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WILLFUL FORGETTING:
"WHITE INDIANS," TRAUMA,
AND RELATIONALITY
IN AMERICAN HISTORICAL LITERATURE

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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This work proposes a critical vocabulary for the study of American historical literature and Native American literature in the light of the genocide of Native America. Considering this genocide in terms of trauma theory (including perpetrator trauma) and relationality theory, it becomes clear that a "working-through" for the non-native postgenerations who have unintentionally inherited stolen lands (along with a self/other construction of non-Native and Native Americans) is ethically and socially desirable. In transcending the dominant self/other paradigm, one's orientation to US American and Native American historical literature is not about *possessing* knowledge of these histories and literatures, but rather *knowing* them in the relational sense, in terms of one's holistic relation to them in the present. The "white Indian," a historical or literary figure who has inhabited both EuroAmerican and Native society either symbolically or in reality, is a helpful point of focus in the study of both relational intersubjectivity and narrative strategies used to encourage the forgetting of genocide. Narratives by and about "white Indians" from the seventeenth century up until today can represent and perform various forms and degrees of relationality; they can also represent and perform the forgetting or justification of Native American genocide. Teaching these texts not as "dead letters" but as living messages deserving of an ethical and social response can encourage the working-through necessary to achieve more of a healing intercultural intersubjectivity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Trauma, Relationality, and "White Indians" in Literature

> The knowledge of horrible events periodically intrudes into public awareness but is rarely retained for long. Denial, repression, and dissociation operate on a social as well as an individual level.
>
> –Judith Herman, *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror*.

The contiguous United States occupies over three million square miles. This immense amount of land once teemed with numerous and varied ancient polities. Over the past 500 years, hundreds of societies and civilizations that once dominated North America, with their myriad cultures, languages and extensive trading networks, have been purposefully destroyed or dispossessed by the expansion of the early European colonies and the United States. Despite the fact that, according the National Congress of American Indians, there are over 300 Native Nations within the United States (NCAI 15), standard maps do not show them. These cultures and peoples have been made geographically invisible. This erasure from the mainstream frame of reference of the living cultures that flourished across the continent for thousands of years is only one contemporary piece of evidence of the forgetting of the American genocide.

Neither the conventional United States' national narrative nor any popular version of its national identity acknowledge or take responsibility for this genocide. In fact, many are still in full denial. For example, in 2012, Colorado State Senator Ellen Roberts refused to support a resolution acknowledging a Native American genocide because, she said, Indians were not actually extinct; ironically, she had earlier signed two resolutions recognizing the Armenian genocide and the Jewish Holocaust, both of which had survivors (Moya-Smith).

It has been known for some time that Adolph Hitler studied and admired the "efficiency of America's extermination—by starvation and uneven combat—of the red

savages" and was "very interested in the way the Indian population had rapidly declined due to epidemics and starvation when the United States government forced them to live on the reservations" (Mandelbaum). It seems that Hitler was inspired by US Native American policy to create ghettos and concentration camps. While trauma theory experienced one of its biggest growth spurts in response to the horrific suffering of Jewish people (and other "non-Aryans") during World War II, it has not addressed the specifics of the American genocide in great breadth or depth. Doing so would mean that US residents would need to fully come to terms with its own crimes against humanity; accepting these past traumas, as victim, perpetrator, or inherits is necessary to healing historical trauma. In other words, not only would the people need to understand the extent of the crimes committed against the original peoples of the land, but they would also have to find a subject position that would account for their own implication as beneficiaries of theft and genocide. This study proposes a critical vocabulary for the study of Native American and "American" literature that can simultaneously acknowledge the past and continuing traumas experienced by Native peoples, and offer each reader the potential to experience a holistic (intellectual, emotional and social) relationship to the trauma, based on cultural and personal intersubjectivity, which can help us see beyond the horizon of guilt.

In order to reach this goal, we must first define our terms. First, the term genocide needs to be addressed. It is an emotionally charged term, as well it should be. Part of its emotional weight comes from the Holocaust: in particular the horrifically conceived use of factory-like processes and machines to kill millions of innocent people.

"Structural genocide" is the term Patrick Wolfe proposes for what has happened, and which is still happening, in the United States. Wolfe's study of settler colonialism makes a case for genocide accomplished by means of settlement as a structure built into the colonization and expansion of United States territory (393). The agricultural lifeways of settlers who wanted their own plots of land of their own necessarily destroyed hunting grounds as well as villages and Native agriculture. In this process, the original occupants

of the land were not seen as sovereign peoples but as savage "Indians" (393)."[1] Even after the disappearance of the physical frontier, attacks on Native identity and sovereignty continued inwardly: with the dissolution of tribal sovereignties by the Supreme Court and the resulting nullification of all previous government treaties with those nations; with the infamous Dawes Allotment Act which broke tribal sovereignties and attempted to dissolve communities by "assigning" lands held in common by tribal nations to the tribe's individuals and families;[2] and with Indian boarding schools, which encouraged the breakup of families by taking children from their homes, forbidding them to speak their Native language or dress in Native apparel in order to assimilate them to white society and break the continuity of native family traditions (399). Colonial trading companies and governments purposefully introduced alcohol to Native societies, which had no cultural traditions to mediate its use, ultimately devastating communities with the effects of alcoholism. Andrew Jackson's administration ordered forced removals in which Native peoples of the old Southwest (now the Southeast) were herded, penned, and driven like cattle from their ancestral lands. The Native American genocide then is multi-modal, encompassing settler skirmishes, militia attacks, wars, removals, legal maneuverings, and education. Wolfe argues that these modalities all stem from settler colonialism, or structural colonialism.

How, then, can it be possible for a citizens of a nation founded on structural genocide to see the nation as such without suffering an unbearable cognitive dissonance? Trauma theory is most relevant in addressing atrocities that many would rather forget in

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[1]. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter Three, Pequot Native preacher and writer William Apess, when still a child, decided that whites came up with the term "Indian" in order to degrade people like him (31). Implicit in this revelation is the notion that America's native people did not originally see themselves as "Indians," but rather as members of individual nations.

[2]. Sioux physician, writer and Federal Indian Agent Charles Eastman described some of the subtler, yet more insidious effects of the allotment acts. He was in charge of registering the families of the Sioux for their allotments, and many Sioux family groups, including elders with multiple wives, did not fit into white America's definitions of "family" and so their legal rights were divided unevenly (184-185).

order to avoid the chasm between myth and history. In her seminal work *Trauma and Recovery* (1992), Judith Herman outlines distinct phases and effects of traumatic experience, traumatic memory, and recovery from trauma. A traumatic experience is an incident or series of incidents in which a subject experiences something so profoundly terrifying, objectifying, or morally wrong that known words and concepts are inadequate to describe it, and no action on the part of the survivor could have prevented it at the time; the traumatized person can only cope with the utter incomprehensibility through dissociation—a separation from aspects of the memory or experience.

In other words, memory is dis-membered. For instance, a visual memory of an assault may remain as a flashback, but the terror associated with it is severed from it and stored separately in the brain (43). The memory of this event cannot be integrated into a coherent narrative of one's life, but it exists in the psyche nonetheless, often in intrusive, vivid, sensory flashbacks (38), and in unconscious behavioral repetition of the event (39). The intensity of the flashbacks creates ruptures in the continuity of experience: strong emotions associated with the event are displaced elsewhere, and their displaced eruption, or behaviors developed to suppress them, also create ruptures in the continuity of conscious, narrative memory (38). Through dissociation or avoidance, subjects often experience a constriction in their field of consciousness, as they avoid any stimulus that may trigger the anxiety that heralds the proximity of the painful memory (44).

In no way do I wish to support the idea of a single mode or process of trauma, for every case is unique, and the process does not apply to collectivities in precisely the same way it applies to individuals. However, I intend to rely on core concepts of Herman's model: collective traumas in history which involve ethnic others, the perpetration of injustice, dispossession, and genocide are often not incorporated into the collective memory. This omission leaves the society fragmented, creating oppressed groups whose voices are not heard, whose realities are not represented in such a way as to create a pluralistic and egalitarian collective.

Clearly, for many, avoiding the confusion and guilt about belonging to a nation built on structural genocide is preferable to confronting this legacy. But if we can seek to

find a subject position that will allow us to explore this, one such possibility is offered by Marianne Hirsch's concept of postmemory and the postgeneration.

Hirsch explores various forms of memory of the Holocaust in the descendants of survivors. Dialogues and disputes over the "guardianship" of memories of the Holocaust include questions such as: "How do we recall the pain of others? What do we owe the survivors? How do we carry stories forward without appropriation? How are we implicated? Can the memory of genocide be transformed into action?" (104). In this study, out of respect for Native sovereignty, I will not make an incursion on Native writers' authority in addressing these questions. However, such a boundary need not entail a forgetting for non-Natives of this fundamental aspect of US history. Certainly the category of "non-Native" is the broad and necessarily includes many varied subjectivities and other historical traumas, but given the fact that the nation was built on deliberate genocide, it is important to consider American history and national identity in the light of this trauma and its many repercussions. Because of crimes committed against Native communities, countless non-Natives have inherited stolen lands and resources. Therefore Hirsch's questions seem appropriate for Natives and non-Native US citizens to consider in light of US structural ge**n**ocide.

Hirsch distinguishes between the experience of those directly involved in the Holocaust and the generations after—the descendants experience what Hirsch calls postmemory of the event (105), which arises from the silences, depression and despair of their parents. The next generations, hoping to restore a sense of connection, wish to re-animate these absences and gaps as living memory (111); yet, their power may also overwhelm descendants' own life stories (107).[3] For Hirsch, shared memory manifests in two categories: communicative family memory, embodied in and mediated by family dynamics and practice (110), and, citing the work of Jan Assman, national and cultural memory, which is mediated by symbolic rather than embodied systems. The ruptures of

[3]. This desire to reconstruct the past and create a living connection to it may account for fictional narratives in which a white man becomes an Indian, a topic that we shall explore later.

collective traumatic experience compromise both private and public forms of memory (111). The "post" generations work to fill the gap, counteract the loss by reactivating and re-embodying publicly mediated memory with embodied forms of expression, restoring a living, affective link to the past.

In other words, the dis-memberment of a traumatic history is treated with an intergenerational re-memberment: later generations seek to overcome the dissociations of trauma by restoring in some fashion not only lost memories, but also a lost affective relation to the past. Native American literature performs this work by creating narratives that link the past and the present in a meaningful way. However, non-Native historical literature tends to be silent about the legacy of genocide. Dissociation happens not only for the victims of trauma, but often for perpetrators as well, who often distance themselves for the crimes they have committed or from which they have benefitted. Therefore Hirsch's questions are pertinent, but how do we apply these concepts and terms to the perpetrators of past traumas and, more appropriately, their descendants or beneficiaries? And who are the descendants or beneficiaries? Are they victims or perpetrators or both? Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz argues that anyone living in "a settler society that has not come to terms with its past," even recent immigrants and their children, the "historical trauma" of the land theft "affects the assumptions and behaviors of living generations at any given time" (229). In fact, as we shall see below, the rhetoric of settler colonialism and trauma are extremely complex. Therefore, without assuming each subject's total implication, we need to sort out various subject positions and stances.

To begin with, trauma theory itself has in its history a model of perpetrator trauma that has been interpreted mainly for victims of trauma. Freud's literary model for the repetition compulsion in trauma was exemplified for him in one of the plotlines of Torquato Tasso's early modern epic/romance, *Jerusalem Delivered*:

> The hero, Tancred, has unwittingly slain Clorinda, the maiden he loved, who fought with him disguised in the armour of an enemy knight. After her burial he penetrates into the mysterious enchanted wood, the bane of the army of the crusaders. Here he hews down a tall tree with his

> sword, but from the gash in the trunk blood streams forth and the voice of Clorinda whose soul is imprisoned in the tree cries out to him in reproach that he has once more wrought a baleful deed on his beloved. (Freud 22)

The repetition of his fatal error, the insistence of the unrecognized trauma attempting to express itself and be understood, is interpreted by Freud as Tancred's crime (if unwitting), not Clorinda's experience. And yet most trauma theory focuses on victimhood/survivors. I do not intend here to revise trauma theory based on Tancred's centrality, but rather I see Freud's example as indicative of the complex layering of implication and innocence in contemporary political, legal, and cultural discourse for postgenerations. In order to come to a point of clarity about the postgenerations' relationship to the American genocide, we must sort out this tangled rhetorical skein.

Psychoanalyst and classicist Dr. Jonathan Shay has coined the term "moral injury" for the traumatic effects of battle on veterans: he defines moral injury as a wound to the moral self that happens when one commits an act one knows to be wrong in response to the command of legitimate authority in a high-stakes situation (183). Shay explains how moral injury negatively impacts character: ambitions, ideals, attachments and the ability to trust are all eroded. "When social trust is destroyed … there are few options: strike first; withdraw and isolate oneself from others …; or create deceptions, distractions, false identities, and [misleading] narratives" (186). A core component of this disorder is the loss of trusting and caring relationships.

In cases where a perpetrator does not face the condition of moral injury, claims of victimhood—even potential victimhood—are often used to justify past and/or continued violence. From Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law to the nation's pre-emptive invasion of sovereign countries, claiming a subjective potential victimhood is enough to warrant the use of deadly force even for those who have the upper hand.

The suffering of a soldier with moral injury, PTSD or some combination thereof is real enough; however, the way the soldier's suffering is presented can reinforce a collective sense of innocence and victimhood in the nation, enabling both authorities and

ordinary citizens to avoid facing their own implication in the violence done to others. Jesse Kirkpatrick's article "Military Drone Operators Risk a Serious Injury" argues that pilots of military drones, who all too often injure or kill innocent noncombatants, are owed the heroic status of soldiers on the ground because they risk moral injury. According to Kirkpatrick's logic, the guilt felt for killing innocent people is an injury of more concern than the injuries inflicted by the drone operator. Thus violating one's conscience becomes a heroic act. A different rhetoric suggesting the innocence of US military actions is particularly evident in one Wounded Warrior Project video, which portrays a veteran who has been disabled in both movement and speech. A tearful relative attests to the young veteran's courage while sentimental music plays. No mention is made of how, when, or where he was wounded. For all the viewer knows, he could have been hit by "friendly" fire or wounded in a helicopter accident. The lack of political or military context discourages any critical thought about US complicity in the wounding of this apparently wholesome damaged soldier; instead, it creates a living martyr for "freedom."

This rhetoric of innocence is not only used episodically, it is endemic to US national identity. Dunbar-Ortiz notes how the continued view of vulnerable "settlers in their circled covered wagons" as "valiant" implicitly frames the land theft and killing involved in settler colonialism as brave and laudable acts (94). The pervasiveness of this intrepid "innocence" goes hand in hand with a conscious and hostile labeling at work in the military: Dunbar-Ortiz quotes Robert D. Kaplan, a military analyst and writer, who explains how whenever he visits troops in places such as Columbia, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq, he is invariably greeted with the phrase "Welcome to Injun Country"—clearly, these military personnel see themselves as continuing the tradition of the 19th century US army in "taming the frontier" (220). This disturbing sense of playing cowboys and Indians with human lives and foreign sovereignties is not only evidence of the continued aggression and colonization built into structural genocide (or the "taming" that is tantamount to the "terraforming" of global capitalism), but also clear evidence of many Americans' inability to emotionally and socially process the horror of this history. For nationalists in the postgenerations, the inability and/or unwillingness to "work

through" perpetrator trauma and guilt enables them to perpetuate the trauma. And even for those who are wary of nationalism, the structural nature of the genocide perpetrated by settler culture makes it difficult to see past the constructs in which we operate.

However, articulation of the forms of implication for the postgeneration may be gleaned from Bernhard Giesen's work on what he terms "perpetrator trauma" in post-Nazi Germany. Giesen notes several characteristics of perpetrator trauma in culture and discourse specific to Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. While the Holocaust was a more compressed series of events in time than the five hundred years long American genocide, Giesen's concepts apply to some specifics of the Native American holocaust (114).

Kiyoteru Tsutsui identifies the problem of perpetrator trauma as part of a global growth in awareness and historical responsibility:

> With the recent rise of global norms that call for revisiting past human rights violations,, a growing number of nations have had to confront their own ugly pasts, be it war crimes, genocide, state repression, slavery, or apartheid. In this process, many nations have had to deal with "the trauma of perpetration," guilt-inducing memories of perpetration of severe human rights violations. How do nations square these difficult memories with the typically triumphant master narrative of their national history? (1390)

The first aspects of Giesen's perpetrator trauma are denial and dissociation. In the US, schoolchildren are taught about the traditional ways of Native American people, but there is still a stark silence about the hundreds of varied cultures and languages, with trading networks along coastlines and rivers, who were completely dispossessed and nearly all killed for their land and resources. Similarly, discussions of actual living Native societies and the challenges they face are rare. In fact, a constructed "pastness" of Native American trauma seems to make it a non-issue for many. And, as Herman notes, "The

ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness" (1). Professors teaching in the humanities and social sciences often come up against the obstacle of student denial; most students are willing to accept that atrocities, racism, and injustice happened in the past, but maintain that these crimes are no longer an issue. For example, Kenneth W. Stikkers notes that

> [many] white Americans believe that America has entered a "post-racial" age, especially with the election of a Black president, and that race and racism are no longer significant factors in American life. Virtually no people of color agree with that judgment. Fifty-four percent of white Americans believe that "[c]ivil rights for blacks have 'greatly improved' in [their] own lifetime," while only 25% of Blacks think so, and 9% of Blacks believe that matters have gotten worse. (2)

This split in perspective speaks to a narrative dissociation in US culture and history, as well as the notion that the past is somehow essentially different from the present. If white postgenerations are in denial, it may not only be an avoidance of guilt (as in the rhetoric of innocence), but denial can also derive from a lack of specific knowledge about the embeddedness of racism in the culture of the US, as well as a lack of specific knowledge about how racism works. For Kim and Sundstrom,

> [it] is not enough merely to make people aware that racism exists in the present, for accounts of racism tend to have a generality that obscures important particularities of group-specific types of racism: e.g., the genocide-based racism against Native Americans differs notably from the slavery-based racism against African Americans, and the racist anti-Semitism directed at Jews is distinct in expression and historical effect. Indeed…racism is more deeply tied to its context than is commonly recognized, and those contexts are significantly, even if not uniquely, national. Just as racism occurs within contexts, the obscuring of particular racisms also is contextualized. (21)

The working-through of denial and dissociation for the postgeneration requires both inquiry specific to historical circumstances and narratives of national identity, and a wider awareness that there are, indeed, deep and ongoing historical traumas that members of the postgeneration may not be responsible for creating, but are responsible for understanding. The study of American literatures in juxtaposition can help with this process, as examples of perpetrator trauma become evident in many texts.

Another factor in Giesen's perpetrator trauma is demonization and decoupling. Demonization, of course, blames the one who is being treated unjustly by constructing him/her/them as deserving of such treatment; but it also applies to the assignment of blame for atrocities. For example, the widely publicized cruelties of the Spaniards against Native peoples seemed to make exploitative English trade and land practices mild in comparison (theblacklegendproject). Decoupling is a separation of one's own subjectivity from the perpetrators; attributing pastness to a phenomenon is one common method of decoupling. My children are currently being taught about the traditional ways of the Native Americans as they lived before the European invasion. Their notion of Native American peoples is set in some other past reality, a place more of imagination than of social reality. How can students come to understand that what happened hundreds of years ago is not in some separate space of the past, but still present in various ways? Despite their sympathetic intentions, popular films such as *Avatar* and *Dances with Wolves* absolve audiences of guilt about living on stolen or swindled land, because viewers identify with the good guys who have not only become Natives, but champions of and for the Natives. The films place the Native people in some other realm, e.g. the past, as in Costner's film, or on some other planet, as in Cameron's. Either way, in the act of leaving the theater enchanted by these tales of noble white Indians, the audience decouples simultaneously from the past and from whites who perpetrate cruelties. There is no room for consideration of how the colonialisms represented may actually still be working.

Giesen also identifies withdrawal from the traumatic events as a key component in perpetrator trauma. In the 19th century, once the strongest Native tribes or alliances

were no longer a threat to the expansion of US territory, Indian peoples became imaginary, romantic figures for entertainment. Forced removal onto reservations coincidentally ensured that their suffering would remain unseen and unknown by most whites, who could then withdraw any concern from real Natives and enjoy the sentimentality of romanticized Indians in theater and fiction. For instance, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow wrote a highly popular epic poem called *The Song of Hiawatha* (1855) (poets.org). Using Ojibwa stories he learned from Henry Rowe Schoolcraft and his Ojibwa spouse, Jane Johnson, or O-bah-bahm-wawa-ge-zhe-go-qua (The Woman of the Sound Which the Stars Make Rushing Through the Sky) (Morris 9), Longfellow twisted the mythic figure of Hiawatha to serve the colonial agenda, as Hiawatha teaches his people the settled life of the agriculturalist and then sails off into the sunset, bidding the people to follow the leadership of white Christians. Not only did Longfellow turn a mythic Native hero into a mouthpiece for the US agenda, but he also used a European epic form to give it a European sense of antiquity (Morris 10). *The Song of Hiawatha* was the best-selling poem of the 1850's (Nyong'O 88).[4] Its widespread popularity speaks to the white audience's withdrawal from any sense of the urgent needs and struggles of Native people to preserve their communities and cultures in the wake of the massive and traumatic forced removals in the decades before its publication.

Lastly, in perpetrator trauma, Giesen observes the objectification of trauma. Museums display Indian artifacts as dead relics and Natives as primitive people in dusty dioramas. Certain aspects of New Ageism and tourism in the vicinity of Indian polities help people "identify" with Indians or purchase a little piece of identification. A deep reckoning with the trauma of the perpetrator, either in the past or the present, is avoided at all costs, and thus the "trauma" is no trauma at all but a fiction of colonial commemoration.

All of the aspects of perpetrator trauma Giesen identifies rest on a foundation of a self/other constructs: dissociation, demonization, decoupling, and withdrawal and

[4]. In fact, the poem is still read aloud as a tourist attraction at Minnehaha Falls in Minnesota (Amy Moore).

objectification are all possible when one group assumes its subjectivity to be objective, without serious regard for others' experiences of reality.

Human suffering (of those all too often seen as "others"), stemming from prejudice, isolation, poverty, alcoholism and suicide, are all continuations of the historical trauma of white US-Native relations; as Ann Kaplan has noted, there are various kinds and degrees of trauma for sufferers and survivors (1). Collective manifestations of postgenerational culpability include the dissociation or "forgetting" of US crimes against Native Americans as well as the separation of American literature and history into "American" and "Native American." These deep problems are due in part to the dissociations of cultural memory, fragmentations of the storytelling that creates history. In identifying this dissociation as such, I in no way suggest that a more complete Native American history should be "assimilated" into US history, or that there should be one grand unified history of everything; that in itself would be a colonialist pursuit. A "mainstream" or whitened history which claims ownership of Native history and Native historical trauma would only perpetuate trauma for those whose voices and experiences have been glossed over, and whose culture has been appropriated, twisted into stereotypical representations, and locked into the past. More to the point is what Saira Mohamed argues: that trauma itself has no moral valence; it is a human condition that must be worked through in order for communities to coexist peacefully (PAGE).

Both critically and pedagogically, understanding aspects of perpetrator trauma from a postgenerational stance can allow readers to digest these patterns and identify them in literature. As the specifics of American atrocities and their "mediation" or erasure through literature comes into focus, members of the postgenerations can come to understand different degrees and types of contemporary implications. These concepts can help us critically and pedagogically create a non-defensive (non self/other) stance for deeper inquiry into literary evidence of the ongoing perpetration and denial of trauma.

For when it comes to those suffering from PTSD, there is, in an experiential sense, no past; in individual trauma, even decades after the incident, the traumatized person relives the event as if it were incessantly happening in the here and now (Herman

37). For postgenerations, individual and collective memory can still be influenced by gaps, fragments of trauma, absences, and silences (Hirsch 5). In Sherman Alexie's *Indian Killer*, a murder mystery set in contemporary Seattle, Alexie creates a metaphor for Indian rage in the mysterious "Killer," whose presence and actions spark an outbreak of Indian-white violence. Each violent or appropriative encounter evokes the traumatic past, brings it into the present in acts of violent rage. In the face of non-Native ignorance, objectification, appropriation and/or "forgetting," Alexie challenges the reader to confront and understand Indian rage at centuries of injustice, but also shows characters attempting to overcome the self/other relation of white American and Native American, but failing to do so.

Clinical psychoanalyst Stephen Mitchell offers alternatives to the limitations of the self/other paradigm. Mitchell's *Relationality: From Attachment to Intersubjectivity* (2000) is a groundbreaking, clinically oriented work, which synthesizes and develops psychoanalytic concepts that can contribute insights into recovery from the traumas perpetuated by self/other constructs. Briefly, Mitchell proposes a hierarchical scheme of self-states: the first and most basic is the narcissistic state of oneness, experienced by an infant with her mother, in which there is no separation of self and other; the second state is one of shared affect, in which a group of people share an emotion (such as crowds cheering at a football game or audiences watching a melodrama); the third state is an experience of the world in terms of self-other configurations, the familiar defining of Self against Other, Us vs. Them; and finally, the most complex and highest ranking state in Mitchell's formulation—intersubjectivity, which is a self-state constituted by the acknowledgement of self and others as subjects (58).

The Cartesian self of modernity—one of the grounding concepts of modern forms of authority as well as personhood—is a monad experiencing the world only through awareness of its own mind, whereas contemporary philosophy and psychology now understand the self as arising from a social and linguistic community. Subjectivity is not solipsistic, arising on its own and in Lockean fashion deciding to join one society or another; the individual and the society are mutually constitutive just as subjectivity and

intersubjectivity are mutually constitutive (Mitchell xi-xii). In contrast to the intersubjective awareness Mitchell describes Wolfe sees, in the workings of settler colonialism, an emergent markers of modernity: a hierarchical "chain of command" which is structured by the notion that the subjectivity of the sovereign denies the subjectivity of those live outside the hierarchy. The colonial chain of command reaches across national borders and extends beyond the metropole to the frontiers, where sovereignty is implicit in settler incursion on Indigenous lands, forces of the international market (including demand for the resources of the land, the landlessness of European settler immigrants), and the prioritization of individuality as a justification for attacks on tribal sovereignty (393).

Native American critic Shawn Wilson's definition of relationality begins where Mitchell's leaves off. For Wilson and other Native American scholars, community is built on human relations and human relationship to the land (80). Space between people, and between people and land, is sacred and ceremony helps us come into a closer relation, a shared space. This sense of sacred and shared space is more important than time (or history); academic research as theorized by Wilson is a ceremony done with the intention of bringing ideas into closer relation—drawing connections—thereby inviting people into closer relation (87). In this light, knowledge is not about the possession of facts, but about knowing more deeply, being not only aware of, but part of, a more conscious relationality. In French there are two verbs for "to know": 1) *savoir*, which denotes the possession of knowledge, and 2) *connaitre*, which denotes knowing a person or place. Without this clear distinction in English, I propose using "knowledge" and "knowing" respectively to represent these different forms of knowledge, as well as the incorporation of more profound knowing in our quest for knowledge. For, as Philip J. Deloria states, "playing Indian has been as much about reading books as it has been about meeting Native people" (189).

Thus, the extension of trauma theory to include perpetrator guilt in the American genocide, and the notion of degrees of implication and responsibility for postgenerations, ultimately lead to a focus on intercultural intersubjectivity and relational knowing of real

people, real circumstances, and the creation of new relationships within and without the academy.

This focus can help address some of the current concerns of numerous scholars working in postcolonial theory, American literary theory, historiography and American Studies. For example, Irene Visser notes that many critics in postcolonial studies reject trauma theory, claiming that its basis in psychoanalysis and deconstruction is too narrow for their purposes (1). Extending literary psychoanalytic theory to include relationality, as Mitchell does, and also to include perpetrator trauma offers postcolonialism additional interpretive tools for addressing the moral and relational realities that colonialism attempts to hide, and offers the possibility of a way forward in postcolonial relations. In the field of American Studies, George Lipsitz has identified a moment of crisis as transnational entities, communication technologies, and people challenge the very notion of the nation as defining the boundaries of academic disciplines, with the understanding of these boundaries as dangerous. The nation-state as a primary site for the conceptualization of history, culture and politics has created unilateral histories which shape the cultural narratives derived from those histories (17). For instance, the Cold War reinforced a conception of the world in a self-other configuration of us and them, East and West, right and left (18). These self-other configurations leave us cognitively unprepared to comprehend the functions of culture and the formation of nations in relation to one another; these oversimplified binary constructions leave us inept in the face of polylateral histories and cultures (18). Thus there is a strong case for creating a relationality-based modality of study for "American" and "Native American" literature, for these seemingly separate histories are still happening, and their effects—for both survivors and their descendants—are not merely in the past, but continue in the present.

In defiance of the construct of Native "pastness," Gerald Vizenor has developed the concept of survivance at work in Native American literature. Survivance bears inflections and valences from varied interpretations, but here I wish to focus on three main aspects: 1) as an assurance that the story of Native people is continually unfolding; survivance rejects "terminal creeds" which promote a sense that the Natives are somehow

"gone" or existing as or in some version of the past (1); 2) as a refusal of tragedy and "victimry," but focuses on adaptation and survival (2); 3) as the space of what Vizenor calls the "fourth person," a concept which, in keeping with Mitchell's intersubjectivity, denies the dominance of the subject-object relation embedded in the hierarchies and binaries of modern epistemology and the English language (2).

In Vizenor's anthology on survivance, Deborah Madsen, who describes the destruction of the Anishinaabe world in terms of "Post-Apocalyptic Stress Syndrome" (64) has invited critics to read and revise trauma theory through Native American literature (63). Similarly, Louis Owens has called for a "theoretical discourse that will encourage dialogue with [Native American] literature rather than merely overlaying it with an authoritative and ill-fitting European theory-grid" (38).

In response to a crisis of national identity which is currently manifesting as an unhealthy nostalgia for a rigidly defined American past (e.g. the Tea Party movement), Lipsitz calls for scholars to develop "new and greatly needed forms of knowledge," to study "ethnic" and "American" literature and culture in a more "theorized and *knowing* way" (xvii, emphasis mine).

In answer to these various critics' call for and gestures toward a new approach to the study of American literature (and culture), aspects of perpetrator trauma theory, relationality theory, and survivance theory can encourage an understanding of how the trauma of the past can be addressed in such a way as to transcend self-other configurations and promote intersubjective responses to authors, to promote intercultural intersubjectivity in studying "white" and Native American works intertextually. The ultimate goal is to give readers the tools to begin to address the five hundred-years-old wound of Native American genocide not only intellectually, but also emotionally and socially.

Peter Nabokov writes of a Hopi view of history in which the story is planted like a seed into the listener. He quotes Hopi artist Michael Kabotie: "The Hopi believe that if you want to teach a person the history or the song that is deeply connected to our history you feed them corn. You're planting this history into this person. You're planting your

song into this person. That way that history will grow inside him" (41). My proposed approach derives inspiration from this metaphor, in that, once given the critical tools to transcend self-other formations and allow for a holistic response to experiential intersubjectivity, readers will have a "seed" for intersubjective social responses, which can manifest according to their unique personhood and circumstances.

Naturally this project can and should be expanded to include other canonically segregated literatures as well, but I do not presume to present a one-size-fits-all theory here; the issues and traumas of US indigenous people differ from those facing immigrant populations and their descendants, or the postgenerations of slavery and Jim Crow.

Inhabiting the Present

Giesen indicates that intercultural mourning over the dead—along with the transformation of those constructed as national heroes into victims of violence[5]—is the only way to "blur" the conflicts of the past.[6] The spectacle of shared remembrance by sincere and untainted representatives of polities that have perpetrated and suffered atrocities mourning together actually acknowledges traumatic loss and neutralizes nationalistic tensions. Giesen also posits this turn to remembrance as a new model for national identity (153-154).

Enlightenment and industrial notions of progress have ended in horrors such as Stalinism, wars for world domination, mass exploitation, and genocides; thus, many nations cannot in truth and good conscience look to a utopian future but must instead face the realities of the past via public rituals of confession (154). Perhaps this model for national remembrance will enable more people to enter the present more fully, more relationally. Philip DeLoria notes that many Indians see white Americans as not

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[5]. Shay's work on moral injury seems to be in keeping with this change in perspective.
[6]. I interpret Giesen's "blur" as a dissolution the self/other divisions of nation/race/ethnicity/religion, etc.

"finished"; if he gestures toward a model of national identity that is more intimately tied to the land, one can also apply this notion of being unfinished to the unfinished work of creating a national identity, which publicly acknowledges its past transgressions in taking the land and which can mourn side by side with Natives (191).

At issue here is the question of how American history is "re-membered," and I use this term with an emphasis on my earlier claim that history has been "dismembered"—as portions of it have been cut off, dissociated from other portions, as Native American history has not been integrated adequately into the popular imagining of American history. Through approaching "American" and Native American texts intertextually and intersubjectively, with the goal of knowing rather than possessing knowledge, it may be possible for more people to understand the past and ongoing reality of this trauma and respond to it ethically and socially—not only through mourning, but perhaps beyond the current horizon in unforeseen, new, and creative relationships and events.

Why the "White Indian?"

Although the depth and breadth of the historical trauma of US–Native relations is not well understood in popular culture, there is, according to Philip Deloria, a long tradition of American whites "playing Indian"—appropriating Indian names, dress, drumming, etc.—in order to create uniquely "American" identities. However, these appropriations, from the Boston Tea Party to the Boy Scouts, are far removed from any considerations of inequality or actual gatherings of whites and Native Americans (190-191).

The "white Indian" is a fascinating figure in popular culture, to be sure, and is often lambasted by academics as a figure of colonialist fantasy. Examples include the protagonists of films such as Sully in James Cameron's *Avatar*, Tommy and Bill Markham in John Boorman's *The Emerald Forest*, Ray Levoi in Michael Apted's *Thunderheart*, Frank Hopkins in Joe Johnston's *Hidalgo*, Ghost in Marcus Nispel's *The*

Pathfinder, and John Dunbar in Kevin Costner's *Dances with Wolves*. These protagonists create a sympathetic white subjectivity for audiences (allowing them to be "Indians" too), while becoming superior to the Native people themselves:[7] Sully becomes the tribe's champion, while uber-pale and blue-eyed Tommy becomes the chief of his tribe; Levoi—one quarter Indian but culturally white—turns out to be a reincarnated mythic Indian hero; Hopkins, also part Indian but not raised as such, wins a grueling horse race by praying to his Indian ancestors when his horse drops from exhaustion, and his prayers are answers as his horse rises to his feet, Hopkins mounts, and wins the race;[8] Ghost's adopted tribe bows to him as if he were a God when he saves them from his original people, Vikings who wish to kill the Natives; and John Dunbar becomes a Sioux *par excellence*.

Many members of the films' audiences—in Mitchell's "shared affect" state—can identify with the sympathetic, even superior "white Indian" subject position and therefore are excused from thinking of themselves as beneficiaries of genocide; this is one facet of what Anne Kaplan terms "empty empathy" (100). While these characters and plotlines are inexcusably appropriative and manifest the demonization, decoupling, withdrawal and objectification outlined by Giesen, they are also part of the rhetoric of innocence. It may well be that the insistence and recurrence of these white Indian narratives reveals a desire on the part of many non-Native Americans to be reconciled with the troubled past of US history, and to be exonerated from any relation to the largest genocide ever known. The very insistence of this type of white Indian tale, however, is evidence of its failure and inadequacy: its repetition can be read as the repression of guilt that has not been worked through. Specifically, these narratives do not address the difficult question of what it means to live on land that was stolen or swindled, while largely ignoring or

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[7]. Thus, the White Indian plotline fulfills the stereotype of the noble savage, with the noble savage being white.

