piqueteros
44. Transgender activists - *Transgénero, travestis*
46. Users of service - *Usuarios de un servicio (como pasajeros de una empresa de transporte, ciclistas por ciclovia, usuarios del subte, enfermos o pacientes que se quejan de un hospital) ciclistas, usuarios del subte*
48. Other demonstrators (does not specify) , *manifestantes..*

- empleados de casino flotante,
49. Members of aboriginal communities -
Miembros de comunidades aborígenes
(*wichi, toba, etc.*)
50. Immigrants from neighboring
countries (Bolivia, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Chile) and Perú -
Inmigrantes de países limítrofes
(*Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile*) y
Perú
51. Soccer fans - *Hinchas de equipos de*
fútbol
52. *Ahorristas*
53. *Mujeres (amas de casa, o grupos de*
mujes con demandas de género y
también cuando especifica “solo
mujeres y niños”)
54. --
55. *Religiosos, curas, católicos, iglesia –*
no judíos
56. *Profesionales (abogados, visitantes*
médicos, dentistas, jugadores de
fútbol, Médicos en toma de hospital.
Periodistas en caso cabezas y otros
damnificados)
57. *Judíos, comunidad judía, asociaciones*
judías
58. *Indigentes, muy pobres, vecinos o*
habitantes de villas miseria
60. *Presos*
59. *Ex combatientes*
62. *Inmigrantes*
61. *Deudores*
64. *Discapacitados*
63. *Beneficiarios de planes sociales (jefes*
y jefas de hogar)
65. *Funcionarios (concejales,*
representantes)
66. *Victimas de violencia del estado,*
victimas policiales
67. *Catch all de discriminados (enfermos*
de SIDA, drogadictos, marginales no
especificados,
99. *No Data*

.....

Actors were re-coded as follows:

5. Actor Recoded

- 1= Teachers
2= students/youth
7= Other state workers (not teachers)
37= Political party members, political party officials,
pressure groups, lobby groups

40= Social Movement Activists or Organized Actors:
 35, 44, 53, 20,39, 43, 32, 34, 35, 36, 52,
 47= Non-state workers 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 28,
 22, 29, 26, 16, 17, 56, 53 (housewives), 55 (religious,
 clergy), 46 (users of service, not organized people that
 make claim to private company or institution) 33
 (families and neighbors, not organized)
 58 = Unemployed, cardboard collectors, recovered
 factory workers, street vendors, squatters, homeless,
 shanty town residents, transgender, LGBT activists,
 aboriginal groups, indigents, disabled, victims of
 violence, discriminated groups).

.....

Marginality

- 1. If any marginal actor or group appeared
- 0. Non marginal actors reported

Among **marginal actors** were included: *piqueteros*, unemployed, cardboard collectors, recovered factory workers, street vendors, squatters, homeless, transgender, LGBT activists, aboriginal groups, indigents, disabled, victims of violence, discriminated groups.

.....

Political leverage

- 1: if actors with political leverage were among the main actors in the demonstrators
- 0: if actors without political leverage were leading the demonstration

Political leverage: Among the actors that **do not** have political leverage I included: informal workers (such as street vendors), pensioners, small farmers, prostitutes, unorganized groups that spontaneously act together (such as squatters resisting an eviction), and marginalized people who do not belong to a union or a collective that provides them with group identity or spatial location where to meet and organize collective actions.

In specific periods, the following groups were also among those without political leverage: students and youth, unemployed workers, left-wing SMO activists and militants, pickets.

6. Claim (issue, grievance, demand)

Select up to three main categories (or sub-categories) in order of relevance.

0100 Jobs, employment (general)

- 0102 Better wages
- 0103 Improvement of work conditions (amount of hours, security)
- 0104 Against dismissals and reduction in salaries (ajustes). Por reincorporación de despedidos.
- 0105 Demand more jobs from the government
- 0106 To demand payment of back wages

0200 Education

- 0201 back wages or increase in education salaries
- 0202 Administrative or Management reform
- 0203 In support of another sector (clarify which)
- 0204
- 0205 More buildings, improvements in buildings
- 0206 Por contrataciones, temas de antigüedad
- 0207 Cierre de centro escolar (against, to protest)
- 0210 School cafeteria/ school lunches (opening)
- 0211 Opening of new institutions
- 0212 Against education "ajustes"
- 0213 Education Budget cut
- 0214 Against reduction in student scholarships
- 0215 Against Education Workers strike
- 0218 Against education workers dismissals
- 0219 Against discrimination in education
- 0221 Boleto estudiantil
- 0222 For more participation, voice in decision making process
- 0226 Against education legislation
- 0227 Education Reform
- 0228 More budget/funding for education issues

0300 Justice

- 0301 Against decision (como decision de detener a alguien o en contra de una acusación)
- 0302 pedir justicia, castigo
- 0303 Pedir justicia social (queremos mayor distribución del ingreso, igualdad ante la ley, impuestos más progresivos)

