Selling Sacred Cities: Tourism, Region, and Nation in Cusco, Peru

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_Selling Sacred Cities: Tourism, Region, and Nation in Cusco, Peru_

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It is hard to imagine a more iconic representation of Peru than the Inca archeological complex of Machu Picchu located in the Cusco region. However, when US explorer, Hiram Bingham, announced that he had discovered the “lost city” in 1911, few would have predicted Machu Picchu’s rise to fame during the twentieth century. My dissertation traces the unlikely transformation of Machu Picchu into its present-day role as a modern tourism destination and a representation of Peruvian national identity.

Beginning in the 1920s, cusqueño elites embraced the discourse of tourism to re-imagine their region’s indigenous heritage not as a sign of backwardness, but as a modern attraction for cultured travelers. Aligning with transnational diplomatic and cultural institutions in the 1930s and 1940s to promote tourism, locals elevated Machu Picchu and cusqueño folklore as symbols of Peru to the world. After the Second World War, locals continued to lobby the state to invest in tourism using recovery efforts following a 1950 earthquake to promote tourism. Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s the Peruvian state, in coordination with UNESCO, spent heavily on
developing tourism. Yet, state-led tourism failed to bring economic prosperity to Cusco. Rather than attract elite travelers it encouraged the arrival of hippies and backpackers to the chagrin of locals. Tourism in Cusco nearly collapsed in the 1980s under the pressures of debt crises and political violence. Out of this chaos emerged grassroots and adventure tourism that, by the 1990s, became a widely successful economic model. Recently, however, outside investors and corporations have displaced local participation in the tourism economy. Now, control over the profits and politics of tourism has emerged as a central source of conflict in Cusco.

Examining the development of tourism in Cusco, my dissertation reveals how transnational forces can alter the relationship between region and nation in Latin America. Thanks to transnational actors involved in promoting tourism in Cusco, Machu Picchu now serves as a global representation of Peru. However, if tourism has the power to elevate a region’s culture and identity, cusqueños also discovered its destructive ability to erode local political and economic independence.
Dedicated to my parents, Anna Marie Rice and Charles Rice
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<tr>
<td>ANEA</td>
<td>Asociación Nacional de Escritores y Artistas, National Association of Writers and Artists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANATUR</td>
<td>Cámara Nacional del Turismo del Perú, National Tourism Chamber of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCPT</td>
<td>Comité Central de Propaganda Turístico, Central Tourism Propaganda Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAA</td>
<td>Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Corporación Nacional del Turismo, National Tourism Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPESCO</td>
<td>Plan Turístico y Cultural Perú-UNESCO, Peru-UNESCO Tourist and Cultural Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPAC</td>
<td>Corporación Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviación Comercial, Peruvian Corporation of Commercial Airports and Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTURPERU</td>
<td>Corporación de Turismo del Perú, Peruvian Tourism Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRYF</td>
<td>Corporación de Reconstrucción y Fomento de Cuzco, Cusco Reconstruction and Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGTUR</td>
<td>Dirección General del Turismo, General Office of Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTURPERU</td>
<td>Empresa Nacional del Turismo, National Tourism Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOPTUR</td>
<td>Fondo de Promocion Turística, Tourism Promotion Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPNA</td>
<td>Instituto Cultural Peruano-Norteamericano, Peruvian-North American Cultural Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Cultura, National Institute of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRENA</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales, National Institute of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICTI</td>
<td>Ministerio de Industria, Comercio, Turismo, e Integración, Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism, and Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINCETUR</td>
<td>Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo, Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIAA</td>
<td>Office of Inter-American Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Touring y Automovil Club del Peru, Touring and Automobile Club of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAAC</td>
<td>Universidad Nacional San Antonio del Abad del Cusco</td>
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Introduction

Speaking at a National Geographic Society gala in 1913, Hiram Bingham III, the explorer celebrated for uncovering the famed “lost city” of the Andes less than two years earlier, confessed that Machu Picchu, “is an awful name, but it is well worth remembering.”¹ For over a century, it appears that writers and travelers have followed Bingham’s advice. Since Bingham first arrived at Machu Picchu in 1911, the now-iconic ruin has featured prominently in thousands of publications as diverse as serious scholarly inquiries, poetry, travel posters, and coffee table books. In addition to its literary inspiration, Machu Picchu serves as the focus of a burgeoning tourism economy centered on the Cusco region of Peru. Nearly 1.2 million visitors arrived at Machu Picchu in 2013, the primary attraction of a national tourism industry that is estimated to contribute roughly US $1.5 billion annually to the Peruvian economy.² Both of these factors have contributed to perhaps Machu Picchu’s most important contemporary role: a nearly singular and iconic representation of Peru.

Barrels of ink have been dedicated to Machu Picchu.³ Most publications on Machu Picchu fall into two general categories. The first set examines the site’s pre-Colombian past. The second, much larger, category includes diverse publications directed at interested travelers and casual readers that showcase the site’s present-day beauty, appeal, and ecological setting.

³ For example see, Fondo de Promoción de las Áreas Naturales Protegidas del Perú, Recopilación bibliográfica del Santuario Histórico Machu Picchu, (Lima: Profonanpe, 2000). The bibliography, now 14 years old, lists roughly 1,140 scholarly publications on Machu Picchu. The bibliography excludes the more extensive uses of Machu Picchu in guides, propaganda, and commercial publications.
Overlooked, however, is the historical gap between Machu Picchu’s archeological past and the contemporary global fascination with the site. Machu Picchu’s omnipotence in popular and professional consensuses that declare it the most important historical site in Peru hides its unlikely rise to prominence. When Bingham first announced his discovery of Machu Picchu in 1911, few Peruvians paid much attention to the site for decades. Bingham’s disparaging comments regarding Machu Picchu’s “awful name” suggest that even he may have doubted the economic and cultural potential of the site. This dissertation argues that, far from being predestined, Machu Picchu’s transformation from an unknown ruin into a global travel destination and national icon followed a long historical path with many turns and, at times, dead ends. Examining the rise of Machu Picchu and Cusco’s tourism economy reveals that Bingham’s travels formed a small part of a fascinating historical narrative played out on local, national, and global stages.

However, the modern history of Machu Picchu is more than an engaging narrative. This dissertation argues that it is impossible to understand the political realities of contemporary Cusco and the powerful symbolism of Machu Picchu without accounting for the historical factors that facilitated the growth of tourism in Peru’s southern Andes. Much like the story of Machu Picchu’s rise, the development of tourism in Cusco did not follow a predictable model over the course of the twentieth century. The present-day tourism economy of Cusco is dominated by private capital, most of it centered in Lima or abroad, that markets the region as a site for adventure and indigeneity. Yet, this is a far cry from the original vision of cusqueño elites who viewed tourism as a cultural tool to consolidate indigenista folklore and assert their region’s modernity. Present day travel to Cusco is also starkly different from mid-twentieth century projects that envisioned tourism as a state-led enterprise for social development. However, if
efforts to bring travelers to Cusco have changed over time, the achievements and goals of one era have influenced, often unpredictably, tourism efforts of another. Far from following a set model of development, Cusco’s tourism economy has formed from the grafting of successive visions of development and culture over time. Peeling back these layers permits a broader understanding of the contemporary conflicts defining tourism and cultural patrimony in Cusco.

The unpredictable course of Cusco’s tourist economy reflects another research question explored in this dissertation; the role that tourism has played in leading the national state to embrace Machu Picchu and the indigenous culture it represents. A primary reason few predicted Machu Picchu would become a travel destination stemmed from the fact that national leaders of Peru’s Aristocratic Republic at the start of the twentieth century saw little political, economic, and cultural possibilities in their nation’s Andean regions. I argue that Machu Picchu’s transformation into a site for international travel altered Lima-based notions about the role of indigenous culture in debates over national identity. As regional efforts to attract international interest in Cusco’s archeological heritage proved fruitful, the national state became more willing to embrace Machu Picchu and signs of cusqueño folklore. In many ways, the outside gaze of the tourist and traveler has transformed Machu Picchu into what Mary Louise Pratt has theorized as a “transnational contact zone,” where global and local notions of cusqueño regional folklore and history have intersected to elevate it as a national representation of Peru. However, the process of transculturation also mandates a mutual, if unequal, cultural borrowing.

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tourism has popularized Cusco’s heritage, it has also forced cusqueños to create and alter narratives that are appealing to global markets and travelers.

The connection between tourism development and indigenous nationalism in Peru raises an additional final question regarding the intertwined nature between nationalism and transnationalism. Following the lead of Benedict Anderson, historians have often credited the emergence of imagined national communities with the development of domestic political or market forces. As a result, historians have cited the inability of the postcolonial Peruvian state to construct inclusive political and cultural institutions as a key factor in limiting nationalism. However, other historians have argued that in Latin America, transnational forces and contact zones can prove equally influential in the construction of state nationalism. I argue that the close relationship between the growth of tourism and indigenous-influenced nationalism in Peru lends further proof of the ability for transnational forces to bypass or shortcut domestic obstacles in the creation of national identity. If Peruvians have sought to create new inclusive communities by going, according to Alberto Flores Galindo, “in search of an Inca,” perhaps it is time we also lent attention to the influence of tourists who arrived at Machu Picchu with the same goal.

**Scholarly Contribution**

In addition to the larger questions at the heart of this investigation, my dissertation also expands upon scholarly fields related to tourism, culture, and development. Before diving into

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9 See, Claudio Lomnitz, *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism*, (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2001, 125-144.
tourism, however, it is worth reviewing archeological studies on Machu Picchu itself. Archeologists still remain divided over the economic and political role the city played in Incan history. The site lies roughly 80 kilometers northwest of Cusco City in the ceja de selva highland jungle located between Peru’s Andean altiplano and Amazon basin. The archeological complex sits high above a horseshoe-shaped bend of the Urubamba River centered on a small plateau between two mountains: Huayna Picchu and the larger Machu Picchu from which the site’s name is derived. Most archeologists agree that the site was constructed in the middle of the 15th century during a time when Tawantinsuyu, commonly referred to as the Inca Empire, rapidly expanded beyond its capital of Cusco. Even the original name of the city remains unknown.11 Machu Picchu, like many settlements in the area, became abandoned after the Spanish invasion of Cusco in 1533 and the retreat of the Inca leadership to Vilcambamba until its final defeat in 1572. The first theories proposed by Bingham bestowed Machu Picchu with an almost-mythic status as the origin of the Inca civilization, its last capital of Vilcambamba, and as a home for the Inca’s Virgins of the Sun.12 Over time, archeologists have uncovered evidence negating Bingham’s theories. Instead, others have argued that Machu Picchu served as a ceremonial center to honor Inca beliefs and the landscape of the Sacred Valley.13 A larger group of scholars have argued that Machu Picchu served as a royal hacienda constructed by Túpac Inca

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11 José Tamayo Herrera, El enigma de Machupicchu: Historia, arqueología estética, ecología y prospectiva del monumento artístico-arqueológico más importante del Perú, (Lima: n. p., 2011), 40-41. Tamayo Herrera theorizes that the site was called Willkallaqta.
Yupanqui to serve either as a retreat or regional administrative center. This dissertation will not engage much with debates over the archeological past of Machu Picchu. However, it will contribute to scholarship examining the role tourism has played in determining policies of preservation and cultural management in Cusco.

More central to this dissertation’s topic is its contribution to scholarly works on tourism. Sociologists led some of the first critical scholarly inquiries into tourism beginning in the 1970s. Led by Dean MacCannell, scholars employed the phenomenon of international travel to question notions of identity and authenticity in the postmodern world. Successive scholarly work on tourism, most prominently the work of John Urry, also focused on how the experience of travel cast light on questions of vision and power. Soon, anthropologists also began to examine both the cultural and social effects of tourism on local communities. Cultural theorists have also integrated the study of tourism and travel into their field. Tourism as a source for serious scholarly study has attracted the attention of Latin Americanist scholars, especially anthropologists. Considering the growing influence of tourism economies throughout the region, it is of no surprise that scholars have examined the effects of international travel on social change, sexuality, ecology, and cultural change in Latin America. The Andean region has also

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17 See the most recent publication of this by, John Urry and Jonas Larsen, *The Tourist Gaze 3.0*, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011).


provided rich ethnographic case studies on the local effects of tourism.\textsuperscript{21} However, these studies overwhelmingly focus on the contemporary social effects of tourism. This study hopes to compliment ethnographic research on tourism in the Andes with a deeper historical perspective.

Already, historians have critically examined the rise of tourism in Latin America. Considering the early emergence of tourism in these areas, Cuba, Mexico, and destinations in the Caribbean have attracted the bulk of many excellent historical studies on tourism in the region.\textsuperscript{22}

The historical development of tourism in the Andes, on the other hand, has received little attention from scholars. In addition, historical studies on tourism in Latin America have analyzed its growth through the lens of the nation state. This is largely due to the fact that, in many Latin American republics like Mexico and Cuba, tourism did in fact emerge as national cultural or political project. Although centered on national tourism projects, these studies have not ignored transnational factors, particularly the growing economic and political influence represented by the United States. However, little scholarly work has analyzed the historical development and influence of tourism and transnationalism on a regional level. Historians of travel and tourism in the United States have argued for its importance in influencing regional


identity, politics, and economics. Employing the regional lens, this dissertation examines the ability of tourism to influence the relationship between region and nation in Latin America.

Fortunately, Cusco’s regional history has long attracted scholarly interest. One key question for historical investigation in Cusco includes the formation of regional politics and identity following independence. Historians and historical anthropologists have investigated the burst of regional indigenismo and folkloric projects in Cusco during the first half of the twentieth century. Cusco has also proved to be a case study for analyzing the challenges of political change and development in Perú’s Andes in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century. Although some of these investigations have mentioned the influence of tourism in Cusco, until now, no comprehensive study of its historical development exists. Related to Cusco’s regional history are the many studies of Bingham’s expeditions and exploits in the region. These studies range from biographies, exposés on Bingham’s illegal trade of artifacts, and analyses of the influence of the imperial gaze represented by the North American explorer.

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However, as this dissertation will illustrate, Bingham’s arrival in 1911 could hardly predict the tourism economy that has emerged a century later in Cusco.

**Organization**

This dissertation is organized into five chapters organized in a general chronological sequence spanning the twentieth century. The narrative of each chapter is centered on a primary historical trend or moment of change that most determined the development of Cusco’s tourism economy. Chapter one traces the early roots of Cusco’s tourism in the first three decades of the twentieth century. In particular, the chapter argues that the local embrace of tourism proved equally, if not more influential, in starting Cusco’s rise as a global travel destination than Bingham’s announced discovery of Machu Picchu in 1911.

Although isolated and underdeveloped since the late colonial era, Cusco remained a destination for travelers. However, nearly all of the early travel accounts emphasized Cusco’s society, historical structures, and indigenous population to cast the region as a backward and exotic place. Such characterizations bolstered and reflected the dominant thinking of the political and intellectual leaders of Peru’s Aristocratic Republic. According to Lima-based observers, indigenous regions like Cusco represented obstacles for Peru’s modernization and instead encouraged a national identity that emphasized development on the coast and mestizo nationalism. Like many early travelers, Bingham arrived in Cusco in 1909 to document the region to satisfying an increasingly imperial gaze of the United States as well as his hopes for scholarly and political fame. Returning to Cusco in 1911, Bingham announced his discovery of a famed “lost city” named Machu Picchu drawing international interest to Cusco once more.

Although Bingham touted his discovery as evidence of his individualism and courage, his expeditions depended heavily on the support of cusqueños. The importance of local support became evident as Machu Picchu descended once more into obscurity following Bingham’s unceremonial departure from Cusco under charges of theft. However, I argue that, while Machu Picchu receded from prominence, Cusco’s elite embraced the goal of promoting their region as a tourist destination. Unlike earlier travel narratives, the language of tourism allowed cusqueños to re-imagine Cusco’s indigeneity not as a sign of backwardness, but as attractions for modern, cultured travelers. Most of the early tourism promotion efforts were closely related to the surge of Cusco’s indigenismo movement that employed regional folklore and indigenous culture in a modernizing discourse. These efforts culminated in the 1934 commemoration of four centuries since the establishment of Spanish rule in the city. Promoters used travel guides and events to buttress indigenismo narratives and forge regional folklore. However, the chapter also highlights how early tourism promotion remained an elite cultural project employed against political challenges to their authority. The most serious threats to regional elite power emerged from above in form of the centralizing Patria Nueva politics of President Augusto Leguía between 1919 and 1930, and from below in the form in serious grassroots agrarian rebellions that rocked the region throughout the 1920s. Thus, tourism served both to assert Cusco’s relevance in the Peruvian nation and regional elites’ political control.

Chapter two examines how the development of transnational networks of politics, culture, and economics helped elevate Cusco tourism from a regional to a national project. The cusqueño elite benefited from national and hemispheric political changes that permitted the tourism narrative crafted in the 1920s to expand beyond the southern Andes. The fall of the Leguía government in 1930 and the Trujillo uprising of 1932 left a vacuum for cusqueño
political and intellectual influence to rise to national prominence. Simultaneously, international interest in Andean culture grew thanks in large part to the Good Neighbor Diplomacy cultural policy promoted by the United States. Employing transnational diplomatic and cultural connections, sites and folkloric narratives crafted for regional tourism promotion gained legitimacy on a national and later hemispheric level. Increasingly, signs of Cusco’s regional folklore and history emerged as representations of Peru abroad. Machu Picchu and Cusco featured prominently in 1930s and 1940s film reels, exhibits, and popular imaginings of Peru as an Andean nation. By the end of the 1940s, during a brief period of democratic populism, tourism also began to represent a path for development as the national state, encouraged by the United States, invested in hotels, roads, and promotion efforts. Tourism in Cusco had begun to change from a cultural project of the regional elite to a development effort on the part of the national state.

However, if control over tourism began to slip from the hands of the cusqueño elite, the imagery of Machu Picchu and the Andes reflected their early 1920s indigenismo cultural projects that emphasized a utopian and idealized vision of the region’s Incan past. In addition, to market Machu Picchu to US consumers, diplomats and tourism promoters re-imagined the legacy of Bingham. Suddenly, the controversial explorer became lauded as a symbol of Pan-American cooperation and solidarity. In this era, Bingham’s false claims regarding his discovery of Machu Picchu were legitimized to attract tourism development. The chapter concludes noting that, despite the progress of the 1930s and 1940s, hopes for tourism development in Cusco remained weak. Relying on transnational actors, tourism promoters had established few alliances with the Peruvian national state. In addition, this policy exposed Cusco tourism to the political shifts of US foreign policy as it transitioned from Good Neighbor to Cold War warrior. The military
overthrow of Peru’s populist government in 1948 and the subsequent withdrawal of state funding of tourist projects illustrated the limited political reach of tourism promoters.

Chapter three begins during a particularly challenging era for Cusco tourism. As the Peruvian state withdrew from promoting tourism in the region, cusqueños received another shock in 1950 when a large earthquake destroyed much of the city center. However, locals and tourism interests recognized that the earthquake also marked a moment of opportunity. Cusqueños used the funds allocated for earthquake reconstruction to compensate for the withdrawal of the state from tourism and preservation efforts in the region. Simultaneously, worries about the structural integrity of Machu Picchu due to a lack of preservation also helped cusqueños lobby the central state for funding to renovate the monument to receive tourists. The use of what Mark Carey has termed, “disaster economics,” permitted Cusco’s tourism economy to survive and even modernize at a time when the national state had little interest in investment in the region.28 The chapter also documents the unforeseen negative effects of tourism development policies following the 1950 earthquake. Much to the surprise of locals, efforts to call national attention to the precarious state of Cusco’s historical sites often backfired when the Lima press used the poor conditions at Machu Picchu as further evidence of the region’s provincialism and backwardness. More seriously, the consensus to rebuild and modernize the region’s infrastructure and historical sites in anticipation for tourism led to questionable decisions regarding the management of reconstruction and preservation. Finally, the chapter highlights how the disaster economics of the 1950s, while benefitting the development of tourism, ultimately failed Cusco’s regional economy. Rather than fulfilling plans to use the earthquake recovery to modernize Cusco’s agrarian economy, promote industrialization, and

reform the region’s stratified political structures, local political leaders diverted funds to tourism promotion. As a result, the progress of tourism investment did little to prevent serious agrarian uprisings and revolts that broke out in Cusco by the end of the decade.

The collapse of Cusco’s agrarian economic and political base by the start of the 1960s sets the stage for the dissertation’s fourth chapter. Once again, the national and regional leaders endorsed state efforts to invest in Cusco’s tourism development. Beginning with the election of Fernando Belaúnde in 1963, the Peruvian national state took a leading role in tourism promotion and infrastructure investment in Cusco. Other factors, especially advances in aviation technology that placed Cusco within easy reach of international travelers, helped usher in Cusco’s first legitimate tourism boom by the late 1960s. These efforts expanded when the military government of General Juan Velasco took power in 1968. The national state, encouraged by UNESCO, sought to employ tourism along with agrarian reform as a tool to remake Cusco’s regional society as part of the Plan COPESCO. To spur development, the military focused on attracting elite international travelers through the financing and construction of modern hotel and tourist facilities. Cusqueños applauded these policies and viewed tourism as an opportunity for economic growth in the region in the wake of the agrarian reform.

However, the chapter also examines why the military government’s visions of developmental tourism ultimately failed to achieve economic progress or political consensus in Cusco. Contrary to the military government’s goals, concerns about the negative impact of tourism development, particularly proposals to construct a modernist hotel adjacent to Machu Picchu, provoked heated debates between cusqueños and preservationist interests based mainly in Lima. In addition, the military’s investment in tourism and its leftist political rhetoric invited the unexpected arrival of counter cultural and hippie backpackers instead of elite tourists. These
international visitors failed to spend money to support the tourism economy as envisioned by government planners and locals. Even worse, the arrival of counter cultural travelers raised local concerns regarding crime, immorality, and drug use. Like many other Velasco-era initiatives, the Plan COPESCO’s highly technical strategies and centralization limited opportunities for everyday cusqueños to benefit from tourism in the 1960s and 1970s. Any hope for the state-led development tourism model to succeed ended when the Velasco regime collapsed under mounting economic and political pressure in 1975. As the Peruvian state adopted austerity economics, tourism development in Cusco appeared as a failed attempt at top-down modernization. Yet, by eliminating the power of Cusco’s landed elite through agrarian reform and attracting new waves of international travelers, the Velasco regime had unwittingly laid a foundation for Cusco’s contemporary tourism economy.

Chapter five examines how Cusco’s wildly successful tourism economy emerged out of the failed experiment of state-led modernization. As Cusco entered the 1980s, tourism in the region faced increasingly grim realities. The Peruvian state, rocked by economic crises and debt, was forced to dramatically cut back its investment in tourism promotion. Efforts to encourage private investment in Cusco tourism failed as increasing political violence coordinated by the Shining Path scared away potential entrepreneurs and international travelers. By the start of the 1990s, tourism arrivals to Cusco bottomed out at levels unseen since the 1960s. However, the dreary state of tourism policy hid dynamic changes occurring on the grassroots level in Cusco. Local and expat entrepreneurs pioneered the development of hiking, backpacking, and adventure travel. Simultaneously, the national state used its limited resources to invest in the creation of nature preserves, trails, and the declaration of Machu Picchu as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
These activities supported grassroots efforts to reinvent Machu Picchu and Cusco as sites for tourists interested in history and adventure.

The government of Alberto Fujimori quickly seized the new imagery of adventure travel to Cusco as it sought to open Peru to international private investment. Under Fujimori’s economic reforms, the national state divested from tourism and privatized its hotel and rail facilities. Instead, the national state marketed Cusco as a source for international investment and worked to facilitate the entry of Lima and foreign-based capital into the regional tourism economy. In doing so, the state fully embraced Machu Picchu and Cusco as symbols of Peru. These efforts did help the rapid modernization of Cusco’s tourism economy. Within several years international arrivals to the region had increased tenfold. However, the new state policies provoked local anger from cusqueños who believed that the region’s tourism economy now excluded them from the most lucrative markets. In a reversal from the 1970s, by the end of the twentieth century, cusqueños often rallied against state-supported tourism development that they perceived as stratified, unequal, and as a threat to the region’s historical heritage and environment. After a century of growth, it appeared that tourism had transformed cusqueños into figurative owners of Peruvian national identity, but displaced their control over the region’s economic and political future.

Sources and style

A central argument of this dissertation asserts that tourism policy in Cusco has rarely remained under the control of a singular group or institution for any prolonged period of time. Additionally, the offices, ministries, and departments responsible for tourism development in Peru practiced particularly poor record keeping in a country infamous for inconsistent archival management. As a result, I have drawn from a wide range of archival, published, and non-
traditional sources to trace the history of tourism in Cusco. Some state-authored documents I cited originated from the files of the Ministerio de la Hacienda y Comercio (Ministry of Finance and Commerce) stored in the Archivo General de la Nación in Lima. However, the bulk of state-authored sources on tourism and preservation policy were found in offsite archives managed by the state ministries that have inherited these files. Files from the now-defunct Instituto Nacional de Cultura (National Institute of Culture, INC) are stored at the Ministerio de Cultura (Ministry of Culture) in Lima. The Ministry of Culture’s library also holds documents from the Plan COPESCO and some related tourism institutions. I located a large bulk of state tourism documents starting with Plan COPESCO and extending into the Fujimori government in the archive of the Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo (Ministry of External Commerce and Tourism, MINCETUR). Archives from several state institutions like the first Compañía Nacional del Turismo (National Tourism Company, CNT) remain lost. Fortunately, the publications and promotional materials of such institutions are found in the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. The national library’s newspaper holdings also proved to be especially useful in tracking tourism policy and political debates. Several other archives in Lima have also provided source material for this dissertation. The papers of Albert Giseceke and Jorge Muelle, two individuals who played important roles in preservation and tourism promotion in Cusco, are held in Lima’s Archivo Riva-Agüero. I also have cited archives of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of Peru held in the central library of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in Lima.

In Cusco, the collections held in the library of the Centro Bartolomé de las Casas contained publications and planning reports from various decades that aided my research. The municipal archives held in the Biblioteca Municipal del Cusco provided information on
preparations for the 1934 civic celebrations and early local tourism policy. State authored
documents used for this dissertation were also located at the Cusco office of the Plan COPESCO
and the Cusco seat of the Ministry of Culture. Cusqueño newspapers cited in the dissertation can
be located both in the collections of the Biblioteca Municipal del Cusco and the hemeroteca of
the Universidad San Antonio del Abad del Cusco (UNSAAC). Finally, several individuals who
participated in Cusco’s tourism economy offered interviews on their experiences and
observations. The dissertation is by no means an extensive oral history of Cusco tourism.
However, their observations helped cast important insight, especially in regards to grassroots
tourism endeavors.

Archives in the United States also aided my research. This dissertation draws from the
newspaper and periodical collections at the New York Public Library. Documents from the
United States government cited in this dissertation, especially those from the Good Neighbor
Era, can be located in Record Group 59 of the State Department and Record Group 229 of the
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, both located in the US National Archives in
College Park, Maryland. Bingham’s documents and correspondence are stored in the Yale
Peruvian Expedition Papers at Yale University’s Manuscripts and Archives Department.
Correspondence and reports on the earthquake recovery in Cusco are also held at Yale in the
George Alexander Kubler Papers.