[8]. As the character Walter Crow Horse from *Thunderheart* notes, "A man waits a long time to have a vision, and he may go his whole life without having one. Then along comes some instant Indian with a fucking Rolex [and he] has himself a vision" (Thunderheart).

denigrating Native neighbors. Still, it is a symptom manifesting from the very human need to address the underlying problem, perhaps even a basic human intuition of a foundational, relational state of being.

With qualification that this is in fact a speculative umbrella, an experimental sub-genre, I believe we can use the figure of the "white Indian" to exercise the vocabulary of postgenerational culpability and to explore the possibilities of relationality in literary study. For the purposes of comparison and contrast in this project, I loosely define "white Indians" as either Euro-Americans who have become Indians in some way, as well as Indians who have been seen as "whitened" in some way by religious or cultural assimilation. This definition is in no way meant to imply that every "white Indian" has some essential similarity; each case is unique in terms of person and historical context. I believe it is a useful category for bringing "American" and Native American texts together into a discourse of trauma, survivance, and relationality.

Eula Bliss notes that in German, the word for guilt also means debt. This semiotic overlap seems particularly appropriate for the postgenerations of US structural genocide. Bliss speculates that the condition of being white is "forgotten debt." She relates how she read *Little House on the Prairie* to her son, and how, at the end of book, the family realizes their house has been built illegally on Indian land. The French-speaking Indians leave, and so does the family. Bliss' son, hearing this, says he doesn't want to hear any more; he says he wishes he were "French" (as in Indian) (50). He does not want to be allied with the perpetrators of trauma, and, being a child, he is not prepared to shoulder the burden of debt.

Debt can only be remembered through pain, according to Bliss; Nietzsche noted that creditors in antiquity, like modern loan sharks, could physically maim a debtor for not paying up on time (50). Clearly Bliss' son was pained by the knowledge of American settlers living on stolen land. Bliss reflects that the pain of guilt results from the realization that what was once deemed a good life is founded on evil. She notes the rhetoric of innocence and empty empathy in pointing out useless, grandiose, empty gestures of those who wish to exonerate themselves from responsibility for, or relation to,

traumas they have inflicted, or the spoils of trauma which they have inherited. "White guilt/debt" may manifest, for some of the postgeneration, as a moral injury; for others, it may be a conscious and/or inherited denial, decoupling, appropriation, or objectification. However, this awareness of guilt as debt can act as a "hinge," Bliss notes (83). This hinge may enable the opening of a door between the gestures and traumas of self-other configurations and the practice of intersubjective relationality.

The understanding and actions of the knowing, socially constituted, intersubjective self offers possibilities for addressing the centuries-old wound of Native American/Euro-American history in the relational sense. The beneficiaries of the crimes against Native peoples can begin to learn to dialogue through their segregated literatures as well as through relational experience with Native neighbors in the academy and the local community. In the experience of intercultural or personal intersubjectivity, relationships must be able to withstand hearing another subject's frustration, rage and pain; thus, literary study can respond emotionally and socially to the rage, frustration and pain of what Native American literature expresses, and the symptoms of perpetrator trauma in "American" literature. To advocate for intersubjective relationality in literary study is to encourage and honor the unique experience of each reader's holistic engagement with narratives of history and their potential to create new relationships. To acknowledge US national genocidal trauma as members of an implicated postgeneration allows us to turn the hinge of guilt, so that the beneficiaries of the genocide can begin to respond to this history not only intellectually, but also emotionally, socially, and ethically.

Conclusion

In the following chapter, I will explore texts by two "white Indians" of the revolutionary era: Hector St. John de Crevecoeur and Colonel James Smith. The narratives involve the traumas of settler incursion on Indian lands, the resulting conflicts, and the violence of

the Seven Years' War and the Revolution. Included also are the capture and adoption of Smith by a Caughnewaga Mohawk community, and the "capture and adoption" of his son by a religious cult. Both Crevecoeur and Smith show an evolving perspective of traumatizing structures, and offer glimpses of imperfect alternative lifeways based on relationality with their Native neighbors. There are glimpses of cultural intersubjectivity in both of these works. And what both of these authors discover is that in the end, the rapaciousness of a colonizing economy is a structural trauma that turns people into mere objects, and which offers only illusions in return.

In Chapter Three I analyze the use of "white Indian" as a literary trope in the invention of US history. The focus is on two early historical romances, James Fenimore Cooper's *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*, and Catharine Maria Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie*. Both works were part of a literary movement which helped define the young Republic's identity and history, and which took on the challenge of representing the wronged Native American characters in an historical narrative which would create a positive national image for white readers. Each major Native American character in these works has a white "twin" who takes on the most palatable aspects of their counterpart's Indian identity, while shedding any actual taint of "Indianness." Through this distillation and separation process, noble savages sacrifice themselves to save their pure white friends, making way for the "superior" Euro-American Christian communities to grow. However, while one of these works relegates Indians to the past, the other brings the past into the present, offering some awareness of the continuity of time and trauma.

In Chapter Four, I compare the autobiographies of William Apess and George Copway, two Methodist missionary Native Americans—examples of the "whitened" Indian. I examine the ways in which Methodist evangelical conversion offered these authors a context and vocabulary to communicate their peoples' traumas and potential for improvement to white audiences. The conversion process also offered a way to work through trauma, as well as to communicate trauma into terms the white audience might understand. For both men, hopes for intercultural understanding were disappointed,

although their intersubjective approach to their readership resonates today as they ask their white readers to help their communities survive.

In the concluding chapter, I analyze a contemporary historical novel that performs intercultural intersubjectivity. Diane Glancy's *Stone Heart* places "official" history in dialogue with Indian presence and absence while overturning the colonialist myth of Sacajawea as Lewis and Clark's eager guide. I will also discuss pedagogical possibilities of using the White Indian figure along with the "live classroom" approach to facilitate the readers' abilities to distinguish self-other configurations of cultural identity from intercultural intersubjectivity, and also to facilitate relational experiences with native scholars and community members, in which "knowing" is prioritized over the conquest and possession of "knowledge."

CHAPTER TWO

A Tale of Two Jameses:
White Indians and the Spectrum from Intersubjectivity to Objectification

> There is, no doubt, a secret communion among good men throughout the world: a mental affinity, connecting them by a similitude of sentiments.
>
> –Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer*

Crevecoeur's White Indian Fantasy: Trauma, Adoption, and Adaptation

Hector St. John de Crevecoeur has been written about as, among other things, a citizen of England, an American farmer, a trader, a diplomat, a French aristocrat, an intellectual celebrity (Moore), a cartographer, and a spy (Ben-Zvi 73). However, he has yet to be written about seriously in terms of his real and imagined adoption into Native American groups. Of course, a reading of *Letters from an American Farmer* would seem to lend little support the idea of his being a white Indian: after all, Indian culture only comes into play in the final section of *Letters*, when Farmer James writes of his decision to move his family to an Indian community. This section reads rather like a desperate fantasy. However, both the structural critique of colonialism in *Letters* and Crevecoeur's experience as an adoptee of two Native groups inform James' decision.

Crevecoeur was no Farmer James. Born to a wealthy family in Normandy, France, in 1735, as a young man he traveled to England; in time he left England for New France where he served the French during the Seven Years' War (Bourdin and Williams 426). After his service, he traveled extensively through New York State and surrounding regions, where he was adopted into the Oneida tribe (Grabo 159, Travels). Circumstances surrounding this adoption are unclear, it is only mentioned briefly in *Travels*. Eventually he settled to start a farm and family (Bourdin and Williams 426). After the Revolutionary

War began, when the French Revolution was beginning to kindle, he returned to France to secure his family lands; he also sold *Letters from An American Farmer* to a publisher and it was issued in 1782. The American Revolution struck him a terrible blow, for while Crevecoeur was visiting France, his wife was killed in an Indian raid, and his farm was destroyed (Cunliffe 134). After returning permanently to France, in 1801 he published accounts of his former travels in New York State, and died in 1813. Serendipitously, a manuscript of *Sketches of Eighteenth Century America* was discovered in an attic in 1925, which gave critics much more insight into his intellectual sophistication through the depth of his reflections on the American Revolution (Cunliffe 134).

Letters from An American Farmer is an epistolary work consisting of letters sent by a fictional English farmer named James to a learned acquaintance in England. James is content with his colonial life, and even sees utopian possibilities in the agrarian society of colonial North America: a peaceful society of interdependent, autonomous agrarian people (Robinson 17). The novel charts changes in James' perspective as he travels and writes about different inflections and effects of colonialism, until finally, the Revolution breaks out. James, like Crevecoeur, writes that he does not wish to choose a side, and describes his fear that he and his family are now vulnerable to persecution and deadly attacks by both the rebels on the British and the American sides, as well as their Indian allies. In the final letter, James describes his plans to move his family into a Native American community far removed from the conflict.

In all, *Letters* shows a coherent process of discovery: the gradual, progressive realization of the structural trauma of the colonial system, its manifestation in war, and hope for a viable alternative in Native American society. This argument goes against the grain of past criticism. In "Crevecoeur's American: Beginning the World Anew," Norman S. Grabo views James' celebration of possibilities under a mild British rule in tension with "the horror that accompanied the irrational repudiation of that system"—the American Revolution (160). However, the horror in *Letters* comes well before the war: indeed, horror is at the heart of this colonial system, as James learns when he witnesses the suffering produced by slavery. Ed White, in "Crevecoeur in Wyoming," argues for a

mosaic reading of the differing perspectives in the work, a reading that does not seek unity but rather juxtaposes multiple perspectives in Crevecoeur's work. I certainly agree with a mosaic reading of Crevecoeur's collected works, but I argue that, when viewed as a trauma process and in the context his *Travels*, *Letters from an American Farmer* does in fact cohere. It charts a growing understanding of an economic and social structure that is inherently traumatic, and gestures toward a healthier form of community.

In early criticism of *Letters*, James' plan or fantasy of becoming a white Indian was dismissed as unimportant to the overall text (Cunliffe 134)). Some, according to David M. Robinson, have gone so far as to suggest that either the author or his character had lost his understanding of reality (19). Yet the case is quite the opposite: this final letter reveals a realistic and comprehensive grasp of the inhumanity of the colonial economy. The economic structure is inherently traumatic, and problems with the colonial economy lead to the revolution. Nature itself seems less idyllic than it appeared in his first letter, now violent, as conveyed in James' reports of battling snakes and the aggression of the hummingbird. Despite the revelation of the basic brutality of nature, James glimpses a vision of a life that may escape the evils of the colonial economy; still, he fosters no illusions about the hardships of living off the land. James' fantasy can be viewed in a more logical light when we consider Crevecoeur's experiences living as an Indian. In *Travels*, Crevecoeur reveals that he (or the persona of the work) is not only an adopted member of an Oneida Native American family, but has also has spent a winter living as an Iroquois; he has witnessed and experienced both war and peace in these cultures. Therefore, together with the last three chapters of *Travels*, "Distresses of a Frontier Man" is immensely important to understanding Crevecoeur's insight into intercultural relationality.

Crevecoeur's knowledge of Native American relationality is what enables him to critique European and American society so effectively. Central to James' growing understanding of colonial society are the artificial boundaries separating people from one another: the enjoyment of wealth by Southern plantation owners at the expense of enslaved African Americans exemplifies a lack of human intersubjectivity at the core of

the colonial economic system. An economy based on the exploitation of others is inherently trauma-producing and thus can be deemed structural trauma. Crevecoeur's knowledge and experience with Native American adoption provides James an option that, despite the character's trepidations, is a viable method for coping with loss and escaping the structural trauma built into the English colonial economy. The narrative arc, taking James from a life of seeming independence and fulfillment, through the terrors of war, and ultimately to a retreat from European American society into an unknown society with an uncertain future, makes *Letters From an American Farmer* not only an epistolary work of deep disillusionment at the comprehension of structural trauma, but also an early moment in the evolution of the "white Indian" figure.

James' Epistolary Journey

Crevecoeur's use of the epistolary form gestures toward a discontinuity or gap between the knowledge and perspective of the local (James and his farm) and the global (his learned correspondent). If we think of these letters in terms of the colonial tradition of "relations" (reports from the outlying territories written for authorities and audiences in the metropole)[1] then the issues of trauma and relationality in the colonizing (even globalizing) culture take center stage. For it is the global scale of these letters that reveals the traumatic objectification implicit in colonialism.

As James takes up the task of writing letters to a learned acquaintance in England, describing life in America, his perspective broadens until he achieves an understanding that brings him into crisis, changing his earlier perspective so completely that he observes that the society he lives in, once considered a utopia of autonomy and interdependence, is "fictitious" (202). Dennis Moore sees a continuation of this broadening perspective, identifying James' initial "myopia," and, in the expanded French version of *Letters*, an

[1]. For example, *A True Relation by Captain John Smith* (1608), *The Jesuit Relations* (1632 - 1673), and John Easton's 1675 *A Relation of the Indian War [King Philip's War]*.

increasing detachment from specific experiences, and a broader focus on systemic injustice (158). Reading *Letters* and *Travels* together, we can see four different sources of trauma at work. The most obvious trauma is that stemming from the outbreak of the Revolution and the horrors it brought to James and his family. The second is the inhuman trauma of slavery as witnessed by James. The third is the collective trauma of Native American nations. And the fourth is the structural trauma of colonial exploitation that has created all three.

James begins to imagine his European correspondent's objective view, even as his own conceptual territory is his local experience and relationship to the land and animals in his domain. His letter on Charleston reflects a bird's-eye view of the economic system in which he participates; accordingly, he witnesses the suffering wrought by slavery. The emphasis in his report is on the absence of human connection between the slave owners and the slaves. James notes how the urban lifestyle of the wealthy Southerners is unconscionably—and falsely—disconnected from the suffering and exploitation that is the source of its wealth:

> While all is joy, festivity, and happiness in Charles-Town, would you imagine that scenes of misery overspread in the country? Their ears by habit are become deaf, their hearts are hardened; they neither see, hear, nor feel for the woes of their poor slaves, from whose painful labours all their wealth proceeds. Here the horrors of slavery, the hardship of incessant toils, are unseen; and no one thinks with compassion of those showers of sweat and of tears which from the bodies of Africans, daily drop, and moisten the ground they till. (153)

Farmer James contrasts his own model of slavery with Southern chattel slavery: his "negros" work side by side with him, eat at his table with him, and are treated like family members. Second class family members, to be sure, but at least as persons and not as objects. Thus, at this point in the text, as James' letters to his European friend widen in

scope, he bears witness to the trauma inflicted by the agricultural system of slavery, and to its denial of relationality, while assuring himself that he is not part of such a system.

The chapter immediately following the letter on slavery draws the focus in to an intimate view of nature: most spectacularly, snakes. This passage dramatizes tension between a purportedly objective view and a relational reality. The letter begins, significantly, with James protesting that he does not especially want to write about snakes:

> Why would you prescribe this task? You know that what we take up ourselves seems always lighter than what is imposed on us by others. You insist on my saying something about our snakes; and, in relating what I know concerning them, were it not for two singularities, the one of which I saw, and the other I received from an eye-witness, I should have but very little to observe. (166)

Here James resists the pressure to see things from an objective view, with an eye to possessing a breadth of knowledge. Instead he insists on his partial and personal knowledge in relating anecdotes about the black snake, the copperhead, and the watersnake. While he domesticates their image by pointing out that rattlesnakes are not particularly dangerous if not aroused, by noting that they are tasty to eat, and by adding an example of a de-fanged rattler kept as a pet by Native Americans, he also acknowledges their dangerous aspects. His final example, of the fight between two snakes, parallels his description of the hummingbird as beautiful but fierce and potentially deadly—to each other. James notes that hummingbirds "often fight with the fury of lions, until one of the combatants falls a sacrifice and dies" (170). The two snakes' battle was "uncommon and beautiful," and their "eyes seemed on fire and ready to start out of their heads" (172). In the earliest chapter, James views nature as something that can be tamed and domesticated; here he bears witness to its sublimity and brutality.

The symbolism of the snake in the era of the revolution also hints at a new wariness of danger not only in nature but also in colonialism and the potential for

rebellion. Benjamin Franklin's propagandistic drawing of a segmented snake represents the colonies, which are being urged to unify: "JOIN, or DIE." Zachary McLeod Hutchins sees Crevecoeur using his description of the slaveholding South as a snake, and the battle between a rattlesnake and a watersnake joined at the tail as a sign of the danger of the united segments (696). For James, who has been content with mild and distant government, the unified snake segments can be read as the danger of stronger, more centralized authority, and, perhaps, the war to come. James' view is shifting, becoming warily critical of both nature and colonialism; his early agricultural Eden was never truly a paradise.

Furthermore, the letter that follows parodies James' initial perspective, and the nature of European interest in the colonial project. This letter is not from James, but from a "Russian gentleman" (Iwan) who visits the farm of botanist John Bertram. The Russian, seeing a model for the development of his country in what he observes on Bertram's farm, expresses a utopian hope for a rational society of bounty produced by control over nature. One ironic tension in this letter is the fact that Iwan decries slavery as an "ancient barbarous custom" (283). And yet, unjust social hierarchies are not critiqued; indeed, they are admired: "I observed, in all the operations of his farm, as well as in the mutual correspondence between the master and the inferior members of his family, the greatest ease and decorum" (182). The naturalized hierarchy conceived of by the "genteel" Russian shows his limited interpretation of democracy. Iwan's vision of democracy as a milder form of feudalism ironically reflects James' critique of colonialism and his own former naiveté.

As Bertram shows Iwan around the land, the Russian inquires about banks Bertram's laborers are building. The botanist explains that the farmland has been reclaimed from "useless" and "putrid" wetlands of the Schuylkill River; these lands now "enricheth and embellisheth" the surrounding communities (176). And yet these very communities are compared by Iwan to the streets of dead Pompeii:

> Though their foundations are now so recent, and so well remembered, yet their origin will puzzle posterity as much

> as we are now puzzled to ascertain the beginning of those which time has destroyed. Your new buildings, your streets, put me in mind of those of the city of Pompeia. (175)

This European perspective of world history anticipates the doom of a hopeful new society: the gravity of its past foresees its passing. Iwan's perspective both objectifies nature and conceives of civilizations in a stadialist-inspired, cyclical mode. Through this European visitor's perspective, Crevecoeur suggests that since a civilization that upholds slavery cannot last, and since the stadialist perspective foretells civilization's ultimate crumbling and return to savagery, it would seem that the utopian experiment about which Iwan and Bertram are so optimistic is doomed.[2]

With these two letters, Crevecoeur has taken James' broadening perception to a perspective completely incompatible with his earlier utopian vision of "improvement." The thread connecting the local view and the global view is finally broken at the end with James' last letter, "Distresses of a Frontier Man." Indeed, as James' retreat from European American society is concomitant with the end of his letter-writing, this letter suggests that the local and the global, the relational and the objectifying, are ultimately incommensurable. James will substitute his "relations" (i.e. letters) to his learned European friend with a more essential relationality. To preserve his family from danger from either the revolutionaries or the British, he plans to move to a large Indian community to the west, noting that "their system is sufficiently complete to answer all the primary wants of man, and to constitute him a social being, such as he ought to be in the great forest of nature" (199). James compares experiences of both cultures and finds that European American society is lacking in terms of the socially constituted self:

> By what power does it come to pass, that children, when they have been adopted young by these people, can never be prevailed on to re-adopt European manners? … there must be in their social bond something singularly

[2] For more information on the stadialist view of history, see George Dekker's *The American Historical Romance,* Chapter Three (73).

> captivating, and far superior to be any thing to be boasted of among us: for thousands of Europeans are Indians, and we have not one example of even one of those Aborigines having from choice become Europeans! There must be something more congenial to our native dispositions than the fictitious society in which we live. (202)

With the fictions stripped away and the cruelties, inequalities, and naivetés and injustices of colonial society exposed, "life appears to be mere accident, and of the worst kind: we are born to be victims of diseases and passions, of mischances and death: better not to be than to be miserable" (197). Realizing the dehumanizing disconnect between slaves and those who exploit them, between colonizing powers and colonists, between partisans and pacifists, James reveals that the ultimate lack of relationality which creates trauma for so many so often is built into the very structure and scope of empire.

Furthermore, this announcement occurs in the final letter of the book. But why does James not foresee writing more letters from the Native American village? He explicitly announces that this is his last letter; he cannot envision a continuation of correspondence from the Indian village, even though such a correspondence would have been entirely plausible, and perhaps of great interest to James' European acquaintance. Would his correspondent not want to learn about such a fascinating situation? Would James not want to have some sense of continuity with his acquaintance, as well as the opportunity to reflect and keep his intellect engaged? He certainly expresses a concern to preserve as much of his family's "civilized" nature as possible while living with the Indians. Yael Ben-Zvi sees James' plan as reflecting a desire for "voicelessness" (100). However, the Indian speeches represented in *Travels* do not suggest that there is anything "voiceless" about Native American culture at all. "Voicelessness" can only pertain Eurocentrically to a refusal to engage with European discourse. Accordingly, I maintain that James' retreat from the literary world, as Robinson notes, is a departure from the system that uses people to serve those in power, choosing the only available alternative (21). The end of letter-writing signifies the abandonment of the global, colonial view with its quest to possess knowledge; the end of correspondence with Europe represents a

turn toward the "knowing" of a richer social life. For Crevecoeur, despite the negative aspects he sees in Native cultures, this retreat can be read as an embrace of the "social bond" that James can only guess at. As James notes, "thousands" of Europeans have become Indians. Cultural exchange and intersubjectivity is happening outside the colonial system. While James explicitly states his wish for his children to not become fully acculturated as Indians while living in their community, this very boundary allows for cultural intersubjectivity, as, in James' vision, his family and members of the Native community live together while respecting cultural difference (208).

Crevecoeur as Indian Adoptee

In the years after his service as a surveyor in the Seven Years' War, and before he settled into farming life in New York State, Crevecoeur traveled extensively through the Ohio region and New York State, eventually (in 1801) publishing an account of his travels. These accounts support the notion of Crevecoeur's cosmopolitanism and breadth of knowledge—in his journeys, he meets and speaks knowledgably with people who are from or who have been to Poland, Jamaica, Antigua, Lisbon, and America, and shares observations about cultures and events in various parts of the world. Crevecoeur's experiences with Native Americans are presented on a level with his impressions of Europeans. In fact, the passages in *Travels* depicting Indian life are more extensive, both experientially and in quantity, than the other encounters, with three chapters devoted to experiences among Native Americans of New York State: specifically the Mohawk and Oneida tribes.

Chapter IX of *Travels*, "The Indian Council at Onondaga: The Great Debate Between Kesketomah and Koohassen," is divided into two parts. The first is a moving scene which depicts despairing people who have suffered tremendous loss. The second section describes the debate referred to in the chapter title, an argument over whether or not the community should embrace aspects of the whites' agricultural system and

technology in order to be as "strong" as the whites and stop the loss of territory, or whether to retain their traditional ways, preserving their treasured values of honor, courage, and independence.

In Chapter VIII, the narrator and his companion/interlocutor, Monsieur Herman, arrive at Onondaga, exchanging observations about indigenous peoples in general; the narrator expresses a sophisticated understanding that speaks to Crevecoeur's experience of "knowing" Native life vs. possessing knowledge about it. The following exchange illustrates this distinction.

> Narrator (to M. Herman): What difference does it make to the creative power whether we live under birch bark or gilded marble? When we occupy the place that she has set aside for us in the scale of being, her plan is fulfilled, no matter whether we are hunters, nomads, or farmers.
>
> Monsieur Herman: There have … been some great writers who have written beautiful discourses to prove that civilization is not a gain but a sad departure from the primitive and sublime imprint that we received from the Creator. I myself had been persuaded by them.
>
> Narrator: What those writers have said … was inspired only by a spirit of criticism and originality. They preconceived the savage being, whom they did not *know*, in order to satirize their contemporaries. (Chapter VII, emphasis mine)

Here Crevecoeur shows *knowing* (as opposed to *knowledge*: one is intersubjective, the other objective). He relates experiences of being among the Natives through their

devastating wars and their terrible winter hunger. He also refers to the horrific traditions of prisoner torture and ceremonial cannibalism.

This passage suggests that Crevecoeur accepts indigenous life as having a place in creation, in a "scale of being." "Scale" can denote hierarchy and ascension but also balance, ratio, level, and dimension; the term implies a multiplicity of states of humanity, all with flaws and strengths, acknowledging all as human without idealizing or dismissing any human condition in general. His cultural criticism also tempers any illusory utopianism about James' choice: the stronger social bond that the narrator of *Letters* hopes to find comes along with the regular practice of rituals that are horrific in European eyes. *Travels* shows a sophisticated understanding of cultural relativism.

More evidence of Crevecoeur's experience as a white Indian follows this discussion, as the narrator meets with his old friend Kesketomah. They converse about general happenings in the community, and of the speaker's adopted Indian family. Not only was the Frenchman adopted by the Oneida (Grabo 159), but he also recounts, in Chapter Ten, how he spent a winter living as an adoptee of a Mohawk community. After being groomed and dressed like a Mohawk, and given a Mohawk name, he states: "I found myself well lodged, fed and clothed as if I had been among my friends in Montreal" (Ch. X). Thus Crevecoeur most likely lived among the Native Americans in New York State and knew several as good friends, and as adopted family. This biographical fact, along with his complex reflections, brings to the final chapter of *Letters* a new significance. Firstly, Crevecoeur's "Indian" side is a rich area for study, opening possibilities for new interpretations of his other works. Secondly, the fact that the mind of the author that created Farmer James knew Native American life and then decided to have him consider living in an Indian society, suggests that James' fantasy is of life in a known, human, and richly relational space, not merely a despairing retreat beyond a liminal social horizon. This weight and significance is bolstered when James' choice is viewed in terms of structural trauma and its intercultural, relational remedy.

The Cure of Adoption

After speaking with Kesketomah, the narrator and M. Herman attend the Great Council of Onondaga. Two themes are addressed in Chapter IX, as the elders speak of traumatic personal losses as well as the collective trauma of entire communities dying. In the first section, a series of individuals come forward telling how they have encountered others who have suffered terrible losses: Wequash, whose wife has left him; Muskanehong, who has been widowed; Kahawabash, who exists in a near catatonic state as a black snake has killed his wife, most of his children, and most of his village, while every member of his wife's tribe (to whom he might have turned to as family) has died of smallpox. All of these despairing sufferers are reminded that life is full of evils, and are urged to take "the cure of adoption." It was a custom during this period for Natives in the Northeast to assuage their grief at the loss of loved ones by adopting someone from another tribe, or a white person, who, in a ceremony known as "requickening," will be given the name of the person who has died (Richter 38-39). The last of the sufferers discussed is a woman named Tiendarhah. While her husband was away hunting, she gave birth to a daughter, who died. Tiendarhah is on the verge of suicide; she fears her husband's reaction and wants to die before he returns. She is urged not to give in to this suicidal impulse; she is assured that her husband's grief would be compounded if she died, and would be lessened if he could comfort her. Again, the cure for the trauma of loss is a deepening understanding between people: an ongoing relationality, and also a closer bond. These personal losses are mitigated by re-integration into the community via a new relationship with an adopted person. Whether Crevecoeur witnessed this in reality, or created a composite representation of this part of the council, it is important enough to him that he devoted much attention to it. In either case, the world of Farmer James created by Crevecoeur is a fallen world fraught with the evils of empire (slavery and war) and the hazards of nature (the snakes and hummingbirds); however, there is a remedy. The suggested cure for personal traumas, these states of inconsolable loss and isolation, is a new intersubjectivity, a continuing close and personal relationality. On the spectrum of

relationality, this creation of community through intersubjectivity is a far cry from the structurally dictated dehumanization imposed by colonialism.

In the second half of Chapter IX, after the individuals' stories had been told, Kesketomah and Koohassen exchange their ideas for mitigating the crisis of the Native American groups whose populations have plummeted due to disease, armed conflict, alcohol, and the incursion of settlers onto their hunting grounds. Both wish to save their people from extinction: one pragmatically, the other culturally. Kesketomah urges everyone to farm and to forge iron so that they will have a stronger claim (in the eyes of the English) on their lands, and to have the kinds of tools and weaponry that would make them more formidable foes, as well as the kind of political stability that would enable them to multiply again; Koohassen argues against agriculturalism. It would degrade the Native people—they would no longer learn to be brave and free, they would instead become the craven and greedy, valuing money over honor, bound by governments and "lying writings." Crevecoeur presents the dilemma facing these people, communities, and cultures, succinctly. Kesketomah reminds the young and idealistic Koohassen that the world is radically changing, and in order to survive, the tribes must adapt. He observes that agriculture has allowed the Europeans to become populous and powerful, and that in order to compete, they would have to, in a sense, "adopt" it. Of note here is the fact that Crevecoeur has his farmer James do exactly what Kesketomah advises. Having realized the structural trauma of European empires, James plans a variation of what Crevecoeur's Native friend advises: become adopted, and adapt. Crevecoeur has James throw in his lot with the Natives. In *Travels,* the narrator criticizes the Indians for not turning to agriculture and is horrified by some of their ways: torture, lack of foresight, cannibalistic orgies and drunkenness. And yet he deals with the Native people as individuals, in friendship, on a human level, as in his conversation with Kesketomah about unwise sale of lands, new farms, and news of the speaker's adoptive family (*Travels* Ch. VIII). Even if the Native way of life is troubled and threatened, it is not illusory and offers the "cure" of strong bonds—the ability to recreate social bonds in the face of annihilating forces.

Even as the indigenous peoples faced overwhelming collective loss, so too were the colonies suffering. Crevecoeur's writing refuses to look away from the horrors of the Revolution, and he refuses to accept that the war is being fought for a noble cause. In one of Crevecoeur's *Sketches*, there is a short play in which an "American gentleman," Ecclestone, remarks:

> When the accounts of this mighty revolution arrive in Europe, nothing will appear there but the splendid effects. The insignificant cause will be overlooked; the low arts, this progressive succession of infatuations, which have pervaded the whole continent, will be unknown. The brave, the warlike Americans will be blazoned out as the examples of the world, as the veteran sons of the most rational liberty. Whereas we know how it is: how this country has been trepanned and insensibly led from one error to another. (*Sketches* Chapter 12)

Clearly Crevecoeur harbors no Romantic notions about the Revolution: for him the war was instigated by people who simply wanted more wealth and power than they could have under British rule, and they hid this motivation behind the ideal of liberty (Cunliffe 136-137). As Grabo has noted, "Distresses of a Frontier Man" is a general summation of eight other works by Crevecoeur detailing incidents such as the torture of a farmer by an angry revolutionary militia group, a massacre at Wilkes-Barre, the displacement of families, and other incidents of abuse, theft, and partisan violence (163-164). Dealing with a horrific war, as the "American gentleman" notes, by mythologizing it as a founding narrative, involves selective forgetting. But neither James nor Crevecoeur can forget. As Ben-Zvi notes, Crevecoeur's central concepts are "rooted in the irreconcilability of humanity and Eurocentric empire as simultaneously mutually constitutive and mutually exclusive terms" (74). In other words, for Crevecoeur, human social life is irreconcilable with the hierarchical and alienating structures imposed by society. Focusing on Crevecoeur's critique of Empire by itself, this is a brilliant articulation of the unfolding revelation at work in *Letters*.

However, such a statement is incomplete—a duality constructed without Crevecoeur's "knowing" and experience as an Indian adoptee; his Indian experience, I argue, has a significant impact on his conceptual framework. There is in fact a society stemming from the mutually constitutive joining of humanity and community: Indian life. It is not utopian in the least, but according to Crevecoeur, neither is it founded on illusion. It is not held together by the "mental affinity" Farmer James imagined in his introduction, but by a deeper social bond. Crevecoeur's insistence on dispelling illusions by recording and recalling the evils of the war challenges his readers to accept the injustice of what has happened, to mourn the loss of peace and unity, and to re-integrate the memories of war into the social world—perhaps even the collective identity—through story. In addition, adoption as Crevecoeur depicts it in native societies serves as a remedy for traumatic loss. Adoption, then, represents a faith in relationality, in the ability to adapt to irrevocable losses by forging strong social ties.

Chapter X of Crevecoeur's *Travels* includes a story about an Indian woman named Catta-Wassy. Her husband had vanished, captured by another tribe. She traveled two hundred miles on foot to find him, only to discover that he had been adopted and married to another woman. The community's leaders decided that the man should remain in his new situation. Catta-Wassy mourned, but eventually married another and became a much admired and well known farmer. This story parallels, in brief, the process that Koohassen objected to: a terrible loss, and a gradual adoption and adaptation. While the collectivities of Indian societies struggle with a relentless invasion and erosion of their worlds, and while the collectivity of Europe (and implicitly the United States), will, according to the "American gentleman," turn a blind eye to the savagery and traumas of the Revolution, Crevecoeur glimpses what is, perhaps, a model of recovery from traumatic loss. What Crevecoeur adopted from Native cultures must have left such an imprint upon him that even after the death of his wife in an Indian raid, he published this account of his travels and friendships among them.

Colonel James Smith: "Objectivity" and the Insistence of Relationality

Crevecoeur's Farmer James ultimately chooses Native American social ties over the fictitious society he once imagined as utopia, but which was in fact based on the structural trauma of exploitation and which resulted in a horrific and bloody revolution. James Smith experienced a reverse journey: from Indian adoption to participation in the war. A frontier-raised Pennsylvanian, he was captured at age 18 and from 1755-1759, he lived as a Caughnewagha Indian (262) with the name "Scoouwa" (T. Smith 7). After escaping from his Indian family, he went on to become a militia leader in frontier conflicts and in the Revolution.

Smith's captivity narrative mediates the humane qualities of Indian life he experiences as much as possible by breaking the narrative up with descriptions of land from a settler's perspective. His post-captivity section is similarly fraught with tension: many of Smith's actions point to the deep influence of his Indian coming-of-age, but he makes clear his ability and willingness to fight hostile Indians. Much later in his life, having, perhaps, reconciled himself to the trauma of his captivity by writing the narrative, Smith used his pen to attack a Shaker colony that had indoctrinated his son, critiquing some of the same traumatizing and exploitative dynamics realized by Crevecoeur's Farmer James.

Smith's structural attempts to contain the influence and importance of Indian relationships in his narrative, and to objectify his experience as well as the Natives, anticipates the Crimes against humanity which is the inheritance of most non-Native Americans. However, the content of his autobiography, together with biographical facts, suggest a sustained, if conflicted, cross-cultural intersubjectivity.

Trauma and Text

Trauma is characterized by "belatedness" (Kaplan 43), a delayed response to an event so overwhelming that it cannot be incorporated into the life story of the traumatized individual. Trauma is defined by the inability of the traumatized person to integrate an experience into a cogent narrative of his or her life; to integrate the story back into one's life, to re-member the dismembered memory, is a painstaking and gradual process (Herman 184). Thus, the full emotional response to the experience is delayed or "belated." In the preface to Smith's account, the author explains that although he was encouraged to do so, he did not publish an account of his captivity among Indians for almost forty years: he was a captive from 1755-1759, but delayed expanding on and publishing his journal until 1799 (262). He cites as a reason a general ignorance of Indian ways which would make his tale seem more like "fable or romance" than history (262). Andrew Newman, in line with Smith himself, argues that the deferral of the narrative might have been a fear of a negative response (53). Certainly the political environment of settler colonialism and retribution against tribes who allied with the French during the Seven Years' War and with the British during the Revolution would not have been conducive to Smith's sensitive and thought-provoking portrait of Caughnewaga (Mohawk) culture. However, trauma may also have played a large part in his sense of the anticipated reception of his experience as unreal. As trauma creates a delayed response, and memories of trauma are not bound by chronological or linear time **(**Herman 89**),** I argue that the text reflects the trauma of captivity through: 1) a bifurcation of the text into subjective narrative passages and objective descriptions; 2) disruptions and layerings of time; and 3) distinct representations of knowledge and knowing.

