Stony Brook University

The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University.

© All Rights Reserved by Author.
Welfare and Warfare: 
Social Action for Algerian Migrants in Metropolitan France during the Algerian War

A Dissertation Presented

by

Elizabeth Caitlin Sloan

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Stony Brook University

May 2012
Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

Elizabeth Caitlin Sloan

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the
Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend
acceptance of this dissertation.

Herman Lebovics – Dissertation Advisor
Professor of History

Kathleen Wilson - Chairperson of Defense
Professor of History

Eric Beverley
Assistant Professor of History

Clifford Rosenberg
Assistant Professor of History, City College of New York

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Charles Taber
Interim Dean of the Graduate School
Abstract of the Dissertation

Welfare and Warfare:

Social Action for Algerian Migrants in Metropolitan France during the Algerian War

by

Elizabeth Caitlin Sloan

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Stony Brook University

2012

This dissertation is a study of welfare services provided to Algerian migrants in France from the end of World War II through the Algerian War. The brutal war ending in Algerian independence in 1962 fell in the midst of thirty years of French industrialization fueled by the arrival of thousands of Algerian workers. It also followed over a century of definition and redefinition by the French state of what it meant that Algeria and France formed a single nation. In this period, Algerians’ perceived cultural difference was the object of serious concern to state policy makers and local associations alike, concern rooted in assumptions that Algerians’ capacity for assimilation was hindered by their presumably un-modern, Muslim lifestyle, as well as in fears that the Algerian National Liberation Front was gaining ground in the metropole. This dissertation argues that the realm of welfare became a second front during the Algerian War, in which social services became a wartime tactic and the stakes were the future of Algérie française and the validity of republican colorblindness.
For my parents
Table of Contents

Abstract of the Dissertation iii
Dedication Page iv
List of Abbreviations vii
Acknowledgements viii
Curriculum Vitae x

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1
The Fourth Republic Confronts Algerian Migration (1946-56) 32
- Conceptualizing Algerian Difference after World War II 36
- “A Massive Influx” 39
- Algerian Workers on Strike 42
- State Social Action 48
- Calling on the Associations 56
- ‘The Events in Algeria’ and Cautious Optimism 69
- Conclusion 76

CHAPTER 2
Fighting Poverty, Fighting Algerian Nationalism at the Transition to the Fifth Republic (1957-59) 78
- Crisis in Algeria 81
- The FLN Arrives in the Metropole 83
- The Muslim Affairs and Social Action Service (SAMAS):
  Social Action as Counterterrorism 85
- The Collection and Distribution of Information (the CTAM) 97
- Radio and Print Propaganda 100
- The SAT-FMA: Policing under the Guise of Social Action 108
- The Return of de Gaulle 114
- The *Fonds d'action sociale*: Social Action without Repression 118
- Michel Massenet and the 1959 Social Action Plan: Drafting a Unified Policy 122
- Linkages and Tensions 136
- Conclusion 142
CHAPTER 3

Private Associations and the Politics of Social Action

Associations in the Fifth Republic’s Social Action Plan 145
Gaullists 149
Religious Organizations 153
Associations’ Political Activities and Tensions with the French Government 156
The ‘Cultural Level’ of Families in the bidonvilles 161
Youth on the Streets 169
Algerian Women and Girls 177
Colonies de vacances 179
Persistent Poverty and Isolation 184
Conclusion 186

CHAPTER 4

Social Action and the Paris Police (1960-62)

The Fight against the French Federation Continues as Independence Approaches 189
The Force de Police Auxiliaire (FPA) 191
Poverty and the Police in the Parisian bidonvilles 195
Police Violence and the Lead-up to October 17, 1961 201
Michel Massenet’s Resistance to Police Brutality 208
Local Resistance 216
Conclusion 221

EPILLOGUE 223

BIBLIOGRAPHY 238
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMANA:</td>
<td>Aide morale aux Nord-africains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANARF:</td>
<td>Amicale des Nord-Africains Résidant en France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRS:</td>
<td>Bureaux de renseignements spécialisés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC:</td>
<td>Centre des Archives Contemporaines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANAM:</td>
<td>Commission d’Aide aux Nord-Africains dans la Métropole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARAN:</td>
<td>Centre d'accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMADE:</td>
<td>Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIV:</td>
<td>Centre d'identification de Vincennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSMONA:</td>
<td>Contrôleurs sociaux de la main-d’œuvre nord-africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTAM:</td>
<td>Conseillers techniques aux Affaires musulmanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS:</td>
<td>Fonds d’action sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN:</td>
<td>Front de libération nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA:</td>
<td>Français musulmans d’Algérie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA:</td>
<td>Force de Police Auxiliaire (harkis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEANARP:</td>
<td>Groupe d’Etude et d’Action pour les Nord-Africains de la région parisienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCLT:</td>
<td>Jeunesse, Culture, Loisirs, et Technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLM:</td>
<td>Habitation à loyer modérée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAME:</td>
<td>Inspecteur général de l’Administration en mission extraordinaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA:</td>
<td>Mouvement national algérien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTLD:</td>
<td>Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF:</td>
<td>Nouveaux francs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAA:</td>
<td>Office administrative de l’Algérie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS:</td>
<td>Organisation armée secrète</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA:</td>
<td>Parti du peuple algérien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF:</td>
<td>Pari communiste français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTF:</td>
<td>Radiodiffusion-télévision française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC:</td>
<td>Service d’action civique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMAS:</td>
<td>Service des affaires musulmanes et de l’action sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS:</td>
<td>Section administrative spécialisée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT-FMA:</td>
<td>Service d’assistance technique aux Français musulmans d’Algérie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAU:</td>
<td>Section administrative urbaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAA:</td>
<td>Service de coordination des affaires algériennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCINA:</td>
<td>Service de coordination des informations nord-africaines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGAA:</td>
<td>Secrétariat général pour les affaires algériennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLSNA:</td>
<td>Service des liaisons sociales nord-africains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SONACOTRAL:</td>
<td>Société national de construction de logements pour les travailleurs algériens et leurs familles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSFNA:</td>
<td>Service social familial nord-africain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

While much of the work that goes into writing a dissertation is done alone at a computer screen, this project was far from a solitary endeavor. Thanks are therefore due, first and foremost, to my advisor, Gene Lebovics, who first encouraged me to critically examine French republican values. His guidance, constructive criticism, and numerous reassurances were essential to my seeing this dissertation through to completion. Eric Beverley provided wise advice at various stages of the writing process and helped me see the big picture in which my project fits. Cliff Rosenberg generously offered his time and expertise on the topic of immigration control and I am grateful to have had him on my committee. Kathleen Wilson elucidated the theoretical currents that ultimately underpinned my research project and has provided indispensable support throughout my years as a graduate student.

Thanks are also due to Paul Gootenberg, who taught me to ask productive research questions when my work was in its earliest stages. Courses with Brooke Larson, Alice Ritscherle, Olufemi Vaughan, Young-Sun Hong, Alix Cooper, Sara Lipton, and John Williams sharpened my skills as a historian and pushed me to examine issues of race, inequality, and national belonging beyond the geographic and temporal confines of modern Europe. I am also indebted to Lynn Struve, Stephen Andrews, Carl Ipsen, Wendy Gamber, and Jim Madison for fostering my interest in history as an undergraduate at Indiana University.

Nancy Green offered academic guidance as well as needed reassurance during my first weeks in Paris. Kristen Stromberg Childers read my research proposal and offered sage advice. Conversations with Emmanuel Blanchard, Amelia Lyons, Elisa Camiscioli, Angéline Escafré-Dublet, Lizabeth Zack, Amit Prakash, Héloïse Finch-Boyer, Pete Soppelsa, and Jaime Wadowiec were likewise invaluable to this project. I am also grateful for the help I received from archivists and librarians at the Centre des archives contemporaines, the Centre d’accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales, the Cité nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration, and the Frank Melville Jr. Memorial Library at Stony Brook.

I was lucky to be chosen to participate in the Trans-Atlantic Summer Institute at the Center for German and European Studies at the University of Minnesota during the final stages of writing and editing. Seminar leaders Patricia Lorcin and Abderrahman Moussaoui generously read and commented on portions of the dissertation. Thanks also to fellow TASI participants Marie-Thérèse Atséna Abogo, Sabina Bellofatto, Sarah Boardman, Jennifer Croft, Jérome Drevon, Jane Freeland, Sara Marzioli, Hugh McDonnell, Terry Peterson, Mircea Platon, Fabien Sacriste, Charlotta Salmi, Brian Shaev, Andrew Shield, Sebastian Sparwasser, Evgeniy Sterin, Ebru Sungun, Helin Ucar, and Hanene Zoghlami, whose wide-reaching expertise made for many fruitful discussions and gave me fresh insight into the issues my research addresses.
Thanks to Christóbal Zuniga-Espinoza, Marisa Balsamo, Justin Williams, Hee-Jeong Sohn, Rika Michalos, Andrés Estefane-Jaramillo, Kelly Condit-Shrestha, Mark Rice, Adam Charboneau, Matt Scalena, Christina Bosco Langert, Sung Yup Kim, Soraya Baselious, Seth Offenbach, Greg Jackson, Ryan Shaffer, Tara Rider, and many others for camaraderie both inside and outside the seminar classroom. Roxanne Fernandez and Susan Grumet made my transitions back and forth from SBU to France and Texas as smooth as possible and made me glad to return each time. Chris Mauceri, Tim Nicholson, and Tristan Tomlinson read numerous drafts of chapters and contributed comments and criticism at every stage of this process. I am eternally grateful for their advice, wry humor, and, most importantly, their support throughout these long and sometimes isolating years of graduate study. To the Elizabeths, Hornor and O’Connell-Gennari: thank goodness for our shared first name and for Susan’s perverse desire to confuse undergraduates. What might otherwise have been many lonely hours spent writing and grading in an empty office were filled with laughter because of your friendship and what is, frankly, a ludicrous knowledge of movie dialogue and song lyrics.

I am grateful for friends and family in Indiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas, and beyond, who cheered me on and reminded me that there is, indeed, life outside my apartment, and for my grandmother, Lorraine, who called me every week to make sure I was writing. Jay Ellsmore filled my life with music and picked me up each time starting another chapter felt like an impossible task. I would also like to affectionately acknowledge my brother, Charles, with whom I had many years to practice supporting an argument with evidence at the dinner table before I first put this skill to use in higher education. Finally, I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Bob and Kay, who raised me to love books and ideas and to seek out knowledge before leaping to conclusions. For their steadfast love, patience, and encouragement I am forever grateful.
Elizabeth Caitlin Sloan  
Curriculum vitae

2821 Carlisle St., apt. 446   Dallas, TX 75204    (812) 369-0194   eliz.sloan@gmail.com

EDUCATION
PhD  History, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York  2012  
Dissertation: “Welfare and Warfare: Social Action for Algerian Migrants in Metropolitan France during the Algerian War” Advisor: Herman Lebovics

MA, History, Stony Brook University  2007

BA, History and French, Indiana University, Bloomington  2005  
magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Instructor of Record, Stony Brook University  2010
Developed and taught Modern France, an upper division course for history majors.

Teaching Assistant, Stony Brook University  2005-2010
As a TA I designed and solo-taught discussion sections for courses marked with *.

Islamic Civilization  Fall 2010
Introduction to Modern European History*  Spring 2008, 2010
The Civil War and Reconstruction*  Fall 2007
Nazi Germany  Spring 2007
Disease in American History*  Fall 2006
Women in European History  Spring 2006
Politics, Culture, and Authority in Early Modern Europe  Fall 2005

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
University of Minnesota, Center for German and European Studies  2011
Trans-Atlantic Summer Institute Fellow
Stony Brook University, full tuition scholarship  2005-Present
Stony Brook University, teaching assistantship  2005-2010
Lilly Foundation Community Scholar, full scholarship to Indiana University  2001-2005

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS


PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
College Board AP Reader 2012

LANGUAGES
French (near-fluent reading, writing, and speaking); Spanish (some reading); German (some reading)

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
American Historical Association
Society for French Historical Studies

REFERENCES
Herman Lebovics, Professor of History, Stony Brook University
E-mail: hlebovics@notes.cc.sunysb.edu

Kathleen Wilson, Professor of History, Stony Brook University
E-mail: kawilson@notes.cc.sunysb.edu

Eric Beverley, Assistant Professor of History, Stony Brook University
E-mail: eric.beverley@sunysb.edu

Clifford Rosenberg, Associate Professor of History, City College of New York
E-mail: CRosenberg@ccny.cuny.edu
Introduction

This dissertation is a study of welfare services provided to Algerian migrants in France from the end of World War II to the years immediately following Algerian independence in 1962. My aim with this project is to shed light on the malleability of ideas of French national belonging by analyzing them in a complicated era of high stakes and great uncertainty. The dissertation centers on the question of how the Algerian War shaped French efforts to welcome Algerians—who, following World War II, were entitled to equal French citizenship in the metropole—into the national community. I argue that the realm of welfare became a second front of the war, in which the stakes were the future of the French empire, the place of Algerians in the French nation-state, and the validity of republican colorblindness. During the Algerian War, social action took on key importance not only due to its perceived capacity to assimilate a North African, largely Muslim population seen by many in France as culturally foreign, but also because of its usefulness in rooting out and defeating the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

State welfare programs for Algerian migrants were not only shaped by the wartime climate of political suspicion, they were also a key component of France’s systematic plan of action to maintain rule over Algeria. During the Algerian War (1954-1962) social action was both a tactic used to combat the FLN and a tool of integration. These fascinating dual roles intersected and were in conflict with each other at both the state and local levels. This dissertation therefore first traces the actions of the various state policy makers who created initiatives combining welfare action with propaganda and police surveillance, examining the
social, economic, political, and intellectual contexts in which they made their decisions.

Secondly, it analyzes the actions and attitudes of those at the local level: the social workers, religious leaders, teachers, and camp counselors on whose actions and expertise the government relied to house, educate, and assimilate the Algerian community. Moreover, it explores interactions and tensions between the public and private sector.

When the FLN set up an extensive welfare network to recruit militants for its French Federation, the Ministry of the Interior planted social workers in shantytowns to act as surveillance antennae while compiling detailed lists of clients’ political beliefs. Radio programs that had once provided information to Algerians on social services broadcast imperial propaganda, and police prefect Maurice Papon created a specialized force whose social service stations were merely fronts for surveillance and, increasingly, brutal repression of the Algerian community. Welfare administrators singled out Muslim Algerians and sought to reverse their social and cultural ‘handicaps’ through new welfare programs designed specifically for them. At the local level, participation in private charitable associations gave French men and women the opportunity either to remedy the errors of a neglectful colonial regime, or to rise to the Gaullist call to action to preserve Algérie française. Ultimately, what united these diverse projects—whether pursued in the name of the mission civilatrice or the right to national self-determination, the fight against poverty or the fight against terrorism—was their devotion to Algerians’ assimilation into French culture. Providing welfare—and particular kinds of welfare—became a way for the state to exert control over Algerians’ becoming French.

Emmanuel Blanchard has referred to Algerians in metropolitan France as a “population troublant les déliminations du national.”¹ The question of Algerians’ place in the French nation

---
is one with a troubled imperial legacy that, arguably, remains unresolved today. Throughout this dissertation, I have sought out the ideas of bureaucrats and private citizens on both the relationship between France and Algeria and on the position of Algerian migrants in metropolitan France, as well as how these ideas evolved over the course of the fighting. I have also explored how they weighed contradictory aims such as social equality vs. national security, preserving French national identity vs. upholding Republican values, and assimilating colonial populations vs. maintaining the Empire itself. In addition, as Todd Shepard has convincingly argued, before 1962, decolonization was not a given.² Some former colonies, such as New Caledonia, Corsica, Martinique, and Guadeloupe stayed French, becoming overseas departments and territories (DOM-TOMs). The Fifth Republic undertook a massive, unprecedented investment into infrastructure aimed specifically at integrating Algerians into French society that far exceeded services provided to other immigrants in the same era. The integration policies that the Fourth and Fifth Republics pursued imply that, up until the very end of the war, the dominant belief among those in the French government, as well as many private citizens, that Algeria should remain part of France. Therefore, I’ve also sought answers to the question: why didn’t it work?

**Theoretical Roots**

Welfare is an important subject of historical inquiry because it has become an integral part of citizenship in modern welfare states such as France. Following T.H. Marshall, citizenship in the twentieth century encompasses certain social, in addition to civil and political,  

² Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*. 
rights, which may include a fair wage, housing, and public education.\(^3\) The modern welfare state, which began in the late nineteenth century and greatly expanded in the years following World War II, brought laws that differentiated between French and foreign.\(^4\) Welfare is therefore a marker of citizenship, meaning that the reduction of poverty, crime, and other social ills is a duty owed by the state to its citizens. Beyond this, however, welfare is one way that states forge national identities. Public housing complexes built in France in the 1950s, for example, were designed to raise residents up to a certain level of “modernity” and to reinforce so-called “French” ways of living. In the case of immigrants, the success of social services such as French language classes and job training have represented, for some observers, the ability of government-guided assimilation to trump diversity. Critics, likewise, have blamed the failure of such programs to create equality on migrants’ insurmountable cultural difference. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, welfare is an arena in which issues of national identity are debated. But during the Algerian War, when the debate over Algeria’s attachment to France escalated to the level of violent confrontation, welfare and war became inextricably linked. After over one hundred and thirty years of colonial domination, the French found themselves having to defend the idea that France and Algeria formed a single nation. Drawing on a long history of using social services for political means, French administrators sought to maintain political control over the Algerian population—and, thus, the Algerian territory as a whole—by mobilizing the apparatuses of the modern welfare state.\(^5\) Rather than trace the historical


\(^5\) As a brief note, it should be explained that French welfare is not the same as US welfare, i.e. all citizens in France benefit to some degree from the welfare state. The state’s interest in Algerian workers is not necessarily evidence of their social marginalization as in the US, but rather of the activist Republic. This dissertation argues that it is the nature of the state’s welfare measures that matters.
trajectory of the failures of the French welfare state, I explore its often-contradictory motives, goals, and expectations. For example, assumptions that Algerians were innately different did not simply disappear when they were needed as workers, nor did they reappear when the political link between Algeria and France was severed in 1962. This dissertation traces the twists and turns of debates over what is Algerian and what is French, and when, and if, they were seen as one in the same.

Furthermore, Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality—or, the “conduct of conduct”—opens up useful lines of questions about the ways that welfare organizations used housing and adult education to shape the behavior of North Africans in France. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 entitled Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault explored the development, in the eighteenth century, of a new “art of governance.” the governance of people as a biological species, or “population.” “Bio-power,” likewise, encompasses techniques of power that “observe, monitor, shape and control” the behavior of a population.6 The population therefore became the object of a new kind of power by which states intervention into biological matters such as sexuality and reproduction became legitimate and expected.7 Foucault’s theories allow us to understand interventions into the behavior of individuals as calculated manipulations of the behavior of a population. Using the idea of governmentality, we can see French public housing and family educational services not only as humanitarian aid, but as part of broader strategies of power. Foucault’s related conception of the family as an instrument of governance, in which manipulating change in family structure and behavior is one way to influence change in


the population as a whole, is also useful. This theory allows us to question the motives of French interventions into the lives of Algerian migrant families with regard to the community as a whole. By providing recreational activities and job training to young men and home economics classes to young girls and women, the French state used Algerian families as instruments in a larger plan of assimilating the Algerian population into French society to counter their identification with Algerian culture, and, thus, Algerian nationalism.

**Historiographical Review**

Until the 1980s, immigration to France did not attract the attention of historians, and was instead the realm of political activists. Formal academic research on the topic was mainly demographic in nature. Since Gérard Noiriel’s groundbreaking 1988 study, however, Francophone and Anglophone historians have written extensively on immigration in France. Writing amid popular xenophobia and attempts to erase immigrants from French history, Noiriel puts recent North African immigration into historical perspective, drawing broad connections to their nineteenth century predecessors. He argues that France is, and always has been, a country of immigrants. This assertion has led researchers to reclaim North Africans’ place in French history. The acknowledgment of France’s immigrant heritage, though, has spurned more questions and debate than definitive answers about the nature of the state’s treatment of these immigrants.

This dissertation builds specifically on two bodies of historical scholarship: studies of the Algerian War and studies, which tend to focus on more recent history, of social inequality among North Africans in France. My research examines the issue of Algerian migration through the

---

8 Ibid., Lecture of 1 February 1978, 104-105.
new entry point of welfare initiatives, and provides a cultural analysis lacking in the dominant narratives of the French welfare state. Historians have written widely about the impact of imperial domination and the violent way Algeria gained independence on the status of Algerians in France today. Alistair Horne’s classic account of the Algerian War, *A Savage War of Peace*, provides a detailed, complete account of the war compiled through dozens of interviews conducted in France during the 1970s.10 French historian Benjamin Stora has written prolifically on the war, and has argued that France’s failure to deal with its colonial legacy, and the brutality of the Algerian War in particular, has caused an inability to understand the current problems faced by people of North African origin living in France.11 In a similar vein, Todd Shepard links decolonization to a new, racialized version of French national identity, which he argues arose following Algerian independence. In *The Invention of Decolonization: the Algerian War and the Remaking of France* Shepard has written that the French “determination to exorcize Algeria” resulted in a “willful denial” of the two countries’ shared past and the Republican virtues of universalism and equality. He has argued that during the Algerian War, the French emphasized Algerian ethnic difference and deemed them unassimiable—Algerian Muslim men were increasingly perceived as violent savages, and women’s veils as proof of un-modern and anti-secular attitudes. After 1962, former French citizens of Algerian origin lost their citizenship, became “Muslims,” faced severe limits to entry into France, and were deemed unassimiable.12

My research draws inspiration from works that have examined the history of discrimination against North African migrants in the interwar period and the final years of the

---

Algerian War, respectively. 13 Two recent historical works have traced French discrimination against people of North African origin in the metropole to the interwar period. In his examination of colonial migrants, Neil MacMaster downplays the turning point of the Algerian War. MacMaster argues instead that Algerians became the target of an exclusionary racism much earlier in the twentieth century, a fact that Clifford Rosenberg has demonstrated in his study of the interwar period in Paris, which examines how the French state singled out North African Muslims using social assistance and special police forces. In their Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, MacMaster and Jim House use sources from the formerly classified archives of the Prefecture of Police to demonstrate that the October 17th, 1961 massacre of Algerian protesters by the French police was not an isolated event but was the apex of the Paris Police’s systematic use of brutality against Algerian migrants. 14 This dissertation also draws inspiration from works by scholars of the legacies of colonialism who have traced racism in France today to the brutality of the Algerian war and France’s failure to deal with its colonial legacy. 15 Histories of the construction of racial categories in France are likewise crucial to my project. 16 Drawing from past insights, I explore


14 Jim House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory (Oxford University Press, 2006). The authors also explore the importance of the event in French memory.


the value judgments the diverse participants in the social welfare network made about Algerian migrants in France and the social, political, and religious contexts in which they acted. Examining welfare initiatives allows me to gauge, in concrete terms, the ways in which the Algerian War determined the future place of Algerians in the French nation.

Scholars have written widely on the ideological contradiction between universalizing French republican ideology and efforts to exclude or single out immigrants based on religion, culture, or race.17 The application of laws separating church and state in French public life and the integration of immigrant communities in France, such as in the recent debates over the wearing of the Muslim veil, have aroused great academic as well as popular debate. My dissertation engages with debates on the meaning of French republican values from an historical perspective. I aim to deconstruct notions of French exceptionalism and universal Republican citizenship through the analysis of one historical moment in which such notions were mobilized. In my work, I demonstrate that the French state alternately emphasized and downplayed markers of cultural difference in its policies aimed at the integration of Algerians into French society. Likewise, notions of French citizenship did not remain uniform, but varied across state ministries and private institutions, between individuals, and over the course of the Algerian War. the French and Algerian cultures a mere four years later at Algerian independence.

Social action directed at migrants in the Algerian War period has not been extensively studied. Two notable exceptions are the doctoral dissertations of Amelia Lyons and Angeline

Escafre-Dublet. Lyons has brought attention to the extensive network of social services targeting Algerian families and has argued that, contrary to previous assumptions, Algerian families were both a visible and desirable presence during these years.\textsuperscript{18} She has argued that after the Algerian War, Algerians lost their privileged status and became “invisible” among other immigrant groups in France. Escafre-Dublet’s work addresses the cultural elements of state welfare in a broad-ranging study covering the 1940s through the 1980s, and she has asserted that the very existence of such programs is a form of hypocritical racism on the part of the French state.

**Historical Context**

The Algerian War followed over a century of definition and redefinition of the status of Algeria and Algerians vis-à-vis France and the French. The French occupation of Algeria began with the conquest of Algiers in 1830. With the 1834 annexation of Algeria, Algerian Jews and Muslims became French subjects. After the revolution of 1848, the new constitution made Algeria an extension of the French Second Republic. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, French *cols* established modern Western settlements in Algeria that attracted Europeans from other Mediterranean nations such as Italy and Spain. Whereas early imperialists had touted the assimilation of indigenous populations, this policy was delayed and eventually abandoned in favor of racial segregation and imperial domination. The colonial administration exploited the country’s resources while devoting little money or energy to economic development to benefit Algerians. There was socio-economic as well as geographic segregation between the European and native populations in Algeria.

There were vast disparities in the political rights given to European Algerians, who were full French citizens, and native Algerians. With Napoleon III’s sénatus-consulte of 1865, Algerian Jews and Muslims were granted French nationality, but this did not mean equal political rights. According to Patrick Weil, Algerians Muslims’ French nationality was “denatured,” meaningless, and gave them no greater rights than other colonial peoples. Although Muslim men did have other important political rights (such as the right to sit on a jury), they were granted French citizenship later than other ethnic groups in Algeria. Whereas, in 1870, citizenship rights were extended to Algerian Jews, Algerian Muslims had no political rights until 1919. The code de l’indigénat (native code), which the French government adopted in 1881, established inequality in matters of justice, denying Muslim Algerians rights of association (such as in unions or political parties), restricting freedom of religion and travel, and established penalties for offenses such as speaking disrespectfully to a European and defaming the Republic. Furthermore, although women in France gained the right to vote and all other political rights of French men, Muslim women in Algeria had only restricted rights until 1958, when full citizenship was extended to all Frenchmen, regardless of origin or local civil status. In 1889, French politicians reintroduced the droit du sol principle of French citizenship, whereby citizenship is granted by virtue of birth in France rather than based on French parentage, as a way to register young men born of immigrant parents for military service. To get the measure approved, though, they needed the support of the colons, who used the power they wielded in the weak Third Republic to pass legislation that created barriers for Muslim subjects seeking naturalization. Algerian Muslims had to renounce their religion and were subjected to morality and family background checks before their applications for naturalization were sent to the local prefect, the minister of justice, and finally to the Conseil d’Etat, and, finally, to the President
who signed a formal decree. Naturalization became harder for Algerian Muslims to obtain up to the start of World War I, with up to three-quarters of all requests denied. At the turn of the century, liberal parliamentarians led a campaign for the assimilation of Algerian Muslims as French citizens. Once again, the colons, led by Governor General of Algeria Charles Lutaud, blocked the measure, and the result was that only a very few Algerian elites were exempt from the code de l’indigénat.

The legal restrictions on Algerians’ rights were the product of a variety of arguments about Algeria and Algerians’ place in the French nation state, all premised on a general idea that North Africans were too culturally and racially different to be considered true Frenchmen. The Kabyle myth, in which Berber-speaking peoples (Kabyles) from eastern Algeria were seen as the least physically and culturally alien of North Africans, never went uncontested. Furthermore, historians have accepted that previous characterizations of French methods of imperial domination throughout the empire and in Algeria in particular as assimilationist were in fact false. In Algeria, assimilation remained merely a theoretical, far-off goal, constantly delayed by arguments that Algerians were, for the time being, incapable of the rational decision making necessary for the exercise of political citizenship. While denying the existence of innate difference or different paths to civilization (asserted by proponents of “coexistence”), colonial

---

20 Rosenberg, Policing Paris, 112.
22 French administrators posed their approach to colonial domination in direct contrast to the policies of the nineteenth century British Empire, in which “scientific” racism was used to justify increased fears of racial mixing and a tightening of social control, for example in India, after the 1857 mutiny. William B. Cohen has persuasively argued that while race was never explicitly used as a marker of legal inequality in the French Empire, assimilation was in fact never the norm. See also Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford University Press, 1997).
bureaucrats argued that it was necessary to “break down local traditions and structures that promoted superstition and ignorance.”

However, there were only limited attempts to put such measures into place. Instead, lawmakers used the issue of local legal jurisdiction to justify denying political rights to all Algerians. Racist practices, if not explicitly race-based laws themselves, defined French governance of Algeria.

World War I brought new and larger waves of Algerian migration to metropolitan France, and Algerian Muslims were mobilized both as soldiers and as industrial workers. Half of the approximately 300,000 foreign workers in wartime France were from the colonies or China. The war also brought limited advances in political rights in recognition of the sacrifices made by the 175,000 Algerians who served in the French military. In 1919 an electoral college was established, made up of elite Algerian men, which held authority in local elections only. Yet European settlers in Algeria used their influence in the French parliament to deny Algerians French citizenship. Moreover, nothing was done to improve conditions for the masses of ordinary Algerians, who were the victims of famines and diseases, such as cholera and typhus, which plagued Algeria. At the end of World War I, more than one third of Muslim Algerian men between twenty and forty were in the metropole.

---


24 The extent to which such practices were racially based has been the topic of debate among historians. Emmanuelle Saada, for example, has argued that race played a fundamental role in post-1789 understandings of who could be a French citizen (See *Les enfants de la colonie: les métis de l’Empire français entre sujétion et citoyenneté* (Paris: La Découverte, 2007). Todd Shepard has pointed out that although racist thinking based on inferiority and attachment to Koranic law informed French approaches to governance in Algeria, French law did not refer explicitly to race. Unlike in the United States or South Africa, he writes, “There was never a widely embraced principle […] to explain the situation of dramatic inequality in Algeria.” (*The Invention of Decolonization*, 33). This is crucial to his argument that race only became a marker of citizenship at Algerian independence in 1962.


Clifford Rosenberg has shown that the interwar period was a formative era both in the history of French immigration control and, specifically, in the French administration’s treatment of Algerian Muslims. Paris in 1920s and 1930s was home to White Russians, Spanish Republicans, colonial workers, as well as several leaders of colonial independence movements including Messali Hadj, Léopold Senghor, Aimée Césaire, Deng Xiaoping, and the future Ho Chi Minh.  

Italians, Poles, and Spaniards came during interwar period, especially after the United States imposed quotas in 1924, which redirected the flow of immigrants to France. In 1930 France had the highest rate of immigration in the world with 515 per 100,000 inhabitants. But whereas protections such as legal status and work permits, asylum for the oppressed, and support from the League for the Rights of Man and the Socialist Party existed for other migrants to France, Algerians were without such protections. Despite their technical French nationality status, Algerians were in fact treated worse than other groups of immigrants.

After the war ended, the French government sought to fight under-population and restart the economy by importing 3 million foreigners. However, Algerian Muslims were not seen as essential to this effort. Once they were demobilized from the war effort, the Ministry of the Interior ordered the Paris Prefecture of Police to repatriate any Algerians without stable work or residence. In actuality, nearly all Algerians were sent home, without regard for their status as French nationals; yet, because Algerians could travel freely back and forth from the metropole and the government could not bar their entry, many returned after being repatriated. French settlers’ desire to retain labor in Algeria led the French state to impose travel restrictions on Muslim Algerians, who, starting in 1924, were required to obtain special papers, including a

---

29 One thousand people at a time were ferried in a cargo ship from Marseille to Algiers. Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 124.
work contract from the Ministry of Labor and a clean TB test, in order to apply for a travel permit (*certificat d’embarquement*). But this did not have the intended effect, and the end result was a huge increase in clandestine immigration. Ultimately, the government could not prevent Algerians coming to the metropole. Instead the immigration service was reorganized at the Prefecture of Police, which imposed a new surveillance network solely for North Africans.

The French government had never before singled out a particular category of migrants for differential treatment. In the years before World War I, North African Muslims faced harsh prejudice, discrimination, and violence, but these were the same kinds met by all past groups of migrants to France. Jews, Russians, Italians, and even rural migrants to French cities were all at times seen as culturally foreign, degenerate, and having a penchant for criminality. Before World War I, the French government tended to group foreigners and the urban poor together as a single “social problem.” But after the war, republican authorities “began to transform an anti-‘Arab’ prejudice that was broadly similar to the prejudices most other migrants encountered into something fundamentally worse.” The government commissioned studies of the aptitudes of different races, and employers could select employees based on race. Although, as scholars have shown, the purportedly colorblind French republic was not immune from race theory, theories of racial hierarchy had never been applied outside the colonies. Stereotypes of Algerian Muslims as backwards, impulsive, and capable of the worst justified the extension of the racist colonial system of administrative control to the metropole and formed the basis of new forms of

---

institutionalized racism against North African Muslims emerged. As they would in the post-World War II years, administrators worried about the ethnic incompatibility of Muslim North Africans and pursued measures designed to both educate and contain what they believed to be a volatile population.

There were two schools of thought among members of the French government concerning North African migration, whose numbers peaked at 70,000 in 1930, the vast majority of whom were young men (women made up less than three percent of migrants) occupying the most unpleasant, lowest-paying jobs. Some officials argued that North Africans were childish, unfit for French civilization, and even dangerous, and therefore were more concerned with control of the Algerian population than, for instance, granting political rights and freedoms or with improvements in education or living conditions. Others, such Socialist deputy and the Popular Front’s minister of colonies, Marius Moutet, pushed for reforms, believing that the legitimacy of the empire depended on reforming the legal status of colonial subjects.35

Crucially though, in the 1920s and early 1930s as well as during the Algerian War, the right and leftwing (excluding the PCF and colonial nationalists) sides of the French government were united in their view of empire as “crucial to France’s standing as a great power.” In the interwar years, Socialists’ “faith in state planning to improve peoples’ lives” led them to support the North African services created by Chautemps and Godin, despite the right’s policing

35 Rosenberg, Policing Paris, 138-139. Humanitarians such as Motet wanted to reform Muslims’ legal standing, improve education, and curb settlers’ authority and exploitation by employers. However, as Rosenberg points out, this humanitarianism had a paternalistic side. “Without surveillance, without tutelage, without a moral guide,” Moutet wrote, “they fall prey to all the temptations of street.” For Moutet and others, political “liberation” entailed freeing so-called “natives” from their backward ways by giving them the gift of French civilization. See Humanitarians such as wanted to reform Muslims’ legal standing, improve education, and curb settlers’ authority and exploitation by employers. As Rosenberg points out, this humanitarianism, too, had a paternalistic side. “Without surveillance, without tutelage, without a moral guide,” Moutet wrote, “they fall prey to all the temptations of street.” For Moutet and others, political “liberation” entailed freeing so-called “natives” from their backward ways by giving them the gift of French civilization.
Two events sealed the consensus between these two political camps. First, politicians were motivated by fear of political unrest following the Bolshevization of the French Communist Party and the emergence of Algerian nationalism under the wing of the PCF in Paris in the 1920s. The second event was the horrific 1923 murder of two French women committed by an Algerian man. By 1925, a consensus “broader than any other in French politics at the time” had emerged regarding the management of North African migration.

With the backing Minister of the Interior Camille Chautemps, the right-wing head of the Paris municipal council and former colonial administrator, Pierre Godin, organized Paris’s North African Services. With a force of 12,000 men (more than all the other forces in France combined minus the gendarmerie), the Paris Police became “the first police force in a major city to enforce systematically distinctions of citizenship and national origin.” Their goals were to prevent political violence and to control the labor market, rather than to expel migrants. Using methods of population control—statistics, censuses, specialized bureaucracies—developed in the late nineteenth century, the Paris Prefecture of Police sought to gain information on and thus to intervene in the daily lives of the foreign-born population. Godin employed a special North African police force, the North African Brigade, which followed Algerians in France from 1925 to 1945. He chose its members because of their knowledge of Arabic or Berber, which resulted in the brigade being made up of settlers and soldiers—“colonial misfits with little hope of

36 Rosenberg explains that their dedication to the empire was one of the reasons Socialists supported the creation of the North African Services; see *Policing Paris*, 152.

37 On the afternoon of November 7, Khémili Mohamed Sulimane entered a grocery store on the Rue Fondary, grabbed the grocer’s wife, and sliced her cheek before stabbing her to death. Next he entered the street and stabbed and killed a woman who happened to be passing by and attacked two others before he could restrained. What followed was a mass outcry. Rumors, corroborated by eye-witnesses, that Sulimane was in love with the victim and that she had repeatedly turned down his advances only reinforced the trope of the of lascivious colonial subject attacking metropolitan morality. Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 143.

promotion” — who were known for corruption and brutality. The North African Brigade patrolled the tightly knit neighborhoods, checking people’s residency papers, conducting background checks, questioning anyone who looked out of place, and routinely confiscating work and residency papers. Members of the Brigade also tried to discourage Algerians remaining in the metropole, for example by denying them unemployment insurance and family benefits and trying to stop them from mobilizing politically. By 1935 North Africans were being arrested, frequently for ‘vagabondage,’ at four times the rate of the general population.

Another striking similarity between the interwar and Algerian War periods is the fact that the high-ranking officials in charge of funding the services used social services as imperial propaganda. Providing social assistance for colonial migrants served the idea of Greater France, painting a picture of a unified and benevolent French Empire for the international community. Furthermore, Interior Minister Camille Chautemps, like his Algerian War successors, recognized the importance of not appearing to be treating North Africans like foreigners.

In the interwar period, the French government created welfare structures exclusively for North African Muslims, who made up only twelve to fourteen percent of the foreign population, further segregating them from European immigrants (for whom no special services were provided). These investments in social action allowed Godin to hold his coalition together amid calls from humanitarians on the left for reform while increasing opportunities for police

---

41 Rosenberg, Policing Paris, 162.
43 Rosenberg explains that while European immigrants were often the object of the same racist socio-medico fears and security concerns as colonial migrants, proposals for social assistance that singled them out were abandoned due to fears of protests from immigrants’ home governments about segregation. See Policing Paris, 184-85.
surveillance of North Africans.\textsuperscript{44} In 1925, the Municipal Council of Paris approved the creation of the SSPINA (which became the \textit{Service d’assistance aux indigènes nord-africains}, SAINA, in the 1930s), thus establishing what Linda Amiri has called “a colonial enclave in the heart of Paris.”\textsuperscript{45} As was the case with Algerian War-era state structures, the SAINA’s mission was far from purely humanitarian. The SAINA’s officers were colonial administrators selected, like the North African Brigade, because of their mastery of colonial techniques of the surveillance and repression of the Algerian population. They divided Paris and its banlieue into eight sectors and eight districts in order to provide surveillance. Their goal was “to establish administrative segregation between French citizens and Algerian immigrants.”\textsuperscript{46} With its headquarters in the eighteenth arrondissement of Paris, the SAINA managed included subsidized housing, hostels, job placement, and assistance with applications for state aid and identification papers. The SAINA also worked closely with the Franco-Muslim hospital of Bobigny which, like the other social service for North Africans, was founded (in 1931) to bring North Africans further under state control.\textsuperscript{47} Using information gathered from social services such as these, the Paris Police kept an enormous card file that centralized information collected on North Africans each time they applied for a job or sought shelter or medical attention.

The Fifth Republic’s blend of surveillance and social assistance was therefore not new. Nor was its belief that the state should intervene to encourage the assimilation of an immigrant population seen as culturally foreign. What was new, however, was the importance placed on cultural assimilation and the elimination of poverty as methods of maintaining political power.

\textsuperscript{44} Rosenberg, \textit{Policing Paris}, 161.
\textsuperscript{45} Amiri, \textit{La bataille de France}, 20.
\textsuperscript{46} Amiri, \textit{La bataille de France}, 21.
\textsuperscript{47} Most patients entered the hospital under police escort. Rosenberg, \textit{Policing Paris}, 191.
During the interwar period, policing dominated the social action sphere.\textsuperscript{48} But during the Algerian War, although there was substantial overlap between social action and surveillance as well as ambiguity surrounding where one started and the other began, culturally assimilating the Algerian population via social welfare measures was itself a primary goal of state services.\textsuperscript{49}

It is not surprising that Algerian nationalism flourished in the metropole, given that one of the first nationalist organizations, l’Etoile Nord-Africaine, had its root in the PCF. Algerian Messali Hadj founded l’Etoile Nord-Africaine (the North African Star) in Paris in 1926. At the February, 1927 Congress of the Foundation of the League Against Imperialism in Belgium, Messali Hadj made a speech in which he demanded independence, a freely-elected assembly, and a national army for Algeria, as well as the retreat of French troops. Hadj was inspired by Ho Chi Minh, with whom he met at the Congress. The French government saw Hadj as a threat, and it banned l’Etoile’s newspapers and sent SAINA officers to raid meetings, during which they confiscated attendees’ identity papers and arrested others. In some cases, the SAINA paid for Etoile supporters to be deported back to Algeria. Despite having its roots French Marxist tradition, l’Etoile Nord Africaine began experiencing a strained relationship with the PCF in the late 1920s. In 1928 Hadj’s organization voted for independence from the PCF, and 1933 marked the definitive rupture between the two parties. The failure of the Blum-Violletatte bill in 1936, which would have granted more autonomy to Algeria, resulted in the radicalization of Algerian nationalism. In 1937 l’Etoile Nord-Africaine became the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), whose goals were “Ni assimilation ni séparation, mai émancipation du peuple algérien.” French police

\textsuperscript{48} Rosenberg, \textit{Policing Paris}, 192. Rosenberg writes, “Of the interwar period, Clifford Rosenberg has written: “The surveillance and assistance efforts were supposed to be kept separate, but in practice the police controlled the entire operation.”

\textsuperscript{49} See, for instance, Todd Shepard, \textit{The Invention of Decolonization}, 76. Shepard writes, “Between 1958 and 1962, the Fifth Republic’s policy of integrationism pursued the most coherent and aggressive effort in French history to make Algerian ‘Muslims’ equal to other Frenchmen.”
arrested Hadj soon after, along with other PPA members, and sentenced him to two years in prison and outlawed his political party.

In the 1930s, the racism of the Fascist movements gaining strength in Western Europe spread to the realm of French immigration policy. The French government formulated immigration policies that discriminated against colonial peoples and refugees, particularly Jewish refugees fleeing Hitler’s Germany. Economist Georges Mauco entered Prime Minister Philippe Serre’s cabinet as the undersecretary of immigration services. Mauco established a hierarchy of nationalities based on their proximity to French culture; for instance he deemed Russians and Armenians inassimilable because their language was too far from the French language. In 1932, a quota system was put in place that distinguished desirable immigrants—Western Europeans whose cultures, the reasoning went, were close enough to France’s to promote easy assimilation—from undesirables from Eastern Europe and the Empire. Thus, while some immigrants, such as Spanish, Italian and Portuguese workers, were seen as potential citizens, others, such as the Polish miners who arrived in the interwar years, were meant to go home when the labor shortage was less acute. Still other groups of would-be immigrants, including the Senegalese riflemen who fought as part of the French army in WWI, and Jewish refugees fleeing Hitler’s Germany, were denied entrance.

Under Vichy’s version of the SAINA, the enemies were Communist resistance as well as Algerian nationalism and North African Jews were added to its list of targets. The North Africans Services was accused of recruiting North Africans to collaborate with the Milice. Some did, believing that their chances for independence were better under Hitler’s control than

---

under the Resistance—the 2nd North African Bridgade was referred to as the ‘SS Mohammed.’ The majority, though, supported the Allied cause and fought alongside French troops—the 1937 creation of the carte d’identité militaire ensured that Algerians and other colonial peoples, who were not technically French citizens, would be eligible for conscription into the French military. Of the 400,000 men who served under General de Lattre de Tassigny in the 1re Armée Française in the Provence offensive that followed the Normandy invasion, two-thirds were from French colonies. Yet, soon after victory in Europe was celebrated on May 8, 1945, events in Sétif and Guelma in the eastern region of Constantine proved that the French government did not intend to uphold the Atlantic Charter’s guarantee of peoples to govern themselves. Bombings by Algerians in these two cities in which ninety-eight European settlers were killed were met with bloody military repression. French troops massacred the Muslim population in attacks “orchestrated by the French military and supported by the colons [settlers].” Ultimately, World War II resulted in a massive increase in workers coming to work in the metropole and a radicalization Algerian nationalism.

The cultural policies pursued by the French government in years leading up to and immediately following the Algerian War were something new. In the years before post-war economic boom and the dismantling of European empires, the French government did little to encourage the assimilation of Algerians who crossed the Mediterranean. Instead, officials used Algerians’ perceived cultural difference to justify denying them basic civil rights and perpetrating violent policing techniques against them. Neither, as Angeline Escafré-Dublet has asserted, did the arrival of so many foreigners—three million immediately following World War

52 Amiri, La bataille de France, 29.
53 Amiri, La bataille de France, 31.
I—nor George Mauco’s convictions that certain groups were too culturally foreign to assimilate, lead the government to “take charge of helping them in the obstacles they could encounter upon arrival in France even when they were not considered familiar with French ways of life” through social action policy. \(^{54}\)

Two historical phenomena forced the reluctant French state to address Algerians’ unequal citizenship status: the nationalist movements in colonies in Africa and Asia spurned in part by the participation of thousands of colonial troops in a world war fought against racist domination, and the thirty “glorious” years of French economic growth following the war that brought thousands of Algerian workers and, increasingly, their families to metropolitan France.

After World War II, the French were eager to bury all traces of the racism of the Vichy regime. In this context, culture quickly replaced race as the marker of difference. Much work has been done recently on the racialization of colonial immigrants in postwar Britain. \(^{55}\) However, France provides a contrasting case because its Republican commitment to color-blind politics masked racial discrimination and created an environment in which culture became a code word for race and an acceptable marker of innate difference. Unlike Britain’s overt discrimination against people of African, Caribbean, and Asian origins in defense of an imagined ethnically homogenous (white) national community, French racism was couched in the language of Republican citizenship, secularism, and modernity. Despite Algeria’s privileged status, the

\(^{54}\) Escafré-Dublet, *Invisible Immigrants*, 54. She continues, “The specific context of the Algerian War and the irreducible difference attributed to Muslim populations are the reason this specific action was put in place.”

Fourth Republic (1946-1958) discriminated against Muslim Algerians as well as other colonized peoples in subtle, implicit, rather than in explicit legal ways. When the post-1945 economic boom brought urgent demand for migrant workers, the French state tried to recruit workers from elsewhere in Europe rather than import them from Algeria.

There were important changes in Muslim Algerians’ legal status following World War II, which corresponded with a shift in European thinking about non-white peoples. The ordinance of March 7, 1944 granted Algerians free circulation between Algeria and metropolitan France, a right later guaranteed by the Algerian statute of September 20, 1947. The March 7, 1944 ordinance was a response to Ferhat Abbas’ *Manifeste du people algérien* of February 1943, which urged the creation of an autonomous Algerian state on the federalist model that would be protected by France. As Vincent Viet has written, the ordinance was meant to “regain lost ground” by “resuscitating a policy of assimilation that had been wasting away for decades.”

Building on this aim, the law of May 7, 1946 and the Constitution of the Fourth Republic affirmed that all other Algerians with local civil status were French citizens, with equal rights and duties in metropolitan France but, crucially, not in Algeria itself. Additionally, the French Empire became the “French Union,” consisting of DOMs and TOMs, and the colonies were granted representation in the French parliament. French citizenship was therefore opened up and redefined to include non-white members of the empire. According to Todd Shepard, with these post-1944 reforms, France “attempted to reconcile republican values and imperial conquest,” by redefining the nation state, but the creation of French Union citizenship without political rights left this category uncertain.

---

57 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 45.
Despite their aims of solidarity, however, these reforms instead drove the French empire further apart. This is evidenced by the increasing political capital of the generation of French-educated colonial elites, including Léopold Senghor, who served in the French government. As Jeremy Poplin has written, such elites “increasingly identified themselves with their native communities and demanded reforms leading—not to greater assimilation with France—but toward autonomy and eventual independence.”\textsuperscript{58} Neither did all French support the Fourth Republic’s reform efforts. For instance, European settlers in Algeria fought these reforms and succeeded in limiting ‘Muslim’ political rights yet again, denying, for example, Muslim women the vote. Furthermore, legal disparities between the metropole and Algeria such the existence of a double electoral college—which gave Algerians one-half representation and thereby limited their decision making power—further undermined claims by the French state of universal citizenship and equality throughout the empire.