0400 Welfare state/state provision of social benefits

- 0401 Housing/ land requests
- 0402 Housing issues (other)
- 0404 Denounce political use of welfare plans
- 0405 Welfare, unemployment plans - Subsidies
- 0406 Against Poverty, complain about crisis, denounce crisis, poverty, against crisis
- 0407 Demand Health benefits to the poor
- 0408 Subsidies for discapacitados
- 0409 In demand of goods, help for soup kitchens
- 0410 To demand more benefits for the elderly, aumentar el haber mínimo para jubilados
- 0411 Precarious housing demolition
- 0412 Protest evictions/housing demolitions
- 0413 Pedir tarifa social

0500 Human Rights

- 0501 Remember anniversary - *Recordar aniversario (golpe, Cordobazo, etc.)*
- 0502 To demand the annulment of specific legislations related to dictatorship - *Reclamar nulidad efectiva de leyes de Punto final y Obediencia Debida*
- 0504 Amnesty for political prisoners
- 0505 Legislation on human rights issues
- 0506 Freedom of Speech, freedom of assembly (antes 1340)
- 0507 repudiar golpes pasados o en otros países

0508 homenajear desaparecidos, victimas de terrorismo, etc (con acto, monument)
0509 Acusar persona de complicidad con golpe, con dictadura, pedir la cárcel para figura política.

6000 Police brutality

6001 Anti police brutality – denunciar police brutality
6002 Anti repression
6003 Demand freedom of political prisoners/freedom of social movement leader (Raul Castells, por ejm)
6004 Against Government surveillance/Prosecution of Protesters
6005 Denounce police brutality in jails, tortures, ill-treatment of prisoners .

7000 Government/political power

7001 Internal dissent (dissent within the political party)
7002 Away with them all (Que se vayan todos)/ at national level
7003 Away with them all (Que se vayan todos) at provincial level
7004 Against policies, decisions, at national level (contra la modificación, intervención de numerous del INDEC)
7005 Against Policies, decisions, at provincial level
7006 Administrative reforms
7007 In demand of infrastructure improvements/more equipments
7008 Against adjustment plans - *Contra plan de ajuste, recorte de presupuesto (en educación, salud), en contra del corralito, pesificación, en contra de convertir ahorros en bonos.*
7009 More participation - *Por mayor expresión o participación en toma de decisiones. Piden reunirse con autoridades para encontrar solución*

7010 Against corruption - *Protestar contra corrupción, impunidad, mal desempeño de político*

7011 In support of legislation, policy - En apoyo a ley, proyecto, política

7012 To demand the government that it does what has promised - *Exigir/reclamar al gobierno el cumplimiento de acuerdos firmados (promesa de trabajo, tierras, etc.) Promesas como urbanizar una villa 2006092203. También por control del gobierno a los servicios brindados: 1998081401., Regualción del Estado.*

7013 Against decision by government

7014 For change in economic model

7015 For change in political model

7019 Against Political figure

7020 acusar persona de incumplimiento de deberes de funcionario public

7021 in favor of government, against protesters or another sector , apoyar gobierno(counterdemonstration)

8000 Environmental movement

8001 Soil/water and landscape (plants, trees) protection

8002 Against mining

8003 Anti-Current Method of Solid Waste disposal. Basural CEAMSE 2007102201

8004 Not In My Backyard (NIMBY)

8005 Against paper mills

8006 Against highway opening, construction

8007 Against factory pollution/contamination

9000 Union (incluye disputas por representación de trabajadores)

9001 re hiring of dismissed workers

9002 payment of severances (pago indemnizaciones)

9003 cambio en convenio laboral

1100 Public health issues (general)

1101 More health budget

1102 More budget for hospitals

1103 Improve hospital infrastructure, new equipment, goods (insumos)
1104 Senior citizens health issues
1105 Denunciar falta de medicamentos en droguerías, farmacias

1200 Gay/lesbian rights (general)

1201 Gay rights (males)
1202 Lesbian rights (female)
1203 Same Sex Marriage

1300 Miscellaneous Social Issues

1301 Against tax increases, to demand reforma impositiva, en contra del CER
1302 Prisoners' Rights
1303 Victims' Rights
1304 Indigenous People's rights
1305 HIV victims' rights, HIV prevention
1306 To demand security, safety.