Smith's text consists of two different modes of writing: straightforward narrative, and non-narrative (objective) framing or containment strategies. In one of his opening statements, he frames his narrative as a simple rendering of events that will be easy and

entertaining to read. In short, a great story of an extraordinary experience. However, he carefully phrases it so as to distance himself from the narrative: “Believing nature always outshines art, [I] have thought, that occurrences truly and plainly stated, as they happened, would make the best history, be better understood, and most entertaining” (263). In this excerpt from the preface, Smith invites the reader to an ostensibly transparent window into his years of captivity. However, his translation of experience into “occurrences” displaces him as relational subject; occurrences simply happen—they are facts. Excising the concept of experience in the title, Smith distances himself from the content and its effects on him, while offering a sensational, entertaining story. “Occurrences” is not only a generic term widely used during this period, but also a term which contains events as if they are discrete in time. These events are in the distant past—any sense of continuation of their effects on him, and his memories, is absent.

Furthermore, hot on the heels of this statement, Smith announces the main purpose of the text: to offer “observations on the Indian mode of warfare” (263). If occurrences are "truly and plainly stated," Smith is nonetheless careful to stand outside of these events, “observe” them and control their introduction (as well as to reassure his reader that he has not fought on the side of the Indians). The preface establishes a bifurcation that plays out in the pages to follow: a narrative mode in which Smith at first is powerless to be anything but an observer, and to which he reverts between relational episodes with his Indian family and friends.

Trauma and Sensory Response

Smith was captured by three French-allied Natives (264) while serving as a messenger on a new road being built toward the French Fort Duquesne. Smith’s companion is quickly killed and scalped, and Smith is forced to run and walk for four days to the French fort

(264). For the next several days he is a helpless prisoner and witness to the horror of warfare.

Smith's initial response to the accumulation of trauma in the first few days of his captivity highlights the indelible imprint of sense memory associated with trauma (Herman 38). After arriving at French Fort DuQuesne, Smith observes French and Indians return from their battle against the English General Braddock's forces. These warriors "kept a constant firing of small arms…which were accompanied with the most hideous shouts and yells from all quarters; so that it appeared to me as if the infernal regions had broke loose" (267). He also witnesses a prisoner being burned alive: "He screamed in a most doleful manner; the Indians, in the mean time, yelling like infernal spirits" (267). Unable to bear the "hideous shouts and yells" and the burning man's screams of agony, Smith retreats to his room to find a sermon book on his bed, a present from a French soldier. The sense associated with this memory is visual, for the sight of the book is juxtaposed with horrible news for Smith: "When I came into my lodgings I saw Russel's Seven Sermons, which they had brought from the field of battle. … From the best information I could receive, there were only seven Indians and four French killed in this battle, and five hundred British lay dead in the field, besides what were killed in the river on their retreat" (267). Not only does the book's presence testify to the materiality of the death of its previous owner and the fact that no one will be able to rescue Smith, but it also initiates a focus on visual observation which continues throughout the narrative. As it continues, this focus on the visual seems to be one of the few responses available due to his helplessness as a captive.

As soon as the Fort has settled down, Smith is taken on a journey of several weeks during which he continually shifts from the narrative mode into a detached, descriptive mode:

> [I] was then taken to an Indian town on the west branch of Muskingum. … On our route betwixt the aforesaid towns the country was chiefly black oak and white oak land, which appeared generally to be good wheat land, chiefly

> second and third rate, intermixed with some rich bottoms.
> The day after my arrival at the aforesaid town. (268)

As Mitchell notes, the depth of human relationality is always present in every situation, even if it is denied (57). What changes in Smith's text is the degree to which he can tolerate the power of this relationality among people who have captured and adopted him. During these earliest days of his captivity, Smith views the land as he is used to seeing it, as a farmer's son, but this is not merely habitual observation; here Smith has turned from helpless witness to an observer with an agenda—the future settlement of the land. This appraisal of the land serves as a silent assertion of his cultural identity. As a captive in the present, he is forced through this landscape. As an observer, he imagines this land's potential for settlement. These observations punctuate most of the captivity narrative. The following example is typical: "We were out on this tour for about six weeks. This country is generally hilly, though intermixed with considerable quantities of rich upland, and some good bottoms" (273). Recall that Smith was concerned that his readers would not believe his narrative; he was reluctant to write and publish this narrative because of its apparent unreality. Explicitly speaking, this unreality would be an experience of Smith's readers. Therefore a third valence of the bifurcation of narrative and visual observation operates for the audience. The world Smith represents must be accessible to his white American audience. David Herman argues that "worldmaking," whether in historical narratives or in fiction, is the central element of narrative analysis (15). As Smith initially describes the world he has entered, he uses visual observation to help the reader imagine the setting through a settler's understanding of land-as-potential-farmland:

> Here we remained some weeks, and killed a number of deer, several bears, and a great many raccoons. From the mouth of this river to the falls is about five and twenty miles. On our passage up I was not much out from the river but what I saw was good land, and not hilly. About the falls is thin chestnut land, which is almost the only chestnut timber I ever saw in this country. (275)

The helplessness of being a captive is counterbalanced by fantasies of future control and ownership. In this situation, Smith fights against his captors not only by taking visual possession of the land he sees around him, but also, in retrospect, by taking the reader along with him. The battle to wrest the frontier from “Indians” goes on in his mind and writing.

This juxtaposition of the present moment's narration with a metanarrative extending into the future corresponds to Hayden White's concepts of narrative and narrativity. White argues for three different types of historical records: the annal, a simple listing of events and dates; the chronicle, which has a clear point of view or voice and may contain elements of story, but which lacks a unifying plot (6); and the third type of historical representation, which presents events without reference to a narrator, as if events (“occurrences”) can "tell themselves” (3). Noting that this type of historical narrative is deceptive in that it conceals the narrator’s subjectivity, White shows how such accounts only seem to be “objective” (3). This method of concealing the underlying cultural and historical assumptions of historical writing, this literary device which hides the meta-narrative, White calls “narrativity” (4). When representing himself in the midst of "occurrences," Smith engages in simple narrative. In the non-narrative/observer mode, however, he approaches narrativity. That is, he creates a narrative that is not strictly chronological, but which is mediated by temporal shifts. Even as he writes of the past, he is also imagining the future of westward expansion.

These shifts in time create different temporal strata: the time of Smith’s capture, during which his journal helped him cope with trauma; the time of composition of the narrative, and the imagined future he shares with readers. This layering of time, which is typical of traumatic memory (as well as various narrative forms), serves the larger social purpose of placing settlers and Indians in different time worlds. Smith projects the familiarity of agriculturalism onto the future of the lands currently occupied by Indians. Thus, these descriptions provide a kind of perspectival familiarity as Smith takes readers on a dive deeper into Indian culture.

Relationality

If Smith uses description and dissonances of time to frame and mediate many of the "remarkable occurrences" of his time among the Caughnewaga, these occurrences themselves often belie an ironic layering of his fears during the initial phase of captivity, and the sense of security he gradually acquires. The first hint of such layering occurs in the very first days after his capture, when his captors: "divided the last of their provision which they had brought from fort Du Quesne, and gave me an equal share … this and a young ground-hog, about as large as a rabbit, roasted, and also equally divided" (264). Surprisingly, the very same men who killed and scalped his companion and who are holding him captive share with him equally all they have. While at the fort, Smith had been initiated into Indian life by enduring a ceremonial gauntlet of torture: two lines of Indians he must run through as they beat him. As Smith lay inside Fort DuQuesne gradually healing from this ritual, he asks one of his captors why the Indians had beaten him:

> Though he spoke but bad English, yet I found him to be a man of considerable understanding. I asked him if I had done anything that had offended the Indians which caused them to treat me so unmercifully. He said no; it was only an old custom the Indians had, and it was like how do you do; after that, he said, I would be well used. (266)

This early in the ordeal of his capture and adoption, Smith has already noted the equal sharing of food, and shows an understanding of Native intelligence and custom. He even shows a touch of humor at the remembrance of his terror during the formal adoption ceremony (a humor shared with the Indian audience watching his "baptism"):

> I thought that the result of the council was that I should be drowned, and that these young ladies were to be the

> executioners. They all three laid violent hold of me, and I for some time opposed them with all my might, which occasioned loud laughter by the multitude that were on the bank of the river. At length one of the squaws made out to speak a little English … and said no hurt you. On this I gave myself up to their ladyships, who were as good as their word. (268-269)

Similarly, after he has been groomed by "their ladyships" and presented to the chief, Smith's narration shows a fear that in retrospect he reveals was not warranted, as the chief assures him that he is now one of the tribe by "strong law and custom," and that he will be loved and protected: "At this time I did not believe this fine speech … but … from that day, I never knew them to make any distinction between me and themselves in any respect whatever" (269).

During his time among the Caughnewaga, Smith begins to appreciate Indian knowledge, as when he learns that beavers do not eat fish (291-292), and that maple syrup can be made not just by boiling down the maple sap, but also by letting the water freeze out of the sap, then removing the ice (297). He even begins to admire and be humbled by the values of the Caughnewaga culture. In one incident, when Smith's adoptive brother Tontileaugo returns from a hunting expedition, Smith tells him that a Wyandot Indian has come by their camp, and that Smith had given his guest some roasted venison to eat. Tontileaugo enquires further:

> I suppose you gave him also sugar and bear's oil to eat with his venison. I told him I did not. … He replied, you have behaved just like a Dutchman. Do you not know that … we ought always to give them the best that we have? I acknowledged that I was wrong. He said that he could excuse this as I was but young; but I must learn to behave like a warrior, and do great things, and never be found in any such little actions. (283)

The "civilized" Smith is humbled by this "savage" custom of hospitality and generosity. In fact, the more he observes Caughnewaga social life, the more virtues he sees:

> They appeared to be fulfilling the scriptures beyond those who profess to believe them, in that of taking no thought of tomorrow; and also in living in love, peace, and friendship together, without disputes. In this respect they shame those who profess Christianity. (287)

These observations and lessons for Smith all fall within variations of self and other. But, as Newman has explained), a turning point comes, when, months after he has lost a leather pouch full of his books, some of his companions find the pouch and books, and rejoice at their discovery along with Smith. He notes, "This was the first time that I felt my heart warm towards the Indians" (281). Newman notes that this turning point allows Smith to enjoy Native life without guilt (48-49). This moment also reveals that his adopted tribe accepts Smith's difference without rejecting him. These Natives, who do not read, respect his love of books: this acceptance of Smith's otherness is a manifestation of intersubjective relationality, which helps heal the trauma of capture. He is unconditionally accepted, even if some of his ways are different. Soon Smith begins to form close bonds.

> Sometime in October, another adopted brother, older than Tontileaugo, came to pay us a visit at Sunyendeand, and he asked me to take a hunt with him on Cayahaga. As they always used me as a free man, and gave me the liberty of choosing, I told him that I was attached to Tontileaugo. (288)

Despite his strong attachment to Tontileaugo, Smith likes this older adopted brother (Tecaughretanego) immediately: "I was much pleased with my old brother's conduct and conversation; and as he was going to a part of the country I had never been in, I wished to go with him" (288). Smith is beginning to trust more easily; he now inhabits not only potential farmland for settlers, but a relational social world.

Time and Paradox of Trauma

As Smith's narrative depicts a growing attachment to adopted brother and immersion in his captors' culture, Smith's descriptions of land also begin to change. In a few instances, instead in terms of its potential for colonial settlement, he begins to show how it is seen and used by Native Americans. In the following passage, Smith's descriptions of the land incorporate himself and his Native companions in relation to wild-growing "black haws":

> We proceeded on to the head waters of the west branch of Muskingum. On the head waters of this branch … there is a large body of rich, well lying land; the timber is ash, walnut, sugar tree, buckeye, honey-locust, and cherry, intermixed with some oak, hickory, &c. *This tour was at the time that the black haws were ripe, and we were seldom out of sight of them*; they were common here both in the bottoms and upland. (274, emphasis mine)

The next example of description does not take the reader out of time as completely as other examples have; for here Smith does not exit the narrative into an imagined future but describes the landscape within the context of Indian life and culture:

> In some places there were large flats where nothing but grass grew, about three feet high when grown, and in other places nothing but nettles, very rank, where the soil is extremely rich and loose, here they planted corn. (284)

This tendency continues as Smith becomes more trusting of and comfortable with his adoptive people:

> In this … manner we lived until October; then the geese, swans, ducks, cranes, &c., came from the north, and alighted on this little lake, without number, or innumerable.

> Sunyendeand is a remarkable place for fish in the spring,
> and fowl both in the fall and spring (287).

Not only does Smith begin to see the land through the eyes of an Indian and keep his descriptions in the same time period as his story, but he also becomes part of the land, and his knowledge of the land itself saves him.

One evening Smith falls behind his companions and becomes lost in a blizzard, as the snow covers the others' tracks; he finds a hollow tree and secures the opening against snow and cold air: there he sleeps until the next day, when first attempt to move the opening and exit the cramped, dark shelter fails (293-294). Then,

> [I] prayed to Almighty God to direct and protect me as he had done heretofore. I once again attempted to move away the block, which proved successful…and I immediately received light; so that I found a very great snow had fallen … and I was so rejoiced at obtaining the light that … I then turned into my cell, and returned God thanks for having once more received the light of heaven. (294)

This rebirth is both Christian and pagan. This is where the paradox of Smith's Indian identity and his Christian identity crystallizes; it is the site of transdifference[3]—a place that can both hold and transcend paradox—in a text characterized by unresolved traumas of capture and (eventual) departure, tremendous tensions among present, past, and future and, of course, mixed cultural identifications. Smith has had to trust his own wits and instinct, as well as nature and God, in order to survive. This passage marks a significant turn toward hybridity in Smith's perspective: his survival is significant to him as both an adopted Indian and as a Christian. After his emergence, he returns to his companions, who are overjoyed to see him; he relates his story

[3]. In Gerald Vizenor's anthology *Survivance: Narratives of Native Presence*, Helmbrecht Breinig defines transdifference as the "co-presence" of what are generally conceived of as indissolvable oppositions or dissonant, irreconcilable elements (47).

amidst happy exclamations from all the listeners, and is told by Tecaughretanego that he has the potential to be a great man (295). In response, Smith states:

> I told my brother Tecaughretanego that I thanked them for their care of me, and for the kindness I always received. I told him that I always wished to do great actions, and hoped I never would do anything to dishonor any of those with whom I was connected. (295)

And indeed as Smith internalizes these values of courage and relationality, he becomes a fully Indian white. After this incident, his admiration for his older adopted brother, now a mentor, grows. He notes that Tecaughretanego had been a "great warrior, and an eminent counsellor, and I think as clear and able a reasoner upon any subject" as he had ever known (303). He continues, noting he "was among the Indians as Socrates in the ancient heathen world; and … may be equal to him, if not in wisdom and in learning, yet perhaps in patience and fortitude" (310).

Smith's rebirth is a moment of transdifference, a paradox as he becomes a new kind of man. This is something he simply is; he does not theorize it. Thus he struggles to place the elder Tecaughretanego in the scheme of his understanding of the present. Even though Smith seems to experience the deep truth of relationality with and through Tecaughretanego, he cannot seem to reconcile that truth with the other realities of the Pennsylvania frontier in the 1750s. For Smith and presumably many of his readers, Tecaughretanego's existence in the present is too dissonant with the belief in Indian savagery, which justified appropriation of their land.

The reference to Socrates resolves the dissonance by playing with multiple aspects of the narrative. In one sense casting Tecaughretanego as a kind of Socrates is perfectly apt for his patient method of teaching ethics in the oral tradition. However, Socrates' pastness also takes Tecaughretanego out of the same world that Smith's audience occupies. As with the land appraisals, in this description Smith takes his readers both into the past (antiquity in this case) and the settlers' future, linking the spread of Euro-American territories and culture to the ancient past through Smith's relationship

with Tecaughretanego. In addition, Smith qualifies Tecaughretanego's religious practice as stemming from "the light of nature, unaided by revelation" (310). And as Newman has argued, in translating Tecaughretanego's speeches, Smith uses Biblical terms that suggest a figuration of the Indian sage as a "proto-Christian" (43). Again, Smith must create a "storyworld": a world of ancient pasts, classical or Biblical, to accommodate Tecaughretanego.

Newman explores the tension between Smith's praise of Tecaughretanego (along with Smith's consistent characterization of the old man as his adopted brother) and his stand in later writing as a settler and soldier who must necessarily be anti-Indian and characterize them as an exploitable resource of military knowledge (47). It is likely, however, that in his relationality with his adopted community, he has both witnessed and experienced a relationality that transcends the confinements of the dominant antagonistic self/other constructions of Anglo-Americans and "Indians." His intercultural intersubjective experiences would necessarily be extremely difficult to communicate in the discourse of his day. In fact, his later religious seeking, his conversations with a clergyman in his community, and his return to Native communities as a missionary near the end of his life suggest an ongoing attempt to reconcile or rise above the cultural/racial/religious binaries created by settler colonialism.

As Mitchell explains, the four different states of relationality he proposes can coexist in a state of transdifference, and can also shift quickly from one to another. Spero notes that after his repatriation, Smith often confided with a local minister of his struggles to accept that some of the kindest Indians he knew committed acts of unspeakable cruelty in war (176). Smith's struggle to reconcile the Indians' conduct in warfare with their conduct in peace corresponds to these shifts in time and in relationality. Thus he is able to hold transdifference, and to hold off dissonance.

However, these temporal and relational shifts make for inherent relational instability, and Smith's loyalty to his brother/mentor eventually comes into sharp conflict with his situation as a captive adoptee. During one winter, Smith, Tecaughretanego, and Tecaughretanego's young son Nungany are camped for winter hunting about 40 miles

from any others; it is up to Smith to provide for the young boy and for the old man, who is lame with rheumatism (307). Smith succeeds in providing plenty for all until snow on the ground makes hunting a great challenge (308). Every step Smith takes makes a sound which alerts prey before he can shoot, and in time the three companions begin to suffer greatly from hunger (308). Nonetheless, Tecaughretanego encourages and inspires Smith. Smith describes in detail how his mentor, in spite of his hunger and arthritic pain, was patient and mindful of making cheerful conversation to keep everyone's spirits up; in addition, he instructed Smith in hunting while showing faith in his "diligence, skill, and activity" (307). Tecaughretanego also cautions Smith that hunger can derange the mind, and that he must learn to be patient when food grows scarce, because it is through times of hunger that the "great Being" reminds humankind "that we are to love and serve him; and likewise to know the worth of the favors that we receive, and to make us more thankful" (308). On the following day, as all three are suffering from hunger, Smith sets out to hunt; despite Tecaughretanego's recent lesson in patience and faith, the intensity of Smith's hunger diverts him from his purpose, and he formulates a plan for escape back to his home in Pennsylvania (309). But as he hurries away from the camp, he sees buffalo tracks, and soon discovers and kills a large buffalo cow:

> I immediately kindled a fire and began to roast meat … When hunger was abated, I began to be tenderly concerned for my old Indian brother and the little boy I had left in a perishing condition. … I scarcely thought on the old man's speech while I was almost distracted with hunger, but on my return was much affected with it, reflected on myself for my hard heartedness and ingratitude, in attempting to run off and leave the venerable old man and little boy to perish with hunger. … I thought also of that part of his speech which treated of the fractious dispositions of hungry people, which was the only excuse I had for my base *inhumanity*, in attempting to leave them in the most deplorable situation. (309, emphasis mine)

Newman characterizes this passage as the "emotional climax" of the narrative (42). And it is indeed where Smith's longing for his natal community comes into direct conflict with the rich relationality he has experienced with his native family. Even as the visual land appraisals contain Smith's identity as an adopted Indian, Smith presents himself as the "inhuman" savage and his Indian brother as the "venerable" teacher. This incident is not only the emotional, but also the moral climax of Smith's captivity narrative: it is the fruit of intersubjectivity as well as his Indian education. After this passage, Smith does indeed leave Tecaughretanego and his son, when they are no longer in a "deplorable situation." Smith has in effect, in his captivity among "savages," learned the values of humility, generosity, courage, faith, and responsibility to his community. However, the layering of time lends the story an atmosphere of romance, removing Indian life from the practical progress of settler life. In any case, having done what the elders would approve of, perhaps Smith felt he had earned his right to escape. We can only speculate since he does not describe his departure in any detail.

What must have been a very painful departure from his adopted brother and nephew is left out of the narrative. After the passages devoted to Smith's conversations with Tecaughretanego and the old man's influence on Smith, the account of his escape from the old man and Nungany is almost shockingly brief:

> Tecaughretanego, his son Nungany and myself, went from Detroit (in an elm-bark canoe) to Caughnewaga, a very ancient Indian town, about nine miles above Montreal, where I remained until about the first of July. I then heard of a French ship at Montreal that had English prisoners on board, in order to carry them over sea and exchange them. I went privately off from the Indians, and got also on board. (316)

Despite the surprising nature of the lack of any emotional content in this passage, rhetorically, this absence of feeling has its purpose. To share his feelings at this parting would explicitly reveal what has been implicit throughout the narrative: that the Indians and Smith are both equally capable of great humanity, and startling inhumanity. That

beyond the trauma of capture Smith experienced a strong sense of shared responsibility for all community members' well-being that superseded selfish impulses. That beyond the frontier, "savages" were living like true Christians. And yet his Indian friends were also capable of wartime atrocities (Patrick Spero 176). The mediation of this disturbed relationality by "objective" containment and temporal shifts, as well as the abrupt departure with no elaboration on the ethics or emotions speak to the trauma he endured, and his inability to reconcile the relationality he experienced among them with the actions of these same people when they became warriors fighting to protect their lands.

The Post-Captivity Section: Repatriation and Repetition

The lengthy account of Smith's post-captivity career shows him integrating his Indian identity into his identity as a militia leader, an explorer and revolutionary. Smith's post-captivity shows a complex layering of responses to his time in captivity. These responses include: 1) Smith fulfilling the role his Native community wished for him, that of a "great man" and a "warrior"; 2) Smith's gradual repatriation into law-abiding Anglo-American society, which includes engaging in military actions against hostile Native groups; and 3) showing how he is no savage but, to the contrary, that he has earned the approbation and approval of high-ranking military and civilian citizens. The "brief account" of his adventures as a militia leader is much more developed than Smith hints at in the title. In fact, this "brief account" serves as a narrative of his journey: from recovered "white Indian," to militia leader acting outside of the law, and eventually as upholder of the law, an *a propos* journey for a "white Indian" who must prove he is not a savage.

Although there is no toggling between description and narrative here as in the captivity sections, this portion of the autobiography is also composed of alternating narrative and non-narrative elements. Narratives of the adventures and exploits of Smith alternate with documents that lend authority to his narrative not only by serving as stamps

of approval, but also by incorporating his story into a larger print culture, and his development into a civilized Lockean subject voluntarily accepting external authority.

The first imported text is a song written by George Campbell about a conflict in which Smith gathered a militia of other former Indian captives, whose purpose was to keep frontier settlers safe from Indian raids. In this particular incident, Smith's "black boys" (former Indian captives like himself) set about to stop traders from supplying goods and weapons to hostile Indian groups (319). The traders' merchandise was eventually set ablaze by Smith and his black boy militia, who used Indian military tactics to succeed. Another incident of this nature culminated in the kidnapping of a British officer, which Smith concedes was an action "entirely out of the channel of the civil law" (319). The song by Campbell addresses the legal uncertainties of the situation:

> Let mankind censure or commend,
> This rash performance in the end,
> Then both sides will find their account.
> 'Tis true no law can justify,
> To burn our neighbor's property,
> But when this property is design'd,
> To serve the enemies of mankind,
> It's high treason in the amount. (320)

Smith includes this song in his account without qualifying the characterization of Indians as "enemies of mankind." When Indians are involved, then, the question of civil law ceases to apply consistently: a lawless enemy cannot be fought by staying consistently within one's own law. Conveniently, Smith's position as a "white Indian" enables him to walk the thin line of claiming a "warrior's" authority outside the law even as he chooses to embrace the rule of law— in retrospect.

The second imported text is a poem Smith himself writes during his exploration of Kentucky territory. As he was forced to experience new territory and frontiers as a captive, he now undertakes a frontier experience autonomously. In this poem he laments

his loneliness;[4] Smith's main comfort is "peace of conscience": he notes that "I had now been eleven months in the wilderness, and during this time, I neither saw bread, money, women, or spirituous liquors; and three months of which I saw none of the human species, except Jamie" (323). This adventure can be read as a repetition of his time with the Indians, except, in accordance with the principle of creativity in repetition noted by Mitchell, and Janet's concept of the urge of the body to achieve victory over the trauma (Kerr), Smith returns to the wilderness as an Anglo-American explorer, a lonely non-Indian. Not only is he a free man, but he is authoritarian as well: he has a slave to order about. When Smith has accidentally injured his foot, he not only shows his Indian knowledge, but also his authority in the situation: "Jamie obeyed my directions faithfully," "I ordered him to search for Indian medicine," "I ordered Jamie to make us a shelter," "I commanded Jamie to take my gun" (322). Thus Smith has completed a "redemptive" return to living outside civilization. The first time he was forced into the wilderness as a captive. This return enables him to experience such a journey again, but with himself in control, even when badly injured. He has returned to the woods, not as a captive, but as a master, not as a green neophyte but an experienced woodsman with an Indian's knowledge of natural medicines. His time "alone" imbues him with saintly virtue, which he uses to critique "civilized" attitudes upon his return: he notes that he was viewed with suspicion until he obtained clean, new clothes, thus showing a "noble savage" insight into the limitations of a superficial "civilized" perspective (324). When he and Jamie emerge from the woods, people refuse to believe their story of having explored the backwoods region, and he is even confined as a suspicious character. However, he observes the irony of civilization when he says "I dressed myself in good clothes … mounted on horseback, [and] no one ever asked me for a pass; therefore I concluded that a horse thief, or even a robber, might pass without interruption, provided he was only well dressed" (324). Now that he has been a "child of the forest" of his own accord—or

[4]. The "poor stupid slave," Jamie, who accompanies Smith in his explorations of the Kentucky region, and who helps him recover from an injury, apparently does not count as company.

rather, a “man of the forest”—he can begin to channel his warrior’s ways into an expression of natural law, and transition to an acceptance of civil law.

“Black boy” militias like his own, to protect frontier settlements, had been defying British authority by preventing trade with the Indians past the settled boundary; many suspected militia men had been jailed at Fort Bedford without due process; Smith’s subsequent impressive, liberation of this American Bastille is painted as a revolutionary act (235), an action upholding natural rights and fighting unjust law. Sometime after this event, he is apprehended by British officials; during the confrontation, a man is shot and killed, and Smith is framed for murder (325). The third imported text, a newspaper article defending him from the charges, casts him as a victim of British tyranny, characterizing his imprisonment somewhat hyberbolically as "unlawful and tyrannical, perhaps unparalleled by any instance in a civilized nation" (329). Smith appears in the role of the nation itself**,** oppressed by unjust laws. While Smith is incarcerated, 300 people are on the point of storming the prison to liberate him, but he asks them not to, showing faith that the law would exonerate him, which it ultimately did (326). His relationship to the law has evolved from that of a “black boy” acting outside the law to that of an oppressed colonial who believes in civil law. Thus while he transitions from acting outside the law to becoming a patriot rebel, he assures his would-be rescuers, as well as his readers, of his cultural and legal alignment with the new nation to come.

Letters of recommendation from the "Council of Safety" are the fourth and fifth imported texts; by way of recommending him as a potential battalion leader, these missives highlight Smith's experience as an Indian captive and his expertise in Indian ways of war (332). His Indian knowledge is now approved and authorized by high-ranking officials (despite George Washington’s rejection of his recommendation that American soldiers be trained like Indians). His Indian knowing, however, goes unspoken. Indeed, in the entire post-captivity section he shows no thought of those he left behind, only his forward trajectory to a self-appointed Indian-inflected manliness, and thence to civil legitimacy and legal authority.

The last imported text is a copy of Smith's general orders for an Indian-style military formation to be used in attacking an Indian town; the anticipated battle never takes place, as the Indian town is deserted when Smith's forces arrive (334). Thus the evolution from "white Indian" to revolutionary military leader has a rather anticlimactic ending, but Smith puts a good face on it by explaining that his company had seemed so intimidating to the Indians that they fled in advance.

Among the Caughnewaga, Smith has changed from helpless captured youth to a survivor and hunter who has internalized the values of Indian manhood. Therefore in this post-captivity section Smith seems to actually fulfil the Indians' expectation of him: he has learned "to behave like a warrior, and [to] do great things" (283). Meanwhile, the assemblage of patriotic commendations presents a cross-current that neutralizes the "savage" aspect of having been a "white Indian."

In spite of the benefits of his Indian education and personal relationships, the final ethnographic section represents Indians in a more detached "objective" light. Compared to the narrative, the appendix/ethnography shows a disconnected view of Smith's experience to which his adoptive family is not privy. This objectification manifests the splitting off of Smith's emotions from his experience. The fact that the knowledge is a result of knowing is not foregrounded, but it is mediated by the conventions of the print culture of the early republic.

Examining Smith's Appendix

In *Letters of the Republic*, Michael Warner characterizes eighteenth century American print culture as an embodiment of the public sphere. To "appear" in print legitimizes a citizen; however, appearance in print also demands the "negation of person" (42). That is, any personal traits are wholly subordinated to "a rational and disinterested concern for the public good" (42). In a variation of this disembodiment of public voices, the assembled structure of the second part of Smith's account reflects a struggle to both

legitimate and negate the Indianness of his person. Smith must sort out the knowledge possessed about Indians from his relational "knowing" of Indians.

In fact, here is the beginning of this appendix titled "On the Manners and Customs of the Indians": "The Indians are a slovenly people in their dress. They seldom ever wash their shirts, and in regard to cookery they are exceedingly filthy" (335). These are harsh opening words for the people who, according to his own account, showed him unfailing kindness and whose communal spirit puts to "shame those who profess Christianity." Despite this rude introduction, Smith's observations on Indian culture are somewhat even-handed. As evidence of the dominance of the "objective" over the relational, though, Smith's participating and mediating "I" is pushed from center stage. Passive constructions abound, and 'I' appears 38 times in 12 pages, as compared to 548 times in 53 pages of the captivity narrative.[5]

This section functions rather like a dissection. While appendices of this sort are common to captivity narratives, it is important to note how they function, at least in this case. Description here separates Indian life into various aspects and modes: manners and customs, traditions and religious sentiments, civil government, and war craft. This non-narrative examination seems to counterbalance Smith's earlier chronological representation, which wove these aspects together in a narrative sympathetic to the Caughnewaghas' way of life. However, although he is critical at certain points, he is careful when discussing "Their Traditions and Religious Sentiments" to make distinctions between various tribes and not to generalize (337). Furthermore, he endorses Tecaughretanego's views on reason and happiness. In the discussion of leadership and warfare, he uses examples from his own experience to forward his argument for adopting Indian disciplines in the US military.

However, at this point, Smith sees the Indian economy as inferior. As noted by McCoy, Smith saw the equal sharing of food and resources as systematically

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[5]. In addition, the appendix contains 23 instances of "we" in 23 pages. This "we" denotes Smith and his readership. Meanwhile, in the "captivity" section, "we" (denoting Smith and his Indian companions and community) appears 369 times in 53 pages.

dysfunctional: the person who is “industrious’ should be rewarded, and the indolent should suffer the consequences of their inaction (231). Smith’s generally “objective” stance in the ethnographic sections assumes the ascendancy of the observer over the observed; the literate subject over the non-literate object, who cannot respond in kind. Thus the narrativity of these sections presupposes the reader as an observer with power over the observed: the Native Americans are represented as a kind of natural resource. Observation, once the only power of an isolated captive, becomes a mode of dominance for Smith and his readers. But to be fair, Smith does not abuse this power egregiously.

While noting that some of the Natives’ ways are “barbarous,” Smith also laments the "inhumanity" of the Paxton Boys’ massacres of peaceful Indian settlements (345). And, of course, when hunting for Tecaughretanego and Nungany, he himself discovered his own capacity for “base inhumanity.” Significantly absent from his account—other than a general caution against imitating the Indians’ “inhumanity” (again, this term does not apply exclusively to Natives)—are the memories Smith spoke of to Anglican minister Thomas Barton. As noted by Spero, Smith often spoke with Barton about the disturbing elements of Indian culture; he spoke of “mangled bodies” of the English, and witnessed his Indian relatives—even the “gentlest”—inflicting atrocities on white settlers (176). Clearly in citing his own “inhumanity,” and in emphasizing the Indians’ “discipline” in war over images of inhuman barbarians, Smith distances himself and his former Indian community from notions of absolute savagery. But his conversations with Barton reveal an ongoing struggle to integrate his mixed experiences. Despite the strategies he has employed to contain the narrative of his relationality with his adoptive family, Smith nonetheless expressed a conflicted cultural intersubjectivity.

After the Autobiography

Smith claimed that he delayed writing about his experiences because it would seem “unreal” to his audience, but as I suggested earlier, it may well be that he was not ready

to access the complexity of his emotions, to balance the horrors he witnessed with the bonds of friendship and family. His account seems to work against itself if one tries to read it through a paradigm of dualism.

The moment that seems to hold the transdifference of the entire account most powerfully is Smith's emergence from the tree in the snowstorm. In this moment he is fully Christian and fully Indian. The light of Nature and the light of God are one. He is reborn from the womb of nature into the light of God and into the unconditional acceptance of his adopted Indian community. This central image, however, reconciles savagery and Christianity for Smith only, not for his Native community, who lived as peacefully as Christians, but who fought like "barbarians."

The writing and publication of his story might have served as a "working-through" for Smith, the "belated" incorporation of many of his traumatic experiences into a coherent narrative. For not long after the publication of his autobiography, his life took on an entirely new direction: he began to explore different religious possibilities, and eventually became a missionary to Native Americans in the Kentucky region (T. Smith 79). When the Second Great Awakening swept through Kentucky in 1801, Smith joined the movement (T. Smith 77), but he may well have been seeking a way to reconcile some of his Native experiences with different sects. While experimenting with the Stoneite religious movement, Smith said that "there was one spirit but a diversity of operations" (T. Smith, 77). After all, when near the end of a long, hungry winter, Tecaughretanego prayed for relief from his arthritic pain, and prayed that he might kill some turkeys the next day, Smith notes in the next scene that they "killed four bears and a number of turkeys. Tecaughretanego appeared now fully persuaded that all this came in answer to his prayers, and who can say with any degree of certainty that it was not so?" (313). Smith seems to still be reconciling his beliefs with former Indian life, for in this "diversity of operations" we can read a multicultural understanding of human relation to the divine. During this period of revivalism, Smith received a license to preach among the Native Americans (T. Smith 79). As a minister spreading the gospel, he could return to

the scene of past trauma securely, as a teacher where once he was a student. Smith could also experience the relationality that he may have missed from time to time.