As tensions between colonizer and colonized intensified and political forces pulled them further apart, economic growth pushed them together, forcing the French state to address the ambiguities of Algerians’ place in the French nation, face to face. Between 1948 and 1953 the number of Muslim Algerians living in metropolitan France doubled from 120,000 to 240,000 (including 5,000 women and 15,000 children).\textsuperscript{59} This increase caused severe social crises that the Fourth Republic was ill equipped to handle, and shantytowns sprang up on the outskirts of French cities. Policy makers allocated limited funds to remedy these ills, and tended to approach Algerians in France as temporary workers rather than as potential Frenchmen.

\textsuperscript{58} Jeremy Popkin, \textit{A History of Modern France}, 291.

\textsuperscript{59} CAC 19860271, 3: Commission consultative nationale pour l’étude des questions nord-africaines, PV of meeting of April 10, 1956.
In November 1954, the newly formed Front de libération nationale (FLN) set off a series of bombings in Algeria, drawing France into a war—though admission that it was indeed fighting a ‘war’ did not come until much later—that lasted until France granted Algeria independence in 1962. In addition to waging brutal warfare nationalist forces in Algeria and as well as on the other side of the Mediterranean in metropolitan France, the French government had to justify the membership of thousands of Algerians—whose numbers in France grew during and after the war from 240,000 in 1953\textsuperscript{60} to 523,000 in 1965\textsuperscript{61)—in the national body. Military arms were not the only weapons deployed by the French government in the fight against Algerian nationalism. There was a second front in the realm of social action. When Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic came to power in 1958 with an ambiguous promise to bring the war to a successful end, it took social action beyond practical necessity and made it both a wartime strategy and an imperial public relations campaign. Economic developments known as the Constantine Plan were planned in Algeria, where military brutality and the use of torture continued despite protest from many in France as well as the international community.

Crucially, this period also witnessed the expansion of the French welfare state, which sought to guarantee a decent standard of living to both the metropolitan French and Algerians living in the metropole who, for the first time, were entitled to equal citizenship. (Following WWI, most social welfare came from private sources such as poor relief and Christian charities who were eventually replaced by the far left as volunteers gradually became civil servants.) The success of social services have represented, for some observers of France, the ability of government-guided assimilation to trump diversity, to raise recipients up to a certain level of

\textsuperscript{60} CAC 19860271, article 3: Commission Nationale Nord-Africaine, feuille de presence, Réunion du 18 Novembre 1953.

\textsuperscript{61} AN F1a 5010: SAMAS Ref.: SAM No. 3-312, “Note sur le Services des Affaires Musulmanes: Mission-Organisation-Moyes” 20 March 1965.
‘modernity,’ and reinforce both French culture and French republican values. Critics have likewise blamed the failure of such programs to create equality on migrants’ insurmountable cultural difference. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, welfare is an arena in which issues of national identity are debated. Yet during the Algerian War, when the debate over Algeria’s attachment to France escalated to the level of violent confrontation, welfare and warfare became inextricably linked. This period thus provides fertile ground for an exploration of the connection between social action and national belonging.

With the gradual realization on the part of the French government that Algerian migrants would settle permanently in metropolitan France, an economic/security problem became a cultural one. At this crucial turning point, the goal of administrators became not just policing, Algerians, rendering them visible, remedying poverty or containing disease, but assimilating them into French culture as well. Integration, Todd Shepard has explained, became a way for the French state to reverse the inequalities that the system of different civil statuses had produced. The goal of integration was simultaneously taken up in Algeria, where liberal Gaullist governor general Jacques Soustelle “theorized and pursued policies aimed at ‘integrating’ ‘Muslims’ into the nation,” which speaks to his recognition of the inequalities that French colonial governance had produced.62

Chapter 1 focuses on the decade following World War II, examining the social welfare structures created by the Fourth Republic in response to both the large waves of migration from Algeria and the radicalization of Algerian nationalism, which had existed in metropolitan France since the 1920s. The rapid increase in migration and the social ills that accompanied it drew existing prejudices against North Africans to the surface and created the perception among many

62 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 46.
in the government, as well as in French society at large, that France was being overrun by foreigners. Yet officials equally downplayed Algerian difference, mobilizing republican discourses of color-blind assimilation and a unified French Empire to defend the free circulation of Algerians between Algeria and the metropole—a policy that provided the expanding French industrial sector with an affordable and mobile supply of single male workers. By situating social welfare for Algerians in this context, I argue that policies pursued by the Fourth Republic were formed at the intersection of economic growth, social welfare, imperial unity, and republican ideology. This chapter demonstrates that the social action and surveillance apparatuses created by de Gaulle’s government in 1958 had their genesis in this earlier period, when the loss of Algeria became a real possibility. It also shows, however, that although the massive investment in social action for Algerians undertaken by the Fifth Republic was in fact proposed in the early 1950s, it took the spread of violence to the metropole at the height of the Algerian War for it to come to its full fruition.

The dissertation then follows the effect of the escalation of violence in Algeria and the arrival of the French Federation of the FLN in the metropole in January 1957 on the government’s approach to Algerian migration. As the Algerian War escalated, tens of thousands of Algerians migrated to metropolitan France, drawn there by the promise of employment in the rapidly growing industrial economy and fleeing the zones of ‘pacification’ to which the French military had forced thousands to resettle. Chapter 2 explores the tumultuous years 1957-1959, which witnessed rising poverty among the Algerian community, a revamped FLN in the metropole, a generals’ coup in Algeria, the fall of one French government, and the beginning of another—Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic. It was during these years of instability and rising fears of losing French control of Algeria, that the French state undertook an unprecedented
investment in social services geared specifically toward the integration of Algerians into French society. 1958 marked the creation of a new administrative body, the Service des Affaires Musulmanes et de l’Action Sociale (SAMAS), whose governing principle was that the integration of the Algerian Muslim population into French society was vital to fighting Algerian nationalism in the metropole. The Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon, created a specialized force in charge of policing Algerians in the metropole, whose officers brutally repressed pro-FLN demonstrations, killing dozens. Yet tensions within the uneasy marriage of welfare and warfare are evident at both state and local levels, undermining ideas of a monolithic, state. For instance, social action delegate Michel Massenet advocated the separation of social action and surveillance and spoke out against Papon’s actions. Meanwhile, at the Paris Prefecture of Police, Prefect Maurice Papon devised a special police force, the SAT-FMA, whose social service stations were merely fronts for surveillance and, increasingly, brutal repression of the Algerian community.

This chapter investigates interactions within this complex bureaucracy, analyzing the competing discourses and actions of this diverse group of state administrators who, because of the unusual circumstances of the Algerian war, were brought together in the social action sector. It ends with an examination of the comprehensive social action plan drafted by Massenet in 1959.

The French state did not take a purely top-down approach. In pursuit of their goal of the cultural assimilation of Algerians in France, administrators reached out to over one hundred and fifty private associations with expertise on the Algerian community, which it funded and supervised over the course of the Algerian War. Chapter 3 moves the analysis down to the local level, taking as case studies a handful of associations in and around Paris that provided social aid to Algerians during the later years of the Algerian war. Many of these associations received grants from a special state fund, the Fonds d’action sociale (FAS), designated specifically to
assisting Algerian workers families living in the metropole. The associations themselves illustrate the range of French public views on Algeria and on the state’s treatment of Algerian migrants. While some fervent Gaullists saw social service as their personal contribution to defending Algérie française, other organizations, such as Catholic charities and student groups, housed, fed, and educated Algerian families without ulterior motive. Despite their political differences, however, the associations examined in this chapter had much in common, such as their belief in the power of summer camps for children, their involvement in adult education and job training, and their concern over women’s lack of cultural adaptation.

Chapter 4 deals with the culmination of the French state’s repression of Algerian migrants and how the events of the last years of the Algerian War played out in the social action sphere. It begins with an examination of the structures and techniques used by the Prefecture of Police to locate suspects, and the climate of fear they created in the bidonvilles as well as on the streets of Paris. It then traces the lead up to October 17, 1961 and responses of social action administrators and association members to the violent events of that night. The dissertation ends with an examination of what happened at the end of the war. It follows private associations through their decisions to continue their works, redirect their action, or simply to disband once the need to keep Algeria French was gone. It also considers the new bureaucratic structures that replaced those of the Algerian War era. Most striking about the social action sector at the transition to Algerian independence are the continuities, not only in bureaucratic structures and personnel, but in their doubts about the political loyalties and so-called “cultural level” of Algerians who had migrated to France and the techniques used to mitigate the perceived cultural divide between ‘Muslims’ and ‘the French.’ Although the need to maintain French political
control of Algeria was lifted with the declaration of the ceasefire on March 19, 1962, concerns about Algerians migrants’ belonging in the French republic remained.
Chapter 1

The Fourth Republic Confronts Algerian Migration (1946-56)

The short-lived Fourth Republic was defined by the dual processes of decolonization and industrialization. The rapid industrialization and economic expansion in France following the destruction of World War II required the importation of labor, and large numbers of Algerians traveled for the metropole seeking employment and, after 1954, escaping from the violence of the Algerian War. France was experiencing a housing crisis itself, and was poorly equipped to handle this new wave of migration. Those lucky enough to find housing rented rooms in overcrowded, rundown lodging houses from slumlords called “marchands de sommeil”; others built temporary shelters from scrap metal and other materials in the bidonvilles (shantytowns) that were springing up on the edges of French cities. Crucially, this period also witnessed the expansion of the French welfare state, which sought to guarantee a decent standard of living both for the metropolitan French and for Algerians living in the metropole who, for the first time, were entitled to equal citizenship, if only on metropolitan soil.\textsuperscript{63}

In the same years, the Algerian nationalist movement radicalized and grew due to France’s refusal to negotiate on the issue of political independence. In 1946, Messali Hadj founded the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD), a cover for the outlawed Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), which called for full independence for Algeria. Five

\textsuperscript{63} With the September 20, 1947 Algerian statute the French government sought to lessen Algerians’ political and legal inequality by confirming their freedom of circulation and entitling them to the same rights as other French citizens when in metropolitan France. The statute also created an Algerian Assembly divided into two colleges: one made up of 464,000 European men and women plus 58,000 Algerians with French status and the other consisting of 1,300,000 Algerian men eligible to vote. Each college had equal weight in electing the 120 delegates. Each college elected an equal number of deputies in Paris. The statute also confirmed the territorial continuity of France across the Mediterranean and the
out of fifteen of the MTLD’s deputies won seats in the Algerian Assembly, and Ferhat Abbas was elected under the banner of his own Union démocratique du manifeste algérien party. The MTLD gained support among Algerian workers in France; members of its French Federation, headed by Abdellah Fillali, paid monthly dues, belonged to cells, groups, or sections, and participated in mass demonstrations. By 1949, the nationalists had become disillusioned with politics as a path to Algerian independence. Headed by MTLD member Ahmed Ben Bella, they formed the Organisation spéciale (OS) in preparation for armed struggle. French authorities in Algeria quickly went after the OS, using torture to force it to disband. The judicial proceedings that followed caused tensions within in the MTLD and in March of 1954, former OS members called the centralistes (after their support of the MTLD’s central committee) split from the party. Now convinced of the need for immediate armed struggle, the centralistes in October 1954 formed the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, the FLN. On November 1, 1954 the FLN launched thirty simultaneous bombings at symbols of French power throughout Algeria.64

The Fourth Republic’s reactions to Algerian immigration were varied and at times contradictory. This rapid increase in migration and the social ills that accompanied it drew existing prejudices against North African Muslims to the surface and created the perception among many in the French government, as well as in society at large, that France was being overrun by foreigners. Yet policy makers from across the political spectrum equally downplayed Algerian difference, mobilizing republican discourses of color-blind assimilation and a unified, enlightened French Empire to defend the free circulation of Algerians between Algeria and the metropole—a policy that provided the expanding French industrial sector with an affordable and mobile supply of single male workers. By situating social welfare for Algerians in this context, I

argue that policies pursued by the Fourth Republic were formed at the intersection of economic growth, social welfare, imperial unity, and republican ideology. The Fourth Republic was thus influenced by the earlier interwar period and provided the ideological foundations and institutional structures on which the Fifth Republic built its social welfare regime. Moreover, like de Gaulle’s administration, Fourth Republic governments reached out to private welfare associations, who ultimately bore the responsibility of remedying social ills in the Algerian community (as well as the North African community at large) during the early 1950s.

In some senses, the Fourth Republic’s response to Algerian migration was an extension of that of interwar governments. Since Messali’s Hadj’s founding of l’Étoile Nord-Africaine in France in 1927, French administrators had been aware of the specter of Algerian nationalism on metropolitan soil. Officials once again voiced concerns about North African migrants as dangerous and prone to disease and criminality. And racial prejudices, far from disappearing after World War II, simply reappeared phrased in cultural, rather than biological, terms. In the interwar period there had been calls for the government to adopt a policy of culturally assimilating Algerians in France. Over the course of the Algerian War, state investment in programs devoted to this goal increased enormously, particularly in 1959 when de Gaulle’s government undertook an aggressive social action plan designed to combat segregation and integrate Algerians into French society. Additionally, the Fourth Republic, like the Paris Police’s North African Services of the 1920s and 1930s, used social services as a pretext for the surveillance and policing of North African immigrants. Although the SAINA was dissolved at the Liberation because of hostility from colonial migrants and a series of incidents in Algeria in 1945, the change happened only on paper. The supervision and surveillance of North African

migration continued under state control, particularly after 1945 when Messali Hadj and his supporters radicalized their discourse and began calling for complete independence. The SAINA’s administrative services were transferred to the Department of the Seine, while the police were reassigned to stations in Paris and its banlieue.66

The immediate postwar period also, in many ways, foreshadowed what was to come when de Gaulle came to power in 1958 after the escalation of violence in Algeria. For instance, like de Gaulle’s government, Fourth Republic officials responded to demonstrations by Algerian workers in France with an increase in social action in an attempt to ease political unrest and to appear to be sympathetic to Algerians’ concerns. The 1951 demonstrations convinced state officials of the potential for grass-roots mobilization and mass protest that existed within the Algerian community even before the Algerian War began.

The outbreak of nationalist violence in November 1954 only increased existing concerns about the level of cultural assimilation of Algerian migrants. The Fourth Republic adopted a policy of integration that both recognized the particularities of Muslim Algerians and attempted to remedy institutionalized inequalities between them and Algerians of European origin. In the realm of social welfare, this translated to initiatives that took into account the origins of ‘Français musulmans d’Algérie’ (FMAs—the term used for Algerian migrants following the 1947 Algerian Statute which granted Algerians French citizenship in metropolitan France).67 In its last years, the Fourth Republic laid the foundation for a social welfare scheme directed specifically toward FMAs. The goal of this initiative was to retain French rule over Algeria in three ways:


67 Not until the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which confirmed the territorial indivisibility between Algeria and the metropole, did all Algerians have full French citizenship.
by remedying institutionalized discrimination, by giving Algerians a better quality of life in both Algeria and the metropole, and by increasing surveillance to weed out nationalist political activity. Finally, the Fourth Republic initiated the process of extending social citizenship to Algerian migrants through interactions between state forces and private associations, on whose efforts Fifth Republic officials would rely heavily to counter the power of the FLN in metropolitan France.

**Conceptualizing Algerian Difference After World War II**

In the immediate postwar period there were two competing discourses on immigration to France. On one side was the cultural racism personified by Georges Mauco, a leading expert on immigration in the 1930s and 1940s. In his 1932 work on immigration, Mauco advocated implementing quotas based on ethnicity, and he was highly critical of the opening up of naturalization policy and the amnesty given to refugees, many of whom were Jews, under Léon Blum’s Popular Front. After the Nazi invasion, Mauco made his anti-Semitism clear in testimony he gave before the Conseil d’Etat in Vichy, expressing, as Patrick Weil has written, his “core belief in the irremediable and total determination of personality by ethnic origin.” Yet, a savvy politician, in 1944 he switched sides and aligned himself with the Resistance. At Mauco’s

---


recommendation the new Fourth Republic established a High Committee on Population and the Family and Mauco was named the committee’s secretary general.\textsuperscript{70}

Changes in the ideological landscape wrought by World War II produced a competing discourse of unity in diversity. In a post-Vichy France, explicit references to racial difference were unacceptable in mainstream politics. Additionally, Roosevelt and Churchill’s 1941 Atlantic Charter pledged “to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them,” while de Gaulle’s 1944 Brazzaville Declaration recognized colonial people’s contribution to the Free French cause by promising them “a share in the management of their own affairs in their own country.”\textsuperscript{71} The idea that all nationalities—regardless of perceived cultural, religious, or ethnic difference—could be subsumed within a single French nation gained popularity after World War II because it offered a solution that preserved the empire from national self-determination movements while condemning the racism of the fascist regimes. With this “shift in European attitude toward nonwhite peoples,”\textsuperscript{72} French colonies became “Overseas France,” and the French Empire became the “French Union,” consisting of Overseas Departments (DOMs) and Overseas Territories (TOMs). In addition, as the demand for cheap labor grew, French immigration policy became less restrictive with regard to the national origins of migrants.

Important changes in the legal status of so-called ‘French Muslims of Algeria’ following World War II were one result of this new French mindset concerning the empire. The ordinance

\textsuperscript{70} Weil explains that Mauco got this post at the suggestion of Louis Joxe, who was secretary general of the provisional government. In 1937, Joxe had commissioned Mauco to do a study on the “assimilability” of foreigners (See \textit{How to be French}, 133).


\textsuperscript{72} Todd Shepard, \textit{The Invention of Decolonization: the Algerian War and the Remaking of France} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) 40. Additionally, Frederick Cooper has argued that after the victory of democracy following World War II, the rhetoric of imperialism was replaced by that of social progress.
of March 7, 1944 granted Algerians free circulation between Algeria and metropolitan France, a right later guaranteed by the law of September 20, 1947. Building on this aim, the Constitution of the Fourth Republic and the laws of May 7 and August 27, 1946 granted French citizenship and the vote (in Algeria) to Algerians. However, although some French officials supported independence for Indochina—before and, especially, after war began there—independence for Algeria was unthinkable for most French people. There were nationalist uprisings in Algeria in the summer of 1945, but these were rapidly suppressed by French troops. Furthermore, despite the new statute for Algeria, Algerians never achieved equal political citizenship because European settlers fought proposed reforms and succeeded in limiting Muslim Algerians’ political rights. For instance, while Muslim Algerians were granted the right to vote and representation in the Algerian Assembly, French bureaucrats rigged Algerian elections in order to prevent pro-independence leaders coming to power, eliciting usage of the phrase “elections à l’algérienne” to describe such shoddy democratic practices. Additionally, the measures before the Algerian Assembly (1/2 of whose members were chosen by French settlers and the other half by the so-called Muslim population) required a two-thirds majority to pass. This meant that roughly 922,000 settlers, or pieds noirs, eager to protect their own interests in a racist system had veto power over eight million Muslim Algerians. Although Messali Hadj’s Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), which called for independence from France, won sweeping victories in the 1947 municipal elections in Algeria, it was allowed only nine seats in the Algerian Assembly, while government-chosen “independents” were given fifty-five seats.

The March 7, 1944 ordinance was a response to Algerian People’s Union leader Ferhat Abbas’ Manifeste du people algérien of February 1943, which urged the creation of an autonomous Algerian state on the federalist model that would be protected by France. Vincent Viet has written that the ordinance was meant to “regain lost ground” by “resuscitating a policy of assimilation that had been wasting away for decades.” Viet, La France Immigrée, 169. Previously, Muslims’ local status had been used as rationale for not granting them French citizenship, the assumption being that local loyalties would take precedence over loyalty to the French republic.
“A Massive Influx”

Algerian migration to metropolitan France increased rapidly in the late 1940s and the 1950s due to the policy of free circulation and to rapid industrialization and a burgeoning consumer economy, which encouraged Algerians to seek work in the automobile and steel industries in the metropole. Although the French economy was growing, initially it did not grow quickly enough to employ the thousands of Algerians who were migrating to France (more than 11,000 Algerians arrived in one month in 1946). Between 1948 and 1953 the number of ‘Algerian Muslims’ living in metropolitan France doubled from 120,000 to 240,000 (including 5,000 women and 15,000 children). In 1949, 83,447 Algerians migrated to France; in 1954, this number was 159,786. This rapid increase in migration caused severe social crises that the Fourth Republic was ill equipped to handle. When workers began to arrive en masse, filthy shantytowns sprang up on the outskirts of French cities.

When Algerians gained new political rights following World War II, racial stereotypes about them as dangerous criminals and vagrants persisted and were fueled by the growing specter of Algerian nationalism. Although, as Emmanuel Blanchard has written, this was only a “very secondary concern” at the start of the 1950s, by the end of the decade, Algerian nationalism was an organized and dangerous movement in metropolitan France. When, in 1945, Algerians became ‘French Muslims from Algeria,’ and they were therefore no longer

74 CAC 19860271, 2: Procès Verbal de la Conférence interministériel du 9 juillet 1946 sur le problème de l’emploi de la main d’oeuvre algérienne en France.
75 CAC 19860271, 3: Commission consultative nationale pour l’étude des questions nord-africaines, PV of meeting of April 10, 1956. Algerians made up the large majority of North Africans in the metropole. See CARAN F1a 5056: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, Circulaire No. 232, Objet: Assistance morale et matérielle aux citoyens Français Musulmans originaires d’Algérie, June 26, 1950. According to a 1949 census, of the 225,000 North Africans in France 207,000 were Algerian.
76 Blanchard, La Police Parisienne et les Algériens, 6.
technically under the jurisdiction of a separate police force (the North African Brigade was dissolved the same year). From then onward, in order to continue policing the Algerian community, the French government had to adapt its structures to the new Algerian statute, which, by granting Algerians equal French citizenship on metropolitan soil and as well as the right to travel freely between France and Algeria. Thus, leading up to 1956, there was a progressive recreation of structures that singled out/targeted Algerians without publically doing so.77

New administrative structures were accompanied by a public relations campaign against Algerians in the metropole. Emmanuel Blanchard has emphasized the role of the Paris police in the construction of the idea of a so-called ‘North African problem’ over the course of the 1940s and 1950s. By mobilizing political channels (influencing the Paris municipal Council and the General Council of the Seine) and by exerting a strong influence on journalists, the police convinced legislators and public opinion alike that North Africans were a dangerous and unwanted population requiring state intervention and reforms to limit their presence in the metropole.78 Monique Hervo, too, has described her experience with the growing xenophobia in France in the 1950s, when the evening newspapers warned of the “invading hoards” of dangerous, sexually aggressive Algerians.79

In the 1940s, French officials’ discussions of Algerian immigration centered on its lack of regulation and the social problems caused by the influx of unskilled workers from an agricultural society into French cities. In a 1949 letter to the Minister of Labor, for example, the president of the National Alliance against Depopulation, André Toulemon, bemoaned the “massive influx in

77 Ibid., 15.
78 Blanchard, La Police Parisienne et les Algériens, 12.
the country, without control of any sort, of Algerians of whom only a small number have a work
ccontract and are likely to be employed usefully.”80 To another administrator, Algerian migrants
constituted “a Muslim population which, by its physical constitution as well as by its habits,
submits itself painfully to the conditions of work and existence imposed by the circumstances [in
metropolitan France].”81 Officials were additionally concerned about unskilled Algerian workers
without work contracts flooding the labor market, as well as the possibility that they were
spreading diseases such as tuberculosis and syphilis. For these reasons, the formal
recommendation of the commission for the study of North African immigration, organized by
Toulemon in 1949, was to “retain as many Algerians as possible in their own country.”82

Georges Mauco’s ideas of the relative assimilability of Western European immigrants
over non-white peoples survived the war and permeated social action policy. On October 20th,
1948, representatives of various government ministries met at the High Advisory Committee on
Population and the Family, chaired by Mauco, to discuss what was referred to as “the North
African problem” and to determine “the proper measures of stopping the influx of Algerian
workers toward the metropole.”83 Since Algerians, unlike other colonized populations, had the
right to migrate freely to France, the government could not legally prevent them from entering
the country the way it did with other national groups: requiring the possession of a work contract

80 CAC 19860271, 2: Letter of 23 March 1949 from André Toulemon, president of the Alliance Nationale
contre la dépopulation to the Minister of Travail et de Securité Sociale, Daniel Mayer.

81 CAC 19860271, 2: Letter of 20 Feb. 1948 from Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat à la Présidece du Conseil
Chargé des Affaires Musulmanes, Objet: immigration des Nord-Africains vers la Métropole, V/letter

82 CAC 19860271, 2: Commission pour l’étude de l’immigration nord africain, 17th March 1949,
“Vouex.” Additionally, the headquarters of the National Immigration Office (ONI) were placed in Italy
rather than in North Africa, where the majority of foreign labor was coming from, in an attempt to recruit
more Western European workers.

83 CAC 19860271, 2: Letter of November 16, 1948 from the Ministre du Travail et de la Securité Sociale,
Direction de la Main d’Oeuvre, Sous-Direction de l’Emploi 1er Bureau to Monsieur le Président du
or a medical examination, for example. One solution to this problem was to take measures to limit Algerians’ leaving Algeria. Attendees were concerned that Algerians were receiving erroneous information regarding job prospects in France, and decided that efforts should be taken to ensure that recruitment was conducted only on the basis of official work contracts. Some metropolitan bureaucrats urged their counterparts in the General Government of Algeria to limit the numbers of people crossing the Mediterranean by informing the Algerian public about the reality of employment in France: low salaries and heavy competition. One participant suggested that “a sanitary control exercised without discrimination between metropolitan French and Algerian French might slow down the exodus of Algerians by permitting the retention of those afflicted with contagious diseases.” In 1948 the High Committee on Population and the Family recommended that information be distributed in Algeria about the difficulties of finding employment and housing in France, describing the moral and material conditions of Algerians already in the metropole as “deplorable.”

Algerian Workers on Strike

Protests in Paris, Lyon and Mauberge on May 1 (Labor Day), 1951 provided new impetus for social action for Algerians in metropolitan France. Government officials’ responses to these events are telling because they hint at the fears of political agitation that permeated social action policy during the Algerian War. After May 1951, French bureaucrats used social welfare as a form of propaganda to quell political unrest, just as they would during the Algerian War. The protests also led to increased policing of Algerians via social action networks, a process that had

85 Ibid.
begun in Paris during the interwar period (see Introduction). The difference between government reactions to these protests and to nationalist violence later in the decade is that in official discourse government spokespeople wrote off the 1951 protests as a reaction to poor working conditions, rather than an organized nationalist movement. Communism, rather than Algerian nationalism, they claimed, was the real threat. At least publically, officials drew no connection between the 1951 events and similar protests across Algeria on Labor Day, 1945 (organized by Messali Hadj and his Algerian People’s Party) nor to the massacres in Sétif and Guelma in which, following a clash between pro-independence marchers and the police on May 8, 1945, the French police and military killed several thousand Algerians (estimates vary from the official French report of 1,020 dead to 45,000 dead). However, changes in policy following the protests imply that French officials did view Algerian nationalism in the metropole as a potential threat.

In a March 5th, 1951 radio speech, Secretary of State for the Ministry of the Interior Eugene Thomas called the Algerians who joined the protest a “small minority” whose “seditious activity would not be tolerated.” To prevent future agitation, Thomas offered a solution that foreshadowed future uses of social action to keep Algeria French. He announced that, due to the “certain number of problems posed by the arrival of numerous workers from Algerian departments in the metropole,” the government intended to realize, “In the least possible delay, a policy of moral and material aid of social and professional promotion in favor of this workforce.” Foreshadowing the Fifth Republic’s intervention into the private sphere of welfare

86 CAC 19860271, 2: Ministère de l’Interieur, “Allocution de M. Le Ministre Eugene Thomas, radiodiffusée le samedi 5 Mai 1951.”
87 Ibid.
action, Thomas proposed “tying together an effective network” of private associations that would receive administrative and material aid from state services.

Government officials were quick to draw the link between social problems and political agitation, which would become the basis of immigrant social services during the Algerian War. At a meeting at the Minister of the Interior’s office following the protests, the IGAME (state inspectors who dealt with immigration), prefects from departments with large Algerian populations, and representatives from the Ministries of Public Health, Labor, and the Interior met at the Ministry of the Interior to discuss the action that the government intended to pursue.

One attendee expressed concern that of the 220-250,000 North Africans in France, only 95,000 were currently employed. According to the Prefect of the Haute-Garonne, M. Pelletier, these protests showed the need to counteract the growth of the Communist party among Algerians by providing them social services. Minister of the Interior Brune reiterated concerns about social problems breeding political instability in the Algerian community, stating “The problem is at once social and political: social in terms of the aid suitable to contribute to the human plan, and political because of the very great permeability of this population to revolutionary propaganda.”

In addition to high unemployment, mistreatment by employers was also a concern shared by many officials. At a meeting of the “Commission interdepartmental coordinating commission for action to undertake in favor of French Muslims of Algeria,” Prefect Damelon blamed employers for the events of May 1st. Damelon emphasized “the necessity to

88 CAC 19860271, 2: PV de la réunion tenue le 24 mai 1951 au Ministère de l’Intérieur.

89 CAC 19860271, 2: PV de la réunion d’information relative aux problèmes poses par les migrations algériennes dans la métropole tenue le 14 décembre 1951 au Ministère de l’Intérieur.
react vigorously in front of the attitude of certain employers who have had the tendency to corrupt Muslim workers, risking thus provoking a renewed outbreak of poverty and misery.”  

Following the recommendations of the High Advisory Committee on Population and the Family, the Ministry of Labor also undertook work across the Mediterranean. By increasing communication with the French government in Algeria and by providing job training and placement there, the Ministry of Labor hoped to unify the workforces in the two countries so that workers would only be recruited to come to France if work was available for them. The general director of social security at the Ministry of Labor (who had been stationed in Algeria in the 1930s) asserted that the solution to stemming the tide of Algerian migration lay in making improvements in Algeria, not with immigration controls in France. He therefore recommended rapidly undertaking a “vast plan capable of retaining the Muslim worker at home by providing him with employment suitable remunerated in Algeria.” Such efforts had little effect on the volume of migration though, because as bad as employment and living conditions were in France, they were worse in Algeria. A series of crop failures (the worst in 1951 when a bad wheat harvest in the Constantine region brought the total number of Algerians to 100,000 in the Paris region alone) forced many Algerians to seek work in France so that they could send money back to their families in Algeria.

Responses to the May 1 protests illustrate the contradiction in the French government’s view of Algerians. On the one hand, France and Algeria were theoretically one nation, and

---

90 CAC 19860271, 3: Commission interministérielle de coordination pour l’action à mener en faveur des français musulmans d’Algérie PV of meeting of 19 May 1951.


Algerians therefore enjoyed equal protection under the law and access to welfare services in France. But government commentators also viewed Algerians with suspicion and were concerned that protestors were fomenting national disunity. These contradictory ways of viewing Algerians are evident in a radio speech given by Minister of the Interior Eugene Thomas following the protests. According to Thomas, Algerian immigration was an “interior problem, whose difficulties should be overcome in a spirit of national solidarity.”

The French, he declared, must understand that “their brothers from the departments of Algeria” were “their equals in rights and duties.” He went on to cite Algerians’ service under the French flag in the two World Wars, recounting dramatically how colonial troops had “served with them under the same flag and at their sides spilled their blood for the grandeur and the liberty of France.” For Thomas, diversity in France was one of its strengths, not a weakness. “The variety in design and the diversity of men, far from harming the French nation,” he asserted, “has always been more of an element of spiritual enrichment than a factor of disunion. France brought democracy to the Muslim populations of Algeria. They, I know, are firmly attached to it.” Despite these sentimental proclamations of unity, the Interior Minister ended with a serious warning. Although, he stated, the government was doing its best to give North African workers in France decent living conditions, he vowed that it would “punish vigorously separatist ringleaders, whose criminal action hurts France and Algeria, whose destinies are now interdependent.”

In Thomas’s view, France and Algeria were two nations together, but this unity was founded on political dominance of one over the other.

93 CAC 19860271, 2: Ministère de l’Intérieur, “Allocution de M. Le Ministre Eugene Thomas, radiodiffusée le samedi 5 Mai 1951” (quote was repeated from circulaire of 26 June 1950).
The result of the May Day protests was increased policing of the Algerian community, a measure that only hinted at the extreme measures the Ministry of the Interior would adopt during the Algerian War. The rationale for this increase echoed the complicated logic and reservations of Thomas’ radio speech. A representative from the Ministry asserted that the French police needed to centralize information on Algerians in France in order to “avoid giving separatist propaganda writers reasons to believe in the reconstitution of the North African Brigade.” But he also warned about police action infringing on Algerians’ civil rights:

Police action is certainly indispensable but its firmness should not exclude the tact, the suppleness and especially should always be just and humane. We must act with firmness, but without brutality, to avoid increasing the ranks of the Communist Party and especially making martyrs. This action will only be effective if it is supported by a profound social action and a professional and political structure that requires great efforts, but for which we are now armed, and that we must lead to good.96

The belief—essential in the Fifth Republic’s overhaul of welfare for Algerians in metropolitan France—that social ills breed political divisions is clear in these early responses. Fourth Republic officials feared both the spread of Communism and an Algerian national liberation movement. Social action was seen as a necessary counterpart to policing because it lessened the root cause of political unrest. This uneasy partnership between policing and social action continued under the Fifth Republic, and became the source of tension among both state and local entities.

95 CAC 19860271, 2: PV de la réunion tenue le 24 mai 1951 au Ministère de l’Intérieur.
96 Ibid., 3.
State Social Action

In 1951, there were approximately 115,000 French Muslims from Algeria living in poverty in metropolitan France. Under the Fourth Republic, welfare providers such as job training centers and youth hostels were not yet purveyors of Gaullist imperial propaganda. But there were immediate practical issues the state had to face. Concerns over Algerian workers’ lack of employment and their unsafe, unsanitary living conditions resulted in the expansion of welfare into new realms. There was also an acute housing shortage throughout the country, which was also experiencing high rates of unemployment. The state also had to face the reality that families were increasingly accompanying male workers to the metropole, a fact to which Amelia Lyons has recently brought attention. In one year, the French government’s budget for welfare for Algerian migrants nearly quadrupled, from 35 million in 1950 to 130 million francs in 1951. Although state programs such as job training and hostels were largely directed at single male workers, administrators increasingly sought out private associations, which had been quicker to acknowledge familial migration and were already providing services to women and children (see below). Algerians’ newly granted equal rights in the metropole carried with them a moral obligation of assistance that, as Vincent Viet has written, was “not without a certain colonial paternalism.” The state singled out Algerians as needing special assistance in order to become productive workers. Tellingly, the French government did not provide specialized assistance to other groups of immigrants, such as the Portuguese, who experienced high rates of

---


poverty and lived, for example, alongside Algerians in the slums of Nanterre (a suburb on the outskirts of Paris).

The state social action organized under the Fourth Republic was a conglomeration of efforts of various ministries. The Ministry of the Interior had a supervisory role; a pamphlet published in 1953 described it as “the administrative tutor of the local metropolitan and Algerian collectivities,” in charge of “the general coordination of all the problems concerning French Muslim citizens.” Through collaboration with other public and private efforts, it provided both “moral and material” aid to facilitate the integration of Algerians into the national community.\(^{100}\) Interior chaired the Interdepartmental Coordinating Commission for Action in Favor of French Muslims of Algeria in metropolitan France (created in 1946), which wrote policy and handled the allocation of funds to various ministries and to private associations (see below). The Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, Sous-Direction d’Algérie, Bureau de coordination et d’action sociales of the Ministry of the Interior worked closely with the General Government of Algeria and was in charge of public order, identification, and assistance to the destitute. This office also coordinated action at the departmental level, and in departments with large Algerian populations, supervised the departmental Advisory Commissions on North African questions. This was done via the conseillers techniques pour les affaires sociales musulmanes (CTAM) auprès des Inspecteurs généraux de l’Administration en mission extraordinaire (IGAME), civil servants formerly stationed in North Africa who beginning in 1951 were sent to the cities with the largest numbers of Algerian workers—Lille, Metz, Lyon, and Marseille. The Ministry of National Education provided night classes and job training for workers, while the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Tourism and the

Ministry of Agriculture developed strategies for utilizing the Algerian workforce in the civil engineering and industrial agriculture sectors—both of which the Fourth Republic expanded as part of its modernization scheme. A large percentage of the funding for state social action for Algerians likewise came from the French Government in Algiers. At the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the Direction générale de la Population et de l’Entraide, Sous-Direction du Peuplement, 10e Bureau tackled sanitation and disease control among immigrant populations, provided medical assistance, and handled general issues relating to “demographic, social, and familial policy.”\textsuperscript{101}

The Prefecture of the Seine developed its own network of social services, including a welcome center, workers’ shelters (foyers), the Franco-Muslim Hospital of Bobigny, and its own team of prefectural social workers (conseillers sociaux pour les affaires musulmanes).\textsuperscript{102} The majority of Algerians lived in the Department of the Seine, and the Nanterre bidonville had first appeared in the late 1940s. Living in squalid conditions and suffering from high rates of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, the Algerian community became increasingly receptive to Messali Hadj’s politics of national independence. The Paris Prefecture of Police, whose interwar foyers had nearly all closed in the 1930s due to mismanagement\textsuperscript{103}, opened a new foyer in 1947 with two-hundred beds whose capacity was quickly doubled with the installation of bunk beds shortly afterward. In a futile attempt to keep up with the burgeoning homeless Algerian


\textsuperscript{102} In Paris, the conseillers sociaux were generally stationed in the mairies (town halls). Their distribution reflects the distribution of Algerian migration in the city. A single conseiller was responsible for several arrondissements (one for the 3e, 4e, 11e, and 12e on the east side; another for the 13e, 14e, and 15e on the south side; one for the 18e in the north; another for the 19e and 20e in the north-east). Since large communities of Algerian migrants lived in the banlieue surrounding Paris, there were additional conseillers there, in places such as Boulogne, Puteaux, Suresnes, Nanterre, and Clichy to the west; and La Courneuve, Pantin, Vincennes, and Alfortville to the east.

\textsuperscript{103} Rosenberg, \textit{Policing Paris}, 193.
population, the Seine’s special North African services opened thirteen additional foyers with over three thousand beds and employed twenty-eight social workers throughout Paris and its banlieue.\textsuperscript{104}

The gigantic task of incorporating a mass of under-trained and largely non-French-speaking Algerian workers into the French workforce fell to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\textsuperscript{105} It had the same responsibilities for Algerian migration as for the metropolitan population at large—seeking out employment and job training—but was also in charge providing shelter for single male Algerian workers coming to the metropole. The Ministry of Labor had its own specialized service, the office of North African social control (\textit{le Côntrole social de la Main-d’œuvre nord-africaine of the Direction de la Main-d’OÉuvre, Sous-Direction de l’emploi}). Additionally, from late 1949 until 1956, the Ministry of Labor supervised the National Advisory Commission for the study of North African Questions, as well as twenty departmental commissions in regions with large Algerian populations.\textsuperscript{106} The national commission was presided over by Workforce Director Alfred Rosier and included representatives from the ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Public Health. Its role was to “facilitate the professional and social adaptation [of Algerian workers] and to ameliorate their conditions of existence.”\textsuperscript{107} The Ministry of Labor also monitored organizations not directly under its authority, such as les Houillières (mining companies), the SNCF (French

\textsuperscript{105} Viet, \textit{La France immigrée}, 175.
\textsuperscript{106} The \textit{Commission nationale consultative pour l’étude des questions nords-africaines} was a sub-commission of the \textit{Commission nationale de la main-d’œuvre} and was created by the arrêté de 30 Mai 1949. There were also twenty departmental commissions in areas with high numbers of Algerian workers.
\textsuperscript{107} CAC 19860271, 2: L’action du Ministère du Travail en faveur des travailleurs nord-africains, November 30, 1949, 3.
railway company), and other industries to make sure they abided by the Labor Code and treated Algerian workers fairly.

In order to achieve its goal of full employment, the Ministry of Labor in 1949 enlisted a team of thirty social workers (the contrôleurs sociaux de la main-d’œuvre nord-africaine—CSMONA), who were selected based on their knowledge of North African languages and culture, to work in areas with significant North African populations.¹⁰⁸ There were six agents in the Paris region (Seine and Seine-et-Oise), four in the Marseille region (Bouches-du-Rhône), and the rest were scattered throughout other regions of France.¹⁰⁹ These men and women oriented Algerians seeking work toward employers, followed them in their tasks as workers, helped find them housing in cantonments, and encouraged promotion through training. They also studied particular issues surrounding the addition of these migrants into the workforce and reported back to the Ministry of Labor. The permanent “bureaux d’intervention” were supplemented by seven itinerant teams of social workers (who received one automobile each from the General Government of Algeria). By agreement with administrators in Algeria, a certain number (roughly half) of CSMONA posts were reserved for Algerians, who were recruited for their “knowledge of the North African milieu.”¹¹⁰ Others came from private French associations that specialized in assisting the North African community.

¹⁰⁸ See Ministry of the Interior circulaire of 27 April 1950 and letter of 5 June 1950 from Ministry of Labor to Interior, Objet: Assistance morale et matérielle aux Musulmans originaires d’Algérie, résidant dans la Métropole, unsigned. Similarly, in 1952, the Governor General of Algeria had dispatched a “Conseiller pour les affaires sociales musulmanes” to the four regions of France with the largest North African populations.


The Ministry of Labor and its advisory commission adopted a policy of procuring work contracts for all Algerians seeking work as well as overcoming workers’ lack of training. The Ministry’s stance was that, despite the risks, Algerians were entitled to work in metropolitan France as much as any other French citizens. Its 1950 report on “Action in Favor of North African Workers” preached solidarity with the workers it referred to as “French Muslims.” Echoing Eugene Thomas’ comments following the May Day protests, the report noted both Algerians’ equal status as French citizens and their military service during World War II (150,000 Algerians served in the French military between 1943-1945).111 “Why should they be less welcome when they arrive as workers than when they disembark dressed in military uniform?” it asked.112 Ethnic origin was no reason to deny Algerians employment.

The Ministry of Labor viewed employment as a way to encourage cooperation between metropolitan and Algerian workers. Its 1949 social action report stated: “Working a trade often implies a very developed team spirit, it always favors a feeling of camaraderie,” making employment “the best way to create the necessary environment for the adaptation of Muslim workers into the center of the French community.” Co-employment, the authors asserted, would gradually cause “the disappearance of the mistrust that too often accompanies relations between the metropolitan population and North African immigrants. The accomplishment of common tasks in the same workshop, in the same business can only contribute effectively to the establishment of a mutual comprehension despite ethnic characteristics.”113 The Ministry’s goal of full employment would therefore not only eliminate poverty and stabilize the Algerian

111 Although Senegalese, Moroccan, Tunisian and other colonial troops had fought on the French side during the two World Wars, the Ministry of Labor singled out Algerians as the only ones worthy of employment opportunities equal to those of metropolitan Frenchmen.
113 Ibid., 2.
community in metropolitan France, it would provide social cohesion as well. In fact, according to some officials, the future of the empire itself depended on providing assistance to Algerians workers in need. As Workforce Director Alfred Rosier put it, “Beyond this social endeavor, this humane preoccupation, this is not only a duty of solidarity that we will accomplish but, in the highest degree, a national duty, since, let us never forget it, the future of French Africa will depend, in a large measure, on France’s entire approach to the French Muslims of Algeria.”

Although Algerians technically qualified for the same poverty relief programs as metropolitan citizens, officials from the Ministry of Labor asserted that the organization of a separate system of social assistance was needed “in favor of immigrants whose inexperience or lack of forethought risks rendering victims of their own initiatives.” For example, in the late 1940s the Ministry of Labor opened the first training centers exclusively for “Muslim workers” and night classes to teach French and basic reading and writing skills. Officials at the Ministry were also concerned that a lack of training was caused by the precarious living conditions of Algerian workers who, the 1950 report noted, suffered from instability and lack of productivity. The authors of this particular report seem not, however, to have viewed these traits as natural characteristics of the Algerian population. Instead, they suggested that instability could be remedied and output increased through improvements in housing complemented by the provisions of more substantial nutrition. After financial constraints and the reluctance of those in power to fund such measures resulted in little construction being accomplished, the Ministry of Labor promoted the creation and management of lodging centers and factory canteens by employers themselves. A final effort planned was aimed at convincing workers of the serious

114 CAC 19760134, 4: Semaines d’études nord-africaines organisée à l’intention du personnel social et medico-social des caisses de Sécurité sociale, allocuation d’Alfred Rosier, 5-10 nov. 1951. Quoted in Viet, La France Immigré, 173.
consequences of malnourishment, as if a lack of desire for nutritious food was causing Algerians’ poor health.\(^{116}\)

In the immediate postwar years, government officials spoke more about Algerian workers’ inferior job skills and poverty than about their foreign culture as such. They racialized Algerians by associating them with particular characteristics such as poor health, illiteracy, and low productivity. Deficiencies brought on by poverty and living in a peasant agricultural society made them less desirable than Western European immigrants, whose familiarity with industrial work, officials argued, rendered them more fit to work in France. But they attributed structural causes to these characteristics that, unlike the racial absolutes theorized by Georges Mauco, could be overcome by specialized welfare services. Additionally, the prevailing belief among those in the French State was that Algerian workers were a welcome and necessary presence—because of the manpower they provided—but not a permanent one. The early state welfare measures, like the state’s reactions to the May 1st protests, illustrate the view among French government officials of Algerians in France as primarily temporary workers. In the case that the social action provided by the state proved to be insufficient, the position of the Ministry of Labor was clear: it would repatriate, free of charge, any Algerian who had not found work.\(^{117}\)

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{117}\) CAC 19860271, 2: Action du Ministère du Travail en Faveur des Travailleurs Nord-Africains, 6 and Annex IV. The Circulaire du 27 Septembre 1949 provided free repatriation to any Algerian who was incapable of working, was receiving unemployment compensation, or who, after six months or more with a placement service, had not been able to find work. In 1951, 3.3. million francs were spent on repatriation. In 1953 this sum had risen to over 12 million francs. See CARAN, F1a 5056: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, sous-direction de l’algérie, “Situation actuelle de l’Assistance aux Nord-Africains résidant dans la Métropole,” October 26, 1954.
Private associations were quicker than were French bureaucrats to respond to the influx of Algerians and other North Africans (Moroccans, Tunisians) coming to France, and several branches of the French government relied on their expertise and the services they were already providing. The associations were also quicker to realize that migrants and their families were settling permanently in France. The scope of the social action they offered during the Fourth Republic years was therefore wider, and the services more varied, than public initiatives at this time. They provided services such as temporary housing and job training for workers arriving in the metropole, French language instruction, recreation for children, and assistance in applying for state benefits. In terms of French funding, the metropolitan government in fact only provided a small percentage before 1958. The majority came from private enterprise, the Algerian government, and Social Security. Crucially, too, the associations’ social action tended not to be specifically directed at Algerians, but was instead organized for all North Africans. In other words, the associations (or, at least those founded before de Gaulle’s return) tended to view providing social assistance as a social, economic, or moral, rather than a political, imperative. At the start of the Fifth Republic, however, this distinction disappeared, as Gaullists leapt to their leader’s call for action and founded a new generation of associations with the explicit aim of maintaining French political control of Algeria.