1337 Anti-Crime Movement

1351 Misc. Religious Claims

1352 Peace - *Por la paz/Contra la guerra*
1353 Against banking restrictions - *Contra corralito*, pusimos dólares, queremos dólares

1355 Against IMF/USA/ Foreign President visiting Argentina - *Contra FMI/ALCA/USA/Deuda Externa/Visita de presidente extranjero*

1356 Against discrimination - *Contra discriminación, protestar discriminación*

1357 Prostitution - *Contra prostitución*

1358 Against demolition of a building - *Impedir demolición de edificio (de la ESMA)*

1360 Protest service malfunctioning or suspension - *(como transportes, luz) por conflicto gremial, trenes que funcionan mal.*

1361 To protest the decision or protest by another sector - *Protestar/rechazar la*

protesta de otro sector porque afecta los intereses del que protesta (comerciantes contra piqueteros)

1362 To protest decision by entity (not government) - *Protestar decisión de club, empresa, etc (no del gobierno)*

1363 In support of another sector or individual - *Apoyo a otro sector o individuo (que no sea gobierno); solidaridad con la lucha de otros*

1364 Protest increasing prices, general

1365 For democracy, to support democracy

1366 For industry, to support industry, reactivation

1367 Against IMF intervention, against requesting help from IMF

1368 Mejorar el humor en la calle, alegrar a la gente

1369 por la cultura, mejorar la cultura.

1370 to request more parks, public spaces, bridges for pedestrians, more green areas, bicycle lanes/paths (to defend green areas)

1371 quejas por falta de gasoil, cortes de luz, falta de gas.

1372 para pedir semáforos

1373 Las Malvinas Son Argentinas

1374 Against violence in futbol, soccer

1375 For policies in favor of farmers, against taxes to farming. Por reforma agrarian.

1376 Demandas corporativas, a empresas privadas: entre otras: mejores salarios, aumentos salariales, más trabajo, trabajadores de Brukman, a bancos para que devuelvan plata, a supermercados grandes para que entreguen comida, alimentos...

1400 Miscellaneous Electoral issues, Campaigns, Political party acts

1401 To support candidate

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Claims were collapsed and re-coded as follows:

Claims Recoded

100: For Jobs And Salaries
200: For Education
300: For Justice
400: For Welfare Benefits
500: For, In Defense Of Human Rights
1300: For Miscellaneous Social Issues
1400: Electoral Claims
6000: Against Police Brutality
7000: Against Government
8000: For The Environment

7. Target

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. National Government - <i>Gobierno nacional (políticos o autoridades; la persona o el cargo: Menem o presidente; la entidad)</i> | 2. Provincial Government - <i>Gobierno provincial (políticos o autoridades; la persona o el cargo: Bussi o gobernador; la entidad)</i> |
| 3. Local Government - <i>Gobierno local/municipalidad/ intendente</i> | 4. Legislators - <i>Legisladores (diputados, senadores)</i> |
| 5. Political parties - <i>Partidos políticos</i> | 6. Justice, judges - <i>Justicia, jueces</i> |
| 7. Businesses/private national companies - <i>Empresarios/empresas/instituciones privadas nacionales (no bancos; ejemplos: petroleras, supermercados, telefónicas, fabricas, empresa de transporte)</i> | 8. Businesses/ private foreign institutions (not banks) - <i>Empresas/instituciones privadas extranjeras (no bancos) . Representates en el exterior (Finlandia)</i> |
| 9. Institution authorities - <i>Autoridades de institución (dirección, jefes, autoridades educativas, salud, públicas)</i> | 10. Banks – Bancos (national or international) |
| 11. State forces – <i>Fuerzas del orden (policías-militares, etc)</i> | 12. IMF/World Bank/FTAA, supranational organizations - <i>FMI/ALCA/BM organizaciones supranaciones</i> |
| 13. Foreign government - <i>Gobierno extranjero</i> | 14. Union - <i>Sindicato o seccion de sindicato</i> |
| 15. NGO - <i>Organización social/ONG</i> | 16. Authorities or politician active during dictatorship - <i>Autoridades, politicos activos durante la dictadura</i> |
| 17. Other | 18. 99. SD |
| 19. Not Applicable | 20. Que se vayan todos, ex presidentes. |

.....
Target was recoded as follows:

Target B:

1. National Government
2. Provincial Government
3. Local Administration (Municipality, Council)
4. Legislators
7. Corporations, Private Companies
11. Security Forces (both police and military)
17. Other (Justice system, political parties, unions, past leaders)

8. Organization

Select up to three organizations in order of relevance.

1. Unions (CTA, CGT; ATE)
2. Political Parties
3. Social Movement Organizations
4. NGOs
5. No Organization
6. More than three groups acting together.

9. Protest (other)

Protest intensity..... Number of protesters that appears in newspaper. If the exact number of participants is not known, a value is selected from a general range assigned according to the following categories: 1 – Small, few handful (1-9 people); 2 – Group, committee (10-49 people); 3 – Large, gathering (50-99 people); 4 – Hundreds, mass, mob (100-999 people); 5 – Thousands (1,000-9,999 people); 6 – Tes of thousands (10,000 or more people).