On a final editorial note, the names of cities and archeological sites in Peru have often
changed over time. For clarity, I use the most common contemporary terms in the dissertation to
refer to the city and region of Cusco and archeological site of Machu Picchu (instead of other
historically-accepted spellings like Cuzco, Qosquo, Machupijchu, Machupicchu, or Machu-
Picchu). However, in direct quotes and cites, I have maintained the original spelling contained in
the source material. I follow the same policy with other names that use multiple spellings like Inca, Sacsayhuamán, Coricancha, Ollantaytambo, and others.
Chapter 1

Making the Modern Destination: The Roots of Cusco Tourism, 1900-1935

Returning from his first visit to Peru in 1909, Hiram Bingham reported: “Cuzco has, in fact, long been notorious as one of the dirtiest cities in America; and it justifies its reputation.”\(^1\) It appears strange that Bingham, whose exploration of Machu Picchu in 1911 is widely credited for establishing Cusco’s tourism economy, introduced the region to North American readers in such disparaging terms. However, as this chapter will show, Bingham echoed a common sentiment of Cusco held by Lima’s political and intellectual leaders at the height of Peru’s “Aristocratic Republic” in the first decades of the twentieth century.\(^2\) In fact, for many Peruvians and foreign travelers, Cusco and its indigenous heritage served as a representation of an Andean society incompatible with the modern world. Contrary to the biases of Lima’s elites, the challenge of modernization did form a central concern in the minds of many regional political leaders and intellectuals of Peru’s Andes. Many of Cusco’s leaders embraced the indigenismo movement that asserted the centrality of indigenous culture in Peruvian nationalism. Others argued for Cusco’s inherent compatibility within a modernizing Peru.\(^3\)

This chapter traces how early efforts at tourism promotion in Cusco played a central role in regional concerns over modernity. I argue that local elites and indigenista thinkers embraced tourism because it allowed them to recast Cusco’s Indian heritage as compatible with the modern world. This chapter illustrates how, long before tourism became a question of economic development in Cusco, it gained popularity because locals embraced the language of modern

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travel to assert their region’s importance to the nation. Scholars have noted that local support can be as important as financial and geographic factors in determining the initial success of tourism development. The case of Cusco’s early support for tourism follows this pattern. As we will see, the initial failure of Machu Picchu to become a notable travel destination following Bingham’s expeditions illustrates the importance of local political support for tourism. Although the amount of international tourists arriving in Cusco for the first three decades of the twentieth century remained nearly non-existent, the era proved important for building local political and cultural support for future tourism development.

However, Cusco was not the only Latin American example to use its cultural heritage and appeal to tourists to define regional heritage. The uniqueness of Cusco’s early experience with tourism stems from the inherently transnational character of Cusco’s efforts to promote travel. First, early tourism promotion in Cusco often relied on transnational actors who served as interlocutors between Cusco and the world. More importantly, Cusco defined itself as a potential tourist destination based on the region’s appeal beyond the national frontier of Peru. In fact, Cusco’s legitimacy as the true representation of Peruvian national identity stemmed largely from its claims to attract the interest of international travelers. The outsized influence of transnational forces in promoting Cusco’s regional identity in Peru in the first decades of the twentieth century began a process that defined the narrative of tourism in the Andes.

Finding and Forgetting Machu Picchu

Although Bingham depicted Cusco as a backward city in his 1909 accounts, the first decades of the twentieth century were marked by economic and social change for Peru’s southern Andes. A few months before Bingham arrived in Cusco, the city celebrated the arrival

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of the Southern Peruvian Railway on September 13, 1908. The inauguration of the railroad marked a major turning point in the integration of Cusco into the global economy. In the early colonial era, Cusco boasted a dynamic agricultural and textile economy based on regional consumption and export to Potosí, Arequipa, and Lima. However, the Bourbon Reforms of the eighteenth century, violent Túpac Amaru II Rebellion, and Independence Wars destroyed much of Cusco’s economic infrastructure and trade. Continued fighting in the chaotic years following independence and the collapse of the colonial textile economy in the mid-nineteenth century left the Cusco region depopulated and isolated. Railroad promoters and large hacienda owners pressed for the new railway to link Cusco with Puno, Arequipa, and the port of Mollendo. Small landowners, peasants, and laborers correctly feared that the railroad would only further damage their economic conditions by aiding the hacendados’ exports while flooding the local economy with cheap manufactured imports and textiles. Still, the arrival of the railroad marked a major shift in Cusco’s regional development.

In addition to looking to the Pacific, Cusco’s elites also expressed interest in expanding rail and economic links into the region’s interior valleys. Starting in 1880s, rising global demand for rubber and other tropically-grown commodities motivated Cusco’s economic elite to explore

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7 Cusco’s colonial economy was based on the production of grain, foodstuffs, sugar, coca, livestock, and textiles. Numerous scholars cite economic pressures created by the Bourbon Reforms as a key cause of the Túpac Amaru revolt. See, Ward Stavig, *The World of Túpac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 207-36; and, Escandell-Tur, *Producción y comercio de tejidos coloniales*, 253-317.

8 Tamayo Herrera, *Historia regional del Cuzco republicano*, 27-43. Tamayo estimates that from the Túpac Amaru II revolt and 1900, the city of Cusco’s population had decreased by 65%. Cusco’s underdevelopment did not signify inactivity. Walker, *Smoldering Ashes*, illustrates how the early nineteenth century was an era of expanded political participation in Cusco.

9 Tamayo Herrera, *Historia regional del Cuzco republicano*, 95-102; Réñique, *Los sueños de la sierra*, 31-42. One of the first studies evaluating the effect on the railroad was completed by Luis E. Valcárcel and titled, “La cuestión agrarian en el Cusco,” in *Revista Universitaria*, 9 (June, 1914): 16-38. Valcárcel found that the railroad decreased prices and hurt local agricultural and manufacturing economies.
the humid valleys north and east of the city of Cusco. These valleys, located in the ceja de selva climate, provided ideal conditions for the cultivation of rubber. Cusco’s elites, hoping to expand their investments beyond the underdeveloped altiplano hacienda production, believed their region’s future prosperity lay in exploiting land in these valleys. Elite and intellectual interest in the ceja de selva valleys near Cusco led to the creation of the Centro Científico del Cuzco (Cuzco Scientific Center) in 1897. Until its close in 1907, the Centro Científico published several geographic surveys of the Urubamba Valley area in the hopes of encouraging the construction of a new railway. The efforts of the scientific organization proved successful in 1910 when the Peruvian government approved the construction of a new railway that would connect Cusco with the fertile valley of La Convención by traveling through the Urubamba and Vilcanota Valleys. The path of the railroad would travel directly below the site of Machu Picchu. By 1900, significant clearing was completed in anticipation of the route. Thus, by 1911 the environs of Machu Picchu were not the uncharted wilderness described in Bingham’s accounts, but a key economic frontier of Cusco.

On the eve of Bingham’s arrival in Cusco, the region also experienced an era of tremendous intellectual change. New literary works began to challenge the dominant national discourse that disparaged regions like Cusco as part of the nation’s “mancha india” or Indian stain. Literary works sympathetic to the plight of Peru’s Indian population appeared as early as 1848 when Narciso Aréstegui published El Padre Horán. However, at the start of the

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11 José Luis Rénine, El Centro Científico del Cuzco, 1897-1907, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1980); Rénine, Los sueños de la sierra, 45-47; Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 93.

12 Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 100.

13 Kristal, The Andes Viewed From the City, 44-54.
twentieth century, interest in the condition and cultural background of Peru’s Indian population began to increase led by Lima writer Manuel González Prada. One of González Prada’s students, Cusco native Clorinda Matto de Turner authored what many literary critics believe is the first indigenista literary work, Aves sin nido in 1889. Although early indigenista works remained an urban-based movement, the works of González Prada and Matto de Turner raised intellectual awareness of Indian culture and history in Cusco.

These intellectual shifts also affected Cusco’s primary learning institution, the Universidad Nacional de San Antonio de Abad del Cusco (UNSAAC). The governing structure and curriculum of UNSAAC had remained largely unchanged since the colonial era. In May 1909, students of UNSAAC began a strike to call for a democratic university administration, a modern curriculum, and lowered tuition. A sector of Cusco’s elites, led by El Sol newspaper owner Angel Vega Enríquez backed the students. The national government and President Augusto Leguía conceded to the strikers’ demands. In 1910, Leguía appointed a young US educator from Philadelphia named Albert Giesecke to reform and modernize UNSAAC. To many people’s surprise, the new rector successfully won the approval of the student strike leaders, local elites, and educators. Giesecke’s tenure as rector of UNSAAC between 1910 and 1923 would lay the foundation for the development of cultural tourism in Cusco. First, the education reforms instituted by Giesecke at UNSAAC produced a generation of scholars and political leaders known as the “Generation of the sierra.” Gesiecke’s students – Luis E.

14 Ibid., 93-161.
15 The limited reach of early indigenismo is documented in: Kristal, The Andes Viewed From the City, 1-25; Mirko Lauer, Andes imaginarios: Discusiones del indigenismo 2, (Cusco: Centro de los Estudios Regionales Andinos, Bartolomé de las Casas, 1997); Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 70-75.
16 Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 116-122;
17 “The Reminincences of Albert A. Giesecke,” Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1963, 31-32. Giesecke completed his studies first at the University of Pennsylvania and also completed graduate studies at Cornell University. The Peruvian ambassador to the US asked Leo Rowe, Giesecke’s advisor at the University of Pennsylvania, to recommend a candidate. Giesecke arrived in Lima in 1909 and in Cusco in 1910. At the age of his appointment he was 27.
Valcárcel, José Uriel García, and Francisco Tamayo – would play a central role in promoting folklore, indigenismo, and archeological studies of Cusco in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{18} Second, Giesecke’s familiarity with North American learning and political institutions guaranteed that UNSAAC and Cusco could establish critical links beyond Peru.

Giesecke’s connections with the United States helped link Bingham with Machu Picchu. Giesecke, eager to foment cooperation between UNSAAC and US academic institutions, aided Bingham during his expeditions in Peru. Bingham returned to Cusco in 1911 on an expedition to locate Vilcabamba, the last refuge of Inca resistance that fell in 1572 when the empire’s final leader, Tupac Amaru, surrendered to Spanish forces. Through research in the United States and Lima, Bingham knew that the unmapped Vilcabamba lay in the ceja de selva jungle climate in Cusco’s northwestern valleys. With Giesecke’s help, Bingham talked to hacendados, regional authorities, and UNSAAC students to learn more about potential Inca sites in the valleys of the Urubamba and Vilcanota rivers.\textsuperscript{19} Giesecke, along with numerous local prefects and small landowners, suggested to Bingham that he inspect a ruin that lay between the twin peaks of Huayna Picchu and Machu Picchu.\textsuperscript{20} In fact, evidence of Inca ruins at Machu Picchu dated back to the 1860s.\textsuperscript{21} Traveling down the Urubamba River valley proved relatively easy considering most of the route was cleared in anticipation of road and rail projects. Arriving at the base of Huayna Picchu, Bingham, a Peruvian military sergeant, and a local entrepreneur named Melchor

\textsuperscript{18} Tamayo Herrera, \textit{Historial regional del Cuzco republicano}, 123-26.
\textsuperscript{20} See an early account of local knowledge of Machu Picchu in, Biblioteca del Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, Cusco, (hereafter, CBC), José Gabriel Cosio, “Una excursion a Machupiccho,” \textit{Revista Universitaria} 1, no. 3 (December, 1912): 12. Giesecke recounted his experience in honor of the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Bingham’s first visit to Machu Picchu, Archivo Riva de Agüero, Lima, Collección Archivo Giesecke, (AG), AG-D-033, “50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Speech,” 2.
\textsuperscript{21} Researchers have extensively documented the existence of Machu Picchu and ruins at the site on geographical studies that predated Bingham’s 1911 expedition. Hugh Thomson, \textit{The White Rock: Exploration of the Inca Heartland}, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001); Mould de Pease, \textit{Machu Picchu y el código de ética de la sociedad de arqueología americana}.  

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Arteaga ascended to the ruin on July 24, 1911. Much to Bingham’s surprise upon arriving at the summit, he found three families living and cultivating crops adjacent to the ruin. The young son of one of the families, Pablito Richarte, guided Bingham through the ruins of Machu Picchu for several hours. Bingham’s constant claim to be the sole discoverer of the lost city of Machu Picchu proves tremendously false. Pablito Richarte, however, could at least claim the honor of being the first of many future tour guides at Machu Picchu.

Despite the fact that cusqueños had known of, and in some cases lived and worked by, Machu Picchu, Bingham returned to the United States as a celebratory figure. Bingham also proved to possess a savvy ability to channel public interest in his work through the use of interviews, photographs, and magazine publications. *National Geographic*’s April, 1913 edition featuring Bingham’s article on his exploits, titled, “In the Wonderland of Peru,” broke the magazine’s circulation records. Scholars have often cited Bingham’s production and North American consumption of his photographs and publications as a prime example of the increasing imperial gaze of the United States towards Latin America at the turn of the twentieth century. The fact that Machu Picchu entered the popular consciousness in an era of mass media aided global fascination in the topic. By the end of the decade of Bingham’s exhibitions, fiction publications with titles like *The Hidden City of the Andes* and *The City in the Clouds* appeared in bookshops. Even Gaston Leroux, author of the *Phantom of the Opera*, published a Machu Picchu-inspired novel titled, *The Bride of the Sun*. The *New York Times* captured public

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23 Hiram Bingham, “In the Wonderland of Peru,” *National Geographic Magazine* 24, no. 4, (April, 1913); for more information on the publication and reception see, Heaney, *Cradle of Gold*, 166.
fascination with Machu Picchu, labeling it, “the greatest archeological discovery of the age,” in a
June 15, 1913 article on Bingham’s expeditions. “Just now, when we thought there was
practically no portion of the earth’s surface still unknown,” observed the New York Times “when
the discovery of a single lake or mountain, or the charting of a remote strip of coast line was
enough to give a man fame as an explorer, one member of the daredevils’ explorer craft has
‘struck it rich,’”26 Peruvians also noted the new international attention on their country. Javier
Prado Ugarteche, a former prime minister and member of one of Peru’s most prominent political
families, thanked Bingham in an August, 1913 letter stating: “I owe you a thousand
congratulations for your work, and thanks, as a Peruvian for your labor of propaganda in favor of
my homeland.”27

Bingham continued to “strike it rich” securing funding for two additional expeditions to
Machu Picchu in 1912 and another spanning 1914 and 1915. However, as Bingham returned to
Cusco and Machu Picchu in search of greater fame and exploits, his ambition eventually collided
with growing awareness of national heritage. Since independence, Peru had legislation
protecting pre-Hispanic sites and artifacts. However, only at the start of the twentieth century
did Peru make more concerted efforts to protect its national history.28 Prior to his 1911 and 1912
expeditions, Bingham received broad permission from the national state to excavate at
archeological sites. Although policy often changed, Peru did place restrictions on Bingham’s
ability to export any artifacts. Violating the agreement, Bingham consistently sent artifacts from
Peru to Yale. Bingham also arranged illegal and undocumented exports of various pre-Hispanic

27 YPEP, Box 8, Folder 109, Javier Prado Ugarteche to Hiram Bingham, August 19, 1913.
28 For an overview of the development of Peruvian archeology and legal frameworks see, Ramiro Matos Mendieta,
Only during Bingham’s third expedition did his illegal activities provoke conflicts with locals led by Luis E. Valcárcel, the young indigenista and UNSAAC student. Valcárcel entered a formal legal accusation against Bingham’s failures to comply with preservation policy. Despite his blatant violations of the law, Bingham escaped prosecution. Outraged that Peruvians dared to scrutinize him and increasingly isolated as oversight of his expeditions became a local cause célèbre in Cusco, Bingham abruptly stopped his work and left Peru in August of 1915, but not before organizing several more illegal shipments of artifacts to Yale. Although few would have suspected it, Bingham would not return to Peru for another 33 years.  

Spurned by Peru, Bingham did manage to publish a comprehensive book on his 1911 expedition named *Inca Land*. Bingham’s volume gave broad political and geographical surveys of Peru as well as minutia of his expedition, but it contained surprisingly-little information on Machu Picchu. Bingham justified the decision by describing *Inca Land* as a first volume to be followed by a future book on Machu Picchu. Bingham wrote to the publishers on June 12, 1922 promising: “My next book, which I hope will be a companion volume to this, will deal very largely with the ruins of Machu Picchu and the things found there.” However, Bingham quickly became distracted by his growing political interests by enlisting as a commander in World War I and then successfully running for lieutenant governor, then governor of Connecticut. In 1924, Bingham won election to the US Senate where he effectively dropped

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29 For specific details on the agreements between Bingham and the Peruvian government for each expedition, as well as Bingham’s violations see, Heaney, *Cradle of Gold*, 75-77; 115-116; 127-130; 155-156; 165-166; 171-173.  
32 Hiram Bingham to F. H. Allen, June 12, 1922, YPEP, Box 17, Folder 292, 9886; Hiram Bingham to Ferris Greenslet, June 15, 1922, YPEP, Box 17, Folder 292, 9889; Bingham wrote to Grosvenor of the *National Geographic* that *Inca Land* would primarily deal with the 1911 expeditions and a second book would recount the 1912 and 1915 expeditions. See, Hiram Bingham to Gilbert Grosvenor, October 2, 1922, YPEP, Box 17, Folder 296, 9903.
his interest in Machu Picchu for the remainder of the decade. Many cusqueños were more than happy to forget Bingham. In 1926, UNSAAC rescinded an honorary degree it had granted Bingham. In a 1926 interview, Cusco-based archeologist José Gabriel Cosio stated: “I absolutely don’t lament the departure of Bingham…The Yale commission never worked for Peru; its activities in our country were reduced to exporting in total secrecy.” No archeological expeditions returned to the site until 1933 and travelers avoided Machu Picchu. When the British writer, Anthony Dell, traveled down the Urubamba Valley in 1925 he declined to visit the once-famous ruin. “The place is now overgrown with vegetation and is the haunt of poisonous snakes and spiders,” commented Dell. With the cultural and political ties that brought it to global prominence cut, Machu Picchu once again became a lost city in the popular consciousness.

**From Andean Backwater to Andean Mecca**

The decline of Machu Picchu’s global appeal weighed little on the minds of cusqueños in the 1920s. However, local elites did express concern regarding the influence of travel accounts that described their city and region. Bingham’s publications on Cusco followed a long tradition of travel writers who visited and recorded their experiences in Peru’s Andes. Unfortunately for the residents of Cusco, nearly all of these authors portrayed the city and region as exotic, backward, and incompatible with the modern world. E. G. Squire, a US commissioner who traveled extensively through Peru in 1863 and 1864, published a book on his experiences in 1877

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34 AG-0140, Hiram Bingham to Albert Giesecke, May 6, 1926.
37 Originally published in 1992, the seminal work that began to analyze the political and cultural legacy of travel chronicles of the Andes is, Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*; the legacy of colonial travel accounts is also discussed in, Deborah Poole, *Vision, Race, and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Image World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 58-84; post-independence impressions of the Andes are analyzed in, López Lenci, *El Cusco, paquarina moderna*, 36-79.
with the title: *Peru: Incidents of Travel and Exploration in the Land of the Incas*. Squire’s publications served as one of the first, widely-produced travel narratives on Peru. The publication also set a common tone for future travel accounts of Cusco. Squire observed that, “seven-eighths of the population of Cuzco are pure Indians, and knowledge of Quichua (sic) is almost absolutely necessary.” For the non-Indian population of Cusco, Squire offered little praise, “there is hardly anything that can be called society,” he concluded. Squire counted only two forms of recreation in Cusco: “religious processions and cockfighting.” The author concluded by noting: “Of the filthiness of Cuzco every visitor must have sickening recollections. It offends the eye as well as the nose.”

In Ollantaytambo in the Urubamba River Valley, Squire described its indigenous population as fundamentally incompatible with the modern world. Squire observed: “I must give them the credit of having followed my photographic boxes through the plaza with uncovered heads, kissing them devoutly, under the mistaken notion that they contained relics of the saints.” Squire regarded the non-Indians of the city of Cusco as equally ingenuous regarding their faith. Displaying feelings of Anglo-Saxon superiority common amongst US citizens in the nineteenth century, Squire attacked Cusco’s public Catholic rituals as evidence of its decadence. Squire recounted a funeral procession he had witnessed stating: “As they passed the various squalid homes in that quarter, the women rushed out with disheveled hair, and, huddling behind the bier, commenced the loudest and most extravagant wailings of which human organs are capable.”

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39 Ibid., 455.
40 Ibid., 460.
41 Ibid., 461.
42 Ibid., 505.
43 Ibid., 459.
Travel narratives of Cusco from the twentieth century described the region and its people in less-disparaging terms than Squire. However, one common theme in early twentieth century travel narratives of Cusco was comparing the area’s imagined Inca past with its apparent contemporary squalor. Writing on her trip to Cusco for *National Geographic* in 1908, Harriet Chalmers Adams praised the city as “America’s ancient Mecca,” while looking down upon it from the Inca fortress of Sacsayhuamán. However, she warned readers that the urban center, “rivals Constantinople in unpleasant odors – in fact, I believe Cuzco holds the world’s record.”44 Another travel writer, Annie Peck, offered readers an extensive description of the city’s incaic structures. Later, however, she juxtaposed the site against the current underdeveloped state of the city by commenting: “Yet how altered [it is] from the days of its glory!”45 Recounting his 1909 visit to Cusco for North American readers, Bingham also compared Cusco’s glorious past with its perceived present backwardness. “It is pathetic to see the filth and squalor that surround the walls of the magnificent old edifices,” observed Bingham. He continued, noting that, “the Incas were not a remarkably cleanly folk, and it is as well not to expect too many of the conveniences of the XX century when visited a metropolis of the XV.”46 Bingham’s comments echoed the sentiments of many visitors that Cusco remained a city of the past.

When travel narratives of Cusco did note the city’s progress, authors often emphasized the challenges that faced the region as it modernized. Peck wrote of the recent arrival of the railroad to Cusco as one sign of progress for the city. However, she commented that, “the hotels alas! (sic) leave much to be desired. Slow, indeed, are the people to realize the necessities which must (sic) be supplied if the town is to advance, to attract tourists and business men.” According

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46 Bingham, “Cuzco and Sacsahauman,” 234.
to Peck, only one of the city’s lodging establishments, the Hotel Comercio, “may be endured for a night or two.”

In her 1908 travel account, Marie Robinson Wright praised that, “Cuzco has made notable progress within the past few years and is constantly improving in social and economic development.” However, Robinson Wright noted that, “the modern city must pay the penalty of past fame by a harder struggle for present recognition than new cities have to experience.”

Robinson Wright argued: “the change from old to new conditions in Peru is a transition in which the Indian has had little share; not because he is prevented but because of his disinclination to learn new ways and his lack of capacity to receive and apply modern knowledge.”

In Inca Land, published in 1922, Bingham offered praise for Cusco’s modernization. “Telephones, electric lights, street cars, and the ‘movies’ have come to stay,” noted Bingham. Yet, when describing Indians gathered at the Cusco’s market, Bingham painted the scene for his readers as, “a never-ending source of entertainment to one who is fond of the picturesque and interested in strange mannerisms and customs.”

Even if Cusco has slowly begun to modernize, according to international travelers its people and culture remained exotic and strange to the outsider.

It is difficult to know if cusqueños obsessed about foreigners’ observations on their region. Of more concern to cusqueño elites and intellectuals was how foreign travel narratives mirrored and legitimized existing Lima-based notions regarding Cusco’s backwardness. Despite Cusco’s modernization since the final decades of the nineteenth century, most limeños regarded the region as part of Peru’s mancha india that hindered the nation’s progress. Many national leaders openly questioned if Cusco, or any of Peru’s Andean regions, had a role in a country that

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47 Peck, The South American Tour, 112.
49 Robison Wright, The Old and the New Peru, 453.
50 Bingham, Inca Land, 157-158.
increasingly concentrated its economic and political activity on the Pacific coast.\(^{51}\) Peruvian-authored travel accounts of Cusco proved equally, or perhaps, more critical of the region’s perceived backwardness. Hildebrando Fuentes, a former prefect for Cusco, published a detailed guide to the region in 1905. When describing a typical Indian inhabitant of Cusco, Fuentes remarked: “In arts and professions he is an imitator, and has the ability to learn; but he does not invent: he does not have creative genius.” Fuentes continued stating that, “I don’t believe he is opposed to civilization – as one generally thinks – but yes, he is late to accommodate himself to it.”\(^{52}\) Most concerning to cusqueños was the travel account written by the limeño intellectual José de la Riva Aguero, now known as Paisajes Peruanos. Observing Cusco during his 1912 visit to Peru’s Andean regions, Riva Aguero presented a consensus held by many limeño intellectuals. “The coast has represented innovation, swiftness, joy, and pleasure,” noted Riva-Aguero, “the highlands, have symbolized an almost backward conservatism, a seriousness that approaches sadness, a discipline that approximates servility and an endurance leading virtually to torpidness.” Using these observations, Riva Aguero argued in favor of the supremacy of Lima and a pro-mestizo nationalism that would slowly absorb and eliminate Peru’s mancha india.\(^{53}\)

Returning to power in 1919, President Augusto Leguía implemented an extensive highway construction campaign in Peru. However, even as Leguía’s plans promised to bring increased travel to Cusco, the Lima-centric press continued to depict the Andes as anti-modern. The cover of the February, 1927 edition of the Lima travel magazine Ciudad y Campo y


\(^{52}\) Hildebrando Fuentes, El Cuzco y sus ruinas, (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1905), 186-187.

\(^{53}\) José de la Riva-Aguero, Paisajes Peruanos, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, 1995), 225.
Caminos best depicted the imagined contrast between Peru’s automobile-oriented modernization with the perceived backwardness of the nation’s Indian past. The illustration showed a well-to-do family’s auto having to navigate between Indian peasants, llamas, and rural geography (Figure 1.1).\(^{54}\) Even when reports emerged of new travel reaching Cusco, Lima’s press portrayed modernization as opposed to the traditional character of the Andean city. Documenting infrastructure improvements taking place in July of 1927, Ciudad y Campo y Caminos reminded readers that, “Cuzco is a city that slowly advances with the progress of time.”\(^{55}\)

Cusqueños responded to these denunciations through a variety of political, artistic, and literary efforts that valorized their regional identity and folklore as compatible with the modern world.\(^{56}\) As part of this effort, cusqueños embraced the discourse of tourism to refashion their region in the eyes of Lima and the world. In fact, the first call to use tourism as a force for modernization in Cusco originated from the Philadelphia-born rector of UNSAAC, Albert Giesecke. In the August, 1921 issue of Revista Universitaria, Giesecke penned an article in honor of Peru’s independence centennial titled: “Cuzco: Tourism Mecca of South America.” Giesecke stated: “Without any doubt, during the centennial the region that will offer the tourist more interest for its historical precedence is Cusco, seat of the old empire of the Incas; Rome of South America, or Mecca of tourism in all of America, as some justly call it,” (Figure 1.2).\(^{57}\) Like the previous travel narratives, Giesecke’s article highlighted the many historical sites Cusco offered a potential visitor. However, rather than emphasize the city’s incompatibility with modern travel, Giesecke emphasized Cusco’s refined amenities. His article assured readers that,

\(^{54}\) BNP, Ciudad y Campo y Caminos, (CCC), No. 26, (February 1927), cover.
\(^{55}\) BNP, CCC, No. 31, July 1927, 19.
\(^{56}\) Mendoza, Creating our Own.
“streetcars and automobiles wait for the arrival of the train” that could rapidly ferry visitors to one of the city’s modern hotels. “For afternoon tea,” Giesecke advised, “the traveler can go to the Maxim café on the ground floor of the Hotel Colón.” Far from being a dirty, outdated city, Gisecke highlighted how Cusco could accommodate a modern traveler.