The Ministries of the Interior and Labor decided early on that private citizens could be enlisted to provide “le contrôle sociale” of the Algerian workforce. A June 1950 memo on assistance for workers arriving from Algeria from the Ministry of the Interior’s Algerian services to the departmental prefects asserted that Algerians arriving in the metropole were met, at every level, by an administration that was “too impersonal to their liking and which had neither the
power nor the material means” to life their social status.\textsuperscript{118} The memo therefore declared that in each area where Algerian Muslims lived, it was desirable “to solicit the devotions of people, whose numbers are higher than one imagines, who know North African or are interested in it,” and to unite them into social action teams.\textsuperscript{119} M. Queuille, the author of the memo, imagined that these teams could advisor Algerians on their rights and employment possibilities, as well as guide them through “the numerous formalities by which the most modest citizen is bound” such as identity papers, Social Security, and registration with the military. Queuille’s primary aim in encouraging the formation of the social teams was to bring Algerians closer to state services and to coordinate the efforts of each involved ministry and organization, public and private. He also called for a study to be conducted on the “social control” of the North African workforce. He explained:

The mission of the team would be to facilitate contacts between the new arrivals, the population, private associations, and the public authorities, in strict cooperation with all of the competent administrations, such as the local Public Health and Population and Social Security services, post-secondary education, as well as with charitable efforts. It should rely on the support of services most particularly affected, in the departments with high Muslim density, to conduct a study of the problems posed by the employment of the North African workforce (social control of the North African workforce); I insist, on this subject, on the cooperation of the Ministries of Labor and Social Security, to avoid the dispersion of efforts and to strictly tighten cooperation between the public and private organizations that are pursuing the same objective of moral and social assistance.\textsuperscript{120}

A representative of the Workforce Office at the Ministry of Labor responded favorably to the request by the Interior Ministry for increased public intervention into the private sphere: “I

\textsuperscript{118} CARAN F1a 5056: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, Circulaire No. 232, Objet: Assistance morale et matérielle aux citoyens Français Musulmans originaires d’Algérie, June 26, 1950, signed Queuille, 1.

\textsuperscript{119} CARAN F1a 5056: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, Circulaire No. 232, Objet: Assistance morale et matérielle aux citoyens Français Musulmans originaires d’Algérie, June 26, 1950, signed Queuille, 2.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
share your hope of encouraging, in all the regions where French Muslims of Algeria live, the
devotion of people who, because they know North Africa, cannot help but be interested in the
delicate problems posed by Algerian immigration,” he wrote. “I am entirely of your same mind
as to the interest attached to uniting these people into social teams whose action would be led
and, if necessary, guided, supported and coordinated by the Public Powers.”121 In practice, state
connections with the associations were made via the CTAM, whose supervised their work first in
the Department of the Seine and, eventually, throughout France.122

The decision to invite representatives from the associations and labor unions to sit on the
Advisory Commission was made in 1949, when it came to the Ministry of Labor’s attention that
these organization were “ignorant of the work the commission was doing.”123 The Ministry of
Labor had become aware that organizations were debating issues at their meetings that had
already been decided by the commission, lacked information the Ministry had received at the
National Advisory Commission meetings, and were unaware of the results it had obtained. The
Commission began working with private associations and labor unions in order to profit from
their knowledge and experience, but also to monitor and control their actions. The Coordinating
Commission had at its disposal a special Social and Sanitary Action Fund, which was a part of

121 CAC 19860271, Letter of June 5th, 1950 from Le Ministre du Travail et de la Securité Sociale,
Direction de la Main d’Oeuvre, Sous-Direction de l’Emploi 1er Bureau to Monsieur le Vice-Président du
Conseil, Ministre de l’Intérieur, Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, Objet:
Assistance morale et matérielle aux Musulmans originaires d’Algérie, résidant dans la Métropole, Ref:
122 See Nordine Amara, “Le CTAM dans le Nord: la guerre dans sa dimension coloniale?” in Raphaëlle
Branche et Sylvie Thénault, eds., La France en guerre 1954-1962: Expériences métropolitaines de la
guerre d’indépendance algérienne (Autrement, 2008). For more on state policing of the associations,
see Chapter 4.
123 CAC 19860271, 3: Letter from Ministère du Travail, Direction de la Main-d’Oeuvre, Sous-Direction de
l’emploi, 1er bureau to the Vice President du Conseil, Ministère de l’interieur, Services d l’Algérie et
des departments d’Outre-Mer. Objet: Commission Consultative Nationale pour l’étude des questions
nord-africaines.
Social Security fund reserved specifically for Algerian migrants. With a limited budget of 20 million old francs in 1950 (approximately $57,000 USD in 1950) the Commission gave out small grants to associations.

There were two associations that, by the early 1950s, had obtained national status (with multiple centers throughout the country) and which the government enlisted to coordinate the work of other, smaller, associations. These were the Commission d’Aide aux Nord-Africains dans la Métropole (CANAM) and Aide morale aux Nord-africains (AMANA), which published studies of various aspects of North African migration (the Etudes Sociales Nord-Africanes), trained employers in working with the North African workforce, and managed youth hostels. These four major associations had been founded in the 1920s and 1930s.\(^{124}\) The CANAM bridged the logistical gap between state initiatives and the work of the dozens of small, varied, private associations providing services to North Africans in metropolitan France. An early report proposed that the CANAM should function as “a level of recourse, a superior and central authority” by serving as intermediary between state and local efforts.\(^{125}\) The goal of the CANAM was to “help people originating from North Africa in their adaptation to the conditions of life in the Metropole, by giving them aid and assistance in a spirit of fraternal solidarity.” Like the Ministries of the Interior, Labor, Public Health, and National Education, the CANAM developed and strengthened contacts with private associations, and it boasted maintaining “close and trustful relations with all the private works that are equally interested in the amelioration of

\(^{124}\) CARAN F1a 5056: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, “Situation actuelle de l’Assistance aux Nord-Africains résidant dans le Métropole,” 3. Two additional associations of note from this period are Amitiés Africaines, which assisted North African veterans, and le Service Social Familial, which gave material assistance and guidance to North African families.

\(^{125}\) CAC 19860271, 4: Rapport présenté par M. Darrouy-Secrétaire Général Administratif à M. le Président de la CANAM, 2.
the living conditions of North Africans in the Metropole.” Its funds came from private gifts from its members (including businesses using the North African workforce), rents from its workers’ shelters, and grants from local governments, the Algerian government, and the Ministry of the Interior, and they were managed by the Bank of Algeria.

In the year 1951/52, the CANAM gave out seven million francs (roughly $20,000 in 1950) in small grants to private associations. For example, the CANAM funded workers’ shelters—some provided free emergency housing, others charged tenants a fee—run by private associations. It also gave small loans to associations such as Aide aux Travailleurs dans la Région Marseillaise (ATOM) and Amitiés Nord-Africains in Nanterre. It became “particularly

126 CAC 198602371, 4: CANAM untitled memo, 1954.

127 The CANAM was created in 1927 by decision of the Gouverneur general de l’Algérie and was part of the Office Algérien d’Action Economique et Touristique (OFALAC) as a public entity, receiving most of its funding from the Gouvernement general de l’Algérie. It began as the Commission d’Assistance aux Nord-Africains and its original focus was assisting Algerian sanatorium patients, which included the delivery of food and other items during Muslim holidays. Its offices were located at 28, Ave. de l’Opéra, Paris and later moved to 14, rue J. J. Rousseau, Paris 1er. The CANAM’s board of directors also included representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Labor, and Public Health, the Administrative Office of the General Government of Algeria, the Director of the Bureau of Social Control of North Africans of Paris, the Bank of Algeria, the Paris branch of the French Red Cross, and the Muslim Institute. When the president of the money-strapped organization, Louis Morard, died in 1949, M. de Serres-Justiniac (who was at that time the Director of the Administrative Office of the General Government of Algeria and would later head the Social Action Fund) recommended that it reestablish itself as a private association. M. Le Beau, Honorary Governor General of Algeria, became its new president, and its vice presidents were M. Schiaffino, President of the Algiers Economic Region and M. Aouam, Vice President of l’Union Nationale des Blessés de Guerre. The new association, founded on February 8th, 1950, was named the Commission d’aide aux Nord-Africains dans la Métropole (a.k.a. Comité Louis Morard). It received substantial funding from the General Government of Algeria (20 million francs in 1952) and from the Ministries of the Interior and Public Health. A decree of May 7, 1954 recognized the CANAM as a public utility, meaning that its structure, use of funds, and distribution of assets needed to comply with statues set by the Conseil d’Etat and it was required to engage primarily in general interest activities. The CANAM later produced instructional propaganda radio programs in conjunction with RTF and the Ministry of the Interior. Its annual budget in 1959 was around 90 million NF. See CARAN Fla 5056, SAMAS Ref: SAM/AM No. 3-3658 “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre (à l’attention de Monsieur Galichon), Objet: Documents remis à la Présidence de la République,” November 12, 1959. See CAC 19860271, 4: The CANAM’s 1952 board of directors included representatives from the Ministries of the Interior, National Education, Labor, Public Health, and Foreign Affairs, the Prefecture of the Seine, and from the Offices of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.

128 CAC 19860271, 4: Rapport présenté par M. Darrouy-Secrétaire Général Administratif à M. le Président de la CANAM, 4.
close,” its 1952 annual report claimed, to the UNIOPOSS (Union Nationale Interfédérale des oeuvres privées sanitaires et sociales), and extended membership to the presidents of this and other associations. The CANAM was particularly active in the fields of workers’ education and housing, the same areas that the Ministry of Labor had deemed essential for integrating Algerian workers into metropolitan life. By the fall of 1951 the CANAM and the associations it funded were offering manual education classes at Ministry of Education adult education centers in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Grenoble. Additionally, private associations such as ATOM in Aix and Marseille and AMANA in Paris, Lille, Gennevilliers, and Lyon were offering general education classes.129 These classes combined academics (reading and writing French, history, geography, math) with cultural adaptation (using the telephone, letter writing, telegrams, walks, films, leisure, etc.).130 In March 1952, night classes opened for forty students in the workers’ shelter in Nanterre—a commune to the west of Paris where there was a large Algerian community and where a squalid shantytown existed into the 1970s—with the collaboration of and under the control of the Ministry of National Education. The CANAM was also one of the first to offer classes for North African youth and to advocate on their behalf at state meetings.131 Importantly, the courses offered by private associations included special classes for boys ages 14-17, and for women and girls, groups that would become key demographics in the Fifth Republic’s massive reform of social action.

The collaborative work of the CANAM and the French government in the areas of workers’ housing, education (for workers and, later, women and children), job placement, and


sanitation demonstrates a fairly broad vision—particularly for the early 1950s—of the social action needed for Algerian workers in metropolitan France. Indeed, its 1952 annual report optimistically stated that efforts were being made to “bring about the harmonious conjunction” of these specialized and polyvalent paths to facilitate “[Algerians’] integration into the national community.” The report later declared that the CANAM “desire[d] ardently to bring together different views, methods, and actions to pursue all of the paths possible to successfully carry out work in favor of North Africans, in an affirmed spirit of fraternal solidarity and affectionate comprehension.”

_Aide morale aux Nord-africains_ (AMANA) was one of the first associations dedicated to assisting North Africans in France. Its name, which translates roughly from Arabic as ‘trust,’ reflects the association’s goal of promoting mutual comprehension and acceptance between the North African and metropolitan communities. In their 1953 report on social action, the association described the teaching of “the minimum of knowledge necessary for a man to ‘manage himself’ normally in our cities” as a form of “patronage,” and as a “sustained and discrete friendship” between two people. AMANA was founded by professor of philosophy M. Bonduelle on December 22, 1945, and its president was Vice-Admiral Rivet. The association’s director and its primary driving force, however, was the Reverend Father Jacques Ghys. Ghys was a member of the Pères Blancs, a missionary order to Africa that had conducted

---

132 CAC 19860271, 4: Rapport présenté par M. Darrouy-Secrétaire Général Administratif à M. le Président de la CANAM, 1.
133 Ibid., 3.
134 AMANA still exists and today it helps people find work.

Jacques Ghys sought to remedy ignorance among the general French population about the Algerian community in France. For instance, members of AMANA taught the first Arabic dialect classes (Initiation Pratique à l’Arabe Dialectal, or IPAD) in France in 1949 at the Ecole Nationale de Santé.\footnote{CAC 19770391, 2: AMANA report, July 2, 1959.} In addition, the association’s 1953 pamphlet on social action contained a section entitled “Things to Know,” including a list of common Arabic words that metropolitan French people should learn such as caïd, imam, marabouts, and muphti, as well as how properly to address a person of authority. The pamphlet also reminded metropolitan readers to treat North Africans with respect, for instance, not to \textit{tutoyer} (use the informal form of ‘you’) to someone they had just met, and to keep in mind that North Africans had families, origins, and languages of their own. “Don’t make fun of their language,” it cautioned. Don’t make a joke out of deforming words because you risk making a fool of yourself and as a result losing a person’s ‘good graces.’ Did you know that not all speak Arabic but that a good number use Berber […]? It might be useful to keep this in mind in the formation of your [social action?] teams.”\footnote{CARAN F1a 5056: “Guide de l’action sociale au benefice des Nord-Africains en métropole,” \textit{Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines} no. 34, 1953, p. 54. “Ne vous moquez pas de leur langue. Ne vous amusez pas à déformer les mots car vous risqueriez de vous ridiculiser en en sortant de ‘bien bonnes.’ Savez-vous seulement que tous ne parlent pas arabe mais qu’un bon nombre emploie le berbère (chleuh marocain ou kabyle). Il serait peut-être utile d’en tenir compte dans la formation de vos équipes.”}
In 1947, Ghys founded *les Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines* (ESNA) to disseminate information on Maghrebi culture, society, and politics.\(^{140}\) ESNA published a weekly compilation of news reports on North Africa from the French as well as the international press, and between 1950 and 1965 it put out 103 *Cahiers Nord Africains* (North African notebooks), each devoted to a special topic relating to North Africans. According to Ghys, mutual understanding between peoples “on both sides of the Mediterranean” was necessary for successful integration of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians into French culture.\(^{141}\) The *Cahiers* were an open forum where writers with a variety of cultural and political backgrounds could voice their opinions on topics such as “La femme musulmane” (The Muslim Woman) and “Logement familial des Nord-Africains en France” (Familial Housing of North Africans in France). Contributors sought to dispel negative misinformation on the Muslim religion, for example, and to show that the North African community was comprised of permanent residents, many of whom lived with their families in France, rather than temporary single workers. This was a challenging undertaking because in the early 1950s the ‘myth of return’ dominated French attitudes toward North Africans in France (in face, this mistaken belief persisted into the 1970s). Most people believed that the workers who had arrived to meet the needs of France’s postwar economic boom had come to the country for that purpose alone, and would soon leave. This was, of course, far from the truth, and during these years increasing numbers of Algerians were being joined by their

---

\(^{140}\) Escafre-Dublet has written that with the founding of the *Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines*, AMANA acquired “expert status” on the matter of North African populations. For example, the *Cahiers nord-africains* became the reference for social workers working with North Africans and the manual they published, “Ali apprend le français,” became indispensible to reading classes. (59)

\(^{141}\) Ibid. In 1965, the two publications became *Hommes et Migrations*, which exists to this day.
wives and children. Others among them were marrying native French wives and starting families.

AMANA was particularly innovative in its attention to Algerian families. It operated primarily in areas of Paris with large North African populations, including the 20ème Arrondissement on the eastern periphery (its Maison de Jeunes was located on the Rue de Pelleport) and the Goutte d’Or neighborhood on the North side of the city. Its goal was to bring “aide et concours aux Nord-africains transplantés en France.” The association’s statutes list the association’s activities as “professional training classes, the organization of leisure, the support of youth, and the development of contacts between North Africans and Metropolitans.”

AMANA began receiving state funding in 1948 and was granted around 150,000 NF per year from the FAS (although the FAS was dedicated to Algerian workers and their families, AMANA’s efforts were directed to all North Africans in France). One of its earliest projects was the construction of a shelter for North African families in the Seine-et-Marne department. It started the first remedial education classes for North Africans in France and assisted in housing workers before the SONACOTRAL existed. The association had progressive views on familial migration. Its members advocated encouraging Algerian family settlement in France to combat social isolation and suppress pro-liberation unrest. As early as 1953, the Cahiers Nord-Africains were touting the “normalizing” effects of familial immigration on otherwise isolated, unruly

142 A description of Le Service Sociale Familial notes that the association provided social services for Muslim families as well as to “ménages mixtes.” See CARAN F1a 5056: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, “Situation actuelle de l’Assistance aux Nord-Africains résidant dans le Métropole,” 3.


144 CARAN F1a 5045: Programme des réalisations sociales au profit des travailleurs d’origine algérienne en métropole, Adopté par le Conseil d’Administration du Fonds d’Action sociale le 7 décembre 1960
single men.\footnote{145} Ghys even embraced the idea of North African men and French women raising families together, a revolutionary idea at the time. He also welcomed North African women, who, he argued, were the key to successful assimilation. One researcher in Marseille who contributed to the Cahiers, Agnès Pitrou, argued that families could bring much-needed stability to immigrant communities because they could be integrated into French culture in ways that single men could not.\footnote{146}

In 1954 there were approximately sixty-eight organizations—some privately run and others under the aegis of municipal or departmental governments—providing assistance to North Africans living in metropolitan France. These included organizations that offered help to anyone in need, including Algerians, as well as those that had specialized services aimed at this population. They were supplemented by twenty-two ‘centres d’accueil de passage’ (reception centers), which provided temporary shelter and, in a few cases, technical training, for North Africans arriving in France and, primarily, tried to ensure that they entered the workforce.\footnote{147} Many of the smaller associations were founded in the mid-1950s in direct response to the rise in migration from North Africa and were funded, from the outset, by the Ministry of the Interior.

Administrators readily acknowledged that more times that not, it was private associations, not state services, which provided crucial social assistance to North Africans in France. An unsigned report on private courses for North Africans in the metropole distributed at a November, 1953, meeting of the National Advisory Commission remarked that private initiative had long been concerned with “the problem of North Africans transplanted to the

\footnote{145} “Le logement des Nord-Africains, deuxième cahier,” 29.
\footnote{146} “Le logement des Nord-Africains à Marseille,” 45.
Metropole.” The report lauded private associations for sensing early on “the necessity of establishing human contacts with the category of the population, to help it adapt to metropolitan life.”\textsuperscript{148} For instance, associations sought to fill gaps in general instruction for adults and youth outside of the national French education system. Such classes were often conducted inside housing centers rather than in separate schools. While the action undertaken directly by the Ministry of National Education remained very insufficient, an unsigned report on education remarked, “One can only congratulate the private effort, which made clear the path on which the public powers have now embarked.”\textsuperscript{149} The state also relied on private initiatives to house workers. In 1954, a report on the working conditions of North Africans in France written by the Inspector General of Labor and the Workforce noted that North Africans enjoyed “equal employment opportunities, legal protection, and social advantages” but that the “insufficient, wretched conditions” of workers’ housing “left much to be desired.”\textsuperscript{150} A report on social action for North Africans in the metropole published by the Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines in the previous year cautioned readers against “the belief that they will find here the easy solution to the problems of housing North Africans,” since most workers’ shelters, such as those run by the French Red Cross and the Association of North African shelters in the Paris region, were totally full and likely to remain that way.\textsuperscript{151} The management of workers’ shelters constructed by the Ministry of labor was left to private associations—an example of the public/private partnership

\textsuperscript{148} CAC 19860271, 3: Commission Nationale Nord-Africaine, feuille de presence, Réunion du 18 Novembre 1953.


\textsuperscript{150} CAC 19860271, 2: 27 Sept. 1954 “Rapport Preliminaire de l’Inspecteur Général du Travail et de la Main-d’Œuvre Chaillé sur les conditions de travail et de view dans la Métropole des travailleurs Nord-africains.”

that would become the standard during Algerian War.152 Public and private efforts were complimentary, but it was the private associations that were most forward thinking, productive, and knowledgeable during these years.

The Algerian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior sought to exploit the associations’ knowledge at a series of training seminars at the École nationale de la santé publique (National School of Public Health). The goal of these seminars, which were held three times a year from 1956 to 1961, was to orientate government functionaries, social workers and public employees working in sectors where they interacted with Algerians to some of the issues specific to this population and to teach them skills for reaching and helping this community. The seminars included visits to associations in Paris as well as visits to social centers in the provinces. Experts on North African cultures and languages from private associations were frequent speakers at the National School of Public Health training seminars. For example, Jacques Ghys, who led AMANA, held two sessions at the inaugural seminar: one entitled “From pastoral civilization to industrial civilization: Psychology of the migrant” and another on “North African in crisis: From the political to the social.”153 General de Butler, president of the AEFPA, an association that provided job training and apprenticeship, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Seriey, president of Amitiés Africaines, which served North African military veterans and their

152 Workers’ housing was a source of tension between the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of the Interior. Labor had lobbied for funds to build shelters for several years but had not been able to get sufficient funds for the construction needed. Then, in 1956, the Ministry of the Interior created the Société national de construction de logements pour les travailleurs algériens et leurs familles (SONACOTRAL) under the law of August 4, 1956. SONACOTRAL, which received more funding than any other semi-public association, remained under the protective aegis of the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Travail was not involved in the SONACOTRAL, claiming it did not want to be part of an “enterprise of pacification” that moved social action away from its assimilationist foundation. See Viet, La France immigrée, 181. Inter-ministerial tensions persisted during the Algerian War and are addressed in Chapters 2 and 4.

153 CAC 19860271, 4: Comité scientifique et pédagogique de la section d’étude des problèmes sanitaires et sociaux concernant la migration algérienne en métropole, at the Ecole nationale de la santé publique, 1956-1961, “Program of the first training seminar.”
wives and children, held additional sessions. Each of these men would play crucial roles during the Algerian War, and at least one would come under the scrutiny of the Ministry of the Interior for his stance on Algerian independence.

Additionally, the training seminars brought to light rivalry between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Labor. Disagreements between these ministries over how to address problems related to North Africans in metropolitan France—which began as fights over funding for workers’ housing and later intensified with the creation of a heavily funded, Interior-run national society for the housing construction—affected plans for these training sessions. The Ministry of Labor was invited to serve on the planning committee, but refused. Six of the Ministry of Labor’s CSMONA social workers (contrôleurs sociaux de la main-d’oeuvre nord-africaine) were admitted to the first training session. When none of them showed up, a representative from the Ministry of the Interior wrote a letter to the Labor representative telling him what he was missing and reprimanding him on not sending his social workers to the training session. Tensions between government branches and especially surrounding Interior’s authority and the entry of policing and repression into the social action realm would intensify as the war continued.

‘The Events in Algeria’ and Cautious Optimism

By the mid-1950s there was cautious optimism across government Ministries on the prospects for assimilating the Algerian community into French society. The dominant themes in discussions from this period were that Algerian workers (though not their families) were a welcome presence, but the government needed to intervene to alleviate social ills. Employment rates among Algerians in France improved (to 80% of job seekers in October 1953) as the French
economy entered consistent economic growth at the start of the 1950s. The employment rate also rose due to the government’s order that employers not hire foreign workers if national workers (including Algerians) could be found, and demand for workers remained high.\footnote{CAC 19860271, 3: Commission Nationale Nord-Africaine, feuille de presence, Réunion du 18 Novembre 1953.}

In these years of optimism, government officials mobilized discourse on France’s unique ability to assimilate foreign cultures in arguments for Algerians’ cultural belonging in the French nation. This is noteworthy because they would later employ the same reasoning to criticize Algerians’ perceived failure to hold up their end of the deal. At the June 1955 meeting of the National Advisory Commission, Alfred Rosier compared concerns that Algerian workers would not adapt to fears earlier in the century about Breton farm laborers. He reminded attendees that France had conquered the task of assimilating regional cultures into a single French culture, so the same could be done with Algerians seeking work in France. In other words, given time and the proper training, Algerians would eventually assimilate.\footnote{CAC 19860271, 3: Commission consultative nationale pour l’étude des questions nord-africaines, PV of 29 June, 1955.} According to one official, the successes gained so far were largely due to the participation of the associations, many of whose leaders occupied spots on the advisory board of the National Advisory Commission.\footnote{The National Advisory Commission had, by 1953, become quite a cooperative organization and included representatives not only from various government ministries but also from the associations, labor unions, and the Algerian Assembly. CAC 19860271, 3: Commission Nationale Nord-Africaine, feuille de presence, Réunion du 18 Novembre 1953.}

Social services administrators of the Fourth Republic were initially slow to react to the Algerian War and did immediately use social action, as the Fifth Republic would later do, as a wartime tactic. Fighting Algerian nationalism in the metropole instead fell primarily under the jurisdiction of the military, national security, and the police, which, in August 1955 created the Service de coordination et d’information nord-africaines (SCINA), which kept records of daily
attacks and other nationalist activity. When the FLN began its bombing campaign to drive the French out of Algeria on November 1, 1954, the National Advisory Commission belatedly addressed the bombings only to the extent that they proved an obstacle to immigration. The war, which the French government stubbornly referred to as “the events in Algeria,” (leaders also claimed the 450,000 French soldiers in Algeria were not combat troops but were only “maintaining order and establishing security”) first appeared on the agenda at its April 10, 1956 meeting—nearly a year and a half after the war began—when “Repercussions of the events in Algeria on the employment of the Algerian workforce in the metropole” was number three on the order of the day.\(^{157}\) One concern was purely practical: the fighting was slowing the arrival of workers because it was more difficult for Algerians to depart from Algeria (although there is a report of a group who walked forty kilometers without stopping to get on a boat crossing the Mediterranean). This posed a problem particularly when Algerians worked at the “base cycle,” or the beginning stages, of production, because without their labor, industrial production was delayed. The National Advisory Commission wanted Algerian workers to continue to migrate to France because they were needed to keep industry running.

But the National Advisory Commission was also concerned about the war’s psychological repercussions on Algerian workers. The author of a report presented at the same 1956 meeting asserted that the events in Algeria had “provoked a state of anxiety” among the North African workforce, which was even stronger when workers originated from operational zones.\(^{158}\) The consequences, the report claimed, were already clear: stress, instability, and, worst of all from the Commission’s point of view, the desire to return to Algeria. Surprisingly, there is

\(^{157}\) It was only in 1999 that the French Chamber of Deputies and the Senate passed a law recognizing “the events in Algeria” as a war.

\(^{158}\) CAC 19860271, 3: Commission consultative nationale pour l’étude des questions nord-africaines, PV of meeting of April 10, 1956; Annex 3, 32-33.
no mention of Algerian workers posing a security threat because of their potential for nationalist uprising. The report expressed concern that employers, who were already fed up with Algerians’ participation in strikes, might be more reluctant to hire them because of the war, but there was no mention that this reluctance might have been due to fears of Algerian nationalism in the metropole. It warned that it was essential that employers not use the war as an excuse to replace Algerians with foreign labor. There was “nothing alarming” about Algerian manpower in France, the report claimed. “With the help of rational measures it seems possible to remedy the difficulties reported in certain industrial sectors affected by the unforeseen departures” of Algerian workers.\(^{159}\) Ultimately, the Ministry of Labor wanted Algerians to remain in France. Certainly, there were economic reasons for this desire: Algerians provided a source of unskilled, cheap labor. Whether or not the employment of Algerians in the metropole had greater political significance in these years is unclear.

Even within the ranks of the High Committee on Population and the Family—which had based earlier recommendations for limiting Algerian migration on ethno-racism—there was a newfound sensitivity to the plight of Algerians in France. A report on “Algerian Muslims in France and in the Islamic Countries,” for example, acknowledged the many problems posed by the influx of unskilled, non-francophone Algerian workers into metropolitan France, yet called for sympathy and understanding rather than repatriation.\(^{160}\) The authors of the report expressed concern, as did nearly all commentators on Algerian migration, that Algerians were unprepared for life and work in a Western, industrialized country such as France. Evoking a common stereotype, the authors described “the Algerian peasant, lost in our industrial cities,” who was

---

\(^{159}\) Ibid.

“morally, totally abandoned.” However, rather than point to an innate ethnic inferiority, as Georges Mauco and others had done, the report blamed poverty and the failure of the authorities to take necessary action on Algerians’ failure to integrate into French society. Foreshadowing the increase in public works of the Fifth Republic, the report called for Frenchmen to take action to avoid the perceived cultural divide’s growing larger: “Bridges can and should be built,” it proclaimed, “not only by the authorities, but also by French workers and businessmen.” Whatever steps are taken to ameliorate the problem, the authors asserted, with colonial propriety, they must be “humane, fair, and benevolent.”

Likewise, French officials tended to attribute differences in French and Algerian culture to economic or environmental factors rather than to innate biological, i.e. racial, traits. There were disparities, but these, they claimed, could be lessened through increased economic development in Algeria and social action in the metropole. The authors of a demographic report on Algeria submitted in 1956 to the High Committee on Population and the Family asserted that the high birthrate among non-white Algerians could be lessened with education and rapid economic development that would “raise the standard of living and the cultural level of the Muslim masses.” The authors’ recommendations for social action in Algeria are similar to those that were eventually undertaken in metropolitan France: education, with emphasis on Muslim young women who, thanks to domestic education and social worker visits, would abandon old habits. One can observe in this demographic report on Algeria a view of culture as malleable and formed by circumstances rather than as fixed and innate. Its authors were concerned with

161 Ibid., 15.
162 Ibid., 16.
practical differences in ways of living, and they therefore directed welfare services to disparities that they believed could be overcome.

The same report also addressed the possible structural causes of Algerians’ perceived isolation. “If Muslims have a tendency to live in groups,” its authors reasoned, “this is often by necessity and it is not less true that numerous youth wish to establish themselves in European society. The possibility of housing themselves ‘like everyone else’ should be offered to them.”164 This thinking illustrates a shift from the innate race-based conception of Algerian difference proclaimed in the interwar period and under the Vichy regime, to one based on external, economic, or structural, factors. The fact that officials began focusing on economic development in Algeria as a way to ease migrants’ transition to industrial life in French cities supports this transition. Such initiatives foreshadowed reforms proposed, but never fully carried out, by the Constantine Plan of 1959.

The assumption among those in power that Algerians would not settle permanently in France may account for the lack of explicit discussion of Algerians’ “foreign culture” and “failure to assimilate” in this era versus during the Algerian War. In other words, the belief that Algerians would not become a permanent fixture in French society rendered any cultural difference of little concern, particularly when compared to immediate social issues such as poverty, housing shortages, and unemployment. Additionally, the idea that Algerian national culture could be a threat to French cultural or political power does not appear to have been of much concern to Fourth Republic officials. As the war progressed, the Algerian National Liberation Front increasingly promoted a distinct Algerian national culture—as well as their particular brand of Islam—in which Algerians could take pride. The Algerian identity offered by

164 Ibid.
the FLN represented an alternative to the dominant French idea of Algerian culture as traditional, unenlightened, and produced by poverty. As a consequence, Algerian national culture, and Islam in particular, came to be seen as threats to French authority. Under the Fourth Republic, however, this was not yet the case.

The year 1956 witnessed an escalation of violence in Algeria, where the FLN had been waging guerilla warfare against French colonial forces. The fighting coincided with a state-level structural change that would have significant implications in the government’s dealings with the Algerian community in France. The Ministry of Interior—responsible for state security—began increasingly to intervene in services related to the Algerian population. Earlier concerns about Algerians assimilating peacefully into French society found new footing in the context of national security and the preservation of the empire. The SONACOTRAL, an organization devoted to building housing for Algerians in France, was created by the law of August 4th, 1956 “under the protective aegis” of the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Labor, which had lobbied for years for funding to build workers’ housing, opposed its creation. Additionally, an inter-ministerial action Committee for social affairs concerning the Muslim Algerian population in the metropole, which was to have been presided over by the Ministry of the Interior was planned, but never met. According to Vincent Viet, this was because other ministries “Did not want to be part of an enterprise of pacification” that moved social action away from its assimilationist foundation. The Ministry of the Interior’s takeover of social action hints at the tension that was to arise between French government Ministries, each with their own conflicting

---

165 Ministry of the Interior control of social services for Algerians in France culminated with the creation in April 1958 of the Services des Affaires Musulmanes et d’Action Sociale (SAMAS), whose goal was to suppress the spread of FLN influence in the metropole through the surveillance and assimilation of the Algerian community. See Chapter 2.


167 Ibid.
obligations. Among these were the alleviation of poverty, the encouragement of economic growth, the elimination of FLN activity in the metropole, and the maintenance of French political power in Algeria—the issue that caused the fall of the Fourth Republic and brought Charles de Gaulle back to power in 1958.

Conclusion

The Fourth Republic mobilized an under-funded hodgepodge of state Ministries, committees, and, most effectively, private associations, to welcome and train Algerians searching for work in France’s rapidly expanding industrial economy. Its scattered efforts to improve employment and housing appear, in many ways, in stark contrast to the authoritative surveillance apparatus that replaced them. In fact, a 1952 memo from the Minister of the Interior’s office explicitly cautioned Departmental Prefects that the social workers sent by the Governor General of Algeria to address “Muslim questions” were forbidden from engaging in “police methods of surveillance that might cast doubt on the humanitarian character of their mission.”168 In terms of structure and ideological convictions, however, the Fourth and Fifth Republics have much in common. The fact that the Prefects had to be told that the government had not stationed social workers in these areas so they could spy on the Algerian community arguably implies that there were those among them who thought otherwise.

By the time the FLN’s assault on French political control of Algeria made the tenuous situation of Algerians in metropolitan France worthy of the attention of top officials, the idea that this population needed special assistance was taken for granted. Thus, when, in late 1958,

representatives from the Ministry of the Interior proposed revolutionary welfare reforms in favor of Algerians, they could draw on what was by then a familiar trope. State initiatives based on the assumption that Algerians were not only culturally handicapped but also potentially dangerous predate not only de Gaulle’s coming to power, but also the Algerian War itself. Indeed, it was under the guise of using social welfare to assimilate a population at an inherent cultural disadvantage that the Fifth Republic launched its tangled blend of social welfare and police repression.
Chapter 2

Fighting Poverty, Fighting Algerian Nationalism at the Transition to the Fifth Republic (1957-59)

As the Algerian War escalated, tens of thousands of Algerians migrated to metropolitan France, drawn there by the promise of employment in the rapidly growing industrial economy and fleeing the zones of ‘pacification’ to which the French military had forced thousands to resettle. A 1958 census recorded 318,400 so-called ‘French Muslims from Algeria’\(^\text{169}\) in France, where they were concentrated in rundown housing and in rapidly growing bidonvilles (shantytowns) in the industrial suburbs outside French cities.\(^\text{170}\) This resulted in what Jim House and Neil MacMaster have described as the “ideal conditions for the elaboration of the clandestine networks” of the Algerian National Liberation Front or, FLN and its rival, the Mouvement nationale algérien (MNA).\(^\text{171}\) The responses of the French government to these two problems—Algerian nationalism and poverty—overlapped significantly. Indeed, as this chapter demonstrates, they were two sides to a single policy.

In the final months of the Fourth Republic and, later, under de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, Algerians living in metropolitan France came uniformly to be seen by many state administrators

\(^{169}\) This was the term used by the French government to describe non-European Algerians.

\(^{170}\) F1a 5010: Ministère de l’Interieur, Cabinet du Ministre, Affaires Sociales Musulmanes en métropole, “Repartition des Nord Africains en Metropole” January 1958. The report showed 125,000 Algerians in the Department of the Seine. There were also high concentrations in Lyon, Metz, Lille, and Marseille.

as criminals and potential terrorists.\textsuperscript{172} Yet these same governments also undertook an unprecedented investment in social services geared specifically toward the integration of Algerians into French society. This chapter explores why this was the case. To brush aside these social aid programs as mere fronts for state policing and surveillance is too simplistic, although in some instances this was the case. It is more accurate to address the contradictions inherent in French social welfare programs for Algerians after 1958, and the varied ways in which administrators conceptualized the services they provided. What makes the final years of the Algerian War fascinating is that social services became tools of shaping national allegiance, at times in violent and repressive ways. This chapter approaches the policies pursued in these years as attempts by various state agents not only to curtail nationalist activity and reduce poverty, but fundamentally to redefine Algerians’ place in the French nation.

Recent historiography has drawn attention to the contradiction inherent in singling out Algerians in order to secure their equal status in a color-blind republic.\textsuperscript{173} Research has shown that the plethora of state services that targeted Algerians were not an anomaly wrought on an otherwise pure and perfectly functioning republic by the sins of empire, but were instead the imperial side of the republican project. Yet most studies have concentrated on either the policing of Algerians in France, or social action for them, rather than addressing them as two interlocking

\textsuperscript{172} For simplicity’s sake I will use ‘Algerian.’ ‘French Muslims from Algeria’ was the accepted term at the time but was used interchangeably with ‘North African’ and ‘Algerian.’

elements of a broader policy. This chapter explores the ideological as well as structural roots, from roughly 1957-59, of the Fifth Republic’s marriage of policing and social action and illustrates the interconnectedness of the complex bureaucracy created by Charles de Gaulle and his cabinet. It argues that social welfare for Algerians in France during this period was a product of the Algerian War and was explicitly designed to meet counterterrorist as well as integrationist ends. Indeed, these two goals worked hand in hand, as did the agencies that upheld them.

As discussed in Chapter 1, in the ten years following World War II, government officials undertook measures to alleviate poverty and unemployment and to provide training and education to Algerian workers for employment in French industry. They concentrated efforts on social ills that plagued the Algerian community in France rather than its political allegiances. Money was perennially in short supply, yet officials were optimistic that through a combination of public and private programs, they could produce a healthy, productive, and assimilated French Algerian workforce. This is not to say that Algerians’ presence in the metropole was unproblematic. Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim discourse, employment discrimination, and police brutality toward Algerians and other colonial peoples (such as the *tirailleurs senegalais*—Senegalese riflemen, the general term for black African soldiers serving in the French army) were all present in France long before Algerian independence became a likely possibility. Furthermore, Fourth Republic bureaucrats routinely debated whether Algerians’ newly granted

---


French citizenship guaranteed them training, housing, or other forms of social welfare when they arrived to work in France.

Yet by the start of the Fifth Republic, social action discourse had become thoroughly imbued with the language of empire. There was more at stake for government administrators than migrants’ poverty, disease, or unemployment. The social welfare of Algerians in France became not only a marker of the French state’s commitment to their integration into the national body, but also a means by which the government could keep tabs on and shape the lives of members of the people with whom it was at war. The answers to how, and why, social action went from being a social issue to a matter of urgent political importance married to surveillance and repression can be found in the escalation of violence in Algeria and the entry of Algerian nationalism, and especially the FLN, into metropolitan France.

**Crisis in Algeria**

Public opinion in France was largely against the Algerian War. The draft made the war unpopular, and the lack of international support for the war (including monetary support from the United States) made many in France question the wisdom in fighting. There were French protests from the left as well as Catholic democratic tradition of the Resistance.\(^{176}\) The diminishing economic importance of the empire and, later, public knowledge of the French military’s use of torture, made many in France willing to accept Algerian independence.

However, for the military establishment as well as for Gaullists and others in France, French national pride depended on maintaining control of Algeria. Unexpected defeat in May 1954 at Dien Bien Phu, six months before the start of nationalist violence in Algeria, represented

\(^{176}\) Interestingly, other former Resistance members were pro-war and founded social aid organizations upon de Gaulle’s return to power. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
not only the loss of political control of Indochina, but also a severe blow to French status as a world imperial power.\(^{177}\) Therefore, although public opinion was largely ready to accept the end of imperialism, French leaders were unwilling to give Algeria the independence that had been granted to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos after defeat in 1954 and to Morocco and Tunisia after peaceful settlements in 1956. Even Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France, who, despite calls from the military officials to continue fighting, had brought the conflict in Indochina to an end, refused to support Algerian independence (he would, however, later speak out against repressive policies in Algeria). In November 1954, in response to the start of FLN attacks in Algiers, Interior Minister and future Socialist President François Mitterrand famously proclaimed: “Algeria is France.”

As the war escalated, so, too, did French repression of the Algerian population on both sides of the Mediterranean. In Algeria, Generals Raoul Salan and Jacques Massu rejected Mendès-France’s strategy of pacification and integration. Under pressure from the *colons* (European settlers) in Algeria, new Prime Minister Guy Mollet gave the military free reign to put down the rebellion. The March 16, 1956 Special Powers Act granted the French governments in Paris and Algiers the power to introduce any measures necessary to combat the FLN, transferring police and civil functions to the army and leading to what House and MacMaster have described as “a dangerous concentration of power that slid towards a quasi-fascist, militarized regime.”\(^{178}\) Tensions reached a head, when, in October 1956, French officials violated international law by intercepting the airplane carrying future Algerian president Ahmed Ben Bella and forcing it to land in Tunisia, where Ben Bella and other FLN members were arrested and later imprisoned.

---

\(^{177}\) Defeat at Dien Bien Phu was also of significance to the FLN as it demonstrated that defeating France was a possibility.

During the infamous Battle of Algiers, which lasted from January to October, 1957, General Massu’s armed forces used counter-insurgency tactics developed during the Indochina War, including the systematic use of torture.¹⁷⁹

The FLN Arrives in the Metropole

Initially, the Mouvement nationale algérien (MNA), which Messali Hadj created at the outbreak of the Algerian War as a counter to the FLN, was the sole representative of armed nationalist struggle in metropolitan France. But the arrival of the first emissaries of the FLN in 1955 broke the hegemony of the MNA. The MNA was more moderate than the FLN and was willing to compromise with French leaders, and ideological disagreement became violent in Algeria, where the FLN defeated MNA guerillas. In 1956 the fighting between the two organizations spread to the metropole, with the FLN progressively succeeding through the dual strategies of armed struggle and a hearts and minds campaign that included a mixture of social action and political propaganda. Thus, it sought to become the primary interlocutor between the Algerian community in France and the French state. Mohamed Lebjaoui, a member of the Conseil national de la révolution algérienne, was designated head of the Fédération de France du FLN, and he arrived in metropolitan France in January 1957. As Linda Amiri has explained, Lebjaoui initially knew little about Algerian life in the metropole, but eventually he became aware of the “political as well as material possibilities” that existed there.¹⁸⁰ The internal reorganization he headed included the creation of l’Amicale générale des travailleurs algériens,

¹⁷⁹ Although French leaders repeatedly denied that torture was used, it was widely documented in works such as Henri Alleg’s 1958 La Question.

which organized an eight-day strike from January 28 to February 4, 1957, resulting in police surveillance of their meetings and the arrest of three FLN leaders, including Lebjaoui. Lebjaoui’s replacement was Omar Boudaoud, whose orders were to intensify the armed struggle by executing important people, to sabotage communications and vital centers of the French economy, to intensify propaganda, and to collect as much money as possible. By 1958 the French Federation of the FLN had overtaken the MNA in the metropole and established a ‘state within a state’ whose aim was complete control over Algerian migrants in the metropole. The dues collected by the French Federation financed in large part the Provisional Government of Algeria (GPRA). Therefore, beating the FLN in metropolitan France meant a halt in Algeria’s claims to independence.

In 1957 the FLN was blamed for murders in the French cities of Firminy and Stains, an attempted murder in Knuttange, and death threats addressed to employees in two workers’ shelters in the Paris region. The power of the Ministry of the Interior over social services for Algerians in France increased dramatically in 1957 following the redistribution of duties between the governments in Paris and Algiers in response to the arrival of the war in metropolitan France. The Ministry of the Interior’s responsibilities in Algeria were transferred to the new Ministry of

---


Algeria, which was given “quasi dictatorial powers” including legislative authority. Thus relieved of its duties in Algeria, the Ministry of the Interior redirected personnel, resources, and methods of controlling the native population in Algeria to controlling Algerians in the metropole.

**The Muslim Affairs and Social Action Service (SAMAS): Social action as counterterrorism**

The Ministry of the Interior had long held a watchful eye not only over Algeria, but also over Algerians in France. Its funding and influence in social services for Algerians in the metropole increased steadily up to the creation of the SAMAS in April 1958. Since 1947, there had been a specialized section, “au sein du bureau politique” of the Sous-Direction de l’Algérie at the Ministry of the Interior, which replaced the office of Algerian Affairs at the liberation.

In 1952, the “magnitude of the problems posed by [the Algerian population in France]” led to the addition of eight Algerian Civil Service administrators and the creation of an Office of Muslim Affairs. As discussed in Chapter 1, this office coordinated the work of the other ministries (Labor, Public Health, Education, etc.). The Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior chaired the Interdepartmental Action Committee for Muslim Social Affairs. However, while it was indirectly involved Interior handled only issues of public order and a limited number of other services, such as repatriation, while the bulk of social services were provided by the Ministry of Labor, and, to a lesser extent, Public Health, Education, Public Works, and Agriculture.

---

184 Viet, *La France immigrée*,


186 Ibid.

by 1957, initiated some of the services that would define social services in the Fifth Republic. For example, it already had several *conseillers techniques* (‘technical advisors’) in the field, working closely with Algerians. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior was by the early 1950s awarding grants to private associations that provided services to the Algerian community. Among the Bureau’s early accomplishments were a summer camp for Algerian youth in the Prefecture of the Seine (a means of teaching patriotism to youth at risk of falling into the hands of the FLN—see Chapter 3) in 1957 and the construction of two emergency transit shelters for Algerian workers.

On April 1, 1958, days before Prime Minister Félix Gaillard’s fall and one month before a mob seized government buildings in Algiers and demanded de Gaulle’s return, Gaillard’s government created a new organization that would irrevocably change the French government’s dealings with the Algerian community in France.\(^{188}\) The Service des affaires musulmanes et de l’action sociale (Service of Muslim Affairs and Social Action, SAMAS) married social aid for and police surveillance of Algerians in France and was under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.\(^{189}\) Its goal was to implement “an effective social policy designed to facilitate the adaptation of Algerian workers and their families to the conditions of life in the metropole” and thereby “thwart the designs of separatist parties.”\(^{190}\) In his plan of action for his new agency, Interior Minister Bourgès-Maunoury wrote of the necessity to define and put into practice a policy that “displayed both firmness and generosity, the fight against terrorism being strictly

\(^{188}\) The SAMAS was created by the arrêté of April 1, 1958.

\(^{189}\) The French Ministry of the Interior, unlike the United States Department of the Interior, is the branch of government responsible for national security, including law enforcement and identity papers. Giving the Ministry of the Interior a central role in welfare programs for Algerians was essentially like granting authority to the FBI or the Department of Homeland Security. This shows that the top echelons of the French government viewed Algerians in France as a matter of national security.

\(^{190}\) “Programme d’action à l’égard de la population musulmane algérienne en métropole,” 12.
linked to the effectiveness of social action,” which he asserted was the “indispensable complement to repressive action.” Thus, with the creation of the SAMAS, social aid became an explicit wartime tactic. Projects undertaken by many government agencies were meant, to varying degrees, to indirectly curtail FLN activity. But in the policies of the SAMAS there were explicit linkages between counterterrorism and cultural assimilation, and counterterrorism was always the end goal of social action. Its emphasis on cultural assimilation was also unprecedented. In the decade following the end of World War II, French administrators undertook job training, housing, and other initiatives to make Algerians productive workers in the French industrial economy. Yet it was only after the start of the Algerian War in 1954 and the subsequent rise in FLN attacks in metropolitan France in particular that policy makers explicitly sought to encourage cultural assimilation as a form of political control.

Interior officials envisioned the SAMAS as a major centralizing body that would “animate and coordinate all activities of public and private order in favor of French Muslims in the metropole.” It was divided into four sections: the Section for Documentation and Studies (research, reports, migration patterns of the North African workforce), the Administration Section (management, budget, control of the associations, aid to victims of terrorism and repatriation, Institut Musulman, and the Mosquée de Paris), the Section of Social and Psychological Action and Moral Aid (methods of action, training seminars), and the Section of Housing and Shelter for the Muslim Population living in France (relations with the SONACOTRAL and the other departments, housing policy, protection and relocation of Algerians under attack from the FLN).

191 Ibid., 2.
192 CARAN F1a 5010: Ministry of the Interior, Circulaire No. 206 of April 22, 1958
The SAMAS’s governing principle was that the integration of the Algerian Muslim population into French society was vital to fighting Algerian nationalism in the metropole. As its leader, prefect Marcel Blanchard explained it, even though the government was undertaking sufficient “repressive means based on proven methods,” the specific problems posed by the “delicate” fight against FLN activity in the metropole caused the need for action to “go beyond cleanly policing or repressive action.”

According to Interior Minister Bourgès-Maunory, the alleviation of poverty and social advancement of individuals were insufficient given the rapid spread of nationalism, and it was thus imperative that policy translated to “real integration in the metropolitan community of Muslim citizens from Algeria.” By integration, he meant breaking up isolated communities, teaching the French language, training and employing workers, sending children to French schools, encouraging housekeeping practices that met its standards of what was ‘French’ and ‘modern,’ and generally increasing Algerian participation in government welfare programs.