10. Outcomes

1. Commitment by authorities to resolve - *Compromiso de autoridades a resolver*
2. Conflict escalates, violence - *Escala el conflicto y violencia*
3. No resolution - *Sin resolver ni reacción de target*. Incluye vuelta al estado de cosas previo a la protesta.
4. Conflict is completely solved - *Resuelto totalmente*. Demanda se cumple, avanza el pedido.
5. Conflict moves to legal avenues - *Se pasa a vías legales*
6. Positive partial resolution - *Se resuelve alguna demanda. Incluye por ejemplo la renuncia de algún político o jefe policial. O juez ordena a supermercado entregar comida. Ejemplo: 2007042601*
7. Government postpones. Issue not solved and grievance continues. It could be that the beginning of school classes are postponed or suspended; a public works is suspended, elections are postponed, there is asueto administrative.- *Gobierno posterga clases o suspende clases, gobierno suspende o postpone acto, inicio de algo, elecciones, obra, asueto administrative.*
8. Dialogue meeting with authorities - *Mesa de dialogo/reunión con autoridades*
9. Government punishes (toma represalias). Suspension of payments, Budget cuts due to institutional instability - *No pago por paro / se reduce ayuda financiera por inestabilidad institucional. Descontar días de faltas por paro.*
10. Conflict or division in the sector that protests - *Conflicto o incisión en el sector que protesta*
11. Law is passed - *Se aprueba ley*
12. Arrests - *Arrestos*
13. Rally, event against repression or to repudiate violence - *Acto, marcha, evento para repudiar o en contra de la represión, desalojos, violencia*
14. Justice ends event (negatively) - *Justicia termina /pone fin a evento (termina con corte de ruta, desaloja ocupación, envía policía). Juez decide terminar con corte de ruta y envía a la policía a desalojar.*
15. Document presentation - *Presentación, realización, envío de un documento*
16. Conflict inside state forces - *Conflicto dentro de las fuerzas estatales (policía/gendarmería)*
17. -
18. Deployment of more or different state forces to repress - *Envío de otras fuerzas del estado para reprimir*
19. Confrontation between protesters and authorities or protesters and state forces - *Enfrentamiento entre manifestantes y autoridades o state forces*
20. Confrontation between protesters and groups against protest (counter demonstrators) - *Enfrentamiento entre manifestantes y otro grupo en contra de protesta (no autoridades o state forces)*

21. Protest is set to continue until further notice - *Se planea continuar con la protesta hasta nuevo aviso*
22. Government will not open dialogue until protest events finish - *Gobierno no dialoga hasta que termine proteste*
23. New protest (rally, sit-in, march, any form) to protest authorities decision

or to support another grievance. (Madres que hacen envío masivo de cartas por el mundo contra demolición de la Esma). Nueva movilización, se convoca a nueva movilización.

10.b Outcomes recoded

1. Issue/claim solved positively
2. Issue/claim solved negatively. Repression (such as decision by judge that decides to end with the event and discontinue protest. Forbids further protest events of the like.)
3. Protest continues – ongoing (more protests organized to continue claim)
4. Escalation of conflict (violence, confrontation between actors)
5. Partial positive resolution
6. Partial negative resolution (such that government decides to discount days in which teachers go on strike)

11. Security forces

Reported Security Forces' Action

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1. **Appear and do nothing.** The newspaper reports that agents, officers show up at a protest event but don't take action.
2. **Display of force** and take limited visible action: Use of barricades, displays of preparedness. *Custodiar, patrullar las calles. (puede ser con carros hidrantes/escudos/caballos),*

“fuerte operativo policial; Vallado; Vigilar, Vigilancia policial. Also included are actions such as divert traffic, block road, direct protesters. This excludes making arrests, using equipment, using force. Cercar manifestantes (limitarles agua, luz, etc. Ej: 2001061502).

3. Make **arrests** and display barricades.

4. Make **evictions** (from buildings and public spaces such as parks or roads) *Desalojos con violencia, heridos (ej: 2002011101, 2002011103, 2007092201).*
5. Use of **physical force**: pushing, hitting, shoving, kicking, pulling hair.
6. Use of **weapons**: gas, rubber bullets, fire, pepper spray (*balas de goma, balas de plomo, gases lacrimógenos, armas de fuego*).
7. **Combination** of physical force, weapons, equipment, arrests, and people wounded reported.

8. **Confrontation** between protesters and authorities. *Enfrentamiento* It is not known who started the confrontation but there is violence involved.

9. **Threat of force** or arrest to end a protest event, disperse demonstration, evict land occupation or demand something from demonstrators: Newspaper reports that judge ordered raid, forceful eviction of land, property or area. For example, display weapons, use sound dispersal. *Juez ordena allanamiento: 20070819 corte de ruta impedido.*

Forces involved (Who)

.....