Relocating Savagery

While Smith was away from home working as a missionary among the Indians in Kentucky, his son (James Jr.) was drawn into the Shaker Movement, along with three of his children. In the introduction to Smith's narrative, Gordon Sayre notes that "[Smith's] son James Jr. had joined [the Shakers], much to the annoyance of James Sr., a Presbyterian" (260). But there was very much more than annoyance at work. Smith published two pamphlets denouncing the Shakers: one is entitled "Remarkable Occurrences Lately Discovered Among the People Called the SHAKERS; of a Treasonous and Barbarous Nature, OR SHAKERISM DEVELOPED" (T. Smith 80). Smith lived with the group in Ohio for a time in an attempt to understand why James had joined; eventually he saw all that he cared to see, and came to the conclusion that the group was a sham, using a façade of doctrines whose effect was to benefit the leaders and exploit the deceived and dependent members (T Smith 80-81). Smith departed the Shaker Town but returned with his daughter-in-law Polly to try to bring her children back home. After a brief supervised visit, the eldest son was forcibly taken from his mother while the Shakers taunted her and, according to Smith, gloated over their victory (T. Smith 81).

At this time the Shaker doctrine included the belief that their leader Ann Lee was the reincarnation of Christ, and that men and women should be celibate (A. White 6). Those within the sect were taught that they had found the group with all the ultimate answers, which had to be explained to them by their superiors because they were too difficult for ordinary people to understand, that they must practice absolute purity, that visits with anyone outside the group were forbidden or strictly supervised, and apostates

would be sent to Hell. Smith saw the group as an example of "savage barbarity" (T. Smith 81).[6]

In his Pamphlet denouncing the Shakers Smith writes,

> To see [my son] not only seduced from Christianity, but divested of the feelings of humanity, to see my kind daughter treated with savage barbarity, her heart-rending sorrow, made a subject of mock and exultation, my dear grandchildren forced into despotic bondage, was too much for human nature to bear. (Qtd. in T. Smith, 81)

Note that the attributes of non-Christianity, inhumanity, and savage barbarity in the quote above are here leveled without qualification at the Shakers. Terms normally used to dehumanize Indians are here applied to a group that presents itself as an embodiment of religious purity.

McCoy sees in Smith's denunciation of Shakerism an analysis of a society structured to keep the common laborers in their place; furthermore, Smith's analysis is a critique of capitalism in miniature (236). In fact, says McCoy, Smith represents Shakerism as "the [alternative] barbarous other to American civilization" (232). Like Crevecoeur, Smith sees the trauma built into the structure of an exploitative system. Not only was his son's seduction by the group all too sadly and ironically a repeat of his captivity and adoption, but in fact it was a "despotic bondage" which seems far worse than his experience among the Indians. Smith here uses language much stronger and more damning than anything he had to say about Indian culture in his autobiography.

His response was akin to the way he responded to British tyranny, showing the kind of leadership he used in the years before the revolution. He traveled to Lebanon, Ohio to rile up a crowd of about 500 people, who accompanied him to Shaker Town. Almost as he had taken Fort Bedford years before, and as hundreds had gathered to try to

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[6]. In fact, from the descriptions of the group in T. Smith and in the pamphlets themselves, at the time the groups had all the characteristics of a cult. For Robert Jay Lifton's eight criteria for identification of cults, see Chapter 22 of *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*.

free him from imprisonment, this massive group demanded the release of all children from the Shaker compound (T. Smith 81). The demonstration successfully convinced two of Polly's children to go home with her and their grandfather (T. Smith 88). Smith was now a militant fighting not Indians or British but freeing his grandchildren from captivity to an exploitative religion.

Conclusion

Smith had been captured and adopted into a Native American tribe, benefited from it in some ways, and went on to live a productive life. His son had been seduced into a religious cult and "divested of the feelings of humanity" (T. Smith 81). In the former case, what seemed a horrible fate was an experience characterized in part by relational richness. In the latter, what on the surface seems like religious devotion and sacrifice was in essence manipulation and slavery. The tragic irony could not have been lost on Smith, as his denunciation of the abuses of Shakerism contradict his 1799 critique of the Indian economy: recall that he thought the sharing of resources would reward the lazy. His experience of equal sharing among the Caughnewaga may have given Smith an alternative perspective on economic hierarchies, a perspective which allowed him to see past the group's façade to its unbridled exploitation of low-ranking members.

More evidence points to the long-term influence of Native culture on Smith. He was a close friend and neighbor of another former Indian adoptee, Stephen Ruddell (T. Smith 79). Ruddell was married to an Indian woman, and from Smith's acquaintance with them it is not unreasonable to assume that they shared an understanding, if not an ongoing conversation, about their Indian experience. One anecdote in T. Smith's biography relates how the old Colonel took Stephen's young son on his knee and sang him an Indian song (T. Smith 79).

However, vacillation seems to have accompanied this long-term Native influence; Smith still advocated fighting Indians. When the War of 1812 broke out, he wrote a

treatise on Indian warfare, in which he explained the knowledge he had gleaned during his captivity: in this treatise he recommends pre-emptively sending the Army into Indian territories and towns (T. Smith 90). One of Smith's sons raised a company of men that traveled north to drive off the British and their Native allies. Seventy-four year old Colonel James Smith accompanied this party, but after the Indians at Fort Wayne had been defeated, he vanished for a time, and was reportedly seen in Ohio preaching to Indian communities the same year (T. Smith 95).

Smith's ambivalences are equally represented in his life and his writing. The literary devices he uses to contain and communicate his experience of the humanity of Indian lifeways (objective framing and analysis vs. narrative, scouting for places of future agricultural settlement vs. Native travel to hunt game) reflect the uncertainties of frontier life during the tumultuous decades during which he lived. The frontier can be said to have either lived or dissolved in Smith—perhaps, transdifferently, both—as he vacillates between self-other and intersubjective constructs of his Anglo-American/Native American experience.

Both Jameses in this chapter, Farmer James and James Smith, have not only knowledge but also knowing of Indian culture, which informs their narratives. Farmer James sees the trauma built into colonialism and manifesting in war, then seeks an alternative in Native culture, with which Crevecoeur was well acquainted. James Smith represents trauma less conceptually, but attempts to balance the trauma and the relationality he experiences, to show positive aspects of Native culture, to live be a "great man" as his Native mentors taught him. Furthermore, neither Smith nor Crevecoeur confines characteristics of savagery to Native cultures; in fact, they show the potential for cross-cultural intersubjectivity which could benefit both Native and colonial communities.

CHAPTER THREE

Narrativizing Genocide:
Twinning and White Indians in American Historical Romance

> … it could be argued that perhaps expecting a community of memory to form around a moral trauma is expecting too much of ordinary humans.
>
> --Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory*

We have seen how writers during the Revolution experienced different degrees of relationality with Native Americans, and how the complexities of intersubjectivity offered intercultural possibilities that transcended the structural objectification of that period. After the Revolution, the new government—hungry for more land, resources, and wealth—found every excuse to continue westward expansion, killing or relocating Native Americans, while making and breaking treaties. At the same time, the nation was creating its own identity, and imagining what its official history should look like.

Susan Scheckel notes that a chorus of voices called for a literature that would "convey and reinforce the distinctive identity of the new nation, and many insisted that the Native American would be the perfect subject matter" (8). Scheckel notes, of course, the paradox of defining national identity by glorifying Native American character while simultaneously appropriating their lands and destroying their cultures (9), for the 1830's marked the beginning of Andrew Jackson's era of forced removals of eastern Native nations from their ancestral lands. However, this kind of denial is not paradoxical when we consider it a symptom of perpetrator guilt.

In response to these drives (e.g. the Pequot War and King Philip's War), a new model of the Native American began to emerge: the noble, doomed savage. Nakamura

has noted that as early as 1804 a textbook for children and families represented King Philip as a tragic hero (130); in 1805 historian Abiel Holmes noted a general change in the characterization of Philip from villain to heroic prince defending his people (131). In 1814, Washington Irving published the first version of his memoir of King Philip, which was republished in 1821's *The Sketch-Book of Geoffrey Crayon, Gent.* In *Philip of Pokanoket: An Indian Memoir***,** the leader of the alliance against the Puritan invasion is described as a model of natural, noble human perfection and courage (Irving 1). The noble savage was becoming a staple of American culture.

Significantly, in 1820, an epic heroic/romantic poem set in King Philip's War was also published. Written by James Wallis Eastburn and Robert Charles Sands, *Yamoyden* tells the story of the love and marriage of Yamoyden, a noble Native, and Nora, a young English woman, amidst the conflicts of King Philip's War. In its six cantos, *Yamoyden* unapologetically depicts the Puritans as murderous hunters of Indians who act without mercy or remorse (13). The poem begins from a Native American point of view, as the Indians peer "from forest shades … with awful dread" at the appearance of the first English ship as an "ocean-monster" (9). In *Yamoyden*, a Puritan named Fitzgerald has unknowingly killed his brother in the Puritan revolt (Eastman and Sands 135). He subsequently flees to New England where he lives as a widower in the wilderness with his daughter Nora. Yamoyden befriends and helps the father and daughter (135). Fitzgerald is alarmed by a romance developing between his daughter Nora and Yamoyden. Their romance develops through the sharing of stories: her stories of the beautiful cities and works of art in England, his stories about the natural wonders and adventures of the wilderness. Yamoyden and Nora elope and have a child. Yamoyden wants to learn all about Christianity, but he does not become a Christian. This intercultural understanding without assimilation constitutes intersubjectivity: the lovers remain distinct individuals who do not simply fulfill expected roles as husband and wife. As Yamoyden faces his warrior's death bravely, Nora clings to him. The father, who thought his daughter had degraded herself in her marriage to an Indian, tells her he will forgive her "sin," take her back home, and love her child. However, as he speaks, Nora

dies wrapped in an embrace with Yamoyden, their eyes locked in "the glance of love/that conquers time/was blent with confidence sublime;/As if on their departing view/With heaven, that love was opening too!" (250). Time, prejudice, and religion have all been transcended in the union of the lovers, and Fitzgerald has a glimpse of that transcendence. As Nora and Yamoyden lie dead in each other's arms, Nora's father pledges to care for their child.

In the course of the action leading up to the lovers' death, a scene depicting the Puritans preemptively attacking a Narragansett stronghold vilifies the aggressors in no uncertain terms. The attack is characterized as "a holocaust for freedom" (16). Passages such as this challenge accepted notions that cultural and racial boundaries are sacrosanct, and that the Puritans' massacre of Philip's people was justified.

Although *Yamoyden* was praised by critics for its style, the content concerning the condemnation of aggression against Native societies seems to have been ignored completely. In particular, 19th century critic John Gorham Palfrey proclaimed that narratives about the Puritans' treatment of the Native Americans must be considered in a strictly aesthetic light (Nakamura 138). Thus Palfrey and the critics who followed his lead completely erase from consideration the culpability of Puritans who massacred noncombatant Indian women, children, and the elderly.

Whether sparked by the shockingly candid Yamoyden, the urging of critics, the crisis of Indian removals, or a combination of all three, the period after the publication of Yamoyden saw a veritable explosion of literature and drama centering on Puritan–Indian conflicts (Nakamura 137). In *The Indian Chief as Tragic Hero: Native Resistance and the Literatures of America, from Moctezuma to Tecumseh*, Gordon Sayre studies a number of these works, including *Yamoyden* and the two novels to be studied in this chapter: Catherine Maria Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie* (1827) and James Fenimore Cooper's *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish* (1829). While Sayre primarily studies these works in terms of Native resistance, my focus here is specifically on the representation and performance of genocide via their use of the "white Indian" figure.

For the moment, however, we must return to our two dead lovers locked in a transcendent embrace. In an age where a certain level of racism was accepted, the representation of their locked gaze reflects a rare intersubjectivity: the recognition of another as separate but not "other." The possibility of this kind of relationality between a Native American and a European American is represented here as simultaneously possible, and yet, because they are dead, impossible. We have seen how the texts of both Crevecoeur and Smith suggest that these narrators seek and struggle with a relationality with Native Americans transcending the self/other binary.

The Romantics, however, focus on something completely different. For example, as Washington Irving helps create the image of Metacom as a great man, he is projecting a fantasy:

> In civilized life, where the happiness, and indeed almost the existence, of man depends so much upon the opinion of his fellow-men, he is constantly acting a studied part. … The Indian, on the contrary, free from the restraints and refinements of polished life, and, in a great degree, a solitary and independent being, obeys the impulses of his inclination or the dictates of his judgment; and thus the attributes of his nature, being freely indulged, grow singly great and striking. (1)

In this passage, Irving imposes a Romantic notion of "savage" individuality without the qualifying understanding of the mutual obligations of support with which Smith was inducted into his Caughnewaga identity, an identity his companions understood was not exactly like theirs, but in which they rejoiced (as when they found his books). It is not the apotheosis of the "great and striking" noble savage that marks the climax of Yamoyden, but rather the achievement of interpersonal and intercultural intersubjectivity.

Iwona Irwin-Zarecka doubts a community of memory can form around a "moral trauma" (50). Traumatic memory is hidden at the subconscious level. Not only the the pain of the victim, but also the guilt of the perpetrator may be further hidden from conscious remembrance through the dissociation of emotion and event. As Judith Herman

has noted, emotion and experience associated with the trauma are not accessible to conscious experience, regulation or coherent narrativization (89, 184). As writers began to create a history for the US, they had to find ways to address, transform, or avoid altogether the genocidal basis of settler colonialism and westward expansion in order for that history to be positive. Therefore it is necessary to find and explore symptoms of national forgetting, displacement and avoidance in the creation of national narratives.

The insistent return of the Native American in American historical narratives noted by Scheckel can be read as a traumatic repetition (12): a return to the "scene of the crime" to remove any evidence. The proliferation of literature around these cultural memories, if in part sparked by Yamoyden, can be read as attempts to renegotiate perpetrator guilt. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with Irwin-Zarecka's claim that we are "expecting too much of ordinary humans" to form a community of memory or discourse around the American genocide (50). If the discourse of the 19th century US literary community falls short of facing its own culpability, it is at least presenting a body of work with which we can continue to engage in new ways. Reading for literary manifestations of evasion and perpetrator guilt, and/or the desire to transcend the self/other relation, are just two ways in which we can advance the conversation.

Yamoyden's premise of a Puritan patriarch and widower who has fled England and begun a family, and the centrality of an interracial marriage between his daughter and a Native American man, are repeated in later works, including Catherine Maria Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie* (1827) and James Fenimore Cooper's *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish* (1829). Specifically, this chapter will examine how these texts handle, explicate, work through or attempt to contain the legacy of genocide using variations of the white Indian theme.

Both of these novels share a vestigial early modern "island logic" (Greene 140). Speculative narratives about the New World were, in early modern times, set on "islands," self-contained social units, where the European travelers or settlers were cut off in an essential, elemental way from their origins in a discrete, bound place, such as Prospero's Island, More's Utopia, or even reaching back to the classical tradition, the

islands of the *Odyssey*. The homesteads of Fletcher and Heathcote (both called Bethel) are set in the wilderness, and are intended by their founders to be "islands" of purity, free from the corruption and politics of England or Boston. In *Hope Leslie*, water passages mark significant and permanent departures, as well as divisions, between tragedy and possibility. In addition, William Fletcher establishes his home on the frontier in Western Massachusetts, far from Boston and its authoritarianism. Similarly, in Cooper's novel, Mark Heathcote's Bethel is built on a frontier in Connecticut, apart from the Puritan establishment and its politics; it is intended to be an island of godliness. But central to each plot is the fact that such islands cannot be. The wilderness is not simply an elemental body, a geographical boundary that utterly divides one kind of society from another. The waters are crossed and the wilderness is peopled. The situation of these settlements sets the stage in Cooper's *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*, for the godliness and survival of the settlement to be challenged from without and within by the savage spirit of revenge. In Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie*, the surrounding, peopled wilderness will present a challenge to the authority and justice of Puritan theocracy.

These two novels incorporate historical trauma into their structure through representation and performance: both represent wars between Puritans and Native Americans, and while Cooper's novel performs a closure that reflects the doom of Native American lifeways (a "terminal creed"), Sedgwick's novel performs a dialogic relation between past and present. Both novels also create Indian and non-Indian characters who are like "twins." This twinning can be a form of traumatic repetition, a manifestation of the dissociation of trauma, a means of parsing out real or imagined desirable and undesirable qualities of Indians and whites, and/or an opportunity for intersubjectivity. In other words, twinning can serve as a starting place for appropriation and literary ethnic cleansing, and/or as a device for dialogue and new relational possibilities. In working through different degrees of relation to and implication in Native American genocide, we are free to imagine and live new possibilities with others who are no longer "other." Conversely, not working through these relations, we remain locked in the cycle of denial and traumatic repetition.

Repetition and Twinning in *The Wept of Wish-Ton-Wish*

If trauma manifests in repetition, then *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish,* Cooper's 1829 frontier historical romance is built on traumatic repetition. Repetition and replication (twinning) undergird the structure of *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*. The wholesome new settlement established by widower Mark Heathcote, a benevolent and deeply spiritual patriarch, is attacked by Native Americans and leveled to ashes, only to be rebuilt anew. Cooper's version of "working through" trauma to stop the repetition of destruction ultimately depends on two characters who exist at the periphery of civilization. The Narragansett chief Conanchet, once a captive of the Heathcote family, and a Puritan regicide in hiding, known only as Submission, are friends. By virtue of their having lived outside their natal cultures, both have the potential to understand each other and to negotiate peace.

The trauma begins long before the novel opens, with the Puritan Revolution. The character known as Submission was one of the judges who condemned Charles I to death; in the aftermath of the Restoration, he went into hiding near the newly established settlement of Wish-ton-Wish, Puritan Emigrant Mark Heathcote's "Bethel." However, the founding violence of a new order in England was bound to be repeated in the New World, even in Bethel ("the house of God"). An ocean is not sufficient to separate the Puritans from that founding trauma.

The settlement and its residents are getting along peacefully when one night they find a lone boy outside their compound: it is Conanchet, son of a slain Narragansett Chief, and he is taken captive (Ch. 4). The Heathcotes hold him, in an attempt to convert and civilize him (Ch. 8). But eventually Conanchet's people come to rescue their young prince, burning the settlement to the ground, and taking two young captives, Mark Heathcote's granddaughter Ruth and a developmentally disabled boy named Whittal Ring (unfortunately called an "idiot" by Cooper). As the rest of the family is hidden below the

basement of a block tower, no one is aware that the two young people have survived. Conanchet gazes speechlessly at the ruins before joining his companions on the way back to their village. When the survivors emerge, Mark gives thanks for their lives, urging others to do so as well. His religious conviction demands a denial of trauma and loss. If the characters were able to mourn or work through the terror of the raid and the loss of the children, Cooper does not show it. The only overt symptom of the trauma is the failing health of Ruth Sr., as she pines for her lost daughter.

Many years pass, and the settlement has grown even larger with the addition of a church and stronger ties to distant colonial authorities. Mark's less visionary son, Content Heathcote—the father of the girl who was captured—is now in charge of defending the settlement. King Philip's War has begun, and Conanchet, now grown to be the chief of his people, has allied with Philip (Metacom). Metacom has targeted Wish-ton-Wish. The question is now whether the initial violence will be repeated or not. The main characters who must make this decision are Mark Heathcote's son Content, who does not have the deep spiritual integrity of his father, and the white Indians.

White Indians and Twinning

Both Sedgwick and Cooper create a range of characters spanning the gap between the separate identities of Indian and Puritan: different degrees of cultural exchange create a spectrum of Red –to whiter–to White. Whereas, as we shall see, Sedgwick creates white Indians who are all noble, each in their own way, Cooper creates a hierarchy of white Indians from the lowest form of savagery to the noblest. Twinning in *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish* acts as a kind of literary ethnic cleansing, creating nobility through deferment to whiteness/Christianity. Through their interactions, qualities of whiteness/Christianity and/or Indianness are transferred between them. Through this process, the savage gives way to the civilized. The various white Indians in this novel serve to show degrees and types of savagery, and to mediate relations between whites and Indians. There are five

major representations of “white Indians” in this work: Conanchet, his wife Narrah-mattah, their infant child, the village “idiot” Whittal Ring, and the English outlaw Submission.

Whittal Ring is a simpleton to begin with, but after his lengthy captivity among the Narragansett he becomes debased, suspicious, cunning, and untrustworthy. This is the very lowest image of the human “savage”—incapable of higher reasoning and barely human. When young Mark Heathcoate is engaged in a heated battle with hostile Indians, Whittal Ring seizes his arms as several Indian warriors attack. As they kill Mark, Whittal Ring yells “Murder the lying and hungry pale-faces! They leave us no food but air! No drink but water!” (290). Mark has led a vengeful assault that destroyed the village where Whittal lived, and so it seems appropriate that his death comes about from this most unthinking of persons. Whittal is a personification of the savage drive for revenge, with no redeeming transformative motivation.

The captive child Ruth, renamed Narra-mattah, grows to be a beautiful white Indian. Cooper presents her as possessing the undeveloped child-like innocence and beauty of savagery. She has not matured into an individual in her Indian identity, she sees herself as an extension of Conanchet: "Narrah-mattah is a wife" (Ch. XXXI). However, as Conanchet, wishing to save her from the violence of warfare, tries to explain that he wants her to go back to her family of birth, whom she has forgotten, she seems half-animal: “The female listened attentively. Her gaze was wild and uncertain, and yet it was not absolutely without the gleamings of a half-reviving intelligence” (Ch. XXV). She listens, “stupid” and “uncomprehending,” until she gradually realizes that she was once a little white girl named Ruth. When she finally remembers her past, she reverts to childhood, and she cannot reconcile herself to having been Conanchet’s wife. She dies in shock. Ruth embodies the dissociation of trauma, and her death performs the incommensurability of Christian and Indian lifeways, the inevitable end of the “savage” state inherent in Cooper’s stadialist view of history.

Conanchet is made a “white Indian” as a result of his “adoption” by the Heathcotes. Mark Jerng notes that Heathcote would like to educate Conanchet, and bring

him into the family through religion (28). Conanchet's mercy is associated with the influence of the Heathcotes and his loyalty to them. However, his "improvement," his glimpses of intersubjectivity with the family, leave him vulnerable to his fellow Indians, who despise his lack of cruelty. Without harming his white friends, Conanchet adheres to his Indian nobility and integrity until his death, to which he goes willingly knowing that, although his village is gone, the Heathcotes will care for his child.

Conanchet's relationship to his community, an aspect of Indian life that, as we have seen, is an essential part of Native culture, is barely mentioned until near the end of the novel. He does not mention his own extended family or the loved ones he and his wife and child might have had in his home community, or whether such family was alive or dead. In sending his wife back to the Heathcotes, he is acting the part of the stereotypical vanishing savage, one who exists solely in relation to Euro-Americans, and who willingly yields his life and interests for their wellbeing and superior civilization.

The "highest form" of the white Indian in the novel, Submission, exists as an outlaw from British justice, as James Smith did for a time. It is only he who, living outside the law and on the fringe of the settlement, can mediate between the agrarians and the "savages." His name is paradoxical—he would not submit to oppressive rule in England, so he turns to living beyond the law, in the wilderness. However, his exile serves a purpose, for not only can he mediate between those within civilization and those without, but his position—living in a cave on a hill overlooking the settlement—makes him a protector of the settlement who has a "civilizing" influence on young Conanchet. Not only is he a mediator between savagery and civilization, and a protector of civilization, but given his role as a transitional figure in the evolution of society, his gaze performs the objectivity of stadialism.

Objectivity and Narrativity

Submission's position above the village is an analogue to the purported "objectivity" of the narrative style. He declares, "Though of white blood and of Christian origin, I can almost say that my heart is Indian" (Ch. XXX). If his heart is practically Indian, his gaze is not, for he is presented as facing the settlement: "seated on a stone … at the place where the eye commanded the widest and least-obstructed view of the abodes of man in the distance" (Ch. XXXI). Submission's protective gaze overlooking the settlement is akin to the "God's eye view" which is upheld by the narrativity of stadialism and the hierarchy represented by the variety of white Indians in the novel.

Returning to Hayden White's concept of narrativity, Cooper's work fits squarely into the type of "history" that alleges to have an objective narrative point of view. White argues that this is the most suspect type of history because its objectivity is an illusion (3). In contrast, Crevecoeur's epistolary form, the autobiographical form, and *Hope Leslie*'s multivocal qualities (the combination of letters, discursive narration, and subjectivities), each has a distinct way of speaking to a reader—a reader with the imagined or real potential to respond socially. Cooper's ostensible objectivity precludes a social response. Instead, it fulfills the need for a redemptive, authoritative perspective which creates a sense of "history." This version of history valorizes stadialist concepts: a budding settlement of religious purity is threatened by savagery—from without by military attacks, and within through miscegenation. The "higher" form of civilization will inevitably succeed. Its founding trauma of violence will be redeemed by sacrifice—Conanchet's sacrifice in order to save Submission—without the working-through of trauma allowed by less encompassing and more personal modes of historical writing.

Cooper chooses a critical time in colonial history to represent US–Indian captivity and adoption: a prelude to the horrific King Philip's War, when tension between colonists and Native nations were high, cross-cultural possibilities in Cooper's world are limited self/other configurations, with little room for intersubjectivity. Alternative cross-cultural experiences such as ongoing trade or long-term, friendly community relations are foreclosed not only by the violence of the time depicted, but also by the stadialist model of history—a staple of Cooper's conceptual underpinning. In addition, in 1827, when

Hope Leslie was published, and in 1829, when *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish* was published, the political and legal maneuvering that culminated in the removal of the Cherokee from Georgia was approaching its peak. Cooper's novel reflects a perspective that supports this remove as inevitable, despite the fact that the Cherokee were among the tribes who had adopted settled agricultralism and other Anglo-American ways most widely. The final tableau of his novel, set in a graveyard, points to the mindset that Indian removal was inevitable, if not a *fait accompli*.

In the stadialist understanding of Cooper's time, one form of society must supersede the previous one, regardless of the cost to both (Dekker 74-75). Thus Ruth/Narrah-Mattah, having gone backwards towards savagery, is not allowed to live. And Conanchet, whose evolved sense of mercy is at odds with his savage identity as an Indian warrior and chief, sacrifices himself to save Submission and the settlement. The implication is that he willingly gives way for the superior culture.

Time and the White Indian

American colonialism brought civilization and empire into direct contact with "savagery." Each form of society was believed to have its merits and drawbacks. The pull of progress was attributed to humankind's desire for more knowledge and truth, yet it also brought about the oppression of imperialism. Savagery and the pull of the "ancient" involved negative qualities, and yet also brought out humanity's heroic qualities (Dekker 74).

While stadialism is clearly a foundational concept at work in *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*, Cooper uses it with some sophistication. George Dekker reads Cooper's view of history as one in which Providence is conflated with progress, leaving the characters unable to consider possibilities beyond their own cultural constructs, so that history unfolds according to unconscious actions (9). This unconsciousness is a factor that allows the repetition of trauma without working through it. Thus, for Cooper, only from the

objective "outside," or from a distance, can we make sense of people's actions during historical crises. But as we have established, trauma does not obey the rules of time. The pain of the survivors and the guilt of the perpetrators are still matters to be considered by their respective postgenerations.

Reconciliation or Repetition?

One moment of potential reconciliation unfolds as Conanchet brings his infant son to Submission, with instructions to bring him to Narrah-mattah, now living with her birth family. The child is clearly an embodiment of the possibility for a new kind of American identity, partly Native, partly white/Christian. Submission laments, "Why should the Indian and the White do each other such violence? The earth is large, and there is room for men of all colors and of all nations on its surface" (332). As Submission and Conanchet discuss this question, the young Indian chief learns that Submission helped take the head of Charles I in the first part of the English Civil War. Amazed that Submission has been such a great warrior, Conanchet asks him to be a counselor and a revered member of his tribe. Submission replies:

> It may not be—it may not be, Narragansett. That which hath been generated in the spirit must abide, and it would be 'easier for a blackamoor to become white' … than for one who hath felt the power of the Lord cast aside his gifts. But I meet thy proffers of amity in a charitable and forgiving spirit. My mind is ever with my people; yet is there place for other friendships. (333)

Submission asks Conanchet to end his alliance with Philip and live in peace with the new community, but Conanchet's people have been too much harmed by the war for him to change alliance: "Where is my village? I see a dark place near the islands, on the shores of the Great Lake, but I see no lodges" (334). Gravely, Conanchet reprises the words of

Submission: "My mind is ever with my people," and both men sit in silence, understanding each other's situation (334). The moment of greatest intersubjectivity in the novel unfolds as a mutual revelation of incommensurability.

Despite this deep difference, the agency of Submission and Conanchet enables the progression from savagery to civilization. White and red lives are lost, but the novel focuses mainly on the sacrifices of "white" Indians: Conanchet and Narrah-Mattah. Conanchet dies as a result of having saved Submission from hostile Indians. When Narra-Mattah is first reunited with the Heathcotes, her infant son is looked upon with horror by the rest of the family as a reminder of the girl's sexual intimacy with Conanchet. The baby is not mentioned again, leading at least one critic to believe that Cooper simply left him out of the picture.[1] After all, the son of Narra-Mattah and Conanchet cannot live in a strictly stadialist history. An Indian must be a pagan savage, and a White English person must be a Christian. Therefore the child is off stage until the novel is over.

As Jerng states, in *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*, "personhood as a site of intertwined histories between Native American and white settler is suppressed" (37). For Cooper, sacrifice, "offstage" assimilation, and remembrance seem to be the limit, although the notion of the "Wept" (Ruth) implies a long and unresolved mourning, a reverberation of trauma that has simply "faded" over time like the names on the gravestones of Ruth, Conanchet, and Submission. However, Cooper brings the story into the future with what I read as a fictional dedication set in 1871 (about forty years after the publication of the novel) to what seems to be a thoroughly whitened (at least Chistianized) descendant of Ruth and Conanchet's child:

> To The Rev. J. R. O. of Pennsylvania
> Notwithstanding there are so many striking and deeply
> interesting events in the early history of those from whom
> you derive your being, yet are there hundreds of other
> families in this country, whose traditions, though less

[1] "Cooper is even more harsh against the amalgamation of the two races than are Child and Sedgwick, since he never mentions what has become of the child of Conanchet and Ruth" (Nakamura 146).

> accurately and minutely preserved than the little narrative you have submitted to my inspection, would supply the materials of many moving tales. You have every reason to exult in your descent, for, surely, if any man may claim to be a citizen and a proprietor in the Union, it is one, that, like yourself, can point to a line of ancestors whose origin is lost in the obscurity of time. You are truly an American. In your eyes, we of a brief century or two, must appear as little more than denizens quite recently admitted to the privilege of a residence. That you may continue to enjoy peace and happiness, in that land where your fathers so long flourished, is the sincere wish of your obliged friend,
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> THE AUTHOR

Cooper's fictional dedication suggests that he has written this history from personal family materials entrusted to him by a minister. This "descendant"'s assimilation is clearly complete, and it is with unintentional irony that Cooper gives him the "gift" of his own family's story. As noted earlier, in the Hopi tradition, telling a history equated placing seeds into the listener (Nabokov 40): it is a relational act. What does it mean that Cooper plants this historical "seed" into the descendant of Conanchet and Narra-Mattah? It means that Cooper himself is the mediator of Indian history and heritage.

Cooper's novel represents a trauma that is as inevitable as the forces of civilization—both the "superior light" of Christianity and the European-style polity's merciless assertions of superiority. In its framing, it performs an homage and a gift. This framing brings it into the present, but not in the same way that Sedgwick brings history to the present. As noted above, although the novel was published in 1829, the dedication is dated "1871," making it what might be called a "love letter to the past."

"Love Letter to the Past"

E. Anne Kaplan has analyzed Kevin Costner's *Dances with Wolves* as a film that creates "empty empathy" (100). Such films present us with fantasies of colonialism in which the

audience identifies with a white man who becomes an Indian. This white Indian seems to remove the burden of any implication in the American genocide by assuring audiences that if they had been in such a situation, they too would have helped defend the Natives. The "empathy" created is "empty" because the incident is isolated in the past. Kevin Costner, in introducing a book about the film, said that "[Dances with Wolves] will forever be my love letter to the past" (Owens 114). In characterizing the film as such, Costner speaks of a past that is somehow essentially separate from the present, and from the Natives who are living in the present day. Such constructions of the past fall in line with Vizenor's terminal creeds: beliefs that the lives and cultures of Indian societies are gone. In one sense, a love letter to the past is an attempt at relationality and mourning, but in another sense, it falls far short by not acknowledging the continuance of Sioux culture, the survivance of the people. This love letter is not addressed to living Sioux, but to yet another example of the doomed noble savage.

Twinning and Repetition in *Hope Leslie*

Catherine Maria Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie* (1827) is set in the aftermath of the 1637 Pequot War, when the Pequot people were massacred in their large village in Mystic, Connecticut, by a Puritan force and declared by Puritan authorities to be extinct. Any surviving prisoners were sold into slavery; most were shipped off to serve as slaves on Caribbean plantations. Sedgwick's novel depicts the servitude of two Pequot children in the Puritan homestead of William Fletcher, west of Boston. These children, Magawisca and Oneco, are the son and daughter of an exiled Pequot chief, Mononotto. They each become enamored of one of the young people in the household, respectively, Fletcher's son Everell, and one of his stepdaughters, the eponymous heroine's younger sister Faith Leslie.[2] Both Hope Leslie and Magawisca save one another from harsh Puritan and

[2.] Faith Leslie is based on Eunice Williams, who was abducted along with her family by French-allied Mohawks during the Seven Years' War. Her father, John Williams, wrote a

Indian justice. In addition, Hope helps to reunite Mononotto's family, while Magawisca helps to unite Hope and Everell.

Twinning in this novel serves to create multiple relational possibilities, and thus multiple possibilities inherent in history. The mirroring and differentiation between the characters speak of both the limitations of cultural boundaries, and the possibility of transcending those limitations. The most prominent and central twinning is that of Hope Leslie and Magawisca. Hope is a light-hearted young woman, while Magawisca, daughter of a sachem, is of royal bearing, dignified and wise. Both live in the Fletcher household at different times; Magawisca lives among the Fletchers until she is freed by her father in a horrific raid that kills most of the family. It is after the raid that Hope joins the survivors of the restored Fletcher household as a young child.

The Pequot War has cost Magawisca her brother, all but one of her younger siblings, and her home community in Mystic—the young woman lived through and witnessed the horrors of that attack: the screams of the dying, the flames, the charred remains of what had been her home, her friends, and family, and, in the aftermath, the merciless execution of many of the families that had managed to escape. As a captive servant of her enemies, in the difficult position of caring about the members of the community that had destroyed her people,[3] Magawisca gradually realizes that she is actually loved by William's wife, Martha Fletcher. She and Martha's son Everell develop a great affection for each other. Like Nora and Yamoyden, they develop a bond by exchanging stories: as he shares his studies with her, she tells him stories of her people. This sharing of stories lays the groundwork for a potential intersubjectivity.

Magawisca endures yet another massacre when her father (Mononotto) comes to save her. When he finally attacks Bethel to free Magawisca and her younger brother

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captivity narrative of his harrowing encounters with savages and Catholics (Demos 51). However, he does not mention that Eunice married Francois Xavier Arosen, an Indian man, and elected, despite desperate appeals from her birth family, to remain with the Mohawks for the rest of her life (Demos 111).