Gisecke’s call to advocate for tourism in Cusco found a receptive audience in UNSAAC where many of his own students and colleagues of the Generation of the sierra, already active in archeology and the indigenismo movement, proved happy to promote their region as a modern tourist destination. Cusco historian and Gisecke colleague, José Gabriel Cosio, published the first, book-length tourist guide in 1924. In addition, Cosio integrated photographic images taken from above Cusco to show the city’s size and layout (Figure 1.3). In his introduction, Cosio informed the reader that his publication, “is not a serious book of historical criticism nor erudition.” Instead, it was, “written to respond to an immediate need for the tourist, in the form of a simple, brief, and clear guide, it will fulfill its objective if the visitor to Cuzco can, with its direction and help, learn how much this millennial city possesses and guards that is important and worthy of admiration.” Despite the modest introduction offered by Cosio, the guide books authored by cusqueños in the 1920s and 1930s made a serious effort to change outside perceptions of Cusco.

In order to refute the image of Cusco as backward, cusqueño guidebook authors stressed the city’s compatibility with modern, cultured travelers. In his 1921 article, Giesecke recommended that tourists visit UNSAAC, not only because it was one of South America’s oldest universities, but also to observe one of Peru’s first co-educational institutions and to visit

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58 Ibid., 5.
its new archeological museum. Giesecke also recommend that tourists purchase books authored by locals on Cusco society and history to become better acquainted with the region. Giesecke suggested that tourists pick up copies of Clorinda Matto de Turner’s publications, José Gabriel Cosio’s history of Cusco, editions of the Revista Universitaria, postcards, and photographs. In 1925, Giesecke, Valcárcel, and José Uriel Garcia published another guide titled, Guía histórico-artística del Cuzco, that also recommended potential tourists to visit Cusco’s “important centers of instruction, including the university, two national institutes, and the seminary which dates to the sixteenth century.” The 1925 guide also recommended locales where visitors could find examples of local art reminding readers that, “Cuzco was a center of enormous and profound artistic production like no other city in Peru and even in South America.”

Unlike travel narratives that emphasized the abandoned state of Cusco’s archeological sites, cusqueño-authored guidebooks valorized Inca architecture, highlighting its appeal and arguing that its construction was comparable or even superior to other global cultural artifacts. The Guía histórico-artística del Cuzco guide recommended a visit to the town of Ollantaytambo where, “one can contemplate the stupendous ruins that still remain from the grand structures built over the summits of the surrounding hills.” The same guide highlighted incaic walls between Truinfo and Belem streets in Cusco stating: “they reveal the precision of the instruments used, as well as the great mathematical knowledge of their builders.” In 1927, Valcárcel published a tourism article in Ciudad, Campo, y Caminos on touring Cusco’s Inca heritage.

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63 Ibid., 68.
64 Ibid., 41.
65 Ibid., 48.
Again, Valcárcel repeated local claims of the superiority and durability of Inca structures. “It appears that eternity will seal each wall that the Inka built for the perpetual memory of their race,” boasted Valcárcel.\footnote{BNP, CCC, no. 31, July 1927, 17.} Focusing on architectural sites also permitted the authors of guidebooks to include many photographs of Cusco. Guidebook photographs, often presented as academic or still-life studies of the region’s incaic architecture, presented controlled settings for the authors to present images that reinforced Cusco’s modernity.\footnote{The use of photography in the formation of an official Cusco indigenismo is noted by, Deborah Poole, Vision, Race and Modernity, 168-197.}

In addition to highlighting the architectural skill of the Inca, early guides established links between the pre-hispanic and modern era by emphasizing Cusco in relation to the academic study of archeology. In Giesecke’s initial 1921 article, he reminded visitors that Sacsayhuamán had served as a site for archeological work conducted by Bingham expeditions.\footnote{Giesecke, “El Cuzco,” 6.} Cosío’s 1924 guide invited readers to engage with sites of Cusco history as archeologists. For example, the guide invited visitors to walk around the city’s Plaza de Armas, identifying the foundations of the former Inca palaces and structures that lined the square.\footnote{Cosío, El Cuzco histórico y monumental, 30.} Guiding visitors through the Santo Domingo church and Coricancha temple, García’s publication invited visitors to study the site through detailed instructions: “Leaving the cloister, on the right hand side, one sees a beautiful Inca wall, well cared for and almost two meters in height.”\footnote{Ibid., 56.} A guide published by Valcárcel in 1934 also stressed ongoing archeological work in Cusco. Describing recent restoration efforts Valcarcel noted to visitors that, “beneath the actual city, many ruins, remnants of buildings, dating from remote periods, remain to be discovered which today will be forever buried, unless another Mussolini can be found to lay bare these marvelous hidden treasures, as Italy’s
Mussolini did in Rome.” Valcárcel and his indigenista peers shared no sympathies with fascism. Instead, Valcárcel wished to highlight how Cusco’s efforts mirrored large, coordinated urban archeology projects in Rome. In doing so, Valcárcel hoped to portray the city’s indigenous heritage neither as exotic nor mysterious, but as a clear link between the past and the nationalist movements of modern world.

By the mid-1930s, the authorship of tourist guides had expanded beyond the realm of indigenista intellectuals to Cusco’s civic organizations. An extensive tourist guide, the Guía General del Cuzco, appeared in 1937 with funding from the local government and chamber of commerce. The 1937 edition preserved the emphasis on modernization and international appeal first conveyed by the earlier publications. Conscious of the city’s reputation, the guide boasted that, “the cleaning and canalization of the city, give it an appearance very different from the dirty and embarrassing image presented by the explorer Squire in 1863.” Along with travel and history descriptions, the guide book emphasized Cusco’s many civic organizations. Entries in the 1937 publication listed membership in the Rotary Club as well as its recent charity achievements. The guide contained information regarding many modern professional and civic organizations including the Medical Association of Cusco, the Association of Cusco Engineers, the Society of Cusco Artisans, and even the Sicuani Tennis Club (Figure 1.4).

Locally-produced tourist guides not only defended Cusco from insults of backwardness, the publications. The guides also acted as tools for indigenistas to present their ideas regarding race and regional identity. Despite the optimistic message of progress conveyed in the tour guides, in the 1920s and 1930s, Cusco was fraught with violent social conflict over race. The

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71 Luis E. Valcárcel, Cuzco: Capital Arqueológica de Sud América, 1534-1934, (Lima: Banco Italiano, 1934), 12.
73 Ibid., 131.
74 Ibid., 133-143.
arrival of the railroad followed by Leguía’s highway construction opened Cusco’s agrarian zones to increased capitalist exploitation. Wealthy landowners bought or confiscated land from Indian communities. As a reaction, Indians joined with reformers of the Comité Pro-Derecho Indígena Tawantinsuyo. Leguía had formed the Tawantinsuyo movement as part of his efforts to build a populist base for the Patria Nueva policies. Quickly, Indians and activists used the Tawantinsuyo organization to attack abusive rural elites and government authorities. Violent agrarian revolts and land seizures by Indian communities rocked southern Peru from 1921 onward until the Leguía government outlawed the movement and jailed its leaders in 1927. Originally considered a millenarian movement, scholars have re-assessed the goals of the Tawintinsuyo uprisings as a focused political effort by Indian communities to push for more inclusion in national and regional politics.

 Scholars of indigenismo have argued that Cusco’s indigenistas failed to understand or support the political and social demands of rural Indians during the Tawantinsuyo revolts. Instead, indigenistas downplayed the social conditions of Cusco’s Indians while celebrating folklore based on urban and mestizo culture. By the end of the 1920s and early 1930s, indigenistas embraced the possibility of creating a “new Indian” through education and

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urbanization. Efforts to emphasize Cusco’s regional identity as literate, urban, and mestizo were reflected in descriptions of early tourist guides. Introducing Cusco to visitors, the 1937 Guía General informed travelers that, “eight to ten percent of the population has to be definitely white, natives, and foreigners; 60 percent is mestizo, creoles; and the rest, something more than thirty percent Indian.” The 1937 also predicted that, “the urban population will be 40 percent literate and the rural population still remains almost entirely illiterate, something that does not prevent a current inclination towards education, even in the most impoverished ayllus (Indian communities).” The progress in creating “new Indians” through modernization, education, and mestizaje allowed the Guía General to conclude that, “in only the dawn of the present century that Cusco starts to reclaim its legitimate prestige and take its historic role as the nucleus and center of [Peruvian] nationality.” As cusqueños asserted their region’s role as the true representation of Peruvian nationalism based on the New Indian, they sought out opportunities to highlight Cusco’s national and international appeal. Fortunately for cusqueños, 1934 presented an important civic anniversary to underline their region’s promise as a cultural and tourist center.

**Cusco Quadricentennial and Tourism**

By the 1930s, Cusco’s indigenista writers and civic associations had crafted an effective argument for their city’s potential as a modern tourism destination for cultural travelers. Now cusqueños needed a platform to showcase their city’s tourism potential. Tourism backers found the perfect opportunity in 1934 when Cusco planned to honor the four hundredth anniversary, 78 79 80 81

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[80] Ibid., 23-25.

dubbed the Quadricentennial, of the Spanish foundation of the city. Cusco’s regional elite, battered by both agrarian revolts and opposition from the Augusto Leguía government in the 1920s, entered the next decade on more stable political ground. By the early 1930s, the indigenous agrarian uprisings were eclipsed by the work of Cusco’s neo-indigenistas that emphasized Indian folklore over grassroots political demands. 

Simultaneously, the turbulent years following the fall of Leguía’s government in 1930 encouraged national leaders to re-establish traditional economic and political ties to Peru’s regional elites. In August 1930 Coronel Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro led a successful coup deposing Leguía. The political change offered a unique opportunity for many cusqueño political leaders and intellectuals to rise to national prominence. The anti-Leguía stance of Cusco’s regional elite and intellectuals permitted many cusqueños and neo-indigenistas to rise to prominence in the cultural and political bureaucracy of Lima. For example, Cusco political leader David Samanez Ocampo headed the interim government following the coup in 1931. At the same time prominent Cusco political and cultural leaders enjoyed increased prominence in Lima during the 1930s.

Cusco’s regional leaders began to promote the need to lobby the central state for funds to prepare the city for the Quadricentennial. Early on, supporters of the proposed civic celebrations emphasized its potential to draw tourists to Cusco. *El Comercio de Cusco* newspaper backed the efforts to secure funding in advanced of the Quadricentennial noting: “we would inaugurate numerous public works that would provide legendary and marvelous Cosko the characteristics of a civilized town, zealous of its monuments and capable of offering them for the veneration of

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international tourism.” The activities of Cusco’s congressional delegation proved successful and, on September 13, 1933, President Benavides signed Law 7798 declaring that the Cusco Quadricentennial on March 23, 1934, “to be celebrated as a national holiday.” The law created the Comité Central del IV Centenario del Cuzco (Central Committee of the IV Centenary of Cuzco, or Quadricentennial Committee) and granted it a budget of 600,000 soles to prepare for the celebrations. The law also provided funds for restoration works and a new tourist lodge at Machu Picchu. Other benefits promised to Cusco for the 1934 event included a new Archeological Institute, civic improvements, and a new municipal hospital. Although less publicized, the law planned exploit Indian laborers to complete nearly all of the projects.

Energized by the passing of Law 7798, tourism backers in both Cusco and Lima urged the state to use the planned Quadricentennial to attract travelers to the Andes. Lima’s La Crónica newspaper published a special section in its October 29, 1933 edition that urged the national state to, “organize tourism propaganda and with that, allow the civilized world to know the excellencies of our land and the glorious achievements of our race,” in preparations of the event. A second entry in the newspaper, titled, “The Future of Cuzco,” highlighted the need for the Peruvian state to consider the region of as a potential center for international travel. “Archeological Cuzco is truly a fortune in our hand, a beautiful and emerging good for which tourists pay and our country should be interested in selling,” noted the article. As the civic date approached, Peru’s press closely followed the restoration of the city’s archeological sites and Machu Picchu. El Comercio de Lima, commented on the progress on March 9, 1934 by proudly

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86 Biblioteca del Congreso de la República del Peru (hereafter, BCP) Ley 7798, September 13, 1933.
87 BNP, “El turismo, riqueza que debe beneficiarnos,” La Crónica, second section, October 29, 1933, III.
88 BNP, “El Porvenir del Cuzco,” La Crónica, second section, October 29, 1933, III.
noting that, “surely the labors currently in progress will provide the best attractions for tourists.”

As the national and local government prepared for Quadricentennial, diverse groups used the language of tourism development to lobby for additional funds. For example, in 1933, the Cusco Provincial Council lobbied the central government for increased restoration funds for the Coricancha archeological complex, “so that tourists can have free access to admire our glorious past, and so that the Patronato Arqueológico (Archeology Council) of this city, may have immediate control over its most perfect historical site.” Local institutions were not the only people who hoped to benefit from a potential tourism boost during the Quadricentennial. Several US expatriates contacted the city government inquiring about potential jobs promoting or organizing Quadricentennial activities. Even a pastry chief named Moises Ponce de León contacted the Quadricentennial Committee offering his, “knowledge in the areas of confection, fine pastry, and as chief of cuisine at your disposition,” for the festivities.

While some attempted to seek temporary opportunities during the Quadricentennial, other groups hoped to use the event to advocate for long-term change in Cusco. By March of 1934, Giesekce joined with several prominent civic leaders of Cusco to form the Comité Central de Propaganda Turístico (Central Tourism Propaganda Committee, CCPT). In coordination with the Quadricentennial Committee, the new committee organized create musical shows and exhibitions to show visitors Cusco culture and history and draft reports on the need for lodging.

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90 Archivo Municipal del Cusco (AMC), Legajo 98, Consejo Provincial del Cuzco to Senor Director de Ensenaza i Exámenes, August 29, 1933.
91 AMC, Legajo 97, Robert A. Burns to Alcalde Provincial del Cuzco, May 8, 1934; Legajo 98, James McGrady to Alcalde Provincial del Cuzco, March 9, 1934.
92 AMC, Legajo 98, Moises Ponce de León to Senor Presidente de la Comisión Organizador de las Fiestas Pro-Centenario del Cuzco, March 3, 1934.
improvements. On the eve of the Quadricentennial opening, the CCPT presented a report, “to convert Cuzco into a global tourism attraction.” The CCPT’s report argued that the national government needed to use the Quadricentennial to organize tourism development in Cusco. The report presented 11 recommendations to promote tourism that included the coordination of archeological preservation, the creation of a central tourism planning office, state funding for hotel construction, and increasing publicity of Peru abroad. An editorial in *El Comercio de Lima* appearing on April 4, 1934 endorsed the CCPT’s report and recommended that the national government adopt all of the recommendations.

While the CCPT advocated for long-term planning to develop tourism in Cusco, the Quadricentennial Committee had already taken steps to achieve such a goal. The Quadricentennial Committee contracted architect Emiliano Harth-Teré to create a long-term urban plan for Cusco. In 1934, Harth-Teré completed Cusco’s first urban planning guide: the *Plano Regulador*. Endorsing the completed plan to the city, Valcárcel wrote: “The magnitude of the Plan Regulador de la Ciudad del Cuzco is the guide that the Municipal Council must follow when considering any urban modifications.” Although Harth-Teré’s plan was only a general outline provided to regulate urban preservation and development in Cusco, many of his suggestions proposed for the Quadricentennial in 1934 would continue to form the basis of cultural and tourism-oriented planning for the remainder of the century. Harth-Teré’s plan argued that technical oversight and careful planning would aid Cusco’s development while preserving the city’s architectural heritage that attracted global interest. The plan would, “take into account the double aspect of the city: first, its archeological value that obliges the

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97 AMC, Legajo 97, Luis E. Valcárcel to Presidente del Consejo Municipal del Cuzco, March 16, 1934.
The plan proposed that Cusco be divided into distinct planning zones. The “archeological zone” outlined in the plan would encompass most of the city center where, “ruins and objects of architectural or artistic merit,” would be administered by the Archeological Institute of Cusco. Besides the historic center of the city, the 1934 plan advised the creation of commercial, industrial, and residential zones in Cusco. Harth-Terré’s optimistic plan for Cusco even advised that future residential planning, “should be created with discrete details in order to not discriminate against the aboriginal element, the under-salaried worker whose life is still primitive.” Unfortunately, the Quadricentennial Committee lacked funds to begin the extensive 1934 proposal. Still, the reception of Harth-Terré’s plan illustrated how tourism, once used to highlight Cusco’s modernity to outsiders, had started to become a motor for modernization itself.

However, as cusqueños prepared to showcase their city, fears lingered that arriving tourists would be disappointed with the actual state, or lack of, Cusco’s modernization. Concerns emerged that Cusco’s hotels and lodging were not as modern as guides and promotions often claimed. The Quadricentennial Commission created a specific sub-committee dedicated to preparing and inspecting lodging with the hopes of maintaining high standards. This committee worked in cooperation with a municipal hotel and lodging inspector to issue licenses and inspect businesses for safety and cleanliness. Unfortunately for the Quadricentennial planners, Cusco still lacked many modern lodgings in 1934. A survey completed by the lodging commission found that Cusco only had ten locations qualified to house travelers. Of these locations only one,

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98 AMC, Legajo 97, “Informe Preliminar sobre el Plan Regular para la ciudad del Cuzco,” 1.
100 AMC, Legajo 97, “Informe Preliminar sobre el Plan Regular para la ciudad del Cuzco,” 7.
101 AMC, Legajo 97, Sub-Comisión de Alojamiento to Alcalde del Consejo Provincial del Cercado, March 6, 1934. The letter outlines the cooperation agreement between the sub-commission and the municipal lodging inspector.
the Hotel Ferrocarril, qualified as a “first class,” hotel. Many of the city’s other lodgings boasted less than spectacular facilities. The Hotel Colon, for example, had 58 rooms but only 4 bathrooms. In fact, the lodging commission discovered from its survey that Cusco’s hotels had only 128 rooms and 27 bathrooms in total. The lodging commission asked the Hotel Ferrocarril to double its beds in preparation for the Quadricentennial, but received a negative response.

Lacking sufficient resources and space in Cusco’s established hotels, the Quadricentennial lodging commission began to solicit individual residents to provide temporary housing for expected visitors. At the start of 1934, Cusco residents living near the city center received letters from the lodging commission announcing: “We have the great satisfaction to approach you, relying on your true cusqueño spirit, and in honor of the quadricentennial of the Spanish foundation of our city, to ask you to provide lodging in the amount of ______ beds, for the visitors that you should be able to house after March of this year.” Allocated funds from the central government, the lodging commission organized a loan program to help support residents make preparations and any needed renovations for visitors. City residents would use rents paid during the festivities to pay back the loans and earn a modest profit. For example, one application estimated that the lodging loan would be repaid with 20 percent of the profits earned from guest stays during the festivities.

Motivated by financial opportunity and civic obligation, residents responded to the call. Humberto Gil responded to the lodging commission in an enthusiastic letter stating: “I wish to

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102 AMC, Legajo 97, Sub-Comisión del Alojamiento, Hoteles i alojamiento de la ciudad del Cuzco, March, 1934.
103 AMC, Legajo 98, Ferrocarilles del Sur del Perú to Senor Presidente del Sub-Comisión de Alojamientos para el IV Centenario del Cuzco, February 20, 1934.
104 AMC, Legajo 97, Sub-Comisión de Alojamiento, January 29, 1934.
105 AMC, Legajo 98, Presidente del Comité Central del IV Centenario del Cuzco to Sub-Comisión de Alojamiento, March 15, 1934.
106 AMC, Legajo 98, “Bases a las que se sijetaran (sic) los préstamos para la instalación de casas de alojamientos i hoteles.” April 28, 1934.
107 AMC, Legajo 98, Sr. Camillo to Presidente de la Comité del IV Centenario del Cuzco, February 3, 1934.
contribute to the celebrations of the upcoming Quadricentennial to be held in this historic city.”

Gil pledged that if the lodging commission allocated 5,000 soles for renovations to his property at 18 Calle Hatunrimiyoc, “I will set up lodging for visitors with breakfast and tea; and it will feature sufficient accommodations for the good service of the guests, with a capacity of 40 people.”

Manuel Avila applied for a loan of 3,000 soles to provide, “a service of comfortable and very decent dining and housing.”

Enrique Santos of 89 Calle Hatunrimiyoc wrote to the lodging commission promising housing for 15 guests if he was provided with a loan of 1,500 soles.

Some homeowners received generous stipends to renovate in anticipation of guests.

For example, Hermoza Hermanos received 10,000 soles from the lodging commission to renovate her house for Quadricentennial visitors.

However, not all residents responded to the offers of the lodging commission. Wenceslao Cano responded to the lodging commission: “my house does not have the possibility of offering lodging, because it is small and only provides space for my family.”

Despite the Quadricentennial Committee’s efforts to improve lodging in Cusco, press reports indicated that the city still lacked adequate facilities to be considered a tourism center. *El Comercio de Lima* reported that, two weeks before the Quadricentennial, Cusco’s lodging options remained limited.

Despite the lodging problems, the Quadricentennial Celebrations commenced at noon on Thursday, March 22 when the city’s churches rang their bells to mark the celebrations. In Lima, President Benavides saluted Cusco at a special Te Deum Mass held at the Metropolitan

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108 AMC, Legajo 98, Humberto Gil to Sub-Comisión de Alojamiento, February 2, 1934.
110 AMC, Legajo 98, Enrique Santos to Presidente de la comisión de alojamiento, March 22, 1934.
111 AMC, Legajo 98, Hermoza Santos to Comité Central Pro-IV Centenario, January 24, 1934.
112 AMC, Legajo 98, Wenceslao Cano to Señores Miembros de la Sub Comisión de Alojamiento para el Centenario del Cuzco, February 8, 1934.
Cathedral. Cusco started the day with a 21-gun salute followed by inaugurations of public works, a military parade attended by Prefect Coronel Jorge Vargas, and a musical concert at the municipal theatre of folkloric songs. Every night between Mach 22 and March 25, a parade took place in the Plaza de Armas, often followed by a fireworks celebration. On Friday and Saturday nights, the municipality offered public screenings of films to city residents. The celebrations also featured traditional civic celebrations including a Te Deum Mass, a reading of the Spanish act of foundation, and singing of the national and Cusco anthems. Ceremonies marked the completion of historic restoration and new street projects and modernizations. Some of the most popular attractions included the inauguration of Cusco’s new airport and the dedication of the recently-restored Sacsayhuaman archeological complex. The Teatro Municipal held nightly concerts that featured local musical groups. The final concert held on Sunday, March 25 featured the famous Centro Qosqo de Arte Nativo – the region’s most prominent folkloric music and cultural group. After the civic festival in Cusco, inaugurations of restored archeological sites, including Machu Picchu, continued into July of 1934. Nearly two decades after Bingham’s departure, Machu Picchu again waited for tourists.

Conclusion

It appeared that the Quadricentennial had achieved many of the goals of cusqueños who employed the promise of international tourism to reinvent their region in the eyes of the nation. The event did attract international press. An article published in the March 24, 1934 edition of the New York Times marveled how “1,000 Indians had been at work restoring the ancient glories 

of the capital city of their forebears.” The article also reported that, “the government hopes to have Cuzco…recognized as the outstanding archeological city of South America.”\textsuperscript{117} Perhaps even more impressive was the recognition awarded by Lima’s press. \textit{El Comercio de Lima} lauded the celebrations in an editorial published on March 23, 1934 that stated: “In this solemn tribute, the mind of the coast has merged with the mind of Cusco, and from this fusion of two spiritual worlds, surges the soul of Peru, synthesis of two fundamental psychologies that complement each other and strengthen in the common heritage of nationalism.”\textsuperscript{118}

However, the overall economic success of the Quadricentennial most likely proved limited. \textit{El Comercio de Lima} reported that “numerous tourists” had visited Cusco for the Quadricentennial. However the paper could not produce statistics to support its claim.\textsuperscript{119} During the festival, \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} reported no increased train or airplane arrivals to Cusco.\textsuperscript{120} This suggests that the majority of visitors to events during the Quadricentennial arrived from Cusco or its nearby communities. In addition, the Quadricentennial Committee’s last-minute scramble to compensate for Cusco’s substandard lodging illustrated the many structural problems that challenged the region’s plans to develop tourism. Finally, \textit{El Comercio de Lima}, despite supporting the Quadricentennial, still retained many of the paternalistic positions cusqueños hoped would diminish with the recasting of Cusco as a modern destination. “\textit{El Comercio} supports the development of tourism in Cuzco in 1934,” stated the newspaper’s March 22, 1934 editorial reporting the Quadricentennial celebrations, “what better honor can we offer to Cuzco than to incorporate into the present energy the four million pariahs that vegetate in the

\textsuperscript{117} “Cuzco Celebrates Fourth Centenary,” NYT, March 24, 1934, E8.
\textsuperscript{119} BNP, “Sigue Afluyendo gran número de turistas a la población del Cusco,” ECL, morning edition, March 27, 1934, 11.
\textsuperscript{120} BMC, “Llegadas,” ECC, March 27, 1934, 5.
highlands of Peru?"\textsuperscript{121} Despite the achievements in the decades leading to the Quadricentennial, perceptions of Cusco as an isolated, underdeveloped region persisted. However, as \textit{El Comercio de Lima} dismissed the so-called pariahs of Peru’s Andes, larger political shifts had begun to create national and hemispheric conditions to elevate tourism in Cusco as a national project. Soon, the transnational ties that helped elevate Cusco’s regional identity in Peru would begin to raise the region’s profile across the hemisphere.

\textsuperscript{121} BNP, “El Cuzco frente al IV centenario de su fundación española,” ECL, March 2, 1934, morning edition, 4.
Figure 1.1, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, *Ciudad y Campo y Caminos*, 1927. The magazine portrays modern travel as incompatible with Andean culture.
Figure 1.2. Cusco, Biblioteca Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, *Revista Universitaria*, 1921. Alfred Giesecke’s first call for making Cusco a center for modern tourism.

Figure 1.3. Cusco, Biblioteca Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, José Gabriel Cosio’s *El Cuzco Histórico y Monumental*, 1924.
Figure 1.4. *Guía General*, 1937. In addition to highlighting historical attractions, this later guide also showcased organizations illustrating Cusco’s vibrant civic life. Picture here are the members of Cusco’s Provincial Council.
Chapter 2

Good Neighbors Make Good Tourists: The Rise of Cusco and Machu Picchu Tourism, 1930-1948

In the 1920s, Cusco’s local elite and indigenista intellectuals began to embrace the promise of international tourism in their region. The prospect of attracting well-to-do, educated travelers to marvel at Cusco’s rich heritage appealed to cusqueños sensitive to Lima-based notions of their region as a backward and isolated relic of Peru’s mancha india (Indian stain). These tourism-promotion efforts were led by and complimented the work of a new generation of indigenistas focused on emphasizing the “new Indian” and a folkloric interpretation of the Andean past. However, by the end of the 1920s, tourism in Cusco remained more of a dream than a reality. Unlike the cases of Mexico and Cuba, where the national state took a keen interest in promoting tourism, cusqueños enjoyed little support from the Peruvian national government. Even worse, when the Peruvian state did take an interest in promoting itself as a travel destination, it promoted a Lima-centric image emphasizing the nation as coastal, modern, and mestizo.