1. Federal Police - *Policía federal*
2. Provincial Police - *Policía provincial*
3. National Border Guard - *Gendarmería*
4. Police Infantry, Anti-riot and specialized police task forces *Infantería policial Fuerzas de choque de la policía como grupo Halcón y guardia antimotines*
5. Judge – *Juez, representante de la justicia*
6. Prefecture or Coast Guard- *Prefectura*
9. Thugs (specify) – *Empresarios, matones, private security, hooligans, personas no identificadas con uniforme de policia*
14. Aviation Police (*Policía Aeroportuaria*)
15. At least three of the forces mentioned above acting in combination.
16. Other forces: includes state officials or agents that act as police, snipers, and other force not included in prior categories.
99. SD

When the article reports on an event at a province outside de Buenos Aires City area, the term

“police” is the default for local police (2). In events that took place at the City of Buenos Aires, the term “police” is the default for federal police (1).

.....

Number of Forces

Number mentioned in newspaper (when article says “un *cordón policial*” this was computed as 20-30 agentes)

.....

Arrested

1: if one or more demonstrator was arrested.
0: if no demonstrators were arrested

If any arrests were made, the variable is coded with the number of people arrested.

.....

Injured

1: if newspaper reports people were injured during protest event.
0: if there are no reports of people injured during protest event.

If any people were reported injured, the variable is coded with the number of people injured.

.....

Killed

1: if newspaper reported a person or persons died during protest event.
0: if no reports of people killed appeared .

.....

Police Violence

If police used any violent means in the course of their activity at the protest is coded 1, no violence is coded 0

This dummy value represents whether police engaged in any confrontation or violent tactics such as attacking protesters with physical violence, or used equipment or weapons (such as guns, tear gas, nightsticks, or riot control equipment), made violent evictions, made arrests, or threats to protesters.

12. Socio-economic and Contextual Data

Unemployment Rate, Poverty Rate, Economic Growth extracted from Indec¹⁹¹ (National Institute of Statistics and Censuses) at www.indec.gov.ar and from Ministerio de Trabajo (*Labor Ministry*) at www.trabajo.gov.ar

¹⁹¹ The National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) is the public body, of a technical nature, depending on the Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, which runs all the official statistical activities carried out throughout the country

Appendix C

Description and Summaries of Data Collected

The table below presents a summary of the general characteristics of the protest events attended by police during the different periods of this study.

Table C.1: Summary Of Contention Features When Police Appeared Each Period

Summary Of Contention Features By Period When There Was Police Presence				
Year	Main Demands	Focus of the Target	Main Actors	Main Forms of Action
1997-1998 Menem (Neoliberal)	For jobs, employment	Government (National and Provincial)	‘Marginals’ (Very needed, poor people and minorities)	March and Roadblock
2001-2002 de La Rúa and Duhalde (Crisis, transition)	Welfare benefits	Government (National and Provincial) and also Corporations and Private Sector	‘Marginals’ (Very needed, poor people and minorities) and Activists (SMO, human rights groups, families of victims, etc.)	March and Roadblock
2006-2007 Kirchner (Left-leaning, ‘progressive’ turn)	Educational and Against Police Brutality, Anti-Repression	Government (National, Provincial and Local)	SMO Activists	March, Roadblock and Occupation

The table below presents the frequency distribution of the events in which claims were for jobs and welfare benefits by period when there was police presence:

Table C.2: Protest Events With Claims For Jobs and Welfare When Police Appeared

Protest Events With Claims For Jobs And Welfare Benefits When There Was Police Presence			
Year	Demands for Jobs and Welfare Benefits	All Other demands	Total
1997-1998 (Neoliberal)	28	32	60
<i>Row percent</i>	47%	53%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	20%	15%	17%
2001-2002 (Crisis)	80	84	164
<i>Row percent</i>	49%	51%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	58%	41%	48%
2006-2007 ('Progressive' turn)	29	90	119
<i>Row percent</i>	24%	76%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	21%	44%	35%
Total	137	206	343
	40%	60%	100%
	100%	100%	100%
Chi-square: 18.501 p<0.001			

As table 2 above shows, *demands for jobs and welfare benefits* when there was police presence were higher during the Crisis of 2001/2 (58%), which is when poverty and unemployment levels reached the higher rates of the period. In 1997/8 and 2001/2 police presence had similar percentages at protest events demanding for jobs and welfare benefits (20% and 21% respectively). When we focus on events with police presence and demonstrations with diverse claims (*all other claims*) –for justice, the environment, against repression– except jobs and welfare, it is interesting to see that these are highest in 2006/7 (76%). On most of the events in which police appeared in 2006 and 2007, protest events were in demand for something other than employment.