[3.] Indeed, the Pequot "War" the first truly genocidal war in English colonial history. Survivors were sold into slavery in the West Indies, and the tribe was declared extinct. (Cave 2)

Oneco, his warriors (despite Magawisca's pleading and Everell's valiant fighting), kill Martha Fletcher, her baby boy, and the young daughters. Everell and Hope's younger sister Faith are taken as captives. Even as Oneco cares for Faith, Magawisca has come to love Everell, and agonizes as her father plans to behead him in retribution for the beheading of his own captive son in the immediate aftermath of the Pequot war. He sees in Everell a courage and dignity that makes him a worthy sacrifice. Magawisca attempts to intervene in the sacrifice by physically shielding him, and her father's axe, already descending, severs her protective arm rather than Everell's head. Mononotto and his warriors stand in awe, accepting this intervention as a kind of miracle, as they allow Everell to escape.

Magawisca bears a permanent scar: the loss of an arm. Even as the new generation was developing the potential to understand and love one another, the violence from the previous generation is visited upon them, severing their natural, hopeful connection.

After the raid on Bethel, Hope Leslie arrives as a small child, unaware of the horrors that have just taken place. This succession links the two young women to the larger story of the English taking over Pequot territory. The place of the Pequot girl, like the territory of the Pequot people, is taken by an English replacement. However, Hope, not directly affected by witnessing the war or the raid, grows up happily, a "child of nature." Like Magawisca, Hope develops a deep fondness for Everell, although in her youth it is a sisterly love. Thus Hope, like Magawisca and Everell, is a member of new generation who may still have the potential to transcend the repetition compulsion of violence between the cultures.

Both Magawisca and Hope have the ability to see beyond the limitations of their cultures. Magawisca began to love her English family despite the Indian belief in revenge, and in saving Everell even stops the traumatic repetition of her own brother's death. In parallel, Hope pushes at the boundaries of strict patriarchal purity through her independent nature, and an inclination to follow the dictates of her heart and conscience.

Hope's independence is mildly troubling to the stern patriarchs, but becomes truly problematic when she helps an old Pequot medicine woman, Nelema, flee from prison.

Hope, like Magawisca, shows a potential for intercultural understanding. The elderly medicine woman has helped cure Hope's tutor of a deadly snakebite. A narrow minded and bigoted servant called Jennet has spied on the curing ritual and accuses Nelema of witchcraft. Subsequently, Nelema is sentenced to death, but before the sentence can be carried out, she vanishes from prison, with the help of Hope Leslie. When Hope saves the old woman, the scene is a mirror image of Everell's salvation: as the young Indian woman defies her father's harsh justice to save a beloved member of another ethnicity, so does Hope defy Puritan authorities and save the old Pequot woman from their cruel justice. The parallel between these two attempts at execution puts the Puritans on a par with savagery. Meanwhile, in saving their friends, both young women have preserved some measure of hope for the end of traumatic repetition. The difference lies in the outcome that Hope is not wounded, while Magawisca is permanently disfigured. Whereas Hope is unaffected by the violence of the past, Magawisca suffers an irrevocable loss which serves as a reminder to the reader (and to the audience at her trial) of the trauma done to her people.

Magawisca's ability to protect her English friends is compromised by an unwillingness to betray her father. Hope must contend with an insistently patriarchal attempt to dominate her. Despite not holding Hope accountable for Nelema's escape, Governor Winthrop pressures Hope's foster father, William Fletcher, to arrange a marriage for Hope with someone who can "control" her: "I am impatient to put jesses on this wild bird of yours, while she is on our perch. … I am satisfied that you will not oppose any means that may offer to secure the lambs of our flock in the true fold" (162). To Winthrop, women are nothing much more than domesticated animals. In this representation of patriarchy, Sedgwick suggests that women's equality (in both cultures) could temper cultural differences and bring peace. Accordingly, even as these plans are being made for her domestication, Hope's vision of the world is expanding beyond the harsh confines of Puritanical thought.

Sedgwick has used twinning between Hope and Magawisca to show the relational limitations built into patriarchy. In an extension of that twinning, and in an example of twinning for contrast, Sedgwick represents the difference between a domineering and a relational perspective. In a letter Hope writes to Everell, who has been sent to England for his education, Sedgwick presents a stark contrast between perspectives. Hope, her tutor, and Fletcher have climbed a mountain and are surveying the land all around. Hope writes:

> We lingered for an hour or two on the mountain. Mr. Holioke and your father were noting the sites for future villages, already marked out for them by clusters of Indian huts … My senses were enchanted on that high place. I listened to the mighty sound that rose from the forest depths of the abyss, like the roar of the distant ocean, and to the gentler voices of nature, borne on the invisible waves of air—the farewell notes of the few birds that still linger with us—the rustling of the leaves beneath the squirrel's joyous leap—the whizzing of the partridge startled from his perch; the tinkling of the cow-bell, and the barking of the Indian's dog. (105)

The summit is being experienced in two distinct ways. Fletcher and Holioke use the perspective to objectively and coldly plan out "future villages" which will necessarily displace the people living in the "huts." Their experience is of a future of domination of the landscape, and their position on the mountaintop symbolizes their assumption of supremacy and authority. In fact, Mr. Holioke surmises with Fletcher "that the spirits of those who have died for liberty and religion, have come before us to this wilderness, and *taken possession* in the name of the Lord…"[4] (104, emphasis mine).

[4.] While Sedgwick does not refer to Cowper in *Hope Leslie*, there are references in her other works indicating her familiarity with this popular poet's work. For example, in Sedgwick's *Clarence: Or, A Novel of Our Own Times Cowper*, it is referenced on page 152 and, in a collection of works by a deceased young poetess to which Sedgwick contributed, there is a poem dedicated to Cowper (Davidson 194). The twin views of the mountaintop are suggested in the following widely published poem by William Cowper:

In contrast, Hope's mountaintop is a place not of cultural dominance or cultural replication, but a site of transcendence. Hope simply hears the life all around her, and lets it act upon her. The final notes of this passage, the cowbell and the Indians' dogs, create a harmony between the coexisting English settlements and Indian villages. Later in the same letter, Hope notes, "I had often heard you, Everell, say, that Magawisca believed the mountain, and the valley, the air, the trees, every little rivulet, had their present invisible spirit—and that the good might hold discourse with them" (111). Hope learns from Magawisca'a experience of immanence to feel a greater sense of the connectedness in nature. Hope, a Puritan version of Magawisca, has been influenced by the Pequot princess to experience the land relationally, hearing it and experiencing a transcendent harmony between cultures in conflict.

Indeed, the conflict is not only between the two cultures, but also represents the kind of subjective split or dissociation characteristic of trauma, specifically the dissociation of the men who are planning to direct and control the land around them, without any regard for its other human inhabitants beyond the self/other construct. Fletcher and Holioke are missing the relational reality that Hope, through Magawisca via Fletcher, has learned. In their isolation from and deafness to the relational nature of the natural world and the indigenous people who are its original owners, their actions will naturally continue the work of settler colonialism, replicating and continuing the violence of the Pequot massacre—not in degree, but certainly in kind.

I am monarch of all I survey,
My right there is none to dispute,
From the centre all round to the sea,
I am lord of the fowl and the brute.
O solitude! Where are the charms
That sages have seen in thy face?
Better dwell in the midst of alarms,
Than reign in this horrible place.

Time and Trauma

Hope's perspective on the mountaintop may be critiqued as an anachronistic Romanticism, a sensibility that was not possible in Puritan culture; but such seeming inconsistencies create a dialogue between the past (and its traumas) and the present (Sedgwick's time as well as ours). Specifically, trauma does not obey the limits of time. For the traumatized individual, when an event triggers a traumatic memory that has not been emotionally integrated, flashbacks and repetition collapse the past and the present emotionally. For the collective, history will be told in ways that can elide or avoid the crimes upon which the country was built. Histories involving the American genocide can be told which either justify its criminality, or which render it a cerebral, neutral fact, with no emotional or social valences: "historical fact," which has not necessarily, as Shoshona Felman and Dori Laub point out, "been taken cognizance of"—that is, understood emotionally, socially, and ethically (57). Such unprocessed "historical fact(s)" are the fodder of which terminal creeds, such as stadialism, are constructed. However, *Hope Leslie* uses a dialogue between past and present that has the potential to defy terminal creeds such as Cooper's.

Sedgwick demonstrates an understanding of traumatic time in Everell's experience of trauma, first vicariously through Magawisca, and then alongside her. When Magawisca tells Everell how her people were massacred, he understands the Pequot's perspective, and sheds tears for her and for them; the trauma becomes present in the telling for both the speaker and for the listener, who becomes a sympathetic witness. This manner of witnessing, according to Felman and Laub, changes "knowledge" to a "knowing" birthed in the moment of the listener's witnessing, and makes the listener a "co-owner" of a traumatic event (57).

Soon after, in a revenge repetition of the massacre of the Pequots, Magawisca and Everell both experience the bloodbath at Bethel, and both attempt to save the Fletcher family. As his captors lead him to the place of execution, the timelessness of trauma

seems to prepare him for his imminent execution: "past and future were present to the mind, as if it were already invested with the attributes of its eternity" (88).

Sedgwick's fluid representation of time parallels the timelessness of traumatic memory, while also serving other functions. Jeffry Insko notes several anachronisms in *Hope Leslie*. For instance, when Magawisca is on trial for her life, having been accused of consorting with the devil, she defies the Puritan magistrates in a speech quoted by several scholars: "I am your prisoner, and ye may slay me, but I deny your right to judge me" (302). Later in the same scene, she reiterates her statement in terms that come from Revolutionary, not Puritan times: "I demand of thee death or liberty" (309).

This line has been read in various ways. Laurel Hankins sees Magawisca's Patrick Henryism as evidence that Sedgwick's novel works to naturalize ideals of democracy, and that having Magawisca—whom Hankins reads as identified with the land—speak these words makes her an "unassimilated source" (161) and a "natural resource" (177) of "fundamental American values" (i.e. the love of liberty). While Hope is domesticated, and thus will be subjected to the compromises and corruptions of civilization, Magawisca refuses assimilation, retaining the purity of American freedom (177). In addition, despite Magawisca's adherence to the vanishing savage type, Sedgwick gestures toward continuance as she speaks of Magawisca as living a story "which remains untold" (177). Magawisca's disappearance into Indian country is qualified by the haunting memory of her severed arm—a reminder of her unique identity and history, the violence initiated by the Puritan massacre of the Pequot people, and the violence done to her body as a consequence.

Magawisca's courtroom defiance is also read as evidence that Sedgwick portrays Native Americans not as savages, but as equal to whites. Patricia Kalayjian calls it a heroism on a par with Revolutionary heroism and Christian martyrdom (67). In the parting scene, when Magawisca refuses to remain with Hope and Everell, she reminds them that rather than Christianizing her (as Hope wishes to do), the Puritans would be better off adhering to their own principle of forgiveness; in other words, the violence and tragedy of this episode in history is the fault of the Puritans (67). Thus Magawisca, who

vanishes over the water, heading for Indian country to find her father, Oneco, and Faith, leaves a double reminder of Puritan criminality against the Pequots in her disfigurement, and in her admonishment of sanctimonious Christians. These messages resonate beyond the colonial time period to Sedgwick's contemporary audience.

Jeffrey Insko identifies three distinct time periods that the novel inhabits: the ostensible colonial context, the time of the Revolution, and Sedgwick's time (179). While Insko's focus is on how the fluidity of time performed by Hope Leslie complicates a historicist view, my focus is on the dialogic nature and relational dimension of the novel, which can help us to address Insko's questions: "What if the novel demands that we question whence derives the authority of history itself? What if it posits that events can and do exceed their containment within discrete moments in time?" (181).

Hope Leslie presents ample evidence for an affirmative answer to the latter question. According to Amy Dunham Strand, *Hope Leslie* was written not only in relation to the Pequot War, but also in relation to a removal (involving her own family) of Native Americans from Western Massachusetts, where Sedgwick chose to set her novel. The novel can also be seen as part of a chorus of voices in support of the 1830 women's petition to Congress on behalf of Native Americans (132), as well as to debates about the Cherokee removals (133). Sedgwick represents the inhumanity of the Puritan massacre of the Pequots, Magawisca's unassailable nobility (in poignant contrast to the loss of her arm), and the reunification of Magawisca's family—including Faith Leslie, who has married Oneco and refuses to return to Puritan life. All of these elements in the novel stand out in favor of the continuance of Indian culture and life.

Most of these examples are applicable in the historicists' sense: chronologically linked to the author's subject, her life and the culture and politics of her time. But to return to Insko's first question, "what if the novel demands that we question whence derives the authority of history itself?" (181). We typically conceive of the ultimate authority in history as chronology. But what does chronology do? It subjects events to an abstract principle of organization: sequence. The establishment of cause and effect further authorizes chronology in that sequence. The authority of chronology is especially

problematic in historical fiction, in which created narratives have the effect of authority. They also possess the illusion of objectivity, an objectifying self/other relation so extreme that it pretends not to be relational at all; objectivity assumes an "outside" space for the observer, which can be imagined but which cannot be real. As Hayden White argues, the more "objective" the presentation of historical narrative seems, the more likely it is to be concealing a meta-narrative (3). "Objective" authoritative narratives of history, then, are presented to the society in question in order to reinforce beliefs that are not necessarily overt enough to be questioned and discussed. Sedgwick, in bringing history to bear on the present, is asking readers to consider the conditional nature of historical truth. As Insko puts it, Sedgwick illustrates "an important theoretical point: history and fiction aren't different because they belong to different genres; critics assign texts to distinct genres in order to establish their differences" (187). Not only does this theoretical point highlight the subjectivity of all historical narratives, but it also allows us to understand the relevance of all stories, whether history or fiction, written or oral. To take this a step further: what if the ultimate authority in history were relationality? What if historical events were discussed in terms of the type of relationality being enacted? The past and the present would look very different indeed. It seems that history is defined as such in part by the lack of acknowledged relationality in and among its narratives.

Trauma is often defined as an event (or sequence of events) that, due to their overwhelming and painful nature, cannot be integrated into a coherent narrative of consciousness. In tackling the tragedies of Puritan–Indian conflicts, early nineteenth century writers such as Sedgwick were attempting to incorporate the atrocities of the colonists into a coherent narrative. As noted above, these narratives can be attempts to conceal crimes against humanity, or they can help the postgenerations work through them by helping us to create a relationship to the events—a relationship that engages us mentally, emotionally, and socially. For trauma is not a single event contained in time. It reverberates and repeats itself until it is (all too seldom) resolved, and its ultimate resolution is the transcendence of self/other configurations, and the achievement of intersubjectivity (Mitchell 64).

Sedgwick often interrupts her narrative of the past with "News from the Present" (Insko 187). Insko notes an example in Sedgwick's first full description of Hope Leslie as a person who is utterly "unlike the authentic 'thoroughly educated,' and thoroughly disciplined young ladies of the present day" (189). For example, in a strict patriarchal culture, Hope obeys only "her own heart" (174); she is "open, fearless, and gay" (178), with a "love for exploring hill and dale, ravine and precipice" (177). Sedgwick, in comparing Hope's natural independence and virtues with the cultivated and tamed "young ladies" of her day, is asking the reader to engage with history and the ways it can be present in the present. In introducing the past to the present, she creates a kind of temporal intersubjectivity. The past is not necessarily "other" than now, it can be as immanent as Magawisca's Great Spirit. Peter Nabokov notes myriad ways that history has been traditionally understood by Native societies: as stories linking events and lands to a deep past (83); as simultaneous, parallel experiences of mythic time, recent history, and present time (81); and also as a story that is made so accessible in time that storytellers can experience it as if they are personally present during the events (43). These sophisticated understandings of time allow for a fuller, multifaceted, and more relational experience of history for a society. To some degree, Sedgwick's anachronisms enact the latter of these understandings: She narrates as if present in the past, while also speaking directly to the present. Rather than serving as an authority on the past, and presenting it as a memento, Sedgwick asks the reader to engage with its relational potential. Therefore, as we sorted out the various white Indians in *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*, I shall sort out the relationalities in *Hope Leslie*

Relationalities and Resolutions

Intersubjectivity occurs most powerfully before the end of the first half of *Hope Leslie*, between Everell and Magawisca. However, two events occur during the denouement which show the heroine both recognizing and respecting difference in such a way that

transcends Mitchell's three first states of relationality: narcissistic assumptions of sameness, a shared feeling among a group, and variations of self-and-other. These involve Magawisca and Hope's younger sister Faith.

As noted above, Faith was taken prisoner when Mononotto raided Fletcher's homestead, Bethel. Oneco, Magawisca's younger brother, was especially fond of the young child, and protects her during the party's journey back to Indian country. Years later, when Hope frees Nelema, she asks the old woman to arrange a meeting so that Hope can bring her younger sister home. When Faith is finally brought to the Winthrop's house, she speaks no English, and is miserable, longing for her husband. Hope cannot understand why or how Faith would not want to come home to her own sister, her own culture, but when Faith finally elopes with Oneco, she comes to accept it as the will of God. Hope cannot quite understand Faith, but she accepts the difference nonetheless.

After Everell and Hope have helped Magawisca gain her freedom, they beg her to remain with them as a friend. Hope expresses her fear that Magawisca's noble mind would be wasted in the solitude of the wilderness. Magawisca replies as noted above, that there is no such thing as solitude in her spiritual awareness of the world. And the pain of the trauma she and her people have endured is too much for her to overcome: "It cannot be—it cannot be" she says, like Cooper's exile, Submission (349). Hope quickly agrees, but silently wishes Magawisca could improve her naturally noble mind and spirit even more if she became a Christian.

How is it that Hope has gone from being the free spirit she once was to a more orthodox Christian? How has she lost her "white Indian" qualities? I argue that this change is partly an ironic twist on genre added by Sedgwick, and partly a manifestation of Sedgwick's vision of a marriage of equals. By the novel's end, Hope has become a heroine of the sentimental plot – about to be married to her true love Everell. In addition, she has, as Amanda Emerson argues, learned to narrow her sphere of action to a smaller domain, where she is less likely to cause the kind of chaos her earlier actions threatened (29). With this acceptance, she seems to lose her insight into the deep relationality she experienced on the mountain. It is Everell who truly appreciates Magawisca's otherness,

as he blurts out: "Oh! yes, Magawisca … come back to us, and teach us to be happy, as you are, without human help or agency" (352). Somehow Everell, perhaps through his unspoken love for Magawisca, has retained a glimpse of a cultural intersubjectivity.

As Hope and Everell have grown up almost as brother and sister, their marriage, as Maglina Lubovich notes, will be one of equality rather than patriarchal dominance and wifely submission (29). Thus both Hope and Magawisca have escaped imprisonment/captivity—a trope that runs throughout the novel. But more options are possible for a Puritan woman, for as Everell and Hope are united, another twinning occurs. Esther Downing, a pious young woman who came from England to stay with the Winthrops, has become a close friend of Hope. Esther is in love with Everell, and he is too kind to reject her outright. Though Everell had always loved Hope, Hope, in an effort to be a good selfless Puritan, encourages him to marry Esther. But to both Magawisca and Esther it is clear that Hope and Everell belong together. Even as the selfless and noble Magawisca leaves by boat to return to Indian country, so does Esther return by boat to England, not to confine her kindness and good works to a husband and household, but to share them in a larger sphere. Esther is also a clear "twin" to Magawisca, whose influence throughout the novel has gone far beyond the domestic sphere.

Esther as a double for Hope speaks to Sedgwick's life: while she often lauded the role of the woman in the domestic sphere, she adamantly refused to sacrifice her autonomy and remained single her entire life (Kelly 211). Amanda Emerson sees in the three heroines, Hope, Magawisca, and Esther, three different versions of female subjectivity and happiness. Before their union as a couple, Hope and Everell had a brother/sister relationship (reflecting Sedgwick's own choice to substitute matrimony to closeness to her brothers); their union gestures toward a marriage of equals rather than patriarchal dominance (Kelly 28-29). Even so, Magawisca prefigures Esther and the independence of women who, in Sedgwick's time, made the courageous choice to defy the confinement of domestic life and embrace a larger sphere of agency. Magawisca is as independent and selfless as Esther, and outspoken and brave as Hope, but she also expresses indignation and rage—qualities that, Emerson notes, relegate her to the status

of noble vanishing savage for no real reason other than that Sedgwick's nineteenth-century culture is not ready to integrate the kind of power and anger manifested in Magawisca into womanhood (Emerson 32). Magawisca is also reminiscent of Rebecca from Scott's *Ivanhoe* (Karcher xxv). Everell and Magawisca have shared a deep connection based on mutual interest in the other's difference and experiences, not an "othering" distance, or a connection based on similarities, but the separateness and intertwined interest of intersubjectivity. Like Scott's Rebecca, Sedgwick's Magawisca has saved the hero. And like Rebecca, Magawisca sacrifices her interest in the hero because religious and "racial" difference would have made their marriage impossible. Here she ceases to be a "white Indian" and departs, fully Indian.

As the novel began with William Fletcher not being able to marry his "true love" because of religious difference, so it ends with another such impossibility. Sedgwick presents a world that is resistant to change, and as the Puritans were oppressed in England, so they blithely plan to dominate Indian lands. Nonetheless, in the potential for intersubjectivity among the younger generation in the Puritan colony, there is some measure of hope. Their compassion and friendship prevent the repetition of bloodshed and war within the world of this novel.

While in reality the bloodshed of King Philip's War is yet to come, and, in Sedgwick's time, Indian removals of the Jackson administration were only beginning, she attempted to present a world where there existed—for a time, however dimly—ways of seeing and understanding across cultural boundaries, and the opportunity to think and act more freely based on the dictates of one's conscience. Nonetheless, *Hope Leslie* does not represent a full working through of trauma. The colonial community has not acknowledged the wrongs it has done to the Pequot nation. Amends have not been made, only more plans for dominion. Magawisca's arm cannot be healed, and her people cannot be restored. However, the novel performs the act of bringing the past into the present in a dialogic manner, one in which no objectivity is pretended. Rather, the letters and voices of the characters, along with the conversational and ironic style of the narrator, keep a sense of dialogue about the past open, along with its fluid relation to the present.

Sedgwick's "resolution" of Hope Leslie herself into a more conventional character, the lack of an ending for Esther, and Magawisca's arm all suggest the artificiality of endings and the persistence of historical wounds, potentialities of intersubjectivity, resistance to conformity, and the potential for a wider social scope of vision and action. The dialogism within and of her work, the potentialities represented by twinning, and the fluidity of time all suggest that we are still in the middle of history.

Conclusion

By now the value of treating these white Indian narratives as a genre should be clear. Their popularity from the early nineteenth century up until today clearly demonstrates that a language of culpability is struggling to find a narrative form, even as some of these texts attempt to justify or evade culpability for the dispossession and genocide of Native Americans. The popularity of films such as *Avatar* is a testament to the investment of even the most sympathetic writers in inventing Indians rather than seeing them.

Even as LaCapra's historiography calls redemption narratives into question, for they deny trauma (179), Gerald Vizenor's survivance theory rejects victimry (1). Negative founding traumas reinforce the victim status of the noble vanishing indigene, thus perpetuating trauma. If the "victor's" founding trauma is an ongoing crime against humanity—a war between a community and others who are seen as threatening to that community in some way—then in the grammar of violence, the victor is the first person, while the victim is the object or third person. One of the key aspects of Vizenor's survivance is the "fourth person," a case that transcends the uneven self/other binaries of fictitious "objectivity" (2). The postgenerations of the victors are the poorer for not being able to witness or to know—and out of that knowing, to begin to understand—a collective narrative that can include all available subjectivities. In relationality theory, working with the concepts of intersubjectivity and the "white Indian" as a trope or as a

defining figure in a genre, we have a space where we may face the inheritance of genocide.

Both of the authors studied in this chapter attempt to address past crimes against native societies. Despite his sympathy for Conanchet, and the dedication to Conanchet's fictional descendant, Cooper's stadialism and the cultural blindness of his characters enable him to sidestep the issue of white culpability. Old Mark Heathcote's zealous beliefs do not allow those under his influence to mourn or work through their traumas; they must be immediately grateful to God when their home is burned to ash and two of their children stolen. Conanchet's sacrifice and Ruth's death are erasures of a union that "cannot be," and take the place of working-through. The vision of the worn gravestones at the end is one of peace: the past is dead and gone. And though Sedgwick similarly "vanishes" the noblest of her Native characters, that character is still angry, still wounded. Her physical and emotional state leaves room to question the justice of history, and allows remainders of Indian culture and Indian suffering to trouble the past and present. Meanwhile Sedgwick's play with time and genre allow the past to exist in the present, where a dialogic relationship with past atrocities and intersubjectivities is possible.

CHAPTER FOUR

Survivance and Relationality: Community and Conversion in Two Nineteenth Century Native American Autobiographies

> Trauma has the quality of converting that one sharp stab... into an enduring state of mind … The moment becomes a season, the event becomes a condition.
>
> –Kai Erikson, *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*

> Conversion is a process, not a specific event.
>
> –Lewis R. Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion*

We have seen intercultural, intersubjective possibilities at work in Crevecoeur and Smith as responses to trauma. Now we will examine these same possibilities in Native American conversion narratives of the early 19th century. The texts to be studied in this chapter mediate between cultures and identities, but they also mediate trauma, using the conversion process and the conversion narrative to communicate and move past the isolated condition of trauma. In their moves between cultural constructs, they complicate the objectification/relationality–knowledge/knowing binaries seen in previous chapters. These Native American autobiographies reveal various complex relationships between trauma and conversion. In particular, these authors' religious conversions provide a form for the creative repetitions of trauma: for survivance.

William Apess' autobiography narrates the religious conversion of the formerly abused and exploited author. His journey ultimately brings him from alienation to a place of belonging, from being voiceless child to a powerful speaker. A cyclical repetition structures the text. The recurrences are always associated with Apess' voice. The repetitions echo an abusive episode in Apess' early childhood, and parallel his conversion process. This dual process culminates in an important victory for the Wampanoag Indians

in Mashpee, Massachusetts, and the powerful voice that speaks the "Eulogy for King Philip."

Apess' journey involved building relational networks of trust, which were sometimes betrayed; his disillusionment led him to pursue more stable relationalities. However, the response to trauma can also lead to pitfalls, one of which is the fantasy of compensation (Herman 190). Herman notes that

> part of the problem is the very legitimacy of the desire for compensation … the quest for fair compensation is often an important part of recovery. However, it also presents a potential trap … The fantasy for compensation is often fueled by the desire for a victory over the perpetrator that erases the humiliation of the trauma [but] in reality the struggle for compensation ties the [survivor's] fate to that of the perpetrator. (190)

George Copway's autobiography, like that of Apess, also is built on the interwoven nature of conversion and traumatic repetition. But while Apess found community and voice on his journey, Copway fails his community and falls into a struggle for compensation that makes him complicit in US policies. Copway's compromised relationality with his own people (due to embezzlement and rebellion against the elders) leaves him with little accountability, and he turns to ethically questionable behavior.

Whatever their differences, both of these conversion narratives/autobiographies show survivance at work. Both authors interweave the various stages of religious conversion with trauma, exposing the crimes done to their people. Further, crimes against Native societies are concealed in many ways during this period. Hilary Wyss outlines some of the traumatizing strategies of authority: during 1820s-1840s, when Apess and Copway wrote their autobiographies, the construct of Native "authenticity" was of great concern (63-64), hence the evolution of rigid racial hierarchies based on "scientific" proof of the inferiority of darker races (64). Using this so-called science, in the *Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia* case, the state of Georgia attempted to make Native Americans "non-persons" (64). All of these concepts, deeply traumatizing to their targets, revolve around

a central idea: white Christians have a monopoly on "objectivity"—and they get to determine who is human and who is not. To engage this aspect of colonialism with concepts of trauma, survivance and relationality can give us a view beyond a critique of the various ruses deployed by colonializing powers.

The trauma of objectification involved in colonialism robs the "objects" of voice. Bernd Peyer sees missionary work as an extension of this dynamic: converts to Methodism in particular undergo a traumatic conversion, which Peyer says was intended to assimilate Indians and the lower classes into an obedient, exploitable underclass (7). This trauma, and resistance to it, is indeed a driving force in many Native American autobiographies; in perceiving and protesting the difference between Christian theology and Christians' behavior, a handful of Indian converts/missionaries have been able to turn their new language and belief into what Peyer calls "a theology of liberation" (13). Even if these writers may at first advocate for cultural assimilation, the changing scope of their understanding eventually leads them to critique and confront the forces of colonialism (20).

Both Apess and Copway were converts to Methodism, an increasingly popular and inclusive religion. During the Jacksonian era of mass displacement of Indian nations, when traditional Native societies were threatened by the influences and incursion of white settlers and white culture, religious conversion was the only hope that these two writers had for the survival of their communities. According to Laura Mielke, the popularity of captivity, conversion and slave narratives at this time was due in part to the fact that these narratives allowed white readers, consumers of sentimental/affective culture, to read about the affecting circumstances of those whose circumstances were more difficult than their own, simultaneously establishing their affinity with sufferers/survivors and their distance from their suffering ("Native to the Question" 250). Apess and Copway benefitted from this interest in conversion narratives to gain the attention of the public: they showed how Indians were part of living, if beset, cultures—fellow humans, many of them Christian, capable of "improvement" and not inferior in

any sense. In using this form, Apess and Copway could assure readers of their respectability, while the authors would be assured of a white audience.

Furthermore, the Methodist movement addressed problems deriving from modernity's monadism, as well as the privileging of knowledge over knowing: Methodism emphasized that all people were estranged from each other and from God, and also figured theological knowledge as "saving or experiential knowledge" (Vickers 12-13). It would seem to promise fuller relationality and knowing through living and intersubjectivity.

Trauma Theory and Relationality

The configurations of trauma and traumatic repetition are complex in these two works. William Apess represents himself as having experienced tremendous personal loss and suffering as a small child, including separation from his parents, starvation, and extreme physical abuse. Historical trauma, too, is a factor here, for even long after the initial defeat of a Native American society, poverty, lack of social stability, health problems and child abuse can be traced back to historical loss (Brown-Rice 119-120). Thus the loss of his natal culture (which was all but wiped out by colonists during the Pequot War), and the scorn with which he was often treated as a Native and a Methodist, and we have what clinicians today would likely call a case of complex PTSD, or C-PTSD.

In C-PTSD, trauma has occurred repeatedly over an extended period of time (National Center for PTSD). Besssel van der Kolk and others have delineated C-PTSD as a complex of symptoms arising from chronic interpersonal trauma: these symptoms include difficulty in regulating emotion, especially anger; a chronic sense of guilt and shame; somatic symptoms which cannot be explained medically; and also changes in belief systems (e.g. in religious conversion) ("Assessment" 8-9).

If trauma generates a process that compels a person to revisit the past event, conversion is a meaning-making process that rewrites the past. For a Native American convert, pre-conversion suffering may stem from daily life in the conditions of

colonialism (e.g. disease, poverty, displacement, alcoholism, experiencing prejudice and attacks on Native culture). Pre-conversion trauma may also be caused by the conviction by a Christian missionary that paganism is in fact a sin. The moment of conversion then reinscribes all previous suffering as leading up to the moment of conversion.

The relationship between the moment of religious conversion and life afterward is on one level structurally analogous to the relationship between trauma and repetition. In the traumatic process the repetition compulsion draws the survivor back into similar circumstances until he or she can achieve a new relationship to the traumatic event (van der Kolk, Trauma, 175). In the conversion process, the conversion moment becomes a touchstone, a memory to return to, and to be narrated in order reinforce the new belief system and convert others. And as there is a drive for a trauma survivor to achieve a new relationship to a past event (the traumatic event), there is a drive for a religious convert to renew a relationship to a past event (the conversion moment).

In the conversion process, as Lewis Rambo explains in *Understanding Religious Conversion*, a convert's social, cultural, religious and personal systems converge (7). Rambo's seven-stage conversion model can be summarized thus: 1) Context: social, cultural, relational and economic circumstances; 2) crisis: a need to change one's orientation to life; 3) quest: seeking transcendence; 4) encounter: meeting an advocate (e.g. a missionary); 5) interaction: becoming more deeply involved with a community of converts; 6) commitment: joining the religion/group, usually via ritual; and 7) consequences: positive and negative outcomes of the new belief system on multiple levels. These stages can reoccur and repeat in different ways (17).

Trauma can parallel or interact with conversion in many ways. Establishing safety is the first stage in healing (Herman 155). The initial "encounter" of conversion can be a socially meaningful moment which welcomes a trauma survivor into a safe community of friendship, enabling him or her to achieve a measure of healing. However, conversion can also be traumatic in and of itself. In addition, trauma can mimic conversion, as below.

Each of these processes begins with a context unique to each individual. Into the religious seeker's context there comes a crisis, which may or may not be traumatic. For

example, the crisis may be the loss of a loved one or committing a sin. After this crisis, the convert begins a quest for a solution (Rambo 7). Eventually the convert encounters and commits to a religious group, and experiences positive and negative consequences (e.g. relief from isolation, enjoyment of clarity, and possible persecution by nonbelievers) (7). It is also worth noting that the conversion moment can be one of sublimity: the loss of self in the face of perceived overwhelming power.

For the trauma survivor who was victimized, obviously, the journey begins with a terrifying event beyond the victim's control (Herman 33). After the traumatic event, the survivor seeks change as well, but without full access to the emotions of the event and its relation to other events surrounding it, tends to fall into a re-creation of the traumatic event and/or a fantasy that a certain course of action will be a panacea for his or her suffering.[1] The traumatized person may, like the religious seeker, encounter a situation that offers a new way of thinking or being, but once he or she commits to this change, may find that the change was based solely on a fantasy that the commitment would be a panacea, a fantasy which is bound to collapse (Herman 181).

The relationships between conversion and trauma can serve as factors of survivance. The conversion of a Native from his or her natal beliefs to a form of Christianity, and from a provider in his or her community of origin to a preacher or missionary may seem like an act of assimilation, but it is also an act of survival. And in survival itself there is resistance (hence the term survivance). In these conversion narratives, we shall see not only how the social aspects of conversion mediate trauma, and how the repetitive cycles of trauma and conversion create a matrix for survivance, but also how the texts themselves place the authors as fellow believers or intellectuals on a level playing field with Euro-Americans, while calling for a relational response from the reader, an invitation to help heal the historical trauma that affects both Native Americans and Euro-Americans.

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[1] An autobiography can serve as a mode of at least partial working-through, as traumatic events are put into relation to surrounding events, into a chronology, and associated emotions may be recalled, even if incompletely.

William Apess: Trauma and the Birth of a Voice

The story told by William Apess' conversion narrative begins with a horrific trauma involving the loss of his voice. Subsequent developments in his life show how—through traumatic repetition, religious conversion, and a widening and deepening sense of relationality—Apess develops one of the most powerful voices in Native American literature.

According to his autobiography, William Apess was born in Colrain, Massachusetts in 1798 to a poverty-stricken Pequot couple who parted ways when Copway was about three years old, leaving him and his siblings so that they could find work elsewhere. During this period, the Pequots were a mere remnant of the tribe they had once been; after the decimation of the Pequot War, the survivors were shipped to the West Indies to work as slaves, or given as captives to other Native tribes (Peyer 129). In addition, as Barry O'Connell notes, Pequot survivors were compelled to sign a treaty forbidding the name of the tribe to be spoken and proclaiming the Pequots extinct. At the time of Apess' birth, the Pequots were very nearly so: There were only about 30-40 poverty-stricken and scattered tribe members (Konkle 34)—many had left the community to find work on the fringes of white society (Tiro 656). Apess' parents left their home to find work elsewhere, leaving their children in the care of their grandparents, who were alcoholic and abusive. Apess and his siblings suffered from near constant hunger and severe beatings; they lived "in continual dread of torment" (5). The autobiography relates how one day, when he was about four years old, his grandmother nearly beat him to death. The old woman had come home drunk from a day of trying to sell brooms and baskets, and asked the young boy if he hated her; Apess explains that he did not understand her question so, in an attempt to comply with her, answered "Yes" (6). She began to beat him, repeatedly asking the question over and over again as he answered "Yes" (6). When the beating was over, the young boy's arm was broken in three places; an uncle intervened and soon all the siblings were named wards of the town and placed

with other families (O'Connell xxx). The town indentured the boy to a neighboring white family, the Furmans (6).