What is curious about the Interior Minister’s approach to Algerians in France is that, although he claimed that the majority of them were loyal and peaceful, he also held the paternalistic view that all Algerians had the potential to become terrorists without state intervention. On the one hand the Interior Minister downplayed the nationalist threat. In memos to fellow administrators he reduced the Algerian nationalist movement, which was at the time dominating the French military in Algeria, to mere “agitation.” He emphasized that Algerians truly belonged in the French nation, pointing out that “Despite the exaction and the threats from Algerian separatist parties, despite the murderous violence of their political rivalries, the

---

agitation that has developed here is only that of a minority.”

Bourgès-Maunoury even referred to “the clean divorce,” that he claimed had taken place between Algerian nationalists and the majority of the Muslim population in the metropole, who wanted only peace and tranquility, not Algerian independence, and wrote of the need to “encourage metropolitan opinion to separate the guilty parties from the masses of sound migrants and to be welcoming, understanding and fraternal toward them.” In a February 1958 memo, Bourgès-Maunory waxed sentimental and implored his team of administrators to “Arouse, in their respective regions and departments, a common will for the year 1958 to be truly the year when the Muslim population of Algerian origin becomes aware of its unshakeable belonging in the national community.”

On the other hand, the Interior Minister seemed to view all Algerians in metropolitan France as uniformly foreign, isolated, and potentially dangerous. In the same report he wrote that the community of Algerian immigrants in France formed a “relatively homogenous whole which, with the exception of a small number, differentiate[d] itself naturally from the population of French origin as a whole.” Language, culture, and lifestyle, he claimed, made for a “de facto separation” from metropolitan society, which Algerians’ living conditions further accentuated.

SAMAS head Marcel Blanchard echoed this concern with Algerians’ isolation in his August, 1958 report on “Problems posed by terrorism in the metropole.” “For the majority of Algerian Muslims,” Blanchard wrote, “life in the metropole remains a temporary exile.”

---

194 Ibid., 1.
195 Ibid., 2.
197 CARAN F1a 5010, Note of 23 Juillet 1958 from Marcel Blanchard, head of SAMAS, to Interior Minister Pelletier. Objet: “Problèmes poses par le terrorisme Nord-Africain en Métropole.”
imposed by the shock of being “transplanted into a society whose structure is essentially
different” from their own. To cope with their isolation, Algerians grouped themselves in
“colonies” where they maintained “all of the strict traditions of solidarity that characterize their
society of origin, of patriarchal structure” on the margins of metropolitan society, with which
they kept “only the necessary contacts.” If metropolitan workers were hostile to Algerians—he
wrote of the “growing hatred” among metropolitan workers toward the Algerian worker—and
employers refused to hire them, Blanchard argued, Algerians were to blame for having isolated
themselves. Like the Interior Minister, Blanchard differentiated between FLN instigators
(“terrorists”) and the Algerians who, in his mind, were mere victims of the FLN’s power in the
metropole. Yet he, too, saw all migrants as potentially dangerous. He wrote that, having
withdrawn from metropolitan society because of poverty and the difficulty of moving to a
foreign place, Algerian migrants were now “isolated or shut in in the strict circle of their own
society whose spirit of solidarity now opposes any idea of independence toward nationalist
movements.”198 In other words, the FLN was forcing all Algerians to join their movement and to
oppose assimilation. But the government could make this pressure easier to resist by integrating
Algerians into French society. As Blanchard explained: “The Muslim worker will offer more
effective resistance to the pressure of terrorism if he feels better integrated into metropolitan life
and if he is no longer pushed by his complex of uprootedness to seek the traditional solidarity of
the ethnic group to which he belongs. All of the social measures that attempt to avoid the
Algerian worker feeling isolated or victimized by the environment in which he lives thus
complement psychological action.”199 To fight isolation, therefore, was to fight the FLN.

198 Ibid., 1.
199 Ibid., 9.
Bourgès-Maunory and Blanchard took for granted a frequently-invoked dichotomy: the ‘native’ French population, regardless of ethnic background, religion, political views, social class, etc. versus the unassimilated mass of ‘barbaric Algerian Muslims.’ Whereas they saw Italian and Portuguese immigrants as assimilable, both men clearly delineated French nationality as European and non-Muslim, and Algerian culture—which they never clearly defined—as a hurdle to assimilation and even a potential source of violence. Moreover, by attributing Algerian nationalism to a lack of assimilation on the part of the Algerian community in France, they reduced Algerian political agency to a cultural handicap; a sign not only of physical poverty but of moral and intellectual weakness as well. If only Algerians were assimilated into French society, the Interior Minister and his chief bureaucrat reasoned, they would realize the superiority of the French political system—never mind the hundred and fifty years of racially based colonial domination and exploitation—and would agree to remain under French control. Using this black and white model, policy makers were able to justify targeting Algerian migrants on the basis that none were assimilated and all were at risk of falling, against their will, under FLN control.

Bourgès-Maunory and Blanchard also understood that they needed at least to appear to be treating Algerians as equal citizens in order to win them over to the French cause. The idea was that Algerians could be convinced to remain loyal to France if they believed the state was welcoming them and treating them with fairness.200 “It cannot escape you,” the Interior Minister wrote to regional leaders, “that, in the present circumstances, the conditions in which the Muslim population in the metropole is received, aided, adopted, and protected, have a direct effect on its

state of mind and on the state of mind of families living in Algeria.” Blanchard echoed these sentiments, asserting that the government had to create a “psychological climate of confidence and tranquility” by guaranteeing Algerians work and decent housing as well as security, so that they felt “neither isolated or victimized.”

The scope of the SAMAS was widespread and varied, reflecting the broad way in which ‘Muslim Affairs’ and ‘social services’ were defined. One way in which the Ministry of the Interior sought to combat isolation of Algerians in France was through its housing policy, and in 1957 the vast majority of the Ministry of the Interior’s budget for social action for Algerians in the metropole was devoted to housing (nearly 400 million francs out of a total just over 500 million). Most of these funds went to the Société National de Construction de Logements pour les Travaillers Algérians et leurs familles (SONACOTRAL), which constructed dormitory-style shelters (foyers) exclusively for immigrant workers as well as HLMs (habitations à loyer modéré), which resemble American housing projects, for immigrant families. Another 100 million francs went to emergency shelters. In 1957, Ministry of the Interior funds helped build two emergency shelters of one hundred beds each in Orléans and Nantes as well as a vacation camp for one hundred young Algerian workers who were staying in shelters in the Paris region.

201 “Programme d’action à l’égard de la population musulmane algérienne en métropole,” 4.
“Problèmes poses par le terrorisme Nord-Africain en Métropole,” 2.


204 F1a 5010: Ministère de l’Intérieur, Bureau des Affaires Sociales Musulmanes en Metropole, 18 October 1957, “Affaires Sociales”
The government had founded the SONACOTRAL in 1956 in response to rapidly increasing immigration and a severe housing shortage caused by rising birth rates and migration from rural regions into urban areas in addition to the arrival of immigrant workers. A few firms built hostels for their employees, but most Algerians—as well as Portuguese, Spaniards, Tunisians, and Moroccans—had to scramble for a place to live. Some rented rooms in lodging houses run by *marchands de sommeil* (slumlords). Others, especially those with families, lived in bidonvilles, which one contemporary French observer referred to as the “leprosy” of French cities. As they grew rapidly in size and as fears about FLN power in France heightened throughout the Algerian War, the problem of the bidonvilles continued to plague the French administration. A 1959 report from the Ministry of the Interior stated: “The living conditions in the bidonville of Nanterre [a suburb west of Paris] are worse than those of any other Algerian settlement. This veritable ‘cour des miracles’ without houses, roads, or hygiene is a challenge to human dignity.”

Administrators in the Ministry of the Interior viewed the bidonvilles, rundown lodging houses, and cafés where Algerians congregated as a serious threat to both public safety and to winning the war. For instance, one SAMAS administrator described the areas of dense Algerian population where there were “groups of individuals of doubtful character who easily escaped all surveillance.” The housing shortage, he claimed, thus “facilitated the diffusion of

---

206 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche No. 5, “Une expérience-pilote : la liquidation du Bidonville de Nanterre,” secret. The expression ‘cour des miracles’ refers to the place in Paris where the blind and disabled would beg during the day (and by nighttime they could see again—hence the ‘miracle.’)
207 “Programme d’action à l’égard de la population musulmane algérienne en métropole,” 7.
anti-national propaganda.” These concerns were legitimate. Partly in response to attempts by Police Prefect Maurice Papon to “penetrate the Algerian community through the SAT and under the guise of social work” (see below) the FLN French Federation had created a “parallel state within a state.” By 1959, it had turned the immigrant community into what sociologists Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys have described as an “almost self-sufficient counter-society.” Support for the FLN among Algerians in the metropole was not a given, and at the beginning of the war many Algerians were not committed to fighting. Like the French government, FLN leaders used a combination of social action and coercion to garner the support they desired. The FLN stepped in where the government had been reluctant to intervene, creating health and social welfare committees that provided Muslim schools, family benefits (because so many men were in prison or in detention centers), and housing repairs and offered families protection from the police in exchange for dues and oaths of allegiance to Algerian nationalism. It also set up a clandestine system of taxation, including fines for breaches of discipline, and comités de justice, which imposed sharia law and punished migrants for breaches of discipline and for those who took any recourse to the French judicial system. The hope of the French Federation was to restrict Algerian migrants’ contact not only with the French state but with French society in general.

Marcel Blanchard believed the destruction of the bidonvilles and the relocation of residents were essential to beating the FLN. “All efforts relating to the amelioration of this

---


211 Ibid.

212 House and Macmaster, Paris 1961, 63.
situation,” he asserted, “result in the stabilization of Algerian migration in the metropole and, thus, contribute appreciably to the fight against terrorism.”

Blanchard advocated relocating Algerian families living in the bidonvilles to *centres d’urgence* and *centres de transit* where, he claimed, they could experience more stability and would also be subject to “the essential rules of hygiene and policing.” For single men, he advocated relocation to dormitories. He hoped these would only be a temporary solution, allowing time for the ‘*assainissement*’ (cleansing) of their old neighborhoods—tearing them down and replacing them with modern apartment buildings.

Blanchard’s policies illustrate the important link many contemporary observers drew between Algerians’ degree of cultural assimilation and their allegiance to the French government. The place a migrant called home was used as the judge of his character, his modernity, and his aptitude for becoming a Frenchman. But housing seemed also to offer solutions. By replacing shantytowns with modern high-rises, reformers hoped to make assimilation work. In an era when the future of Algerians in France was uncertain, housing took on a supreme importance because of the essential, internal changes it was believed to produce. By housing Algerian workers in dormitories and HLMs, policy makers hoped to encourage French cultural practices and thereby to sever workers’ ties to Algeria. One transitional subsidized housing high-rise in Marseille, for example, was consecrated to the “progressive education” of Algerians and to their “adaptation to life in a modern apartment complex.”

---

213 “Problèmes poses par le terrorisme Nord-Africain en Métropole,” 2.

214 F1a 5010: Ministère de l’Interieur, Cabinet du Ministre, Affaires Sociales Musulmanes en métropole “Note concernant les credits du chapitre 41-53—Subventions en faveur des populations algériennes résident en métropole,” 4. ‘Centre de transit,’ such as the one in Vincennes, were put in place to identify migrants arriving in the metropole who were part of the FLN.

215 “Pour le logement des Africains du Nord” *Cahiers Nord-Africains*, 85 (August-September 1960) 25. Assumptions about culture as a marker of national allegiance would continue to define policy vis-à-vis
Beyond assimilation, Blanchard’s motivation for relocating Algerians was to disrupt FLN organization and sever lines of communication between nationalists. “Being housed in a shelter where workers of different ethnic origins are admitted,” he explained, “permits a more effective protection against terrorist commandos and insures a more rapid assimilation to metropolitan life, in a climate of greater tranquility.”

By the summer of 1958, the combined efforts of the Labor and Interior Ministries and several private associations had built space for 10,000 beds, with another 50,000 planned.

In addition to housing, the SAMAS promoted the full employment of Algerian workers (a goal only possible with the cooperation of metropolitan employers) as a necessary second step to integrating Algerians and, therefore, to fighting Algerian nationalism. Algerians were coming to the metropole primarily to work, and thus their employment was a central concern to bureaucrats from all sides of the social action realm. Marcel Blanchard called on metropolitan participation to achieve the full employment of Algerian workers in the metropole, which he described as “an imperative that is at the same time political, psychological and economic, which supposes on the one hand, the adaptation and the professional preparation of Muslims and new jobs and, on the other hand, the pledge of employers and fellow workers to accept, on absolutely equal footing, the integration of these Muslim workers in the business world.”

The SAMAS organized job training for Algerian veterans and also contributed money for a préformation (vocational education) and orientation center in Marseille, which would provide basic education and job placement for Algerian youth. It also produced educational films to prepare workers for work in Algerian migrants as the war progressed, particularly as more and more families began to join husbands and fathers in the metropole.


217 “Problèmes poses par le terrorisme Nord-Africain en Métropole,” 8.
industry. The goal of these efforts, as with housing, was to ensure that Algerians recently arriving in the metropole did not join the ranks of the FLN or the MNA.

The Collection and Distribution of Information (the CTAM)

The collection and distribution of information was central to the SAMAS’s operation. For this task the Ministry of the Interior used a corps of officers who specialized in the Muslim Algerian population, the conseillers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes en métropole (technical advisors for Muslim affairs in the metropole), or CTAM. The CTAM were created in 1951 as a control measure in response to the influx of Algerian migrants and fell under the power of the Direction de l’Algérie et des department d’outre-mer. They were the eyes and ears of the Ministry of the Interior. In 1957, eighteen of these twenty-five civil servants came from the ranks of the Algerian Civil Service; the others were recruited from the Social Service branch of Ministry of the Interior.218 Their minimum qualifications were ten years in Algeria or a good knowledge of the “language, psychology, and sociology of Muslims” (i.e. having served in Morocco or Tunisia).219 Historians of the late colonial period have pointed to the crucial link between the imperial and metropolitan administrative corps, noting that colonial agents were routinely chosen to fill new metropolitan positions because of their experience with Muslim


219 CARAN F1a 5045: SAMAS/Am No. 1-1311 Note pour Monsieur le Ministre, 1 Juin 1959
Objet: “Compte rendu d’une réunion qui s’est tenue le 26 Mai au secretariat general pour les Affaires Algériennes pour étudier les possibilities d’encadrer la population musulmane de la métropole par des officiers S.A.S.; examen critique du projet; propositions,” 3.
North African populations. According to House and MacMaster, the Interior Ministry “constantly circulated top officials between the Maghreb and metropolitan France.”

Whereas the duties of the CTAM were at first limited to the gathering of information on social issues among the Muslim Algerian population (migrants’ places of origin, their age and gender, and their patterns of settlement in the metropole) Interior Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury in 1958 determined that this limitation “no longer correspond[ed] to the present situation characterized […] by the strict dependence that exists between social problems and problems of public order.” He therefore authorized the CTAM to handle “all questions relating to Muslim affairs,” including rooting out FLN members and reporting them to the local police forces. The CTAM were stationed throughout France, in the third, fourth, and seventh military regions (Rennes, Bordeaux, Dijon, the Ardennes) and in the Seine Maritime, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Haut-Rhin, Isère, and Loire Departments. Six were stationed in the Department of the Seine (Paris), where a January 1958 report showed 125,000 ‘French Muslims from Algeria’ out of a total 318,400 in France. They worked in conjunction with the nearly one hundred


221 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 35.


223 “Programme d’action à l’égard de la population musulmane algérienne en métropole.”

224 F1a 5010: Ministère de l’Interieur, Cabinet du Ministre, Affaires Sociales Musulmanes en métropole, “Repartition des Nord Africains en Metropole” January 1958. There were also high concentrations in Lyon, Metz, Lille, and Marseille.
local bureaux d’interventions sociales located in bidonvilles, to which Algerian residents had to go for consultations on housing, familial allocations, social security, pensions, civil status, hospitalizations, physical rehabilitation, and travel authorizations. The Minister of the Interior saw such personal interactions as a prime way to collect information on Algerian clients and he was proud of the “trust with which Algerian migrants greeted the majority of social agents.” The SAMAS hoped to take advantage of that trust by getting Algerians seeking assistance to confess their allegiances to the FLN.

Four times a year, the CTAM relayed information of interest—as they had done while stationed in Algeria or while serving as colonial administrators in the empire—from their respective regions to their superiors in the French government. These reports were lengthy and complex, and included sections where the CTAM could fill in information of obvious relevance to the Ministry of the Interior, such as Algerians’ personal political ties and sentiments on the Algerian War and their interactions with the French police. The Ministry also wanted to know how many people were taking advantage of social services such as housing and education, so the CTAM submitted detailed notes on enrollments and curricula, the numbers of patients treated at hospitals, and on Algerians’ interactions with social workers and the associations. But the CTAM were also instructed to report on seemingly mundane happenings, such as sports and leisure (daily activities, weekly matches, paid matches), migrants’ reactions to radio programming and their television viewing habits. They also submitted information on the metropolitan population, specifically attitudes toward Algerians, and any involvement they had

225 “Programme d’action à l’égard de la population musulmane algérienne en métropole,” Reference is to Professor Montagne’s 1952 report on Algerian migration to metropolitan France.
with Algerians such as at work, in unions, as neighbors, or through the local press. “Each time a fact or an element is judged interesting,” Damelon instructed them, “it should be brought to my attention as soon as it is known.” By observing all facets possible of Algerian life, the CTAM were the eyes and ears of the Ministry of the Interior. The SAMAS used this information to modify its own policies, and also shared some of it with the community at large. For instance the agency edited and sent out a series of ten reports on Algerian migration, along with syntheses of the tri-monthly CTAM reports, to regional prefects, employers, and private social aid associations.

Radio and Print Propaganda

The SAMAS supplemented policies designed to integrate Algerian migrants into French society and gauge their political allegiances with pro-French political propaganda. Blanchard wrote openly about his agency’s true purpose in a letter to the Prime Minister, stating: “psychological social action often interpenetrate, often to the point of being confused.” For instance, the SAMAS contracted out the CANAM—a private association that funded charitable

---


projects such as shelters and job training—to produce educational radio programming in Arabic and Kabyle. The CANAM’s collaboration with the propaganda arm of the French government began in 1952, when the Ministry of the Interior began paying it to produce programming geared for North African workers as part of Radiodiffusion-télévision française (RTF)’s émissions arabes. These ‘causeries sociales’ and ‘émissions éducatives’ (which aired Friday mornings on the Paris-Inter station) reported on factories, shelters, and job placement services, and offered advice on topics ranging from nutrition and hygiene to the minimum wage, collective bargaining, medical insurance, and job contracts and sometimes including interviews with North Africans and Arab music.\footnote{RTF claimed it had 1800 listeners per month in 1951. See CAC 19860271, art. 4: Letter of March 1, 1951 from M. Colonne, Chef du Services des émissions arabes to Ministry of Labor, ref. AG/SB 41439. On February 24, 1953 M. Laurent, Chef du Bureau de Coordination et d’Action Sociale of the Ministry of the Interior, Sous-Dir. de l’Algérie wrote to the IGAME in regions with large Muslim populations, asking for their input on choosing topics for the programming. See CARAN F1a 5057.}

Drawing on propaganda methods used in Algeria, the programming began to adopt a more overtly anti-Algerian nationalist slant. Administrators read, for example, Henri de la Bastide’s treatise, “La Radio est l’arme essentielle de la pacification algérienne” (radio is the essential weapon of Algerian pacification), which asserted the importance of a unified, widespread propaganda campaign utilizing radio in both Algeria and the metropole.\footnote{CARA F1a 5057: Henri de la Bastide, “La Radio est l’arme essentielle de la pacification algérienne.” De la Bastide was a writer, university professor of Maghréban civilization, and former POV who served as a contrôleur civil in Morocco specializing in information and public relations. From 1958 to 1960 he was a conseiller technique in the cabinet of the Secretary General for Algerian Affairs.}

Administrators even discussed re-airing Radio Alger programming to combat Algerian propaganda in the metropole.\footnote{CARAN F1a 5057: Letter of August 26, 1953 from Rosier to the office of the Governor General of Algeria, Direction des Emissions en langues arabe et kabyle. Objet: Tournées de reportage effectuées en Métropole par Radio-Alger. Representatives from Radio-Alger also visited the metropole to advise administrators on how to produce effective radio propaganda.} One show that aired in early 1954 was devoted to educating
Algerians about French civilization—the assumption being that they would choose the benefits it had to offer over Algerian independence. The granting of independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 provided particular impetus to pro-French propaganda. Since Tunisians and Moroccans maintained the right to live and work in France, administrators feared that the FLN was using this example to win them over to the cause of independence. By 1956 RTF was airing Arabic programming each morning, with additional educational and social shows on Wednesdays and Fridays, respectively. One program, entitled “Ecoute Meziane” (Listen, Meziane), was written by a team of French men and women in the format of a dialogue between two Algerian men, Meziane and Rachid, who gave listeners advice on how to seek out social services minced with not-so-subtle references to the French state’s benevolence toward Algerians and the mutual duties owed by the two nations. They addressed topics related to working in the metropole, but also industrialization in Algeria (i.e. the Constantine Plan), the role of women, justice in France, and the new constitution of 1958.

In the “Conséquences du rattachement de l’Algérie à la Métropole” (Consequences of Algeria’s attachment to the metropole) edition of “Ecoute, Meziane,” Rachid, joined by his friend, Bachir, discuss the reasons Algeria should remain under French control with the skeptical

---


234 See, for example, CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Note concernant la situation de la migration algérienne (compte-rendu de la réunion des Conseils techniques pour les affaires musulmanes en métropole, en date du 16 mai 1961),” 3. The May 1961 CTAM report claimed that the FLN was invoking the Tunisian example to assure migrants that they would benefit from Algerian independence. Its authors wrote: “the Tunisians are enjoying themselves thanks to the fact that the accords that granted Tunisian independence also gave Tunisians a certain number of utterly exorbitant privileges as to their entry into French territory.”
Meziane. Rachid introduces Meziane to Bachir, and they begin by agreeing that the issue of Algeria’s attachment to France is a controversial one.

Rachid: All of that is more than certain. But let’s leave the worrying to those who have the power to resolve this difficult problem. Me, I’ll just say one thing: these are two countries that history has made depend on one another. This dependence gives each one of them duties, what are they?

Bachir: In other words, what are the consequences of the attachment of Algeria to the metropole?

Rachid: That’s it… consequences for France, consequences for Algeria.

Bachir: I believe that us, we generally have a tendency to only see one side of the question, that is to say that we only consider the relative inconveniences of this attachment of our country to France.

[…]

Rachid: What is the point of speaking with rancor? You can’t have a discussion that way. I think that to be fair, a lot of problems are often complicated and come about because people don’t consider them coolly enough, but they always put passion into them.

Bachir: You’re right, Rachid, since we’re lucky enough to meet this morning around this microphone, and to be able to discuss this among friends, let’s take advantage of it. No doubt some of our listeners agree?

The discussion then moves to the historical connection between the two countries, which Rachid describes by evoking a picturesque metaphor. “History is history,” he tells his friends, “that which it has joined together is not easy to pull apart. There are rocks that the sea has beat against for thousands of years, without ever wearing them down.” Bachir then cites the example of the roughly one million French settlers in Algeria, whom he calls “An important and active part” of the population, who, he later points out, “Live as we do, share our life, have made and continue
to make our land valuable.” The two supporters of French Algeria outline for Meziane France’s many contributions to Algeria:

Rachid: So France has contributed men, but it has also contributed capital: each has increased the value of the land. Its businessmen and engineers have created commercial and industrial enterprises, its functionaries have organized a vast administration.

Bachir: French investments in Algeria have certainly been numerous.

Each time Meziane interjects with a counter argument, the other two offer what is meant to be an informed, rational defense of French colonization. Given how arid Algeria is, they explain, the country is lucky that the French came and made the land usable. In fact, the French, they tell Meziane, do not actually gain much from the long list of contributions—factories, mines, arable land, roads, bridges, railroads, ports, schools, hospitals—it has given Algeria. When Meziane points out that the French government was happy to take refuge in Algeria in 1940, Rachid reminds him that Algeria, too, benefitted strategically from this arrangement. Furthermore, Bachir asserts, France has had to deal with the religious and cultural differences of the Algerian people, and has even housed and educated those who have migrated to the metropole. The gist of the conversation is that France is doing Algeria a favor:

Bachir: You see, Meziane, all of that to tell you that those who judge at first sight assign all the blame to France; when one gets to the bottom of things, one sees things more clearly.

Meziane: In the end, you’re saying that Algeria is a burden for France.

Bachir: Not at all, my friend; it’s not one or the other: either you misunderstood us, or we haven’t explained ourselves clearly. Algeria allows France to extend beyond the Mediterranean, it reinforces French power in this important region of the globe.”
Next the three characters discuss the cultural benefits of French colonization. Once again, Meziane is skeptical, but, by alluding to the scientific advances that the Arab world once brought to Europe, Rachid tries to show Meziane that he and Bachir are not biased:

Meziane: You can’t ignore that as Muslims, we are fatally more attracted to the East, or to the West, than to the North. Around us is the same land; the same language, the same religion, often a common past. Are you going to abandon all that?

Rachid: Who said anything about abandoning?

Bachir: […] I willingly accept France, because I believe that is would be a catastrophe for us to suddenly detach ourselves from it.

Rachid: Already, in the course of history, we’ve been sufficiently torn between East and West.

Bachir: Yeah, I’m sure that political stability will come to us from our attachment to France.

Meziane: You’re lucky you can be so sure: that’s not at all what I think.

Bachir: It certainly takes effort to adapt to western life, but I think it’s necessary and indispensable, without in any way abandoning our ancestral virtues.

[…]

Rachid: Have we forgotten that a great amount of knowledge rests on what the Arabs transmitted to the Occident hundreds of years ago […] Now we’re behind. We have to regain the lead.

Meziane: Can’t we regain it alone?

Bachir: What country can, in this day and age, be so confident as to go it alone? And plus, don’t forget that Algeria is a poor country. If it’s content to live with scarce agricultural resources, it could never feed, not now, not later, this larger and larger population it now has thanks to advances in hygiene and better living conditions.
Rachid: Yes, it needs to keep ameliorating its agricultural methods and its industrial infrastructure.

Bachir: And it can only do that by standing on the shoulders of France. I’ve found that this is a truth that many people lose sight of in their discussions.²³⁵

In this explanation, France is modern and prosperous while Algeria is culturally and economically backwards, and modernization and development are only possible via political domination. Propaganda radio programming grew dramatically over the next few years. By 1959 the Arab and Berber programming service had twenty-eight offices and three studios at the Centre Christophe Colomb and aired three hours of programming in the metropole (plus an additional thirteen hours in North Africa). The goal of the programming it aired in Algeria and the metropole, a comprehensive 1959 explained, was “to thwart anti-French propaganda,” as well as to inform and entertain audiences. A map in the report plotted the origins, in North Africa and the Middle East, of “hostile programming” in red ink with green beams of good programming emanating from France and extending across the Arab world.²³⁶

In the same vein, the SAMAS invited regional prefects to facilitate the distribution of Mᵉssages d’Algérie (a newspaper published by a Gaullist association) and subsidized a contest for its readers. Blanchard considered sending tracts by mail to individual families and hoped to send different tracts to different groups—new and old migrants, single men and families, Kabyles and Arabs, and to include photos from their ‘villages of origin.’ The CTAM agents were in charge of preparing them for their own regions, and they worked with military authorities in the Ardennes, Rhône, Loire and Bouches-du-Rhône military regions on tracts

whose goal was to show Algerian soldiers “the diversity and importance of metropolitan economic activities” as well as “the primary technical and industrial sectors” in which they could find work. “Beyond presenting the occasion for contact with metropolitan Frenchmen,” Blanchard bragged, “these visits constitute, from the advice of military authorities, a national propaganda with the most effectiveness for young soldiers.”237

Blanchard saw visual media as particularly useful and his agents kept lists of movie theaters with high numbers of ‘Muslim’ patrons, where they showed propaganda clips demonstrating the benevolence of the French government in Algeria during the course of normal programming, so that they would “appear to be addressed to the entire audience and not only to Algerian viewers.”238 However, it was the small screen in which he placed the most faith. Blanchard described television as “a marvelous instrument of propaganda for Algerian Muslims.”239 The SAMAS installed television sets in North African shelters d’hébergement, which Blanchard believed resulted in “better comprehension of metropolitan life” among viewers and “a stabilization and a fixation of the shelter population,” making for “easier control and protection for the police services.” He was also pleased to hear about “instances of contact with other metropolitan workers invited for the large popular shows” such as the World Cup and the Tour de France.240

In March of 1958, the Ministry of the Interior received its first reports from the CTAM, and, despite its preliminary efforts, the situation appeared dire. Agents from the Paris region reported that the North African population displayed “reserve and fear.” On the political front,

237 “Problèmes posés par le terrorisme Nord-Africain en Métropole,” 5.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid., 3.
240 Ibid.
the FLN influence was growing, particularly in the Rhône Department. In another region, they reported: “A climate of worry and fear leads workers to live in very closed small groups.” Employers had a tendency to limit the number of Muslim Algerian workers so that their business would not be compromised by incidents provoked by them. Algerian workers had been eliminated from particularly vulnerable industries—for example, there was a fear of sabotage in the petroleum industry. In the Bouches-du-Rhône region, employers were “more and more reluctant to give Algerians positions of trust,” and in the Loire and Alliers region employers claimed Algerians were responsible for 88% of the total accidents in factories. Throughout France, employers preferred to hire Moroccans, whom they considered more stable and reliable. In the third region the metropolitan population was afraid, particularly those in direct contact with Muslim Algerians. In places where there was heavy competition for employment, more hostility was reported among metropolitan French, and even in la Moselle, where job prospects were good, newly arrived North Africans were met with hostility from European workers and foremen. This was bad news for the SAMAS, which planned, in the following year, to pursue “all avenues likely to have repercussions on the maintenance of public order.”

The SAT-FMA: Policing under the guise of social action

The bureaucratic link that was most troubling to contemporary observers, including the French press, was that between the SAMAS and the new sections of the Paris Prefecture of Police created to weed out and destroy the FLN. Interior Minister Bourgès-Maunoury appointed Maurice Papon Prefect of Police and he arrived in the metropole from Algeria in March 1958. Papon, who was responsible for the deportation of 1500 Jews from Bordeaux under the Vichy

---

regime, was chosen because of the expertise in the repression of Algerian nationalism he had acquired as an high ranking administrator in North Africa. Historians have noted the double standard that existed with regard to what public opinion considered acceptable in Algeria, where torture and other brutally repressive techniques were used throughout the war, and in France, the land of ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity.’ The exception to this rule was the Paris police force. With the blessings of de Gaulle and his Prime Minister Michel Debré, Maurice Papon introduced colonial policing techniques into the metropole.

In August 1958, Papon along with representatives from the Ministries of Information, the Interior, and the Armed Forces, implemented a new intelligence gathering bureaucracy at the Paris Prefecture of Police whose structure and methods were based on policing mechanisms in Algeria. It consisted of the Service d’assistance technique aux Français musulmans d’Algérie (SAT-FMA), the Municipal Police, and specialized ‘anti-terrorist’ forces, centralized under the authority of the Service de coordination des affaires algériennes (SCAA). This structuring of police services mimicked that in Algeria. For instance, the SCAA was the metropolitan version of the Centre de reseignement et d’action in Eastern Algeria, which Papon had created to coordinate the ‘counterrevolutionary’ work of the military and the police in Constantine. Of this complex police bureaucracy, the SAT-FMA is most crucial for understanding the role of the police in the social service sector. Prime Minister Debré explained their role as “Preserving the

---


243 See for example House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 27-28. The authors assert that although de Gaulle was against military power in Algeria, he was “less concerned by Papon’s militarization of the Paris Police.”

Muslim population from the political influence and material constraints of the anticolonial organizations.”

The SAT-FMA was the metropolitan version of the Sections administratives spécialisées (SAS) and the Sections administratives urbaines (SAU). The SAS were created in 1955 to fill the void between the French administration and the ‘communes mixtes’ far from the urban centers; the SAU were the urban version of the SAS and began operating in Algiers and Constantine in 1957. The duty of the colonial administrators who made up of the SAS/SAU was to remove the Algerian population from contact with ‘terrorism,’ and to guarantee a framework of protection in order to introduce reforms. Thus, they “set out to win over the population through economic and social reform, from the construction of schools and irrigation projects to provision of health care and employment.”

But in the hands of the SAS and SAU, social services were “perverted into instruments of intelligence gathering and reform” which, House and MacMaster have asserted, thus “destroyed the fundamental objective of reform” by hindering, rather than advancing, social improvements. The SAS/SAU were in charge, among other things, of the massive resettlement campaigns in Algeria through which, by 1961, 2.35 million people, or, 26% of the Algerian population, had been uprooted. Through resettlement, a service that would normally been a form of social action (rehousing people living in poverty) became a tool of violence at the hands of the French colonial administration.

---


246 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 45. The authors explain that the SAS’s actions were consistent with the French colonial administration’s reliance of social sciences as instruments of power.

247 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 54. The three were secretly flown in from Algeria on 13 August 1958.
The SAT-FMA was the brainchild of three SAU officers—Roger Cunibile, Henri Pillot, and Hippolyte Berenguier. Emmanuel Blanchard has referred to the services they created as “the ‘indigenous affairs’ of the Paris banlieue,” since it was made up of former SAS/SAU officers imported from Algeria. Cunibile, Pillot, and Berenguier divided Paris into six sectors (corresponding to the six police districts). Each district had a bureau de renseignements spécialisés (BRS) “strategically located in the densest areas of Algerian population” on the edges of Paris and in the banlieue—for instance, once was located in the Mason départementale de Nanterre, bordering on the Nanterre bidonville. A circulaire of 13 July 1959 extended the SAT-FMA to the cities of Marseille, Lyon, Saint-Etienne, and to the Seine-et-Oise département.

Like their interwar predecessor, the Paris Prefecture’s North African Services, the SAT-FMA used the promise of social action as a means of infiltrating Algerian enclaves and rooting out FLN activity. House and MacMaster have explained Roger Cunibile’s reasons for creating a social action branch of the Paris Police:

Since Algerian immigrants were constantly on the move within a vast warren of cheap lodging houses and shanty towns, and were deeply suspicious of all French authority, the Prefecture of Police faced a seemingly insurmountable problem in trying to penetrate the FLN milieu. The solution to this was sought in a carrot-and-stick approach, a mix of inducements and coercion, that would seek to locate and identify every Algerian by a multitude of filters, of bureaucratic and police checks, that would catch them in one way or another.

While, as House and MacMaster have noted, “Cunibile claimed that the SAT played no part in the repressive activities of the Prefecture of Police, in reality the fundamental goal was to

---

248 Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens, 319.
249 House and Macmaster, 70.
penetrate and subvert the clandestine FLN network […] (OPA) and to ‘win the Battle for hearts’, an order of priorities in which social aid ‘constitutes a means rather than the goal’.

Indeed, for the SAT-FMA, improving the social welfare of the Algerian community was not even, as in the case of the SAMAS, a means of combatting violence but was instead a front to carry out interrogations, beatings, arrests, detentions, and deportations. Algerian migrants, often semi-literate and with little knowledge of French, had to go to a BRS to receive social welfare benefits such as unemployment and familial aid and assistance locating work as well as for all administrative business such as to obtain identification papers, travel permits, and vehicle registration.

Aspiring to a “Panoptic project that would enable a total surveillance of Algerians in Paris,” the SAT-FMA gathered information on the name, age, location, village of origin, and employment status of Algerian migrants. The Opérations Meublés, as House and MacMaster have explained, “were carried out by ‘commando’ teams of public health inspectors whose overt purpose was to check legal rent levels and living conditions and to compel landlords to carry out improvements.” However, while social workers and housing inspectors did make up part of the teams, “they also included police from the Prefecture whose real objective was to collect information on individuals for the central fichier, to establish a census of each lodging house, and to chart the location of suspected groupings of FLN sympathizers or activists.” After one year, the SAT-FMA had amassed a huge card file of approximately 45,000 individual dossiers, which, by October 1961, had grown to 96,000.

---


252 House and MacMaster, 75.

Once their targets were located, SAT-FMA officers, using tactics developed in Algeria, raided houses at night and “seized men from their beds” before busing them to lodging houses far away with “potentially hostile strangers” as part of ‘Opération Osmose.’

Those who tried to return to their homes were arrested and sent to the Centre d’identification de Vincennes (CIV), a holding center managed by the SAT-FMA—a system “clearly inspired by practices of ‘psychological action’ in Algeria.” After two days they were typically released, retained for trial by military court, or, in an absence of evidence, sent to centres d’assignation à résidence surveillée (detention centers) run by the Ministry of the Interior for an indefinite amount of time.

In 1959, over 4,000 people were detained at camps in Larzac, and St. Maurice-l’Ardoise; plus an additional 1,000 young men under the age of twenty-five at the camp in Thol. That same year the SAMAS began funding and arranging the ‘resettlement’ Algerians deemed ‘incapable of assimilating’ (i.e. those active in the FLN) into French society back to their ‘native villages’—a coded phrase for their deportation to internment camps in Algeria.

---

254 House and MacMaster explain that the information-gathering methods employed by the SAT-FMA were based on the approach of Robert Montagne, a sociologist commissioned by the Interior Minister to lead a team that carried out a study of ethnic groups in France and, in particular, the tendency of Algerian migrants in France to live in village groupings and to maintain regional loyalties (74).

255 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 72. The authors note that these tactics were meant to create insecurity and mistrust within the FLN by rupturing social support networks and money collections: “The Osmose operation illustrates a general feature of SCAA-SAT repression: the objective was not only to gather intelligence or to dislocate FLN networks, but also to harass and wear down the morale of the entire Algerian community through a multitude of inconveniences and an omnipresent insecurity,” 73.

256 Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens, 321.


259 CARAN F1a 5010, “Constitution et Attributions du Service des Affaires Musulmanes et de l’Action Sociale,” 2. The decision to repatriate prisoners from the detention centers to resettlement camps in
the card file, the SAT-FMA could also locate migrants’ villages of origin in an attempt to track individuals between Algerian and France. The SAT-FMA then invited Algerian migrants to meet with the SAS officer from their village, who then shared with them information on economic reforms, distributed letters from relatives, and showed a propaganda film.\footnote{260}

In seeking an explanation for the radicalization of the policing of Algerian migrants that began in 1958, historians have looked to the intellectual climate in which French administrators were operating. House and MacMaster have pointed out that Maurice Papon, along with many of his fellow colonial administrators of the Cold War era, subscribed to the theory of ‘revolutionary warfare,’ which posited that nationalist guerilla movements, inspired by Mao Tse-tung, sought to overthrow Western government through the use of terrorism and clandestine political networks. To counter the influence of the FLN, the French army had to develop “forms of unconventional warfare and, in particular, psychological and propaganda techniques, to win the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Algerian people, so isolating the tiny minority of terrorists from their support base.”\footnote{261} The Paris Police then imported these brutal forms of policing to the metropole, culminating in the massacre of October 17, 1961 (See Chapter 4).

**The Return of de Gaulle**

Meanwhile, the crisis in Algeria had caused a decline in confidence in the French government, and France went through three Prime Ministers in a single year. Increasing

\footnote{260} House and MacMaster, *Paris 1961*, 74-75.

\footnote{261} House and MacMaster, *Paris 1961*, 29. As an explanation for the brutal repression in Algeria, this theory makes sense, but, as the authors point out, it does not account for the widespread and indiscriminate use of violence perpetrated by the Paris Police in the last years of the Algerian War.
numbers of Frenchmen supported bringing back former president and mythic hero of the liberation, General de Gaulle (whose recently published memoirs reminded the public of how he had delivered France from Nazi domination). In Algeria, the \emph{colons} were growing fearful that the metropolitan government was unable, or unwilling, to defend the colony. What happened next marked the transition from the Fourth to Fifth Republics. Former Governor General of Algeria Jacques Soustelle began to organize a coup d’état to bring de Gaulle back to power, even travelling to France to garner support for his plan. Then, a parliamentary crisis led to the creation of a new government headed by Pierre Pflimlin, who announced that he would seek a negotiated settlement with the Algerian rebels. Furious, the \emph{colons} revolted, storming government buildings in Algiers in protest of what they viewed as total abandonment by the Paris leadership. Against orders from the President, the French Army supported the uprising and its leaders called for an emergency government to be installed in France. On the night of May 13, 1958, General Jacques Massu seized power in Algiers and even planned to send paratroopers to France to stage a military coup. Taking advantage of the revolt, Gaullist activists in Algiers called on their hero to step up, and, having waited for a legitimate way to reclaim power, de Gaulle heeded their call. On May 29, 1958 Charles de Gaulle was granted special emergency powers for 6 months, during which time he was to draft a new constitution. On June 1st he officially became Prime Minister.

The \emph{colons} believed that with de Gaulle in power, Algeria would remain French. In his speech at Algiers on June 4, 1958, de Gaulle uttered the famously ambiguous words “\textit{Je vous ai compris}” (I have understood you).\footnote{Charles De Gaulle Speech in Algiers, June 4, 1958, available at http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/article.php3?id_article=521.} Shortly after, he laid out his dream of a new French community composed of the metropole and its semi-independent former colonies, whose
inhabitants would be full French citizens. He called for full participation of Algerians in the French electoral process. “I declare that,” he announced, “as from today, France considers that in the whole of Algeria there is only category of inhabitant: there are none here but fully-fledged Frenchmen, fully-fledged Frenchmen with the same rights and the same duties.” In October 1958, de Gaulle appealed to the FLN to accept a “paix des braves” (peace of the brave) and to enter into negotiations. The FLN rejected this appeal, and had by this point set up a provisional government, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Revolution, GPRA, in Cairo. Historians who claim the General always knew independence was coming have pointed out that de Gaulle never once spoke of ‘Algérie française’ (French Algeria), the slogan of those in support of continuing the war. Yet the Algerian War lasted for four years after this speech, and, despite the backlash that followed the publication of Henri Alleg’s memoir of being tortured by the France’s 10th Paratrooper Division, torture continued in Algeria under de Gaulle’s watch.  

As in Algeria, repressive police tactics and violence toward Algerians in the metropole increased when de Gaulle and his Prime Minister, Michel Debré (a member of de Gaulle’s Union for the New Republic party, who took office in January 1959 and served until April 14, 1962, less than a month after France signed peace negotiations with the FLN), took office. Arriving at a ‘French solution for Algeria’—and particularly its Saharan oil fields and nuclear test sites—was Debré’s primary goal. The SAMAS had in Debré a sympathetic supporter, who, as House and MacMaster have put it, was “quite willing to resort to state terror against the Algerian nationalists.” Debré believed that a comprehensive approach that married social services with policing gave France the best chance of beating the FLN. In a letter to Social Action Delegate Michel Massenet (see below), Debré asserted the imperativeness of social control of the Algerian

---

population in the context of the fight against the FLN. Social and repressive measures, he wrote, “must be integrated into an overall plan designed to rapidly destroy the politico-administrative organization of the FLN and to definitively win French Muslims of Algeria over to our cause.”

When, in late 1958, French Army leaders repositioned their forces to fight FLN guerillas rather than attempt to directly control the Algerian population at large, the metropolitan government reversed this policy: control the population at large in order to weed out nationalist activity.

The Fifth Republic’s social aid scheme included unprecedented scope and funding of social action for Algerians in France. De Gaulle came to power because of a crisis in authority over the Algerian War, and he was therefore expected to do something dramatic to combat the FLN both in Algeria and in the metropole, where its influence was growing. As Vincent Viet has written, de Gaulle’s metropolitan policies with regard to Algerians “were a sharp contrast to the hesitations of his Algerian policy.”

His government centralized the administration and greatly increased the provision of social aid for Algerians in France. A brief explanation of the bureaucracy created and refashioned by the Fifth Republic upon its founding amid the crisis of 1958 will be helpful for exploring its implications for Algerians in France. The interconnectedness of integration and counterterrorism are evident in the programs and organizations that de Gaulle created.

De Gaulle’s first reform was the creation of the position of Secrétariat général pour les affaires algériennes (SGAA) by the decree of June 9, 1958. The first general secretary was by

---

265 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche no. 1, Michel Debré, “Définition d’une politique d’ensemble.”

266 The FLN received a high percentage of its money via dues collected in the metropole.


268 For a thorough explanation of the complex bureaucratic structures that were organized, and reorganized, under the Fifth Republic, see Vincent Viet’s *La France immigrée: Construction d’une politique 1914-1997* (Paris: Fayard, 1998) 190-217.
René Brouillet, a former diplomat who had served in Algeria. The SGAA, stationed at 80 Rue de Lille in the offices of the Prime Minister, was, in the words of de Gaulle, “Algeria in Paris.” The SGAA was in charge of the coordination of all services pertaining to Algerian migration. De Gaulle centralized relations between the General Delegate of the Government in Algeria and the metropolitan administration and executed orders in the metropole relative to Algeria. Importantly, as Vincent Viet has pointed out, “Social action and questions of surveillance, repression, and psychological action” were also among his duties. Because he reported directly to the Présidence du Conseil, the SGAA had a key position of power. Another important reform was de Gaulle’s June 28, 1958 creation of the Office administrative de l’Algérie (OAA), which was to be led by Guy de Serres de Justiniac, who had been part of the cabinet of the Governor General of Algeria (Maurice Violette) and later headed the FAS (see below). Additionally, the ‘Section P’ of the French government in Algiers handled the distribution of propaganda on the “events in Algeria,” as the violence was referred to, among French Muslims from Algeria.

**The Fonds d’action sociale: Social action without repression**

Funding for de Gaulle’s great expansion of social action came from the *Fonds d’action sociale pour les travailleurs algériens en métropole et leurs familles* (Social action fund for Algerian workers in the metropole and their families, FAS), which was created by Ordinance no. 58-1381 of 29 October 1958. The goal of the FAS was to combat poverty among Algerian families in France and, thereby, to encourage assimilation, increase loyalty to the French state, and subvert the FLN. It centralized the distribution of funding to the various ministries, regional

---

269 Quoted in Viet, *La France immigré*, 192.

270 Viet, *La France immigrée*, 192.
governments, and other agencies handling housing, employment, and other welfare services. One of its functions was to provide small grants to the private welfare associations that—because of their experience, knowledge, and manpower—were largely responsible for implementing the government’s policies. The Algerian portion became known as the Constantine Plan, which was a vast program of economic and social development designed to bring stability to a country in which forced relocation by the colonial government had created great instability. The Plan also had explicit political aims: it was meant to convince Algerians of the benevolence of the French government, in hopes that they would choose a ‘French solution’ to the conflict.271

Like so many other social action organizations, the FAS had its roots in the empire. Since 1952, the SGAA (General Secretary for Algerian Affairs) had had at its disposition money from the *Fonds d’action sanitaire et sociale* (FASS) which was money set aside from the *Caisse nationale de Sécurité sociale* (social security fund) to improve the living conditions of families in Algeria. This money came from the difference in metropolitan and Algerian rates of payment of *allocations familiales*. Rather than pay Algerian workers the same rate as metropolitan workers—to which, as technical French citizens, they were duly entitled—the government decided instead to apply the difference to social aid programs. This decision was made despite protests from the CSMONA and the National Advisory Committee for the Study of North African Questions (see Chapter 1). The FASS’s president, Pierre Laroque (a member of the High Committee on Population and the Family, which was notorious for racist and eugenic positions on North Africans) and his successor, Jacques Doublet, were adamant that the

---

271 For more on the FAS see Amelia H. Lyons, “Social welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France: the case of the *Fonds d'action sociale*,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 43, no. 1 (February 2009). According to Lyons, the massive investment in family assistance programs made in the last years of the Algerian War via the FAS is evidence that French officials saw Algerians as potential citizens—a proposition that they abruptly abandoned following independence in 1962, when social action was abandoned or opened up to migrants of all nationalities.
remainder not be paid directly to Algerian families. As one member of the committee explained, raising the rate paid in Algeria would “cause the birth rate to rise while at the same time encouraging heads of households to work as little as possible.” De Gaulle’s incarnation of the FAS worked the same way and continued to be drawn from this discrepancy in the payment rate of familial allowances.