Table C.3: Nature of Violent Tactics Used By Protestors

Nature of Violent Tactics Used By Protesters		
Violent Tactic	Frequency	Percentage
Weapons (rocks, bombs, guns, firebombs, bricks, stones)	56	16.3%
Physical or hand-to-hand violence (includes pushing a barrier or fence)	32	9.3%
Other (such as setting items or property on fire)	15	4.4%
Combination of Weapons and physical violence	9	2.6%
Combination of Physical Violence and other*	2	.6%
Weapons, physical, and other types of violence	5	1.5%
Did not use violent tactics	224	65.3%
Total	343	100%
Note: *Other forms of violence include wearing masks, carrying sticks, or ignoring commands by authorities.		

Table 3 above shows the nature and frequency of the different tactics employed by demonstrators that involved some form of violence. Although protesters were reported as using weapons and physical violence and combinations of these, as the data shows, it is important to highlight that on most of the events (65%) there were no forms of violence used.

Table 4 below displays the different security forces that were mentioned by newspapers during the different contentious collective action events.

Table C.4: Type Of Security Force Present Each Period

Type of Security Force Present at Protest Event Each Period				
Force	1997/8	2001/2	2006/7	Total
Federal Police	18	41	49	108
<i>Row percent</i>	17%	38%	45%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	30%	25%	41%	31.5%
Aviation Police	0%	2	0%	2
<i>Row percent</i>	0%	100%	0%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	0%	1.2	0%	.6%
More than three forces combined	9	39	8	56
<i>Row percent</i>	16%	70%	14%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	15%	24%	7%	16%
Provincial Police	28	58	20	106
<i>Row percent</i>	26%	55%	19%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	47%	35%	17%	16%
Border Guard (<i>Gendarmería</i>)	2	12	15	29
<i>Row percent</i>	7%	41%	52%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	3%	7%	13%	8.5%
Police Infantry (anti-riot and specialized task forces)	1	9	21	31
<i>Row perc</i>	3%	29%	68%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	2%	5.5%	18%	9%
Judiciary	1	0%	2	3
<i>Row percent</i>	33%	0%	67%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	1.7%	0%	1.7%	.9%
Coast Guard Police	0%	0%	3	3
<i>Row percent</i>	0%	0%	100%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	0%	0%	2.5%	.9%
Thugs (privately hired security)	1	3	1	5
<i>Row percent</i>	20%	60%	20%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	1.7%	2%	.8%	1.5%
Total	60	164	119	343
<i>Row percent</i>	17.5%	48%	35%	100%
<i>Column percent</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 5 below displays the frequency of the independent variables used in the logistic regression analyses.

Table C.5: Frequency Distribution Of Variables Used in Logistic Regression

Frequency Distribution Of Variables Used In Logistic Regression	
Violent Tactic by Demonstrators	N=118
Protest targeting the Government	N=241
Claims for Jobs	N=137
All Other Claims	N=206
Events that took place in Greater BA area	N=177
Events Outside Greater BA area	N=166
Property Damaged	N=153
Arrests	N=163
Events that took place in 2006/7	N=119
Events that took place in 1997/8	N=60

Table 6 below shows the different tactics employed by security forces each period.

Table C.6: Variation In State Forces' Action At Protest Gatherings By Period

Variation In State Forces' Action At Protest Gatherings By Period					
Security Forces' Action		Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>de la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Total
Non-Violent tactics	<i>Appear and do nothing</i> ¹	20%	14%	18%	16%
	<i>Display force</i> ²	12%	15%	17%	15%
	<i>Threat</i> ³	1%	3%	3%	3%
Violent tactics	<i>Make arrests</i> ⁴	10%	15%	18%	15%
	<i>Make evictions</i> ⁵	7%	3%	7%	5%
	<i>Use of physical force</i> ⁶	0%	4%	1%	2%
	<i>Use of weapon</i> ⁷	17%	4%	2%	6%
	<i>Combination of violent methods</i> ⁸	26%	32%	28%	30%
	<i>Confrontation</i> ⁹	7%	10%	8%	9%
Total		100% N=60	100% N=164	100% N=119	100% N=343
Chi Square = 29.253, p < .05					
Notes:					
1: Appear and do nothing refers to situations in which police show at the event but have no interaction with demonstrators. For example when they stand several meters away from the protest gathering just watching what is going on.					
2: Display force and take limited visible action. Police appears and sets up barricades, and brings hydrant trucks, armored fighting vehicles, aerial surveillance, mounted police on horses, police dogs, riot gear such as masks, helmets, shields					
3. Threat of force –or arrests– to end a protest event, disperse demonstrators, evict land occupation, or demand something from demonstrators. Newspaper reports that judge ordered raid, forceful eviction of land, property, or area. For example, use of sound dispersal weapons to end demonstration or judge orders forceful eviction of property or roadblock and arrests if people don't leave: <i>Clarín</i> , August 19 th , 2007 "Gendarmería impidió, por primera vez, un corte de ruta."					
4. Make arrests. Although this category does not involve brutal violence, arrests always involve some form of coercion.					
5. Evictions were placed as a separate form of action because most of the time these involve extreme violence by different security forces. Depending on the nature of the occupation (state territory occupied by indigenous communities, private housing occupied by squatters, <i>buildings (such as a factory) or public spaces such as parks roads.</i>) state forces could be federal, provincial or the border guard. Also, they may use dogs, riot gear, fire weapons, and even tanks or bulldozers to destroy precarious housing built by squatters.					
6 Use of physical involves: pushing, hitting, shoving, kicking, pulling hair					
7. Use of weapons include: tear gas, rubber bullets, led bullets, pepper spray, water cannons, fire					
8. Combination of physical force, weapons, equipment, arrests, and people wounded reported					
9. Confrontation between protesters and police. Both actors engage in violence.					