The Furman family included Mr. Furman's mother, an old woman to whom he became so attached she let him call her "mother" (13). Judith Herman has studied in depth how both children and adults reenact traumatic events, sometimes consciously, "with a fantasy of changing the outcome" or in an adaptive, "socially useful manner," but more commonly "people find themselves reenacting some aspect of the trauma without realizing what they are doing" (39-40). In addition, Herman notes that reenactment can be "uncanny"; this uncanniness is mostly explained by theorists who maintain that traumatic reenactment, however terrifying or painful, is driven by a deep need to re-experience and master the overwhelming feelings of the traumatic moment (41–42). Given the urge for the trauma survivor to achieve a new relationship to a past event, there is a healthy impulse for a repaired maternal relationality in Apess' attachment to old Mrs. Furman. However, she soon dies, and Apess seems to somatically relive the intensity of the terror of the beating: not only is he "much affected" emotionally, but afterward, Apess was stricken with two successive ailments which baffled a local physician (13). The first sickness was a series of choking fits: "Whenever I would try to lay down, it would seem as if something was choking me to death, and if I attempted to sit up, the wind would rise in my throat and nearly strangle me. 1 felt continually as if I was about being suffocated" (13). The second malady was an involuntary vocalization: "I felt very singular, and began to make a strange noise. I believed that I was going to die … Every effort to breathe was accompanied by this strange noise, which was so loud as to be heard fifteen or twenty rods off (14).

As represented in the autobiography, the loss of this new, benevolent grandmother seems to have stripped away a layer of protection from the primal fear of his violent biological grandmother. His voice, his "yes" is an impossibility, and yet a necessity. "Yes" is the affirmation of longing for life and relationality, but uttering it will bring the fear of death and alienation. Thus, for Apess as a young boy, the rising of voice or breath in his throat—both necessary to life and relationality, and to the defiance of torture and

expression of pain—was terrifying, alien, chaotic, and associated with the fear of annihilation. Apess is denied both the primal “yes” of a loving relation to a nurturing figure, and seems also be unable to utter a basic, primal cry of pain at the loss of this new (grand)mother.

In arguing for the existential split of the subject created by the linguistic inadequacy to capture the present, Linda Belau states, "One always has a failed relation to a primary experience of satisfaction. And this failure, this cut on the body, marks the birth of knowledge and its counterpart, desire" (sec. 3). For Apess, this condition is all too real: the word "yes"—uttered to affirm some possibility of benevolent relation to a caring maternal figure—is a "yes" to hatred, terror, pain and bodily harm, to murderous rage, and total displacement from his family and culture.

Apess’ autobiography narrates a series of traumatic repetitions. He died young, an alcoholic, and profoundly discouraged about Indian–white relations, never completely healed. However, the traumas which compose much of his autobiography are not only markers of pain, but also the birth pangs of what would become an influential spoken and literary voice. Apess' religious conversion gives meaning and creative potential to his repeated experiences of cruelty. Through this creative response to trauma, through acts of survivance and relationality increasingly involved in each episode of violence, Apess discovers his voice.

While the Furman family does not seem purposefully unkind in general, they alienate Apess from any notion of being a Native American and (perhaps unwittingly, perhaps wishing to “convert” him) participated in the objectifying violence against Indians that was culturally pervasive at this time. While *saying* the wrong thing to his grandmother ("Yes") nearly gets him killed, the violence goes deeper with the Furmans. With Mr. Furman, *being* the wrong thing brings about racial violence and shame: after the old Mrs. Furman’s death, Apess, without a voice or form to articulate the feelings appropriate to his losses, begins to act out rebelliously; Furman beats the boy and calls

him an "Indian dog" (12). The violence of this incident may not be as harmful to his body as that he suffered at the hands of his grandmother, but the violence to his being is severe.

Not only is he thrashed in the Furman household because he is a Native American, but he is also taught to fear Native Americans. One tactic used to elicit obedience from the young Apess was to threaten to send him "away among the Indians into the dreary woods" (10). The traumas to his dignity and personhood accumulate, and he acts both in defiance of Furman's authority, and in conformity with his being characterized as a "dog." This layering of trauma is also amplified by terrifying stories the family tells about Indian savagery.

Apess illustrates his fear with an anecdote. While gathering berries in the woods, several members of the Furman household including Apess encounter a group of women with dark complexions, most likely tanned by outdoor work; Apess runs in terror back to the house to tell Mr. Furman of an impending massacre (10). Of course, no such thing happens.

After this incident he begins to rebel, as if fighting his own rejection of Indianness, or embracing the constructed "badness" of "Indians," or both. It is likely that he experienced the lack of affect regulation noted in van der Kolk's definition of PTSD. Apess begins to engage in more unruly behavior, including engaging in "depradations" of a watermelon patch, lying, and "profaning the Sabbath" (11).

He attempts to better himself and begins to attend Methodist camp meetings, but Mr. Furman attempts to stop him, believing that he is instead making trouble with other boys; Apess states, "No one had any idea of the mental agony I suffered, and perhaps the mind of no untutored child of my age was more seriously exercised. Sometimes I was tried and tempted— then I would be overcome" (13). This deep anxiety ("mental agony"), the lack of emotional control ("I was tried and tempted"), and fear ("I would be overcome") are all hallmarks of both the Christian conversion narrative, but also of a C-PTSD dissociative experience, an emotional flashback in which the past and the present collapse into each other. Therefore Apess, a boy of about ten, faces circumstances in which it is impossible for him to be "good"—to do or say the right

thing. If he goes to a Methodist meeting to enrich his soul and learn to be good, he faces punishment. If he does not go, he is tempted to act out his frustration and pain.

When Apess writes of his plans to run away from the Furmans, he speaks of it mainly as an adventure, but perhaps there was a deeper desire to escape the difficulty of his situation. At any rate, the punishment for his planning to run away is severe: he is soon sold to a new master, a judge named Hillhouse, who does not allow Apess to continue school and prevents him from attending Methodist meetings (16). Apess, already heartbroken that his family has sold him away, is tricked by Hillhouse into his next indenture (16). He is sold this time to General William Williams in New London. Materially, Apess is now better off, but this family—like the former—does not approve of his desire to attend Methodist meetings (20). We can only guess at the tolls these repetitions of rejection must have had on Apess.

None of his masters have approved of Methodism, and he is often physically punished for sneaking off to attend meetings; again, Apess is subjected to physical violence, but what he once experienced as chastisement for disobedience, he now sees as persecution (20). His suffering is newly incorporated into a narrative of Christian conversion and persecution. Apess, in the throes of terror for his soul, says, "*No tongue can tell* or possibly describe the agony of my soul" (20, emphasis mine). Again, fear of death and damnation goes hand in hand with speechlessness.

A pioneering voice in trauma theory, Pierre Janet, wrote that "traumatic memory has no social component; it is not addressed to anybody, the patient does not respond to anybody; it is a solitary activity" that is "inflexible and invariable" (163). There are three elements I wish to explore in this description of traumatic memory as it applies to Apess' autobiography. 1) In PTSD, one's perspective is severely circumscribed in the state of dissociation that happens when a present situation sums up the overwhelming nature of a past incident (Stolorow 54). With his immanent fear of death and/or Indianness, Apess certainly seems to experience this collapse: his voice brought on the beating his grandmother gave him. Not only his speech, but other valances of that initial trauma (e.g. Indianness, alcohol) must have played a part in his distress and acting out. However, 2)

repetition in this text is not entirely inflexible and invariable. Through repetition, Apess' trauma begins to transform. With each recurrence of violence to his body or psyche in the narration, the author exteriorizes the source of his suffering by degrees.[2]

With almost every act of violence—whether he is physically punished by Furman for acting out, or terrorized by a real or imagined threat—Apess' narration points to the growth of a broader understanding. In reflecting upon this conditioning that made him fear death at every turn, Apess states that if he had known the truth about US–Indian "relations," he would have been just as afraid of the Furmans as he was of the dark women, Indian identity, and his own "sinful" nature (11). He notes that as a young man he ponders the word "Indian," for whenever he hears it, it is a contemptuous slur; Apess is unable to find the word in the Bible and thus determined that "it [is] a word imported for the special purpose of degrading us" (10). This realization is a significant step in a growing awareness that the injustices he suffers are not unique, but part of a broader system. Finally, 3) Claude Lanzmann characterizes the endpoint of trauma as "transmission": that is, an act of communication that is not addressed to anyone in particular, for the perpetrators may well be invisible or inaccessible, but which urgently needs to be heard (Caruth 204).

As noted in the introduction, E. Ann Kaplan also speaks of "translation": if trauma is not beyond our comprehension, but marks its limit, then the traumatized will find forms, syntaxes, or words of any kind which will not be able to communicate the experience fully, but which will translate aspects of it—enough perhaps to narrativize and integrate some of it (103). Apess uses the act of conversion, the forms of speech available in Methodism, along with the written forms of conversion and captivity narratives, as such translations—and he finds a medium for transmission in Christianity.

[2.] This process parallels the general change, noted in the chapter introduction, in religious perspective happening at this time, as the focus of religious action moves away from the contemplation of one's sinfulness, toward agency in one's own salvation and in reforming society.

Persecuted Communities

Maureen Konkle explains how Methodism empowers Apess on multiple levels, providing an environment of equality and ethnic and racial diversity, as well as inspiration for the "unimpeachable" literary form he uses: the conversion narrative (27). An egalitarian and evangelical sect with lively and unorthodox forms of worship—such as week-long camp meetings in the woods—Methodism drew the scorn of the dominant and conservative Anglican and Reformed denominations of Protestantism (Konkle 26). In addition, Hilary Wyss sees elements of both conversion and captivity narratives at work: Apess represents himself as a captive forbidden his chosen outlet for spirituality (73), like Mary Rowlandson, who was captured for ransom by allies of King Philip during King Philip's War (Rowlandson), and James Smith (both of whom, however, were given Bibles by their captors). His conversion constitutes an escape, and Methodism is a sphere in which he actually can have a voice to express and access his experience as a Native American (Wyss 73).

As the Methodists gain a foothold in Providence, where Apess lives with the Williams family, "a storm of persecution" and "sectarian malice" takes place. As Konkle points out, when Apess joins the Methodists, who are ridiculed and scorned whether they are black, white, or Indian, he is no longer alone in his sense of being victimized (27). Belonging in this persecuted community enables Apess to negotiate the negative messages about his legitimacy and worth. His alignment with Methodism helps him to cope with abuse, as evidenced in this scene, which takes place in the Williams' household:

> The devil I believe was in the chamber maid … she persecuted me with as much bitterness as Paul did the disciples of old. … One day after she had procured me a flogging, and no very mild one either, she pushed me down a long flight of stairs. … When I told Mr. Williams that the maid had pushed me down stairs, she denied it, but I succeeded in making them believe it. In all this trouble, the Lord was with me of a truth. I was happy in the enjoyment

> of his love. The abuse heaped on me was in consequence of my being a Methodist. (22)

Apess explains that Methodist sermons "arouse [him] to a sense of … danger" (17). An intense stirring of emotions, a bodily sensation that likely repeats the intensity of the physical and emotional abuse he has known from an early age. Now, however, he is part of a larger body; injuries to his body and fear of death become associated with his spiritual evolution, and a growing confidence in his voice. Significantly, in this episode, he does not seem to be seriously injured, and even more importantly, he is able to speak up for himself and be believed. His voice, previously choked off and incoherent, can now say "No" to Williams' rule forbidding him to attend Methodist meetings: "They had possession of the red man's inheritance and had denied me liberty; with this they were satisfied and could do as they pleased; therefore, I thought I could do as I pleased" (18). By this point, Apess' voice has grown stronger as he has found a community which allows him equal fellowship and which allows him to exteriorize the source of his suffering.

At the age of fifteen, Apess decides that he has the right to do as he pleases, and leaves the Williams' household for good (22). Drawn once again toward "a sense of … danger," he joins the army during the War of 1812, where he falls into heavy drinking and gambling. However, this attraction to destructive behavior, as another repetition of the violence his grandmother initiated him into, marks another stage in the simultaneous development of relationality and voice.

While Apess serves as a drummer in the War of 1812 (26), traumatic repetition becomes intensely physical. Apess' depiction of his life in the military emphasizes the kinds of starvation, fear of death, and unjust treatment he has experienced previously as a young child living with his grandparents. He makes a point to describe "the extreme sufferings" of the enlisted men: "The horribly disfigured bodies of the dead—the piercing groans of the wounded and the dying—the cries of help and succour from those who could not help themselves—were most appalling" (29).

Note the dashes in this passage, which are uncommon in this text. They seem to take the place of words, representing the gap in coherence and articulation brought on by trauma. The experience exceeds the capacity of Apess' language here to communicate the horror, and it brings on a repetition a blockage of voice.[3] Death is not only a threat in battle but—as with his grandmother and his masters—in the harsh discipline of the military. During his service, Apess witnesses an execution:

> *I cannot tell* how I felt when I saw the soldiers parade, and the condemned clothed in white with bibles in their hands, come forward. … The poor creatures were compelled to kneel on their coffins, which were along side their newly dug graves. … An officer then advanced, and raised his handkerchief as a signal to the platoon to prepare to fire—he then made another for them to aim at the wretch who had been left kneeling on his coffin, and at a third signal the platoon fired, and the immortal essence of the offender in an instant was in the spirit-land. To me this was an awful day—*my heart seemed to leap into my throat*. (26, italics mine)

Significantly, Apess "cannot tell," and once again he mentions a blockage in his throat: as when he was a child, speech and fear of death are intertwined. The punishment that equates speech and disobedience with death is repeated, and the attempt to find voice falls short. In this liminal experience, his horror is compounded as it is added to the pattern of fear, violence, and loss that he experienced both with his grandparents and the Furmans, and probably among the Williams family as well. However, in this repetition, Apess' relationship to community continues to evolve.

Kai Erikson has discussed how trauma can create or erode community. On the one hand, trauma can "damage the tissues" of community as invasion, incursion, colonial pressures, and poverty have eroded the Pequot community; on the other hand, trauma can create a sense community through a shared feeling of being "marked out" for some

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[3.] This catch in the throat, sometimes known as globus hystericus, seems to be caused in by intense anxiety. (Health Central).

special reason (190). As an enlisted man, Apess now belongs to a collective that has bonded through the shared trauma of privation and battle. This bond leads to new relational possibilities based on resistance to authority and collective power. When the hunger of the army began to affect not only the enlisted men but those of higher rank, one officer offers Apess two dollars for a small amount of flour (28). However, Apess refuses the offer; instead, he and the other soldiers shared their flour to make an unleavened bread which Apess terms "a delicious repast" (28). The soldiers are protected from the abuse of tyranny and the fear of death in an act of communal nurturance, with a Biblical allusion to the Passover, the eve of freedom for God's chosen people. The healing, relational response to trauma is clearly at work, and Apess' sense of identification has extended beyond Methodists to include the enlisted men of the lower classes.[4]

While his experience with the army enables Apess to experience the empowerment of belonging to a community capable of resistance, ultimately he finds the culture of the army to be "sinful," for during this time he continues to drink heavily (31-32). In response to this state of danger to his soul, he makes his way back to Indian family, where he will finally experience a full religious conversion (132).

Conversion and Voice

It is my contention that religious conversion can consist of both 1) the traumatic collapse of past and present, during which the past trauma colors present experience, and 2) a transformational space in which the trauma can be given new meaning, and new potentially healing relational possibilities. According to Rambo, the pre-conversion crisis

[4.] Ultimately, as Konkle has noted, Apess will broaden his scope to include all people of color as well as white Christians. Whereas in this section of the autobiography, he hints at the poor and oppressed being akin to the Hebrews—God's chosen people—later in the text he challenges more explicitly and harshly Anglo-American notions of being God's chosen people, pointing out that in the entire world, there are fifteen dark skinned people for every white (38).

involves a matrix of factors (44). Clearly Apess suffers from extreme guilt, which reaches crisis proportions at times. In addition, he has experienced relational traumas of betrayal and abuse. He has been drawn to situations of danger and self-destructive behavior repeatedly. Little wonder, then, that he should seek transcendence through religious conversion.

After leaving the military, Apess undertakes a solitary three hundred mile journey to his natal home, and struggles along the way with alcoholism, poverty and prejudice (38-39). This journey serves the purpose of a kind of penitential pilgrimage to a place where he will birth his voice. Once home, he struggles with his sense of sin and shame for some time until he begins to attend camp meetings and derive inspiration from his aunt Sally George (40). As noted above, the emotional intensity and camaraderie of these meetings seems to satisfy both the need for the repetition of intensity and danger as well as the need for redemption.

One of the Methodists' unorthodox practices was allowing the laity to speak at gatherings (Taite 189). This policy helps Apess take a step toward his ability to speak as an Indian on behalf of Indians. His conversion process maps onto the trauma process we have seen at work, blocking Apess' voice. That voice's blockage and liberation are part and parcel of conversion and trauma.

> Behold, one of the brethren called on me to pray. I began to make excuse, but nothing would do; he said, pray, and I thought I must. I trembled through fear, and began to wish myself at home … While endeavouring to pray, it appeared as if my words would choak me—the cold chills run over my body—my feelings were indiscribably [sic] awful. (39)

The "choak" with its accompanying sensations, by now familiar to the reader, recalls the strange maladies of his childhood. However, the conversion process, like the trauma process, needs to incorporate the troubling past in order to continue. When Apess describes this aspect of his conversion, again he invokes voicelessness: "*no tongue can*

tell the anguish of soul I felt" (20, emphasis mine). This inability to speak describes both the liminality of trauma and the blocking effect it has had on Apess' voice.

Joshua David Bellin has also seen the centrality of voice, especially the spoken word, in Apess' work. He notices early on the importance of the advice spoken by Mrs. Furman, the influence of family stories vilifying Indians, and his mortification the only time he ever swore "a horrid oath" his "conscience roared despair and horror like thunder" (qtd. in Bellin 94). Apess emphasizes Aunt Sally George's words on everyone around her: "she would often pour into the ear of the sin-sick soul the graciously reviving promises of the Gospel" (40). Christian and Indian identities are in harmony as he describes his aunt's "glorious" prayer meetings in the "groves" that were "God's first temples" (40).

These groves are also the site of leave-takings that are not traumatic or forced, as were his abandonment by his parents and his being sold from one family to another: "whenever we separated it was in perfect love and friendship" (40). The relational harmony Apess encounters in the Methodist meetings are part of the healing involved in the trauma process. In the like-mindedness and spirituality of a camp meeting those gathered could enjoy a strong sense of community, that, however ephemeral, could by recalled or created anew. For Apess, the meetings provided a social context and a form for a life of displacement and diaspora: both his own and that of the Pequot people. It is during this period that he is finally baptized.

Methodist religious revivalism, with its lively egalitarianism, gives him the confidence to speak. He comes to see religious truth and freedom in individual, felt, and spoken ways. Bellin identifies the spoken voice as a key element empowered not only by Methodism, but also by Indian oral culture (Bellin 90-91). Exhorting and preaching are both Christian and Indian cultural practices, and while Apess was not exposed to the traditions of his natal culture as a youth, he would have witnessed its power under the influence of Sally George (Bellin 93).

During this period, Apess, now free from alcohol, resolves to find "steady" work, but his employer refuses to pay him, and even moves to strike him. But Apess physically

fights back. "I had been cheated so often that I determined to have my rights this time, and forever after" (37). This agency, this ability to stand up for his rights, precedes a pivotal moment at a revival meeting when Apess feels moved

> to rise and speak. I trembled at the thought; but believing it a duty required of me by my heavenly Father. I could not disobey, and in rising to discharge this sacred obligation, *I found all impediment of speech removed*; my heart was enlarged: my soul glowed with holy fervor, and the blessing of the Almighty sanctified this my first public attempt to warn sinners of their danger and invite them to the marriage supper of the Lamb … Oh, it was a joyful scene. (41, emphasis mine)

Apess has found a context for his voice. His sense of being expands as he is no longer constricted by the threat of death for speaking. In fact, he uses his voice to make others fear death. Trauma and conversion operate in an interconnected fashion. In this case, conversion allows for a transformation of trauma, its recontextualization into a meaningful narrative of Christian sin and salvation. Not only has he recovered his voice, but along with it, a strengthened sense of community and the agency of defiance that would characterize his writing and his role in the Mashpee fight for rights.

Both trauma and religious conversion interweave throughout this text: strands in a braid of survivance. Post-trauma, there is an urge for the traumatized person to achieve a new relationship to a past event. As for Apess' autobiography, I proffer the notion that his transformational drive is composed of the need to transcend objectification, to claim the voice that says the right thing on behalf of himself and his people. In religious conversion there is also a strong drive to achieve a new relationship to the universe and to others. The moment of conversion, a sublime experience, serves as a touchstone for future conduct, almost as a traumatic event sets the pattern for future events. The processes may seem antithetical, as one is meant to be a conscious process, and the other unconscious, but structurally there are fascinating parallels. For Apess, the conversion process initiates a new pattern of redemptive behavior: one that is about using his voice

to compel others to convert—one must struggle to keep on the new path by recalling and repeating to others the wonder of the transformational moment, and causing it to happen for others. Hence, traumatic or not, repetition is central to evangelism.[5] However, the repetition becomes a positive experience. For Apess, the parallels of the trauma and conversion processes converge, and religious behavior can be said to overlay, transform, or mitigate the agonies of traumatic repetition.

I used the analogy of the braid for survivance in this work, naming two of the strands trauma and conversion. The third strand is healthy relationality: a satisfying intersubjectivity that allows for pluralism, communication and community. The relationality of this text consists in Apess' sense of belonging to community as well as in his demand for intersubjectivity with the reader. Notably, in calling Apess a "synecdochic" writer, Arnold Krupat explores the essential relationality of Apess' voice; this part–to–whole relation of a Christian writer and preacher to a Christian audience of diverse ethnicities and classes, Krupat explains, is analogous to the ways in which Native American speakers construct meaning socially: by sharing publicly their feats and insights, so that those feats and insights do not belong only to the individual but to the entire community (Krupat 229).

When the trauma, conversion and relationality are intertwined in this text, the transformational impulse at the heart of trauma and conversion is strengthened, creating a site of transdifference (47). The concept of Apess' biculturalism, for instance, implies a transcendence of an either/or model, yet still refers to the dualistic notion of two separate, supposedly opposed cultures. Critics such as Bellin (89), Wyss (73), Mielke (2002 248), Haynes (669) and Moon (52) have productively explored various ways in which Apess complicates this binary, using white cultural capital to speak as an Indian on behalf of Indians. An emphasis on the processes and patterns inherently incorporates the notion that William Apess is both an Indian and a Christian, and also something more—not

[5.] And indeed, conversion is often brought on by a traumatic process of inciting a state of terror and guilt over potential converts' "sins," until they accept the proffered salvation.

simply in terms of multivocality, but in terms of his subjectivity as it is constituted within a community and through voice.

Apess' speeches in Methodist camp meetings are at first limited to popular exhorting—or exciting emotions and convictions of sinfulness with the hope of conversion—all the while realizing that some are attending his talks to hear what he had to say, while others are there out of curiosity to hear an "Indian" (44). Growing more deeply convinced that he is meant to preach the word of God, Apess applies for a preacher's license but is turned down twice. Nonetheless Apess begins to preach without the sanction of the church, and he is censured (46). Devastated by this penalty, another repetition of unjust punishment, he feels feel like "an outcast from society," but it is not long before he continues to preach again, mainly to Native American and African American audiences (46). Apess' struggle to exercise his voice is now further externalized in his relationship with church authority. At this point in the narrative he realizes that the Methodist Episcopalian church has developed sectarian prejudices, and announces his break with the organization. As Wyss notes, the very institution that has given him a public voice then silences him (77). However, he soon joins the Methodist Protestant Church, which quickly ordains him (Peyer 137).[6]

He was also led to a personal affiliation with a Native community, rather than the church establishment. The Wompanoags of Mashpee, Massachusetts had been subjected to white incursions into their territory for decades when William Apess decided to aid them. In 1834, with Apess' help, the disenfranchised tribe finally won status as a district, with the power to elect their own representatives to the state government (Peyer 147). Apess also helped build and preach in a community church at Mashpee and was adopted into the tribe along with his family. Thus the young, beaten child from an "extinct" tribe became a widely heard voice and a respected member of an Indian community that won a modest but important measure of autonomy.

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6. At this point, chronologically speaking, the autobiography ends. Not much is known about his final years except that he eventually fell deeply in debt and died from the effects of alcoholism (Peyer 147).

A few years after the Mashpee Revolt, Apess delivered a speech in Boston—the "Eulogy on King Philip" (1837), a scathing indictment of prejudice. The lecture turns the tables of history to make white readers see the heroism and patriotism of Metacomet, generally considered to be a villain in King Philip's War in colonial New England, as he fought to protect his nation and people from the Puritans' genocidal attacks including the massacre of countless women and children by fire.

Disillusionment and an Indian Voice

The disillusionment at being held back by the Methodist Episcopalian Church separates Apess' voice from strict sectarian identification, and his voice as an Indian becomes more distinct. The wound of the violence done to his people, to his body, and his identity is not healed, but through survivance, Apess can give the wound a voice. This is another aspect of the overlap between survivance and trauma: the wound speaking. In answer to Breinig's call for trauma theory to make room for a more complex subjectivity, Apess in this light achieves not the ultimate integrated subjectivity of one who has worked through trauma, but a clarity about the trauma, and a dynamic vocality. In fact, the very excess of traumatic experience can manifest in the need to speak it in as many ways possible, even if language cannot communicate trauma fully. What Anne Kaplan calls "translations" of trauma are not lacking in any sense because they cannot fully accommodate the overflow of trauma. Rather they are conscious and effective attempts at the kind of relationality that is the closest thing to a cure for trauma that is possible. The trauma Apess speaks of is not only his personal plight. Rather it is a collective trauma, and he uses his voice on behalf of Native Americans, even all people of color, to break through the illusions of colonialist constructs to a relational reality.

For example, Laura Mielke has studied Apess' subversive use of sentimentalism. The American genres in vogue during his time—captivity narratives, slave narratives, and Indian autobiographies—tended to distance people from the objects of their

sympathy, turning traumatic plights into entertainment. In his autobiography, Apess points out that when he was exhorting, it was clear to him that some people came to hear what he had to say, while others attended for the novelty of seeing the "Indian" speak ("Native to the Question" 255).

If Apess is able to use conventional literary forms of his day not only to affirm his conversion but also to advocate for his people, the outsider-ness of his Native American identity enables him to stand apart from the institutions that first gave him voice. Being Indian is not a cause of terror or shame but an empowering legacy. Even the loneliness, poverty, fear and hunger of his past becomes part of a heroic identity that he shares with other Indians:

> If courage intrinsically consist [sic] in the defiance of hunger and pain, the life of the Indian is a continual exhibition of it. He lives in a perpetual state of hostility and risk. — Peril and adventure are congenial to his nature, or, rather, seem necessary to arouse his faculties and give an interest to existence ... No hero of ancient or modern days can surpass the indian [sic] in his lofty contempt of death, and the fortitude with which he sustains all the varied torments with which it is frequently inflicted. (66)

The hunger, danger and hostility he experienced as trauma as a child are now intrinsic to his identity as an Indian. This is Apess' voice speaking and transforming: he conceives of himself as an Indian. Through this lens, his traumas become part of an empowered identity. He has reversed his position from that of struggling sinner to that of a heroic warrior. And this reversal does not apply only to himself: Apess' voice often challenges the reader by reversing cultural perspectives.

> It has been considered as a trifling thing for the whites to make war on the indians [sic] for the purpose of driving them from their country, and taking possession thereof. This was, in their estimation, all right, as it helped to extend the territory, and enriched some individuals. But let the thing be changed. Suppose an overwhelming army should

> march into the United States, for the purpose of subduing it,
> and enslaving the citizens (31).

If this voice is constructed in relation to white culture in history, it calls for whites to become radically relational, to accept a conscious and vocal Native presence and Native voices in history and in the present. In addition, Apess' voice is also constructed in relation to black Americans, soldiers, and Methodists, as shown above. It is no simple binary of Indian culture vs. Christian white culture, but a matrix of relational experiences through indenture, Methodism, and his military service, out of which emerges a powerful voice.

"Eulogy on King Philip" was his final and most scathing publication. Karim Tiro notes how Apess uses his own "civilized" intellect and nature to confront whites with their hypocrisies. However, his civilized nature is not that of a "domesticated" white Indian (655) but one which defies and exposes "national crimes" (Krupat 226). For Apess, then, conversion and identification with trauma-bonded groups restructures his individual trauma, creating a matrix of possibilities for community belonging and the development of a voice that would condemn the crimes that caused that trauma—and symbolically resurrect the voice and power of his own expiring tribe.

In the appendix the focus shifts sharply from Apess' personal story to the history and customs of Native American communities, including the traumas they faced at the hands of whites. Apess' appendix works to incorporate an accurate account of Native American experience and nature into a framework of Euro-American understanding. In the first half, sources attest to the civilized nature of Native American groups before the influence of white culture. For example, he notes the "utmost kindness" with which New England Natives treated the first white settlers (56) as well as their traditional hospitality to each other: "No roof then rose but what was open to the houseless stranger; no smoke curled among the trees but he was welcome to sit down by its fire" (62). The second half enlarges upon the widely circulated theory of his time that Native Americans were a lost tribe of Israel. Numerous customs and stories are compared implicitly or explicitly to possible Biblical antecedents, including the fact that Indians calculate time in the same

way as the Hebrews (92). While finding his voice and speaking for his people, Apess fits Native America into a Christian narrative, bringing the collective story of Christian community closer to his own experience of redemption. One might assume from his death due to alcoholism that his own personal trauma is never fully resolved; neither is that of Native Americans. Nonetheless, Apess serves as what Kaplan has termed a "translator" of the traumatic experience not only for himself but for all Native Americans. He does not assure the reader of the resolution of personal or collective trauma, but translates the experience into cultural forms that the readers can acknowledge. His is a formidable voice speaking as a Christian Indian to Christians on behalf of Indians.

One more piece of evidence suggests that despite all of Apess' work and potent rhetoric, the excess of trauma suggested by his alcohol-related death still marks the text. The work ends abruptly with a moving account of an Indian mother and her companions mourning for a young son who has drowned. Apess compares this scenario to mourning customs among the Hebrews, noting of the use of professional mourners among the Choctaws and a possible Biblical precedent: "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, consider ye, and call for the mourning women, that they may come, and send for cunning women, that they may come, for a voice of wailing is heard, &c." (94). It is fitting that the final words of Apess' autobiography (1829 ed.) evoke the sound of a "wailing" voice, the "cunning" of survivance, and a symbol of continuance, perhaps even repetition: "&c." The autobiography began with a traumatic incident, for which no deep cry of pain, fear and outrage has been expressed. This inarticulate wailing Apess represents here is an echo of that primal cry of the wounded, the voice of trauma that exists in excess of even Apess' articulate and passionate voice. These elements—a primal cry "choaked" off, survivance, and repetition—cycle throughout his work. While Apess' conversion and trauma processes are inextricably interwoven throughout the autobiography's journey from his own inability to speak to the mastery of a strong Native voice, the ending of the text reflects a circular journey from one inarticulate pain to another, reminding us that Natives, as Biblical distant cousins to the white reader, are bewailing their unspeakable losses.

George Copway: Collective Trauma and "Objective" Totality

Native writer, missionary, and activist George Copway was born Ka-ge-ga-gah-bowh in 1818 in an Ojibwa community near Rice Lake, in Ontario, Canada (Copway 11, Peyer 230).[7] His autobiography/conversion narrative, *The Life, History, and Travels of Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh* (1846), was the first publication written by a Canadian Indian (or First Nations person), and was a sensational bestseller in its day, with six printings in its first year (Dictionary of Canadian Biography). The narrative relates details of his traditional upbringing, his religious conversion and subsequent missionary work. We have seen how Apess' autobiography shows the work of survivance: the author succeeds in developing his voice through a series of traumatic repetitions involving both closer and broader identifications with community. Copway's narrative suggests that he is able to develop his voice in spite of the markers of traumatic compulsion in his text. His autobiography follows a pattern of successes haunted by losses, a mourning for lost relationality in tension with a utopian future for all Native Americans.

"Doubleness" and Collective Trauma

Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh experienced both the joys of traditional life and the changes wrought by colonial policies. According to Bernd Peyer's biography, Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh was born in the very same year that his community lost substantial amounts of land to groups of Irish immigrant settlers (231). The loss of hunting and food-gathering territory must have been a hard blow that forced the community to trade more with whites. And with such trade, there usually came alcohol, as evidenced in scenes from the autobiography: when Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh and his father John, a chief and medicine man, make regular visits to a trader for goods and whiskey; and when the trader

[7.] Rice Lake is in a region that is now known as Ontario's "four season playground" (http://www.ontarioslakecountry.com).

mentioned that nearby Ojibwa communities had converted and had stopped drinking, the father expressed shock. The liquor was expected by the entire community and he did not want to disappoint them (Copway 73). Copway emphasizes the role of alcohol in the unraveling of traditional culture at Rice Lake:

> I recollect the day when my people in Canada were both numerous and happy; and since then, to my sorrow, they have faded away like frost before the heat of the sun! Where are now that once numerous and happy people? … The Ojebwa nation, that unconquered nation, has fallen a prey to the withering influence of intemperance. (42)

In fact, Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh's father himself was prey to alcoholism, until the Methodists arrived one evening in 1827 with exhortations, song and prayer.[8] John was so moved that he immediately poured a newly bought barrel of whiskey into the river and joined the Methodists (Copway 73); his wife converted soon after (Peyer 232). In 1830, Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh's mother lay on her deathbed, exhorting her children to become Christians so that they could join her in Heaven: "The spirit of my dear mother took its flight on the 27th day of February, 1830. Just before her death, she prayed with her children; and advised us to be good Christians, to love Jesus, and to meet her in heaven" (79).

The loss of his home community's original vitality, the loss of his mother, and a vision of a complete reunion in a Christian afterlife, sets a pattern of loss and a longing for totality that is evident in Copway's autobiography as well as in the life he lived after its publication.

Passages such as the one above express success in the traditional culture; it seems that Copway's conversion, which encompassed advocacy for temperance, was an adaptation to the destructive influences of Euro-American culture, as well as a way to be reunited with his mother in the afterlife. A few years after his mother's death, Copway

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[8.] Among this group of missionaries was the influential and respected Peter Jones, a Christian Ojibwa who would become Copway's mentor (Peyer 235).

left home to work as a translator and missionary, first among the Keewenaw band of Ojibwa near Lake Superior, then at the La Pointe mission in Wisconsin (Peyer 237). His work was challenging, as traditionalists resisted his efforts and Copway missed home deeply: “Every Sabbath I devoted about an hour in sighing and crying after *home*” (94). But even as he missed the relational connections he had enjoyed at home, and helped edify communities of Christian Natives, he also worked against Ojibwa rituals that traditionally served to bring the community together. In one episode of his missionary career, local traditionalists call a Grand Medicine Worship to defy the Christian incursion of Copway and his fellow missionaries. As the traditionalists sing and drum for days, the converted pray and sing in a kind of spiritual endurance competition, until after a week the traditionalists cease their worship (101). Thus, even as he works to help his people, he also creates a rift between himself and the traditional life he once loved.