To coordinate the “multiplicity of contacts and services” involved in social action for Algerians in France, de Gaulle created the Interdepartmental Social Action Committee for French Muslims from Algeria in the Metropole. This committee was chaired by the Secretary General for Algerian Affairs at the Prime Minister’s Office and was led, in practice, by Michel Massenet, who was appointed Social Action Delegate. Massenet was also in charge of “assuring the presence of the government in all social action” by making contact with social action providers on the ground, monitoring their activities, and reporting back to the government. French leaders were aware that they were ignorant of much of the local level social action work being provided to Algerian migrants, and had, since the early 1950s, acknowledged the expertise of private associations in this area. Although the committee did not

---

272 CAC 19860269, art. 1, Intervention de Boverat. Cited in Viet, La France immigrée, 200.
274 Michel Massenet was born in 1925 and attended the l’Ecole des Sciences Politiques. He graduated in 1951 from l’Ecole Nationale d’Administration and named Auditeur au Conseil d’Etat. After serving as conseiller technique for Robert Schuman, Garde des Sceaux, he assumed military missions in Algeria. He was a member of Michel Debré’s editorial Commission de la Constitution and, in 1958, was a conseiller technique for the referendum with the Ministry of Information. In January 1959 Massenet was named “délégué du Premier Ministre à l’action sociale pour l’immigration algérienne en métropole.” In 1957 he published a book in which he argued for the necessity of implementing social services in order to maintain French Algeria. See Michel Massenet, Contrepoison ou la Morale en Algérie (Paris: Grasset, 1957).
have direct control over how the FAS was distributed, the FAS board followed Massenet’s recommendations.

In addition to Marcel Blanchard from the SAMAS, its members included representatives from Algerian Affairs, Labor, Public Health, National Education, a few of the larger private welfare associations, and the FAS, among others—most of whom did not share the Ministry of the Interior’s view that social action was merely a means to an end. The placement of head of SAMAS Marcel Blanchard on the Interdepartmental Social Action Committee illustrates the curious overlap of security and social action during the Algerian War. The same decree that created the social action committee chaired by Michel Massenet also mandated a working relationship between his Algerian Affairs bureau and the SAMAS. Rather than temper the SAMAS’s repressive activities, this arrangement actually increased its influence in state social action policy. The committee now had a vocal and powerful member, Marcel Blanchard, who saw social action primarily as a means of rooting out and destroying Algerian nationalism.276 A note from the Prime Minister’s office referred to the Ministry of the Interior as “the most important ministry”277 in social action for French Muslims from Algeria and noted that it was the only government body “with the means necessary to execute decisions taken.”278 Blanchard

276 The decree of December 1, 1958 put the SAMAS at the disposal of the Secretary General of Algerian Affairs “en tant que de besoin” (as needed) in matters concerning social action for ‘French Muslims from Algeria.’


278 CAC 19770391, art. 2. Note à l’attention de M. le Secrétaire Général aux Affaires Algériennes. Objet: Rôle du Délégué aux Affaires Sociales, 5 February 1959, unsigned. A note on the placement of the SAMAS under the dual authorities of the General Secretary for Algerian Affairs and the Minister of the Interior described it as “the sole service specifically designed to apprehend all of the aspects of Algerian migration and to put in place measures called for by the policy defined by the government.” See CARAN F1a 5010, “Constitution et Attributions du Service des Affaires Musulmanes et de l’Action Sociale.” By early 1959 the SAMAS already had personnel stationed in the bidonvilles surrounding Paris and was funding dozens of private welfare associations.
was quite proud of his authority in the realm of social aid for Algerians, and viewed his agency’s role on the Social Action Committee as “a promotion.” In his notes from the committee’s first meeting he bragged to his superior that “It seemed desirable” or, at least, “was not contested” that the SAMAS continue to coordinate the network of private associations and the CTs alongside them. At this first meeting Blanchard suggested that the FAS could be used to pay for SAMAS activities. Although he reported that this idea “drew the attention of the members of the Committee, some of whom seemed to support it,” Massenet dismissed it immediately.279

Tensions between Massenet and the Ministry of the Interior increased over the course of the war and eventually came to a heads after the night of October 17, 1961, when the Paris police killed Algerians peacefully in support of the FLN (see Chapter 4).

**Michel Massenet and the 1959 Social Action Plan: Drafting a unified policy**

By the fall of 1959 General de Gaulle had been back in power for over a year, yet his pledges of fraternity toward Algerians seemed empty. The CTAM reported greater hostility among the metropolitan population toward Algerian migrants, due to increasing FLN violence or perhaps the obvious social isolation of the Algerian community.280 The members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee needed to come up with a unified plan for social action that would both remedy poverty and draw the Algerian and metropolitan communities closer together. The person in charge of drafting the final plan was Social Action Delegate Michel Massenet. The plan was the result of discussions from the meetings of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, which met six times in 1959. Massenet considered

---

279 CAC 19770391, art. 2. Comité Interministerielle PV de 21 Mai 1959. Massenet said that FAS money should go to new initiatives, or otherwise it would become “illusory.”

280 See, for example, CAC 19770391, art. 2: Questions signalées par les conseillers techniques lors de la reunion 22 avril 1959.
recommendations from representatives of other ministries and read studies on Algerian migration such as those conducted by Claude Perret. He also relied on information gathered by the Ministry of the Interior, and met with the CTAM every three months to discuss the general sentiment of the Algerian milieu and specifically their opinions on state social action.

Perret had deemed integrating the estimated 200,000 Algerian workers likely to arrive over the next ten years into the metropolitan workforce “indispensable to the success of the totality of our Algerian policy.” Massenet’s concerns over employment centered on Algerian workers’ lack of technical training and the competition they faced from European and other North African migrants. His employment guidelines were based on the premise that Algerian workers suffered from a “handicap” which they required special services to overcome. Massenet saw that employers did not seem to view Algerian workers as wholly ‘French.’ He therefore envisioned state social action as “balanced between two discriminations”: the unequal treatment Algerian workers faced and the favor employers should therefore give them—a rare example of ‘affirmative action’ in France, where policy makers have generally deemed the concept a form of racism. He based his recommendations in this area on an investigation carried out in October 1959 by the CTAM at the direct order of President de Gaulle, which found that employers tended to favor Spanish and Italian workers over North Africans, and Tunisians and Moroccans over Algerians. Following accords with Morocco and Tunisia, migrants from

281 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Claude Perret “Note sure l’Emploi en Métropole des Français de Souche Algérienne,” 4. Perret added “The battle of Algeria will equally be won in the metropole” (La Bataille d’Algérie sera également gagnée en Métropole.”) His words echo those of Marcel Blanchard, whose “Problèmes poses par le terrorisme Nord-Africain en Métropole” asserted: “Integration into the realm of metropolitan work is almost necessarily the preparatory phase of integration into metropolitan society in general” (8).


283 Ibid.
these states had freedom of migration to France and posed “unwelcome competition” to Algerian workers and frequently ended up living in bidonvilles. These ex-colonials were also a threat to French authority over Algeria. The CTAM report advised the government to reduce privileges for Moroccan and Tunisians; otherwise their success in finding employment would demonstrate that “secession” was profitable.\textsuperscript{284} Massenet, of course, had no authority changing laws regulating immigration; instead his plan instructed employers to favor Algerian workers over other nationalities.\textsuperscript{285} Competition from European workers was also a concern. Massenet labeled the Treaty of Rome (1957), which allowed the free movement of workers within a common Western European market, “discriminatory” and asserted that it was “quite likely to cause bitter reactions among Algerians with regard to their belonging to a French Community founded on equal rights.”\textsuperscript{286} Algerians, he regretted, were only “nominally” French, since they faced harsher competition than foreign workers such as Spaniards and Italians.

Whereas, at its preliminary meetings, members of the Interdepartmental Committee had expressed desire for more training of male workers to take place in Algeria itself, the 1959 plan admitted that, presumably due to the fighting, this no longer seemed possible. De Gaulle had decreed greater communication between the governments in Algeria and metropolitan France and Massenet therefore consulted the General Delegate of the Algerian Government, André Jacomet, on this matter. Although Massenet expressed the need to coordinate efforts in the metropole and Algeria, Jacomet absolved the Algerian government of any responsibility with

\textsuperscript{284} CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Note à l’attention de Monsieur le Secrétaire General pour les Affaires Algériennes. Objet: Enquête sur les reactions des milieu musulmanes en métropole à la suite des déclarations du 16 septembre.”

\textsuperscript{285} CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche No. 4 “Problème nouveau posé depuis le conseil restreint du 28 septembre en ce qui concerne l’Immigration Marocaine et Tunisienne.” Programme d’Action Sociale Pour l’Année 1959 remis à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général pour les Affaires Algériennes le 25 novembre 1959, 8.

\textsuperscript{286} “Programme d’Action Sociale Pour l’Année 1959.”
regard to migrants and instead asserted that job training should take place in metropolitan France, “in an environment analogous to that in which the migrant will evolve,” rather than in Algeria. Existing job training services, such as those run by the Ministries of the Interior and National Education, were therefore to be augmented and new initiatives pursued in the metropole only. In 1958 the Ministry of the Interior had given 12 million francs to the Association Française pour le Développement de l’Enseignement Technique (National Association for the Development of Technical Education) to offer night classes for migrant workers, in which 510 students enrolled. For 1960 the FAS would provide 18 million earmarked for Algerians with which it would open apprenticeship centers in six cities. An education and job training center in Marseille was also planned for youth who were “deprived of the social stability and family support” after leaving primary school. For further education and job training, Massenet recommended that money be given to private associations. Massenet’s plan also reserved funds for the Ministry of National Education’s North African education centers and included a 68 million franc grant from the FAS to l’Alliance Française, which planned to add an additional 108 French language classes (using “ultramodern audiovisual equipment”) for Algerian men and women to the 335 classes it offered in 1958.

The social action that Massenet envisioned overlapped to a great degree with the methods undertaken by the SAMAS in service of its ‘fight against terrorism in the metropole.’ For example, the social integration of Algerians was the central idea of Massenet’s plan as it was in Blanchard’s goals for the SAMAS. Like Blanchard, Massenet advocated housing, employment, and education, with a particular emphasis on teaching Algerian youth in the metropole how to be

---

287 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Letter of 18 March 1959 from Massenet to Jacomet, No. 884 MM/MCB and Letter of 22 May 1959 from Jacomet to Massenet. No. 2952 AS/SS.

288 “Programme d’Action Sociale Pour l’Année 1959, 9.” L’Alliance Française received the second largest single grant from the FAS, after the SONACOTRAL.
properly French and, most urgently, instilling in them allegiance to the French state. But unlike Papon, Blanchard, Interior Minister Pelletier or even Prime Minister Michel Debré, Massenet saw the reduction of poverty and the integration of Algerians into French society as goals in and of themselves, not a means to an end. However, because these men served together on the Interdepartmental Committee, Massenet’s charitable efforts became thoroughly intertwined with the counter-FLN efforts of the police and the SAMAS. Blanchard’s key recommendations for using social action to fight ‘Algerian terrorism’—the “encadrement” of the Algerian population,” the “liquidation of the bidonvilles,” and the “reinforcement of the welfare network” by private associations—appear verbatim in Massenet’s plan.289

Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior was far from the only branch of the French government to view social action as a form of propaganda. For instance, representatives of other ministries acknowledged the political necessity both to assist Algerians and to make this assistance visible to them. A study of familial migration conducted by the Section des Problèmes Islamiques of the Direction Generale des Affaires Politiques et de l’Information, Delegation Generale en Algerie made a directly political argument in favor of cultural assimilation.290 The prefecture d’Alger insisted that increased migration did not show a lack of support for the FLN. People were fleeing the violence and increased repression from the French military, as well as economic failure and drought; they were not migrating to France to escape the FLN itself. “People who leave” the report explained, “keep their same political opinions and often even wish, for sentimental reasons, for total independence for Algeria, even if their

289 Ibid.
personal interests don’t coincide with the foreseen changes.” To win Algerians’ loyalty, the report argued, the French government needed to convince them that it could provide them with a standard of living above what was possible under the FLN. “The visits that these Muslim families make to the Metropole must normally, if they occur under good conditions, permit them to better appreciate the advantages that Algeria will reap from a loyal and fruitful cooperation with France.” In other words, the state should keep migrants happy so they will not be swayed by the FLN’s promises of independence for Algeria.

At the first meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee, the Secretary General for Algerian Affairs asserted that if the members wanted to tackle all aspects of the problem of Algerian migration, they should “raise migrants’ spirits” and make them feel like the government cared about them. Representatives adopted an official goal of “Definitively winning the French Muslims of Algeria to our cause,” and emphasized that Algerians “should be treated and considered wholly French” (des Français à part entière). Such reasoning certainly contains political as well as purely charitable aims. In the 1959 plan Massenet expressed a desire to develop better ways for the government to relay to them “the steps the government was taking to help them.” The Interdepartmental Committee also directed its propaganda efforts to the metropolitan French community. “It is necessary,” Massenet told members, “to show the French

---

291 Ibid., 10-11.
292 Ibid., 12. (Les séjours que ces familles musulmanes font en Métropole devraient normalement, s’ils s’effectuent dans de bonnes conditions, leur permettre de mieux apprécier les avantages que l’Algérie tirera d’une loyale et fructueuse cooperation avec la France.)
294 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche no. 1, Michel Debré, “Définition d’une politique d’ensemble.”
295 “Programme d’Action Sociale Pour l’Année 1959”
public as much as the Algerian public that the action the public powers are undertaking in
developing social action for Algerian migrants is beginning to bear fruit.” Keeping the public,
both Algerian French and metropolitan French on their side, was seen as crucial to the
government’s success.

Massenet’s views on housing policy, like his emphasis on full employment, may have been shaped by a 1959 study on Algerian migration written by sociologist Claude Perret. After conducting fieldwork among Algerian migrant communities in France, Perret concluded that the single most important factor in their peaceful integration into metropolitan society was housing. Having observed that conditions in the Parisian bidonvilles were in fact worse than those in Algeria, Perret asserted, “No other problems will be resolved if habitat is not changed,” adding that it was poor living conditions—combined with poverty—that permitted terrorism to occur. Marcel Blanchard had planned the relocation of Algerians to buildings where ‘native’ French lived as early as February 1958. Following Perret’s recommendations, administrators in late 1959 officially adopted the policy of ‘brassage’ (mixing) of the Algerian and metropolitan

---


297 “Aucun des autres problèmes ne sera résolu si l’habitat n’est modifié: c’est lui qui autorise, pour le principal, l’action terroriste, le chômage faisant le reste.” CAC 19770391, art. 4: Claude Perret, “Note sur certains problèmes concernant les Français-Musulmans en Métropole,” 1959. Perret was the Chargé de Mission (de la division Outre-Mer), Commissariat Général au Plan. This report was part of the work of the Commission d’examen des “Perspectives Décennales” de l’Algérie (Commission Byé). Between 1959 and 1964 Perret wrote several studies on various aspects Algerian migration, which he sent to administrators in metropolitan France. Massenet wrote to Perret noting that his colleague at the Ministry of Labor, M. Laurent, agreed that the report was useful.

298 Ibid., 2.

299 “Programme d’action à l’égard de la population musulmane algérienne en métropole,” 7.
populations. In his 1959 social action plan Massenet stressed the need for the government to encourage *brassage* at youth shelters and in general education classes.

The living conditions of families in the bidonvilles particularly concerned Committee members and this topic appeared on the agenda of nearly every meeting. But while administrators at the Ministry of the Interior saw the bidonvilles as primarily a security issue, other bureaucrats focused instead on the humanitarian crisis there. Under Massenet’s impetus, the FAS made the “reabsorption” of the bidonvilles its number one goal. Between 1959 and 1962, it poured 25 million francs into building 3,500 new housing units (including shelters for single workers and transitional pre-fabricated housing for families) in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. In 1959, 58 percent of the FAS’s budget went to housing, mostly to the SONACOTRAL. Massenet was especially concerned about older youth who had aged out of the public school system. Oddly, the 1959 plan does not make direct reference to Algerian nationalism in the metropole, but the reasoning implied is that, left to their own devises on the streets of Paris and other cities, young Algerian men were likely to fall into the hands of the

---

300 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche No. 10, “Le logement des F.M.A.” and CAC 19770391, art. 4: Perret, “Note sur la Migration des travailleurs algériens en Métropole” Janvier 1959. Perret also asserted that Algerian families needed to be selected “to avoid catastrophes,” implying that only those who had reached a certain level of ‘adaptation’ should be housed alongside metropolitan families. The integration of Algerian and metropolitan populations remained part of the French government’s housing policy beyond the war, though the reality was that these two population became increasingly segregated. French families made up the majority of residents in government subsidized HLMs in the 1950s and 1960s, whereas today residents of the housing projects tend to be first or second (or third) generation immigrants. These communities are isolated due to a lack public transportation into French cities.

301 To combat the housing shortage, the government subsidized the construction of HLMs in the suburbs, but mainly native French residents moved in because North African families were frequently deemed not ready for modern housing. After the French government began to invest more money into building HLMs in 1975 there was a gradual shift as native French moved out and immigrants moved in. Today, the suburbs, or banlieues, outside major cities have large concentrations of people of North African origin. Exact figures are unavailable because the French government does not gather statistics based on ethnicity or national origin of citizens’ parents.

302 In 1958 the FAS replaced the Ministry of the Interior as the primary source of funding for the SONACOTRAL.
FLN. The solution was to open *foyers de jeunes travailleurs* (youth shelters run primarily by private associations) that would provide housing, remedial education and technical training, as well as “a decent perspective on life.”

Like Blanchard, Massenet believed in the necessity of going beyond meeting migrants’ basic needs, such as employment and shelter, and tackling their assimilation into French culture as well. Algerian women and children were to be central to this project (the number of Algerian women in metropolitan France rose from 8,000 in January 1957 to 18,000 two years later; in 1959 there were 50,000 Algerian children under the age of sixteen living in the metropole). Following the urgings of representatives from the Ministries of Public Health and National Education, Massenet advised the FAS to fund an ambitious initiative focused on Algerian families. For instance, Massenet wrote of the “cultural education” of Algerian women, as well as French literacy classes, which would “seek to create favorable conditions for the adaptation of Muslim families to new conditions of life.” He agreed with C. Santelli, the representative from the Ministry of National Education, who saw women and children as especially key to integration, and asked that money from the FAS go to women’s centers where French language and culture would be taught. Another vocal proponent of cultural assimilation was François Villey, the representative from Public Health on the Interdepartmental Social Action Committee, who explained the importance of cultural change in a September 23, 1960 speech at the Congrès

---

304 Ibid., 12.
305 François Villey, the Interdepartmental Committee representative from Public Health was a frequent advocate of the importance of familial aid. See for example CARAN F1a 5010: Comité Interministerielle PV 21 May 1959.
307 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Ministry of National Education, Enseignement générale et Enseignement technique, “Note sur le programme complémentaire du Ministère de l’Education Nationale à financer par le Fonds d’action sociale, 8 June 1959.”
annuel de l’Association Européenne pour l’étude du problème des Réfugiés et des Migrations.\textsuperscript{308} Villey described social action as going beyond simple charity to encompass primary needs (the struggle against misery), wellbeing (shelter), and more evolved needs (leisure, culture); the ‘adaptation,’ rather than just the ‘integration,’ of families being the goal. For Villey, the need for this kind of social action is a “modern problem” caused by the arrival “socially maladapted” people (he lists “youth, foreigners, refugees, and migrants in general”) who, for whatever reason, “need assistance adapting themselves to their new living conditions (leur milieu de vie).\textsuperscript{309}

Although Villey was not speaking directly about Algerians who had migrated to the metropole, one can assume, given his involvement with social services for this population, that Algerians were his primary frame of reference. The implication was that whereas earlier migrants peacefully and easily assimilated themselves into French society, this new crop of arrivals needs intervention from the state to make this possible.

Whether emanating from fears of migrants falling into the hands of the FLN or simply a desire to ease the transition for newly arrived migrants, the ‘cultural level’ of Algerian families, and Arab Muslim women in particular, would come to dominate social action policy. Policymakers referred to this process as the ‘normalization’ of the Algerian population. Officials hoped that by providing assistance to the families of workers who had come to France, the FAS could ease their transition from Algeria to France and assimilate them more easily. As more women and children began to arrive from North Africa, social welfare organizations came to the

\textsuperscript{308} CAC 19770391, art. 4. “L’Action Sociale en Faveur des Musulmans d’Algérie en France” speech by François Villey, Administrateur Civil au Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population, Président de la Section française de l’AER/AWR au Congrès de cette Association à Weggis (Suisse), le 23 septembre 1960. Villey was head of the French section of the AER/AWR.

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 2.
conclusion that the most effective way to integrate immigrants into French culture was through the family.\textsuperscript{310}

It may perhaps be surprising that Massenet—who was adamant that social action not be used to police Algerians—included the installation of social services in the *centres d’assignation à résidence surveillée* in his 1959 plan. But, at least at their conception, social services in the camps had a rehabilitating, rather than simply policing, purpose. Algerians suspected of political offenses were identified at the *centre de transit* in Vincennes, and were then transported to one of five centers (Vadeney in the Marne department, Thol in the Ain, Saint-Maurice in the Gard, Le Larzac in the Aveyron, and Neuville-sur-Ain), which together contained approximately 2,000 people in early 1959 and up to 17,000 in 1962. Massenet seems to have written these guidelines based on recommendations from SAMAS, which was in charge of administering social action in the detention centers—at special closed meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee.\textsuperscript{311}

Captain Hippolyte Bérenguier, one of the founders of the SAT-FMA, seems to have been the first to propose installing social services in the internment camps. Like the leaders of the SAMAS, he saw social action as serving a political purpose. Bérenguier complained that the relatively small number of policemen stationed in the internment camps, coupled with the problem of prisoners arriving without dossiers on their background, made control of the camp a major problem. The FLN, on the other hand, had what Berenguier called “an effective system of reception and indoctrination,” and as well as an organized system of exchange of information

\textsuperscript{310} Todd Shepard has argued that between 1958 and 1962, officials reframed their ‘civilizing mission’ as a ‘modernizing mission’ both in Algeria and in the metropole. See *The Invention of Decolonization*, 6. For more on the importance of Algerian families in the French state’s social welfare programs, see Lyons, “Social welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France: the case of the Fonds d'action sociale,” 12-13.

\textsuperscript{311} CARAN F1a 5010: Comité Interministerielle, PV 21 May 1959. On numbers of detainees, see CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, “Note à l’Attention de M. le Premier Ministre,” 17 March 1959.
with its cadres on the outside, and referred to the camps as “seminaries of the FLN.” Bérenguier singled in on the Arabic reading and writing courses that the FLN had organized in the camps. “Concerning indoctrination,” he wrote, “Arabic courses are being conducting in the three camps. Due to a lack of qualified personnel, these courses cannot be supervised. It would be interesting to seize the course books; one would certainly find in them the hymn of the fellagahs and other patriotic songs, probably verses judiciously chosen from the Qu’ran as well, and even notes for political instruction.\(^{312}\)

Bérenguier warned against approaching the problem of political indoctrination from “a strictly policing point of view,” given that, at its core, this was a political problem. Algerian nationalism being a political problem, Bérenguier wrote that no distinction ought to be made between suspects caught carrying arms and those arrested while unarmed. “Both are dangerous,” he insisted. In his mind, subversive ideas, as much as weapons themselves, were a threat to the French nation. The immediate goal of the camps, he argued, was to make it impossible for suspects to participate in the fight by removing them from contact with other FLN operatives. Yet, this being accomplished, he urged the French state to move beyond mere incarceration and to try to rehabilitate prisoners using social services. He suggested simple French language and arithmetic classes, books, magazines, radio, and films as possible means of gaining prisoner’s trust and, eventually, their loyalty to France, and encouraged security personnel to meet one on one with prisoners to discuss “familial, professional, and social” matters and to offer them

---

advice. Moreover, Bérenguier proposed that a file be kept in which each prisoner’s “evolution” would be carefully noted and where the responsible authority could find background information on him. He believed that the internment camps ought to help prisoners “regain a normal existence from the familial, professional, and social points of view at the heart of the community.” In other words, having removed people from their homes, jobs, and families, the French state should help Algerian prisoners and their families regain these things, but under its direct supervision. Upon prisoners’ release, he advised continued contact with the SAT-FMA officers and CTAM.313

Massenet worked together with the SAMAS and the Prefecture of Police to implement Captain Bérengueir’s proposal. In November 1959, Blanchard wrote to the new Interior Minister Pierre Chatenet about the SAMAS’s organization of “social, educational, and psychological action” in the centers.314 Blanchard believed social action was necessary to combat idleness among detainees and to “prepare them for their eventual return to civilian life.” Otherwise, he feared the result would be “a human and political catastrophe.”315

The educational and recreational initiatives undertaken in the centres d’assignation à résidence surveillée closely mirrored efforts that the government was pursuing in migrant neighborhoods. A CT was stationed in three of the centers (Thol, Saint Maurice, and Larzac), where he had an office, an assistant, and a secretary who communicated with detainees over loudspeaker. The French classes in prisons and centers followed the same model as classes

313 CAC 19770391, art. 8: “Rapport du Capitaine Bérenguier, Attaché au Cabinet du Préfet de Police, sur les centres de séjour surveillé de Vadenay (Marne) Neuville-sur Ain (Ain) et Saint Maurice l’Ardoise (Gard), 10 March 1959.

314 Chatenet served 28 May 1959-6 May 1961. Four other men—Maurice Faure, Jules Moch, Emile Pelletier, and Jean Berthoin—had filled this post since Bourgès-Maunory’s departure. Chatenet was followed by Roger Frey, 6 May 1961-6 April 1967.

given to workers at night apprenticeship classes. Detainees had organized French language classes themselves, but the Ministry of the Interior viewed this as a security threat and took charge of the classes. By contrast, the SAMAS clamped down on Arabic language classes, which Blanchard, like Captain Bérenguier, believed were “no doubt instruments utilized by the FLN.” Blanchard also planned to begin job-training classes, but he was concerned that tools could be used as weapons and that additional security would be needed. He was also faced with the problem that, because detainees had not been charged with any specific crime, they could not be forced to work (they could not be sentenced, for instance, to work crews). Additionally, Blanchard assumed that detainees would not sign up for classes because they believed that they would soon be released. Meanwhile, he planned to see if detainees could do some simple work, such as making artificial flowers.

In January, 1960, the “social and educational services” at the centres d’assignation à residence in Neuville-sur-Ain, Larzac, Saint-Maurice l’Ardoise, and Vadenay consisted primarily of propaganda such as posters produced by the SAMAS, slide shows from Affaires Algériennes and the Institut Pédagogique National, R.T.F. radio bulletins (in French, Kabyle, Arabic), “judiciously chosen” television news programs and televised sports matches, SAS bulletins, Documents Nord-Africains (published by ESNA), and Messages d’Algérie (a Gaullist newspapers that contained fabricated reports of how villages in Algeria were benefitting from the

---

316 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Programme d’Action Sociale Pour l’Année 1959 remis à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général pour les Affaires Algériennes le 25 novembre 1959. The Ministry of the Interior asked the Ministry of National Education to donate books and writing materials for libraries in the detention centers. The FLN was particularly active in the centers, which quickly became FLN recruitment and training grounds.


318 Ibid.
French presence there). There were also French language classes, which were meant to be a replacement for the Arabic language and militant training classes that, much to the chagrin of the French government, the FLN had organized and had been running since the camps opened in 1958.\textsuperscript{319}

**Linkages and Tensions**

Despite similarities in their approaches, competition arose between bureaucrats as they sought to coordinate their efforts while simultaneously meeting their own goals. For example, despite their shared view of social action as a means to an end, the SAMAS and the Prefecture of Police did not always see eye to eye on how to combine assistance and surveillance. When SAT-FMA commanders met with military and Interior officials in June 1959 to discuss the extension of their special police force throughout France, SAMAS representative Laurent spoke out against this idea.\textsuperscript{320} His disapproval seems to have been due in part to the fact that the SAS commanders proposed that regional officers would be administered by the General Secretary of Algerian Affairs, which was de Gaulle’s creation, rather than the SAMAS. But it is also possible to look


\textsuperscript{320} CARAN F1a 5045: SAMAS/Am No. 1-1311 Note pour Monsieur le Ministre, 1 Juin 1959
Objet: “Compte rendu d’une réunion qui s’est tenue le 26 Mai au secretariat general pour les Affaires Algeriennes pour étudier les possibilites d’encadrer la population musulmane de la métropole par des officiers S.A.S.; examen critique du projet; propositions.” At the time there were only six SAT-FMA officers in Paris, the bureau in Nanterre had been temporarily shut down due to threats of violence from the FLN.
beyond mere territorial disputes to better understand the SAMAS’s critique of policing. Indeed, even when Colonel Laure of Algerian Affairs proposed that SAMAS could be in charge of the regional officers, Laurent was displeased. Marcel Blanchard shared his concerns. In his notes on the meeting, Blanchard argued that the SAMAS was wholly competent without the SAU. He believed the project of trying to *encadrer* the Muslim population using the police was founded on an “inexact appreciation of the spirit of the Muslim population” and an “incomplete knowledge of all of the action undertaken by the SAMAS.”

The crux of Blanchard’s argument against expanding policing was that what the military was doing to contain nationalist uprising in Algeria would not work in the metropole. He echoed earlier arguments made by Bourgès-Maunory: Algerians wanted to be treated as equal French citizens, and it was in the government’s best interest to do this. “It is obvious that it would be deliberately going against these hopes and thus risking destroying this capital of confidence in general de Gaulle,” he wrote, to generalize the whole metropole under the system of SAS antennae that have been put in place in the dept. of the Seine. In the Department of the Seine, for example, if Algerians needed to be added to a subsidized housing waiting list or approval to travel to Algeria they had to do this through the SAT-FMA bureau—a policing antennae—whereas most French citizens could simply go to the local housing or travel office. As Blanchard saw it, forcing Algerians to seek social services through police stations suggested that the government saw them uniformly as criminals. Fighting the FLN remained his goal, but he wanted to “deliver Algerians from terrorist threats and extortion” using social action to better integrate them into French society rather than submit them to discriminatory policing. The

---

321 Ibid., 5.
322 Ibid., 7.
323 Ibid., 6.
SAMAS built all of its anti-FLN policy on the integration of Algerians into French society. The Prefecture of Police’s overtly segregationist policies therefore threatened to undermine its efforts.\textsuperscript{324}

Papon, who was interested only in using the offer of welfare to lure Algerians to the police, continued to force collaboration between his security forces and the social action sector. In September, 1959, security officials agreed that the Prefecture of Police would work in “strict collaboration and particular diligence” with social action associations in their departments, which, in turn, were “in no way to compromise the effectiveness of the auxiliary police force.”\textsuperscript{325} Two months later, officials agreed that if SAT-FMA officers could not replace existing social services, they should at least be ensured a role in their “orientation and coordination.” Likewise, Papon’s officers were to be “intimately associated with all efforts in the Paris region” and all involved Ministries were to be sent instructions to examine all requests for assistance from Algerian families “with increased effectiveness and diligence.”\textsuperscript{326} With regard to efforts to rehouse residents of the Nanterre bidonville, it was decided that “For reasons of security, relocation should take place under the control of the auxiliary police” and police stations were to be built on the periphery of the bidonville of Nanterre.\textsuperscript{327}

\textsuperscript{324} In his study of Algerian migration, Claude Perret argued that when agents were both welfare providers and information gatherers of repressive power (he cites the example of the SAU), it was detrimental to social action. See CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Note sure l’Emploi en Métropole des Français de Souche Algérienne,” 2.

\textsuperscript{325} CAC 19770391, art. 2: Compte Rendu du Conseil Restreint du Lundi 28 Septembre, Paris, le 7 Octobre 1959, Republique Française, Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, 2-3. If Massenet protested efforts by Papon to use the offer of welfare to lure Algerians to the police, it was not recorded in transcripts of these 1959 meetings. Massenet did protest following the police murders of dozens of Algerians on the night of October 17, 1961, see Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{326} CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche No. 9 “Fonctionnement des S.A.T. de la Préfecture de Police,” secret.

\textsuperscript{327} CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche No. 5, “Une expérience-pilote : la liquidation du Bidonville de Nanterre,” secret.
Given the interconnectedness of repression and social action, balancing communication between government branches with the protection classified information caused problems. Although, behind the scenes, welfare administrators and security forces worked together (and in some cases were one in the same), all information released to the public was carefully controlled and the exact actions of the SAMAS and the Prefecture of Police suppressed. For instance, in his notes on the preparation of the press conference given by the Interior Minister on 12 September 1958 for members of the Paris, regional, and foreign press, on state social action for Algerian workers in the metropole, Blanchard explained that the actions of SAMAS, which was “the true director and coordinator of all that is done in France in favor of Muslims,” had been voluntarily suppressed.328 Instead, at the press conference Interior Minister Pelletier spoke generally of “the unified effort by the entire government,” which had “improved the lives of Muslims living in our territory.”329 Echoing the words of his predecessor, Bourgès-Maunory, Pelletier urged the need to protect innocent Algerians, who “wanted nothing more than to work in peace” from the “criminals” who threatened their security and announced dramatically the need to “lift the cloud of fear and terror that weighs so heavily each day on the lives of our Muslim brothers both in the metropole and Algeria.” Lest the public think that the war had led the government to use inappropriate repressive methods, the conference assured them that the Ministry of the Interior’s actions were a “peaceful mission perfectly in line with the human ideal that has never ceased to animate France.”330 The fact that it was singling out Algerians was a sign of France’s “solidarity” with Algeria; both were united in the fight against the disruptive, foreign, FLN.

328 F1a 5010: Note a l’attention de M. le Ministre, Objet: “Action sociale: Conférence de presse 30 Août 1958.”
What was not made public—neither in the version of the social action plan released to all concerned Ministries nor, of course, in press releases—was the existence of the *centres d’assignation à résidence surveillée* and Papon’s team of FLN-hunting police officers.

Because of the usefulness security administrators saw in social action, Massenet was frequently present at secret meetings regarding national security and the FLN. A crisis occurred when it was discovered that someone had leaked information on the government’s repressive actions to the press following a September 28, 1959 meeting of welfare and security administrators at the Prime Minister’s office. On the meeting’s agenda were proposed social welfare initiatives including the “immediate cleanup” of the bidonville in Nanterre and “the fight against terrorism in the metropole.”

Clearly, as far as Prime Minister Michel Debré was concerned, these two issues were intertwined. But dealing with security and social action as a single unit posed problems. Looking around the meeting room, a representative from the Ministry of the Interior commented on the “a very excessive number” of participants who were unqualified to discuss “confidential matters.”

Debré shared his suspicion toward the social welfare administrators present. When the security breach was first revealed, Debré first accused Michel Massenet (He was later cleared and two lower administrators were dismissed from their jobs). Although Massenet had been formally invited to attend all sessions of the meeting, he claimed he left before the items on the agenda dealing with repression—repatriation of FLN operatives, the creation of an “auxiliary Muslim police force,” and breaking FLN power in the *centres d’assignation à résidence surveillée*—were discussed because, he explained, they

---


concerned “problems of security in which I have no competence.” This incident demonstrates the ambiguous line between repression and social action, even at the highest echelons of the government. The matter of who exactly was qualified to know what would remain unclear throughout the remaining three years of the war.

On January 21, 1960 Massenet presented his completed social action plan to Prime Minister Michel Debré during a meeting at the Hôtel Matignon. The meeting was the second in a series of three that Debré hosted that day on the “events” in Algeria, which dealt with diplomacy, social action, and workers’ security and the suppression of terrorism, respectively. The following day Massenet sent out a press release to show the public the results of state social services (he had pledged to the security forces that he would “grant particular importance to problems of information” by giving more press releases, etc.). He offered some encouraging figures: twelve workers’ shelters were built in 1959 (and 30 more planned for 1960); 4,000 Algerian workers were receiving job training; a youth center in Marseille that would educate and train 2,000 Algerian youth for work in France was in the works; 500 French language classes, including those just for women were being taught; and there was now twice as much radio programming in Arabic and Kabyle on the airwaves from a year ago. Massenet also claimed that most of the bidonvilles had been “suppressed”—a considerable stretching of the truth given that only 200 families had been relocated in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille combined.

Paris-Presse published these figures, but ran the story with the dramatic headline “25,000 More Algerians in the metropole than in 1959,” challenging the government’s efforts to appear to have poverty—

---


335 CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Bilan chiffre d’une année d’action sociale pour la migration algérienne.”
and the FLN—under control.\textsuperscript{336} Despite its best efforts to beat them, the government’s twin enemies (poverty and Algerian nationalism) remained.

**Conclusion**

The bureaucrats who collected information, set goals, drafted policy, and attempted to implement it possessed a great range of opinion on the balance of social control and social action required vis-à-vis Algerians living in the metropole. Yet they shared common goals related to overcoming the “cultural handicap” from which, they assumed, all Algerians suffered. Blanchard and his SAMAS administrators embraced the assimilation of Algerian migrants into French culture, but they did so in a way that served the Interior’s primary aim of defeating Algerian nationalism. Michel Massenet adamantly opposed using social action for surveillance, yet he nevertheless used information gathered by the SAMAS to draft a social action plan that closely resembled Blanchard’s. At the other extreme, Police Prefect Maurice Papon maintained a charitable front via his SAT-FMA bureaus, whose only purpose was identifying and detaining FLN members. Behind the office doors of the ministries, committees, and advisory boards, the same dozen or so bureaucrats wrote policy based on tenuous observations from transplanted colonial administrators masquerading as social workers. Taken as a whole, state social action conveys a contradictory view of Algerians and their place in the French nation. It was the particular circumstances of the Algerian War—in which Algerian culture was a symbol of the potential for violence and Algerians’ ‘level of adaptation’ marked their political allegiance to France—that united these diverse state actors. In this context, social action and repression became interwoven in the fight to keep Algeria French.

The following chapter examines the local associations that—because of their experience, knowledge, and manpower—were largely responsible for implementing the government’s policies. It also examines their interactions with the French state, from which they received funding as well as a watchful eye. The associations encompassed a wide spectrum of French society and as well as views on the Algerian War. But although they were often divided politically, they, like the state officials in this chapter, shared an ambiguous view of Algerians as fellow Frenchmen and yet utterly foreign, even threatening.
Chapter 3

Private Associations and the Politics of Social Action

This chapter takes as case studies a handful of associations that provided social aid to Algerians in metropolitan France during the Algerian war. An examination of these associations—why they were founded and by whom and the kinds of services they provided—is key to understanding the war and the complex issues that sprang from it. Throughout the Algerian War, but particularly under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, culturally assimilating and increasing surveillance of Algerian migrants via social action became an explicitly stated wartime tactic. The French government relied heavily on the activities and expertise of private associations to implement this policy. Associations were integral players in the government’s fight against the Fédération Française of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which, through a social aid network of its own, sought absolute control over the Algerian population in France. They worked to forge the connections with Algerians that de Gaulle’s government deemed were necessary if France was to remove support for the FLN and Algeria to remain part of France. The state also used its funding of charitable associations as a propaganda tool. Thus, although the Saharan oil fields and nuclear test sites may have been de Gaulle and Debré’s primary interest, they also needed to appear to be defending Algerians’ belonging in the French nation. Furthermore, studying the associations demonstrates the range of French public views on the fighting in Algeria—views that were frequently, though not always, at odds with the official state position.
The goals and methods of the associations in some ways reflected those at the national level. For instance, fervent supporters of de Gaulle sought to defend *Algérie française* via the social action network, while others saw participation in associations as a way to remedy the errors of a neglectful colonial regime. Yet they also gave voice to those excluded or under-represented in French politics: native Algerians, religious organizations (whose power of association was closely monitored under the law of 1901), scholars of North African culture, and students. Private social aid associations thus offer a window into the complexity of ‘the Algerian question,’ a political, economic, and territorial problem intertwined with ideas of race, culture, and national identity. Additionally, although reformers’ motives varied from maintaining French Algeria to social altruism, what united their efforts is that they were based on the premise that changing the daily living habits of North African immigrants was necessary to ensure their assimilation into French society. Similarities emerge between these associations, such as their belief in the power of summer camps for children, their involvement in adult education and job training, and their concern over women’s lack of cultural adaptation.

**Associations in the Fifth Republic’s Social Action Plan**

As discussed in Chapter 1, administrators had long recognized that small associations often possessed a greater degree of expertise on the needs of Algerians in France than the government and, in addition, had built valuable personal ties with this community. The associations had been much quicker than officials to realize that Algerian migrants would settle in the metropole and would require long-term services such as housing and education. Since the early 1950s the French government had relied on and funded in small measure the pioneering efforts of private associations to carry out its goals vis-à-vis Algerian migration, which primarily
included raising employment and literacy rates and rehousing families from the bidonvilles. But only with the specter of FLN violence in the metropole and French control of Algeria at risk did Algerians’ social disadvantages become worthy of sustained attention and funding from the government. The goal of using the associations, more so than in any of the French government’s other efforts aimed at Algerians in the metropole, was to encourage cultural transformation that officials believed would lead to loyalty to the French state. Much of the government literature on Algerian migration asserts the need for the ‘adaptation’ of families to life in the metropole, by which French officials meant their assimilation into French culture. Thus, the initiatives they funded went beyond integrating the Algerian population via housing, employment, etc. and instead aimed to effect changes in peoples’ daily living habits, including cooking, childrearing, recreation, and religious practices.

Following the reforms made at the start of the Fifth Republic, private associations could apply for grants both from the SAMAS as well as from the Fonds d’Action Sociales (FAS), which was designated specifically for projects benefiting the Algerian community and was administered by the office of the General Secretary for Algerian Affairs. At the peak of the Algerian War, the government was providing grants to over one hundred and fifty private associations, all dedicated to providing services such as education, housing, medical care, and cultural activities to the Algerian community. Roughly ten percent of the FAS’s budget went to these social action grants (68% went to the construction of housing, 12% to the labor sector, and another 10% to medical/sanitary action). As Social Action Delegate, Michel Massenet was responsible for coordinating the work of the array of private associations with the French government. Although Massenet was not in charge of allocating FAS funds, he gave recommendations for its distribution and was responsible for overseeing the associations’ use of
the money. Hundreds of applications for FAS grants passed through Massenet’s office each year. Massenet corresponded with the leaders of many associations and met personally with leaders of the larger ones, he served on the board of at least one (the Commission d’Aide aux Nord-Africains dans la Métropole, CANAM), and he occasionally made speeches at their meetings. Additionally, applications for funding from the Ministry of the Interior arrived at the office of Marcel Blanchard of the SAMAS, and many associations received money from both the FAS and the Ministry of the Interior.\footnote{In June 1959 in preparation for a meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, SAMAS head Marcel Blanchard wrote to representatives of the ministries that sat on the board of directors of the FAS, asking them to submit lists of associations they believed deserved funding. From this he created a list of associations throughout the country that had asked for grants, along with some preliminary remarks. The dossiers were examined at a réunion restreinte of the committee (a groupe de travail) which took place Monday, 29 June 1959 at the headquarters of the SAMAS (60 Boulevard Gouvion Saint-Cyr). See CARAN F1a 5045: Comité interministériel d’action sociale pour les français musulmans en métropole, Réunion du 29 juin 1959.}

Fifth Republic officials dramatically increased state involvement with and reliance on local, private welfare groups. Members of the Interdepartmental Social Action Committee made the decision to reach out to private associations at their meetings in 1958/9. Ministry of Public Health representative François Villey urged Michel Massenet to work with private associations that specialized in services for women and children and which had the benefit of “very precious experience on which we can lean.”\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 2: Ministry of Public Health and Population, direction generale de la population & de l’entr’aide, sous-direction du peuplement 10e bureau, “Programme complementaire pour 1959 à soumettre au fond d’action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans d’algérie en metropole et pour leurs familles.” For more on the associations and their role in familial social action, see Chapter 3.} The associations, he argued, had the personal connections necessary to shape behavior at the individual and familial levels. In the social action plan that he submitted to Secretary General for Algerian Affairs Roger Moris in November 1959, Michel Massenet wrote of the need to create “l’encadrement social,” (social direction/control) of the
Algerian population in the metropole.\textsuperscript{339} “In this domain,” Massnet wrote, “all action is delicate, its effects are not very visible, and the state cannot be directly in charge.”\textsuperscript{340} He used the same word, \textit{encadrement}, in a section on Algerian youth, arguing that French associations could provide the \textit{encadrement sociale} and family support that they were lacking. Furthermore, President de Gaulle himself divided the royalties from the publication of his \textit{Mémoires} between a number of charitable associations, among them one that assisted Algerians in the metropole.\textsuperscript{341}

Massenet and Moris traveled frequently throughout France—from Paris to Lyon, Marseille, and Aix en Provence—to check on the progress of the associations receiving state funding. In June, 1960 Massenet spoke to the Rotary International Club of Paris, urging the Rotarians to help families in the bidonvilles, a service that he told them was “an important part of maintaining the colony” of Algeria. Massenet also linked charitable work in the metropole to the Constantine Plan, asserting that both were signs that France was devoted to helping Algeria. In 1960, 1 million NF (the new franc, introduced in January, equaled 100 times the value of the old franc) from a total FAS budget of 17 million NF went to ‘Action en faveur des jeunes, des familles et des inadaptés’ (action in favor of youth, families, and the maladapted). The FAS’s board of directors planned new focus on “aiding maladapted children, women in moral danger, moral prevention for adolescents, domestic education, in-home social work, help for families without shelter.”\textsuperscript{342}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{339} “Encadrement,” which translates directly to “framing” in English, implies both the containment and control of a population.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{340} CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Programme d’Action Sociale Pour l’Année 1959.” (“Dans ce domaine, toute action est delicate, ses effets sont peu visibles et l’Etat ne peut être directement le maître d’œuvre.”)
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{341} See CARAN F1a 5056: SAMAS Ref: SAM/AM No. 3-3658 “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre (à l’attention de Monsieur Galichon), Objet: Documents remis à la Présidence de la République,” November 12, 1959. This money seems to have gone to the CANAM.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{342} CAC 19770391, art. 2: FAS, “Projet de realizations sociales au profit des travailleurs d’origine algérienne en métropole” (article 9 du décret no. 59-559 du 23 avril 1959).
\end{flushright}
be a doubling of night classes, run both by private associations such as the GEANARP and by the Ministry of the Labor’s *Association pour la formation rationelle de la main d’œuvre* (association for rational training of the workforce).

**Gaullists**

De Gaulle’s supporters rallied behind the state’s welfare initiatives, interpreting the General’s ambiguous promise to bring the war to a successful end as a call to arms. Like the state administrators examined in Chapter 2, members of Gaullist welfare associations took as fact the link between culture and political allegiance. Housing the homeless, spreading French culture to families, and steering youth away from Algerian nationalism became their contribution to ensuring a French solution in Algeria. It was French men and women who supported the use of torture and violent repression in Algeria who spoke fervently about owing dues of brotherhood and charity to Algerian migrants to metropolitan France. Furthermore, some of the most strident supporters of the war were former Resistance members “who equated the defense of French Algeria with the defense of national independence.”

One association in particular was closely aligned with the French state’s goals vis-à-vis Algerian migrants and worked closely with the state as it carried out both social and political action. This was Jeunesse, Culture, Loisirs, et Technique (JCLT), which was an extension of the

---

Gaullist militia the Service d’Action Civique (SAC). The SAC, which saw itself as a ‘garde de fidèles’ (keeper of the faithful), was founded in 1960 by former members of de Gaulle’s Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF) party (which disbanded when he became president) with the goal of “defending and making known the thoughts and action of General de Gaulle.” Its members claimed that the SAC was a “civic, cultural, and social organization” and was apolitical. Although its action centered on providing social welfare for Algerians in the metropole, the association had explicit political goals that it made clear in both its published materials as well as in correspondence with the French government. For instance, the SAC’s November/December 1959 bulletin recounted de Gaulle’s return to power, and how its members had come to his side in the fight against both Communism and the FLN. The association pledged not to abandon, and the bulletin ended with a diatribe about Algeria and its need for French “pacification.”