Table 7 below shows the percentage of times property appeared destroyed or damaged during protest events when police appeared each period.

Table C.7: Protest Events And Property Damaged By Period

Protest Events And Property Damaged By Period				
	Neoliberal <i>Menem</i> 1997/8	Crisis <i>de la Rúa</i> 2001/2	Progressive <i>Kirchner</i> 2006/7	Total
Property not damaged	39 65%	84 51%	67 56%	190 55%
Property damaged	21 35%	80 49%	52 44%	153 45%
Total	60 100%	164 100%	119 100%	343 100%
Chi-square=NS				

Table 8 below displays the different security forces that appeared at protest events in Greater BA area and all other locations

Table C.8: Security Forces Present in Greater Buenos Aires Area and All Other Locations

Security Forces At Protest Events In Greater BA Area And All Other Locations			
Security Force	Location		
	Greater BA Area	All Other Provinces	Total
Federal Police	84 48%	24 15%	108 32%
Provincial Police	23 13%	83 50%	106 31%
National Border Guard (<i>Gendarmería</i>)	2 1%	27 16%	29 9%
Infantry/Anti-riot police*	26 15%	5 3%	31 9%
Coast-Guard and Aviation Police	5 3%	0 0%	5 2%
Thugs – Police Not identified	0 0%	5 3%	5 2%
Judge	2 1%	1 1%	3 1%
Three or more forces act in combination**	35 20%	21 13%	56 16%
Total	177 100%	166 100%	343 100%
Chi-Square 116.67 p<0.001			
<p>Note: *Infantry and anti-riot police might also include divisions with horses, dogs, motorcycles and specially trained units. **Three forces acting in combination that include the forces mentioned in the table. Source: Protest data are from author's data set of protest events, and event catalogue created by Stony Brook University's Center for the Study of Contentious Politics in Latin America.</p>			

Table 8 above shows that in the Greater Buenos Aires area, most protest events were responded by Federal Police (48%). Anti-riot police and the combination of different forces also had a high presence (15% and 20% respectively) at protest events in Buenos Aires. The National Border Guard, however, had very low presence (1%) during the periods of this study in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.

Outside of Buenos Aires, provincial police appeared at least at half of all the episodes in which there was police presence. The Federal Police showed up on 15% of the events and several forces combined appeared at 13% of the events. It is interesting that the National Border Guard appeared on 16% of all the episodes that had some security forces attention outside of Buenos Aires. As mentioned above, although part of the security system, the Border Guard is a fully militarized force and between 1997 and 2007 its main function was of policing national border and federal highways. It was only in the 1980s that the National Border became part of the interior security system. It was part of the army before.

Table 9 below, displays claims for jobs, welfare and other claims by police tactic each period.

Table C.9: Claims For Jobs, Welfare And Other Claims By Police Tactic Each Period

Claims For Jobs, Welfare And Other Claims By Police Tactic Each Period				
Period	Police tactic	All Other Claims	For Jobs	Total
Neoliberal Menem 1997/8	Not violent	13 40,6%	7 25%	20 33%
	Violent	19 59%	21 75%	40 67%
	Total	32 100%	28 100%	60 100%
Chi-Square: 1.641 NS				
Crisis de la Rúa- Duhalde 2001/2	Not violent	35 42%	16 20%	51 31%
	Violent	49 58%	64 80%	113 69%
	Total	84 100%	80 100%	164 100%
Chi-Square: 8.977 p<0.05				
Progressive Kirchner 2006/7	Not violent	43 48%	2 7%	45 38%
	Violent	47 52%	27 93%	74 62%
	Total	90 100%	29 100%	119 100%
Chi-Square: 15.58 p<0.001				
Total	Not violent	91 44%	25 18%	116 34%
	Violent	115 56%	112 82%	227 66%
	Total	206 100%	137 100%	343 100%
Chi-square: 24.711: p<0.001				

Table 10 below displays the number of participants in the demonstrations and the type of police tactic.