Fortunately for Cusco, the 1930s and the 1940s offered a unique moment when diplomatic, economic, and cultural institutions outside of Peru, especially those associated with the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States, took a greater interest in the Southern Andes. Employing these new transnational cultural and economic links, cusqueños used the external gaze of the Andes to argue that their region represented true peruanidad. The paradoxical reliance of international and transnational links in elevating Cusco and Machu Picchu as national symbols during the 1930s and 1940s affirms scholarship highlighting the importance of

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1 See, Schwartz, Pleasure Island, 54-73; Berger, The Development of Mexico’s Tourist Industry, 4-15.
transnational contact zones in the formation of national identity in Latin America.\(^2\) This chapter examines how the diplomatic and cultural push of Pan-Americanism and Good Neighbor policies between the United States and Latin America offered cusqueños the transnational links and tools to finally promote Cusco and Machu Picchu as travel destinations, cultural contact zones, and more importantly, national symbols.

Tourism development played a central role in the creation of the transnational links and contact zones centered on Cusco in the 1930s and 1940s. Many of the images, narratives, and sites promoted during the 1930s and 1940s rose to prominence *because* they were already employed by cusqueños interested in exploiting these symbols for tourist consumption in their region. Cusco’s experience was not unique. Tourism development in other Latin American countries, especially Mexico, also elevated and promoted regional folklore and culture as symbols of national identity for the tourist gaze.\(^3\) However, unlike Mexico, the Peru of the 1930s and 1940s lacked a comparable state-driven nationalist project. Therefore, the transnational links that disseminated and developed Cusco’s folkloric and historic narrative for tourism consumption emerged as uniquely influential in presenting Andean and Cusco folklore as the representation of Peruvian national identity.

However, such a process did not lack conflicts and contradictions. This chapter will also illustrate how outside actors contributed to the creation of elite-oriented, idealized visions of Andean indigeneity as national symbols of Peru. These same efforts to create a marketable and tourist-friendly image abroad elevated agents of US imperialism into heroic Pan-American figures. Finally, this chapter traces how the prominent role of non-state and transnational actors

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\(^2\) Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, 6; see also, Lomnitz, *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico*, 125-144.
in promoting tourism in Cusco bypassed a critical institution in Peru needed for long-term development: the national state. As a result, despite many gains in promoting Cusco’s folklore and Andean culture abroad, tourism development in Peru lacked strong institutional and political support; a situation harshly revealed at the end of the 1940s.

**Rediscovering Machu Picchu**

The lack of strong national institutions had not prevented Cusco’s regional elite from forging an effective indigenismo-based folklore in the 1920s. These efforts received further backing after the fall of Leguía’s Patria Nueva government. Succeeding regimes sought to re-establish political ties between Lima and Cusco’s regional elite, culminating in national endorsement of the Quadricentennial celebrations of 1934. Better cultural relations between Lima and Cusco also aided the careers of cusqueños who had led some of the first initiatives to promote cultural tourism in Cusco. For example, indigenista and early travel guide writer, Luis E. Valcárcel replaced the Leguía-alligned archeologist Julio C. Tello as head of the National Archeology Museum in 1931 while Albert Giesecke, the US-born, reform-minded rector of UNSAAC, moved to Lima to work at various educational posts and with the US embassy.

Additional political events in the early 1930s aided the interest of cusqueños hoping to promote their region’s culture and folklore on a national scale. Following the party’s loss to Sánchez Cerro in the 1931 presidential elections, the Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre-led populist APRA party led a failed uprising in 1931 based in the aprista-stronghold of Trujillo. Similar to Cusco, Trujillo boasted a dynamic regional economy, politically-engaged regional class of intellectuals, and an extensive collection of pre-Columbian historical sites from the Chimú Era.

In fact, during the 1920s, Lima-based travel magazines consistently published articles

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highlighting Trujillo’s Pacific coast and impressive ruins of Chan Chan – the largest pre-
Columbian city in South America. However public perceptions changed dramatically when
government troops executed thousands of APRA followers on the grounds of Chan Chan outside
of Trujillo during the 1931 revolt. On April 30, 1933 an APRA militant assassinated Sánchez
Cerro as revenge for the Trujillo massacre. The succeeding government led by former military
leader Óscar R. Benavides acted quickly to ban APRA and symbols of the party’s militancy. As
a result, Chan Chan, now a symbol of APRA activism, received little attention from the national
state during the 1930s. As Trujillo’s regional leadership and cultural heritage declined in status
during the 1930s, Cusco saw a positive reversal of fortune.

In the favorable political and cultural climate of the 1930s, Cusco folklore institutes,
artists, and thinkers began to project the neo-indigenista cultural project on a national scale as the
true representation of Peru. One notable result of these efforts occurred when the national
government passed Law 7688 declaring Cusco the “Archeological Capital of South America,” on
23 January 1933. The law’s passage affirmed for cusqueños the importance of their city and
region to national concepts of peruanidad. El Comercio del Cusco proudly reprinted editorials
published by newspapers throughout Peru declaring the city as, “Rome of South America,” the,
“Mecca of South America,” and the “Living Museum of America.” The national embrace of
the 1934 Quadricentennial marking four centuries since the Spanish foundation of Cusco in 1534
illustrated the new national prominence of the region’s folklore and archeological heritage.
Marking four centuries since the Spanish conquest of the city enjoyed a warm reception in both

8 Kláren, Peru, 275-6.
9 Mendoza, Creating our Own, 93-123.
10 Ibid., 73-74.
11 BMC, “Homenaje de americanismo merecido a la ciudad del Cuzco, la milenaria capital de los Incas,” ECC, January 27, 1933, 2.
the regional and national press. Lima’s La Crónica newspaper dedicated an entire section of its October 29, 1933 paper to Cusco. The supplement also contained an editorial advocating for Cusco’s importance both as a national symbol and potential tourist hub.

The stance taken by La Crónica reflected a narrative generated as part of the Quadricentennial celebrations that emphasized the promise of tourism. Cusqueño thinkers also emphasized the importance of their city and the region’s archeological sites as representations of both Peruvian and American heritage, but also as critical images to portray abroad for the interest of tourism. Cusco’s Revista Universitaria republished a speech presented by Dr. Miguel Angel Nieto on November 15, 1933 in the municipal palace in preparation for the Quadricentennial. After recounting Cusco’s long history from the Incas, to the colonial era, and the fight for independence, Nieto concluded by reminding the audience of Cusco’s increasing international appeal as a destination for enlightened scientists and well-to-do travelers. “It is also necessary to put in context the happy circumstance that this millenial city has been declared the Archeological Capital of the continent,” Nieto noted concluding his speech by observing that, “there should be no tourist that in his itinerary does not plan a visit to Cusco, just like a visit to Tibet or the Holy Land.”

Cusco officials offered optimistic predictions of tourism development based on continued infrastructure improvements in the region. Cusco’s new passenger airport opened in 1933 and highway construction linking the region with Lima continued through the 1930s. By 1933, the Santa Ana Railway provided a direct rail link between Aguas Calientes at the base of Machu

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12 BNP, “Homenaje al Cuzco, la ciudad imperial,” La Crónica, October 29, 1933, I.
13 BNP, “El turismo, riqueza que debe beneficiarnos,” La Crónica, second section, October 29, 1933, III.
Picchu and to Cusco. In addition, a new road connected Machu Picchu to the town of Quillabamba in the north.\textsuperscript{16} The increased accessibility of Machu Picchu in the early 1930s permitted Cusco high schools and the Sociedad de Artesanos to organize field trips to the site.\textsuperscript{17} As part of Quadricentennial celebrations, the government funded the construction of a small lodge adjacent to Machu Picchu to permit small parties to stay overnight. Officials inaugurated the new lodge on July 31, 1934 by commissioning a special train to bring visitors to Machu Picchu.\textsuperscript{18} The improvements at Machu Picchu even attracted the attention of the North American press with the New York Times declaring the site, “now accessible to visitors,” in 1938.\textsuperscript{19} A key improvement was the introduction of “autovagon” train cars that made travel comfortable and convenient on the Santa Ana Line to Aguas Calientes (see Figure 2.1).

As transportation links improved, cultural links between Cusco and the outside world also grew throughout the 1930s as the Andean region enjoyed renewed international interest. A year after his censure for violating Senate ethics, Senator Hiram Bingham, best known for his expeditions to Machu Picchu, rededicated his activities to archeology and published Machu Picchu: A Citadel of the Incas in 1930.\textsuperscript{20} Since 1922, Bingham had promised Yale and National Geographic that he would publish a follow-up volume to Inca Land, which, to the surprise of many, did not dedicate many pages to Machu Picchu. In fact, Machu Picchu had faded from North American public awareness during the 1920s so much that New York Times review of Machu Picchu: A Citadel of the Incas began by reminding readers: “Fifteen years ago, Machu

\textsuperscript{16} BMC, “La inauguración de la carretera Machupicchu-Quillabamba,” ECC, 6 July 1933, 2.
\textsuperscript{17} BMC, “Excursión de maestros y alumnos del colegio San Francisco a Machupicchu,” ECC, 21 June 1933, 5; “Hacia Ollanta y Machu-Picchu. Excursión del 29 de julio. Conferencias e incidentes,” ECC, 8 August 1933, 2; “Las alumnas del Colegio de las Mercedes excursionaron a Machupicchu,” ECC, 11 September 1934, 5.
\textsuperscript{18} BNP, “En un tren especial cedido por el gobierno se efectuó ayer la excursión hacia Machupicchu,” ECL, morning edition, August 2, 1934, 13.
\textsuperscript{19} Alida Malkus, “To a ‘Lost’ City of the Incas,” NYT, November 13, 1938, 197.
\textsuperscript{20} For more on Bingham’s censure see, Christopher Heany, Cradle of Gold, 201-211; Hiram Bingham, Machu Picchu, a Citadel of the Incas.
Picchu, the white and beautiful citadel on a narrow ridge high above the rushing Urubamba River in Southern Peru, was well known by name and by picture to all Americans.” The review, written by archeologist and former Yale Expedition member, Philip Ainsworth Means, described the new book rather positively but correctly criticized Bingham’s conclusion that Machu Picchu was, in fact, Tampu-tocco, the origin of the Inca civilization. Ainsworth Means reminded readers: “The truth of the matter is, of course, that Machu Picchu is one of the frontier fortresses built by Inca Pacacutec (first half of the fifteenth century).” *Machu Picchu: A Citadel of the Inca* enjoyed modest sales, perhaps because it sold for a rather expensive $50. However, any renewed attention to Bingham’s exploits at Machu Picchu did not prevent the senator from suffering an electoral defeat in 1932.

It is hard to gauge the influence of Bingham’s publication, but there is no doubt that, starting in the 1930s, a renewed US interest in the exploration of South America began to blossom. Part of North American intrigue with the Andes stemmed from the overall popularization of the fields of archeology and anthropology that, by the 1930s, had entered mainstream US media outlets.\(^{23}\) *The New York Times* noted the phenomenon stating in 1931 that, “South America is becoming a favorite haunt for explorers and adventurers…Men are cutting their way through the menacing forest of the Gran Chaco; they are delving into the ancient ruins of the Inca.”\(^{24}\) A similar article published in the *Washington Post* in 1934 announced to readers that, “for travel off the beaten track South America holds a good place in the limelight,” and described Machu Picchu as: “the most amazing ruin in the world.”\(^{25}\)

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22 Alfred M. Bingham, *Portrait of an Explorer*, 337.
24 Douglas Naylor, “South America Calls to the Explorer,” NYT, November 1, 1931, 82.
However, renewed interest did not always guarantee veracity, especially in the popular press. One article appearing in the *Boston Globe* from July 21, 1931 celebrated the twentieth anniversary of Bingham’s discovery. The article played fast and loose with the legacy of Machu Picchu – even by Bingham’s standards. The *Globe* proclaimed that Bingham’s discovery of Machu Picchu was, “nothing less than the find of the mother city from which the Incas of Peru spread their power,” and that for centuries Spaniards and gold seekers had sought Machu Picchu only to have their efforts thwarted when, “wily Indians purposely misdirected the explorers to death and disaster.” Bingham himself became a man of myth who, “met an aged Indian whose fondness for ‘fire water’ was greater than his anxiety to continue the mystification of tribal secrecy,” surpassed the odds to find what the article questionably heralded, “the lost Inca city that cradled the potato.”

The increasing mystical allure of Machu Picchu provided opportunities for amateur explorers, travel writers, and entrepreneurs who traveled to the site in hopes of becoming another Bingham. Few if any of these future visitors achieved Bingham’s success, but their dispatches to US dailies often fomented additional – almost always incorrect – public interest in Machu Picchu. Richard Halliburton traveled to Machu Picchu in 1934 in search of the supposed one hundred Inca sun virgins who had fled to the site following Pizarro’s invasion. Halliburton explained to his readers how he observed 99 graves of his imagined Incan vestal virgins and concluded that the lack of the final grave was due to the fact that, “no one came to bury the last to die.” To conclude his research Halliburton stayed the night at Machu Picchu in hopes to encounter ghosts of the sun virgins. Halliburton assured his readers: “There was no doubt – some young ghosts, some middle-aged ghosts, some very old ghosts, but all very virginal

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ghosts.” Unfortunately for us, Halliburton never detailed exactly how he arrived at his findings.  

Peruvians themselves employed their intellectual connections with the international community to encourage and steer public interest in Cusco and Machu Picchu. Giesecke, who aided Bingham’s first expeditions and issued some of the first calls to develop tourism in Cusco in the 1920s, continued to play an influential role in promoting Machu Picchu. Giesecke helped noted travel novelist, Blair Niles, during her visit to Peru in 1935 by introducing her to archeologists and securing her visit to Cusco. In 1937, Niles published a book based on her experiences titled Peruvian Pageant that earned positive reviews from media outlets like the New York Times. Fictional literature and film also engaged North American readers with the Andes and Machu Picchu. Thorton Wilder’s critically-acclaimed The Bridge of San Luis Rey, published in 1928 won the Pulitzer Prize and inspired public interest in Peru. Wilder’s novel received two film adaptations: one silent picture released to relatively positive reviews in 1929, and a second “talkie” that debuted in 1944. The second film, received a cool critical reception, but still managed to garner an Academy Award nomination for best original score. Children’s literature also invited readers to relive the imagined adventures of Bingham-inspired explorers. One book titled, The Citadel of a Hundred Stairways, featured an adventure between a young tourist from “Yankee-landia” and his cusqueño peer who discover treasure on “Machu Picchu Mountain.” The novel, published in 1941, also featured engaging color illustrations for young,

28 AG, 1095, Blair Niles to Albert Giesecke, December 4, 1935.
US readers (Figure 2.2). In 1946 *The Quest for the Golden Condor* by Clayton Knight appeared on US bookshelves. The book featured a Pan-American adventure that paired a US child traveler with Peruvian peers on a treasure hunt which reached a plot climax at Machu Picchu. *The New York Times* book review praised the novel, especially the fact that, “the final chapters are packed with excitement and lighted by the splendor of the high Andean scene.” Literary fascination with the Andes extended beyond the United States. Belgian cartoonist Hergé set one of his serialized Tintin adventure series, *Prisoners of the Sun*, in the Peruvian Andes in 1946.

However, in order to channel increasing global awareness of Cusco and Machu Picchu into tourism development, local elites would need a powerful ally. Cusqueños found that ally in the new Good Neighbor policy of the United States. Associated with the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the non-interventionist and Pan-Americanist diplomatic shift of the United States towards Latin America began in the late 1920s. The Hoover administration realized the negative animosity the United States’ gunboat diplomacy policies had provoked in Latin America and made early friendly overtures towards its hemispheric neighbors. Roosevelt placed additional emphasis on Hoover’s policy, expanding its reach and labeling the new diplomatic shift as the “Good Neighbor Policy.” The need to secure good diplomatic standing with Latin America became ever more urgent as the 1930s drew to a close as the threat of global armed conflict loomed. In August of 1940, Roosevelt created the Office for Coordination of

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33 “For the Young Reader’s Bookshelf,” NYT, May 12, 1946, 133.
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics to direct US cultural diplomacy efforts in the region. Nelson Rockefeller served as the head of the new office, renamed the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) in July of 1941.  

**Pan-American Andes**

Before the creation of the CIAA, prominent Peruvian political and cultural leaders sought to establish closer cultural ties with the United States. Pro-US interests in Peru expressed worries in regards to suspected Axis influence in the country in the late 1930s with justification. *El Comercio de Lima*’s editorial stance often advocated better commercial ties with Germany in the late 1930’s, and, as late as 1941, Japan consumed 59 per cent of Peru’s cotton exports. Prominent conservative Lima intellectual José de la Riva Augüero raised eyebrows in the US embassy when he proposed the formation of Japan-Peruvian Cultural Society in 1938. Even Nazis sought to portray themselves as “modern Incas” when they contacted archeologist and anthropologist Philip Ainsworth Means to obtain a German edition of his research on prehispanic Peru. Ainsworth Means declined stating he, “refused to put in a lot of slop in praise of Nazis.”

On June 2, 1938 Peru’s Minister of Foreign Relations, Carlos Concha, US Ambassador Lawrence A. Steinhardt, the rector of the Universidad Nacional de San Marcos (UNSM), Alfredo Solf y Muro, and the Mayor of Lima and active participant of the Touring y Automovil Club del Perú (Touring and Automobile Club of Peru, TACP), Eduardo Dibós Dammert announced the creation of the Instituto Cultural Peruano-Norteamericano (Peruvian-North American Cultural

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39 US National Archives (NA), Record Group 59, Department of State (RG 59), Box 576, 823.42794/5 LH, US Embassy Lima to US Department of State, November 30, 1938.

40 AG-1013, Philip Ainsworth Means to Albert Giesecke, July 4, 1938.
Institute, ICPNA). The stated goal of the new organization was to encourage cultural exchange between Peru and the United States.\textsuperscript{41} The promoters of the ICPNA stated their inspiration to establish the organization stemmed from the 1938 Inter-American diplomatic conference held in Lima. Thus, Ambassador Steinhardt reported favorably on the proposed creation of the ICPNA in 1938 noting, “I am of the opinion that this Society will serve a very useful purpose and will fill a void which has long existed in Peruvian cultural circles.”\textsuperscript{42} By 1941, embassy officials proposed that the CIAA allocated $10,000 in funds towards the ICPNA’s activities in Peru.\textsuperscript{43} Good Neighbor relations with Peru were also aided by the strong pro-US political stance of President Manuel Prado. Elected President of Peru in 1939, Prado promoted close political ties with the United States.\textsuperscript{44} In May of 1942, Prado became the first South American head of state to make an official visit to the United States. CIAA documents recorded that Prado’s reception in Washington was the most significant foreign visit since King George VI’s arrival in 1939.\textsuperscript{45}

The close relationship between the CIAA, the Peruvian government, and the ICPA helped increase public awareness of Peru abroad. In fact, some scholars have argued that the cultural cooperation and publicity campaigns of the Good Neighbor policy were, perhaps, its most influential achievement.\textsuperscript{46} More importantly, the “Peru” presented in the Good Neighbor policy era reflected the growing influence of cusqueño regional identity and folklore. When the CIAA produced Latin America teaching aids for US schools in 1941 the guides dedicated to Peru often helped emphasize the Andean culture of the nation. The Junior High School guide

\textsuperscript{42} NA, RG 59, Box 576, 823.43/1, Lawrence A. Steinhardt to US Secretary of State, June 1, 1938. (0766)
\textsuperscript{43} NA, Record Group 229, Office of Inter-American Affairs (RG 229), Box 327, No. 2048, R. Henry Norweb, US Embassy in Lima to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, “Transmitting a memorandum regarding the proposed activities of the Coordination Committee for Peru and provisional budget,” October 27, 1941.
\textsuperscript{44} Kláren, \textit{Peru}, 281-282.
\textsuperscript{45} NA, RG 229, Entry 1, OIAA, Box 202, Peru – Country Study, “Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Press Division.”
\textsuperscript{46} Gellman, \textit{Good Neighbor Diplomacy}, 73.
recommended H. A. Franck’s *Vagabonding Down the Andes* and C. W. Meade’s *Old Civilizations of Inca Land* for classroom reading on Peru.\(^{47}\) Another lesson planner distributed by the CIAA, “People Who Live in Thin Air: A Study of Life in the Andes Mountains of South America,” outlined lesson plans for elementary school students focusing on the geography and culture of the region with a specific focus on the history of the Inca.\(^{48}\) In 1942, the CIAA worked with the US Office of Education, to develop a nation-wide exhibition, “to aid schools, teacher training institutions, etc., which are interested in the inter-American field.”\(^{49}\) The project received almost one thousand requests and, by April 1942, had distributed 132 traveling exhibits containing books, photos, and specimens from all areas of Latin America. In regards to Peru, the exhibit emphasized Andean culture. The traveling exhibit contained copies of the books, *Bridge of San Luis Rey* and *Old Civilizations of Inca Land*. The inventory also included: an example of an Incan “gourd bowl from Peru,” a “woven Indian coca bag,” a “pair of Alpaca slippers from the Andes,” and “1 knitted Andean Indian cap.”\(^{50}\)

The CIAA collected and distributed films to North American classrooms publicizing Peru and the Andes. Some films distributed by the CIAA featured the titles of *Andean Byways*, *Andean Trails; The Andes and the Amazon; Glimpses of Peru; Inca-Cuzco, Land of the Incas; Lure of the Andes; Over the Andes; Peru, Indians of the Mountains*, and *Peru, Land of the Incas*.\(^{51}\) In July of 1941, the CIAA signed an agreement with the newsreel company, The March of Time, to produce 13 news shorts on Latin America including one film on, “Peruvian

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\(^{47}\) NA, RG 229, Box 399, OEM-CR 1, 3- Education Teaching Aides, *Latin America Today: A Study for Junior High Schools*, September 1, 1941, 65.

\(^{48}\) NA, RG 229, Box 399, OEM-CR 1, 3- Education Teaching Aides *People Who Live in Thin Air: A Study of Life in the Andes Mountains of South America*, October 1, 1941.

\(^{49}\) NA, RG 229, Entry 1, OIAA, Box 14, AIA-4186, 0-Educational Programs, “Project Authorization: Exhibits of Materials on Other American Republics.”

\(^{50}\) NA, RG 229, Entry 1, OIAA, Box 14, AIA-4186, 0-Educational Programs, “Project Authorization: Exhibits of Materials on Other American Republics.”

\(^{51}\) NA, RG 229, Box 399, OEM CR 1, 3-Educational Teaching Aids, *People Who Live in Thin Air: A Study of Life in the Andes Mountains of South America*, October 1, 1941, 26-27.
Archeological Ruins.” Through 1942, the CIAA worked with the Hollywood-based Motion Picture Society for the Americas to continue production of Latin American-based film shorts. Films documenting Peru continued to emphasize the indigneity and Andean nature of the nation. CIAA-sponsored film shorts on Peru from 1942 included a feature on daily life in Arequipa. The remaining films, however, included features on Lake Titicaca, “Cuzko,” and a MGM-produced short titled, “Inca Treasure.” Another CIAA-produced film by Howard Knapp, *Heart of the Inca Empire*, was released in 1943 and featured numerous color shots of Cusco and Machu Picchu. The widely distributed *Saludos Amigos*, an animated film co-produced by the CIAA and Disney, did not focus directly on Cusco and Machu Picchu but featured an entire segment where Donald Duck visited Peruvian Andean villages, crossed a traditional Inca footbridge, and conflicted with a stubborn llama.

CIAA efforts to increase US awareness of Peru extended to radio. In 1942, the CIAA worked with Peru’s Radio Nacional to coordinate an English-language program broadcast on short-wave from Lima: “Perú Calls You.” Similar to film efforts, many radio programs sponsored by the CIAA emphasized Peru’s Andean culture. When the radio series, *Hello Americans*, premiered in 1942 under the direction of Orson Welles, the first episode focused on Peru and featured the title, *The Andes*. Broadcast on the CBS Radio Network on the Sunday evening of November 22, 1942, *Variety* praised the radio special as, “excellent entertainment and

52 NA, RG 229, Entry 1, OIAA, Box 217, “Contract Number NDcAr-86.”
56 NA, RG 229, Box 351, Letter P-444, Arthur Dewey, Chair, Coordination Committee for Peru to Nelson Rockefeller, November 21, 1942.
fair education.”  However, when the Coordination Committee for Peru proposed a radio special on the Lima-based UNSM, the CIAA Central Office denied the request labeling the project, “of little value.” The CIAA also collected rights to Peruvian music for radio broadcast in the United States. Although many samples of the music included Lima-originated styles like the vals criollo and marinera, the CIAA also included many folkloric songs to represent the Andean highlands. The CIAA even contacted the family of composer Daniel Alomía Robles to acquire rights to broadcast his famous Andean ballad, El Condor Pasa.

**Good Neighbors Make Good Travelers**

Increasing US and global attention towards the Andes did not go unnoticed in Cusco, and more importantly, in Lima. However, international tourism in Peru remained limited through the 1930s. Most international tourist visits arrived in Lima as passengers on elite ocean steamer tours of South America. Usually these visits lasted for only a few days and rarely ventured beyond Lima. When *El Comercio de Lima* proudly reported the arrival of an ocean liner in Callao carrying 450 North American tourists in February of 1938 it also noted that the group remained in Peru for only two days before departing for Chile, limiting their sightseeing in and around Lima. *El Comercio de Lima* observed that, “currently, tourists stay a few short hours in

58 Original proposal found in: RG 229, Box 352, 3 Peru-Radio Scripts & Material, Background Material, Letter P-943, John W. G. Ogilvie, Associate Director, Radio Division to Arthur Dewey, Chairman, Coordination Committee for Peru, January 13, 1943; project cancellation in RG 229, Box 352, Memorandum, October 14, 1942.
59 RG 229, Box 352, Letter P-1378, Stuart Ayers, Principal Radio Field Representative, to John W. G. Ogilvie, Director, Radio Division, July 7, 1944.
the capital and many times travel on steamships that are subject to itineraries that impede them from staying more days,” and argued that the Peruvian state needed to encourage investment so that, “travelers visit our territory for longer periods that permit our national economy to make the most of their influence.” Tourism promoters pointed to the growth of aviation transport during the 1930s as one solution. In fact, Peru’s aviation commerce did experience a period of rapid jumping from 145 flights in 1928 to 34,571 flights in 1937. Yet, observers noted that more reforms were necessary to develop tourism in Peru – especially beyond Lima.

The TACP led the effort to use transform growing interest in Peru into profit and progress. Under the leadership of Dibos Dammert, in July of 1936 the TACP upgraded its former bulletin to a magazine named *Turismo*. The first edition of *Turismo* reflected the rising prominence of Cusco and Machu Picchu as symbols of touristic Peru. A large photo of Machu Picchu graced the cover of the new magazine and the edition featured a poem by José Santos Chocano titled, “La Tristeza del Inca,” (Figure 2.3). The magazine also featured an article (published in English) regarding Cusco by Phyllis Snyder. According to Snyder, “To visit Peru and not include in your itinerary, what is at once the center and circumference of Incaic and Spanish Colonial history, is an unpardonable sin, a foolish lapse.” *Turismo* dedicated articles to many national topics, yet articles about tourism possibilities in Cusco often made regular appearances in the magazine’s editions. *Turismo* was not alone in pushing for greater national recognition of the tourism possibilities of Cusco and Machu Picchu. A 1938 editorial in *El

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Comercio de Lima predicted that the treasures of Egypt were losing appeal, while Peru’s archeological heritage, “seduces even more.”\(^{68}\) Consensus in Peru had emerged over the importance of Cusco as a tourist center.