Prime Minister Michel Debré was a great supporter of the SAC. In a February 1960 letter to Roger Moris Debré wrote: “The great advantage of its action is due to its having metropolitan workers behind the banner of Gen. de Gaulle and outside of any political positions. The SAC practices neither purely social and apolitical action nor partisan political propaganda, but is consecrated to an humane action of contact and aid without ulterior motives that can only reinforce the attachment of Algerian Muslims as much to the General’s person as to the most French solution in Algeria.” Debré was also pleased that a “fruitful partnership” had been

---


345 CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Bulletin de Liaison du Service d’Action Civique,” No. 2, Novembre/Decembre 1959. The first issue of the bulletin (octobre 1959) stated: “This bulletin is not a newspaper, since in our combat we want it to be a weapon” and included a sentimental call to arms about reviving the French Empire, entitled “La Tache Rose” (the Pink Stain—presumably a reference to the spread of Communism in formerly colonized areas of the world).
established between the SAC and the SAT-FMA police bureaus, even referring to the SAC as “an extension of the SAT.” According to Debré, Constantin Melnik, an adviser on police and counterinsurgency from 1959 to 1962, encouraged members of the SAC to focus their work on Algerian Muslims in France. Algerians identified by the police as being FLN members were placed in factories directed by SAC sympathizers, and SAT-FMA officers advised workers who were SAC members to take Algerian youth under their wings. Additionally, members of the SAC assisted the police by putting up flyers against loitering in bidonvilles and lodging houses in the Paris region where Algerians lived, and helped Algerians seeking to escape the FLN find safe housing.  

As secretary general of the SAC, Robert Levillain recruited other members, some of whom had served in North Africa with the Resistance, in his quest to save French greatness by aiding Algerians in France. Levillain founded three associations in 1960/61—JCLT, the Club Olympique Parisien (for sports and leisure), and l’Association Française d’Aide aux Jeunes Travailleurs (a youth shelter)—which he managed from 79, rue de l’Eglise, Paris. The largest of these was JCLT, which opened its first youth center on the rue Pelleport in 1960. Levillain opened the first JCLT center because, he wrote, there was a need for a place, with music, books, games, etc., “where Muslims could congregate,” since they were “always being followed” by the police. It is unclear if Levillain was being critical of policing; perhaps he saw himself as helping the police by assembling Algerians in one, supervised, location. In another document, he

346 CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Note à l’attention de Monsieur Moris,” signed M. Debré, 22 février, 1960.
347 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Robert Levillain, “Note concernant l’action psychologique et d’Information.”
praised Papon’s SAT-FMA officers for “understanding the specific situation of French Muslims from Algeria” and for “detecting and solving their problems without delay.”

Like many state bureaucrats, Levillain believed that charitable work and political propaganda went hand in hand, and he called psychological action the “most effective compliment to all aid in favor of Muslims.” “It is not in the role of the SAC to have a political activity that would be contrary to its statutes and to its spirit,” Levillain wrote in a note on psychological action and information, “but the SAC cannot dissociate the social action, and simply human action, that it carries out in the Muslim realm in the name of General de Gaulle, from its duty to inform the French Muslims of the metropole of the reality of the Algerian problem, that is to say, their problem.” He advocated distributing “abundant and appropriate information for the Muslim masses” as well as twice monthly movie screening on French objectives in Algeria. According to an August 1961 report on the SAC’s activities, the association had shown sixty propaganda films (produced by the Discothèque du Ministère d’Etat aux Affaires Algériennes and the Service Cinématographique des Armées, de l’Education Nationale) at its centers. Furthermore, members of the SAC wrote a report on the reactions of their young spectators, to judge the films’ effectiveness.

JCLT also produced its own print propaganda—a newspaper called Messages d’Algérie—which portrayed the positive elements of the French presence in Algeria along with personalized messages from areas from which large numbers had migrated and was distributed

---

348 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Robert Levillain, “Note Prelable.” Levillain continued: “However unfortunate this may be, Algerians must be sorted into those destined to be bums and those who, taken in hand and followed [traced], will one day become managers.”

349 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Robert Levillain, “Note concernant l’Action Psychologique et d’Information.”

by SAT-FMA police officers. Levillain believed Messages d’Algérie would make a real contribution to the information side of the “events in Algeria.” Levillain worried that the only time information got exchanged between French administrators in Algeria and the metropole was when an SAU officer in the capital wrote to an SAS officer in Algeria for news on one of the visitors to his bureau. But, he argued, it was obvious that Algerians were receiving news from their families in their ‘douar.’ Levillain explained, “We know what [FLN] propaganda can often make them believe about their Douar and their family (misery, ill-treatment, destruction), and we know what their family means to French Muslims from Algeria.”

His aim with producing and distributing Messages d’Algérie was to control the news migrants were receiving from their families back in Algeria. It is difficult to verify their authenticity, but each issue included a personalized story from such and such village with information on what had been happening there, all with a palpable pro-French bent. Issues also included stories of metropolitan charity, such as a full-page story on a SAC-run Christmas party in one of Levillain’s shelters, complete with a large photo of smiling children holding presents.

Religious Organizations

Yet the reality was that the associations on which de Gaulle and Debré relied did not all share their views on French Algeria and the war. A ‘Second Left,’ composed of religious

351 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Robert Levillain, “Note concernant ‘Messages d’Algérie.’”
352 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Robert Levillain, “Note sur la nécessité d’établir des relations plus étroites entre l’Algérie et la Métropole.”
353 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Messages d’Algérie, 15 Janvier 1962, 13-14. The article explains that one hundred and fifty young people from France, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia packed into 79 Rue de l’Eglise to hear a musical program presented by Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (the Arabic and Kabyle programming division), which included an orchestra, singers, and a belly dancer. RTF handed out a small gift to each child and raffled off two bikes. Commandant Rëngüier of the SAT-FMA was in attendance, the article states, “showing his support.”
groups, university students, and unions and committed to egalitarianism, social justice, and opposition to colonialism, had long engaged itself in the social welfare arena and also received government funding. For example, Secours Catholique, a Catholic charity founded after World War II, had a North African Service branch with ninety diocese delegations throughout the country who were among the first to pay attention to the plight of North Africans migrants in France. One of its member associations, the Maison de Myriam, was founded in March of 1954 by Monseigneur Mercier (dubbed the “Bishop of the Sahara”) and ran a shelter in Montreuil for North Africans who were unemployed and in need of a temporary place to stay. Like many non-political associations, the Maison de Myriam did not limit its services to the Algerian community, but opened its doors to Moroccans, Tunisians, and others in need of help. This association also helped North Africans find employment or placement in a training facility, and provided visitors with metro tickets and work clothes—services that, according to its annual report, no public agency performed. In an average year it assisted two to three thousand visitors, 90% of them Algerians, and provided shelter to one thousand of those. The Ministry of the Interior subsidized the Maison de Myriam continuously from 1954 to at least 1966, with annual grants of up to 50,000 NF, the same amount of funding it gave to the Gaullist SLSNA.354

At the transition from Fourth to Fifth Republic, the Maison de Myriam chose not to change its methods in the name of preserving French Algeria. Instead, members of the association asserted that it was Algerians themselves, and not the French government, who should decide their own fate. “For two years,” its 1958 report explained, “we have welcomed largely those same people who must one day play a prominent role in the future of Algeria.”355 Members were also concerned that, with the start of violence in metropolitan France, North

355 F1a 5107: Maison de Myriam, “Rapport Moral 1958.”
African unemployment had increased because of discriminatory hiring practices. Rather than take a stance on the war, members pledged “To create a peaceful environment despite the war” and to “aid humanity without regard to nationality or religion.” Interestingly, though, the Maison de Myriam continued to receive referrals from SAT-FMA officers, who seemed to believe that, despite the association’s disproval of its repressive tactics, the services it provided nevertheless served the Prefecture of Police’s goals of fighting terrorism with social assistance.

The Cimade (Comité intermouvements auprès des évacués) is a Protestant organization, created in 1939 to give aid to evacuees from Alsace and Lorraine, whose charitable work during the Algerian War is well documented. Unlike other associations, la Cimade did not discriminate based on the ties of the people it assisted to the FLN. The organization’s earliest involvement with Algerians in the metropole was during the first years of the Algeria War, when it began aiding North African communities in Marseille and later Paris, Lyon, and Strasbourg. In 1957, it sent a team to Algiers and later brought public attention to the squalid conditions of the resettlement camps imposed by the French army. It also provided aid to residents of villages controlled by the SAS (Sections administratives spéciales) and to patients in French military hospitals. A right-wing journalist, Roland Gaucher, suggested that the secretary general of the Cimade had close ties to a network that supported the liberation movements in Arabic countries. This may have been true, but these ties were more practical than political. According to the association’s website, when the Cimade took a political stance, for instance by denouncing

---

357 For example, the Salvation Army refused to get involved with a group of religious organizations providing aid to detainees at the centres d’assignation à residence surveillée.
military torture in Algeria or by advocating for the rights of political prisoners in the metropole, it was for humanitarian reasons.\textsuperscript{358, 359}

**Associations’ Political Activities and Tensions with the French Government**

A few associations funded by the French government even openly opposed the war, and they were not alone in this view. Although, at the beginning of the Algerian War, most French people were apathetic, after the writings of de Beauvoir and Sartre revealed to the French public that torture in Algeria had continued under de Gaulle, those in France opposing the war were in the majority. In a referendum on January 8, 1961, 75% French voters voted in favor of Algerian self-determination.

Whereas, in 1958, the conseiller technique investigating the Cimade gave it a favorable review and recommended giving it additional funds, the association ran in to trouble with state and local authorities, who suspected its charitable work in the centres d’assignation à résidence surveillée (detention centers/internment camps) of crossing the line between philanthropic and

\textsuperscript{358} “CIMADE,” http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=15. Consulted September 24, 2011. La Cimade was founded by Christian student groups to meet the “material, psychological, and spiritual needs” of refugees. Its earliest work was in the Nazi internment camps in France. La Cimade also created centres d’accueil and organized underground evacuations of Jews to Switzerland. The organization exists today and works primarily with undocumented workers in France, advocating for their legal rights.

\textsuperscript{359} The CIMADE was part of a broader movement of Christian opposition to the Algerian War. For instance, late in 1959, Témoinage Chrétien sent a journalist, H. Chartier, to one camp to investigate, and he returned with reports of entire families, including women and young children, being arrested during the night. On March 24, 1960, Michel Massenet wrote to the director of the SAMAS, warning him that the press had caught wind of the horrible conditions in the internment camps, and urged him to implement more social action there. CAC 19770391, art. 8: Temoignage Chrétien, No. 807, December 25, 1959 (summary), and Michel Massenet, letter of 24 March 1960, addressed to M. Blanchard of the SAMAS. For a detailed analysis of the Christian antiwar movement see Geoffrey Adams, The Call of Conscience: French Protestant Responses to the Algerian War, 1954-1962 (Wilfried Laurier University Press, 1998) and Sybille Chapeu, Des Chrétiens dans la guerre d’Algérie: l’action de la Mission de France (Paris: l’Atelier, 2004).
political action. Interior authorized La Cimade to enter the detention centers, and in May 1959 Cimade team members made their first visit to the Larzac center, which at the time was home to one thousand Algerian detainees. Finding detainees lacking clothing and medical care, la Cimade put together four teams who visited with the men living there and tried to establish contact with any family members they had in metropolitan France. Cimade members also brought detainees warm clothes, shoes, and books, reportedly donating three hundred kilos of clothes one month.

Historian Jean-Philippe Marcy has referred to the presence of the Cimade at Larzac as “controlled, if not contested.” Authorities worried from the beginning that, since it would meet detainees and might witness incidents occurring at the camp, the Cimade might not limit itself to purely philanthropic action. As a precaution, Cimade team members were required to submit a report of their activities to the Ministry of the Interior, which made decisions regarding their presence there. Furthermore, Renseignements généraux (internal security police) supervised the association’s actions (whom they spoke to, what goods they handed out, etc.) and later admitted to recording conversations between Cimade members and detainees that took place in the social service offices at Larzac. Additionally, there was a regular exchange of information between the director of Larzac, the local prefecture, the Direction général de la Sûreté nationale, and the Ministry of the Interior. The center director was concerned about

---

360 CARAN F1a 51015: Letter of 27 May 1958 from the Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to the SAMAS, ref. no. 6332, AM/JB.


confidential information being leaked to the Cimade, which each month submitted a list of one hundred names to the local prefect, asking him whether they were detained at the center and where exactly they were housed.\textsuperscript{364} When the center director learned that a detainee had given a letter to a Cimade member to be passed on to his family, the director recommended at least a temporary suspension of the association’s work, which the Ministry of the Interior refused. Cimade members were instead asked to limit their mission and to give proof of the “prudence” of their work.\textsuperscript{365}

Tensions between the Cimade and the Larzac center’s director worsened in the fall of 1959, when a new social service initiative (laid out in Michel Massenet’s social action plan) was implemented. This new initiative included social, educational, and psychological action whose primary goal, according to Marcy, was to obtain information from detainees, which the social service employee would pass on to \textit{Renseignements généraux}. Furthermore, all visits between la Cimade and the detainees were henceforth to be supervised by a social service employee. Detainees responded by going on a hunger strike, demanding free circulation between the ‘Oriental’ and ‘Occidental’ (detainees were separated by whether or not they could be rehabilitated) sides of the detention center, better medical care, a lifting of bans on newspapers (\textit{l’Express, Libération, and France Observateur} were all forbidden), and an end to the French language classes (which were laced with political propaganda). The detainees sent a spokesperson to meet with Cimade members, and pastor Marc Boegner, head of the association, transmitted a report summarizing their demands to the French government. Larzac’s director agreed to protect detainees against the cold and to release five hundred men. For the Ministry of


the Interior, the Cimade had overstepped its bounds. As Marcy has written, this incident gave witness to the stakes involved in La Cimade’s visits to Larzac: by entering the center members could see what happened there, and could then denounce it.\footnote{Marcy, Op. cit., 387.} La Cimade continued to advocate for detainees at the centres d’assignation à résidence, making several visits in 1960 and 1961.

It is clear that, at some point during the war, the Cimade began working with the FLN. In November, representatives from the FLN sent a letter to the Cimade, outlining the FLN’s demand for total independence for Algeria, denouncing the “concentration camps” in France, expressing confidence in the Cimade. “We are persuaded,” the letter stated, “that you will echo our call as you have always done in the past.”\footnote{“Nous sommes persuadés que vous ferez écho à notre appel comme vous l’avez toujours fait dans le passé.” Letter of 6 novembre 1961, cited in Marcy, Op. cit., p. 389. For more on the Cimade and other Protestant relief associations see Geoffrey Adams, \textit{The Call of Conscience: French Protestant Responses to the Algerian War, 1954-1962} (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), pp. 141-162.} In 1963, a representative from the office of the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhône wrote to the SAMAS, complaining that the Cimade’s office in Marseille was “still being used by an Algerian organization for purely political ends.”\footnote{CARAN F1a 5105: Letter of 1 October, 1963, Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to the SAMAS, ref. no. 14123, unsigned.}

While the Groupe d’Etude et d’Action pour les Nord-Africains de la region parisienne (GEANARP) was receiving money from the Ministry of the Interior for night classes, a women’s center, and housing placement services for families in Nanterre bidonville (9,000 NF from the SAMAS in 1962), its young treasurer, Armand Desbruyers, was serving on a student committee dedicated to “Developing the current of opposition against the policy known as force in North Africa.”\footnote{F1a 5109: GEANARP, “Statuts.”} Two of the association’s other members, Claude Huet and his wife, operated literacy classes for North Africans in the Nanterre bidonville where, according to the SAT-FMA officer

\begin{flushright}
\footnote{368} CARAN F1a 5105: Letter of 1 October, 1963, Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône to the SAMAS, ref. no. 14123, unsigned.  
\footnote{369} F1a 5109: GEANARP, “Statuts.”}
stationed there, they “Gathered illiterate Algerians in their trailer and, under the pretext of giving them grammatical instruction, distributed anti-national propaganda.” The captain was understandably concerned about their actions, which he believed harmed the action undertaken by the Prefecture of Police.

The experiences of the Amicale des Nord-Africains Résidant en France offer a unique look into the ways associations negotiated the needs of their clients with regulations set by the state. The Amicale was founded by three Algerians living in metropolitan France and began offering night classes taught by volunteers from the Grandes Ecoles of Paris for Algerian workers in 1929. It was especially known for ladling out bowls of couscous in hospitals and prisons on holidays. The Amicale’s president was Louis Rouani. Like his European peers, Rouani was concerned about the isolation of the Algerian community. According to him, of the 400,000 Arab-Berbers living in the metropole, only 100,000 were assimilated. The Amicale’s members were against the FLN, indeed, the association received funding directly from the Ministry of the Interior (approximately 10,000 NF per year until at least 1965) and it always received favorable reports from the police inspectors sent to investigate it. In May 1959 he wrote to Michel Massenet to warn him of the grave danger that the FLN and the MNA (a rival nationalist group) posed. Rouani’s concern was that Algerians’ isolation made them susceptible to recruitment by these organizations, which would then harass and exploit them. But Louis Rouani was also critical of the French government’s repressive policies vis-à-vis Algerian migrants. He feared that Algerians’ isolation, poverty and the discrimination they faced,

370 F1a 5109: Ministère de l’Intérieur, GEANARP dossier.
371 F1a 5109: GEANARP, “Statuts.”
373 CAC 19770391, art. 4: ANARF annual budget reports.
combined with constant harassment by the police, made life in the metropole miserable for them. Furthermore, Rouani was distressed that other associations were engaged in what he called “sociology, demography and documentation,” instead of true social assistance. He also wondered where the money had ended up after the police seized over a million francs from the FLN and MNA (from dues that workers were obliged to pay) and hoped that the money was being used to fund social work and to ameliorate housing. Massenet was sympathetic to Rouani, as he himself disapproved of the government’s use of social aid to police the Algerian community. In 1961, Rouani appealed to Papon, asking him to lift a curfew he had instated so that his students could attend night classes without being stopped by the police. The curfew remained in place.

The ‘Cultural Level’ of Families in the bidonvilles

Despite their different stances on police surveillance of Algerians and even on the war itself, many associations shared the government’s belief in using social aid to shape hearts and minds. Their attention centered on the plight of families living in the bidonvilles. Many associations drew connections between Algerian families’ so-called ‘level of adaptation to metropolitan life’ and the conditions in which they lived.

Members of Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre (whose headquarters were located at 11 bis, rue Victor Hugo, Paris) tried to remedy both isolation and poverty. The association was stationed in the bidonville on the rue de la Garenne where, by 1962, 195 families, including 580 children, lived in precarious conditions, trying to survive cold, muddy winters in shacks with no

---

374 CAC 19770391, art. 4: ANARF (Amicale des Nord-Africains Résidant en France), Letter of 24 May 1959 from President Louis Rouani to Michel Massenet.

375 CAC 19770391, art. 4: ANARF (Amicale des Nord-Africains Résidant en France), Letter of 26 May 1959 from President Louis Rouani to Michel Massenet, “Confidential.”

161
ventilation and water far away. Four or five men shared a single barrack, the association reported, and families with over five children lived in one-room shacks. Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre sought to create “solid links and a warm welcome” by helping people apply for social insurance benefits, showing films for kids, and sending doctors once a week to visit the sick. Although each of its annual reports urged readers to “Be understanding and abandon prejudice,” Amitié Nord-Africaine took a patronizing tone when it came to Algerian culture. “The North African psychology,” its 1957 report explained, “is such that the bidonville, which is, at root, a transplanted village, operates under laws that we don’t understand well but to which we must submit and which bring numerous difficulties in relations between families and public services. We shouldn’t offend or push aside ancestral habits.” It is as if they believed Algerians had chosen to live in dangerous, unhygienic shacks without electricity or running water because they were used to living this way, rather than because they had no alternative.

With funding from the General Government of Algeria and the Ministry of the Interior, the Commission d’Aide aux Nord-Africains dans la Métropole (CANAM) continued to pursue “the adaptation of persons of North African origins to the conditions of life in the metropole” by giving them “aid and assistance in a spirit of fraternal solidarity.” Its social action director,

---

379 CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM, “Statuts,” written by Vice President A. Aouam, Grand Officier de la Légion d’honneur and President: G. Le Beau, Gouverneur Général Honoraire de l’Algérie. The CANAM’s work included distributing government funds to any individuals leaving Algeria who were in need of financial assistance. The grants went to functionaries (5,000 francs to M. Serge Dousson, former Secretary General stationed at the Mairie de Chrea in Algiers “whose presence in Algeria has become undesirable”); European settlers (30,000 francs to M. Louis Laurent, victim of a terrorist attack at Akbou on June 3, 1958); and native Algerians (20,000 francs to M. Amara Abdelaziz, living in Paris, “for reasons of difficulty finding a living situation in the metropole”). See CAC 19770391, art. 4:
Madame Berthelot, was especially interested in families in the bidonvilles and methods of facilitating their adaptation to metropolitan life. “Family action,” she asserted, “either in the form of education or material support, holds a large place in social action.” Like many reformers, Berthelot saw housing as key to this adaptation. For instance, she noted that eight Muslim families that had been rehoused in an HLM in Toulouse were “well on their way to adaptation.” Members of the CANAM were pleased that a survey it conducted with Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française showed “precious indications of the evolution of the habits and tastes of Muslim travelers in terms of habitation,” and that “New ways of living, feeling and thinking were observed.” Members of the Maison de Myriam, too, organized classes to “initiate clients to metropolitan life.”

The *Cahiers Nord-Africains* (published by Reverend Father Jacques Ghys’s charitable association, AMANA—See Chapter 1) contained ambiguous explanations of the relationship between Algerians’ perceived failure to assimilate and the fact that a large majority lived in poverty. In some volumes, the existence of the bidonvilles was presented as proof of Algerians’ innate barbarism and unwillingness to assimilate. At other times, however, this reasoning was reversed. Contributors asserted that poverty was the cause of the problem, not the effect, and

---

380 CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM, Assemblee Generale du 6 juillet 1959, Rapport Moral, présenté par M. Darrouy, Secrétaire Général Administratif, 9. Additionally, the CANAM’s M. Nicola managed two lodging houses which each housed two hundred men. The lodging houses were built from prefabricated metal barracks, with housing for the manager and dormitories of eight to sixteen beds and were open to all North African (Algerian as well as Moroccan and Tunisian) young men. CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM, Assemblee Generale du 6 Juillet 1959, Rapport Moral, présenté par M. Darrouy, Secrétaire Général Administratif, 9. One of Nicola’s shelters was the site of a deadly attack on April 10, 1960, when the director, M. Estival, was assassinated in his office. See CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM, 5e séance, Lundi 2 mai 1960.

were optimistic about the capacity of modern housing to conquer the evils festering in the bidonvilles. The *Cahiers* routinely blamed Algerians’ poor living conditions on an innate backwardness that made them less evolved than native Frenchmen. One author argued, “The evolutionary state of the Muslim family accepts certain things that Western civilization has happily overcome.”382 Thus, Algerians could put up with many family members sleeping in one room and a lack of running water because this was what they were accustomed to. The author of a later volume pointed out that living in a bidonville was an attractive option for some families because of the sense of community that existed there, constituting “A temporary place to live where they can organize a lifestyle that, as primitive as it may seem, is adapted to their immediate social aptitudes.”383 Likewise, another contributor explained, as an Algerian’s personal evolution increased, his attraction to the bidonvilles declined.384

Despite being devoted to enlightening the French public about North African culture, contributors to the *Cahiers* were very critical of several aspects of it. In a 1954 volume devoted to the state of North Africans’ housing, the authors argued that although it is unfortunate that unemployment was much higher among Algerians than among the native French population, this was due to the fact that Algerians generally spent less time looking for work than their European counterparts and that employers rejected Algerian workers because they perceived them as unfit to work.385 A later edition echoed this view, asserting that poor employment among Algerians could be explained by the “cultural handicap” of Algerian workers in France. For example, the author mentioned that the pace of work is much slower in Algeria, and that Algerians were ill

382 ESNA, “Familles nord-africains en bidonvilles,” 44.
frequently because their bodies are not used to working so rapidly. In other words, Algerians were not up to the challenge of participating in a modern, industrial economy.

The *Cahiers*’ researchers recognized the detrimental effect that living in the bidonvilles had on Algerians’ potential for assimilation, and advocated for bulldozing them and rehousing residents. One volume, for example, warned the public of the severe “psychological and moral distress” from which single men living isolated in the bidonvilles suffered, leaving them prone to propaganda, prostitution, and “irrational hostility to European civilization.”

Researcher Agnès Pitrou, who documented living conditions in the bidonvilles of Marseille, was concerned that the “unhygienic” conditions there promoted promiscuity and low morality, and were a bad place to raise children. Pitrou clearly had humanitarian concern for these people’s health and safety, yet she also assumed that poverty bred immorality and sexual excess. Poverty, in other words, was not only a problem in its own right; it was a problem because of the kind of behavior it produced.

Like the SONACOTRAL planners who housed single Algerian men in cell-like dormitories and the postwar developers who wooed French families with HLMs furnished with electric refrigerators and modern plumbing, the *Cahiers*’ contributors recognized the connection between housing and behavior. They firmly believed in the transformative power of modern housing, which could effect a complete change not only in the behavior of its residents, but in their mindset as well. As one writer put it, “Change in habitat is correlative to change in mentality. Because evolved housing, housing ‘like everyone else’s’ and ‘among everyone else’s’ is both the sign and the consequence of a social and moral transformation of the individual and

386 “Familles nord-africaines en bidonvilles,” 47.
the family.” In other words, living in sanitary apartments with modern appliances and privacy from neighbors would make Algerians abandon backward traditions and embrace modern, secular, and French habits, desires, and loyalties. The journal’s ideas were to some extent in line with those of de Gaulle’s government. As discussed in Chapter 2, the French government sought the elimination of the bidonvilles and their replacement with modern housing complexes designed explicitly to discourage cultural practices and to thereby sever ties with their country of origin, the logic being that by encouraging workers to adopt French cultural practices, they could also sever ties to Algeria itself.

Furthermore, in some ways, Jacques Ghys ascribed to the basic idea behind the SAMAS: assimilation breeds loyalty. For Ghys, the best approach to Algerian migration was to treat Algerians as much as possible like other French citizens. In a 1958 introduction to an issue on North African families in France, Ghys criticized the government’s approach, asserting that Algerian men were no longer “ferocious subjects” from an “ancient patriarchal culture.” According to Ghys, they were latent Frenchmen, who could find liberation from such out-dated customs by raising modern families. But Ghys’s devotion to assimilation was absolute; any violation of Algerians’ rights as French citizens (police brutality, discrimination, surveillance, etc.), even when committed in the name of national security, was contrary to their peaceful assimilation into French society. For instance, the Cahiers revealed the discriminatory selection practices of public housing complexes, which set limits on the number of Algerian residents they

390 The liquidation of the bidonvilles also served the goal of the French government to police the Algerian community and keep it under constant surveillance.
392 Ibid.
could accept and segregated families of North African origin from native French families. Writing in 1960, the editors asserted that inadequate housing for North Africans in France was a major obstacle to the insertion of immigrant workers and their families into French life. They decried the SONACOTRAL’s formula for constructing housing, which they labeled “encadrement” (containment). They argued that since the Algerian War began, immigrants had been forced to live without individual liberties. For the editors of the *Cahiers*, only way to integrate them into French culture—and to prevent hostility to the French state—was to treat them more like French citizens. Workers, they wrote, preferred living without discipline in poverty to being subjected to the severe discipline and the isolating, asocial environment of the shelters. The “monstrous” HLM complexes had a similar effect on immigrants, further isolating them from mainstream society. According to the editors, there was much at stake in the debate over housing, since, they argue, bad housing created—or left residents to create for themselves—coalitions of isolated adult workers, and even ghettos. They feared that if the state allowed North African workers to live separated from French society, they would fail to develop loyalty to the French state, and, further discouraged by the poor conditions in which they lived, might look to alternative sources for support. Thus, integration was necessary to prevent isolation, poverty, and the FLN sympathy that they fostered.

---

393 “Pour le logement des Africains du Nord,” 5-6.
394 Ibid., 47.
395 Ibid., 46. A 1959 investigation done by l’Action Sociale du Ministère de l’Intérieur into the housing conditions of North Africans found that there were empty beds in transitional housing facilities because of high prices and a lack of individual liberties (pp.42-46). In addition, a study done in 1961 noted “clear resistance” among single workers in Marseille to state attempts to relocate them from bidonvilles to modern transitional housing (p.27).
Algerians’ Muslim religion was of particular concern to contributors to the *Cahiers Nord-Africains* because they tended to view Islam as a challenge to French secularism. They frequently bemoaned the patriarchal structure of Muslim culture, which they believed was the cause of Muslim women’s “social and cultural backwardness” as well as delinquency among Algerian boys—because of their lack of maternal supervision. \(^{397}\) Contributors also worried about the communitarian way Muslims lived and the detrimental effect they believed it had on Algerians’ personal initiative to adapt to Western culture. In 1961, *Cahiers* contributor Agnès Pitrou asserted that the links immigrants developed within the Muslim community—such as “tribal” connections and family solidarity—were the cause of the “islands” of Muslims she saw living in Marseille. \(^{398}\) Similarly, a 1957 report argued that the lack of solidarity between France and Algeria was due, in part, to a missing “do-it-yourself” quality among Algerians, which the author claimed Frenchmen had at birth. \(^{399}\) Another edition, whose message was that immigration could forge solidarity between France and Algeria, was especially critical of Muslims’ fatalism and their reliance on Providence—qualities that, the author argued, led to a lack of personal effort and a distrust of French welfare services. According to the *Cahiers*, foreign culture was both a cause and an effect of the problems Algerians faced. Language barriers, an unsound work ethic, and an unwillingness to abandon their religion beliefs made it difficult for Algerians to succeed in France, and because they could not find employment or

\(^{397}\) Ibid., 48.

\(^{398}\) ESNA, “Le logement des Nord-Africains à Marseille” *Cahiers Nord-Africains*, 82, (February-March 1961): 16. For more on the self-segregation of immigrant communities, see Alec Hargreaves, *Immigration, “Race,” and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*. According to Hargreaves, North African immigrant tended to be concentrated in isolated communities in urban areas partially because of their limited financial resources, but also because, on arriving in France, immigrants settled in places where family members or others from their village were living. These “chains of recruitment,” he argues, added to the isolation produced by the French state (p. 68).

proper housing, they became further isolated in bidonvilles where traditional North African culture thrived. What is striking about AMANA and its *Cahiers Nord-Africains* is that even an organization devoted to North African migrants and their rights in France had reservations about their capacity to assimilate into French society. Assumptions that Algerians were predisposed to the violent and the primitive highlight ambiguities in the Republican notion of a French citizenship attainable by all, regardless of ethnic heritage.

**Youth on the Streets**

Political and non-political associations alike aimed their efforts at the Algerian boys and young men who, they feared, would join the FLN if left to their own devices. At the May 1959 meeting of the CANAM, Madame Berthelot, remarked that she had noticed “a certain influx of young adolescents, coming alone or joining a family member (usually the father), most of them illiterate or insufficiently educated” on the streets of Paris. These young men, she asserted, posed “numerous difficulties,” namely a need for housing, employment, instruction and job training, and possible repatriation. The CANAM’s Rapport Moral of 1959 emphasized the “vigilant attention” that was needed toward “protecting the physical and moral safety of youth.” Failure to help isolated, undereducated Muslim youth adapt culturally and find work, its authors argued, would have grave social consequences.  

Unemployed young Algerian men also caught the attention of General de Butler of the AEFPA, who asserted the need to “get them off the streets” and into his association’s centers before they were “corrupted” by nationalist militants.  

According to authors of Amitié Nord-Africaine’s annual report, the problem with

---


401 CAC 19770391, art. 4: AEFPA, Program of the “Assemblée Générale du 4 Février 1961,” 2.
teenage boys was that they were more in tune with modern life, and therefore their fathers couldn’t control them.\textsuperscript{402} Associations thus devised specialized kinds of housing and education (remedial, French language, and technical), which Michel Massenet’s 1959 social action report identified as the two key components of the successful assimilation of the Algerian community.\textsuperscript{403} They also created recreational opportunities, convinced that team sports were essential to coaxing youth away from the FLN.

Private associations filled gaps in the French public education system by providing technical training as well as general education for older youth and adults. One private association that provided these services was the Association pour encourager la formation professionnelle des adultes et l’apprentissage des adolescents algériens (association to encourage the professional training of Algerian adults and the apprenticeship of adolescents, AEFPA), which was founded in 1958 by General Jean-Jacques de Butler with money from the FAS and the support of Michel Massenet. General de Butler’s approach to social action was in line with the government’s in terms of his devotion to the cultural assimilation of the Algerian population. In the notes for a 1959 general assembly, de Butler explained that visitors to the center, and especially the dormitory rooms and shower facilities, realized that he had designed it so that it was “not at all different from analogous centers intended for metropolitan youth.” “Everything,” he explained, “will be done so that our pupils adopt the way of life of the place where they live, which is an essential condition of a normal existence for them and of a friendly reception by the metropolitan population.”\textsuperscript{404} For the AEFPA, assimilation meant giving youth skills they would

\textsuperscript{403} CAC 19770391, art. 2: Rapports sur l’Action sociale pour la migration algérienne en métropole, remis à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général pour les Affaires Algériennes le 25 novembre 1959, “Programme d’action sociale pour l’année 1959.”
\textsuperscript{404} CAC 19770391, art. 4: AEFPA, Program of the “Assemblée Générale du 4 février 1961,” 1.

170
need to integrate into society, including the French language and job skills, but also mores they learned by living at the center, such as hygiene and a French diet.\textsuperscript{405}

General de Butler was particularly concerned about older adolescents who had aged out of the French public vocational school system and were too young for job training. In 1959, de Butler requested funding from the FAS and the Ministry of National Education to expand the AEFPA’s operation (at that time there was only one center in Paris). By 1961 the AEFPA was running a variety of educational facilities, including a lycée (high school), a faculté des sciences (college-level science department), a school devoted to industrial electricity, and a college d’enseignement industriel (technical college). Some students earned a vocational diploma, the CAP, which certified them to work in fields such as mechanics, electrical wiring, and masonry.\textsuperscript{406} In 1959, 123 teenagers lived at the association’s facilities, including one at the Red Cross on the rue d’Eglise in Paris; their numbers had risen to 226 one year later. In his 1959 social action plan, Michel Massenet had insisted that education for Algerian youth needed to be accompanied by concrete job training and placement services to give them “a trade and perspectives for a decent life.”\textsuperscript{407} The AEFPA helped youth who had finished their education

\textsuperscript{405}The AEFPA was one in a long list of associations founded or led by former military personnel in Algeria, including AMANA, whose president was Vice-Admiral Rivet, the Comité des amities africaines, whose president was Général Spillman and which also had Lieutenant-colonel Sierieyx on its advisory board, and the Comité Lyautey, an association dedicated to assisting Algerians upon their arrival in France and which was the creation of the widow of Maréchal Lyautey. See Benjamin Stora Ils venaient d’Algérie: l’immigration algérienne en France (1912-1992) (Paris: Fayard, 1992) p. 106: “Les patronages, les centres d’entraide et les ‘couscous de préfecture’ se multiplient et s’entourent, à l’occasion, d’une garantie de romantisme impérial en la personne d’un général en retraite, ou d’un ancien des ‘Bureaux arabes.’” (“The patronages, the mutual assistance centers, the ‘couscous of the prefecture’ multiplied and were surrounded, on occasion, by a guarantee of imperial romanticism in the person of a retired general, or a former member of the ‘Arab Bureaus.’”) Cited in Escafré-Dublet, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{406}CAC 19770391, art. 4: AEFPA, Liste des étudiantes 1961—Résidant au Foyer-Hôtel AEFPA.

apply for jobs and complete paperwork, and housed them “during their period of adaptation to work” once they had left the technical training centers.\textsuperscript{408} Thus, in addition to providing the technical training young men needed to find work, the association worked to ensure the youth it served did not end up back in the Algerian neighborhoods they had left. This served the dual purposes of creating a positive image of caring about its young clients and also keeping them away from FLN militants who would try to recruit them. The AEFPA also directed its efforts toward Algerian children. With funding from the Ministry of National Education, the association offered remedial education classes for approximately sixty younger students. The goal of these classes was to give promising primary school students, who were “not sufficiently encouraged by their parents,” the best chance of being admitted to French high schools where they would be educated alongside their metropolitan peers.\textsuperscript{409}

The SAC also offered shelter and recreational activities to Algerian youth. Like General de Butler, Robert Levillain saw youth who were too old for the public school system and too young to benefit from adult job training as “particularly disadvantaged,” particularly since they had not received sufficient schooling in Algeria. JCLT therefore organized remedial education and French language classes, as well as domestic education classes for Algerian young women, in Paris and Marseille. With centers in the twelfth, fifteenth, and eighteenth arrondissements of Paris, JCLT fused politics and social action, taking Algerian youth out of shantytowns and placing them in summer camps, on their multicultural sports teams, or in dormitories where, along with food, shelter, and job training, young men also received indoctrination with French patriotism. Additionally, in 1961 the association expanded, establishing additional youth


\textsuperscript{409} CAC 19770391, art. 4: AEFPA, Program of the “Assemblée Générale du 4 février 1961,” 2.
education centers in St. Etienne and Roubaix as well as a sports center in Nanterre.\textsuperscript{410} Prime
Minister Michel Debré wrote to personally Secretary General for Algerian Affairs Roger Moris
requesting that the FAS fund Levillain’s efforts (since the Prime Minister’s office could not
afford to do this itself).\textsuperscript{411} The FAS granted the SAC 55,000 NF for the year 1961 (a fairly
modest grant compared to Alliance Française’s 1 million, AMANA’s 150,000 and the SSFNA’s
250,000). In January 1962, over one hundred young people were living in the SAC’s centers in
Paris.\textsuperscript{412}

But Gaullists were not the only ones who directed their efforts toward Algerian boys and
young men. For example, in 1959 the FAS granted Jacques Ghys’s AMANA 30,000 NF to
make improvements to its headquarters in Paris and to expand to other regions of France, and in
1960 it received 38,000 NF to purchase a château in Parisian banlieue.\textsuperscript{413} At this and other
maisons de jeunes (youth centers), young North Africans could find both educational and
employment opportunities (remedial education classes and orientation toward schools,
apprenticeships, job training, and employment) as well as leisure activities (trips, and access to a
television, record player, and foosball table).\textsuperscript{414} By 1960 AMANA was also running the first
shelter for Algerian youth in France, a remedial education course for fifty youth in Paris, and a
recreation center (Maison de rencontres amicales, leisure and vacation) at Moissy-Cramayel,
and it was planning the establishment of a pre-professional training center. It also organized

\textsuperscript{410} CAC 1977-391, art. 2: Michel Massenet, “Note a l’attention de M. le Secrétaire Général aux Affaires Algériennes, 26 mai 1960, Objet: Rapport de l’activité du Délégué aux Affaires sociales.”

\textsuperscript{411} CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Note à l’attention de Monsieur Moris,” signed M. Debré, 22 février, 1960.

\textsuperscript{412} CAC 19770391, art. 4: Messages d’Algérie, 15 Janvier 1962, 13-14.

\textsuperscript{413} CAC 1985 0021, art 2 : 59/03. Dossier : Maintien et activité annuelle. Historian Angeline Escafre-Dublet has noted that relations between AMANA and the French government seem to have been good, given the annual grants the association received. See Escafre-Dublet, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{414} CAC 19770391, art. 2: Dossier préparation d’un rapport sur le plan d’action sociale 1959, Jeunesse nord-africaine en France, 2 juillet 1959.
general education classes for approximately forty youth ages fourteen to eighteen in a public housing complex in Belleville on the Northeastern periphery of Paris run by another association, OEuvre des otages.\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 2: AMANA report, 2 juillet 1959 and report on “Un Foyer de la Jeunesse dans les hauts Belleville et Menilmontant, 47-49, rue du Borrégo Paris 20e, Oeuvres des Otages, 85 Rue Haxo, Paris XXe.”} Michel Massenet took a particular interest in AMANA and sought out Ghys’s advice on the direction social action should take. He also believed that AMANA’s \textit{maisons de jeunes} should be the prototype for future efforts funded by FAS should fund.\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 2: Préparation d’un rapport sur le plan d’action sociale 1959, “Jeunesse nord africaine en France,” 2 juillet 1959. Escafre-Dublet has argued that this shows that Massenet wanted to take a cultural approach to social action (64). She notes that the FAS financed other activities that used cultural action with a more pronounced emphasis on political control.}

Oeuvres des Otages (literally, ‘Hostage Work’), located at 81-95 rue Haxo and 47-49 rue Borrégo in the twentieth arrodissement of Paris, was another charitable association that provided housing and recreation for youth. Oeuvre des Otages managed a building of 160 HLN units for Algerian families, which opened on April 1, 1958. To this it added a preschool for 150 children in October of the same year, and also offered general education classes organized by AMANA for thirty to forty North African youth ages fourteen to eighteen. One of its major works, though, was a youth shelter located next to its family shelter. The association received state funding and attention because its work was in line with the FAS’s plan to “facilitate the harmonious placement/rehabilitation of young migrants in metropolitan society.”\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 2: FAS, “Projet de realizations sociales au profit des travailleurs d’origine algérienne en métropole” (article 9 du décret no. 59-559 du 23 avril 1959).} The goal was to steer youth away from Algerian nationalist political activity by providing shelter, education, employment, and leisure activities. Oeuvre des Otages’s members were concerned that “As often in Paris, the problems that young people face (work, leisure, housing) in working class
neighborhoods were unresolved.” The center had room for one hundred twenty-four young workers, and included living spaces as well as activity rooms, including a library, a ping-pong table and a large sports room for “basketball, volleyball, athletics, tennis, handball, showers, bathrooms, judo, fencing.” The centers also hosted an annual three to four-week-long popular arts festival of theater, ballet, and folklore, which, Oeuvre des Otages’ members hoped, would become “an instrument of cultural radiance” (presumably spreading French culture to Algerian migrants in the neighborhood).

According to Oeuvre des Otages’ papers, the youth center was designed with two goals in mind. First, by locating it next to the family shelter, it hoped to “maintain or recreate a familial environment” that would “permit unmarried young men to mature harmoniously during the years that lead them from the familial life that they have left (or that they no longer have) to that which they have not yet created by marrying.” Second, the association sought to fight isolation and to give young men useful contacts within the metropolitan community. Oeuvre des Otages saw itself as “a crossroads open to all organizations whose goal is to help young people.” By giving the youth who lived at its centers concrete support and a quiet, safe place to relax and pursue personal and professional growth, the association hoped it would prevent them from living cut off from the outside world. The center housed a (European) French couple—a ‘father’ who worked outside the shelter and a ‘mother’ responsible for the youth—whose full-time job it was to direct the shelter. The staff also consisted of an older man as a guardian, a cook, a young woman who served as secretary and nurse, “assuring a certain indispensable female presence,”

and “a responsible North African” who served as activities organizer for residents and for those participating in cultural/sports activities.⁴¹⁹

Oeuvre des Otages was far from the only association to see benefit in encouraging Algerian youth to participate in athletic activities. Robert Levillain believed in the particular power of sports to draw young people out of poverty and teach them to help themselves. The “patience, endurance and will” that they imparted, he wrote, provided “A form of education that leads the young person to become aware of who he is and what he is worth.”⁴²⁰ Levillain believed that if Algerian youth had high self-esteem and felt accepted by their European peers, then they would integrate themselves into French society and choose not to join the FLN. The SAC obtained sponsorship from Minister of National Defense, Pierre Messmer, to create a sports training center for Algerian boys.⁴²¹ The SAC, like Oeuvre des Otages, sought to encourage interaction between Algerian youth and their metropolitan counterparts. At the SAC’s Club Olympique Parisien, young people from North Africa as well as metropolitan France came together to play handball, football, and lacrosse. Having North African and metropolitan kids play on teams together, Levillain claimed, facilitated “the integration of young Muslims into Parisian life” and, by “channeling enthusiasm and possibilities,” gave them the tools they needed to help themselves.⁴²²

---

⁴¹⁹ Angeline Escafré-Dublet has argued that the cultural diversions organized by private associations and funded by the FAS were designed as a replacement for the cultural activities organized by Muslim workers themselves (such as Arab theater), which the Ministry of Cultural Affairs had banned because it viewed them as a form of political propaganda. See Escafré-Dublet, Op. cit., p. 39.

⁴²⁰ CAC 19770391, art. 4. JCLT, report of 31 août 1961, “Avant Propos.”

⁴²¹ CAC 19770391, art. 4: Robert Levillain, “Note sur la nécessité d’un équipement sportif.”

Algerian Women and Girls

While many associations targeted Algerian boys and young men, hoping to prevent them joining the FLN, others focused on the assimilation of women and girls into ‘metropolitan culture.’ One of the largest private charitable associations serving Algerians in the metropole was dedicated to just such an effort. Like Amitié Nord-Africaine, the Service Social Familial Nord-Africain (SSFNA), whose director was Mme Bley, was dedicated to providing services for the adaptation of Algerian families to metropolitan life. It received the most state funding—250,000 NF from the FAS in 1961—outside of l’Alliance Française and the SONACOTRAL, the national French language education and housing construction organizations, respectively.\footnote{CARAN F1a 5045: “Programme des realizations sociales au profit des travailleurs d’origine algérienne en métropole, Adopté par le Conseil d’Administration du Fonds d’Action sociale le 7 décembre 1960.” Alliance française received 1,000,000 NF.} The SSFNA had offices in seven French departments and its members included thirteen specialized social assistants, seventeen social workers, and four domestic education teachers. In 1958, they followed 4,500 Muslim families and 5,000 so-called “mixed families” (one European and one Algerian parent), as well as 800 “young isolated Muslims,” 1,250 heads of household whose families were in Algeria, and 3,200 diverse family cases: meaning that over 10,000 people received assistance. Their work included going to individual homes, domestic classes for women and girls (at twenty-four centers throughout France), and permanent liaisons with the social services in the region.\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 2: Direction Générale de la Population & de l’Entraide, sous-direction du peoplement 10th bureau, Service Social Familial Nord-Africain, July 1, 1959.}

Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre saw huge importance in the “evolution of Muslim women,” describing this as a “fundamental problem that torments all modern Arab countries.”\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Annual report of l’Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre, 1960,” 2.} But, the report claimed, “because of their age and customs, and despite their general desire to
“evolve” Algerian women had trouble changing their habits. Instead, the association focused their efforts on young girls growing up in the bidonvilles. Like other social aid providers, members of Amitié Nord-Africaine tended to view women both as culturally less adapted than men, because they were less likely to be employed in industrial jobs outside the home and were therefore more isolated from French society. But because women were also more active in raising children, members saw them as setting the ‘cultural level’ of the family. Having deemed grown women too reluctant to evolve, the association held classes in a trailer where they taught Algerian girls the essentials of French womanhood. Several times a month there was a cooking class that taught girls how to use “typical French utensils” and to prepare simple dishes.426 “Almost all of them know how to knit and sew,” the group’s 1958 report to the Ministry of the Interior boasted, “Stories and songs make these meetings more enjoyable, often accompanied by a cake they’ve made.”427 In 1961, young French women who were members of Amitié Nord-Africaine took eighty-seven North African women from the Nanterre bidonville into their homes to teach them housekeeping.428 This focus on the details of French cuisine and music implies a misplaced sense of what is important, but such an emphasis on cultural assimilation was not unusual.429

The CANAM’s solution to what its members perceived as Algerian women’s lack of adaptation to French culture was to employ a traveling domestic education teacher, who “undertook a program of rational training” to “facilitate the progressive integration” of

---

426 Ibid., 3.
429 Surprisingly, Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre’s reports make no mention of the political ties between France and Algeria, nor of the war itself.
“insufficiently adapted” families. The woman the CANAM hired had previously worked as a teacher in Algeria, and her “competence and good will,” Mme Berthelot, its director of social services, assured its members, “were indubitable.” She also held women’s French language classes and weekly women’s group meetings herself, in addition to giving “domestic demonstrations” at one of the CANAM’s centers.

*Colonies de vacances*

*Colonies de vacances* (recreational summer camps) have a long history in France stretching back to the 1880s and the municipal *colonies* organized by the working-class cities of the Paris red belt. There are similarities between these earlier *colonies*, about which Laura Lee Downs has written, and the *colonies* to which social welfare associations sent Algerian children during the Algerian War. At the municipal colonies, children of the urban poor were sent to remote villages, where, it was hoped, they would benefit in body and spirit from the “fresh air and good earth of the French countryside” living out an idealized version of peasant life.