Table C.10: Size of Demonstration By Police Tactic

Size Of Demonstration By Police Tactic			
Size of Protest Event	Non-violent police tactic	Violent police tactics	Total
Small (3-9 people)	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
Group (10-49 people)	9 12%	16 13%	25 13%
Large (50-99 people)	9 12%	15 13%	24 12%
Hundreds (100-999 people)	30 40%	54 45%	84 43%
Thousands (1,000-9,999 people)	19 25%	25 21%	44 23%
Tens of thousands (10,000 or more people)	9 12%	9 8%	18 9%
Total	76 100%	119 100%	195 100%

Table 11 below displays violent tactics by demonstrators and property damaged each period.

Table C.11: Demonstrators' Tactics By Property Damaged Each Period

Demonstrators Tactics By Property Damaged Each Period				
Periods	Demonstrators	No property damaged	Property damaged	Total
1997/8	Non-violent tactic	37 95%	8 38%	45 75%
	Violent tactics	2 5%	13 62%	15 25%
<i>Total</i>		39 100%	21 100%	60 100%
2001/2	Non-violent tactic	68 81%	32 40%	100 61%
	Violent tactics	16 19%	48 60%	64 39%
<i>Total</i>		84 100%	80 100%	164 100%
2006/7	Non-violent tactic	60 90%	20 38%	80 67%
	Violent tactics	7 10%	32 62%	39 33%
<i>Total</i>		67 100%	52 100%	119 100%

Table 12 below summarizes the forms of action by protesters and police tactics.



Table C.12: Demonstrators' Forms of Action By Police Tactic

Demonstrators' Forms Of Action By Police Tactic			
Demonstrators' form of action	Non-violent Police Tactic	Violent Police Tactic	Total
Roadblock	20 17%	35 15%	55 16%
Strike	4 3%	8 3%	12 3%
March	38 33%	58 26%	96 28%
Rally	8 7%	7 3%	15 4%
<i>Escrache</i>	10 9%	17 8%	27 8%
Building take over	8 7%	22 10%	30 9%
Land occupation	0 0%	13 6%	13 4%
Pot-banging	4 3%	7 3%	11 3%
Petition & signature collection	2 2%	2 1%	4 1%
Violent forms*	8 7%	13 6%	21 6%
Sit-in	6 5%	11 5%	17 5%
Confrontation	1 1%	3 1%	4 1%
Looting	3 3%	23 10%	26 8%
Other forms	4 3%	8 4%	12 4%
Total	116 100%	227 100%	343 100%

Note: *violent forms include throwing rocks, breaking or damaging target institutions.


Examples of Human Rights Campaigns

Figure 5: Campaign For Equal Rights in Security Ministry




The Ministry of Security's Gender Centers distributed postcards with different images and legends (2011-2015) advocating for gender identity rights, against gender discrimination, against harassment and more. Behind each postcard there are legends with the following texts: "Your identity is your right. We are here for you"; "Faced with a sexual harassment situation, make a complaint" and the telephone numbers, emails and addresses where to file the complaint.

Figure 6: Campaign For Equal Rights in Security Ministry



Examples of Anti-police Brutality and For Human Rights Campaigns

Figure 7: They Won't Scare Us



Faced with threats and extortion, the human rights group CORREPI launched a campaign in 2014 with the slogan, “they won’t scare us” encouraging members and the public to continue denouncing human rights abuses

Figure 8: Criminalization of Poverty

CHARLA ABIERTA SOBRE VIOLENCIA INSTITUCIONAL

CON LA INTERVENCIÓN ARTÍSTICA "EL MONÓLOGO DEL JUSTICIERO" DE GONZALO FUNES

**mi cara
mi ropa
y mi barrio
no son delito**

Campaña Nacional contra la Violencia Institucional

VIERNES 8
DE MAYO
16:00 HS.

EN EL CENTRO CULTURAL
NACIONAL Y POPULAR
LA CASA DE ENFRENTÉ
CÓRDOBA Y 25 DE MAYO - MAR DEL PLATA

CENTRO CULTURAL NACIONAL Y POPULAR
LA CASA DE ENFRENTÉ

In May 2015, the *Campaña Contra la Violencia Institucional* (Campaign Against Institutional Violence) held a conference to discuss the criminalization of poverty. The poster reads “my face, my clothing, and my neighborhood are not a crime”. The *Campaña Contra la Violencia Institucional* aims at controlling state forces at the territorial level. Lawyers, students, and volunteers work at the community level to denounce police maltreatment, train youth on their rights, and organize workshops among other activities at the community level.

Figure 9: Person Guilty of Genocide Lives Here



The *escrache* form of action

Poster distributed in the march of March 24 (no year found) commemorating the start of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. The poster contains a map showing the addresses of the people accused of genocide that were *escrachados* (publicly exposed) thus far. The poster was reprinted for the rallies held March 24 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006. Each year the design was changed and the addresses of the new *escrachados* were added.

http://grupodeartecallejero.blogspot.com.ar/2011_01_01_archive.html