The TACP also began to lobby for state involvement in tourism promotion in Peru – especially in terms of propaganda and coordination. In the editorial of Turismo magazine for December, 1936, the club’s leadership advocated for a new institution, “with the goal to place tourism in our patria in the superior category to which it has the perfect right.”\(^{69}\) Other institutions and companies joined the TACP’s lobbying efforts. Airline companies pushed the state to take a more involved interest in tourism development. Harold Harris, the director of Panagra Airlines contributed an article in the February 1937 edition of Touring asserting that Peru could quickly become la “California of South America.” However, Harris reminded readers, “we arrive at the conclusion that this project should be completed by a dependency of the government.”\(^{70}\) While Panagra waited for government action, the airline produced its own travel propaganda that often highlighted its flights to Andean regions of Peru (Figures 2.4 and 2.5).

Responding to increased calls for a coordinated tourism policy, Peru’s Ministry of Foreign Relations commissioned Giesecke to travel to the United States in 1936 to study possible strategies for tourist-friendly development. Giesecke returned that year and gave the Ministry of Foreign Relations its desired report. Based on his findings, Giesecke recommended reforms including increased propaganda, hotel construction, and a reduction of visa requirements.\(^{71}\) However, Giesecke’s report focused on two overriding principles for tourism planning in Peru.

\(^{70}\) BNP, Harold Harris, “Hacia el Fomento del Turismo en el Peru,” Turismo, no. 112, Feb. 1937.
\(^{71}\) AG-D-071, Informe, 24 de julio de 1936, 26-27.
First, Peru needed to craft a tourism policy to appeal to the United States. In his report, Giesecke informed: “It appears to me that the precise moment has arrived to attracted tourists from the United States of America, origin of more than three-quarters of global intercontinental tourism.”

Second, Giesecke’s report emphasized the importance of Cusco as a future tourism destination. Giesecke reproduced interview answers throughout his report emphasizing North American interest in Cusco. One interviewee advised to Giesecke: “Peru should procure accelerated services, by rail to Cuzco and direct service to that Arqueological Capital of South America.”

Serving in the TACP, Giesecke regularly repeated the conclusions of his 1936 report, often in the pages of *Turismo* magazine.

Initially, the TACP centered its efforts on lobbying the state to construct modern hotels in Peru. In November of 1937, *Turismo* applauded Héctor Boza, the Minster of Development, for initiating studies on the possibility of a state-owned hotel chain. The TACP’s efforts came to fruition on July 22, 1938 when President Benavides proposed resolution 8708 authorizing the construction of state-owned hotels. Resolution 8708, soon dubbed the “Hotel Law,” became finalized and enacted later that year on November 2. The national government selected 13 sites for new hotels and placed the small Machu Picchu lodge under the ownership of the new organization.

In many ways, the Hotel Law marked the first coordinated effort on the part of the Peruvian state to create a national tourism infrastructure. *Turismo* applauded the new law and predicted: “In the very near future the government will open the doors of Peru to a broad and beneficial current of contact with the rest of the world.”

Promotional publications invoked

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73 AG-D-071, Informe, 24 de Julio de 1936, 19.
76 NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 657, Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas, *Nuevos Hoteles del Perú para el Turismo*, año 2, no. 4, (September, 1941), 4.
nationalist language in praising the hotel constructions, particularly the role in opening regions to
Tourist visits. “To know Peru is to admire it. Working to know Peru is to teach how to love it; it
is to teach to have faith in her grandness; it is to undertake a task of true nationalism” concluded
one report on the progress of the Hotel Law.\textsuperscript{78}

As the TACP successfully lobbied the government to invest in tourism, it focused on the
second major goal of its efforts – attracting the US tourist market. By 1943, as the tide of World
War II began to turn definitively in the Allies’ favor, the CIAA also recognized the economic
possibilities for developing tourism in Peru. Other organizations began promoting hemispheric
tourism before the CIAA. The Pan American Union formed a Travel Division in 1935 to
promote inter-American tourism and organized a series of conferences on tourism.\textsuperscript{79} The United
States government also began using the State Department and the CIAA to explore the
possibilities of transforming cultural cooperation into economic results through tourism. The US
Embassy in Lima sent dispatches to Washington reporting on early efforts at tourism promotion
in Peru.\textsuperscript{80} One 1943 CIAA report on transportation infrastructure in Peru predicted that, “the
tourist will play a large part in the financial future of the Republic [of Peru].”\textsuperscript{81} As early as July
1943, the CIAA had contacted the Peruvian Embassy’s Commercial Councilor inquiring about

\textsuperscript{78} NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 657, Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas, \textit{Nuevos Hoteles del Perú para el
Turismo}, año 2, no. 4, (September, 1941), 24.

\textsuperscript{79} The Pan-American Union organized two regional travel conferences: one in San Francisco in 1939 and a second
meeting in Mexico City in 1941 where Eduardo Dibbos Dammert, former Lima mayor and TACP head represented
Peru. At both conferences representatives of national tourism interests discussed strategies for hemispheric tourism
promotion ranging from propaganda coordination, financing, and eliminating visa and travel restrictions. Activities
and participants of the 1941 meeting reported in: NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 656, \textit{Final Act: Second Inter-
American Travel Conference, Mexico, DF, September 15-24,} (Pan-American Union Travel Division: Washington,
DC, 1941); Previous hemispheric tourism efforts summarized in: NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 657, Dorothy Lack,
“Suggested Program for the Development of Inter-American Tourist Travel for the Office of Inter-American
Affairs,” 3.

\textsuperscript{80} See: NA, RG 59, Decimal file 1930-1939, 823.11/87, “Regarding decree of March 1937 designating a special
commission to prepare the draft of a Tourist Law,” March 5, 1937; and, NA, RG 59, decimal file 1930-1939,
823.111/102, US Embassy Lima to Washington, Subject: Encouragement of Tourist Traffic by the Government of
Peru,” December 20, 1937.

\textsuperscript{81} NA, RG 229, Entry 1, OIAA, Box 202, From F. D. Rugg to Mr. J. Stanton Robbins, “Transmittal of Report of
Transportation Survey of Peru,” October 23, 1944, 22.
the government-owned hotel chain stating: “Several months ago, hotel interests in this country were approached with the idea that they might operate them.” Efforts to promote US tourism in Latin America increased as the war reached its conclusion.

By 1945, director Rockefeller personally instructed the US Good Neighbor agency (renamed the Office of Inter-American Affairs, OIAA) to focus on increasing tourism in all of Latin America. By May of 1945, the OIAA issued an internal planning report titled, “Suggested Program for the Development of Inter-American Tourist Travel.” In the report, the OIAA encouraged continued hemispheric cooperation for the development of tourism noting that, “any project undertaken by the Office of Inter-American Affairs to promote travel of our citizens to other American Republics will, therefore, result in better economic and cultural relationships for us all.” Working with the publishing house of Duell, Sloan, and Peace, the OIAA helped publish a travel guide of Latin America geared toward North American tourists. The guides recommended trips to Cusco, “the archeological capital of South America,” and Machu Picchu, “one of the greatest archeological discoveries of recent times.” An English language guide book for Lima and Peru reflected the emphasis on interaction and tourist exchange as part of an overall hemispheric Pan-American policy. Featuring photos of Franklin Roosevelt and Peru’s President Prado, the guide’s introduction optimistically proclaimed: “We believe that a thorough understanding of each other is the firmest basis of mutual respect and

82 NA, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 202, 2-Peru, Economic Dev., Tourists, Dorothy Lack to Juan Chávez D., Commercial Councilor, July 26, 1943.
83 NA, RG 229, Box 656, Nelson A. Rockefeller to Wallace K. Harrison, Director, Office of Inter-American Affairs, April 20, 1945.
friendship in the Americas. We extend then a cordial invitation to all American citizens to visit Peru.”

For proponents of tourism development in Peru, the time to act had arrived.

US diplomats were not alone in anticipating a post-war tourism boom. In the November, 1943 issue of *Turismo*, the editors commented on the upcoming efforts by Roca Muello to hold a National Tourism Conference. “Although it is true that the war has not yet concluded, already the victory of the rightous has appeared on the global horizon,” began a November 1943 editorial in *Turismo*. The editorial concluded that, “Peru should, therefore, prepare with all foresight and organization its plans for tourism for the postwar”

The goal of post-war tourism preparation was best summarized in the January 1944 edition of *Turismo*. The magazine greeted the new year with an editorial titled: “We will prepare for the invasion.” Using the well-known language of war preparation, the editorial rallied Peruvians in favor of a coordinated tourism policy to meet a welcomed invasion of tourists. “It will arrive principally from the North, blond, happy, and wealthy,” predicted the opening line of the essay. “Uncle Sam, acting as commander in chief, will give the order to attack. They will arrive with the most powerful and well-known arms: money, money, money.” The essay predicted that, “Once again the Inca Empire will fall,” and, “the flags of the tourists will fly above Macchupicchu next to ours. What a beautiful defeat!” The essay’s call to arms ended with the final lines stating: “We shall lose this war! We shall be patriots! That all shall come, nothing more. We will disarm ourselves so they do not fight the armies of malaria and filth. We shall not follow the orders of the high command of disorganization. General Tourism shall be the one who strategizes. May it be him who receives our ‘advesary.’ That it may be him who decides. Him who says to the invading army: ‘You are

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87 “Editorial,” *Turismo*, November, 1943, BNP.
at home in our house! Do you like it? On with the victory march."\textsuperscript{88} For \textit{Turismo} and the interests it represented, the planned second conquest of Peru would be welcome, and more importantly, profitable.

**Tourism Triumphant**

New state investment in tourism and its promise for Cusco enjoyed its debut in 1944 as the new state-built Hotel Cusco prepared for its opening. With 93 rooms, the planned Cusco Hotel would be the largest of new venues (Figure 2.6).\textsuperscript{89} Justifying the importance of constructing a new hotel in Cusco, promotional materials noted that the city, “was declared the Archeological Capital of South America…and is on the road to quickly become one of the great tourist centers of the world.”\textsuperscript{90} The same publication detailed renovations plans for the Machu Picchu lodge noting its proximity to, “a spectacle that produces a profound impression on the spirit.”\textsuperscript{91} The early stages of hotel construction in Peru resembled more of the Leguía-era focus on road infrastructure and domestic automobile travel. The placement of hotels reinforced investments on the national highway system. Promotional reports justified state hotel construction noting: “the progressive labor [of the state] has given the country autoways that unite principal centers, and modern hotels lending excellent services to the most important cities,” (Figure 2.7).\textsuperscript{92} However, by 1944 Cusco’s culture and folklore had superseded domestic auto routes as the dominant tourism focus in Peru.

The intertwined relationship between Cusco folklore and tourism reached a new climax on June 24, 1944 when Cusco held its first celebration of Inti Raymi – a folkloric presentation

\textsuperscript{88} BNP, Ayax, “Preparemonos para la invasión,” \textit{Turismo}, January, 1944.
\textsuperscript{89} NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 657, “Hoteles Para Turistas en el Perú.”
\textsuperscript{90} NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 657, Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas, \textit{Nuevos Hoteles del Perú para el Turismo}, ano 2, no. 4, (September, 1941), 20.
\textsuperscript{91} NA, RG 229, Entry 40, Box 657, Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas, \textit{Nuevos Hoteles del Perú para el Turismo}, ano 2, no. 4, (September, 1941), 22.
\textsuperscript{92} Enrique Coronado Suarez, “Hoteles del turismo en el Peru,” in \textit{Boletín de la Unión Panamericana}, (March, 1945), 147.
recreating the Incan solstice ceremony – in coordination with the *Semana del Cusco* (Cusco Week). The idea to celebrate a week of civic pride dedicated to Cusco initially surged from neo-indigenistas looking to commemorate the importance of their region on June 24, the national “Day of the Indian.” The event won the endorsement of the Cusco Provincial Council as well as the Cusco Department Prefect Ernesto Barreto Gutiérrez. Eventually, President Prado himself embraced the initiative. Prado gave national recognition to Cusco Week and even personally arrived in the city for the celebrations in late June 1944. The staging of the civic week, the Inti Raymi enactment, and the presence of President Prado all helped legitimize the neo-indigenista folkloric project as both regional and national identity. In the assessment of Marisol de la Cadena, the event was “the neoindigenistas’ highest achievement.” The dramatic ceremony performed at Sacsayhuaman evoked regional history and a classic example of “invented tradition.” Like many of the neo-indigenista cultural projects that preceded it, Inti-Raymi heralded an imagined, glorious Inca past while simultaneously downplaying the political and racial divisions that marked the contemporary conditions of Indians in Cusco.

Inti-Raymi and Cusco Week also shared previous neo-indigenista obsessions with tourism development. As Cusco’s Prefect Gutiérrez noted, the event would highlight, “in the near future the development of not only internal, but international, tourism.” One the most anticipated events during Prado’s visit was the official opening of the new state-built tourist hotel. “This inauguration marks and important milestone in the work of the government towards the development of tourism,” spoke Prado at the hotel’s opening. The President praised the

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93 “El Día del Cusco,” *La Crónica*, June 24, 1944, 2, BNP.
modern facilities of the hotel and predicted that, “tourists will find in this hotel comforts that permit them to learn and study the most advanced culture of ancient America.” Local and national media praised efforts to promote Cusco. Lima’s La Crónica applauded Prado’s efforts by declaring: “In no other city besides Cuzco can one find a more reliable expression of what we can understand to be Peruvianess.” Cusqueños, of course, reveled in the national spotlight of the hotel inauguration and presidential visit. Cusco’s El Sol newspaper reported that thousands of the city’s civic leaders and residents attended Prado’s speech in honor of Cusco at the local school and greeted the head of state with, “a true apotheosis of applause and enthusiasm.” In fact, the assembled crowd became so enthusiastic a large group of residents lifted President Prado on their shoulders in “an improvised and popular civic act” and carried him back to the newly-inaugurated hotel.

The careful coordination between state policy and cultural tourism that debuted at the opening of the Hotel Cusco accelerated with the election of José Bustamante y Rivero as President in 1945. Bustamante y Rivero’s electoral platform called for populist reforms, expanded democratic inclusion, and a particular focus on state-led economic development to bring Peruvians out of poverty. Much to the delight of tourism interests and cusqueños, the new government promised increased state participation in tourist-centered development as a development strategy for the nation. In November 1945, Bustamante y Rivero formed a committee to organize a state tourism institution with the cooperation of the TACP leadership. At the start of 1946, the national government budgeted 3,000,000 soles for the promotion of

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100 BMC, “Días de fervoroso peruanismo ha vivido el Cuzco en torno a Manuel Prado celebrando el Día de la Ciudad,” El Sol, June 26, 1944, 2.
101 Klarén, Peru, 289.
tourism, an act applauded by Turismo. Finally, in April 1946, the president submitted a proposal to Congress to create a government-administered tourism office. Turismo applauded the effort and called for quick approval in Congress for, “the technical organization of tourism that promises to be one of the largest sources of wealth and grandeur.” On 5 June 5 1946 the Congress of Peru passed law 10556 creating the Corporación Nacional del Turismo (National Tourism Corporation, CNT) – the nation’s first state-supported institution tasked with developing a tourism industry. The organization and institution reach of CNT reflected the wide range of coordination needed for tourism promotion in Peru. The legislation creating CNT gave the new institution advisory duties to review projects with both the local Archeology Boards, Restoration Councils, and tourism-related projects created by the Ministry of Development. The legislation creating the CNT also granted it administrative duties. The CNT assumed the administration of the state-built hotels, the distribution of tourism propaganda, the opening of local tourist offices, and the management of a new tourism guide school.

The first General Director of the CNT was Benjamín Roca Muelle. Prior to his appointment, Roca Muelle had worked tirelessly as General Manager of the TACP between 1939 and 1941 as well as editor of Turismo to advocate for greater government involvement in tourism investment, planning, and promotion. Giving an interview to Turismo, Roca Muelle discussed the great challenge for his office. According to Roca Muelle, Peru’s tourism development lagged behind most nations. Peru’s highways and airports were deficient, the country had an inadequate amount of quality hotels, national museums and archeological sites lacked coordination and funds, the country maintained arcane and cumbersome visa requirements, and

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103 BNP, “Notas y Comentarios,” Turismo, February 1946.
104 BNP, “Notas y Comentarios,” Turismo, April 1946.
tourism propaganda abroad remained insufficient. Yet Roca Muelle remained optimistic. The fact that Peru had a centralized planning office for tourism with its own budget and staff marked a significant progress in Roca Muelle’s goals. “In sum, tourism is an activity that spans an extraordinary field of action…It is a synthetic industry that, well used can become a river of gold for Peru.” observed the new director.\(^{107}\)

In 1947, Roca Muelle and the CNT issued a dramatic call to highlight the importance that tourism would play in Peru’s economic and social future. On June 7 Roca Muelle formally inaugurated Peru’s first national tourism conference. President Bustamante y Rivero attended the conference providing a keynote lecture endorsing state-promoted tourism development.\(^{108}\) *El Comercio de Lima* applauded the move stating: “Tourism currently constitutes an activity that not only has industrial repercussions, but also efficiently contributes towards the better understanding between peoples since it permits individuals to become familiar with various aspects of a country.”\(^{109}\) Speaking on Radio Nacional, Minister of Development and chair of the conference, Pedro Betin Mujíca noted that tourism growth promised gains for all Peruvians. “Tourists do not only come to visit our old cities and abundant archeological remains,” asserted Betin Mujíca, “the tourist is a man accustomed to comfort and needs good hotels, efficient public services, and modern systems of transport…These services, logically, do not only benefit tourists, but all Peruvians.”\(^{110}\) *La Prensa* also agreed that the development of international tourism in Peru would result in better economic conditions for the nation. “One should understand,” the newspaper noted in an editorial,” that the affluence of a considerable number of


\(^{108}\) For a complete reproduction of the President’s address, see: “Discurso del Doctor José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, Presidente de la República,” in *El Turismo en el Perú*, ed. Luis Aylaza Paz Soldán, (Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1947), 63-69.

\(^{109}\) BNP, “Primer Congreso Nacional de Turismo,” ECL, June 8, 1947, 2.

travelers would honor Peru abroad and would make it possible to achieve an exchange that would aid commercial and industrial development.” 111 During the closing ceremony of the conference Roca Muelle announced an apparent new consensus regarding the importance of tourism for national development. “Do not forget it. The work of the CNT is the work of Peru,” announced Roca Muelle.112

Although the CNT proposed to make tourism the “work of Peru,” the organization’s initial plans appeared to make the development more the work of Cusco. From the organization’s start, CNT leadership asserted that, “the conservation and restoration of historical and archeological monuments in the city of Cuzco, although outside the specific mission of the corporation, has deserved preferential attention.” 113 In 1946, CNT reported that it had even organized its own team to prepare a scholarly report to Cusco’s local archeology council highlight preservation priorities for sites in the region.114 The National Tourism Conference only accelerated the CNT’s focus on tourism. El Comercio de Cusco, reporting on the events of the congress, informed its readers of the importance of the work of the CNT and its 1947 meeting in a May 21 editorial. “The referenced congress presents the possibilities to obtain the spoils that Cusco deserves due to its singular touristic importance,” argued El Comercio del Cusco to its readers.115 El Comercio de Cusco’s interest in the congress proved deserved. Of the 19 official recommendations agreed upon during the first National Tourism Conference of 1947, five recommended a specific developmental focus on archeological zones with an additional five mentioning the Cusco’s touristic importance. The recommendations included the development

of an urban plan for Cusco, declaring the city a national monument, establishing a new
archaeological museum in the zone, an extensive restoration of regional historic sites, and
improved investment in folkloric studies.\footnote{BNP, “Recomendaciones sobre nuestro patrimonio artístico aprobados por el I Congreso Nacional del Turismo,” ECL, afternoon edition, June 12, 1947, 8.}

The new positions taken by the CNT proved especially helpful to ongoing local efforts to
restore Cusco’s archaeological and historic sites. In May of 1947, CNT donated 100,000 soles
towards restoration work in Cusco’s churches and colonial painting. That same year, CNT
funded a greatly-expanded Inti-Raymi Festival.\footnote{BNP, “Corporación Nacional del Turismo: Boletín Informático,” ECC, May 7, 1947, 3.} That same month, the CNT headed a
renovation and cleaning project for Cusco’s central Plaza de Armas.\footnote{BNP, “Corporación Nacional del Turismo: Boletín Informático,” ECC, May 23, 1947, 3.} Roca Muelle justified the
CNT’s expenses in Cusco noting: “it is deserved considering the act from a touristic
perspective.”\footnote{Archivo del Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Ministerio de Cultura, (AINC), 08.01.01-04-1, Folder “Zona Monumental – Informes en General – Cusco – años 1941-1968,” Benjamín Roca Muelle to Presidente del Consejo Nacional de Conservación y Restauración de Monumentos Historicos, May 2, 1947.}
The following year, the CNT joined the National Archeology Board to compose
a report on restoration priorities for Cusco’s archaeological sites. \textit{La Crónica} praised the efforts
noting: “This landscape of summits and ruins that dwell amongst the fair cusqueñas should
one of the major beneficiaries of the funds from the CNT. A preservation team began work at
the site in May of 1948.\footnote{BNP, “Serán ejecutadas trabajos de reparación urgentes en las ruinas de Machu Picchu,” \textit{La Crónica}, morning edition, May 18, 1948, 4.}

\textbf{The “Discoverer of Machu Picchu” Returns}

The CNT project at Machu Picchu likely originated from a major promotional coup for
Cusco. At the start of 1948, newspapers announced that selection of Cusco as the site of the
second Inter-American Indigenista Congress. Regional and national officials expressed their
pleasure that the conference planned to be held to coincide with Inti Raymi and Cusco Week on June 24, 1948. Promoters of the conference promised that the event would re-affirm Cusco as
the archeological, folkloric, and touristic capital of South America. Roca Muelle’s CNT
seized the opportunity for the proposed 1948 Indigenista Conference to accelerate tourism
investment in Cusco. The national government and CNT successfully proposed funding a new
access road to Machu Picchu in preparation for the congress. By the end of May, 1948, as 140
workers labored to complete the road, CNT and proposed to increase the size of the tourist hotel
at Machu Picchu as well as several highways that traveled through the sacred valley, “in order to
benefit the members of the Inter-American Indigenista Congress.” However, for CNT and
tourism interest, the inauguration of the new highway provided an opportunity to promote Machu
Picchu far beyond the audience of visiting indigenistas.

Roca Muelle and Giesecke viewed the opening of the highway as an optimal moment to seize the growing global interest in Machu Picchu. To do so, they turned to Hiram Bingham and, in the process, reinvented the explorer and his narrative. Giesecke and Roca Muelle initially proposed placing a plaque or pedestal to honor Bingham as part of the highway project. By March of 1948, the CNT and Giesecke had persuaded the government to name the new access road to Machu Picchu in honor of Bingham and invite the explorer for the inauguration of the highway. When Bingham departed Peru in 1915 accused of theft, the explorer and his hosts held few amicable feelings toward one another. Local distrust of Bingham proved warranted considering the fact that the explorer had illegally exported artifacts from Peru over the course of

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123 Original intent of the highway defined in: AGN, Lima, Fondo de Asuntos Indígenas, Legajo, 3.13.2.9, ano 1948, folio 123, “Resolución Suprema, 15 de Mayo de 1948.”
124 BNP, “El turismo en Cusco,” ECL, May 23, 1948, 2. No mention of Bingham is made in this article. The stated goal for the construction of the highway was the expected Indigenista Congress
his three exhibitions.\textsuperscript{126} Besides his questionable activities, Bingham’s unapologetic support for US imperialism had framed his first publications through a distinct imperial gaze that now appeared opposed to the Good Neighbor discourse embraced in tourism promotion.\textsuperscript{127} Although, as Deborah Poole as argued, North American visions of the Andes often produced many alternate and opposition interpretations of the Andes, the image of Bingham needed to be modified for a new project of tourism promotion.\textsuperscript{128}

However it appeared that the passage of time as well as the promise of Pan-American interest in Machu Picchu has eroded the animosity between the both sides. As early as 1941, Bingham had contacted Giesecke expressing a desire to return to Peru.\textsuperscript{129} Reaching out through mutual acquaintances, Gesiecke contacted Bingham in May of 1948 to inquire if the explorer was interested in returning to Machu Picchu.\textsuperscript{130} With Giesecke’s help, the CNT office in New York translated Bingham’s speeches into Spanish prior to his departure.\textsuperscript{131} To capitalize on the media attention surrounding Bingham’s visit Turismo magazine published a special English-language article for North American readers describing Cusco as, “the millenary capital of the Inca Empire, is the Peruvian city of major attraction to tourists.”\textsuperscript{132} Bingham’s visit promised to be a major debut for both the CNT and Machu Picchu.

In addition to the transportation logistics, promoters of the Bingham visit faced an additional challenge; they had to rewrite the narrative of the “discovery” of Machu Picchu to reflect the Pan-American goodwill the visit sought to promote. Lauding Bingham as the

\textsuperscript{126} Heany, \textit{Cradle of Gold}, 189-198.
\textsuperscript{127} For more on Bingham’s work as a product of “imperial knowledge” see, Salvatore, “Local Versus Imperial Knowledge,” 67-80.
\textsuperscript{128} Poole, “Landscape and the Imperial Subject: U.S. Images of the Andes, 1850-1930,” 107-138.
\textsuperscript{129} AG-0140, Hiram Bingham to Albert Giesecke, August 9, 1941.
\textsuperscript{130} AG-0521, Albert Giesecke to John Clifford Folger, May 17, 1948.
\textsuperscript{131} AG-0140, Hiram Bingham to Albert Giesecke, September 29, 1948.
\textsuperscript{132} BNP, “Cuzco, Imperial Incaeland, the Greatest Goal of Students and Tourists,” \textit{Turismo}, October-November, 1948.
discoverer of Machu Picchu conflicted both with the narrative of actual events of 1915 and the erroneous scientific conclusions of Bingham himself. Initially, both Bingham and his hosts appeared happy to overlook the acrimonious end of the 1915 Peruvian Expedition. When Bingham arrived in Lima accompanied by his second wife, Suzanne, on October 6, 1948, Giesecke reported that he, “was received with real affection by the people.” Bingham returned the welcome with his own friendly thanks to Peru. Providing an interview with El Comercio de Lima upon arriving at the US Embassy, Bingham thanked his hosts and stated that he was looking forward to returning to Cusco after 32 years concluding: “There is nothing comparable to Machu-Picchu.” Even Cusco’s archeological scholars who had advocated for Bingham’s prosecution for theft in 1915, referred to him as a, “romantic North American archeologist, enchanted by the past,” in their 1948 academic bulletin. It appeared that time, Pan-American sentiment, and the promise of tourism had erased former mistrust between Bingham and Peru.

In Cusco, Bingham enjoyed both academic and civic support. Bingham gave a lecture on the history of Machu Picchu at UNSAAC on October 14, 1948. In his lecture, Bingham reasserted his original theories regarding Machu Picchu. He argued that the city was both Tampu-tocco, the legendary origin of the Inca as well as the Vilcabamba-the-Old, the last holdout of the pre-Hispanic empire. Although both facts were seriously doubted by archeologists in Peru and the United States, no one offered public doubts of Bingham’s theories. Few moments emerged during the visit that countered the narrative praising Bingham as the “discoverer” of Machu Picchu. Surprisingly, Bingham himself was one of the few who acknowledged the help of

133 AG-0521, Albert Giesecke to John Clifford Folger, November 22, 1948.
136 For additional accounts of Bingham’s 1948 visit see: Alfred Bingham, Portrait of an Explorer, 343; Heany, Cradle of Gold, 212-214.
cusqueños during his first encounter with Machu Picchu. Interviewed by *El Comercio de Lima* Bingham acknowledged that Melchor Arteaga informed him of the ruin that lay atop his *finca* at Mando Pampa. An editorial published on October 17 in *El Comercio de Lima* also reminded readers that Bingham, “was accompanied by two Peruvians, the guide Arteaga and a Sargent of the National Army with the surname Carrasco.”