Downs explains, “Social hygienic plans to reinforce the fragile bodies of urban children thus entwined with the ancient dream of remaking humanity by removing the young from the corruptions of the city and placing them in a pure, natural setting where they could be nurture and educated for a better society.” Both municipal reformers and members of social action

---

431 CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM 2ème séance, Mercredi 2 décembre 1959, 4.
432 CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM Proces Verbal, 1ere séance, Lundi 19 février 1962.
associations believed in the transformation that a summer spent in a rural setting could encourage in urban children. Both, too, targeted children in their progressive reforms and in each case, a political project was carried out through bodies of urban children. For example, fearing the unhealthy climate of the modern industrial city, colonie organizers in Socialist Suresnes embarked on a large-scale social engineering project that included not only colonies but also schools, dispensaries, and housing blocks, to strengthen ties between the administration and the electorate. In Ivry, municipal leaders used their colonie to bind parents’ loyalties to the Communist mairie.435 “Allegedly non political, forms of child welfare became a terrain of sharpened political struggles,” which included children’s “republics” and red ambassadors. As in the case of the colonies organized by Robert Levillain and others during the Algerian War, reaching out to children became a means to an end, a way of shaping political loyalties and, in the case of the municipal authorities, creating a Socialist utopia, or, for Gaullist associations, protecting the future of Algérie Française.

Private associations from across the political spectrum believed in the power of colonies de vacances to instill French patriotism, teach cultural mores, increase health, and to strengthen the characters of Algerian boys and girls living in poverty in French cities. Their goals were in line with the policy laid out in Michel Massenet’s 1959 social action plan, which called for the “brassage” (mixing) of Algerian and metropolitan youth.436 The AEFPA, for instance, took a total of 108 Algerian children on trips to places throughout France such as the Côte d’Azur, Cap Breton, the Bouches-du-Rhône, and the palace of Versailles during the Easter, summer holiday,


and Christmas holidays. These colonies were intended to increase interactions between the metropolitan and Algerian populations, to bring about a mutual comprehension, and to start lasting friendships.  The GEANARP, some of whose members attracted the attention of the French government for speaking out against the Algerian war, sent one hundred Algerian youth from bidonvilles and transit centers (cités de transit) to colonies in 1961.  That same summer, the Gaullist Service des liaisons sociales nord-africains (SLSNA)—whose founder, Doctor Marcel Gandrille, chose members because of their allegiance to the General—placed twenty-six “deficient” boys and girls aged six to seventeen in colonies in the country where they could socialize with their metropolitan peers. M. Catelouve, the head of the security service for the President of the Republic, founded an association that specialized in the organization of colonies de vacances. Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre, whose reports oddly make no mention of the political ties between France and Algeria, nor of the war itself, organized a colonie for twenty kids in Bordeaux, “where they could spend a month in a relaxing environment under a sky recalling that of North Africa.” The Rotary International Club of Paris ran its own colonie de vacances. An association called the “Union Civique de la Jeunesse de France” ran a “colonie de neige” made possible by a grant of one million francs from the Haut Comité de la Jeunesse et des

437 CAC 19770391, art. 4: AEFPA, Program of the “Assemblée Générale du 4 février 1961,” 3.
438 F1a 5109: Note from GEANARP to M. Helix, Secrétariat Général 2ème poste Hôtel de Ville, du 11 octobre 1961 Objet: subvention de 6,000 NF en attente.
439 The SLSNA was founded in January 1960 and ran medical clinics and night classes. The new director of the SAMAS, Lamassoure, approved of their work and gave them annual grants of up to 50,000 NF a year. See F1a 5106 SAMAS Ref: SAM No. 9-4946 Letter of 14 décembre 1960 from Ministry of Interior (G. Lamassoure, Chef du SAMAS) to M. Le Prefet de la Seine, Cabinet, Affaires Musulmanes.
Sports. The *colonie* took place over Easter vacation and fifteen Muslim youth chosen from Paris region bidonvilles and fifteen metropolitan youth.\(^{441}\)

There were also *colonies de vacances* run by religious orders. The Centre Girondin de Jeunesse Franco-Musulman, for instance, was founded by the Abbé Negré, a priest who had visited the Nanterre bidonville. With the backing of the archbishop of Bordeaux, the Abbé Negré turned a rural country house, the Chateau de Gardera, into a welcome center and *colonie de vacances* for children from the Parisian bidonvilles and banlieues. The Center’s mission was “To battle the frightening misery that reigns in the bidonvilles, and to participate also in the union of the French and Muslim communities.”\(^{442}\) Aided by the Dominican sisters, the CIMADE sought to ameliorate conditions in Arenas, a bidonville in Marseille that was home to 2,500 people, most of them Algerians. One of its efforts was sending one hundred Algerian children to La Lenk, and then to Villeneuve (Switzerland) for the summer, which was documented by a local newspaper in Villeneuve. “Poor kids, intelligent but badly adapted,” the article’s author wrote, “Trapped day after day in a constrained world often without hope, they need to be able to run about in a healthy environment that will give them the desire to escape from the miasma where they stagnate with their own kind.” The article described the children as disobedient at first, but it claimed that as soon as they started dancing, they were transformed,

\(^{441}\) CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Note a l’attention de M. le Secrétaire Général aux Affaires Algériennes, 17 avril 1959, Objet: Rapport d’activité de la Délégation aux Affaires Sociales,” (unsigned) 3. There was also a movement to create *colonies de vacances* for children in Algeria. For example, Dr. Sangline’s Cité des Jeunes created a *village des enfants* in Guynemer in Grande Kaylie for ten to sixteen year old “vagabonds” from Algiers and Constantine. Michel Massenet visited the center in 1961 and the FAS awarded the association 125,000 NF. Mrs. General Jacquess Massu saw on the board of directors of the Cité de Jeunes. See CAC 19770391, art. 4: Letter of September 26 from Revol (FAS) to Michel Massenet.

\(^{442}\) CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Centre Girondin de Jeunesse Franco Musulman”
throwing their arms around the necks of teachers and “embraced our help, to which they had a right.”

Robert Levillain was especially proud of his organization’s *colonies de vacances*, which served the dual purposes of giving Algerian youth health benefits like fresh air, exercise, and proper nutrition, and taking them out of the reach of the FLN’s recruitment arms. Levillain chose to create the *colonies* far away from Paris, in Corsica, because there, he believed, the kids became “more ‘permeable’ to what the counselors want them to do.” JCLT ran a *coloni*e for children ages six to fourteen in Oletta, Corsica, to which it sent thirty-five children in 1961. European young men and women served as counselors. It opened a new *colonie* the same year at Baie de Saint-Florent, where sixty-five Muslims, fifteen Europeans, and ten North African Jews spent a summer playing sports, swimming, hiking in a regimented schedule that included daily inspections. Children were also shown patriotic movies, among others, while counselors recorded their reactions and reported them back to members of the SAC. Youth at the *colonies de vacances* also made their own films for JCLT, to be used as recruiting material. In 1962 JCLT added a session for adolescents up to age twenty, because it was concerned that there were still too many youth “on the Parisian streets, whose only place to spend their vacation was la Place de la Bastille or the bank of the Seine d’Aubervilliers or d’Issy-les-Moulineaux.”

---

443 CAC 19770391, art. 7: Madame Chevalla (?), “L’Algérie à Villeneuve,” *Fueille d’avis de Lausanne* 3 août 1961. (Newspaper clipping) (“D’autre part, habituellement parqués dans un monde restreint et souvent sans espoir, ils ont besoin de pouvoir s’ébattre aussi dans un milieu sain qui leur donne envie de sortir du marasme où ils croupissent avec les leurs.”) The other efforts of the CIMADE at Arenas included night classes, clubs for adolescents and women, and a daycare center.

444 Ibid., 5.


Levillain’s efforts were part of what the Prefecture of the Seine had dubbed “Operation Polonceau,” (Rue de Polonceau is a street in the 18e arrondissement in what was a heavily North African neighborhood) the goal of which, according to Levillain, was to take charge of the “Bands of kids, five to twenty years old, of all origins, who continue[d] to haunt the Barbès neighborhood during the summer, not knowing what to do with their desire for sun, their use of time and their dynamism.”

Levillain was so convinced of the necessity to get Algerian youth off the streets of Paris that he even sent letters to regional prefects, asking them to recruit families who could “house a Muslim child during the holidays,” when, he believed, children were left unsupervised and were therefore “prone to falling victim to the FLN.”

Persistent Poverty and Isolation

It is difficult to measure in concrete terms what percentage of Algerian families received assistance from charitable associations and the effect that such aid had on their transition to metropolitan life during the Algerian War. Housing construction failed to keep pace with demand, and the bidonvilles grew each year until the 1970s. It is equally difficult to judge their responses to such efforts, though there are some official reports on their reactions. For instance, in their June 1960 study on “Problems Posed by Algerian Migration” in departments outside of the Seine, officers of the Ecole de Guerre asserted that Algerians in the Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseille) they had interviewed were aware of services available to them, such as those provided by the CANAM, but the report does not make clear Algerians’ opinions on them. The officers seem critical of this lack of response: “As in so many other domains, they [Algerians]

449 CAC 19770391, art. 4: Letter from R. Levillain to regional prefects, 18 mars 1960.
don’t find anything extraordinary in what is done in their favor, with nothing asked in return.”

The report noted that housing, not cultural or recreational opportunities, was Algerians’ primary concern, and people were impatient for suitable housing. It stated that single workers could sometimes afford housing, but for families, rents were prohibitively high. One year into its operation, the SONACOTRAL had not yet begun to construct HLMs (subsidized housing) in regions such as the Pyrenées-Orientales, and construction was very limited elsewhere in France. While state and local officials across the board bemoaned the dangers of the bidonvilles and the isolation they reinforced, their words were not coupled with real action.

Like members of the private social action associations, government officials offered muddled explanations of the relationship between poverty in the Algerian community and Algerians’ perceived social isolation and lack of cultural assimilation. Some officials saw poverty as the root cause of isolation. Others blamed Algerians and their failure to take advantage of social services offered to them. In areas in the north of France, where people tended to be “working class, filled with familial traditions, and distrustful of strangers,” Ecole de Guerre officers reported “almost no relation, outside of work, between North Africans and the French.” Yet, they asserted, this was understandable, and represented not hostility, but rather “reluctance toward a group with the reputation of a dangerous minority.”

The report included responses of Algerian to a survey conducted by SAT-FMA police officers in Paris. Officers asked Algerians why, despite efforts (employment, housing) to assimilate them into the metropolitan population, they continued to live in groups. The report acknowledged that hostilities in Algeria and FLN power made it difficult for Algerians in the metropole to take

---

450 CAC 19770391, art. 4: l’Ecole de Guerre, “Etude des problèmes poses par la migration algérienne,” 2.
advantage of social services. According to the report, people expressed a desire to emancipate themselves from political pressures, but this was not possible because their safety could not be guaranteed. In other words, with the war still on, taking advantage of metropolitan social services would place them at risk of retaliatory violence from the FLN. However, the officers added that it seemed difficult for Algerians to act against the “instinct of solidarity that one finds among transplanted people whose social structures were still primitive.” Familial ties and distrust of strangers were acceptable if found among native Frenchmen in Normandy, but among Algerians, this was seen as a sign of innate primitiveness. An unsigned report prepared for a conference on “Les Problèmes Sociaux de la Migration Algérienne” in 1961 reiterated this theme. “This world” the author explained, “remains strange to [Algerian migrants] because their low proficiency level prevents them from penetrating metropolitan social life, and their cultural level prevents rapid assimilation and rapid promotion at work.” Algerians’ lack of education and knowledge of the French language, coupled with their “frequent refusal to take advantage of possibilities for promotion,” made them to blame for their own isolation. Racism, the report asserted, did not really exist. Instead, segregation—namely, self-segregation—was the issue.

Conclusion

Unlike other wars of colonial domination, the Algerian War was fought by the colonizing nation against those it claimed were fellow citizens. This unique situation pushed state officials to confront the poverty and isolation of the Algerian community by funding and guiding private


453 CAC 19770391, art. 4: “Les Problèmes Sociaux de la Migration Algérienne,” unsigned, 9. By 1961, out of 350,000 Algerian migrants in the metropole, two-fifths were “mâl-logés,” and 25,000 were living in bidonvilles.
charitable associations. Yet, these same assimilatory efforts were pursued in the name of destroying the FLN and keeping Algeria French, and associations that reached out to Algerian families in the metropole were by virtue of their efforts participants in the fight against the FLN in the metropole, whether willing or unwilling. Some socially conscious French men and women, particularly members of Gaullist associations, saw their work as simultaneously charitable and political, and they combated poverty and isolation in the name of destroying the FLN and keeping Algeria French. Others adopted a hearts and minds quest of a different vein, providing shelter, education, and recreation in the name of fraternity with their Algerian brethren. The charitable associations enlisted to implement the state’s plans differed in political orientation, but not on their essential view of social welfare as a tool of assimilation. Their actions during the war demonstrate a genuine commitment to improving the lives of Algerians in France, whether for political reasons or not, but also a view of Muslim and Arab culture as thoroughly foreign. Regardless of whether or not they believed the two countries would remain a single unit, social aid providers believed that if Algerians were to live in France, there were obstacles beyond homelessness and unemployment that they would need to overcome. Furthermore, private associations experienced, at the ground level, the effects of the French policy makers’ decision to combine social welfare programs with surveillance.
As the previous chapters have shown, with the blessings of Prime Minister Debré and President de Gaulle, Paris Police Prefect Maurice Papon implemented policing structures that used social action as a mere cover for cracking down on FLN activity. Others, such as social action delegate Michel Massenet, the administrators of the SAMAS, and the members of the numerous private aid associations, were committed to the idea that by providing social services France could win over the hearts and minds of Algerian migrants to its cause—even if, in the case of the SAMAS, the line between social action and surveillance was at times blurred. In the two years leading up to the declaration of Algerian independence in July 1962, as police presence in the social action realm increased dramatically, tensions between these two camps came to a heads. Whereas much of the Fifth Republic’s social action plan, particularly in the realm of housing, was left unfulfilled, the surveillance of migrant neighborhoods increased in repressive, often brutally violent ways. This chapter examines the effects of the police’s co-option of social services in the French capital, most notably in the quest to eliminate the bidonvilles surrounding Paris which, by the fall of 1961, were subject to daily raids, and in the implementation of new policing structures such as the auxiliary police force (FPA) to buttress the anti-nationalist work of the SAT-FMA. It also analyzes the responses of social service actors to the murders of dozens of Algerians engaged in a peaceful demonstration on the night of October 17, 1961.
The Fight Against the French Federation Continues as Independence Approaches

On January 8, 1961, voters in metropolitan France and Algerian voted in favor of Algerian self-determination and de Gaulle’s government began peace negotiations with the FLN. On April 11 of the same year, de Gaulle made his first public allusion to a sovereign Algerian state, and spoke of a complete schism between the two nations. On the 20th of May, the negotiations at Evian began. Scholars such as Emmanuel Blanchard, Linda Amiri, James House, and Neil MacMaster have documented the intensification of police brutality in the final months of the Algerian War. As Amiri has written, “One year from the end of the negotiations leading to the independence of Algeria, Algerian emigrants were caught in a vice between the GPRA and the French government. It was in these last months of fighting that the Battle of Paris would reach its worst outburst of violence.” It is now widely accepted that the massacre of dozens of Algerian protestors on that night was not an isolated incident, but was instead the culmination of months of violence perpetrated against Algerians by the Paris police.

Why, if French leaders had by this time accepted the inevitability of Algerian independence, did the police respond with such an excess of force to what was, by all accounts, a peaceful protest? The answer lies in the fact that, even at this very late moment of French colonization, the fight was still about power. Throughout much of the fighting, French administrators truly believed that France and Algeria would remain a single nation. But in 1961, when Algerian independence began to seem inevitable, administrators shifted their focus to maintaining French power going into independence negotiations. Although historians are divided on the point at which de Gaulle acceptable that independence was inevitable, what is apparent is that neither de Gaulle nor Prime Minister Michel Debré wanted to negotiate with the

GPRA or to recognize the FLN as the exclusive representative of the Algerian people.\(^ {455} \) Going into the negotiations at Evian, therefore, the stakes were high and both sides were trying to maintain power, and Debré and de Gaulle gave Maurice Papon *carte blanche* to, as Papon put it, “eliminate the undesirables.”\(^ {456} \) As House and MacMaster have explained, Debré and de Gaulle prolonged the war because they believed they could flank the FLN and negotiate with more compliant and moderate representatives for French economic interests in Algeria such as the Saharan oil fields and nuclear test sites.\(^ {457} \)

One effect of French leaders’ desire to maintain power going into the Evian Accords was the importation of colonial techniques of population control from Algeria to the metropole. Although, as previous chapters have shown, this phenomenon occurred throughout the war, it was especially true in the final years of the fighting. Between 1960 and 1962, nighttime raids, beatings, unauthorized searches by policemen who were often retired military personnel, mass arrests forced relocation, torture, detention in internment camps, and repatriation of migrants to their ‘douars d’origine’—code for internment camps in Algeria—were all commonplace in metropolitan France. In his recent work, Emmanuel Blanchard has documented the radicalization of the policing of Algerian migrants. “From the fall of 1958 on,” he has asserted, “the police played in the metropole the role of soldiers in Algeria.”\(^ {458} \) Although former colonial agents such as Montaner and Papon made up only a small percentage of the French

\(^ {455} \) For an argument that de Gaulle had accepted Algerian independence long before the war’s end, see Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (University of California Press, 2001). For an earlier and opposite assessment see Stanley Hoffman, “De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy: The State and the Play, the Power and the Glory,” in Hoffmann, ed. *Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930s* (New York, Viking Press, 1974).


\(^ {458} \) Blanchard, *La police parisienne et les Algériens*, 331.
administration, only about ten percent between 1958 and 1962, their influence surpassed their weak numbers. They dictated the ideology of the SCAA and under their power the use of military techniques of social control became entrenched in the metropole.459

The Force de Police Auxiliaire (FPA)

In the final years of the fighting attacks on French policing social action services by the French Federation of the FLN intensified. As early as 1958, the French Federation had begun attacking Paris Police posts. In the spring of 1960, French social service providers became targets. Of the seventy-nine civilians—including members of the FPA and the SAT-FMA—killed in the Paris region over the course of the Algerian War, most worked in the social action sphere or in the management of the North African workforce. Many were killed while off-duty and unarmed, usually by a shot to the head. The attacks occurred in waves at the beginning of 1958, the end of the summer 1958, and the end of the summer 1961.460 A Red Cross center in Boulogne (in the Paris region) specializing in assisting women who came from Algeria to join their husbands had to be closed because “the security of the social workers could not be guaranteed.”461 In March and April 1960, three managers of foyers were found dead in reported “terrorist attacks.” Between September 1960 and May 1961, three social workers, MM. Allouache, Thouary, and Judeaux de Barre, were also killed. According to the CT who reported their deaths, the latter two were “elites in terms of social action,” exhibiting “une générosité particulièrement éprouvée et très ouverts à certaines des aspirations, meme politiques, du milieu

459 Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens, 327. For a more detailed description of the FPA, see House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 77-80 and Amiri, La bataille de France, 97-114.

460 See Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens, 334 and 369-372.

461 CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Note concernanct la situation de la migration algérienne (compte-rendu de la reunion des Conseilers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes en métropole, en date du 16 mai 1961),” 2.
algérien.”

Despite attacks on sites of cultural work—for instance, in May, 1961, the CTAM reported that “In Marseille, for 6 months, feminine classes for young girls and women in which are taught the rudiments of the French language as well as apprenticeship to modern life, have been deserted on orders and by threat of death”—the CTAM did not see the FLN violence as resistance against French attempts to make Algerians French. “For the first time,” the report stated, “specialists find themselves absolutely incapable of giving a rational explanation of this phenomenon.” Instead, refusing to acknowledge the fight for Algerian independence as an organized political movement, it described the FLN’s actions as “anarchistic” and “uncontrolled,” citing possible tensions between the French Federation of the FLN and the GPRA for the increase in violence. The political evolution (i.e., the likelihood of independence), it claimed, “disconcerts the large part of the Muslim masses. […] We can’t neglect the hypothesis that the Communist party figured out that the infrastructure of the FLN could be used in reciprocity for the development of its own action.”

On July 13, 1959, Prime Minister Debré approved the creation of the Force de Police Auxiliaire (FPA), a new police force made up of North Africans, which began functioning, under Maurice Papon’s control, in Paris in March 1960. Debré claimed that the purpose of the FPA was to protect the social action of the SAT-FMA from attacks by the FLN. In reality, though, the FPA were part of his plan to intensify the struggle against the FLN and to rally migrants to de Gaulle’s policies. Initially, the FPA was made up of North African soldiers (harkis) who had served in the French army in the colonies, and its ranks grew to approximately four hundred after Algerian civilians opposed to the FLN were recruited locally. In January 1960 the FPA

462 Ibid., 1-2.
463 CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Note concernant la situation de la migration algérienne (compte-rendu de la reunion des Conseilers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes en métropole, en date du 16 mai 1961),” 2.
consisted of just under one hundred men; a year later the number had more than doubled and by November 1960 it had grown to eight-hundred and fifty. Their average age was twenty-four.\textsuperscript{464}

Linda Amiri has asserted that the creation of the FPA essentially amounted to a “Plan Challe bis” (Plan Challe, ‘take two’) for the metropole. The French administration implemented the ‘Plan Challe,’ named for General Challe, in Algeria in February 1959. It included increased investment in economic development (the Constantine Plan) and, most notably, the use of harki troops in order to pacify the Algerian masses and to rally them to the French cause.\textsuperscript{465}

At an interministerial meeting on security, Prime Minister Debré breached the idea of complementing the social work of the SAT-FMA with “an organization of force” that would provide “active protection” for their work.\textsuperscript{466} Thus, on paper, the FPA was to serve a primarily social and psychological function. They were, officially, in charge of distributing counter-FLN propaganda and protecting the SAT-FMA bureaus so that these officers could safely pursue their social and administrative action in migrant communities. In actual fact, however, the FPA raised the level of repression of Algerians by the police. Having virtually no legal accountability, the FPA reported directly to the Prefect of the Seine and the SCAA, which sanctioned their brutal tactics of information gathering. Thus, information on the locations of suspected militants and arms stockpiles could be immediately exploited, leading to very rapid arrests and charges without going through the usual legal channels and judicial proceedings. With no regard for the legal rights as French citizens, detainees were sent to the Centre d’identification de Vincennes awaiting transport to one of several internment camps or else deportation to camps in Algeria.

\textsuperscript{464} Amiri, \textit{La bataille de France}, 97.

\textsuperscript{465} Amiri, \textit{La bataille de France}, 91.

By employing the FPA, Emmanuel Blanchard has asserted, security administrators were able to forgo civil justice in favor of “pure administrative repression.”

The man in charge of what amounted, essentially, to the recreation of the interwar North African Brigade was Captain Raymond Montaner, head of the Nanterre SAT. Montaner had served as an SAU officer in the Clos-Salemberi bidonville in Algiers. His plan was to recreate in Paris what he had undertaken over the course of the Battle of Algiers, during which nearly half of the FPA’s initial recruits had served under his command. Algerian Affairs officers in Algeria recruited the majority of the FPA’s members from among men ages seventeen to forty; the remainder were recruited in Paris from North African neighborhoods. Montaner first stationed the FPA in Algerian neighborhoods in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and eighteenth arrondissements of Paris, and later moved his patrols to the banlieue after receiving numerous complaints from residents about the violence the harkis had brought to their streets (for instance, people in the Goutte d’Or neighborhood complained about the “incessant patrols” and “almost daily exchange of gunfire” between the FLN and the FPA). Using methods such as ‘Operation Osmose,’ in which suspects were removed from their homes in the middle of the night and transported to lodging houses miles away [See Chapter 2], the FPA severely inhibited the

---

467 Blanchard, *La police parisienne et les Algériens*, 323. Although, by the law of July 26, 1957, the special powers that the French administration exercised in Algeria—such as holding suspects in *centres d’assignation à résidence*—were extended to the metropole, legally the police were nevertheless required to conform to the Penal Code. But Maurice Papon complained that these legal restraints prevented his officers from being able to match the FLN. The Ordinances of October 7th and 8th 1958 “sealed the departure from ‘temps ordinaires’” and allowed the police to escape the legal procedures that were impeding their work. Previously unlawful methods became common practice. Despite routinely surpasses the limits of legality through his policing methods, Papon continued to protest judicial constraints by writing letters to the Prefecture in July 1959 demanding the freedom to use ‘revolutionary war’ methods. See Blanchard, *La police parisienne et les Algériens*, 330-331.

468 Blanchard, *La police parisienne et les Algériens*, 322.

469 Blanchard, *La police parisienne et les Algériens*, 364-65. According to Blanchard, until the arrival of the *harkis*, violence rarely extended beyond the cafés and lodging houses frequented by Algerians.
activity of the French Federation of the FLN by disrupting communication between the small
cells of militants through which the organization operated and by blocking its collection of dues
from the Algerian population.470

Poverty and the Police in the Parisian bidonvilles

By 1962, there were approximately 15,000 men and 1,800 families living in these
conditions.471 Moreover, critics looking for proof that the French government was neglecting its
Algerian brethren had to look no further than the sprawling rows of muddy shacks on the
outskirts of Paris. Even after the war ended, some saw the filthy conditions in which migrants
lived as a hurdle to their cultural integration or, worse, as proof of their inability to do so. As has
been shown in Chapter 2, the ‘liquidation of the bidonvilles’ became an instrument of police
repression and was both one of the primary goals of the SAMAS and the major impetus for the
creation of the Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS). At a the same inter-ministerial meeting at which
he spoke of intensifying the struggle and rallying migrants to de Gaulle’s policies, Prime
Minister Michel Debré announced what was to be a three-year plan to reabsorb the Nanterre
bidonville, during which time HLMs would be constructed to house migrant families.472
Nanterre, to the West of Paris, was by far the largest of several bidonvilles surrounding Paris and
other French cities, consisting of thirteen different shantytowns. In 1961 it was home to 8,000

470 Amiri, La bataille de France, 103. For a more detailed examination of the FPA see Amiri, 97-110.
471 Lyons, “Social welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France: the case of the Fonds d'action
sociale,” 22. For more on families in bidonvilles see Alec Hargreaves, Immigration, “Race,” and
472 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Committee Interministériel Conseil Restreint du 25 novembre 1959, Fiche No.
5, “Une expérience-pilote: la liquidation du Bidonville de Nanterre,” secret. In fact, the last bidonville
was not cleared until well into the 1970s.
people, half of them women and children and, according to House and Macmaster, cultivated a “culture of resistance” and the “most fervent FLN militancy.”

Monique Hervo arrived in the bidonville referred to as “La Folie” on the Rue de la Garenne in Nanterre in the summer of 1959 as a volunteer with Service civil international, vowing to live there for as long as France was at war with Algeria. In this “labyrinth of narrow passages,” with mud so deep it was difficult to walk after a rainstorm, approximately 500 Algerian families, along with some Portuguese, Moroccans, and Tunisians, lived in shacks they had constructed out of discarded building materials, without electricity and with a single communal water pump. The newly erected La Défense and HLMs served for Hervo as constant reminders of the gulf between French society and the families of La Folie. Many of the men of La Folie worked at the neighboring Simca factory or doing manual labor for ten hours a day, but, earning low wages and with no affordable housing available, many had no choice but to construct their own makeshift housing in the bidonvilles.

In La Folie, Hervo encountered a well-organized network of FLN activity. Not only men, but whole families were involved. For instance, a grandmother, whom she calls “une grande combattante,” transmitted messages between militants. Although not all French who were anti-war were pro-Algerian independence, Hervo herself did sympathize with the movement. Benefiting from contacts she had made with l’Amitié nord-africaine de Nanterre, Hervo was accepted by the FLN leadership in Nanterre, who, after trying to recruit her, decided

---

474 Service civil international was founded at the end of World War I and promoted reconciliation and humanism. For instance, in 1920 its young German, French, and English members reconstructed a village near Verdun. (9)
476 Hervo, *Chroniques du bidonville*, 79.
she would be useful serving as cover for the FLN’s activities and thereby helping them avoid the continual presence of the prefectural and municipal social services. From that point on Hervo lived in an old wagon frigorifique and helped the La Folie residents build shelters.

Hervo witnessed first hand the devastating effects of the French government’s “regroupements” in Algeria. In her diary she recounts stories of families whose villages were raided by French troops. Stories of grain stores being sacked, men and boys shot execution-style, women and girls raped, and entire villages being burned or Napalmed appear frequently. Many of the families in La Folie were from Khenchela, where the French set up the first internment camp to which Algerians suspected of FLN activity living in the Aurès-Nemencha region—declared a “zone interdite”—were sent and subjected to interrogations. All others were sent to the camp de regroupement that opened in Touffanna, five kilometers away, in November 1954—part of the French plan to “anéantir l’âme de toute une population rurale.’ Eventually, French troops forced 1.5 million Algerians to move to camps de regroupement. In winter, the French army conducted forced marches, during which families with children marched, in columns, over the mountains, to their new homes in internment camps. Families fleeing the camps often ended up in bidonvilles, where they risked deportation. Others came to the bidonvilles trying to escape police violence in France, choosing to live in those condition rather than be subjected the nighttime raids the police conducted of hotels and lodging houses.

477 Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 28-31. Monique Hervo was even offered dual Algerian/French citizenship at independence, an offer that, she explains, she regrets having refused.
478 See, for example, Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 83.
479 Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 29.
480 Ibid., 59. The French administration decided to apply the technique of population transfer that it was undertaking on a mass level in Algeria to the individual level in metropolitan France. During the night, armed with machine guns, police officers would enter lodging houses and move five or six suspects from one hotel to another, hoping to break the chains of communication among FLN operatives (55). In another instance, police from Puteaux and Nanterre surrounded an old house in good condition, removed
What is most striking about Hervo’s diary when read in comparison to state sources is the corruption of the social service system. There are frequent accounts, for instance, of police officers destroying Algerians’ identification papers and stealing their money, and of families seeking help at the SAT bureau only to have their husband/father disappear the next day—most likely sent to a detention center or possibly deported back to Algeria. When shacks caught fire, families chose to let it burn rather than alert the authorities and be sent to one of the twenty-seven cells at the former prison de la Maison départemental de Nanterre, which served as a homeless shelter. Eventually, the Prefecture of the Seine stopped its policy of rehousing after a fire, “Otherwise,” a social worker told Hervo, “there would be one every day.” One morning in the summer of 1960, a woman in La Folie went into labor and sent her husband to find a doctor. When he called for an ambulance, the dispatcher told him that because it was a holiday, no ambulances were going to the bidonvilles. When residents of La Folie did go to the SAT post to, for example, report missing identity papers or apply for a carte de séjour, the authorities would tell them that they did not recognize the bidonville as a permanent address and that the papers could not be delivered there—putting the family at risk of deportation. When they went to apply for rehousing, some families were given only the option to be split apart and have their children taken into the custody of public assistance. Others were offered a room at the

the roof, and, after forcing out the Algerian family that had been squatting there, razed the house to the ground so that it could not be inhabited (65).

481 Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 92. The former prison was officially dubbed the “Centre provisoire d’hébergement de la préfecture de la Seine. By January 1961 one hundred and twenty men, women, and children were living in the former prison cells following fires in the bidonvilles of Nanterre.

482 Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 144.

483 Ibid., 153.

484 See, for example, Hervo Chroniques du bidonville, 108, 164, and 223.
centre Luquet, a temporary barracks designed for disaster victims where residents lacked access to a kitchen and were subject to strict regulations and a curfew.485

On October 11, 1961 a fifty-year-old Algerian man named Oumar, who had worked for years as a manual laborer, went to the caisse de sécurité sociale of Nanterre, where the woman behind the counter refused to help him. After verbally harassing him with racial slurs and telling him he smelled bad, she told him to open his wallet, she called agents to escort him outside the office, where they took his wallet, removed his identity papers, ripped them up, and threw them in the mud.486 Two weeks later, an Algeria man, H’sin, whose identity papers the police had stolen during a raid, went to a police post in the bidonville to ask for assistance getting them reissued. They directed him to the SAT headquarters at the Maison départementale de Nanterre, where Hervo accompanied him. Shortly after arriving there, H’sin was taken away and Hervo forced into an empty office where she is locked in with harkis guarding the door. After being interrogated by soldiers armed with machine guns wanting to know the locations of particular families in the bidonville, the officers threw her into an immense room full of Algerians, including teenagers, who had been detained. Finally they were both released and told to go to go back to the police post in Nanterre, where the officers told them H’sin would be sent declaration of loss form. When he gave his address as the La Folie bidonville, the officers told him that because the bidonville technically does not exist (since the families there are illegal squatters), nothing can be done.

The descriptions of the internment camps that Hervo relays from Algerians detained there do not match the official government reports on what went on there, one of which claimed that

485 See, for example, Hervo, *Chroniques du bidonville*, 115 and 144.
the centres de transit were trying for “harmonious circulation” of families to HLMs.\footnote{CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Problèmes actuels posés par le développement de la migration algérienne,” February 1961, unsigned.} Men caught without papers—or, more accurately, men whose papers the police had destroyed—were sent to the Centre d’identification de Vincennes, sometimes for weeks, while their families worried what had happened to them. Despite the installation of social services in the internment camps (See Chapter 2), under the leadership of two administrators from the SAMAS and National security, respectively, these efforts were primarily of the psychological/propaganda nature and did little to alleviate the horrible conditions in the camps. Hervo recounted the experience of a man named Boû Hamâma, a driver and deliveryman, who was arrested in La Folie in September 1961. The police ask him for his papers, and he presents an identification card showing that he was a ‘French Muslim from Algeria.’ Hervo writes: “Soon there’s an avalanche of insults, and a scuffle in the middle of other agents who have gathered around. He is searched. Punched in the stomach. Each policeman exerts his physical force. His white ‘superiority.’ […] He is sent away. Destination Vincennes. During the trip the brutality starts again.” He described the triage center to Hervo when he returned to la Garenne after being held for two days: “A repulsive filth. People sleeping on the cement on a bed of old rotten newspaper. In certain corners, there a little straw. One toilet, for three hundred men, is open for fifteen minutes each hour. If you’re sick, too bad. Even the single sink is restricted.”\footnote{Ibid., 94. Footnote reads: “Archives de l’auteur. ‘Officiellement, les conseillers sociaux s’occupent de l’embauche et du relogement des Nord-Africains dans les foyers. Mais, sous couvert de travail social, les} 

Rarely do state social workers who are not police officers appear in Hervo’s account, and when the men with clipboards do arrive in La Folie, she asserts that they are gathering information to transmit to the SAT.\footnote{Ibid.} On August 7, 1960, women from an équipe medico-
sociale itinérante appeared, in military uniform, to distribute shoes and candy to the children. Hervo was skeptical that their motivation is strictly humanitarian, instead calling it “pacification.” “There mission, here in France,” she wrote, “is to patrol the bidonvilles of Nanterre and Colombes and to convince the Algerians, under cover of social aid, to come to the offices of the SAT.” Hervo also reported that the SAT-FMA were attempting to use Algerian women as intermediaries to “infiltrate workers’ quarters” and convince the men to accompany them to the BRS.  

**Police Violence and the Lead-up to October 17, 1961**

The FLN killings of sixteen police officers, as well as two social workers and a night warden at a shelter, only increased tensions and led to even more brutal treatment of Algerians by the police. According to Linda Amiri, the situation in Paris is the autumn of 1961 was “explosive.” As the FLN upped its attacks in response to police mistreatment, the police fought back while the situation was made worse by reprisals from antiterrorist vigilante forces outside the Prefecture of Police such as the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS). On October 5, 1961 Maurice Papon imposed a curfew on all Algerians in Paris, who were not allowed to go out after 7:00 pm. The police also forbade Algerians to drive cars and Algerian men to go out in groups, and it required all cafés run by Algerians to remain closed from 8:30 pm to 7 am. Technically the law excluded Moroccans and Tunisians, students, and government employees, 

---

490 Hervo, *Chroniques du bidonville*, 82. The équipes médico-sociale itinérante were created in Algeria in 1957 by a group of superior officers including General Salan, seeking to win over the population via women.

who were required to present an identification card proving their status. In practice, however, the police ignored such distinctions.⁴⁹²

In La Folie, Monique Hervo witnessed first-hand a dramatic increase in the frequency and brutality of police raids over the course of 1961. “De façon definitive,” she wrote, “la guerre envahit le ghetto.”⁴⁹³ That winter, Captain Montaner’s FPA moved into a hotel at 28 rue de la Goutte-d’Or that had been requisitioned after the expulsion of Algerian residents, resulting in the nearly constant presence of the harkis in the bidonvilles of Nanterre, where, by that time, approximately 1,000 Algerian families lived. The police used systematic violence to create a climate of terror and submission. Montaner’s FPA, who were nominally in charge of Algerians’ welfare, routinely confiscated workers’ identification papers as they got off the trains from Paris, and beat up men and boys who were walking along the streets of Nanterre and threatened them with death. During what were by the end of August nightly raids, the FPA broke down doors, overturned families’ food and water reserves, stole their money, and destroyed children’s toys in order.⁴⁹⁴ Algerian men and teenagers who were arrested were sent to the transit center in Vincennes, or sometimes tortured in “the caves of the neighboring commissariat” of Puteaux, not returning until weeks later, bruised and bloodied.⁴⁹⁵

In August of 1961 the FPA began systematically destroying and setting fire to homes in the bidonvilles, vowing to re-demolish if the family tried to rebuild. Hervo described a particularly violent raid in her journal entry of August 11, 1961:

---

⁴⁹² CAC 19770391, art. 8: Circulaire No. 43-61 à tous Chefs de Service P.M. Paris-Banlieue. Objet: Circulation des Français Musulmans Algériens, 7 October 1961.
⁴⁹³ Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 97.
⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., 129
⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., 97.
Eleven forty-five. A black 403 stuffed with inspectors, two Citroën vans and a navy blue police car emerge. The inhabitants of La Folie are afraid of the 403. When they see it arrive, they know that it’s going to unload its cargo of inspectors who will destroy everything in their stead. Seven civil inspectors accompany fifteen policemen, machineguns in their hands [...]. It’s the first time we’ve seen these special police units. But we quickly understand the goal of their mission: to cut down the makeshift shelters built from a tangle of plaster, rafters, and beams recovered from public dumps. To demolish the carton houses constructed from paper whitewashed with a thin film of tar. Dens formed of decaying, rusted sheet metal. Huts built from pieces of broken brick, piled up, arranged by homeless people that no administration, no municipality, no individual wants to lodge, or even help. They attack the shelter that Boû Salâh has been building. The inspectors challenge the agents who are worried. Vociferously. Shouting orders to accelerate the demolition. Each man works to destroy the shack that the mains of the ‘homeless’ have put up. Not a stone is left intact. Everything is crushed to pieces. Where a shelter has been built for a woman who is six months pregnant and the mother of five children, all that remains is a heap of rubble. Now the police attack a tiny room nearby whose walls have escaped the fire. They want to destroy it, too. From place to place, with massive blows, they bore enormous holes in walls blackened by flame. After they’ve left, there’s nothing but ruins. Trampled shacks in the shadow of the nearby Champs-Elysées.496

Despite the violence, due to the forced regroupements and famine in Algeria, between January and August 1961, the number of families in one Nanterre bidonville on the Rue de Lens tripled, until roughly ten Algerian families were arriving there each week.497 According to Monique Hervo, the social worker stationed in La Folie seemed to know nothing about the destruction, and claimed that it was best not to intervene, because it was “police business.”498

497 Ibid., 126.
498 Ibid., 147. She writes: “Municipalité, préfecture de la Seine, services sociaux de la commune, tous affirment ne rien savoir au sujet de la presence de cette nouvelle brigade de démolisseurs. De toute façon, nous ne pouvons pas intervenir, répondent-ils, c’est du ressort de la police.” Hervo was quick to draw connections between military destruction in Algeria and what was happening in Nanterre. “En Algérie,” she writes, “des maisons sont bombardées, incendiées par l’armée française. Ici, des baraques sont détruites par les agents de la police parisienne.”
The rising tensions between the brutal repression to which North African migrants in France were subjected and the growing inevitability of Algerian independence came to a heads on the night of October 17, 1961. Between twenty and thirty thousand Algerians marched peacefully against what they believed was racist treatment by the police. Unarmed, they marched in three columns from the outskirts of Paris into the city center, violating the curfew imposed by Papon. The goal of the FLN’s well-orchestrated march was to make itself visible to the residents of Paris and to break the geographic and social isolation that kept Algerians on the periphery of the city and off of most Parisians’ radar. That evening, Monique Hervo witnessed men, women, and children leaving La Folie en masse around 6:30pm. FLN agents were stationed at the exits to the bidonville to make sure no one was carrying any object that could be used as a weapon. She followed them, and when she entered the street she saw columns of protesters walking toward Paris from all directions. When they reached Avenue Général de Gaulle between the rond-pont de la Défense and the pont de Neuilly, the police started firing shots toward her group and demonstrators began collapsing around her. Hervo fled back to La Folie with women and children, where silence and fear defined the mood. 499 Eventually, the injured began to return, missing teeth, with heads bandaged, bloodied, suffering from fractures. Others were simply laid out in the alleys of La Folie, refusing to be transported to a hospital for fear of being arrested. 500

On the boulevard Saint-Michel in the Latin Quarter, at the place de l’Opéra, and on the grands boulevards of Paris, officers attacked the protestors, leaving dozens dead, their bodies

500 Ibid., 203. For a more detailed description of the October 17 demonstration, including an account of the particular events of that night at several locations throughout Paris see Amiri, *La bataille de France*, 129-176.
thrown in the Seine.\textsuperscript{501} The police arrested hundreds more, who were transported in RATP buses to holding locations such as the Parc des Expositions and train stations.\textsuperscript{502} Even after this excess of violence on the night of October 17th, they continued to raid the streets of Paris and the bidonvilles, lining men up in the streets to be detained and even transporting women and children from hospitals in packed RATP buses to l’hôpital Sainte-Anne (a mental hospital), where they were locked in rooms guarded by policemen armed with machine guns.\textsuperscript{503} According to Hervo, children as young as thirteen were detained at the Palais des Sports and not released until October 21.\textsuperscript{504} Emmanuel Blanchard has referred to the night of October 17, 1961 as a “colonial massacre,” in which the Paris police used colonial techniques such as those used by the British in India.\textsuperscript{505} On this night, the authorities gave no heed to Algerians’ rights as French citizens nor even to previously embraced policies of cultural assimilation and national brotherhood. Instead French leaders allowed Papon and Montaner to hunt down and destroy “undesirables” based on racial criteria.

Far from being a spontaneous violent response on the part of the police that snowballed out of control, the police response to the demonstration of October 17, 1961 was the result of well orchestrated planned made days in advance, when word of the march first spread. Before

\textsuperscript{501} Until the 1990s, the French state claimed that there was only limited repression on October 17, 1961 and officially recognized only three deaths (one of whom was a European). Today, historians vary in their estimates between several dozen and approximately one hundred and twenty dead. House and MacMaster believe the numbers may have passed one hundred if the whole period of September and October 1961 is taken into account. See House and MacMaster, 203-211.

\textsuperscript{502} Using archives from the Prefecture of Police, Blanchard cites 330 as the number of Algerians who were hospitalized following the demonstration. See La police parisienne et les Algériens, 380. (APP HA 111). Certainly many more of the injured refused to seek treatment for fear of being sent to detention centers and likely enduring further violence.

\textsuperscript{503} Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 216.

\textsuperscript{504} Ibid., 214.

\textsuperscript{505} Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens, 391.
the march began, Montaner deployed his FPA, armed with machine guns, to the bridges leading into Paris. Whereas the FLN supporters marched peacefully to show that police brutality would not deter them from their solidarity in favor of Algerian independence, the police, conversely, tried to demonstrate their power by using normally illegal, brutal methods to stop the protestors. 506

Perhaps because they were North Africans and because they represented, to many observers, a military presence in the metropole, the FPA got away with using illegal methods to collect information. Reluctant to admit that torture was occurring in metropolitan France, police administrators turned a blind eye to the FPA’s methods, preferring that colonial troops, rather than European officers, engage in these brutal practices. Emmanuel Blanchard suggested that, by neither condoning nor forbidding torture, French administrators could claim innocence and remain separated from the ‘barbaric’ methods used on colonial peoples. 507 The replacement of Justice Minister Edmond Michelet with Bernard Chenot, who shared Debré and Papon’s belief in combatting the FLN by any means necessary in August 1961 only further solidified the power of the police and weakened any remaining judicial restraints.

The French never accepted the FLN as legitimate combatants during the conflict, which thus was not called a ‘war’ until 1999, but was instead officially referred to as the “maintenance of law and order.” House and MacMaster suggest that this failure to acknowledge the reality of the situation coupled with fears, which the French state perpetuated, of an “enemy within,”

506 Ibid., 384.

507 Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens, 324. It should be noted that the FPA were not the only French forces to use torture in metropolitan France. The Direction de la surveillance du territoire also used torture, a fact that was brought to light during ‘l’affaire de la gangrène’ in December 1958. See Amiri, La bataille de France, 115-122.
allowed forms violence to be tolerated public opinion.\footnote{Ibid., 30.} Denial of the FLN as legitimate combatants caused some the French government to continue to combat the FLN’s influence even after Algerian independence was inevitable. This would explain, for instance, why attacks—by the police as well as by the OAS—against Algerians in Paris continued even after the creation of an independent Algeria became inevitable. But some members of the French administration, as well as many concerned citizens, in the French public at large, condemned the violence perpetrated by the police and the ‘ultras’ of the OAS. At a November 14, 1961 meeting of social welfare administrators of the Department of the Seine, one conseiller technique denounced the “climate of terror” among Algerians that the police had created.\footnote{Amiri, \textit{La bataille de France}, 187 and House and MacMaster, \textit{Paris 1961}, 146. Although the SCAA attributed the deaths to rivalries between the FLN and the MNA (who, by 1961, were no longer fighting because the MNA had conceded defeat).} Even the President of the SCINA expressed concern about the bodies found in the Paris waterways at an October 4\textsuperscript{th} meeting, and asked the Prefecture of Police if the deaths were related to Papon’s infamous words: “Pour un coup reçu nous en rendrons dix” (For one hit received we will respond with ten).\footnote{See Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Ha 47: Compte rendu de la reunion du SCINA du 4 Octobre 1961, par le commissaire de police de Saint-Etienne au directeur du SCAA, 2, cited in Amiri, \textit{La bataille de France}, 126.} But the bureaucrat who was perhaps the most outspoken critic of the police’s action was social action delegate Michel Massenet. While maintaining his commitment to French control of Algeria, Massenet worked to prevent future police violence, asserting that it was not only inhumane but also detrimental to the French position going into negotiations with the GPRA. In the private realm, members of social action associations witnessed police brutality first-hand and worked with Massenet to advocate on behalf of the hundreds detained following October 17, 1961. Their resistance, however, went largely unheeded, and, as House and MacMaster have
written, “Frey and Papon faced little difficulty in smothering any turbulence among lower level functionaries who shared a work ethic that prevented them from going public or were bullied into submissive silence.”

Michel Massenet’s Resistance to Police Brutality

In the aftermath of October 17, Michel Massenet was one of few state officials to speak out against the Paris police’s brutal actions. Tensions between Massenet and the policing arm of the social service administration existed beginning with his appointment as social action delegate in 1959, and Massenet grew increasingly critical of the invasion of policing and repressive actions into the social aid realm over the course of his tenure. When state officials were first planning the extension of the SAS/SAU to metropolitan France, Massenet wrote to the General Secretary of Algerian Affairs—the authority in charge of these sections—to express his numerous misgivings about the project. The transfer of officers directly from Algeria to the metropole was particularly distasteful to Massenet. He worried about the effects of a military administration being “parachuted in” with “no knowledge of the differences that exist between the management of a Muslim population and the management of a metropolitan population.”