As a missionary he is no longer altogether inside his community, but viewing it from the outside, seeking to change it. He has taken a step along the relational spectrum between intersubjectivity and objectification, a step away from the culturally mediated relationality of his home, toward the more distant relation of objectification. The irony of his position is inherent in what many critics call the “doubleness” of this text (Bellin 194-195, Peyer 237). Cathy Rex proposes that Copway’s firm advocacy for the legitimacy of his natal culture and also of his “Euro-American identifications” is an experiment with literary modes of cultural fluidity and survivance To this perspective I wish to add another valence: that the matrix of this fluidity and survivance is made of a series of responses to trauma—the trauma of personal loss and betrayal, Copway’s own misdeeds, and, most significantly, the collective trauma of the Ojibwa.

When Copway describes his Native upbringing from his perspective as a convert, a dissonance becomes evident. If his conversion is a response to trauma, then the trauma can still be read in such a dissonance. When in his autobiography Copway looks back on his traditional upbringing, he "shudder(s)" when he recalls dancing for the elder men in "those days of … darkness" and "thank(s) God those days will never return" (34-35). However, Copway also conveys an appreciation for traditional moral codes taught by

Ojibwa medicine men: "by adhering to their counsels, the lives, peace, and happiness, of the Indian race was secured; for then there was no whiskey amongst them" (41). Although he “shudders” when he recalls dancing for the elders, in this passage on the traditional teachings, there is nothing essentially wrong with pagan life; it is only the introduction of alcohol by whites that corrupts the culture. It may be argued that he is presenting the wisdom and peace of his traditional culture as a proto-Christian environment, but he specifies that the most corrupting factor of white culture is liquor.[9] Conversion is thus a response to the loss of his peoples’ dignity and happiness as well as their loss of land: a collective trauma.

The complexity with which Copway depicts his natal culture is not only a rhetorical move, but also an intriguing textual "symptom” of trauma. The rift I examine here is on one side composed of nostalgia for a past he must reject, colored by an overwhelming sense of the losses his people have experienced. On the other side of the chasm is the zealous nature of his missionary efforts and his reputation as a public figure. Read in light of this split, other markers of trauma come into focus—markers in the narrative structure which articulate, amidst affirmations of redemption, the profound losses suffered by Copway and his people. The “split” is an example of transdifference. This transdifference—or seeming paradox—serves as a crossroads of four paths: 1) mourning over loss; 2) a creative response to trauma (survivance); 3) the drive to achieve an improved relationality; and 4) traumatic repetition.

Mourning the Loss of a World

Take for example one of the vivid, Romantic descriptions of Ojibwa culture and religious beliefs presented at the beginning of his narrative. Although Copway frames these

[9.] Copway mentions whiskey no less than fourteen times in this text.

memories with Christian qualifications, there is a vibrancy in these passages that spills over these boundaries:

> You will see that I served the imaginary gods of my poor blind father ... My father taught me to that spirit Ee-sha-mon-e-doo—Benevolent Spirit—for his ancestors taught him no other name to give that spirit who made the earth with all its variety and smiling beauty. His benevolence I saw in the running of the streams, for the animals to quench their thirst and the fishes to live; the fruit of the earth teemed wherever I looked. Every thing I saw smilingly said Ee-sha-mon-e-doo non-ge-oo-she-ig; the Benevolent Spirit made me. (9)

Jane Stafford sees this Romantic language as a literary bridge between Euro-American (print) culture and his natal culture (173). Stafford argues that Copway's "evolution from his 'natural' religion"—a lived, immediate experience—to Euro-educated state of reflection and "knowing rather than being" is natural (174). However, I believe this argument is valid only within the culture-bound notion of objectivity, and points to a linguistic failure to provide a specifically relational term for "knowledge" (such as "knowing"). Stafford's knowledge is possession, not the knowing of others as subjects in and of themselves. Thus in the passage above, the passage from lived, immediate experience to "knowing rather than being" can be read not as a natural evolution but as a colonial construct of modernity. Ironically, what Copway illustrates in this passage about his proto-Christian but "imaginary" and "blind" beliefs – of relationship to God through relation to all of life -- is what Martin Buber posits as a state of being without which we cannot be fully human, and cannot experience intersubjectivity: a manifestation of "the instinct to make everything a *Thou*" (27), to experience the sacred in relation to others and to the world, not in the necessary but objectifying "I-It" relation, but what we may term a sacred intersubjectivity: the "I-Thou" relation: "through contact with every *Thou* we are stirred with a breath of…eternal life" (63). Unraveling this tangle of social relations and knowledge reveals an alternate interpretation: that these Romantic passages

constitute the filling of a rift left by the loss of a thriving, deeply valued, spiritually relational way of life. In short, the Romanticism is a response to irrevocable, traumatic loss.

A Creative Response to Trauma (Survivance)

In the passage above, Copway (as an educated Christian) objectively dismisses his father's religious conceits while celebrating the relational richness he experienced when he shared those same beliefs. There is a friction between the framing of experience as "imaginary" and the lived experience of happiness when life is mediated by traditional Ojibwa culture. Copway's alienation from his natal culture—as noted above in his rejection of traditional ways of knowing—is a trauma that divides his subjectivity between a love for his traditional way of life, including a joyful a sense of connection to the natural world, and a rejection of that past in favor of a "converted" (and revitalized) society. This tension is one example of transdifference—of survivance—at work in this text. Even though we use a binary to describe this tension, the joy of his former pagan beliefs and the conviction that Christianity is superior do not have to be seen in opposition, but rather in the layering of experience and different states of awareness.

Copway also responded to trauma by thinking in larger, grander terms. His missionary stint was rewarded with a three-year education at the Ebenezer Manual Labor School in Illinois (Peyer 27). Next he chose to travel east to visit many of the major cities, including Boston (Smith 29). During these travels, in 1840, Copway met and married Elizabeth Howell, who shared his passion for missionary work (238). The newlyweds then traveled 2000 miles west to work as missionaries among the Ojibwa in upper Missouri, where they were treated as alien, taunted by the neighboring Sioux, and where Copway was criticized by his companions as being "vain and headstrong" (Peyer 239). In spite of these challenges and criticisms, Copway began to imagine his work in larger terms—beyond the scope of conversion. Or perhaps because of the criticisms, he

began to imagine for himself a broader field of action: one in which his fellow missionaries' opinions would not matter. He began to critique treaties arranged by the US government and he developed and proposed a plan for creating peace between the Sioux and Ojibwa (Peyer 240). As in the case of Apess, Copway's experience in different settings naturally expands his perspective. But whereas Apess seems to have enjoyed the connections he made—connections and collective activities which empowered him—Copway does not seem to progress toward more meaningful relationality, but rather moves further along the spectrum toward a possibly dissociated "objectivity."

Relationality

After his tour of the major cities, Copway returns to Rice Lake in Ontario. There he finds his home community terribly changed.

> While crossing the lake, I was in perfect ecstasies; my heart leaped with joy; and my thoughts and emotions were at my home long before my person. … at last I planted my foot upon the spot on which I had been reared from my infancy, and where some of the sweetest and happiest recollections of my life were centered. … On enquiring for some of my relatives, I was informed that they had left this, for a better life. Many of my old friends and acquaintances had gone to try the realities of another world. Numbers were bathed in tears, and the wounds of their hearts were reopened. My own heart seemed to bleed at every pore. (139)

Copway relates how he weeps over the graves of lost friends and relatives, and resolves to unite with them in Heaven. His only consolation for traumatic loss is not, therefore, in the continuance of his peoples' lifeways, but in joining his loved ones in a Christian afterlife. Copway's conversion had ultimately led him away from home, which he missed deeply. In the autobiography he seems to be able to hold off a crisis of loss as long as he can keep converting others, but his return to a natal community so changed seems to bear

the inescapable gravity of traumatic loss, what Vizenor would reject as a despairing narrative of a tragic ending, of Indian absence: a "terminal creed."

Copway's autobiography ends on a triumphant note, with his work in Ontario for the Methodist church and the part he played in a revitalized, Christianized Ojibwa council (Smith 32). However, here he faced criticism from elders, including his longtime mentor Peter Jones, for impulsivity, disrespect, and most seriously, embezzlement of funds from both the church and the tribal leadership council, for which he was expelled from both organizations and sent to jail (Peyer 241, Smith 32). Copway was disgraced before his wife, his community, and Jones. There seems to be no evidence of his having valued his relationality with his elders and the Ojibwa leadership enough to work with them anymore. Instead, he fled to New York City with his wife and child to reinvent himself. Capitalizing on the Romantic movement's appetite for noble savages, he wrote an autobiography in which he styled himself a "child of the forest" (Peyer 243), as well an Ojibwa chief (Smith 33). To call himself an Ojibwa chief is not only a misrepresentation, it is a denial of the fact that he wronged his church and tribe. Recall that in Shay's discussion of moral injury, one symptom is creating a false persona.

Traumatic Repetition and the Compensation Fantasy

This shifting of identity, and the omission of any confession of wrongdoing or troubled relationships with his tribal elders—other than an oblique reference in his preface to "crooked paths"—can be read as survivance or fluidity, but it is also characteristic of the evasion and denial of guilt. After betraying his peoples' trust, he rewrote his life, representing himself as a "noble savage" and "chief." On the first page of his narrative he also presents himself as a model of courage and virtue and improvement, and a prototype of the "'improved' Christian Indian," when he states that "what was once impossible—or

rather thought to be—[the “improvement” of the Indian] is made possible through my experience.” (1).

Certainly religious conversion provides new possibilities for social bonding, for spiritual experiences, for community revitalization, a new context for a moral code, and hope for the future. But as suggested by Copway's complicated perspective of his tribal upbringing, Christian Manicheism—its stark notions of good and evil, heaven and hell, Christian and heathen—makes it extremely difficult for his rich pre-conversion experiences to be positively and fully inscribed into his Christian narrative. Furthermore, while the narrative supplied by Christian conversion takes into account the need for mourning and distress over the past, this distress is located within the individual—his or her "sin.” As Copway does not publicly reflect on unscrupulous behavior (which continues until late in his life), he seems more and more invested in redeeming not only himself but every Native in the US: he expresses a desire to convert every last Indian to Christianity. While evangelism is built into Christianity, it also can serve specific social purposes. The conversion, socially, can mirror the traumatic compulsion repetition, which, as in van der Kolk’s model, he must repeat until he can change the story: i.e. if Copway can continue to repeat conversion of other people, specifically, if he can convert the totality of his people, he will have “cured” their traumas. With his natal culture in crisis, and his own unethical conduct hidden, Copway envisions a grandiose plan that will save all of Native America and prove him to be the great man he wishes to be. The survival and empowerment of his people will be patterned on his own conversion experience; through Copway, all Native Americans will be saved. Their losses will be compensated. But, as Herman notes, while the need for compensation is just and the vision of compensation is one of empowerment, the struggle for recompense can bind the survivor to the wrongdoer, perpetuating pain (190). Copway’s drive to convert every single member of his tribe to Methodism and herd them all into their own state, of which he would be lieutenant governor, reflects an intermingling of compensation, empowerment to the point of grandiosity, and complicity with the US agenda of Indian removal.

Totalities and Collective Trauma

As noted above, Copway's drive for totality is an expression of evangelism, and the repetition of peak—sometimes traumatic—experience is central to evangelism.[10] But focusing on how this vision functions within the paradigm of collective trauma is important to understanding the nature and contours of this deep historical wound of the US, and the crimes that caused it. Whereas William Apess' trauma maps structurally onto religious conversion and is mitigated by it, for Copway, the drive to convert maps onto trauma. In Copway's autobiography, trauma is a tripartite conglomeration of the Ojibwa's collective trauma, Copway's personal sense of loss, and his own wrongdoing and complicity.

The impact of collective trauma is clear in this early passage in which Copway expresses a desperate fear of extinction:

> When our warriors were dying, they told their children that they would soon reach that happy country. … O white man! Why did you not tell us before, that there was a better heaven than that of the Indian's? … Thousands have already perished, and thousands more will yet perish unless converted to God. The thought of *perishing*! how *insufferable*! O how *intolerable*! (64)

If this fear of annihilation is characteristic of conversion rhetoric, it is also a symptom of trauma, and this particular religious expression of that fear is the most readily available form to Copway to translate this terror. For the convert, religious belief must be more powerful than these fears, or else it gives little hope or comfort. Thus evangelism, as well as other kinds of movements, use conversion to edify their codes of belief. According to Robert Cialdini's concept of "social proof," the more people who can be converted to a belief, the more true it must be (114-115).

[10.] And indeed conversion is often brought on by a traumatic process of inciting a state of terror and guilt over potential converts' "sins" until they accept the proffered salvation.

Evangelism's narrative of healing is not only a kind of social fiction, but also a conditional and exclusive one: everyone must convert or be damned. In Copway's sense of collective trauma, the repetition of conversion expresses the relational desire for a healed and whole community, and yet it also exists in a hierarchical self/other construct that precludes consistent intersubjective relationality. For Copway, quantity is what matters, and thus his people become statistical entities:

> There are over five thousand living under the British Government, and less than twenty-five thousand under the American government. There are about five thousand of those who receive religious instructions … Those who are not under religious instruction, although accessible, are wandering without the gospel. (204)

Copway also includes an excerpt from an 1842 report to the Provincial Parliament, which consists of numerical descriptions of territories, dwellings, possessions, and the methods and routines of their religious practice. According to Copway, a "number of them"—Chippewa of the Saint Clair River—are converting in a "rapid and uniform" fashion: "221 adults and 239 children" (209).

Quantifications of faith—measured by humans counted as a fraction of another, larger number to be converted—comes from an objectifying standpoint, as opposed to the relational wealth represented elsewhere, in different language. Especially in his plan for the relocation of every Native American to one single territory, Copway seems to objectify the very people who seem to mean the most to him. Why this need for quantification, for totals and totality?

For every positive experience Copway relates, he also relates a loss. The text is structured around by a deep pattern of such losses. Even at the very outset of his autobiography this is clear: "[The Ojibwa's] buoyant spirits could once mount the air as on the wings of a bird. Now they have no spirits. They are hedged in, bound, maltreated, by both the American and the British governments" (42). A humble traditional upbringing with caring parents and wise medicine men is utterly compromised by

government policies, as well as the devastating effects of alcohol on the Ojibwa people. In addition to the earlier reference to whiskey destroying the "peace and happiness" of traditional life, Copway also offers an analytical perspective on alcohol's effects, which "none but fiends in human shape could have introduced" to Indian peoples (41). He notes that whiskey makes his people vulnerable to unfair trading, and that it "inevitably ruins both body and soul" so that "at the end of every year, they are sunk into deeper degradation" (180).

Copway bears witness to the erosion of traditional Indian societies, to the disgrace and misery brought upon people who once had been generally happy, living by a moral code that had maintained a relationally healthy community. Not only does Copway cite the losses of the collective, but he also chronicles his own personal losses. If Copway's text and life story could be measured as a whole, the gains he struggles for seem outweighed by the losses, making the narrative a story of loss, but also of stubborn hope and survivance even as Copway himself eventually succumbs to a loss of healthy relationality.

Much of the autobiography is composed of episodes in which he meets others with whom he inevitably and tearfully parts ways. Copway's experiences as a missionary entails a pattern of successes: he includes anecdotes of the powerful devotion of many Indian converts. But these triumphal moments are shadowed by a series of losses.

For example, on Copway's first missionary assignment, he states that "on Sabbath evenings, every converted Indian would try to include his relatives to embrace religion, and pray in the wigwams of their unconverted relatives. These happy scenes often made me forget home" (97). The success of conversion is clearly colored by his sorrow at being away from home. After his successes at this mission, Copway travels a great distance to his next assignment, suffering greatly from hunger and sickness, and delayed from reaching his destination because of the Sabbath rules. At this point, Copway "looke[s] toward home and [weeps] at the thought of it" (110). At this point in the narrative he directly addresses his father, as if starving not only in body but also for the deep connection of family: the relationality of his home. And during this next assignment, at a

gathering place for Natives from surrounding areas, the sheer number of his people, rather than being taken as a sign of continuity and societal wellbeing, is characterized as an overwhelming evangelical prospect:

> O what a field for labor among all these regions! Indians, from every direction, congregate here every summer; those, too, who have never heard of a Saviour!
>
> When will all my poor people "sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus?" When will they cease to offer up to the Bad Spirit all they possess? Shall these also perish as did the Indians on the eastern coast? … God of mercy, save my poor people. (111-112)

A sight that might have brought him confidence and encouragement is immediately swallowed by Copway's fear of extinction. Every assemblage of community Copway presents is ephemeral. Whereas Apess' fellow Methodists part in "perfect friendship," Copway's partings are fraught with grief. The departure of companions at one of his mission sites renders Copway and his remaining companions "inconsolable" (Copway 119). When he attends seminary his friends scatter afterward. On a visit to Boston, amidst friendly Methodist brethren, he stands by the shore and is inspired to write:

> Once more I see my fathers' land
> Upon the beach, where oceans roar;
> Where whiten'd bones bestrew the sand,
> Of some brave warrior of yore …
> O! Tell ye "pale faces" tell.
> Where have my proud ancestors gone? (134)

In the midst of collegial visits with his Methodist friends in Boston, he is smitten by a sense of racial difference and the devastation of the past. The "whiten'd" bones of the long-dead warrior are a haunting image of the "whitened Indian." Like Copway himself, metaphorically "whitened" by religion and Euro-American culture, the bones are pale. They lie inert, forgotten, not honored, mere objects as ships come and go in the harbor. In

this image lies the seeming paradox of Copway's writing: he is a warrior fighting for the survival of his people, yet he is "whitened," helpless, and living the "death" of trauma. He must ask the "palefaces" where his ancestors have gone, for as a committed convert, he cannot indulge in Indian notions of the afterlife, and the thought of where his ancestors' spirits must have gone in a Christian cosmos must have been unbearable. At that moment, his "whitened" self is dead and his Indian voice holds sway.

While Copway, as "self-appointed … pan-Indian spokesman" (Peyer 245) wishes for the conversion of every member of his tribe, and while he fears for their existence as an entire people, during their lives and after, the clearest evidence of his desire for a totality to replace lost community and connection is the grand scheme he developed and advocated from 1847 to 1850 and beyond. This plan was to be the salvation of all Indians in the US. His proposal was to relocate every Native in the United States to a single territory, which was to become a state in the Union, with a white governor—appointed by the president—who would be assisted by a lieutenant governor, ostensibly Copway himself. In this proposed state, Christianity would be the sole religion, agriculture was to be the basis of subsistence, and the tribal elders, such as the ones who have criticized and censured him, would no longer hold the political power they once did in traditional societies, but would submit to republican ideals (Peyer 245-248). The state was to be called Kah-ge-ga, which Copway translated to mean "Ever-to-be-Indian," but which was also, and probably not by coincidence, the first three syllables of his own name (Peyer 246). Peyer states that by 1850-51 Copway was a virtual megalomaniac (247). I have no argument with this term on a certain level; however, if think of this "megalomania" in terms of the compensation fantasy, we can observe the factors at work around him rather than dismissively pathologizing his psychological state. His fantasy of making things right by creating Keh-ge-ga is deeply entrenched in his own denial of having betrayed both his church and tribal communities. Without turning back to his mentors to make things right relationally, he turns to the Euro-American community and becomes enmeshed in this salvation/removal project that provides him with a vision of empowerment and importance.

Returning to the spectrum that stretches between intersubjectivity and "objectivity"/objectification, it is plain that Copway, now deprived of any meaningful connection to "home," was trying to create a new one. If Copway was a self-appointed pan-Indian spokesman, his plan for an Indian state was certainly not created in a pan-Indian way. There can be no doubt that his desire to save his people from "perishing" was genuinely urgent, but by now, having alienated his most influential Indian allies, he was not working with them at all.[11] In fact, he proposed coercing Native groups to relocate to Kah-ge-ga by having the government withhold their financial support until they did so (Peyer 248).

Advocating for Removal

As noted above, Copway presented himself as an exemplar of Indian "improvement." His Indian State plan was a blueprint for Indian survival, but also of Indian "improvement" modeled on his own. Copway had left behind his home, and upon his return, found that it was no longer home. His Indian State plan demanded that everyone leave behind their homes; his prescription for Indian suffering was, like the conversion repetition, a repetition of his own journey imposed onto others. This vision of a panacea of totality and unity was a fantasy, a balm for the reality of Native American communities being divided and scattered, and for Copway's betrayal and subsequent separation from his former community. Under different circumstances it might have been feasible; either way, it never happened.

While cultures are not static but adaptive, the forces of Anglo colonialism, war, and genocide happened too quickly to allow for Native Americans to have agency in their own adaptation process. Out of elements of Anglo religion and Ojibwa culture, Copway envisioned a future for his people characterized by unity and equality, and yet also by a

[11] He did claim, however, to have interviewed 17,000 Natives, whom he said were waking to the idea (Peyer 248).

lack of relationality so profound that he would force every American indigene from their ancestral lands to fulfill his vision. And rather than face the earlier criticism of his peers and elders, he effaces their subjectivity with his own grandiose vision. There is no intersubjectivity in his planning process. It is a vision of unity, but he has not created it in conversation with tribal elders; rather, it seems to come from a position of standing outside the community and seeing it as an object that can be manipulated to meet his ideal, without regard for the needs, ideas, or feelings of those involved. Like Apess, he wants justice and a future for his people, but whereas Apess' journey takes him more deeply into relationality—so much so that he is adopted by the Wampanoags—Copway stands outside his people, creating a narrative from a "global" perspective which he believes will help them retain sovereignty and power (with himself as the lieutenant governor, of course). Sadly, in pursuing this fantasy, Copway participates in Jackson's removal policies. Indeed, the previous betrayal of his church and tribe makes it nearly impossible for him to experience intersubjectivity.

Trauma to an individual is isolating in its own way, distorting the perceptions, emotions, and relationships with unbearable memories of the past, and avoidance of those memories. Trauma compromises trust, and along with it, any sense of the world being a safe place disappears. Moral injury is also isolating, but the dynamic of isolation is different. One's moral horizon diminishes as one is isolated by degrees: one betrays a friend or associate, and if no reparations are made, then one no longer feels accountable to that person. With each betrayal one commits or experiences, there are fewer and fewer people to whom one is accountable (Shay 186). Copway seems genuinely to want to save his people, and yet does not hold himself accountable to them.

A Falling Star

Copway's success had gained him the admiration of literary luminaries such as Francis Parkman, Washington Irving and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (Peyer 244). But, Icarus-

like, he both peaked and plummeted when he lectured at a World Peace Conference in Germany, where he delivered a long speech at the end of which he presented a peace pipe. The speech flopped on many levels, going 20 minutes over the 20 minute time limit, and was criticized by reviewers as "windy," "incoherent," and "ungrammatical" (Peyer 251-253).

He had failed to live up to expectations at the pinnacle of his career. He had offended and abandoned his community in Canada. He could or would not go home, and so settled in New York City, where noble savages were, unfortunately, now out of fashion (Smith 43). Copway started an Indian newspaper that failed within three months (Peyer 256). He became increasingly desperate for support for his vision, and work to feed his family. He began to beg his famous friends for money, and they snubbed him (Peyer 260). He turned for backing to the racist and anti-abolitionist "American Party" (Peyer 258). He even began to modify his views to placate them, protesting African American rights, since Native Americans did not share those same new rights (Peyer 257).

Tragically, in 1849 and 1850, three of the Copways' four children died and, after a few years, his wife left him. Bereaved and broke, the former missionary began to sink into alcoholism and obscurity, engaging in ethically questionable activities such forgery, trying to force the Seminoles off their land in 1858 (perhaps hoping for federal funds as a reward), and in 1867, illegally recruiting Canadian Indians for a bounty to be cannon fodder for the Union Army (Smith 46-47). Again, these actions can be ascribed to Shay's model of moral injury: lacking reconciliation with/accountability to others, a person suffering from moral injury begins to believe they truly are defined by their actions; they continue along the path of betrayal, seeing others as mere objects. How else to explain Copway's passionate desire to save all of his people on earth and in Heaven turning into the sad attempt sell them off as cannon fodder?

After this period he reinvented himself two more times. In 1867 he began to offer herbal healing his father had taught him long ago (Peyer 261). Was this turn to his father's teaching a way of making amends to his people's culture, or another way to

capitalize on his Indian identity, or, somehow, in the light of transdifference, both? Perhaps he wanted to return to the pre-conversion time he had idealized in his autobiography. Whatever the case, the following year found him living at a Catholic mission, where he confessed to being a "pagan" and converted to Catholicism a few days before his death in 1869 (Smith 48). One can only speculate that for Copway, this last conversion was a final attempt at salvation, and, perhaps, a reunion with his lost loved ones. Whatever his personal failings, Copway made a mark as one of the first Native American writers, and his autobiography presents a powerful example of conversion and survivance functioning within the painful matrix of trauma.

Conversion as Survivance

The crises in Copway's life seem to be addressed not so much through Christian conversion as they are through the conversion process itself; not only by Copway's wish to convert every living Indian, but also as he himself continues to convert—from missionary to speaker, from visionary to desperate schemer, from Christian to traditional healer, from pagan to Catholic.

Copway's autobiography is deeply invested in his relationship to the collectivities of Native America. However, his relationship to these different groups is complicated by his separation from his home, his role as a missionary, his advocacy for Indian removal, and his embezzlement of funds from both the Ojibwa council and the Methodist Church. A. LaVonne Ruoff catalogs a multitude of literary styles—journalistic, oratorical, ironic, confrontational, Romantic—as well as positive roles Copway deploys in his text: warrior, hero, wise teacher (15). These roles must be read not only in the light of his literary agility but also as counterbalances to other roles played in the life beyond the letters: embezzler, Indian removal advocate, and grandiose poseur.

Both the literary and real life roles can be read as manifestations of denial and guilt, as well as survivance. Representation of himself as a leader and potential savior

conceals his betrayal of his church and his tribe. But in the "doubleness" of this text, Copway's balancing act can also be read as an act of survivance: having alienated himself from his tribe and church, and then being rejected by his wife and his literary circle, Copway is utterly isolated. His grandiosity is an attempt to regain the esteem he has lost, and to retain his own identity as an Indian. Joshua Bellin addresses the complexity of Copway's positions, which combine the innocence of "sylvan freedom" with the chauvinistic patriotism of the anti-abolitionist American Party of his time (194). The flexibility of this positioning speaks not only to his deft use of rhetoric, but also to Copway's need to appeal to every potential source of support for his plans.

The vicissitudes of Copway's career bear witness to the alienation inherent in modernity's conception of the self. The isolated Cartesian self, now being supplanted in psychoanalysis by a "relational turn," is constituted only in relation to cognition, not to others; it is not constituted intersubjectively, as essentially related to and relating to others as fellow subjects (Mitchell xi-xii). Any nonsocial model of subjectivity is in itself a trauma, a betrayal of the relational nature of social and natural life.[12] Through the concept of totality, Copway mediates both the trauma of his break with his community, and the brokenness he sees in his community. Furthermore, the concept of totality is also a symptom that overcompensates for his most ethically dubious actions. Specifically, the missionary work he undertakes, which allows him to imagine a better future (i.e. total redemption of all Indian people), also causes a trauma of separation from his home community. And so while conversion causes a trauma, the only cure he envisions for this wound is repetition of this trauma until Native America could be a unified, single, and complete community.

[12.] It is worth noting that a 2013 US Air Force study on drone pilots shows the symptoms of PTSD and substance abuse are almost as high among drone pilots as among actual pilots (Otto 7). One might assume that the further removed one is from a sense of connection to others, the more they are seen as objects, or in fact, mere targets. And yet the technology that allows the pilots to view the effects of their actions close-up brings on guilt, shame, and other symptoms of moral injury (Kirkpatrick).

The subjective split between relationality and objectification that we began with becomes most apparent in one of the final passages, in which Copway's address abruptly changes from listing a totality of Indian peoples (and their suffering) to a sudden relational engagement with the reader.

> The Menomenees in Wisconsin, the Winebagoes and Potawatamees in Iowa, the warlike nations of the Sacs and Foxes, the Osages, Pawnees, Mandans, Kansas, Creeks, Omahas, Otoes, Delewares, lowas, and a number of others elsewhere, must perish as did their brethren in the Eastern States, unless the white man send them the Gospel, and the blessings of education. … You have sent your missionaries to Burmah, China, the Sandwich Islands, and to almost every part of the world; and shall the Indians perish at your own door? (218-219)

Note the abrupt shift from the third person list-making to the second person, as Copway calls upon the reader to help make amends for the damage done by Euro-Americans to the Indians. Here, his language becomes rhetorically relational. Most of his career was spent in trying to convince others to help save Native Americans before they all "perished" -- in body and in spirit. Ultimately, Copway must speak the language of relationship. In reaching out to the reader with direct address, and in earlier passages lamenting the introduction of alcohol to his society, he seeks to assign responsibility for traumas done to Native communities, and to ask for reparation. Perhaps if he had been answered, his path would have been different. Trauma theory proposes it is only by establishing secure relationality and a coherent narrative leading from past to present that trauma, perhaps even moral injury, can begin to be healed.

Conclusion

Relationality theory and trauma theory allows us a greater scope for examining the processes at work in these "white" Indian texts. Deborah Madsen calls for trauma theory to accommodate the concept and state of transdifference that is part of survivance theory, which would enable us to work with a functional and functioning paradox, rather than proffering a therapeutic narrative that turns fragmented experience into a singular, fully healed subjectivity—this, she sees as a form of assimilation (qtd. in Vizenor 64). Survivance therefore asserts the value of human subjectivity, agency, and voice even within an unresolved trauma process. Trauma theory creates a matrix of relational subject positions as part of a process, and the conversion narrative gives form to that process.

If Apess seems to have integrated into community as his voice developed through traumatic repetitions and conversion, Copway seems to lose his connection to community, as well as his public voice. But both authors wrote prolifically, bringing Native American concerns into public awareness. And both passionately demand that their readers engage in their cause, to acknowledge and help the Native Americans. Even as authors like James Fenimore Cooper were writing Native Americans out of American society, Apess and Copway fought through trauma for Native American communities.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion:

"American"–Native American Literary Dialogism and Pedagogical Possibilities

> Integrity is the capacity to affirm the value of life in the face of death, to be reconciled … with the tragic limitations of the human condition… The interlocking of integrity and trust … completes the cycle of generations and regenerates the sense of human community which trauma destroys.
>
> —Judith Herman, *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror*

We have seen how during the Revolutionary era, and in the first half of the nineteenth century there have been moments of intercultural intersubjectivity: the dialogism between "American" and Native American experience. Sadly, these moments have been obscured by "progress" and the mythical "vanishing" of Native American nations. Both Owens and Madsen have challenged critics to reformulate theory so that an intercultural dialogue can be possible between the segregated literatures (and histories). The "official" United States history is dissociated, and memories of genocidal crimes are suppressed by fantasies that perpetuate traumatizing stereotypes.

Of course, there are other deep national traumas that have not been worked through collectively, the most obvious being slavery. Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address was the product of a struggle to make meaning of the mass slaughter: "If God wills that [the war] continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword … the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether" (Lincoln).

This religious interpretation is deeply imbued with the knowledge of slavery as a crime. However, as we have seen in Cooper, sacrifice does not necessarily heal

perpetrator guilt; much working through remains to be done. To address these historical wounds further is beyond the scope of this project, but it is mentioned here to show that the focus on trauma and relationality tested in this project can be applied to many literatures of historical wounding.

Trauma theory is Americanized by the incorporation of Native American survivance. The notion of the postgeneration, with its degrees of implication and relation to the American genocide, can help us approach the atrocities without too much risk of a defensive reaction from students. And finally, the different states of relationality as outlined by Mitchell offers us an alternative to divisive binary constructs. Taken together, these critical tools and concepts can help us to discuss the deep wound of Native American and "American" relations; the concepts in these theories allow us to balance trauma and survivance, inherited criminal history and inherited relationality. For if we are all intrinsically connected, not only through Farmer James' sympathy for the minds of good men, but by a more holistic social contract that creates both self and community, then it is imperative that we address our relationality. In so doing, we can approach our Native neighbors and their literature with an open and intersubjective stance, to cultivate the integrity to maintain remembrance of the 500-year-old trauma, which continues even today.

Stone Heart

The contemporary Native American novel of historical fiction I wish to close with is Diane Glancy's *Stone Heart*, a novel that recreates Sacajawea on her journey with Lewis and Clark. This novel represents processes of survivance and the working-through of trauma. In addition, it *performs* survivance and intersubjectivity. Glancy continues the story of Sacajawea beyond her death and her appropriation by US culture as an icon of westward expansion; thus her novel performs an act of survivance, for, as Vizenor says, "survivance is the continuance of stories" (1). Survivance also involves the Native

presence, and the recreation of Sacajawea as a vulnerable, stoic young woman who is changed by her journey; this process makes her present to us in a way that counteracts popular mythical representations. N. Scott Momaday has woven together languages of anthropology, memoir, and Kiowa history in *The Way to Rainy Mountain*; Diane Glancy has similarly woven Sacajawea's recreated voice alongside excerpts from the Lewis and Clark journal. Her presence in this text highlights the lie that "white" history has promoted—stereotyping her, along with Pocahontas, as an "Indian Princess" who welcomed Euro-American invaders. She has become a "white" Indian inasmuch as she has been claimed by Euro-American culture and American history—an Indian made mythically "white." Sacajawea's journey takes her through the trauma of enslavement and the loss of personhood, through ways she used survivance, and her working-through of trauma. The novel also performs survivance by asking the reader to help create the story by reading the expedition journals in relation to what a sixteen-year-old Shoshoni girl sold into marriage to an abusive French trader—carrying his child and struggling with illness—could truly have felt, thought, and experienced. And while the novel does not represent complete intersubjectivity, it performs that intersubjectivity with the reader, as we shall see.

To date, *Stone Heart* has not received much critical attention other than a handful of reviews. In 2004 Mary E. Adams wrote a short review, noting that Glancy humanizes the story only partly told in the journals of Lewis and Clark, filling out the story with richness, complexity of experience, and emotion. Anne G. Myles reviews the novel in more detail, linking the historical novel to the themes of multicultural literature, focusing on Sacajawea's role as a mediator between cultures (53). She also calls attention to the key issues of form in the text: the predominance of white space, the two-column form, and Glancy's use of the second person—all of which, according to Myles, respectively suggest the ultimate unknowability of history and perform the displacement and alienation of the protagonist (54-55). She concludes that Sacajawea is "pulled apart" by the cultural forces at odds in her world (55). While I agree with Myles' focus on form and style, which I shall address below, I maintain that Sacajawea is not pulled apart as she

endures the innumerable hardships of the expedition, carrying and caring for her baby, while contending with a recurring illness. Through her interpretations of both Lewis and Clark's actions and journals, as well as her journey to her home village, Glancy's Sacajawea undergoes a transformation which allows her to transcend the fragmentation and alienation of trauma and claim the rights of personhood as a traveler—an explorer in her own right.