The highway inauguration took place on Sunday October 17, 1948, opened by speeches by Cosio, Bingham, and Giesecke delivered at the base of the mountain. Cusco Department Prefect Tamayo then asked for Suzanne Bingham to lift the veil to reveal a plaque celebrating Bingham as the “discoverer of Machu Picchu.” Suzanne Bingham broke a bottle of champagne against the rocks near the plaque, and Hiram Bingham, “visibly emotional,” according to the press, gave a short speech in Spanish thanking all those in attendance. *El Comercio de Cusco* reported on Bingham’s presence in heroic terms. “The sunlight bore on him and revealed his white hair and handsome head,” noted the local newspaper. *El Comercio del Cusco* recounted Bingham’s speech noting: “Bingham remembered his first ascension through these mountains, in the middle of a dense jungle, carried by the faith of a main of science; his emotion upon discovering the grandiose and full of majesty ruins.” Leaving Cusco denounced as a thief in 1915, Bingham had returned in 1948 as a benevolent, Pan-American discoverer of Machu Picchu.

When the party ascended the highway to arrive at the entrance to the ruins Hiram traveled by car and Suzanne by mule. *La Crónica* noted the significance of the two journeys: “he was the first passenger to travel the new highway by automobile and his spouse the last person to ascend

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141 BMC, “Las ceremonias en la histórica Machu-Picchu,” ECC, October 18, 1948, 2.
the hill by the old path.” At the entrance of the ruin, Suzanne Bingham inaugurated another plaque placed by the Rotary Club in honor of Hiram Bingham. After the ceremonies, the entire party, including US Ambassador Harold H. Tittman lunched in the tourist lodge as guests of the Rotary Club. *La Crónica* noted that, for the first time, guests who had had breakfast in Lima now could enjoy lunch at Machu Picchu.142 *El Comercio de Lima* observed how, “the Stone city of Machupicchu has suffered the first impact of civilization, but we speak of an impact that will not do damage, because [the ruin] finds itself destined to fulfill its archeological importance and its admirable beauty.”143 Bingham himself commended the work of the CNT and endorsed state promotion of tourism development in Cusco.144

The 1948 return not only rehabilitated access to Machu Picchu, the visit rehabilitated Bingham’s professional career and image. For this achievement, Bingham had to thank Peruvians, Good Neighbor diplomats, and tourism backers who, in the interest of promoting Machu Picchu, had rewritten the historical narrative. Bingham wrote to Giesecke following his 1948: “Your thoughtfulness and your many kindnesses, so numerous that I cannot begin to enumerate them, have placed me under a heavy burden of obligations that will be very difficult to meet! I cannot remember a time when I owed so much in the way of honor, hospitality, and efficient help to one man!”145 The visit allowed Bingham to publish a final book on his exploits at Machu Picchu. Published in 1948, *Lost City of the Incas: The Story of Machu Picchu and Its Builders*, would be Bingham’s final publication.146 Unlike Bingham’s earlier publications that cast an imperial gaze on the Andes and its resources, his final publication emphasized the Pan-

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142 BNP, “Fué inaugurada la carretera Hiram Bingham que conduce a las ruinas de Machupicchu,” *La Crónica*, October 20, 1948, 7.
144 Bingham’s endorsement of the work of the CNT found in: BNP, Manuel E. Cuadros E., “El camino a la ciudad de Machupicchu aumentará el Turismo hacia el Cuzco,” ECL, morning edition, October 27, 1948, 15.
145 AG-0140, Hiram Bingham to Albert Giesecke, November 2, 1948.
146 Bingham, *Lost City of the Incas*. 85
American narratives crafted for his return to Cusco. Bingham’s book drew mixed critical responses. The New York Times noted that: “Just as he himself had to clear away the tropical hardwood forest which had obliterated much of Machu Picchu, the reader has to hack through the underbrush of his awkward narrative and torturous exposition.” ¹⁴⁷ In another review, archeologist Victor Von Hagen also pointed out that Bingham’s theories regarding the purpose of the city were probably incorrect. However, Von Hagen still credited Bingham with drawing much needed public interest to archeology and the Inca and kindly concluded that, “the fabulous city of Machu Picchu, as revealed here, will forever stand as Dr. Hiram Bingham’s archeological monument.” ¹⁴⁸

**Epilogue: Cracks in the Monument**

For many, Bingham’s return to Machu Picchu in 1948 would mark the culmination of decades of work cultivating foreign interest, constructing infrastructure, and rewriting historical narratives all in the interest of transforming Cusco into Peru’s great tourism center and representative of national identity. Yet, the re-invention of Cusco and Machu Picchu did not go undisputed. Although incidents appeared to be rare, sometimes the activities of US tourists caused friction with Peruvians. One US Embassy memo from February 1, 1943 reported that, “certain Peruvians of strong North American affiliation find it very hard to justify the virtues of the people of the United States...the spectacle of quantities of gringos huddled around the cocktail shaker like sheep, trying to find some sort of spiritual warmth, appears to them at variance with the American credo.” ¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ NA, RG 59, decimal file 1940-1949, Box 4362, 823.43, Instituto Cultural Peruano Norteamericano/4, PS/9, George C. Vaillant, Cultural Relations Attaché, to US Secretary of State, Subject: Report on cultural relation activities for the month of January 1944, February 1, 1943 (sic), 3.
More importantly, the CIAA, the CNT, and the many intermediaries promoting Cusco to the world threatened to stamp out counter-narratives of the Andes that did not correspond to the “Good Neighbor” imagery of Machu Picchu and Bingham. As Alex Saragoza notes in the case of Mexico, under tourism policies that standardized regional folklore for the tourist gaze, “the visibility of the local contracted, its multiplicity blurred by an advancing essentialist myopia.”150 This myopia aided Cusco’s elite in stamp out the powerful counter-narratives against exploitation raised by the indigenista grassroots agrarian rebellions in favor of neo-indigenista folklore. Simultaneously, the Good Neighbor tourism narratives, constructed both in the United States and Peru, also reframed Bingham’s activities. Once an unapologetic representation of North American imperial designs on the Andes, Bingham returned to Peru as a heroic protagonist of a largely imagined Pan-American tale of cooperation.

For many, particularly Latin American leftists, Machu Picchu and the Inca served as signs of indigenous resistance and hemispheric struggles against US imperialism, not the invented narratives promoted by the CNT. Chilean poet and Communist Party militant Pablo Neruda visited Machu Picchu in 1943 at the height of the site’s Good Neighbor reinvention of the site.151 Returning to his native Chile, Neruda composed reflected on his experience in the poem “Heights of Machu Picchu.” In the poem, Neruda drew inspiration from the monument to call for class unity of Latin America’s oppressed:

Look at me from the depths of the earth,
tiller of fields, weaver, reticent shepherd,
groom of totemic guanacos,
mason high on your treacherous scaffolding,
iceman of Andean tears,
jeweler with crushed fingers,
farmer anxious among his seedlings,
potter wasted among his clays--

bring to the cup of this new life 
your ancient buried sorrows.\textsuperscript{152}

Ernesto “Che” Guevara also drew similar inspiration visiting Machu Picchu on his now-famous motorcycle tour of Latin America in 1952. For Che, Machu Picchu was, “an arm outstretched to the future, a stony voice with continental reach that shouts ‘citizens of Indo-America, reconquer the past!’”\textsuperscript{153} For Latin American leftists, Machu Picchu represented little of the elite-oriented tourism promoted during the 1930s and 1940s.

However, before Bingham even arrived in Peru in 1948, serious threats placed those decades of work in peril. On October 3, 1948 a major naval revolt erupted in Lima’s port city of Callao. Although Bustamante y Rivero and his government survived the uprising, the Indigenista Conference was delayed. Giesecke, Cusco officials, and Roca Muelle barely managed to avoid the cancellation of Bingham’s visit. Shortly after the warm reception for Bingham, Bustamante y Rivero’s government fell to a military coup led by General Manuel Odría. The new Odría regime was backed by Peru’s economic elite who aimed to return Peru to an orthodox liberal economy and withdraw from the state-led development initiatives (like the CNT) endorsed by Bustamante y Rivero.\textsuperscript{154} The Odría regime wasted little time in scaling back the work of the CNT, as well as the indigenista and Cusco-backed cultural initiatives promoted by Bustamante y Rivero Government. Quickly, the successful transnational connections forged to promote tourism and cultural policy in Cusco became a liability. After the fall of Bustamante y Rivero, the national state had little initiative to pursue development and cultural strategies that

\textsuperscript{153} Ernesto “Che” Guevara, “Machu-Picchu, Enigma de Piedra en America,” \textit{Siete}, (Panama), December 1953, reprinted in \textit{Casa de las Americas} (Havana) 28:163 (July-August 1987), 51. Thanks to Christopher Heaney for this information.
had largely bypassed it in favor of transnational institutions and links. By 1948, the United States had transitioned from the Good Neighbor Era to an aggressive Cold War focus that suspiciously viewed the nationalist and populist projects of Bustamante y Rivero’s government. Serious cracks had developed in the political, cultural, and economic foundations of tourism development in Cusco and Machu Picchu.
Figures

Figure 2.1, US National Archives, RG 229. New tourist rail transport to Machu Picchu from the 1930s.

Figure 2.2, Author’s personal collection. *The Citadel of a Hundred Stairways*
Figure 2.3, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. First Edition of *Turismo*.

Figure 2.4, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Panagra Publicity in *Turismo* magazine.
Figure 2.5. Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. Panagra Publicity in *Turismo*.

Figure 2.6. US National Archives, RG 229. Illustration promoting the new Cusco Hotel.
Figure 2.7, US National Archives, RG 229. Government Hotel Map of Peru, note the emphasis on the national highway network,
Chapter 3

Disaster Destinations: Restoration, Rebuilding, and Recovery of Tourism, 1948-1960

Optimism defined the narrative of tourism development in Cusco and Machu Picchu during the 1940s. Encouraged by the US diplomatic and business interests, the Peruvian state began to demonstrate a strong interest in promoting tourism in Cusco, and commenced an aggressive campaign to build new roads, hotels, and tourist facilities throughout the region. In addition, wartime aviation innovations had cut time and cost for travelers to Peru permitting Cusco to compete with traditional Latin American vacation destinations. Most importantly, Cusco had captured the popular imagination of Peruvian and foreign travelers. With the guidance of prominent Cusco indigenistas working in Lima and Washington, Good Neighbor cultural diplomacy re-introduced Machu Picchu and the Southern Andes to a new generation of global consumers. The promise of developing cultural tourism in Cusco also aided preservationists and local political leaders in soliciting much needed funds to develop the region’s historic sites. These efforts culminated in the carefully-planned return visit of Hiram Bingham in 1948 to open the new tourist highway to Machu Picchu. “The ruins of Machu-Pichu are open to global tourism,” proudly declared El Comercio de Lima as planners finalized what many hoped would mark a new era for Cusco.1

However, the high hopes for tourism in Cusco stoked by Bingham’s visit proved ephemeral. By 1950, three events placed the development of tourism in Cusco in peril. The fall of the reformist Bustamante y Rivero government in 1948 nearly eliminated all state investment and promotion of tourism in Cusco. Second, the lack of state preservation investment at Machu Picchu had allowed time and climate to wear down its structures to the point where some feared the ruin would disappear entirely. Finally, in May 1950 a violent earthquake struck Cusco

destroying much of the city and damaging many historic structures. The earthquake inflicted a terrible blow to Cusco’s regional economy. Additionally, many feared that the tremors had wiped away nearly two decades of efforts to promote the region as a tourism destination. However, by the start of the 1960s, the promise of tourism development in Cusco appeared stronger than ever before. How did Cusco’s fledgling tourist development emerge from disaster to development over the course of a decade with little support from the national state?

This chapter will investigate how local leaders and stakeholders in Cusco’s tourism economy confronted the natural and political threats to its development during the 1950s. In particular, this chapter traces how Cusco residents and regional leaders skillfully channeled the financial and technical assistance made available through the earthquake disaster recovery to create local development – an example of what historian Mark Carey has termed, “disaster economics.” Historians of Cusco have detailed how elites and political leaders employed the earthquake reconstruction in an attempt to create industrial development and modernize the region’s economy. This chapter will trace the previously-overlooked process how Cusco leaders, tourism promoters, and preservationists compensated for the loss of state support following the 1948 military coup by resorting to strategies of disaster economics. To accomplish this goal, these actors relied on many of the non-traditional and transnational links that aided the development of tourism in Cusco prior to World War II. These links included the national and international media, new transnational development and cultural organizations, and personal and political connections in Lima and abroad. With surprising success, these links permitted Cusco to shift from a destination of disaster into one of development. However, as cusqueños and their allies looked beyond the state to foment tourism, their actions provoked conflicts over planning,

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2 Carey, *In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers*, 12.
control over sites of cultural heritage, and raised questions about the goals of modernization in their region.

**Political Shifts for Cusco Tourism**

October of 1948 appeared to mark a new dawn in the development of tourism at Machu Picchu. In that month, Hiram Bingham returned to Peru as a guest of the Peruvian state’s two-year-old CNT to open the new automobile highway to Machu Picchu on 17 October 1948. However, as Bingham cut the ribbon to the new highway bearing his name, ominous signs for tourism, Cusco, and Machu Picchu had already appeared on the horizon. The government of President José Bustamante y Rivero, already shaken by a navy insurrection, would fall victim to a military coup led by General Manuel A. Odría on 29 October 1948. When the new government quickly delayed the planned Second Inter-American Indigenista Congress to be held in Cusco due to – in the euphemistic words of one government document – “adverse climatic conditions,” it became clear to many that the Odría military regime was not interested in pursuing the policies of the Bustamante y Rivero government that emphasized state-led tourism development and a celebration of indigenous nationalism.4

When Bustamante y Rivero’s Frente Nacional Democrático (National Democratic Front) fell victim to Odría’s military coup, it took with it one of the strongest supporters of tourism development in Cusco and Machu Picchu. The new military government forced Benjamín Roca Muelle to leave his post as the president of CNT. Since the 1930s, Roca Muelle had used his position at the TACP and as editor of *Turismo* magazine to lobby for increased state participation in tourism development. However, Roca Muelle’s close association with the Bustamante y

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4AGN, Fondo Asuntos Indígenas, Legajo 3.13.2.9, ano 1948, folio 43. The indigenista conference was eventually rescheduled for June and July of 1949. For details of the conference see: “El II Congreso Indigenista Interamericano,” in *B.B.A.A., Boletín Biográfico de Antropología Americana* 12, no. 1, (January-December, 1949), 16-23.
Rivero government forced CNT’s first president to resign. By 1949, Ernesto Cánepa Sardon had replaced Roca Muelle as director general of CNT. 5 In March of 1950, Odría appointed a special review commission of CNT directed by Roberto Thorndike as the chief of the “reorganization commission” of CNT. The predictable result was the end of the Peru’s first attempt at using the resources of the state to foment tourism development. 6 At a time when the national state took a central role in planning and promoting tourism development in traditional Latin American destinations like Cuba and Mexico, the Peruvian government began to draw back its investments in the tourist economy. 7

It is likely that the Odría regime discontinued CNT due to its the close association with the Bustamante y Rivero government. However, the state’s retreat from tourism development reflected larger shifts in the Peruvian political and economic landscapes. Peru’s upper and middle classes blamed Bustamante y Rivero’s focus on state-led development for a national economic downturn and political instability following World War II. CNT proved to be one of many state-sponsored industries that withered under the Odría regime’s return to orthodox economic liberalism in the 1950s. 8 Even staunch allies of tourism in Peru questioned the viability of CNT. “Creating a costly and difficult-to-publicly fund entity with sights set on an eventual tourism increase was an adventure,” concluded Turismo magazine in its January-February 1951 edition. 9 Other periodicals like La Prensa reached a different conclusion. “The Peruvian government, possibly with very good intentions, created an organization called the National Tourism Corporation, that naturally had to fail because it was born as an independent

5 “La visita del General Odría a la Corporación Nacional del Turismo,” Turismo, July-August 1949.
7 Mexican President Miguel Alemán Valdés vigorously used state resources to support tourism development in Mexico and Acapulco in particular in the 1940s and 1950s as documented by, Saragoza, “The Selling of Mexico: Tourism and the State, 1929-1959,” 102-104; the Cuban state’s role in tourism promotion in the 1940s and 1950s is documented in, Schwartz, Pleasure Island.
8 Kláren, Peru, 300.
9 “Editorial,” Turismo, January-February, 1951, 2
entity, without sufficient authority,” stated an editorial published on April 13, 1952. According to *La Prensa*, CNT did not fail due to the flaws of state-led development, but instead from a lack of adequate government support and efficient administration.  

Although the causes of CNT’s demise were up for debate, Cusco’s regional leaders understood that the resignation of Roca Muelle meant that they had lost a valuable ally in the national government. Roca Muelle had emerged as a strong advocate for Cusco’s fledgling tourism economy. Roca Muelle believed that Cusco and Machu Picchu offered the most promising attractions for international tourists and used the power of his office at CNT to direct needed state resources to the region. During its short existence, CNT had overseen the construction Cusco’s newest hotel, funded Machu Picchu’s 1948 restoration, and planned Bingham’s visit to the region.  

The promotion of tourism in Peru fell under the responsibility of the private TACP headquartered in Lima and its local Cusco office. Although the TACP did continue to promote tourism in Cusco, it lacked the coordination and funding to fill the gap left by the dissolution of CNT.  

In the wake of CNT’s dissolution the task of drawing attention to Machu Picchu returned to the strategies employed in the first decades of tourism promotion – efforts led largely through individual volunteers with international connections. The US-born educator and longtime Cusco resident, Albert Giesecke, emerged as a key informal ambassador for tourism at Machu Picchu after the elimination of CNT. Since the 1920s when he served as rector of the Universidad San Antonio del Abad del Cusco and later as mayor, Giesecke led efforts in promoting Cusco and Machu Picchu as tourism destinations. Giesecke appeared happy to again volunteer to take a leading role in encouraging tourism development in Cusco in the 1950s. Speaking to Cusco’s

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10 Juan Esteban Maguña, “El Turismo en el Perú,” *La Prensa*, April 13, 1952, 2  
12 See for example, Martha Fergurson, “A Tour of Southern Peru,” *The Peruvian Times*, September 30, 1949, 1.
congressional delegation and board of directors of the Club Cusco on 18 March 1954, Giesecke remarked on his activities to encourage tourism. “Even now, I continue daily providing facts and directions to visitors that want to visit Cuzco and Machu Picchu,” spoke Giesecke. “[The region’s] amazing monuments that are cusqueño pride should be preserved with veneration and admiration,” counseled Giesecke who concluded that it was a duty to, “conserve and make them easily accessible to all who want to visit them.”

Giesecke’s comments regarding his aid to travelers were not hyperbole. One US traveler wrote to Giesecke in 1958 that, “apparently all roads lead to Rome except in Peru where all Inca roads lead to you.” Using his Cultural Attaché post at the US Embassy in Lima, Giesecke often provided key travel information about Machu Picchu to airline companies and tourists. So notable were Giesecke’s tourism contacts in Lima and Cusco, other US Ambassadors in South America regularly referred any travel inquires about Machu Picchu to him. Giesecke used his connections to coordinate a steady stream of visits from (primarily) North American politicians and celebrities. For example, Giesecke accompanied Joan Fontaine on her visit to Machu Picchu in 1951. Fontaine’s visit to the ruin departed from the norm when she met and adopted a local girl named Martita Pareja who she met at the Aguas Calientes train station. Giesecke helped arrange the controversial adoption and coordinate return visits that generated additional press for Machu Picchu.

13 Speech contents found in, AG-D-042; event program found in AG-1709.
14 AG, legajo 1143, Franklin K. Paddock to Albert Giesecke, 7 July 1958.
15 See correspondence between Giesecke and U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, Waleter J. Donelly contained in AG, legajo 0424.
16 The narrative of the first visit and 1953 return visit described in: “Joan Fontaine y Martita Pareja,” Caretas, 15-30 September 1953, 6-7. Giesecke received almost annual letters from Fontaine updating him about “our little Inca Princess,” to pass on to the Pareja family as late as 1965. Later letters point to a fascinating, albeit troubled, relationship between Martita, Fontaine, and the Parejas. By 1957, Martita was attending school in Switzerland and Fontaine had gone through a divorce losing custody of one daughter, but keeping Martita. By 1963, Martita was adopted by another married couple named the Beards living in Kennebunkport, Maine and, according to Fontaine, “going through periods of withdrawal.” By 1965, Martita was adopted by the Reverend Howe family of
To compensate for the dissolution of CNT, Giesecke also worked to publicize Machu Picchu in the national and international media. Similar to the strategies he employed in the 1930s and 1940s, Giesecke hoped to use Good Neighbor and Pan-American sentiments and links to maintain public awareness of Cusco and Machu Picchu in the US. In 1951, Giesecke proposed the formation of a “Machu Picchu Club” to create an international group to coordinate preservation and publicity efforts of the site. Giesecke suggested that influential North American journalist Julius Klien serve as the club’s new president with Bingham and *National Geographic* editor Gilbert Grosvenor serving as honorary chairs. Giesecke went so far as to propose that Fontaine’s daughter, Martita, serve as a “young officer,” in the planned Los Angeles chapter of the club.\(^{17}\) Giesecke worked to organize the booster club for Macchu Picchu for several years. Many other prominent cusqueños like José Gabriel Cosio shared interest in establishing the club. However, efforts to establish the Machu Picchu club met a serious obstacle when Bingham declined to participate in the effort in 1955. Responding to Giesecke’s request, Bingham replied that he was “too old and feeble to do much of anything,” essentially stopping the formation of the proposed club.\(^{18}\) Giesecke found more success in publicizing Machu Picchu in the national media in 1952 when he produced a series of national radio programs titled, *The Mystery of Machu Picchu* that earned praise from the TACP.\(^{19}\)

\(^{17}\) AG-0356, Albert Giesecke to Harry Crocker, 23 April 1951.

\(^{18}\) AG-1040, Albert Giesecke to Hiram Bingham, 2 April 1955; Hiram Bingham to to Albert Giesecke, April 26, 1955.

\(^{19}\) AG-1040, Albert Giesecke to Hiram Bingham, 18 July 1952; AG-0414, Eduardo Dibos to Albert Giesecke, August 6, 1952.
Perhaps Giesecke’s most substantial achievement in popularizing tourism development at Machu Picchu occurred in 1953 when he served as technical advisor to the filming of Paramount Studio’s *The Secret of the Incas.*[^20] For a long time, numerous Peruvian business interests had hoped to attracting major Hollywood studios to film in Peru. “North Americans and Europeans are going to visit Aztec ruins because they are familiar with Mexican cinema,” observed *El Comercio de Lima* in 1950, “meanwhile Peru’s incaic civilization exists only in articles and books, advertising for people of high culture and limited numbers.”[^21] Upon learning of Paramount’s desire to film a feature movie in the Cusco area, *El Sol* proudly predicted that: “This will save Peruvians – and particularly cusqueños – from the series of disinformation, disgraceful allusions, and bad jokes that we have seen in some pictures filmed abroad depicting Peru.”[^22] Produced by Mel Epstein, *The Secret of the Incas* was the first major Hollywood picture filmed in Peru. Charlton Heston’s portrayal as treasure hunter Harry Steele would later serve as a direct inspiration for Indiana Jones.[^23] The famous Peruvian singer Yma Sumac also played a supporting role in the film. With Giesecke serving as technical advisor, *The Secret of the Incas* was filmed on location in Cusco and at Machu Picchu. Over 400 Indian extras participated in the shoot, often bringing their own musical instruments and llamas to the set.[^24]

Reviewing *The Secret of the Incas,* *The New York Times* declared, “the Peruvian highlands to be a natural for Technicolor and wide screen.”[^25] Another review praised its “authentic and truly colorful locales.”[^26] The film also was well received in Peru. César Miro praised the film

by stating: “The Secret of the Inca achieves the resurrection of Machu-Picchu and its fabulous scenery animates the forgotten city with new life.”27 In a 1955 letter to producer Epstein, Giesecke happily commented that the film, “had turned out to be quite superior to what I anticipated.”28 Giesecke expressed happiness to his colleagues that, thanks to the film, Faucett Airlines had to schedule “five planes per week between Cuzco and Lima, and the seats have to be reserved weeks in advance.”29

It is important to note that Giesecke was not a one-man tourism promotion machine. His efforts were matched and often exceeded by the Lima-based TACP and its local office in Cusco. Américo Luna, the owner of Inca Land Tours and the president of the TACP of Cusco, lobbied for better transportation funding from the central state.30 The Cusco TACP office also published promotional guides, offered courses to certify tour guides, and held annual forums with local political leaders to promote tourism.31 The national TACP also continued to lobby for better tourism coordination in Peru. In 1954, the Touring Club invited Laurence Tombs, the President of the American Association of Travel Agents to Peru as part of a lobbying and fact finding mission. As a guest of the club, Tombs announced to his hosts: “Peru is not one of the tourist destination countries in South America, it is the tourist destination country of South America.”32

However, in the 1950s the TACP and other tourism backers in Cusco would need more than kind words to overcome obstacles to development – especially in the wake of the destructive 1950 earthquake.

**Seismic Shifts for Cusco Tourism**

27 César Miro, “Una ciudad olvidada re resuicta,” ECL, 4 April1955, 10.
29 AG-1256, Albert Giesecke to Louis Renault, 28 February 1954.
31 “Touring y Automovil Club del Perú,” ECC 22 September 1954, 2; “Reglamento y temario a los que se someterá el fórum sobre turismo en el Cuzco,” ECC, 19 December 1954, 3.
On the afternoon of 21 May 21 1950 a major earthquake struck Cusco. The ground shook for only six or seven seconds. However, the unusual strength of the earthquake (calculated to be 7 degrees on the Mercalli intensity scale) inflicted tremendous damage on the city. The earthquake killed 67 people and severely injured 250. Subsequent reports found that the tremor destroyed 3,000 homes in the city displacing between 30,000 to 40,000 residents. Damage to the city’s cultural heritage also proved to be extensive. “Due to the blind forces of nature, Cuzco in one moment had lost its entire splendor. The Rome of the Americas was left in ruin and desolation,” concluded one report of the damage. Although Cusco’s fate appeared grim in the days after the disaster, regional leaders began to search for possibilities on how to use to earthquake as a key opportunity for development and economic modernization. In the words of one historian, the 1950 earthquake, “closed the curtain on one era, and opened the road towards a different type of modernization.” Initially envisioned as a modernization based on industrialization and agricultural reform, regional leaders and tourism promoters worked to ensure tourist development would also benefit through disaster recovery.

Hoping to legitimize his newly-installed military government, Odría took a keen interest in leading recovery efforts in the region. Odría arrived in Cusco to assess the earthquake damage on 23 May 1950 and immediately declared his dedication to the city’s reconstruction. With the aid of Cusco’s congressional delegation, Odría signed Law 11551 on December 31, 1950. The law created a new national 20 percent tax on tobacco to fund earthquake recovery in Cusco.