He furthermore argued that the very existence of the SAT would violate the most sacred principles of French republicanism. “The principle that drove the Public Powers to envisage the creation of a Delegation of Social Affairs was the strict separation between social tasks and tasks involving the maintenance of public order.” The colonial experience of the SAS/SAU officers, he continued, was “diametrically opposed” to this separation given that it consisted of mixing tasks given by the Prime Minister with those that the maintenance of order implies. Moreover,

---

511 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961, 146.
Massenet insisted, the second principle guiding the state’s action with regard to French Muslims was nondiscrimination. He saw the social services that he coordinated as helping migrants to gain equal footing with the metropolitan population, not to further isolate or single them out. The actions of the SAT-FMA, he continued, “unfortunately reveals a conception that is totally different in which the migrant is treated according to a method of exception, submitted to the control of an administration of a military character and is obliged to go through the intermediary of this administration for simple, daily tasks.” For instance, he explained, a Muslim worker living in the 17e arrondissement would have to travel to a SAT office in Nanterre to obtain a travel authorization while his metropolitan-born neighbor would need only to go to his neighborhood police station. Rather than punish all Algerians for the actions of a few, he asserted, the SAT should help them to organize resistance against the FLN. He called the planned extension of the SAT a “grave error,” whose effect would only be to “terrorize” the Algerians whom they were supposed to be assisting, make them feel that they were being treated like a “dangerous population,” and push them into the hands of the FLN.512

Once the SAT-FMA had taken up residence in posts throughout France, Massenet and Colonel Terce, the officer in charge, clashed repeatedly over what Massenet saw as the service’s abuses of the social service network. For instance, in November of 1959 Massenet informed Terce that he would only support the extension of the SAT under the condition that precautions were taken to respect due legal process, allowing Algerians access to administrative channels used by other French citizens, and to avoid discrimination against Muslims by the SAT.513

512 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, “Note a M. le Secrétaire Général pour les Affaires Algériennes, MM/VL, Objet: remarques concernant les projets d’extension de l’expérience des officiers de secteur en Métropole.”

513 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, Secrétariat des Affaires Algériennes, letter of 6 November 1959 to Colonel Terce, 4807/MM.
When Terce requested 4500 NF from the FAS for his SAT bureaus, Massenet curtly rejected his request. Without denying that the SAT does provide certain forms of assistance, he wrote, “It could prove to be delicate for the Fonds d’action sociale to fund a service whose police etiquette is as obvious as it is honorable.” Massenet also corresponded frequently with Maurice Papon, advocating on behalf of Algerians who had been detained by the police and had come to his office to complain, for instance, about being denied papers or being subjected to unnecessarily rough interrogations at various SAT posts throughout Paris. In fact, Massenet objected to the necessity for Algerians to acquire papers from the SAT in the first place, which he described as “discriminatory treatment.”

On September 15, 1961 Michel Massenet informed the General Secretary of Algerian Affairs of worsening police violence. “In the past few months,” he complained, “the previous efforts to keep police brutality to a strict minimum seen to have come into conflict with the orders given by the Minister of the Interior himself or with an absence of control by this ministry over his police services.” He gave two examples of mistreatment of North Africans by the French police. On July 25th, M. Mohamed Ziad, who had escaped the FLN to come to France

---

514 Michel Massenet, Note to Colonel Terce, Inspecteur des S.A.T., 14 March 1961. « Sans nier l’intérêt qui s’attacherait à la poursuite par les S.A.T. de la distribution de certains secours, il pourrait s’avérer délicat de voir le Fonds d’action sociale subventionner un service dont l’étiquette policière est aussi évident qu’honorable. » Terce was replaced by Colonel Dubois, who admitted to Massenet “the errors of [his] predecessor.” See CAC 19770391, art. 8: Colonel Dubois, Inspecteur des S.A.T., Note à l’attention de Monsieur Massenet, 3 June 1961.

515 See, for example, CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet to Maurice Papon, “Note concernant l’incident qui s’est produit à la S.A.T., 6th secteur, Rue Colonel Monteil Métro Porte de Vanves,” 22 January 1960; and “Note to Colonel Terce, Inspecteur des S.A.T.” 14 March 1961.

516 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Le Secrétaire Général pour les Affaires Algériennes à M. le Ministre de L’Intérieur (a l’attention du Directeur du Service des Affaires Musulmanes et de l’Action Sociale) 15 Mars 1961, 327/MM. Objet: Délivrance des cartes nationales d’identité aux Français Musulmans d’Algérie. Although a memo of 19 January 1961 had technically made it easier for Algerians to obtain identification papers at any police station by eliminating the need to go to an SAT office, Massenet complained that this change was “Not being applied with the necessary zeal” by police officers who, overwhelmed by their work, found the existence of the SAT bureaux a “convenient way to get out of handling certain affairs.”
and whose brother was a Muslim officer stationed in the Sahara, was interrogated late at night at the Café des Olympiades, rue Washington. He was brought to Grand Palais commissariat at 3:00 am, slapped in the face three times, held until noon, sent to the Beaujon detention center, and held under surveillance until after 4:00 pm. M. Zaid was then interrogated, handcuffed, and finally released at 5:30 pm. On September 12th on the Blvd. Saint-Michel, M. Lallen, an Algerian student who was taking technical training classes with Radiodiffusion-télévision française, was stopped by the police, arrested, and sent to Vincennes, where he was harassed and beaten, for twenty-four hours.

It particularly bothered Massenet that an Algerian student who had been brought to France with French state funding as part of a goodwill mission was being treated like an outsider and a criminal. Treatment such as this, he argued, went directly against the spirit of his work, and rather than prove to young Algerian men that French sovereignty was a benefit for Algeria, instead increased tensions between Algerian youth and the French government. He wrote to the Prime Minister on behalf of several more Algerian university students who had been arrested while studying in France on scholarships provided by the French government—one of whom, M. Bouchoui, was the son of a Conseiller aux Affaires étrangères musulmanes. Many of them had been put on house arrest and were scheduled for deportation for “crimes against the security of the French state.” Massenet requested that they be allowed to be on house arrest in the city where they were students, so they could finish their studies. He eventually contacted the Ministry of Armies, which did grant a reprieve to at least two students, one of whom was the son of the director of Information for Radio-Alger.

517 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, Note à l’attention de Monsieur le Secretaire General pour les Affaires algeriennes, 15 Septembre 1961.
518 See CAC 19770391, art. 8: Several folders labeled “étudiants.”
In response to Papon’s implementation of a curfew on all Algerians in Paris and the banlieue, Massenet sent the police his own suggestions regarding the “maintenance of order” in the Paris region. Massenet objects to hours of curfew because of night workers, night classes, and objected to the police chief’s order against Algerian men congregating in groups which, Massenet reasoned, would not stop the FLN operatives, who did not work in groups anyway. He asked to start meeting with the new Minister of the Interior, Roger Frey, to discuss, as he put it, the “psychological and political consequences” of measures the police planned to take to maintain order in the city, before they were actually put in place. As Massenet began to hear increasing reports from his sources in the GEANARP and other aid associations of murders, beatings, and other forms of brutality committed by the police, he made numerous attempts to warn his superiors within the French government that the situation in the Paris streets was getting out of hand. He wrote to the Ministry of Interior, and, having received no response, even went to the cabinet, but was unable to get a meeting with the Minister. He then informed M. Tricot and the General Secretary for Algerian Affairs (see above), but they seem not to have taken any action.

The events of the night of October 17, 1961 only exacerbated existing tensions between the social action and policing arms of the Algerian Affairs branch of the French government. Massenet wrote in a statement to Louis Joxe, the Minister for Algerian Affairs, that he was met with the same ignorance, denial, and apathy from others in the government. He received reports from local associations (which he does not identify by name) that the police were beating people,


520 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, “Déroulement des événements du mois d’octobre 1961 tel qu’il est apparu à mon service.”
and he was concerned about the safety of the people being detained in the triage centers that the police had set up throughout the city to hold demonstrated who had been arrested. Massenet then contacted Lamassoure of the SAMAS to see if his service had access to the detention centers, but Lamassoure was absent and, according to Massenet, the assistant in his office lacked the authority to address the problem and dismissed an identical inquiry from the Red Cross. Soon afterward, Massenet went to the office of a M. Legrand at the cabinet of the Ministre d’Etat, but he was too busy for a meeting. Frustrated and desperate for help, Massenet finally tried to contact a member of the Ministry of the Interior’s cabinet, M. Bourges, without success. When, several days later, Bourges returned his phone calls, he informed Massenet not to worry because there had been no deaths at the triage centers and there were medical teams there—neither of these statements was true. As Massenet saw it, the massacre resulted from the lack of judicial procedures that targeted FLN militants without hurting the entire Algerian community, and what he described as the “growing loss of control” by the Ministry of the Interior over its own police officers. Conclusion: « Il résulte de l’exposé des faits qui précèdent que le seul fonctionnaire qui a possédé à temps des renseignements sur la situation dans les centres a été le Délégué aux Affaires sociales ; que ce fonctionnaire, en raison de son rang administratif et de son insertion administrative n’a pas possédé l’audience nécessaire pour arrêter un déchainement de violences inutiles. »

The only member of the French government to meet with Massenet was Nafissa Sid Cara of Algerian Affairs. Massenet contacted her on October 23rd, and following their meeting she wrote to Roger Frey to express “bitterness” at the “pointless, hurtful and dangerous nature of the methods being employed by the police.” Like Massenet, Sid Cara was concerned that the

---

521 CAC 19770391, art.8: Michel Massenet,”Déroulement des événements du mois d’octobre 1961 tel qu’il est apparu à mon service;” Note remise à M. Joxe.
repression would undermine the government’s efforts to reach out to Algerian migrants, and feared that it would cause resentment among the mass of “honest workers.” At its November 16 meeting, the Committee for Algerian Affairs agreed that the murders and other brutal acts that occurred were “repercussions from the general policy on Algerian matters. It would be in this regard desirable to have a return to a normal regime, or at least a softening of the actual measures could be decided as soon as the necessities of public order permit it. A tight link between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State charged with Algerian Affairs should permit reconciliation of the different imperatives of cause. […] Decision proposed: Consultation of the Ministry of State in all measures that the Ministry of the Interior envisages to take with regard to Muslim migration in the metropole.” However, when Interior Minister Roger Frey handed over Sid Cara’s letter to the prefecture of police, Papon refused to make changes and quickly closed the dossier. In December, three months after filing his complaint regarding MM. Zaid and Lallen, Massenet received one of very few responses to his repeated requests for justice for Algerian victims of French police brutality. Alexandre Sanguinetti, from the Ministry of the Interior, wrote briefly to say that M. Zaid had never complained about police harassment during his interrogation, and that there existed no record of a M. Lallen having been arrested.

The official state explanation of what had occurred on October 17, 1961 was that the FLN had attacked the police, who had responded legitimately to the threat. The state furthermore maintained that radical measures such as the curfew, detention without trial, and

523 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Comité des Affaires algériennes du jeudi 16 novembre 1961, “Problèmes concernant les musulmans d’algérie en métropole.”
repatriation were necessary to protect the police. The FLN, the French administration claimed, had then exploited the situation and had provoked the demonstrations by feeding off of the anger of the Algerian community.

Michel Massenet rejected the government’s claim that beatings, unjustified arrests, and even murder were necessary, calling the police’s action “cold-blooded” and “without precedent in the annals of French policing” and admonishing them for their “total indifference with regard to brutality.” Having worked to gain Algerian migrants’ trust, Massenet was dismayed by the irrevocable damage to this trust the police had caused by their “grave mistakes” without considering the consequences. “Three years of work destroyed,” he wrote. “We can be sure that within days years worth of work has been destroyed and that we have obtained, on the one hand, a violent progression of racism in the metropole, a more and more reserved attitude from employers toward the Algerian workforce, and the liquidation of all of the action accomplished in the service of students.” Furthermore, Massenet asserted, the police’s actions would have grave consequences on future negotiations on Algerian independence. He explained that as Social Action Delegate, he had always tried to preserve the “modest card” that Algerian migration represented in French negotiations with Algerian, if the situation ever came to that. By unilaterally putting an end to the liberties of Algerians on metropolitan soil, Massenet argued, the Ministry of the Interior had destroyed a valuable bargaining tool and had thus played right into the hands of the GPRA, with whom the government had hoped to avoid negotiating. In addition, by resorting to forms of violence that exceeded what the Geneva Conventions had defined as acceptable wartime practices, France had injured its image on the international front. “The beneficiaries of these demonstrations are obviously the FLN, which marks its force by

---

526 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, “Note concernant les modalités du maintien de l’ordre public dans la région parisienne.”
imposing on Muslims the idea that the French government can no longer maintain public order in the metropole without negotiating with the GPRA, and on the other hand accredits, on the international plan, the idea that France is a racist and oppressive country.”

Massenet expressed his frustration in a scathing letter to Prime Minister Michel Debré. “The recent events in the Paris region have profoundly impacted the work that I have worked to accomplish, with your support, over the last three years. It is regrettable that the measures likely to incur such grave consequences were deliberated on from solely the point of view of public order, without consulting any of the most qualified bureaucrats and without the least taking into account of their formal warnings or their experience.” By refusing to take heed of his warnings and by instead resorting to unnecessary force, the Paris police had, in Massenet’s eyes, guaranteed not only that Algeria would gain independence, but that the FLN would lead the new nation.

Local Resistance

Local officials and social services providers, such as teachers and association members, who worked with the Algerian community also spoke out against ongoing police violence and raised questions about what had happened on the night of October 17. Even before the massacre of October 17, teachers at the Ecole Pasteur in the Paris suburb of Genneviliers had suspended their night classes for North African workers, claiming that one of their students, a bright man who had been attending classes there for many years, had been killed in the street by the police while he was returning home, and that it was therefore not safe for classes to continue as long as the curfew remained in place. “Over the years,” the teachers explained in a letter to the Ministry

527 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massenet, “Note concernant les récents événements survenus dans la région parisienne.”

528 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Michel Massent, letter to Michel Debré, 25 October 1961.
of National Education, “we have been able to see and to judge our Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian students, all, today, subjected to the same terror. It is certain that our courses can only regain their attendance and effectiveness with a complete change in the situation facing North African workers and with the cessation of the racial profiling (‘chase au fanciès.’)” that the authorities had been using in the maintenance of public order.529 Months earlier, residents of the 13e arrondissement had organized to protest the presence of the FPA in their neighborhood. Priests and pastors, representatives from the CGT and CFTC unions, and members of the local Communist and Socialist parties organized an ‘Action Committee for negotiated peace in Algeria,’ which, on April 29, 1960 met with journalists to pass on information from witnesses who had come forward with eye-witness accounts of violent interrogations, exactions, and even torture in the basements of cafés.530

In the aftermath of October 17, 1961, local citizens spoke out against the police’s brutal actions. The Mayor of Nanterre (R. Barbet), for instance, denounced the Paris Police at a November meeting of the Conseil général de la Seine.531 The staff at the Sainte-Anne mental hospital—where Algerian men, women, and children were detained—protested and helped the children escape, although the police soon recaptured them—a risky move given that doctors who delivered medical certificates to Algerians documenting mistreatment were themselves

529 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Letter of 13 October 1961 from le Directeur des cours destinés aux travailleurs originaires d’Afrique du Nord to the Ministère d’Éducation Nationale, Direction de la Coopération avec la Communauté de l’Etranger. With regard to racial profiling, Linda Amiria has written, “In other words, any individual with a dark complexion (« teint mat ») was suspect in the eyes of the FPA and its chief, thus, any Algerian.” She also mentions a man from Martinique who was beaten and detained by the FPA. See La bataille de France, 108.


531 Hervo, 230. On June 28, 1961, Barbet wrote to the Prefect of the Seine asking why Captain Montaner was in charge and what exactly his role was. See Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 130.
targeted. Many private associations stepped in to provide assistance to the North African men and women—the police arrested Moroccans and Tunisians in addition to Algerians—who were being held in temporary detention centers throughout the city. For example, members of the Maison de Myriam handed out food to prisoners and their families. The Red Cross informed Massenet that their organization had had several requests from families desperate for information on the men who had disappeared on October 17. Massenet in turn contacted Pierre Somveille at the Prefecture of Police, who responded that two men had been allowed to return home, and one had been deported to Algeria. The Red Cross of Paris contacted Michel Massenet to let him know that they were overwhelmed with requests from Algerian families seeking information on men who had disappeared after October 17th. Members of the GEANARP, too, relayed information to Massenet about Algerian casualties, and he later based his complaints to his superiors within in the French government on first-hand account from these two associations. The GEANARP reported witnessing the bodies of six Algerian men being pulled from the Seine between October 23rd and 26th, including two tied together and another who had been strangled to death. The letter demanded an explanation for these deaths, and urged Massenet to stop what seemed to the GEANARP to be a government cover-up of the identities of the dead and the circumstances of their deaths.

532 Amiri, La bataille de France, 125.
534 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Recherches (see PHOTO for citation)
535 CAC 19770391, art. 8: Series of letter from Red Cross of Paris to Michel Massenet. Massenet contacted Pierre Somveille at the Prefecture of Police, who responded that they police had record of only three of the dozens of men reported missing—two men had been allowed to return home, and one had been deported to Algeria.
536 CAC 19770391, art. 8: GEANARP letter of 27 October 1961 to Michel Massenet.
Christian organizations in particular spoke out against the police and assisted victims of their violence. The CIMADE, which also gave assistance to prisoners at the detention centers, met on October 20 “in a state of shock” and together drafted a letter to Pastor Westphal, the president of the Protestant Federation in France. The letter stated:

The board of the CIMADE […] was particularly profoundly upset by the facts that were relayed to it and which attested to an obvious explosion of racism in the ranks of the Paris Police, of which certain elements have sunk to unacceptable brutality, even after the recent Muslim demonstrations. Whatever may be the explanation, it seems impossible to us for Christian churches not to express their indignation at these facts and their dramatic consequences, and not to vigorously call on the whole population in the name of human dignity. It equally seems to use that a cry of alarm such as this should be accompanied by a direct appeal to the French government for immediate peace in Algeria, the only possibility for avoiding a generalized outburst of violence. We have read with recognition the letter from the board of the Protestant Federation of France. However, it seems to us that at the present time it is necessary to go further and to express ourselves publicly.537

The CIMADE also filed an official complaint against the Paris Police. One of its members, a man named Etienne who was a friend of Monique Hervo, asked her to submit a testimony on the brutality she had witnessed in La Folie.538

Workers unions, too, condemned the actions of the police. In its pamphlet titled “Face à la repression,” the Union Régionale Parisienne C.F.T.C. spoke out against what it described as the “veritable reign of police terror” that had been unleashed on the Algerian community in the Paris region over the last three months. The authors claimed to have received reports from North African witnesses of a string of brutal acts, the same as those witnessed by Monique Hervo, including beatings by police in broad daylight and in front of witnessed, the destruction of


538 Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 226.
identification papers, raids, theft (with the money in some cases going to the radical OAS), expulsions from lodging houses, destruction of property, the detention of up to 2,000 people for forty-eight hours before their transferal to the transit center in Vincennes, and numerous disappearances. In the days following the October 17 demonstration—which they union asserted was a legitimate response to unfair treatment—the Union Régionale Parisienne obtained reports of a lack of food, the most basic hygiene, and medical care at the mass holding centers. Given this situation, its members asserted, France was suffering from the kind of “moral perversion” and lack of individual rights and liberties that leads to Fascism. According to the authors of the pamphlet, the violence in metropolitan France was an extension of the system of colonial exploitation, which, they wrote, “does not limit itself to Algeria but which makes the weighs most heavily on the 250,000 workers exiled in France.”

The union called for, among other things, a resolution of the situation in Algeria—i.e. negotiations with the FLN—and respect for the rights of all those living on French territory.

The Union Régionale Parisienne’s take on the causes of poverty and the spread of pro-independence sentiment within the Algerian community are also worth mentioning due to their sharp contrast to dominant state discourses. Unlike most commentators, the Union saw France and the political, social, and cultural conditions its leaders had created as partially responsible for Algerians’ poverty as well as their undesirable political mobilization. For instance, French employers recruited Algerian workers, who, because they lacked access to adequate education and training therefore took unwanted, low-paying jobs if they were employed at all. These workers sent most of their wages home because of the horrible conditions the French military leadership in Algeria had created with forced mass population displacement. Moreover, because

French officials had failed to provide adequate housing, the only places Algerians arriving in France could live were often bidonvilles or boarding houses, which perpetuated and exacerbated the isolation that they faced upon uprooting themselves from a ‘tribal’ culture and relocating to what was culturally, if not politically, a foreign country. France, the union claimed, was also partially to blame for the spread of Algerian nationalism. “In doing nothing to put an end to such a scandalous situation,” its members wrote, “the public powers have taken responsibility for the revolutionary movement that is cutting across the North African milieu and have laid the foundation for the excesses of violence from which we are suffering today.” In the eyes of the union, state violence—both physical (beatings, arrests, theft, etc.) and symbolic (isolation, racism, the denial of political rights, etc.) were the root of so-called ‘terrorism.’ By using violence to control the Algerian population, the French state had alienated Algerians and thus had caused them to seek refuge in the FLN.

Conclusion

The Paris Police’s actions in the fall of 1961 brought to the forefront the utter contradiction of claims that surveillance and assimilation could be two sides of a single policy toward the Algerian community. The Republican pledges to provide equal protection and to ensure equal rights to all citizens were superseded by colonial methods of consolidating power over colonized peoples. When more peaceful methods of encouraging political loyalty via cultural assimilation had failed, the state resorted to physical force in a last-ditch effort to weaken the French Federation of the FLN. Ultimately, though, this display of brutal force by the police in fact had the opposite effect. The end result of the fight between the FLN and French officials had failed to provide adequate housing, the only places Algerians arriving in France could live were often bidonvilles or boarding houses, which perpetuated and exacerbated the isolation that they faced upon uprooting themselves from a ‘tribal’ culture and relocating to what was culturally, if not politically, a foreign country. France, the union claimed, was also partially to blame for the spread of Algerian nationalism. “In doing nothing to put an end to such a scandalous situation,” its members wrote, “the public powers have taken responsibility for the revolutionary movement that is cutting across the North African milieu and have laid the foundation for the excesses of violence from which we are suffering today.” In the eyes of the union, state violence—both physical (beatings, arrests, theft, etc.) and symbolic (isolation, racism, the denial of political rights, etc.) were the root of so-called ‘terrorism.’ By using violence to control the Algerian population, the French state had alienated Algerians and thus had caused them to seek refuge in the FLN.

Conclusion

The Paris Police’s actions in the fall of 1961 brought to the forefront the utter contradiction of claims that surveillance and assimilation could be two sides of a single policy toward the Algerian community. The Republican pledges to provide equal protection and to ensure equal rights to all citizens were superseded by colonial methods of consolidating power over colonized peoples. When more peaceful methods of encouraging political loyalty via cultural assimilation had failed, the state resorted to physical force in a last-ditch effort to weaken the French Federation of the FLN. Ultimately, though, this display of brutal force by the police in fact had the opposite effect. The end result of the fight between the FLN and French officials had failed to provide adequate housing, the only places Algerians arriving in France could live were often bidonvilles or boarding houses, which perpetuated and exacerbated the isolation that they faced upon uprooting themselves from a ‘tribal’ culture and relocating to what was culturally, if not politically, a foreign country. France, the union claimed, was also partially to blame for the spread of Algerian nationalism. “In doing nothing to put an end to such a scandalous situation,” its members wrote, “the public powers have taken responsibility for the revolutionary movement that is cutting across the North African milieu and have laid the foundation for the excesses of violence from which we are suffering today.” In the eyes of the union, state violence—both physical (beatings, arrests, theft, etc.) and symbolic (isolation, racism, the denial of political rights, etc.) were the root of so-called ‘terrorism.’ By using violence to control the Algerian population, the French state had alienated Algerians and thus had caused them to seek refuge in the FLN.

Conclusion

The Paris Police’s actions in the fall of 1961 brought to the forefront the utter contradiction of claims that surveillance and assimilation could be two sides of a single policy toward the Algerian community. The Republican pledges to provide equal protection and to ensure equal rights to all citizens were superseded by colonial methods of consolidating power over colonized peoples. When more peaceful methods of encouraging political loyalty via cultural assimilation had failed, the state resorted to physical force in a last-ditch effort to weaken the French Federation of the FLN. Ultimately, though, this display of brutal force by the police in fact had the opposite effect. The end result of the fight between the FLN and French

540 It is interesting that the Union Régionale Parisienne did not escape the French tendency to describe Algeria as a static, “tribal” society, whose members were ill equipped for life in a “modern” metropolis such as Paris.
administrators in Paris was a strengthened FLN and pervasive ambiguity surrounding the future of Algerians living in France.
Epilogue

Shortly before independence was declared, Michel Massenet described a “profound trouble” within the associations, and urged French leaders to consider the “psychological problems” that their members would face as the government determined the forms social aid would take once Algerians were no longer French citizens in training.⁵⁴¹ The first trimester 1962 CTAM report described how the “rapid and profound change in the Algeria situation had led to discouragement and lassitude resulting in the departures of social workers whose devotion and competence were undeniable.” Those who only undertook their work in the national interest, the CTAM reported, now felt that their mission was over.⁵⁴²

Whether or not the French public ever truly believed that France would maintain political control of Algeria is up for debate, and certainly there was a range of opinion on this question. Especially telling, though, is the speed with which some associations abandoned any feelings of fraternity with and obligation to the Algerians in France after it officially became independent in the summer of 1962. With no dream of an enduring French Algeria to defend, the SLSNA, which had suffered from a lack of funding from the start, opted not to continue its services after 1964. As its leader, Doctor Marcel Gandrille explained in a letter to an official at the Ministry of

---


the Interior, he had founded the association to aid Algerians but, he wrote, “Seeing as the situation has changed, there is no longer any reason to pursue our action.”

But many others continued to pursue their work after independence. Amitié Nord-Africaine de Nanterre later founded a library, a discotech, and a youth center. The Maison de Myriam also stayed open, citing the need for such a “private and neutral association.” Its 1962 report began with a critique of the government’s efforts: “Another year, a new report, the same problems: bidonvilles, work, housing” and noted with dismay that most of the people it served had never been employed and were more desperate than ever before for training and a job.

Interestingly, the JCLT, which sprang from a Gaullist militia, also continued its efforts. In a letter to Michel Massenet, Robert Levillain explained: “At a time when for many, the problem having lost its political topicality, it has also lost its interest, we affirm that, to the contrary, it is brutally clear that the need for remedial education, job training, and assimilation, continues to exist.” In 1963 JCLT published a brochure calling on the French public to step up and help Algerian youth, despite the end of the empire. In December of the same year, Levillain opened the National Association for the Manual and Technical Education of Adolescents, whose centers were located in Paris, Lozère, Oise, and the Basses-Alpes. Furthermore, in the two years following the end of the Algerian war in May 1962, JCLT harbored sixty Algerian children at its

544 Fl1a 5109: Maison de Myriam, “Rapport Moral 1961.”
545 Fl1a 5109: Maison de Myriam, “Rapport Moral 1962.”
547 CAC 19770391, art. 4: JCLT brochure, June 1963.
colonie in le Bleymard (southern France), including the children of harkis (North African soldiers who served in the French army) and functionaries chased from Algeria at independence. The number of children from the bidonvilles who attended JCLT’s colonies de vacances also continued to increase.548

At the end of the war, the CANAM’s members reported receiving “never-ending solicitations for aid,” largely from people fleeing Algeria following independence. Social action director Mme Berthelot reported to fellow members in late 1961 that “The emigration of Muslim families is intensifying in a considerable way; it most often occurs in very precarious conditions that rapidly create laborious/painful situations.”549 “Almost all of those newly arrived need to be specially oriented and advised as to their aptitude for a job,” the January 1963 report lamented, and “often their physical deficiencies render their working very difficult.”550 The workers’ housing manager, M. Nicola, claimed that he gave out more than a ton of food in Paris in the first three months of 1963, in addition to over 1,500 items of clothing and blankets.551 Shortly before Algerian independence, the CANAM issued a statement of loyalty and pledged to continue to its efforts, regardless of the outcome of the fighting:

Against winds and tides, despite the unleashing of passions, and despite of the violence that is surging in Algeria and in France, we are staying firm on the straight path open in front of us, and are maintaining our social service in a strict neutrality, which has never seemed to us incompatible with the intransigence of patriotism or expressions of civic duty. We have been careful, in every circumstance, to ease by vigilant and disinterested action, the exacerbation of

548 CAC 19770391, Article 4. Letter from R. Levillain, Secrétaire general of J.C.L.T. to Michel Massenet, Délégation à l’Action Sociale pour les Travailleurs Etrangers, 7 décembre 1964. JCLT measured attendance in ‘days spent’ at the colonie. This number increased from 1,800 in 1960 to 14,400 in 1964.


551 CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM Procès Verbal 22 avril 1963, 4.
hatred and fanaticism, and to respect fully the dignity of man. By understanding, confidence and solidarity, with have had in our hearts, as we continue to do it, to lean objectively, with as much interest as friendship, on al the distresses, aggravated by the events, so that we can bring remedy to them by our means. In so doing we are conscious of contributing, in a modest way without doubt, to preserving the vigorous roots of Franco-Muslim friendship. The rejuvenated branches could bloom better, at least we ardently hope they could, in a future that we wish for as soon as possible, at the moment when the hour of peace, of reconciliation and of collaboration between men sounds. We keep pride in having at least kept alive the flame of hope!  

On March 9, 1962, the GPRA and the French Government signed the Evian Accords, ending the fighting, and representatives met the following week to negotiate the terms of peace. On March 19 a ceasefire was officially proclaimed. Algerian independence was formally declared on July 5, 1962, but its transition to full autonomy from France occurred much more gradually. The formal end of fighting did not, however, mean the resolution to the ‘Algerian question.’ For Algerian migrants in France, in particular, many issues remained unresolved. The Evian Accords granted Algerians the right to live and work in France, but they did not make provisions for the organization of social services for the approximately 420,000 Algerians living in France in 1962. With Algerian independence becoming increasingly visible on the horizon, French administrators had to decide how to continue with a social action plan whose impetus had been the need to strengthen Algerians’ ties to the French state. Both continuity and change defined the relationship of the French state to Algerians in France. Continuity and change can also be seen in the choices made by private associations at independence, which are especially telling of the ambiguities surrounding the Algerian presence in France.

552 CAC 19770391, art. 4: CANAM Rapport Moral, Assemblée Générale du 22 janvier 1962, 2-3. Secours Catholique, the Comité Lyautey, the CIMADE, and Service Sociale d’Aide aux Emigrants also continued to serve Algerian immigrants in France at least through the 1960s.

553 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Michel Massenet, “Importance des problèmes musulmanes posés à la France sur son territoire nationale, 20 Dec. 1962. Whereas, following independence, approximately 20,000 people returned to Algeria, in the following six months, nearly 30,000 migrated to France.
In many ways, the concerns of the French administration about Algerian migration in France remained the same. As Michel Massenet observed, “This political event did not change the nature or the amplitude of the social problems that Algerian migration to France poses to the public powers.” For example, French administrators continued to worry about the influence that the FLN, which was now the ruling party of an independent Algeria, had over migrants in France. Although Algeria was now independent from French political control, many in the French administration saw Algerian migrants as pawns in a competition for power and influence.

Now more solidly controlled than ever, the mass [of Algerian migrants] submits itself, without great protest, to the multiple exigencies of the [FLN] and lends itself to an increasingly thorough Algerianization. The Federation has always aimed to separate Muslim emigration from the French administration, it is currently pursuing this same goal with great success. The Muslims have their own tribunals, their own police, their own social services. If they don’t have their own schools yet, in the East they have developed Arabic courses, which young Muslims are forced to attend.

Once again, discussion about Algerians migrants’ political loyalties centered on social action. After the ceasefire, the French Federation continued to collect funds from migrants and, according to a report from the SCINA, forced Algerians to use its social services instead of those offered by the French administration. Moreover, the massive return of political prisoners to France had causes the ranks of FLN militants in France to

---

554 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Comité 17 avril 1963, Michel Massenet, “Projet de réalisations sociales au profit des migrants algériens travaillant en France.”

555 See, for example, CAC 19770391, art. 2: Michel Massenet, “Importance des problèmes musulmans posés à la France sur son territoire nationale, 20 Dec. 1962. Massenet writes: “Algerian migration represents a link between France and Algeria. The ministry responsible for cooperation with Algeria cannot abandon its control over this migration, and cannot disinterest itself from the consequences that abandoning this migration could have on other chapters of cooperation.”

In particular, there was concern about the social services that the French Federation had organized during the war and which, as a foreign government, could now operate freely in France. For example, the FLN opened ‘Comités de libérés’ in several French cities to assist released prisoners as well as organizations for Muslim women that offered, according to the concerned authors of the CTAM report for the first trimester of 1962, “a political and social education.” Michel Massenet worried that Algeria would try to take control of social services for its own migrants in France away from the French administration. The CTAM closely watched the activities of French associations composed of professors, students, and union members who had supported Algerian independence, and whose “excessive politicization” threatened French power in its relations with a newly independence Algeria. Having asserted that the Algerian immigrant population posed “a public order problem,” Michel Massenet determined “the sole means of control that the State conserved toward Algerian migrants is that which results from its control over the structures in charge of social action in their favor.”

Moreover, for Massenet and others, the issue of the ‘cultural adaptation’ of Algerian migrants remained unresolved, as did the means by which the French state would intervene to

---

558 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Michel Massenet, “La migration algérienne et les perspectives de cooperation entre la France et l’Algérie” April/May 1962. Massenet worried that Algeria could exert pressure on its workers in France based on the fact that their families still lived in Algeria. He cited the examples of Italian workers in France in 1938 and Germans in South Africa.
559 CAC 19770391, art. 2: “Les associations d’action sociale pour les migrants algériens après Evian,” excerpt from the report of the Conseillers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes, 1er trimestre 1962, 14.
“permit migrants to adapt to life and work in their new milieu” and to “move easily in a society from which they are separated by the handicap of language, poverty, and of habits.”

The difference, though, was that while the French state continued to see social services as the solution to a perceived failure to assimilate, this failure was attributed to the broader North African—rather than specifically Algerian—community. In February 1963, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou announced his intention to renew the mission of the FAS, whose funds went specifically to Algerian immigrants for two years following independence until they were extended to immigrants of all nationalities by the decree of April 22, 1964. In 1966, the Service de la Protection et de Liaison des Migrants replaced the SAMAS as the major governing body for social services for immigrants of all nationalities. The mission of the SONACOTRAL, too, was extended to all migrants in France. Millions of French francs went to building modern high-rises designed to discourage North African cultural practices and to sever immigrants’ ties to their countries of origin. Yet HLM construction did not meet demands and metropolitan families were favored over Algerian families. It is ironic that many residents of bidonvilles

561 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Comité de 17 avril 1963, Michel Massenet, “Projet de réalisations sociales au profit des migrants algériens travaillant en France.”

562 CAC 19770391, art. 2: Michel Massenet, “Importance des problèmes musulmanes posés à la France sur son territoire national,” 20 décembre 1962.


564 The decree of April 25, 1964 also made Michel Massenet the Delegate for Foreign Workers. On September 16, 1966 Pompidou extended the mission of the FAS to include “social groups posing problems of social adaptation analogous to those of foreign workers, regardless of their nationality status,” which, essentially, meant French citizens of North African origin.

worked in the construction of the very HLMs in which they were not permitted to live. The last bidonvilles were not cleared from the Parisian banlieue until well into the 1970s.

Additionally, despite these administrative changes that ended the singling out of Algerian immigrants to France, many assumptions about the particular challenges they faced remained. A September 1966 report on social integration by Ministry of Social Affairs official François Villey repeated what were by then familiar tropes about Algerian immigrants, asserting, for example, that they were failing to adapt to modern life and that, because of patriarchal North African culture and a lack of education, Muslim women were isolated from French society. Villey recommended that the French administration continue its diverse array of services, including housing, French language classes, job training, domestic education for women, and programs for youth fourteen to eighteen, to ameliorate the living conditions of a population that was “in essence, maladapted to our mode of life and which must overcome the multiple handicaps that arise from its transplantation” and which were “indispensable in the fight against social isolation” and to “permit their adaptation to Western modes of living.”

The government continued to fund private associations that both met immigrants’ physical needs of food, shelter, medical care, etc. and also provided services aimed at their integration into French society and French culture. As the 1968 annual report of association l’Aide aux Travailleurs Migrants dans la région Marseillaise (ATOM) put it, “Material assistance alone doesn’t resolve anything.” Instead, the report asserted, the success of reabsorbing the bidonvilles was “fundamentally linked to the conditioning, or reconditioning, of inhabitants,” so that they might acquire a “new mindset


permitting them to live harmoniously in the urban environment.”569 Men and boys learned skills necessary for finding jobs, while women and girls were instructed in the domestic arts such as cleaning and child and rearing. For example, ATOM offered night school classes for workers and helped them find employment in Marseille. The organization offered similar classes for adolescents, which combined traditional study and technical training with recreational trips designed to steer young men toward a productive, healthy lifestyle.

Many scholars have recently explored the importance of Algeria in French national imaginings, asserting that a resolution to contemporary racism and inequality in France will only be possible when the nation comes to terms with the legacies of the Algerian War. French identity was tied to the prestige of controlling colonies, and, as Phillip Naylor has written, Algeria was of special importance because it was “the door to the Third World” by which France could enhance its image among developing nations and “extend its influence as a great and independent power.”570 At Evian, therefore, France not only lost a colony, it lost an identity. To cope with this loss, de Gaulle mobilized an essentialist vision of “eternal France” as the contributor of culture and civilization—with or without overseas colonies.571 Among the effects of the French denial of their country’s colonial past is that was easier for immigrants from former colonies to be perceived as ‘foreign.’ The Algerian War, Todd Shepard has asserted, “gave birth to the certainty that ‘decolonization’ was a stage in the forward march of history.”572 Historical inevitability and inassimilable difference were explanations shared by the left and the right. Christians, Gaullists, Socialists, syndicalists, and Communists all moved from being pro-French

569 “L’aide aux travailleurs migrants dans la région Marseillaise,” 25.
571 Naylor, France and Algeria, 1.
572 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 1.
Algeria to supporting Algerian independence. Thus, the colonial-era ‘civilizing mission’ was recast as a benevolent ‘modernizing mission’ preparing Algeria for its future as an independent nation.\textsuperscript{573} At Algerian independence, therefore, the French government no longer had to defend the notion that Algerians and Frenchmen were one and the same; Algerians could be “abandoned to the tide of history,” because they had never been French.\textsuperscript{574} Since 1946 and the legal changes that followed World War I, policymakers had struggled to reconcile the notion of a single Franco-Algerian nation with what seemed like obvious differences between the two peoples. After 1962, there was no need to explain the contradiction inherent in a supposedly race-blind state administering policies based on Algerians’ essential difference. National, rather than racial, difference was easier to justify.\textsuperscript{575}

Although de Gaulle tried to resolve the ‘Algerian question’ by denying France’s colonial past, tensions remained between French republican values and notions of a single, essential French identity. In 1968, new left protests against French imperialism provoked Algerian War veterans to take up the Pétainist cause, supporting the Vichy regime’s values of “fatherland, family, and work” over the republican principles of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.”\textsuperscript{576} A government-commissioned report on foreign workers in France published a mere seven years after Algerian independence lacked any hint that Algerians migrants had once been French citizens. It could easily have been written by Georges Mauco in the 1930s and likewise echoed cries of the “massive influx” of colonial migrants that officials feared following World War II. Whereas, Calvez claimed, Poles and Italians were “easily assimilable” and had served an

\textsuperscript{573} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{574} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{575} See Shepard, \textit{The Invention of Decolonization}, 8.
important economic purpose, France was at risk of having to deal with an “unassimilable island” of North Africans who refused to assimilate into French culture.  

In 1974, citing rising unemployment and innate cultural difference that prevented integration in the Republican model, the French state banned immigration of third world peoples. Yet the government also put in place family reunification measures, after which most North Africans chose to stay in France and to have their families join them there. These families suffered from extremely high unemployment, and those who were employed worked mainly in the lowest paying jobs. They were also subject to public contempt. In a 1973/74 survey, only 17% of French people surveyed described their opinion of North Africans in the country as “Good,” while 55% described it as “Fairly Bad” or “Bad.” In the politically charged debates over immigration, it was easy for many observers to claim that North Africans had failed to assimilate into French society. Cultural pluralism as an alternative to strict Republican assimilation—which, by its definition, assumes the existence of a single, French national identity

---

577 Correntin Calvez, “Le Problème de travailleurs étrangers, ” *Journal Officiel de la Republique*, 1969, 2 and 4. As evidence, Calvez noted that “the presence of groups having little vocation of assimilating impedes the adaptation of others, who find themselves more or less in agreement with them and have a tendency to succumb to a reflex of defense and of reinforcement of their national identity.” He recommended that it was thus in the common interest to restrict immigration from North Africa “to avoid the appearance of such ethnic problems,” 4.


580 In 1984, 58% of French people surveyed said the immigrant population (estimated at 7%-8%) was too large, and 70% said that Algerians were “fairly poorly integrated” into French society. “Extraits d’un sondage effectué en janvier et février 1984 par la SOFRES et le Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié des Peuples auprès d’un échantillon représentatif de la population résidant en France.” Source : *Vivre ensemble avec nos différences* (Paris : Éditions Différences, 1985), cited in Hargreaves, *Immigration in Post-War France*, 51-52.
into which all newcomers must assimilate—reached a brief apex in the early 1980s with the ‘Beur’ movement supported by the new Socialist government of François Mitterrand. In December 1983, tens of thousands of people from the housing projects walked to Paris in the *Marche des Beurs* (*beur* is French slang for Arab) demanding recognition from a society that treated them as outsiders. But the rise in popularity of Jean-Marie Le Pen (himself a former intelligence officer in Algeria) and his far-right National Front party in the late 1980s and continuing support for anti-immigration policies in French elections have proven that the issue of diversity in France is far from resolved.

Claims from the years of the Algerian War that housing is key to integration have proven to be true, but in disastrous ways. Once symbols of prosperous modernization, the monstrous, dilapidated public housing complexes that dot the outskirts of French cities today evoke the opposite qualities. Welfare initiatives that were intended to be equalizing have instead meant social isolation for the descendants of immigrants. As more and more North Africans moved into housing projects in the late 1970s, native French families moved out, creating

---

581 Ulrich, Maurice. “Citoyens, et Vous?” *l’Humanité*, December 12, 2003. In 1981, in response to a summer of brutal police violence, young people from immigrant families mobilized to assert their right to live freely in France as French citizens. This movement, which took on a number of political and cultural forms, incorporated both pride in particular North African cultures as well as a desire to integrate into French society. Its participants’ identity became a hotly contested issue. Some in France were eager to embrace the cultural plurality that movement leaders touted, while others saw them only as Arab youths making trouble. The issue was complicated in France by a troubled colonial past and an officially color-blind state.

582 See Herman Lebovics, *Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Marine Le Pen has taken up her father’s cause of protecting the ‘true’ France—and French jobs—from invasion by immigrants and is running as the FN’s candidate for the 2012 French presidential elections. On March 6, 2012 by President Nicholas Sarkozy (whose father immigrated from Hungary) claimed in an interview on France 2 that there are “too many foreigners in France” and, in an attempt to win voters from the FN, vowed to reduce the number of immigrants allowed into France from 200,000 to 100,000 per year.
neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrant families. Azouz Begag, who grew up in the housing project La Duchère outside of Lyon and was, until April 2007, Minister for Equal Opportunities in Villepin’s cabinet, has described how he and other North Africans of his generation were “corralled in housing projects that came to resemble Indian reservations.”

Few efforts have been made to improve or modernize these buildings, many of which were crumbling by the 1980s. A lack of public transportation connecting outlying banlieues to city centers has further isolated such communities. In 2005, for example, unemployment in the banlieues of Paris was double and sometimes triple the 10 percent national average.

Today, familiar debates surrounding the ‘Algerian problem’ have been recast as the ‘immigrant problem’ or, often, the ‘Muslim problem.’ The 1989 ‘Affaire du foulard,’ in which three girls were expelled from a school in Creil for wearing the headscarf sparked debate about French Muslims’ commitment to the values of the secular republic. September 11th and the ‘war on terror’ that followed magnified fears of violence erupting in Muslim communities, and has since led to increased islamophobia and a “de facto militarization of the housing projects.”

---

583 See, for example, Paul Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) 14. Silverstein explains that French efforts to eliminate Algerian ethnic, racial, and religious differences have, instead, always resulted in their elaboration because they have concentrated Algerian populations in isolated housing projects away from French city centers.


586 In 2003, a government commission, led by Bernard Stasi, ruled that wearing the Muslim headscarf was contrary to the French principle of laïcité, and forbade students wearing “ostentatious signs of religion” at school. The commission cited the possibility of Islam subverting personal freedoms as a justification for the banning of the wearing of the Muslim headscarf in public schools. For a more detailed examination of Islam in modern France and an explanation of why Muslim girls wears the headscarf, in their own words, see Trica Danielle Keaton, *Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

587 Paul Silverstein and Chantal Tetreault, “Urban Violence in France.” *Middle East Report (MERIP)* Online: November 2005, 4. Michel Wieviorka has asserted that the problem is worsened because “In the poor neighbourhoods, imams are now sometimes the only actors, and at the same time, Muslims have to
Unemployment, social isolation, and renewed racism have led to feelings of political powerlessness among residents of the cités. In October, 2005, rioting broke out in Clichy-sous-Bois, a poor suburb to the east of Paris and soon spread throughout France following the deaths of two teenagers who were electrocuted after they hid in a power substation, believing that they were being chased by the police. When, after ten days, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin announced a “state of emergency” and to implement a curfew, he was making use of a 1955 law originally designed to curb support for the FLN. For many observers, the by-then familiar scenes of angry youth of immigrant origins—North Africa but also more recent immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa—lighting cars on fire in front of decrepit HLM towers were dramatic proof that Jacques Ghys’s dream of “harmonious and progressive insertion” had failed. As during the Algerian War, some French leaders, such as President Sarkozy, speak of economic and social problems such as poverty, isolation, and unemployment in terms of immigrants’ failure to assimilate into a single French culture and a single French national identity that they presume exists. Thus, perceptions of the “handicap” to entry into the French nation on which administrators based the social welfare scheme implemented at the height of the Algeria War persist to this day. But unlike French leaders during the Algerian War, those on the right of the political spectrum today do not tend to see welfare reforms as the solution.

During the Algerian War, French administrators looked to the social action sphere to combat the growing influence of the French Federation of the Algerian National Liberation Front. Drawing on techniques of population control developed in the colonies as well as on face a strong islamophobia, rooted in a long history where the French stopped the Arabs in Poitiers in 732, had a crucial role in the Crusades, then colonized North Africa, etc.” See Wieviorka, “Violence in France.”

588 Wieviorka, “Violence in France.”

decades of experience at culturally assimilating both immigrants and rural populations in the hexagon, the governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics sought to hold on to political control of Algeria by shaping the hearts and minds of Algeria migrants. Their quest resulted in a massive investment into social services for migrants, and state and local actors worked together to provide housing, employment, and education that, at their best, brought Algerian families closer into French society and alleviated, at least in a limited way, the poverty that plagued the migrant community. It also brought out the worst excesses of the French pursuit of cultural assimilation and its use as a marker of national loyalty. With political control of Algeria and, thus, French global power line, state and local aid providers integrated surveillance techniques and political propaganda into their services, blurring the line between welfare and counterinsurgency. In Paris, the Prefecture of Police used the promise of social action as a front for surveillance and arrests, inflicting nightly raids and a climate of fear on already impoverished communities. Yet the Algerian War was also a unique moment in history when, for a variety of reasons both political and humanitarian, public and private organizations pursued the social, political, and cultural integration of a colonized people—a test, if failed, of opening the borders of French citizenship across the Mediterranea.
Bibliography

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Archives nationales: Centre d'accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales (CARAN), Paris
Series F1a, Archives of the Ministry of the Interior
5010, 5014, 5045, 5055, 5056, 5057, 5105, 5106, 5107, 5109, 5111, 5112

Archives nationales: Centre des archives contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau
19770317, Article 1
19770391, Articles 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9
19770455, Article 39
19860269, Article 3
19860271, Articles 2, 3, and 4

SECONDARY SOURCES