Sacajawea undergoes multiple traumas: the first that we know of is her being kidnapped from her home village by the Hidatsa tribe to be a slave (66). As a teenager she had been purchased by a Frenchman named Toussaint Charbonneau to be one of his wives; she is particularly close to another of his wives, Otter Woman, who is the only one she knows who can speak her native tongue (17). Sacajawea is brought along with Lewis and Clark's expedition so that she can translate between the expedition leaders and Shoshoni, from whom the party would buy horses for a portage between the two main river routes of the journey (13). When she learns that she will be going on the expedition without her friend, she dreads the trauma of separation, and the loss of identity this will entail:

> There will be another separation from what you know. You cannot look into the hollows of Otter Woman's eyes.
>
> You know the explorers will change what you are, that you will be taken into them, that they can look past you without thinking.
> (14)

[Clark]

11th November Sunday 1804

Fort Mandan

a cold Day continued to work at the Fort Two men cut themselves with an ax, The large Ducks pass to the South and Indians gave me several roles of parched meat Two Squars of the Rock mountains, purchased from the Indians by a Frenchmen came down The Mandan out hunting the Buffalow

Clark lists her as a "squar" "purchased by a Frenchman" in a catalogue of events for November 11. The young woman perceives clearly enough that she is not seen as a person by the explorers, and that being among them will alter her. Not only does she

believe that she will be changed, but note that Glancy uses the word "what" instead of "whom" or "who."

Without Otter Woman to share her language and humanity, she fears becoming more of an object than ever. Like Mary Rowlandson, who structures her captivity around a set of "removes" from her former home, Sacajawea is experiencing a series of removes which take her beyond all she has known socially (Rowlandson). Furthermore, this closeness with Otter Woman constitutes her very "self"; for Sacajawea, it is relationality that creates self. Indeed this is true for us all, as researchers now understand (Mitchell xii). Sacajawea's new relations with the explorers will change her; she fears this change will deny her humanity, but as the property of her husband, she is helpless to make her own choice.

Traumatic events are characterized by the helplessness of the subject experiencing something beyond her ability to tolerate (33); Glancy uses the birth of Sacajawea's son to dramatize her helplessness in the face of this journey. It reads as an allegory of the birth of the new reality of white westward expansion. Galloping horses symbolize influences beyond her control—not only the overwhelming and inescapable pain of childbirth, but the inevitability of the changes to come in the region. Sacajawea is the land itself: unable to move, with no free will, "giving" itself to the invaders.

> They are tearing your legs apart. They are riding your belly. You feel yourself grow small. You are nothing beside a horse. They are running toward you. They are running and running. You give yourself to them. There is no other way. (22)

"There is no other way" reflects Sacajawea's narrow sphere of autonomy, as well as a foreshadowing of Lewis and Clark's "way" west, their "way" of seeing things from an authoritative, purportedly objective (but ultimately possessive) perspective, and Sacajawea's ultimate revelation of her own "way" of being. This passage runs alongside a boxed description by Lewis of the labor being "tedious and the pain violent" (22). Lewis describes a rattlesnake tail remedy that is forced into Sacajawea's mouth to hasten

the birth. Lewis notes, "I was informed that she had not taken it more than ten minutes before she brought forth perhaps this remedy may be worthy of future experiments" (22). Lewis' observations of the labor and the rattlesnake remedy are probably not without sympathy for the new mother and child, but the fact that he eventually contextualizes her agonies in terms of an experiment underscores the objectification of Sacajawea and her experience. It represents the lack of relationality that is necessary for Sacajawea's sense of wholeness and self, the lack of relationality reflected in the nation's westward expansion—and its eventual toll on the land, the animals, and the indigenous people of the Northwest.

Generally speaking, when authors such as those examined in Chapter Three depict an Indian going west, his or her departure represents the general westward removal the Native Americans of the eastern US. For example, *Hobomok*, a nineteenth-century novel of interracial marriage often compared with *Hope Leslie*, ends with the voluntary vanishing of the Indian husband toward the west (Mielke 2004 174). But Glancy's Sacajawea presents a complex and detailed journey westward. She does not vanish into the west; it is the west that will soon vanish for the Natives. Sacajawea warns the earth and animals of the coming of the whites. And at the utter limit of the West, she does not vanish either; rather, she asserts her right to go with the rest of the expedition to the shore. Sacajawea, then, bears witness to the changes to come. Knowing that the whites will take all the lands through which they pass, she recreates herself as an explorer, experiencing new ways of perceiving, and new realms of meaning.

Reflecting the liminality of Sacajawea's experience with the white explorers is Glancy's use of the second person. James Mackay sees the second person voice merely as an address to the reader (249); however I interpret this choice as the liminal space between Sacajawea and the reader, as well as between Sacajawea and her objectified self. The second person creates for Sacajawea a dissociation characteristic of traumatic wounds that engages the reader in the heroine's alienation: "You walk-without-those-you-know, without those-you-belong-to. But for Jean Baptiste [her newborn], you feel like an empty earth lodge" (35). Through the second person, Glancy simultaneously puts

us in Sacajawea's mind, and also reminds us that we cannot truly know Sacajawea's thoughts. Because we are asked to be the "you," we are asked to experience on some level the Sacajawea who is not a construction serving westward expansion, or manifest destiny, but a young girl with a new baby, who has been a captive and slave, who is now dealing with alienation, fatigue, chronic fever, a domineering and abusive husband, and an uncertain place among the explorers and new lands. Readers participate relationally in her sense of self and in her alienation from herself.

The second person also plays with the readers' sense of time. While Lewis and Clark's journals are neatly boxed and dated—contained historically—Sacajawea's imagined thoughts flow freely from the past to the immediate present of the readers' experience, reminding readers that history is not then-and-now. As in *Hope Leslie*, the past is a continual presence in the present, and therefore we have a relational connection to it that asks for a relational response. Edkins' "trauma time" is performed here, enabling readers to witness the traumatizing forces of "objectivity," which Glancy contains in text boxes, as Smith contained his Indian experiences with land appraisals (xiv). The containment of the journals allows Sacajawea's voice to flow freely, and allows her to sample pieces of it that stimulate her understanding of the white men.

Glancy's choice of the second person also reflects self-observation, not unlike the "objective" perspective of Lewis and Clark. Sacajawea speaks of herself, addresses herself, and observes herself. This play of subject and object is one way of representing Vizenor's fourth person, a point to which I shall return later.

As Glancy uses the second person to show the dissociation of trauma, and the relationality of history, she uses the two-column format to show the official record's dissociation from affect. The emotional and relational language of Sacajawea complements the "objectivity" of the information in the journals. Even as Sacajawea struggles with her own objectification, Lewis and Clark's objectivity is figured as a dissociation, a disconnection of EuroAmerican defined humanity and Non-Euro-American life this constitutes in great part the foundation of US land claims.

On the right side of each page in the aforementioned bordered boxes are excerpts from the journals of Lewis and Clark. On the left are passages of Sacajawea's thoughts and reflections at the same points in the journey. At times Sacajawea's passages stretch on for pages. At other points they vanish, leaving the reader with white space where Lewis and Clark's narrative dominates, and Sacajawea's voice is silent. The white spaces reflect a historical rupture: the loss of Native voices in history. More than being symbolic, these white spaces carry great "emotional weight" (MacKay 250); but while MacKay sees survivance as the 'haunting" of the text in these long silences, where the reader can only begin to imagine "the fluid, unimaginable Native ghost" (259), I suggest that these white spaces represent an absence that poignantly reminds the reader of the countless Native voices and cultures silenced and destroyed in the American genocide, and their absence from the lands where so many societies had lived for centuries before the European and US invasions. Even as the second person brings the text into the present, Glancy's use of white space reminds us of what has been lost to the past, and in missing that voice, we carry the story with us. If, as critics, we are to encourage cultural intersubjectivity, then we ought to ask if survivance—the rejection of tragedy and victimhood, and continuation of story—applies to reading as well as writing? Can a non-Native reader's internalization of the story constitute one strand of that story's survivance? How does this internalization differ from haunting? And how can a critic's engagement further survivance? The white spaces are spaces of reader response and engagement with what seems to not be there.

The borders around the journal excerpts have a threefold effect of making the journals feel authoritative, yet limited (literally boxed in), and also safely "contained." The content of these text boxes is objective, full of "useful" information and notable events. In contrast, Sacajawea's passages are lyrical, emotional, physical, and relational. They connect to the reader not only through second person but by their borderlessness. The journals' borders represent the way Lewis' and Clark's objectivity constricts their perceptions and their connectedness. And of course, Glancy encloses this dangerous

objectivity in order to give Sacajawea's voice, and her silences, freedom from an oppressive perspective.

A stark example of the contrast between the objectifying and the relational appears in the passage where the expedition comes to Sacajawea's home village. Continuing from a passage of Lewis' journal in which he discloses how firearms can be used to "awe" the Indians, Lewis explains how to get information from them. Meanwhile, Sacajawea is moved to tears by the smells:

> It is the smell of the trees you remember.
>
> The cedar, spruce, pine.
> It is the smell of trees that makes you cry. (73)

> To keep the Indians in good humor you must not fatigue them with too much business at one time. Therefore after the council we gave them to eat and amused them a while by shewing them such articles as we thought would be entertaining to them, and then renewed our enquiries with respect to the country.

As personal, emotional experience is excluded from the official record—from history—Sacajawea expresses her individual relation to the land, to her home. Lewis' observations are about cultural interaction along the lines of manipulation. This excision of emotion and relationality creates a self/other divide, a matrix for the criminality of westward expansion as it happened. The excision of emotion is a kind of dissociation, a symptom of a culturally sanctioned forgetting of the criminality, a denial of the effects of historical dispossession and genocide. If feelings, respect, and intersubjectivity are not tangible, apparently, for Lewis, they don't matter. This absence of affect is a characteristic of scientific writing; but it is a lack. Without affect, how can scientific writing not be based on self/other constructs that allow scientists to treat living beings as objects?

The lack of affect in "objective" history is especially problematic, since history is made by emotional beings, and can often function to perpetuate the shared affective relationality of nationalism, or to hide culpability and guilt. Emotions are not facts, nor are they tangible objects. Thus the emotions Glancy inscribes alongside the official

record remain ephemeral. It is their very evanescence that critiques history. Indeed, the briefness of Sacajawea's life is recorded in this format, even as she is inscribed into the official record:

[Clark, when listing members of the party]

1820

Se car ja we ae Dead

It is possible Sacajawea died of diphtheria.

It is possible Sacajawea died of syphilis.

(147)

Her name is thus authoritatively recorded in history, with a scientific/analytical speculation on the cause of her death. No affect is expressed or recorded. But Glancy's white space on the left side of the page makes her absence palpable and poignant. The absence of Sacajawea's voice is not only a loss of a character in whom the reader has become invested, but also a loss of the reader's shared second-person voice. The novel performs this loss, helps the reader to experience it, not only as a witness, but as his or her own Sacajawea-self. By extension, of course, this white space represents the loss of millions more Native Americans, a loss that the reader is invited to mourn. Poised between the official history and the voice of Sacajawea, the reader is asked by this relational text to feel and see past the misrepresentation of the official story.

But in keeping with Vizenor's rejection of tragedy, if the reader is left to mourn the unspeakable losses of Native American voices, and contemplate the epistemological violence of affectless objective/scientific observation, he or she is also invited to

participate in Sacajawea's acts of survivance. There is much more to naming and authority in this novel than that of the journals. A complex relationship develops between the explorers' colonial project of naming what they find and Sacajawea's survivance. For she comes to use Lewis and Clark's listing and naming to claim a new identity for herself.

As Lewis and Clark "objectively" observe their new discoveries, and capture and cage several animals as specimens, Sacajawea maintains a relational stance toward the animals, and observes Lewis and Clark:

> You see the four magpies, the prairie dog, and a prairie grouse. You hear them cry in their cages. You tell them they are going on a journey. You tell the magpie maybe it will sing in the President's house … They come to look at the land. But they do not see the spirits. They write in their journals. But they do not know the land. They give the animals names that do not belong to them. They do not say what they are. They do not fit. (23)

Even as the animals are listed, drawn, caged or killed, and named without regard for their Indian names, Sacajawea keeps her relational connection to these animals, bestowing a sense of dignity upon them. Similarly, her husband gives her child a European name, Jean Baptiste. Though Glancy's Sacajawea has no say in naming her own child and is treated like a possession by her husband, she accepts Jean Baptiste's name as part of his personhood and his connection to her: Sacajawea feels like an "empty earth lodge," except in relation to Jean-Baptise (63).

In a turn from the objective, scientific naming that predominates the text, Glancy plays with naming. Merriweather Lewis has a dog named Seaman, named so because his breed is from a seafaring area. Sacajawea finds it amusing that the dog is given a name that makes him a "man." Here instead of drawing a black and white portrait of objectification and relationality with animals, Glancy allows for the complexity of cultural difference.

Naming has yet another valence in this novel. Glancy allows a glimpse of human relationality happening in the group of travelers. The men in the expedition give Sacajawea what does seem a fitting name. Because she sings to her baby, the men call her Bird Woman. They even name a river after her: Bird Woman River (38). She embraces the symbolism of this name, especially when she is placed at the head of the party. She is placed here to let any Indians they meet know that the expedition is not a threat:

> The woman and the baby do not go into battle. So this party is safe. The explorers put you at the head of the party. When they don't need you, you walk behind. They should hear your song. It is on your wings they ride. A small bird for such a large hunting party. (86)

For Sacajawea, in the naming that is part of Lewis and Clark's colonial project, the names "do not fit." However, this kind of naming is not universal. Within the group of people that makes up the expedition, where a certain relationality has developed, there is room for naming that does "fit." Sacajawea uses the concept of being Bird Woman to claim her value to herself and to the group, which is, as she says, riding on her wings. Even if "they" do not hear her song, even if they are still a "them" and she does not speak of the party in the plural first person, Glancy's Sacajawea begins to sense that her role is important. "You think you are something the explorers need. You sing to Jean Baptiste. You know the men listen. The song is for them also. You remember they called you *a token of peace*" (107). Her acceptance of this name is one aspect of Sacajawea's creative syncretism, an aspect of the journey from the trauma of kidnapping and enslavement to a new subjectivity as a traveler and explorer in her own right.

As we have seen, in trauma theory, while the traumatized is caught up in a cyclical repetition compulsion, each repetition presents an opportunity to view the memory from a new perspective as the "victim" transforms into a "survivor" and eventually—hopefully—enters a state of healthy relationality. Some of these repetitions can be opportunities for new insights and creative growth. The trauma will always be part of the psyche, but the subject's relationship to it will change, as it loses its dominance

over her awareness. The journey from objecthood to intersubjectivity is both cyclical and linear, as is the creative and healing approach to traumatic repetition.

Repetitions of trauma in *Stone Heart* are inseparable from the linear progress of Sacajawea's syncretic transformation. Before the climax of the novel, in which she demands to see the ocean, she has taken the naming power of Lewis, Clark, and Toussaint for herself: "If you had another name, it would be woman-with-the-stone-beaver's-heart" (55). During the expedition, Glancy's Sacajawea finds a white stone shaped like a beaver. It reminds her that when she was born, her grandmother dreamed of a white beaver with a stone heart and no tail; a heart and a tail would slow the beaver on the long journey it was destined to walk, to places beyond what the Shoshoni know (40). And indeed, when Sacajawea returns to her Shoshoni home, she leaves it again, by choice.

This departure from her village is an example of a creative and conscious repetition of trauma, and example of what Judith Herman describes as an "adaptive" repetition. As noted earlier, "[s]urvivors may find a way to integrate reliving experiences into their lives in a contained, even socially useful manner" (40). Sacajawea was first torn from her home in a terrifying ordeal. This time, she relives her departure from home of her own volition in order to retain the autonomy she would not have if she remained. As mentioned above, Sacajawea has been taken along on the expedition because she will be able to translate with the Shoshoni, enabling the party to obtain horses from them for their portage between the two major rivers that make up their route to the Pacific. When Sacajawea returns to the Shoshoni people, she feels that the "empty earth lodge" within her fills with the air and land of her home (68). However, now that her natal home is no longer a memory but a reality, she remembers that she was "nothing to them either. The women work. They do what they are told" (69). She also works through the trauma of her capture:

> At night when Toussaint sleeps, you cry as you feed Jean Baptiste. You remember how the Hidatsa ripped you from the stream. You see how the Maker might have allowed

> you to be taken. Something larger was coming. The white men who would take your land. They are here now. You choose to go with them. (74)

In the light of her new knowledge and experience, Sacajawea is able to reorient herself to the trauma, to work it into a coherent narrative of her transformation into explorer. Indeed, when she hears her native language again, she begins to feel healed and whole: "You hear your own language in your ears. … The distance in you shuts" (70). At this point of healing, she can choose to stay with her people, considering that her primary task as translator has been accomplished. But she understands that this expedition is the beginning of a catastrophic change for her people, of all the Native people of the region, even of the land. Glancy's Sacajawea will not only seek to understand and bear witness to this change in some way, but as a member of Lewis and Clark's party, she has rights that her own people would have denied her: "Lewis puts you on a horse. The Shoshoni look. The women always walk. The women will not like you. You leave … this time by choice" (74).

Leaving by choice "this time" not only guarantees her more rights as a woman, but also corresponds to the model of working-through in which the subject is able to return to the original trauma, and relive it. But instead of reliving it in a state of helplessness and emotional shock, on the return she is able to experience the emotions associated with it and to make the choice from an empowered position, literally, astride the horse. As Lewis and Clark have been gathering knowledge, Sacajawea has been gathering "knowing": knowing of her own self, no longer a captive, a slave, a beaten wife, but the woman with the stone otter's heart who travels beyond her former cultural horizons, even while carrying that culture with her.

It is not only through the working through of her original trauma that Sacajawea achieves subjecthood. It is also through a syncretic use of Euro-American linguistic and analytical practices that she experiences transformative, culturally intersubjective survivance. A pivotal point in the narrative occurs when a flood threatens to sweep the entire expedition away. While Charbonneau proves to be no help at all, Sacajawea, with a

baby in one arm, manages to save several important items. Not only does she prove herself valuable to the team, but she also observes how Clark lists items lost in the accident:

> Large compass, an elegant fusee, Tomahawk, Humbrallo,
> shot pouch & horn with powder & Ball, Mockersons, & the
> woman lost her childs Bear [the rawhide shoulder-pack in
> which the child rides] & clothes bedding &c. (60)

Sacajawea reflects: "You like their lists. You like their numbers" (60). On a personal level, Sacajawea and Jean-Baptiste have been included in the list, their lost sling counted among others' lost objects; therefore they themselves are not objects, and their possessions are as worthy of mention as anyone else's. On a broader level, quantifying the loss with a list separates the list-maker from the loss. The list-maker and the anatomical sketcher both have the potential to objectify their subjects:

> Lewis makes the likeness of a bird with
> his words. You are called Bird Woman.
> Does he write you on his page?
> Why does he draw the bird?
> Not for power. Not to honor.
> But to copy its likeness?
> To separate its parts. (121)

Sacajawea wonders if she is an object of his listing, if she is this bird, which might be an honor, but then she realizes he is simply taking it apart. As if to counterbalance this dissection, Sacajawea makes her own list, a catalog of things from which she draws sustenance and pleasure:

> You want to poke in the redroot, chockcherry, alder,
> shoemate, sevenbark, purple haw, service berry,
> honeysuckle, wild rose, gooseberry,
> Fir, pine, dwarf pine, larch,
> &c.
> You make lists of them in your thoughts.

You poke behind the stars, the sky. (122)

This list that does not reduce things to quantities; it expresses the expansiveness of the world she wants to explore. Glancy's Sacajawea has taken a mode of dissection and turned it into a Whitmanesque expression of wonder, connection and curiosity: not about the powers of the whites, but about her own world.

The ultimate "specimen" at the end of the westward journey is a dead whale on the Pacific shore: something too large for them to capture and take home, and yet they will still possess it, "swallow" it; the expedition journal records the presence of this corpse as a gift: "[I] thank providence for directing the *whale* to us; and think him more kind to us than he was to Jonah, having sent this Monster to be Swallowed by us in Sted of Swallowing of us as Jonah's did" (102). The irony Glancy teases out here is that Lewis and Clark see the death as a possession, like the lands they will bring death to.

Lewis and Clark make camp within hiking distance of the shore, and plan to leave Sacajawea at camp as they go to investigate. But the young woman has become an explorer in her own right: she demands to see the whale at the journey's end for herself. **"**You ***insist*** you go with them. These men who name the water" (101). She will be an observer in her own right and not merely accept their naming. Indeed, she describes it for herself: the ocean is like an "animal skin being shaken out" (101). She claims her right as an explorer. She belongs, is no longer a belonging. And when she recalls of the whale, it is not with mastery—the memory is a wonder to be shared with the children in her family: "You remember their laugh. You can think of the ribs of the whale you can tell them about" (103). Her knowledge is relational and social rather than objectifying and possessive.

Nonetheless, while she claims the power of personhood for herself, Sacajawea acknowledges that there must be a "source" for Lewis and Clark's "ways" (142). She wants this for her son. And so she loses the last intimate tie she has: that to her son. Four years after the expedition, Sacajawea gives her son to Clark to raise. In doing so, she passes on her legacy as a traveler, one who can survive in and understand a changed

world. And indeed, her son Jean Baptiste became fluent in several languages, lived in Germany for a time, and worked as a scout, guide, trapper, hotel manager, mayor of a town, and gold miner.

Glancy's pairing of the Lewis and Clark journal with Sacajawea's lyrical, ephemeral voice brings the past to the reader, and the reader to the past, making clear the difference between knowledge and knowing. And, as so many of the works in this study have done, it not only shows the forces opposing the humanity of Native Americans and Euro-Americans, but offers a glimpse of the potential for cultural syncretism for the protagonist and intersubjectivity for the reader. The work performs a cultural and literary dialogism within itself, and with the reader as well. The terminal creed is transcended; the story continues.

Conclusion: Teaching Traumatic History through Intersubjectivity

In each of the narratives studied in this project, characters act and interact along the border of a Native society and Anglo-American culture. In this space, both violence and relationality occur. Crevecoeur's Farmer James resolves to quit European colonialism and live in an Indian community. James Smith struggles to reconcile the two lives he has lived, the two cultures he has lived in. In Cooper, to defy that border has deadly consequences; it is an absolute limit. Sedgwick's Magawisca balances allegiance to her enemy "family" and her own people. Apess and Copway both experience conversion and address white audiences in efforts to change their communities' narratives into stories of survival and empowerment—even as Indian removals were destroying communities and lives. And Glancy's Sacajawea, a stranger among the Hidatsa, with the party, and with her own people, forges her own syncretic identity. All of these "white Indian" figures, whether real or fictional, self-created or "whitely" mythologized have had their homes destroyed or have been forcibly taken away into another culture. In fictional

constructions, Cooper's novel is like a gravestone, while Sedgwick and Glancy both offer possibilities for Native survivance.

Nothing less is at stake than questions of how community can be re-imagined and created in a new form after its destruction. The autobiography and conversion narrative gesture toward, but cannot contain the full extent of the trauma at work, but they do communicate the loss. In the gaps between the narrative of the individual striving to help his people and the collective narrative of removal and loss, there appear silences, shifts of genre and/or changes in affect that articulate trauma.

When we look to the past of US–Native American relations, there is so much history that is "unspeakable" that it may seem impossible to know what to do with the "objective" knowledge of this troubled history. In the context of cultural and political constructs which are based on self/other relationality and an insistence on purity of some sort, Dominick LaCapra notes, "genocide is a disavowed yet constitutive outside or Other of modernity" (40). If purity is a virtuous goal, and otherness presents some kind of threat to it, genocide will always be waiting in the wings. Deeply involved in the genesis and progress of modernity is the "discovery" of the New World, "savage" others, and the sacralization of progress, altogether resulting in 500 years of atrocities, removal, and cultural warfare.

The issue of the countless injustices done to Native Americans, the legacy of loss in which most US residents—as postgenerations—are all complicit to some degree, is compartmentalized. It lies outside the imagined domain of ethical action for most. It is easier to ignore our inherited implication. It is easy to avoid "conversion" to the acknowledgement of our own vulnerability, which would necessarily be experienced if we both thought and acted ethically on a deep level. LaCapra notes the importance of the scholar's affective response to texts (40). Sam Durrant maintains that trauma can actually spur our ethical growth—but only if we acknowledge our common vulnerability (92). How can those of us who have inherited the spoils of genocide respond to it creatively and with the goal of an intersubjectivity that respects alterity?

In many of the works we have read, intersubjectivity has been the climax, an underlying and often uncertain dimension, or an effect of the text. As a subject of study, it allows us to examine trauma of the objectified, and achieved or imagined intersubjectivity, as well as the various relationalities between. Thus we can expand our vocabulary for cross-cultural readings. But intersubjectivity is not only a subject; it must also be practiced in the classroom.

In teaching related Native American and Euro-American texts in the context of the American genocide, there must be a balance between content and relationality. Felman and Laub argue that "knowledge" about a trauma should not impede the one who is listening to the survivor with "foregone conclusions or preconceived dismissals," nor should factual knowledge obstruct "new, diverging, unexpected information" (61). As stressed throughout this study, "information" (as in knowledge) is not *knowing* (which can be "new, diverging, and unexpected") but an ingredient thereof. Felman and Laub continue: "Knowledge in the testimony [of trauma] is … not simply a factual given that is reproduced and replicated by the testifier, but a genuine advent, an event in its own right" (62). Because this event involves a speaker and a listener, it is inherently relational, and ideally intersubjective. And in teaching divergent narratives about the American genocide, we and our students need to practice this relational "knowing."

The objectification involved in formalist models of teaching, such as Paolo Freire's famous "banking model," has long been criticized.[1] Progressive education models generally stress the social nature of learning as well as student agency in the learning process. For example, in 2012 Harvard physics professor Eric Mazur discovered that delivering brilliant lectures did indeed transmit information effectively, but they did little to inspire or help develop deeper understandings and new conceptual frameworks to accommodate this knowledge (Lambert). However, he found that students grasped the deeper lessons much more quickly when they discussed it among themselves—he had stumbled onto "peer instruction," aka "interactive learning": "Rather than lecturing, I'm

[1.] These problems are with us today in the prioritization of math and science to help students become workers and consumers in the industrial-consumer society (Spring 4).

making them prepare themselves for class−and in class, rather than telling them things, I'm asking them questions"; as the students work together to solve the problems posed by Mazur, they are discovering through dialogue that "ultimately, learning is a *social* experience" (Mazur, qtd. in Lambert). Michael Uebel agrees that the "passive perception of a phenomenal field" (e.g. the lecture) is not an effective learning state, for if we are to empower students to experience new "knowing," then we must understand that constructs of reality (and history) are "co-created"; furthermore, in the classroom, co-creation involves horizontal relationships rather than hierarchical ones, so that the classroom does not replicate the structures of hierarchy that are the basis of the colonialism this area of study (Native American and Euro-American "white Indian" texts) will inevitably critique (336).

Just as Mazur's goal was to help students create new conceptual constructs, and Uebel emphasizes horizontal relationships, the goal in teaching the American genocide as acknowledged national history must involve the facilitation of listening: the ability to transcend self/other constructions by understanding and practicing intersubjectivity with the texts and with others. Therefore, in the case of learning about trauma, the social nature of learning and the agency of the student are especially critical. Felman and Laub argue for listening to a narrative of trauma is an active process:

> Historical evidence to the event that constitutes the trauma—as a known event and not simply as an overwhelming shock—has not been truly, not been taken cognizance of. The emergence of the narrative which is being listened to—and heard—is, therefore, the process and the place wherein the cognizance, the "knowing" of the event is given birth to. The listener, therefore, is a party to the creation of knowledge *de novo* … by extension, the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event. (57).

In Chapter One of this study, the dis-memberment of history was examined as a symptom of historical trauma and national forgetting. Knowledge that is merely information, that is not knowing, is also dis-membered. Uebel notes that

> material, empirical tangibles are partial [dis-membered] pieces of knowledge, while what drives the "social organism" is actually a network of connections and relationships. These relations can manifest as dynamics of power, "qualities of leadership", experiences of hierarchy, experiences of, dependencies and independencies in interchange, etc. (336)

Understanding and recognizing different forms of relationality in the classroom can be an empowering part of the learning process, and also create conditions for postgenerational confrontation of the American holocaust. An individual with an inherited disorder is not to blame for their condition; they must, however, take active responsibility for managing it. Individuals currently living in a society built on genocide and theft did not create the injustice, but still are responsible for acknowledging it, witnessing it, and for responding socially and ethically.

However, Uebel cautions that "Well-Intended Whiteness" can have negative consequences (e.g. in benevolent or veiled self/other constructs): Uebel prescribes the concept of Martin Buber's "I-Thou" relationality, a form of intersubjectivity, in contrast to the objectifying self/other construct Buber terms "I-It" (334). The awareness and practice of intersubjectivity as active dialogic contact can reveal the privilege distorting some students' perception; honest intersubjective "I-Thou" relationality can be effective in removing the blinders of privilege (334). Therefore teaching schemes of relationality such as Mitchell's will be a helpful ingredient in the pedagogy of the American holocaust; different forms of relationality can be part of a conceptual toolbox, from which the students will build their own new ways of knowing.

Uebel offers a model called "B-learning" which embraces the social dimension of the classroom. In short, B-learning integrates emotion and cognition, examining subject

matter and student responses through self/other contact (326). B-learning is biophilic rather than necrophilic; its objects of study are not treated in an objectifying manner, but rather with an open and contemplative approach that fosters relational, thoughtful responsibility toward that which is studied (328). The B-classroom cultivates genuine and unreserved honesty, inclusion and confirmation so that "all are apprehended and acknowledged"; the B-classroom also creates new possibilities without a "steering ideology" (330). Uebel cites Bakhtin in explaining that the interplay of space between the "I" and the "Thou" constitutes a process of "dialogic relationality." Attention to this relationality can help students and instructors understand their tendencies and rhythms of greater and lesser contact, to be aware of the type, extent and quality of their relationalities (332).

Joel Spring notes that the "great traditions" of education in antiquity "focused on ethical relations and the problem of creating a just society" (2). In turning to the relational, we also turn to questions of ethics in our response to the American genocide and the structures of settler colonialism that created it.

In the interest of co-creation and new, divergent possibilities, I offer only some structural suggestions for the pedagogy of American genocide. The goals of this class are: to help students feel the cognitive dissonance of denying the US history of atrocities; to understand the narrative mechanisms that hide the crimes of the past; to practice that analysis on pertinent texts; and to empower them to respond intellectually, ethically, and socially. Felman notes how the first class she taught on the pedagogical relation between trauma and testimony involved unanticipated experiences of shock for the students; she witnessed and recorded these reactions (6-7). At the end of the class, she read back her testimony to their moments of shock or crisis (54-55) to affirm their responses. In teaching about the American holocaust, and the texts that expose or attempt to conceal it, we invite the unexpected and can model the open, receptive listening that creates a shared understanding.

Judith Herman outlines a basic sequence for recovery from trauma: 1) establishing safety; 2) remembrance and grieving/mourning; 3) the ability to achieve

ordinary social connection (155). She qualifies this simple process by explaining that these stages are often dialectical and oscillating, but emphasizes that recovery will unfold as a gradual shift from shock and helplessness, to safety, to acknowledged memory, to social connection. Given the live (or B) classroom's focus on student-motivated learning, the instructor's role in presenting challenges and creating conditions for social learning, and the intense nature of American genocide as a topic, we can adapt Herman's model of recovery to structure a course around a progression from shock/cognitive dissonance, to the establishment of safety with conceptual tools to help students incorporate the material as historical knowledge, to living with the uncomfortable emotional valence of knowing, to the capacity for non-Natives' mindful social connection with descendants of the survivors of the US genocide.

Therefore the first step is to present a challenge. Students need to feel the problem of unacknowledged genocide intellectually and emotionally. A presentation on the extent of the genocide, its vast scope and destruction, and the fact that their own homes, dormitories, classrooms, etc. have all been built on land that was swindled or stolen, can accomplish this goal of creating a challenging cognitive dissonance, especially when combined with the question of what makes a just society.

Sherman Alexie's *Indian Killer*, a disturbing murder mystery about Indian vs. white violence in contemporary Seattle and a novel with no full resolution, may also be appropriate material. Student discussion and questions should be encouraged, without attempts at solutions or answers. While many will want to resolve the questions to avoid the discomfort of diverging narratives about US history, the instructor should resist student efforts to find answers and encourage them to sit with their discomfort and uncertainties. The purpose of this part of the course is to have the students frame their cognitive dissonance with questions.

The second step will be to explain models of trauma and types of relationality, and have the students apply them. For example, they can identify and analyze relationalities at work in *Indian Killer*. A discussion of the students' relationality to the genocide will be helpful during this phase, where the concepts of perpetrator trauma and

the postgeneration can also be introduced. This phase should help establish not distance from the material, but safety in discussing it and incorporating it into a conceptual framework.

The phase of the course corresponding to remembrance and mourning can be a small group project, where each group chooses a grouping of texts to study. This is where a historicist grouping of related narratives comes into play, or simple pairings of texts. Examples: Present a compilation of *Yamoyden*, *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish*, Apess' "Eulogy on King Philip," and other works set during King Philip's War. Similarly, works centered on Pequot conflicts can be grouped: *Hobomok*, *Hope Leslie*, and the Apess autobiography. Following this grouping method, one could also combine Charles Eastman's autobiography, Zitkala-Sa's autobiographical writings, and *Dances with Wolves*. White and Native readings can be grouped around Jackson's removal orders. Concepts of survivance, including terminal creeds, and any other Native American or postcolonial theory the instructor can use, can be introduced in this section along with the texts. In small groups, the students can each study works of equivalent length or density, summarize them to each other and discuss points of comparison and contrast as the basis for papers.

Throughout the course, there must be space for a great deal of discussion of the impact these texts have on the students. If they are to bear witness to the horrors of the past and their continuance in new forms, then as instructors we must be able to bear witness to students' emotional responses.

Corresponding to social connection, the final phase of recovery as a final project, I would ask the class to come up with a meaningful, ethical social action that they can decide upon as a group. The point of this approach is that with a more relational, felt connection to the past, students can imagine new possibilities in the present. Perhaps they will want to arrange a conference or a visit to a neighboring Native nation. Perhaps they will explore the history and culture of those who lived on the land where their school (or their home) was built before, or shortly after, the Europeans arrived. Perhaps native and non-Native students will present papers in a class conference. Perhaps there will be no

project other than to be more relationally aware. Perhaps if there is any fruit to spring forth from this awareness, it will happen much later.

In teaching these "white Indian" texts we can juxtapose the rhetorics and critiques of westward expansion. We can encourage students to respond to the texts emotionally, socially, and relationally. We can ask them to consider whether they are conceiving the Indians they read about in a self/other relation or from an intersubjective standpoint. We can ask them to write back to these authors as fellow subjects. We can encourage the use of a vocabulary that spans the spectrum from the isolation and denial of perpetuator trauma to mutual subjectivity. We can all bear witness together and create a greater shared experience and awareness. To return to Herman: "The trauma story is part of the survivor's legacy; only when it is fully integrated can the survivor pass it on, in confidence that it will prove a source of strength and inspiration rather than a blight on the next generation" (207). In accommodating this storytelling model not only to Indian peoples, but also to implicated non-Native postgenerations, we can affirm that by fully integrating the trauma story of US–Native American history, that story can become a source of appreciation for Native American survivance, and inspiration to cultivate the integrity of knowing.

We can help each other imagine and do whatever can be done with the different but intertwined burdens that living Natives and non-Natives do not want, but have inherited. As Judith Herman writes, "Resolution of the trauma is never final; recovery is never complete." Creating social space for remembrance of the vast injustice on which the country was founded, and reconciling US history with remembrance of the genocide may be the best we can do for now. Like the stories of the Hopi, perhaps this story will grow inside the listeners and create new possibilities.

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