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33 “Some of Damage Caused by Earthquake in Peru,” NYT, 24 May 1950, 3.
35 George Alexander Kubler Papers (MS 843), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, (GAKP) Box 1, Folder 3, Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento Industrial, Su Óbra, (Cusco: 1952-1953), 1.
36 Tamayo Herrera, Historia Regional del Cuzco Republicano, 168.
37 “Tres Comités de Auxilio Constituyó el Presidente de la Junta Militar de Gobierno en el Cuzco,” ECL, May 24, 1950, 3.
38 Tamayo Herrera, Historia Regional del Cuzco Republicano, 177.
Odría’s quick response also illustrated the success of the previous decades of work by regional indigenistas in promoting Cusco as the folkloric heart of Peru. The Peruvian national press considered the reconstruction of Cusco as a national duty. “We will reconstruct the archeological capital of America,” promised El Comercio de Lima only three days after the earthquake.\footnote{ECL, “Reconstruyamos la capital arqueológica de la América,” 23 May 1950, 3.} La Prensa newspaper based in Lima granted an interview with prominent indigenista scholar and Cusco resident Luis E. Valcárcel reprinting his appeal that Cusco was, “base of cultural originality of America.”\footnote{“Cuzco,” La Prensa, July 28, 1950, 2.} Emotional attachment to the cultural heritage of Cusco extended beyond Peru. Immediately after the earthquake, the government of Spain pledged funds to restore the city’s cathedral.\footnote{ECL, “Sobre la ayuda de su gobierno a la reconstrucción del Cuzco, nos habla el embajador de España,” May 26, 1950, 1.}

However, the early phase of the earthquake recovery proved to be unorganized and unproductive. Engineers and locals conflicted over the paths of new roads, demolition of homes, and the schedule of repairs to critical infrastructure. In addition, archeologists and preservationists led by Valcárcel objected that the recovery’s early emphasis on clearing rubble and demolishing unstable buildings inflicted damage on sensitive historical structures and neighborhoods in Cusco.\footnote{“Se ha procedido a demoler varios edificios del Cuzco para evitar acidentes,” ECL, May 26, 1950, 3; Tamayo Herrera, Historia Regional del Cuzco Republicano, 167.} Valcárcel, stating that, “it’s preferable that Cuzco remains destroyed than falsified,” organized a consensus on both the local and national level that argued that the restoration of Cusco needed increased oversight and technical support.\footnote{“Conversando con el doctor Luis E. Valcárcel sobre la reconstrucción del Cuzco,” ECL, May 26, 1950, 4.} Valcárcel, worked as the head of the first commission to oversee the restoration of the city, but found his task frustrated by a lack of funds and coordination.\footnote{Valcárcel, Memorias, 378.} Valcárcel was an expert on the regional history and had worked since the 1920s to popularize cusqueña folklore. More importantly, during his career as an
anthropologist, archeologist, and journalist, Valcárcel had established valuable contacts with other scholars in North America and Europe. Valcárcel, already comfortable working with transnational institutions, looked to international and non-state actors to aid in the reconstruction of Cusco.\(^{45}\) By the end of May, 1950, Valcárcel had begun negotiating the possibility of the United Nations and UNESCO to lend financial and technical support to the Cusco reconstruction.\(^{46}\)

The United Nations mission headed by Robert W. Hudgens began working in Peru in February 1951. Hudgens boasted a long career specialized in rural development and planning that dated back to 1934 when he coordinated New Deal-era policies to promote growth in the US South. Since 1948, Hudgens had worked as the executive director of Nelson Rockefeller’s American International Association for Economic and Social Development. After months of research, Hudgens advised the Peruvian government that Cusco needed a centralized state authority to oversee the earthquake recovery. Following Hudgen’s advice, the Odría government issued Supreme Decree 10 on 10 January 1952 creating the Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento Industrial del Cuzco (Reconstruction and Industrial Development Board of Cuzco, the Junta).\(^ {47}\) Initially, the Peruvian state and the United Nations missions envisioned the Junta as a state-owned corporation similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Although the Junta did provide funds for the restoration of historical structures in Cusco’s city center, the original objectives of the institution centered on industrial development and agricultural modernization.\(^ {48}\)

However, in the months after the earthquake, a consensus began to form that the bureaucracy of the Junta could also help fill the gap left by the dissolution of CNT in the

\(^{45}\) “Conversando con el doctor Luis E. Valcárcel sobre la reconstrucción del Cuzco,” ECL, May 26, 1950, 4.

\(^{46}\) “Propuestas para que UNESCO ayude a la reconstrucción del Cuzco,” ECL, May 28, 1950, 1.

\(^{47}\) GAKP, Box 1, Folder 3, “Memoria de la Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento de Cuzco,” 1953.

promotion of tourism in Cusco. Only a few days after the earthquake struck Cusco, ex-CNT head Roca Muelle wrote a letter to his colleague and fellow tourism-promoter Giesecke regarding the possibilities to use the disaster economics of Cusco’s earthquake recovery to support tourism development in the region. Referencing the earthquake recovery, Roca Muelle wrote that, “God wants that this should be the cause to complete our dreams of making Cuzco a neatly protected treasure.”

Early forums on the nature of the earthquake reconstruction organized by Valcárcel also emphasized the need to consider “tourism interests” in the reconstruction process. Preliminary reports sent to the Junta emphasized the need for, “the Junta to have great interest in the promotion of tourism and consider it part of its program.”

However, the initial goals of the Junta still remained dedicated primarily to rural and industrial development while paying little attention to the preservation or promotion of tourist sites in Cusco.

Valcárcel used his contacts with UNESCO to arrange for another United Nations-funded mission to aid Cusco’s earthquake recovery. However, the second mission would focus primarily on restoration and preservation of historical sites. At the time of the earthquake, the leadership of UNESCO would prove to be especially sensitive to promoting American culture on an international scale. From 1948 to 1952 UNESCO was led by the Mexican diplomat Jaime Torres Bodet. Like Valcárcel, Bodet was prominent indigenista writer and scholar. During his leadership of UNESCO Torres Bodet sought to re-assert global awareness of Latin American artistic achievement. When presented with Valcárcel’s request for UNESCO to become involved in the protection of Cusco’s cultural heritage, Bodet did not hesitate to organize a

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49 AG, legajo 1277, Benjamín Roca Muelle to Albert Giesecke, May 31, 1950.
research team chaired by the US art historian of Latin America, George A. Kubler. The UNESCO Cusco Mission, often referred to as the Kubler Mission, surveyed the city in July and August of 1951 and began to advise the Hudgens team on preservation needs during the earthquake recovery.

The preservation work of the Junta focused primarily on the restoration of the Cusco’s colonial churches and religious structures. The Junta’s restoration division employed roughly 100 workers and artisans annually to work on restoration work in the city. Early preservation commenced work on the churches of La Merced, San Pedro, La Compañía, San Francisco, San Sebastian, Belen de los Reyes. A smaller team of restorations also worked on repairing damaged paintings, artifacts, and sculptures – most from the same church properties undergoing restoration under the supervision of the Junta. The Junta also restored the Inca wall along Hattun Rumiyocc Street. Most of the city’s Inca structures and walls were originally constructed to withstand seismic activity and did not require extensive repairs – a fact that quickly emerged as a point of regional pride following the earthquake.

In addition to surveying and repairing sites in Cusco, the Kubler team emphasized the need to coordinate future preservation. The team drew upon the earlier proposals outlined in Emilio Harth-Terré’s urban plan drafted in preparation for the city’s Quincentennial celebrations in 1934. Using the findings of the Kubler mission, the Junta published urban Pilot Plan for Cusco on February 15, 1952. Like the Harth-Terré plan, the UNESCO mission believed that the key to maintaining central Cusco’s historic character while promoting tourism development lay

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53 Kubler, Cuzco: Reconstruction of the Town, 1-2.
54 For early restoration efforts of the Junta see: GAKP, Box 1, Folder 3, Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento Industrial, Su Obra, (Cusco: 1952-1953).
55 Regional pride noted in: “Los monumentos del Cuzco y su perdurabilidad a través de las edades,” ECL, May 31, 1950, 3.
56 See: AMC, Legajo 97, Emilio Harth-Terré, “Informe Preliminar sobre el Plan Regular para la ciudad del Cuzco.”
in strict zoning of the city. The 1952 pilot plan proposed to segment the city into several zones, each with its own purpose and character. The pilot plan designated Zone A, the “historical archeological zone” and prohibited any form of new construction in the incaic and colonial center of Cusco. Zone B of Cusco – the modifiable urban zone – was reserved for modern residential and industrial development. In this area, which the pilot plan reported was the largest of the urban zone categories, “the only consideration that should be taken, is its economic capacity.” Plans for Zone C – named in the pilot plan as the “totally remolded urban zone” – proved to be even more extensive. The pilot plan proposed that Zone C, become Cusco’s new commercial heart adjacent to the historical center. The Junta even planned to regulate in areas that had yet to see any sort of human settlement – the final Zone D outlined in the pilot plan. Reflecting its central goal, the report stated that any future development, “should always be adapted to the guidelines of the pilot plan” and avoid any organic or spontaneous development.57

Zone A, the “historical archeological zone” would receive the first priority of the Junta. The pilot plan emphasized that the center of Cusco would emerge as a “civic-cultural nucleus…congregated by public building and educational institutions such as museums, institutes of art, archeology, history, anthropology, etc.”58 The pilot plan represented the first local victory in channeling earthquake recovery efforts towards tourism development. The pilot plan’s introduction clearly stated: “The conservation of [historic Cusco] to its greatest authenticity and character, while is in the unobjectionable recognition of its historic value, is also justified by the recognition of the economic factor of tourism.”59 Several years after the Odría government had withdrawn the state from participating in tourism development, Cusco’s

57 GAKP, Box 1, Folder 8, “Plantamiento General,” 1952, 1-5.
58 GAKP, Box 1, Folder, 8, “Plantamiento General,” 1952, 1-2.
59 GAKP, Box 1, Folder 8, “Plantamiento General,” 1952, 2.
regional leaders had begun to find alternative resources in their efforts to attract tourists to their region.

**The ruins are going to ruins!**

Although Machu Picchu avoided damage during the 1950 earthquake, the archeological site showed signs of significant ecological wear and abandonment. In prior decades, these problems had not caused much concern outside of Cusco. However, as Machu Picchu emerged from the 1940s as an iconic symbol of Peru, the national press began to express concern over how to properly manage the site. Unfortunately, increased international interest in Machu Picchu did not translate into state support for preservation at the site. Previously, CNT had provided critical funds for the maintenance of Machu Picchu. However, after the dissolution of the state-tourism organization, responsibility for funding restoration and preservation efforts of Machu Picchu fell back under the care of Cusco’s Patronato Departamental de Arqueología (Departmental Archeology Council). Formed in 1929, the Archeology Council worked to protect and conserve pre-Hispanic monuments in the Cusco Department. Generally, the Archeology Council depended on the volunteer work of professional and amateur regional archeologists.

Unfortunately, the budgetary limitations of the Archeology Council had become source of surprise to visitors as well as a point of national embarrassment. The need for more preservation funds emerged as early as 1948. While reporting on Bingham’s visit to Machu Picchu, *El Comercio de Cusco* reported that “all expressed an unpleasant surprise toward the state of conservation of the principal structures of the historic and millenarian city.”60 As a response to increased concerns regarding the state of Machu Picchu, the Archeology Council asked its engineer Manuel Briceño to assess the state of the ruins in 1952. Briceño found that the

60 “La ciudad de Machu-picchu, require seria labor de conservación,” ECC, October 20, 1948, 2.
humid climate surrounding Machu Picchu had placed some structures at risk of collapse. Archeology Council president, Luis Felipe Paredes, also visited the site in December of 1952 confirming Briceño’s findings.61

Although Machu Picchu did need preservation work, by the middle of the 1950s, Peru and Cusco had yet to develop any long-term plans to protect the site. Machu Picchu had become a site of national importance, yet the state demonstrated little to no interest in protecting the ruin. On 17 October 1952 the national government declared the creation of the Office of Archeology and History as part of the Ministry of Education. The new office was created by the state in an effort to replace the locally-controlled, and often poorly organized departmental archeology councils. However, the office lacked the necessary funds and staff to complete its assigned task. In a 1953 report to his superiors in the Ministry of Education, the Office of Archeology and History Director Jorge Muelle reported that his institution’s meager budget permitted the hiring of only 12 inspectors to monitor historical sites throughout all of Peru.62 In fact, the majority of Muelle’s reports to his superiors in the Ministry of Education were pleads for better funding and resources.63

Faced with uneven financial support from the national state’s Archeology and History Office, the Archeology Council of Cusco depended on independently-raised funds to finance its operations in the 1950s. The largest amount of the Archeology Council’s funds originated from entry ticket fees for Machu Picchu. The entry ticket fares from Machu Picchu helped Cusco’s Archeology Council remain solvent. However, the Archeology Council often failed to control

the income of these sales. For example, in 1953 the Archeology Council received 24 million Peruvian soles from ticket sales at Machu Picchu. However, statistics provided on visitors by the Santa Ana Railway and the TACP indicated that council should have received 50 million soles. In 1954, visitor statistics indicated that the Archeology Council should have received 30 million soles, when in fact the institution only recorded an income of 18 million.\textsuperscript{64} The Archeology Council suspected that the tourism guides (who were responsible for collecting the tickets) were keeping most of the entry fees for themselves. The manager of the Machu Picchu Hotel admitted to witnessing such frauds in a 1952 letter to the Archeology Council president. In the letter, the manager confessed that most of the tourist guides “at times do not hand over to the treasury what they owe.” Even worse, when employees of the Archeology Council confronted guides regarding the fraud, “sometimes the arguments have occurred in the presence of visitors, which does not fail to give them a bad impression.”\textsuperscript{65}

For the Archeology Council lean budgets, small staffs, and patchwork preservation were not new problems. However, by the 1950s the national press began to follow the preservation of Machu Picchu with greater interest. As Machu Picchu became more prominent in the eyes of Peruvians, so did the lack of preservation at the site. The caretakers of Machu Picchu soon discovered that the national press could serve as a powerful ally in their efforts to secure more funding. When the National Office of Archeology and History provided a meager budget for preservation work at Machu Picchu at the start of 1953, the national press advocated for more funds for the site. “Machu Picchu continues to be the chief attraction for archeologists, tourists, poets, painters, filmmakers, and many other who enjoy its aesthetic value,” declared \textit{El}

\textsuperscript{64} “Fallas en cobro de derechos para visitar Machu Picchu,” ECL, September 21, 1954, morning edition, 14. \textsuperscript{65} JM, legajo 299, foletto 2, César A. Soto to Luis Felipe Paredes, December 15, 1952.
Comercio de Lima on 11 January 1953.\textsuperscript{66} La Prensa echoed the same sentiment in an editorial published on 11 January 1953 that stated: “knowing that we are in imminent danger of losing our priceless cultural treasure, it is easy to explain the indignation that this has provoked in the public opinion.”\textsuperscript{67} The national press took great pride in its new role as an advocate for Machu Picchu. When the national Office of Archeology and History pledged to fund preservation work at Machu Picchu in September of 1953, El Comercio de Lima categorized the government’s response as, “a result of the constant journalistic demands raised in defense of our archeological heritage.” The article went on to declare that: “if France marks its historical legacy with the Louvre, the Tuileries, and Notre Dame; and Italy does it with the Coliseum and the Appian Way; we have written the chapters of the greatness our past in the impressive colossus of stone of Machu-Picchu.”\textsuperscript{68}

However, some newspaper articles suggested that the conditions of Machu Picchu were the result of poor regional management on the part of Cusco. Time magazine published an article entitled “Slipping City” in its 5 January 1953 edition that claimed that Machu Picchu was on the verge of falling into the Vilcanota Valley and criticized Peru for not caring for its national heritage.\textsuperscript{69} El Sol de Cusco took offense at the article and responded in a 12 January 1953 editorial that stated: “The ‘yanqui’ magazine Times (sic) that has more than once treated Peru like a mooch, has clamored like one of the prophets who announced the destruction of Jerusalem.” Even worse, El Sol noted that many Lima periodicals had reprinted the article and suggested that cusqueños were at fault for the current conditions at Machu Picchu. “Just as it has

\textsuperscript{66} “Para restaurar Machu-Picchu se ha presupuesto sólo 600 dólares,” ECL, January 11, 1953.
\textsuperscript{67} “Machu-Picchu,” La Prensa, January 11, 1953, 5
\textsuperscript{68} “Se restaura la ciudadela del Machu-Picchu,” ECL, morning edition, September 10, 1953, 3.
\textsuperscript{69} “Slipping City,” Time, January 5, 1953.
not gone to ruins in two-thousand years since its construction…Machu Picchu is not going to ruin now,” definitely declared El Sol.  

Despite the intense criticism of the national and local press, neither Cusco’s Archeology Council nor the national Office of Archeology and History managed to complete significant preservation work in Machu Picchu well into the mid-1950s. The funds promised by the national Office of Archeology and History for 1954 only amounted to 7,500 soles – an amount insufficient to commence any major preservation efforts at the site. In December of 1954, El Sol reported that in Machu Picchu numerous walls and structure were supported only by makeshift tree branches. By February of 1955, the Archeology Council collected enough funds to commission a new report on the status of Machu Picchu authored by the archeologist Lawrence Roys. The Roys report did conclude that, despite the alarmist rumors circulating in the local and national media, the foundation of Machu Picchu was, “in good condition.” However, Roys warned that many of the ruins individual structures and walls remained at risk at partial or total collapse. Roys recommended immediate action to repair the walls of Machu Picchu’s mortar house that were on the verge of collapse. In addition, Roys noted that the foundation of the northeast corner of the main temple showed signs of collapse. Roys warned that the Archeology Council needed to start restoration work before the next rainy season in order to avoid structural failures in both the mortar house and the main temple.

Using the information provided in the Roys report, the Archeology Council restarted restoration work at Machu Picchu in January of 1955. However, the national media of Peru increasingly criticized the work of the local Archeology Council as a product of Cusco’s

70 “Ruinas que se arruinan,” El Sol, January 12, 1953, 2.
73 JM, legajo 210, “Informe del Arqueólogo Mr. Lawrence Roys sobre las Ruinas de Machupicchu.”
backwardness. *El Comercio de Lima* criticized that, at the start of February, 1955, only three “*peones*” were working in Machu Picchu. “Here lies the most captivating fortress in the world” sarcastically declared the headline of one news article printed in the 7 February 1955 edition of *El Comercio de Lima* that depicted a young peasant boy sitting next to a wall supported by a tree branch (Figure 3.1).74 *La Prensa* described the situation in a more alarming tone when it published an article two days later declaring: “Machu Picchu Runs the Risk of Disappearing.”75

Responding to the chronic lack of funds, by 1955 preservationists and regional leaders began to look beyond Peru for funding sources to care for Machu Picchu. Similar to the preservation aid lent to Cusco after the earthquake, UNESCO offered international technical help. However, the Office of Archeolgy and History was notified too late to begin an application process to the United Nations. As a result, Peru missed the deadline to apply for a preservation program for Machu Picchu. Rafael Aguilar, a national senator representing Cusco, lamented the slow process taken before UNESCO to secure preservation funds for Machu Picchu. “If other countries had such marvelous ruins in their territories…they would not have waited to do the proper actions to preserve them,” commented Aguilar to the press on 7 March 1955.76 Valcárcel similarly denounced the failure to acquire help from UNESCO before the 15 March 1955 deadline as a, “lost opportunity.”77 The missed deadline once again appeared to confirm the critical view that Peru – and Cusco in particular – was unqualified to manage its own national heritage.

74 “No se presta la debida atención a Machu Picchu,” ECL, February 7, 1955, edición de la mañana, 11
The press has not yet finished criticizing the missed UNESCO deadline when, in March of 1955, rumors began to circulate that Machu Picchu’s mortar house structure had indeed suffered a total structural collapse. Paredes, still acting as head of the Archeology Council, traveled to Machu Picchu on 30 March 1955 with a delegation of reporters to see if the rumors were true. The inspection team confirmed that a few rocks had fallen in the mortar house but the damage was not grave. Even more, Paredes praised the work of the men the national press had declared “peones” stating that “we are working with the labor of skilled masons.” Paredes concluded that the principal problem confronting the restoration was not a lack of skilled labor, but a lack of funds from the state. Paredes estimated that the most serious threat to Machu Picchu’s integrity was the shifting foundation of the Main Temple area. If the foundation was permitted to deteriorate, a significant part of it, including the rare Intihuatana stone and religious area, could collapse into the valley below. The site engineer, Manuel I. Briceño, estimated that needed repairs would cost 184,514.50 soles – an amount beyond the budget of Cusco’s Archeology Council and more than previous allocations from the national Office of Archeology and History. Paredes also described that the Hiram Bingham highway was in “a terrible state.” Paredes concluded in a report to the national Office of Archeology and History that: “the impossibility to complete these works is due to the lack of necessary funds,” and pleaded for more financial resources from the state.

The combined embarrassing news in 1955 of the collapsed wall of the mortar room and the missed UNESCO funding deadline appeared to create an image of national crisis surrounding Machu Picchu. As early as February 1955, the National Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a resolution calling for the Ministry of Development and Public Works to, “immediately

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78 JM, legajo 210, folio 11, “Informe de la Visita de Inspección a las Ruinas de Machupicchu,” April 2, 1955.
79 JM, legajo 210, “Machupicchu – Base del Intihuatana por la sección oesta, lado del Puente de ‘San Miguel,’” 4.
80 JM, legajo 210, folio 11, “Informe de la Visita de Inspección a las Ruinas de Machupicchu,” April 2, 1955.
initiate defensive projects for the millennial city of Machu Picchu.” In that same month, the Asociación Nacional de Escritores y Artistas (National Association of Writers and Artists, ANEA) began to organize a national collection to save Machu Picchu. In June 1955, *Caretas* magazine again published a critical report on the lack of preservation work at Machu Picchu. Entitled “Machu Picchu: A Beggar,” the article reported how Cusco’s Archeology Council, “lacked a budget that would to purchase one sixth of a luxury brand car.” The article concluded that, “Machu Picchu’s condition of being a beggar, no matter what painful or inexplicable reason why, must be attended to with all promptness…It would be a grave thing if the donation arrives late; it would meant that the clock of the Intihuatana has arrived at its final hour.”

Responding to the call for donations, the mayor of Lima, Luis T. Larco, organized a city-wide collection of 50,000 soles for Machu Picchu preservation that was delivered in October 1955. However, none of these privately-organized efforts would solve the overdue restoration work needed at the ruin. Briceño estimated that to rehabilitate the site the Archeology Council needed six million soles and six years of labor.

The Junta appeared as a natural source for preservation funding for Machu Picchu. However, by 1954 the Junta’s spending on restoration efforts in Cusco had dropped dramatically (see Figure 3.2). A major source of conflict arose over the fact that management of the Junta remained in Lima and thus did not share the same priorities as local political leaders over what aspects of the recovery should receive attention. As early as 1952, the Cusco periodical, *El Sol*

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84 “La comuna cuzqueña recibe S/. 50,000 para obras de defensa de Machupicchu,” *La Prensa*, October 6, 1955, 7.
lamented the lack of progress on the reconstruction of the city at the start of 1952. In an editorial published a few days later, El Sol blamed a lack of progress on the indifference of the Junta’s leadership. El Sol argued that instead, the earthquake reconstruction should be left in the hands of cusqueños. “There is nothing more natural than an owner who attends to the repair of his own house,” observed El Sol. In the view of the local press, it was Lima’s indifference, not regional backwardness to blame for the abandonment of Cusco and Machu Picchu.

Despite these protests, the Junta made little progress in its preservation mission. Some of the Junta’s problems stemmed from the national government’s unsteady financial contributions. Restoration projects that were independently funded, like the Spanish-funded restoration of the Cathedral, progressed relatively quickly. Junta-funded reconstruction projects, however, remained at a standstill. For example, although the Junta expected to receive ten million soles for restoration from the central government for the 1953-1954 budget, the fund only received 233,333.33 soles. Citing the paralyzed state of the rebuilding and restoration, El Comercio de Cusco lamented 1953 as a “lost year,” for the city. Unfortunately, continued financial problems left most restoration work remained paralyzed and remained uncompleted through 1954. By December of 1954, El Sol, published an editorial observing that some of the city’s most impressive historic structures including the casona of the university, the Jesuit church, and the Almirante Palace had yet to see major restoration work. In another article, the newspaper used blank graphics to show the slow pace of reconstruction in the city (Figure 3.3).

89 “Ano perdido,” ECC, February 5, 1954, 2.
90 CBC, Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento Industrial del Cuzco, Memoria 1953-1954, 8.
Other factors hindered the Junta’s mission of reconstruction – especially local obstruction and abuse of funds. As early as 1951, Cusco’s Chamber of Commerce reported abuses of restoration loans provided through the Junta. “Certain property owners believe that the Reconstruction Law is an easy path to obtain whatever loan they desire, that required nothing more than presenting a loan solicitation,” observed one report composed for the Ministry of Finance. The Chamber of Commerce continued to state how, “the truth is that urban property owners do not have complete property records,” and that loans went to many undeserving or undocumented recipients.92 In fact, reconstruction funds were largely diverted to roughly 30 elite property owners instead of to needed restoration work of living spaces in the city center – a pattern that worsened unequal housing conditions in Cusco.93

By 1954, Cusco’s regional leaders had found allies in their fight to assert more local control over the earthquake reconstruction. When asked about the lack of restoration progress in Cusco, the diplomat and historian, Raúl Porras Baranchea responded: “I believe like the cusqueños, that it is all due to the demanding tendencies of centralism, to the distain and ignorance that exists towards regional interests.”94 In April 1954 Caretas magazine published n exposé titled, “The re-destruction of Cuzco,” to bring national attention to the Junta’s lack of progress. Like Porras Baranchea, Caretas primarily faulted the Junta’s isolation from Cusco noting that the reconstruction was, “working without order nor coordination and with evident fundamental error of putting aside the pilot plan and export its executive powers in Lima, far from the acts and facts.” Caretas criticized the Junta observing: “in almost four years since the earthquake, there certainly is not much that it has completed.”95 ANEA held a special session on

94 “Raúl Porras Denuncia el Absoluto Abandono en que Está el Cuzco,” La Prensa, November 24, 1954, 1.
22 November 1954 to bring attention to reconstruction and preservation problems in Cusco. ANEA reported that of the 50 million soles allocated to Cusco’s reconstruction, the Junta received only 7,200,271.16 soles.\textsuperscript{96} In 1955, national outrage over the lack of reconstruction continued to build. In January 1955, Aquiles Cacón Almanaza, a national deputy from Cusco denounced the rebuilding efforts in the Congress stating that the city remained, “a panorama of ruins,” four years after the earthquake.\textsuperscript{97} Outrage over the stalled rebuilding of Cusco grew so that, by December of 1955, Odría sent a commission to investigate the lack of progress in the region.\textsuperscript{98}

The paralyzed rebuilding of the city’s historic center not only emerged as a national embarrassment, the inactivity of the Junta threatened the development of Cusco’s early tourism economy. By 1955, tourism arrivals in Cusco had stagnated indicating that the promised, post-war boom in international arrivals had diverted to other destinations in Latin America.\textsuperscript{99} In fact, between 1953 and 1956, Machu Picchu experienced a slight decrease in international visitors.\textsuperscript{100} A simultaneous drop of international visitors to Peru in general suggested that the state ignored Machu Picchu at risk to the national tourism economy.\textsuperscript{101} Poor infrastructure also hindered tourism development in the region. In 1951, Cusco’s Chamber of Commerce reported that the Santa Ana railway that carried tourists to Machu Picchu, “operates with material totally deficient

\textsuperscript{99} “3,533 Turistas en 6 meses visitaron la ciudad de Cuzco,” \textit{La Prensa}, July 25, 1955, 3. The article reported that the first half of 1955 saw an increase of only 56 tourist arrivals in Cusco over 1954.
\textsuperscript{101} “Bajó el número de turistas que anualmente ingresan al Perú,” \textit{El Sol}, December 15, 1955, 3.
in quality and quantity.”

Deficits and bad equipment continued to plague the railroad into 1954. Observers also criticized the condition of Cusco’s airport. One 1951 editorial in *El Comercio de Lima* noted that the current air travel infrastructure in Cusco, “continues to display deficiencies, problems, and dangers.”

In 1954, CORPAC, the Peruvian state airport development agency, proposed a new facility in the nearby community of Anta. However, without any funding commitments, the project remained at a standstill into 1955.

The stagnation of tourism in Cusco alarmed longtime promoters of the city who urged quick action. During the stalled earthquake reconstruction, the TACP organized a forum to discuss tourism development and its challenges in Cusco in December of 1954. The 1954 tourism forum proposed that the national state invest to stimulate Cusco’s stagnated and uncoordinated tourism development.

A year later, in a radio broadcast on *La Voz del Cuzco* given on September 17, 1955, Giesecke emphasized urgent need to develop tourism in the region. “More than anything else,” spoke Giesecke, “I have to insist that tourism to Cuzco is the most streamlined and important gold mine that Peru has. Whatever effort and whatever cost that is completed in order to promote tourism will be paid back to the people and for the national economy in tangible and intangible benefits that are incalculable.” Giesecke ended his broadcast with a challenge to national and regional leaders to work to develop tourism in Cusco and the Sacred Valley “with vigor, at whatever cost, and immediately. The time is now.”

**From Disaster to Development?**

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103 “Resolver el problema del ferrocarril del Cuzco a la Convención,” ECC, September 10, 1954, 3.
108 AG, legajo D-048.
The sense of national urgency to protect Machu Picchu and Cusco aided with increased donations. More importantly, national concern permitted for Cusco’s political leaders to push for substantive structural reforms in 1955 that would aid with both the preservation of Machu Picchu and an increased role for the state in tourism promotion. The Peruvian National Congress approved a series of laws to shore up restoration work in both the city of Cusco and at Machu Picchu in 1955. The central piece of legislation, Law 12350, passed at the end of November 1955 replaced the former Junta with a newly-organized Corporación de Reconstrucción y Fomento de Cuzco (Cusco Reconstruction and Development Corporation, CRYF). The CRYF boasted several features that promised to improve upon the mission of the Junta. First, unlike the Junta, the newly-formed CRYF remained headquartered in Cusco and staffed by regional leaders. Second, the new legislation moved beyond the original rural and industrial development goals of the Junta to permit the new corporation to invest in tourism. The new law specifically granted the CRYF with the duty to “develop tourism in the Department of Cuzco.” Finally, the CRYF enjoyed an independent budget guaranteeing a reliable source of restoration and tourism promotion funds.109

Newly-elected President Manuel Prado became a key supporter of the CRYF. In his previous presidential administration from 1939 to 1945, Prado pushed for many early tourism reform efforts including the annual Inti-Raymi folklore festival and the construction of the state-owned Cusco Hotel. Winning a majority in the Department of Cusco in the 1955 presidential election, Pardo returned to the region in February 1956 to formally establish the CRYF.110 Although the CRYF-administered restoration efforts never met the initial levels at the start of the decade, they marked a significant increase over the 1954 spending (Figure 3.2). The legislation

110 “La corporación del Cuzco en marcha desde hoy,” ECC, February 12, 1956, 2.
passed creating the new CRYF included specific goals for tourism development that obliged the new institution with:

1. Completion and progress on lodging, accommodation, and tourism attractions.
2. The execution and maintenance of facilities for the development of tourism.
3. The organization of propaganda and information services in the country and abroad.
4. Opening new tourism centers.
5. Orientation of the tourism industry.
6. The study and solution for problems in the development of tourism.\textsuperscript{111}

The new powers and funds granted to the CRYF appeared to produce results for the promotion of tourism.

Legislation creating the CRYF also provided a new division to manage Machu Picchu preservation and development. The newly-formed Supervigilancia de los Trabajos de Restauración de Machu Picchu (The Machu Picchu Works and Restoration Supervision), replaced the Cusco Archeology Council as the primary organization responsible for maintaining the ruin. The new Supervision named Cusco archeologist Luis A. Pardo as its director. The CRYF and the Supervision promised to bring much needed funds – 350,000 soles in the first year of its formation alone – and coordination to the incomplete restoration efforts at the archeological site.\textsuperscript{112} However, the CRYF’s new focus on tourism promotion, disaster recovery, and heavy-handed tactics also brought new conflicts to Machu Picchu.

In his September-October 1956 report to the Ministry of Education, the regional inspector of archeology, Manuel Chávez Ballón reported that the new restoration efforts at Machu Picchu,

“were continuing with some irregularities.” Chávez Ballón detailed the nature of these irregularities in his next report for November and December of 1956. On the August 13, 1956 the restoration workers went on strike to solicit higher wages. Previously, the Archeology Council had sought out workers from nearby haciendas who provided work during times of low demand. For many local laborers, the Archeology Council provided convenient supplemental incomes between high demand periods. However, the new Supervision of Machu Picchu demanded regular schedules and discipline from preservation workers – a substantial change from work conditions under the Archeology Council. According to Chávez Ballón, during the strike, the workers forbid tourists to enter Machu Picchu and, in some cases, threatened visitors to the site. As a result the CRYF quickly fired the long-serving engineer Manuel Briceño, criticizing him for not controlling his workforce. The CRYF ended restoration work at the site declaring that: “it was necessary to do a better selection of working personnel.” Yet, Chávez Ballón’s report for April and May of 1957 documented that restorations of Machu Picchu remained unfinished due to problems with the work force. Problems began when two managers, only known as the “Salas brothers,” entered into a dispute with a laborer called César Calderón. The fight provoked a larger conflict between the workers and managers that had contributed to inconsistent work and poor quality restorations. Once again, the CRYF had to temporarily stop restoration work.

In addition to changing labor policy, replacing Briceño, offered the CRYF to adopt new, but controversial, restoration techniques at Machu Picchu. Briceño and other employees of the Archeology Council only used traditional tools and materials in their preservation work. A new inspection completed by the CRYF on October 26, 1955 criticized the poor quality of the

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restoration work completed under Briceño’s supervision. This was a surprising accusation against a person who in 1953 was described as, “one of the few Peruvian technicians specialized in the restoration of historical zones.” Critiquing Briceño, the CRYF hired a new team of engineers to supervise the restoration. However, the new teams supervised the insertion of iron and cement to support Machu Picchu’s foundations. Previously, the Roys report recommended the use of modern materials in the reconstruction of Machu Picchu. However, prior to the CRYF administration, the general restoration policy at the ruin was one of preservation, not restoration. When the topic emerged in 1952, El Sol published an editorial defending the decision of the Archeology Council and Briceño to not alter Machu Picchu. “Engineer Briceño told us…he only attempts to ‘defend’ not restore; and thus, we remain satisfied,” stated El Sol. However, with the termination of Briceño, the CRYF was free to use controversial materials in the restoration of Machu Picchu.

Unlike in 1952, no regional or national opposition appeared against the new restoration tactics employed by the CRYF at Machu Picchu. Reports on the progress of the Machu Picchu restoration reported without any sense of irony: “They have employed the same methods of the Incas, with the advantage of using tools of steel, powder, wheelbarrows, and cement.” Chávez Ballón approved the new restoration techniques in his reports to the Ministry of Education. In March of 1957, El Comercio de Lima applauded the use of “modern techniques” in the restoration of Machu Picchu. The prominent sociologist, José María Arguedas, in a report published in La Prensa, also defended the use of modern materials. “The casual visitor, and

118 JM, legajo 210, “Informe del Arqueólogo Mr. Lawrence Roys sobre las Ruinas de Machupicchu.”
119 “Se insiste en la restauración de Machu Picchu,” El Sol, December 1, 1952, 2.
even the educated visitor, but perhaps not an expert, will not be able to differentiate the original part of the ruin from the reconstructed,” Arguedas wrote in the news article. In fact, the only criticism that Chávez Ballón had of the restorations was that they lacked cameras and other equipment to document the work. “It would be laudable and correct to present an illustrated report of what they have completed, so that it can be viewed outside of Peru,” wrote Chávez Ballón, “so that the world knows that Peruvians can complete restorations like in Mexico, Athens, and Egypt.”

Perhaps the most important factor that led the CRYF to adopt the controversial restoration tactic stemmed from its mandate to develop the site as a tourism resource. The desire to remake Machu Picchu accessible to tourists began to consistently override conservation interests. Initial construction work in the mortar room structure completely rebuilt the room with modern techniques and materials (Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5). For example, the October-November 1956 report by the Supervision noted that the difference between the original incaic and reconstructed portions of the mortar room as, “quite visible.” The Supervision justified the reconstruction by stating: “these rooms were only a pile of rocks, and now one can pass through them, granting the tourist more to see in Machupicchu.” Chávez Ballón’s 1957 progress report indicated that the highest priority for the Supervision was restoration of the southern entrance area to Machu Picchu, “not only because it is in danger of falling,” but he noted, “it also causes misfortune amongst the tourists who like to pass there due to the fact it is the place where one can take the best photographs.” The same 1957 report even produced a photo of Hiram

123 José María Arguedas, “El Estado Actual de las Reconstrucciones en el Cuzco,” La Prensa, November 10, 1957, 8.
Bingham overlooking Machu Picchu, endorsing the tourism-oriented narrative that heralded the North American explorer as the discoverer of the ruin (Figure 3.6).

The CRYF’s prioritization of tourism interests in the management of Machu Picchu extended beyond restoration methods. The new organization commenced plans for expanded lodging at the site. Since 1951, Giesecke and Cusco tourism interests led by Américo Luna Sánchez, the head of the Cusco office of the TACP and owner of Inca Land Tours, lobbied to improve lodging conditions in Cusco. Gieseckce and his peers did not over-exaggerate the poor conditions at the small state-run hotel at Machu Picchu. A 5 January 1955 opinion piece in the La Crónica newspaper stated that the state-run hotel at Machu Picchu resembled, “a slightly comfortable jail.”

In 1951, Giesecke contacted the Chicago-based architectural firm of Schweikher & Elting to plan a modern hotel to be built at Machu Picchu. The firm proposed the construction of an ambitious seven-floor hotel built into the mountainside adjacent to the ruin. Their plans were thwarted by a lack of available funding. By law, the Junta could only provide personal loans to homeowners for restorations. The state-run hotel company, another likely source of financing, also suffered from leaner budgets during Odría’s government and declined to fund a new hotel construction at Machu Picchu.

However, the formation of the CRYF greatly increased the central government’s funding for hotel construction. With Giesecke’s lobbying, the newly-formed CRYF diverted 600,000 soles – or 4% of its total budget – towards hotel construction and restoration work at Machu Picchu. Giesecke enthusiastically described Schweiker & Elting’s plans to Bingham in 1955.

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129 Early efforts at hotel construction discussed in, AG-0425, Albert Giesecke to Winston Elting, October 9, 1953.
According to Giesecke, the new seven-floor hotel would provide visitors with the most modern comforts available by allowing guests to, “come out at the upper part of the ruins – with the wonderful panoramic view. Then the visitor would DESCEND (sic) most of the way to visit the different sectors of Machu Picchu.”

Although Giesecke’s enthusiasm to tunnel into the mountainside adjacent to Machu Picchu appeared at odds with his reputation as an early preservationist, his plans reflected the vision of Cusco’s early tourism backers. However for Giesecke and his peers, adjacent pre-Hispanic ruins and modern hotel construction appeared as complimentary parts of the same goal of regional modernization.

The modernization efforts of the CRYF brought additional change to Machu Picchu that also threatened the ruin’s historical setting. Although the Junta had begun plans to construct a new power station along the Vilcanota River near Machu Picchu, the new leadership of the CRYF accelerated plans to build a hydroelectric facility. Beginning in 1958, the CRYF began construction on a new hydroelectric plant located adjacent to Machu Picchu. The natural curve of the Vilcanota River around the Huayna Picchu peak and the plateau of the ruins created an optimal natural setting for electricity generation. Between 1958 and 1962, CRYF funded the construction of a 120,000 kilowatt plant at the western base of Machu Picchu. In fact, the diversion tunnel for the generators runs three kilometers directly underneath the historic structures of Machu Picchu.

Surprisingly, no protests emerged in regards to the new hydroelectric facility’s threats to the historic site. Despite the fact that the new hydroelectric

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132 The Junta constructed a diesel power plant for the city of Cusco and began planning for construction of a hydroelectric plant on the Vilcanota River as early as 1953 as reported in: GAKP, Folder 3, Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento Industrial, Sú Obra, 28-30; GAKP, Box 1, Folder 5, Junta de Reconstrucción y Fomento Industrial del Cuzco, Memorandum sobre el problema de energía eléctrica e industrialización de la cuidad del Cuzco y zonas de influencia en el departamento, (Lima: January, 1956); see also: “Central Hidroeléctrica en el Cuzco,” ECC, March 14, 1955, 3.
133 Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 188-89; José Tamayo Herrera, El enigma de Machupicchu: 96-97.
facility shared its name with the famous adjacent ruin, the original legislation and budgetary agreements between the national government and the CRYF for the Machu Picchu Hydroelectric Plant never accounted for the potential effects the hydroelectric project would have on the existing historical structures. Additionally, detailed construction reports and engineering surveys published during the construction project made no references to the Machu Picchu ruin. Even Caretas magazine, which had led a national campaign to protect Machu Picchu, enthusiastically supported the hydroelectric project. One of the few mentions of Machu Picchu during the hydroelectric project appeared in a pamphlet celebrating the inauguration of the new generating facility published in 1964. “In this same zone, constructed on the hidden summit of Machupijchu, another work was built that has survived centuries and is the lasting glory our history,” noted the pamphlet. For regional leaders, modernization and celebrating the region’s past still remained complimentary goals.

Tourism promoters did not view the actions of the CRYF as excessive. In fact, at the end of the decade, many argued that the early achievements of the CRYF illustrated the need to involve the state in tourism planning and promotion. Pointing to the early success of the CRYF, the editorial page of El Comercio del Cusco advocated for re-forming the defunct CNT to coordinate tourism as early as 1957. During Cusco Week celebrations on 25 June 1959, Giesecke delivered a speech entitled, “Cusco and International Tourism” at the Club Cusco emphasizing the urgent need for state investment in tourism. Speaking to Cusco’s political leaders, economic elite, and prominent intellectuals including Valcárcel, Giesecke argued that Peru enjoyed a small window of opportunity to exploit the growing international tourism market.

“El turismo en el Peru y en el Cusco, principalmente,” ECC, November 6, 1957, 2.
In his speech, Giesecke warned that the new reach of airplanes like the DC-9, the Electra, and new jet technology would soon bypass Peru in favor of other destinations. “For the new era of air travel, Cuzco has one chance to prepare itself if it wants to receive the benefits of increased tourism,” stated Giesecke. “And I ask, where are the hotel facilities and ground transportation, well-trained guides and other essential aspects if 100 or even 200 air travel passengers arrive in Cusco daily?” inquired Giesecke. “If we do not complete these projects immediately,” warned Giesecke, “Cuzco will lose the opportunity to attend to the notable increase of visitors. It would also probably lose sources for its economic life.” Concluding his remarks, Giesecke prioritized two key projects to capture the international tourism market: two new hotels in Cusco and Machu Picchu of 200 beds each and a new airport in Anta.138

**Conclusion**

On January 1, 1959, *El Comercio de Lima* published an article that noted the success with which the restorations had progressed and also congratulated, “the journalistic campaign, in which *El Comercio* had a central participation, to avoid the massive destruction of America’s principal archeological site – the fortress of Machu Picchu.”139 The next month, President Manuel Prado and the first lady visited the newly-restored archeological site to inaugurate the CRYF-funded, expanded hotel facilities at Machu Picchu. Although the new hotel features stopped short of the bold plans proposed by Giesecke, *El Comercio del Cusco* proudly described the renovated hotel as, “one more milestone for progress in Cuzco and an incentive for increased tourism.”140 Prado’s visit to Machu Picchu marked the successful conclusion of local efforts to solicit the resources of the state to develop tourism in Cusco. The disaster economics of Cusco’s

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138 Speech text found in: AG-D-050; Event program found in, AG-1709.
earthquake recovery and Machu Picchu’s emergency restoration had permitted local leaders to channel financial and technical resources to replace leadership and planning roles originally fulfilled by CNT. Not only did Cusco’s elites manage to keep the promise of tourism alive in their region, their efforts at urban planning and archeological reconstruction at Machu Picchu laid the foundation for the tourism boom of the 1960s.

However, deeper conflicts developed alongside the apparent success of disaster economics in the 1950s that would continue to affect the Cusco region. Cusco’s leaders and tourism promoters successfully used their political, economic, and cultural links in Lima and beyond to reach their goals. Appeals for restoration and promotion of Cusco and Machu Picchu often used the international appeal of both sites through film and international travel. However, by marketing their region’s appeal to Lima and the international community to develop tourism and celebrate their local history, Cusco’s elites discovered that their efforts to reach out for national and international allies could backfire when Peru’s national press suggested that the poor state of Cusco’s archeological sites were further indication of the region’s backwardness. Newspaper reports on the abandonment of Machu Picchu and the stalled reconstruction of Cusco emphasized both sites’ national importance while simultaneously underlying the political and economic isolation of the region.

More critically, elites’ use of disaster recovery resources to develop tourism in Cusco after the earthquake produced unintended negative consequences for the historic integrity of cultural sites. By categorizing the reconstruction of Cusco and Machu Picchu as disaster recovery and tourism development, institutions, especially the CRYF, downplayed concerns regarding preservation. Instead, Junta and later CRYF planners selected modern reconstruction techniques at Machu Picchu to increase the pace of the reconstruction and make the site
accessible to tourism. The same development-oriented motivations encouraged the CRYF to complete a major hydroelectric project in the ecologically and historically sensitive area surrounding Machu Picchu with little objection. Such methods did alarm some observers. George Kubler, the author of the UNESCO study created to oversee post-earthquake restorations in Cusco returned to the region in 1956 and expressed alarm at methods of the CRYF. “An unparalleled opportunity for archeological work was lost,” reported Kubler in his critique of the restoration techniques.141

Finally, the efforts to divert disaster recovery efforts towards tourism development succeeded at the cost of ignoring many of the original goals of the earthquake reconstruction. Although the Hudgens Report that led to the creation of the original Junta acknowledged the need to restore Cusco’s cultural heritage, the bulk of its content recommended a dramatic modernization of the region’s economy through industrialization and agricultural reform. However, regional elites proved reluctant to reform the exploitative hacienda economy that formed the basis of their social and economic capital. Cusco elites instead used reconstruction institutions to fund elite-oriented tourism. The Junta dedicated only one percent while the CRYF spent only 2% of its budget towards rural modernization.142 One of the few efforts completed by the CRYF to encourage rural development – the construction of a fertilizer plant – remained delayed until 1965 and later languished due to lack of local demand.143 As the TACP and tourism promoters like Giesecke pushed for new airports and luxury hotels, the majority of agrarian Cusco remained underdeveloped, isolated, and exploited. When local laborers closed Cusco city during a general strike on 10 April 1958, their protest highlighted the limited nature

142 Rénique, Los suenos de la sierra, 153, 161-164.
143 Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 189.
of the earthquake recovery. The short urban uprising served as a prelude to a much larger and revolutionary agrarian movement in the La Convención Valley northwest of Machu Picchu that would explode in 1960. Tourism in Cusco had survived a natural disaster in 1950 only to confront a much larger social disaster a decade later.

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Figure 3.1: Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, *El Comercio de Lima*, 7 February 1955 article denouncing conditions of Machu Picchu and the activities of the Archeology Council
Figure 3.2: Junta/CRYF Restoration Expenditures in Cusco, GAKP, Box 1, Folder 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures (in Peruvian Soles)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>2,539,789.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2,405,131.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4,574,442.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>213,781.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,528,267.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,397,808.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3: Biblioteca Municipal del Cusco. Graphics showing the lack of restoration progress in Cuzco from *El Sol*, December 9 1954, 3.
Figure 3.4: CRYF-managed Machu Picchu Supervision report showing reconstruction of Machu Picchu.
Figure 3.5: CRYF-managed Machu Picchu Supervision report showing reconstruction of Machu Picchu.

6.- La restauración de todas las secciones y salas del grupo 9 o Barrio Inregunta, llamado también Grupo de los Monteros, ya está en su fin, la obra ha quedado bien hecha. Aunque hay ligeras oclusiones que se han eliminado a la vista de lo reconstruido y lo antigo, y rico de dientes, pues antes de ser restauradas estas salas eran solo un monumento de piedras y arena que puede pasar por ellos, habiendo ganado el turista más cosas que ver en Machu Picchu. Los monumentos de las salas no se han reconstruido, solo se han subordinado unas cuantas hiladas para mostrar que existieron.

Abajo.

El sector denominado de las tres puertas o barranco nº 10, está en pleno proceso de restauración, se puede observar en las fotos el proceso que se emplea para levantar los muros a la misma altura que tuvieron al abrigo y con la ligera inclinación típica.

Estos trabajos fueron iniciados por el Patronato Departamental de Arqueología con dinero donado por la Municipalidad de Lima y la Asociación Nacional de Artistas y Escritores de Lima, y ha sido continuado por la Junta de Reconstrucción de Formato Industrial del Cusco, con los fondos que la Ley 12350 en su artículo 4° y 27º ha designado para la restauración de Machu Picchu. Los fondos de esta Ley, en lo referente a Machu Picchu deben ser administrados por el Patronato del Cusco, pero por acuerdo de esta institución ha pasado al control de la Junta. Ahora hay una tendencia para hacer que sea el Patronato Departamental de Arqueología el que se encargue otra vez del control y dirección de estos trabajos.
Figure 3.6. CRYF-managed Machu Picchu Supervision report showing reconstruction of Machu Picchu with the figure of Bingham displayed prominently.
Chapter 4


When Peru’s Minister of Industry and Commerce arrived in Cusco on October 18, 1974, he found a warm welcome printed in the local newspaper. “Cusco Progresses through Tourism,” proclaimed El Comercio in an endorsement of the efforts by Peru’s left-leaning military government to transform the region into a global destination.¹ The slogan also reflected a new phase for tourism in Cusco. Promoted since the 1920s as strategy to promote local folklore, present Cusco as modern destination, and serve as a supplemental source of profit, by the 1960s tourism had transformed into a potential source of regional economic development. In the wake of agrarian revolts and the collapse of its traditional agricultural economy, regional and national leaders searched for strategies to restore economic and political stability to Cusco. Numerous scholarly studies have analyzed the course and legacy of these efforts, especially related to agrarian reform.² Often overlooked, however, is the fact that tourism also emerged as a potential solution to reform Cusco’s economy and society during this era.

This chapter analyzes local, national, and international efforts to transform tourism into an engine for economic and social transformation in Cusco in the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning with the election of reformist Fernando Belaúnde Terry as president, the national state once

¹ See advertisement in: BMC, ECC, October 18, 1974, 3.
again pledged resources and investment to use tourism as a source of national economic investment. These early efforts were quickly accelerated after the 1968 military coup that brought General Juan Velasco Alvarado to power. Ruling with a mandate to undertake a “revolution from above” to structurally transform Peru’s economy, assert national sovereignty, and resolve political fragmentation, the Velasco government accelerated efforts to use tourism not only as a source of economic development, but of social transformation – especially in impoverished Cusco. Despite its nationalist rhetoric, the Velasco government partnered with transnational institutions to create tourism development in Cusco. No institution symbolized this cooperation better than COPESCO, a joint operation between Peru and UNESCO. The COPESCO plan projected that, through an expansion of cultural tourism, the pressing needs of rural development and historical preservation could be resolved in Cusco.

Of course, COPESCO was not the only transnational link that affected Cusco’s cultural and economic trajectory in the 1960s and 1970s. Global technological and cultural shifts elevated interest in the Andes and Cusco to a level not seen since the Good Neighbor Policy. These changes led to Cusco’s first true tourism boom beginning in the mid-1960s. However, the same transnational links that brought promises of modernization, profit, and preservation also threatened to attract unwelcome visitors, investors, and sources of conflict. These unpredictable new patterns proved especially unsettling to a military government that held social and political cohesion as one of its principal goals. Eventually, dreams of social development centered on cultural tourism collapsed in conflicts over preservation, centralism, and the type of tourist economy that would take root in Cusco. Much to the surprise of planners, the institutions formed to carry out their plans evolved into some of the most effective tools to support and legitimize conflicts in the era of developmental tourism.
Preparing for Jet Set Tourism

When a Braniff International Airways Boeing 707 landed at Lima’s Las Palmas airport in late February of 1960, Caretas magazine announced the dawn of the “Jet Age” in Peru.³ PANAGRA introduced its jet service by May (Figure 4.1) and a few months later, the Corporación Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviación Comercial (Peruvian Corporation of Commercial Airports and Aviation, CORPAC), inaugurated a new airport in Callao, Jorge Chávez International, designed specifically to receive jet aircraft.⁴ The end of the propeller-era suddenly reduced the time and cost of travel to Peru from abroad. Introduction of domestic jet service followed later in the decade. By 1968, Faucett Airlines featured regular domestic jet service between Lima and Cusco, eliminating the need for uncomfortable flights with unpressurized cabins and bottled oxygen.⁵ In July of 1961, CORPAC evaluated plans to construct a new airport a few kilometers to the southeast of the current facility opened in 1933 to the Quispiquilla zone of Cusco’s valley.⁶ El Comercio del Cusco predicting the new airport would “give a new and decisive drive for tourism promotion.”⁷ Opened formally in 1965, the new facility bore the name Velasco Astete Airport in honor of the Cusco aviator.⁸ Advances in Peru’s annual international tourist arrivals increased dramatically from 62,000 to 108,000 between 1963 and 1967.⁹ The entire South American continent saw similar results as total

⁵ Faucett Advertisement, Caretas, 372, 7-20 May 1968, np; see advertisement in, BMC, ECC, June 7, 1968, 5.
annual international tourist arrivals increased from 602,000 to 1,124,000 – a trend chiefly attributed to the introduction of jets in the 1960s. 10

However, concerns emerged in Peru whether the country had the sufficient infrastructure to support increased international arrivals. A Caretas investigation into the state of tourism in Cusco in 1962 found that visitors to the city would leave with two general conclusions. “The first,” stated the article, “of admiration before such wonder. The second, pity before the backwardness and abandonment that a city of such renown finds itself.”11 Caretas often pressed the state for more action on tourism, proclaiming in December of 1962: “The industry without chimneys needs fuel.”12 By 1963, Benjamín Roca Muelle, former director of the defunct Corporación Nacional del Turismo, (National Tourism Corporation, CNT) from the 1940s, lobbied for the use of state resources to promote tourism in Peru.13 As a response, in 1963 the Peruvian national government created a special tourism commission that, in September, handed over its final report recommending increased state investment in the tourist economy.14

The president who received the report, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, had a special interest in renewing state efforts to develop tourism, especially in Cusco. Elected in June of 1963 after a short period of military rule, Belaúnde and his Acción Popular party campaigned on a platform of development that departed from the orthodox economic policies of the previous Odría and Prado governments.15 Belaúnde’s campaign promises of agrarian reform, state-led development,
and decentralization helped him win overwhelming support in Cusco.\textsuperscript{16} For many, re-engaging the state to foment tourism development, especially in the Andean highlands, emerged as a central part of Belaúnde’s proposals. True to his promises, on March 6, 1964 Belaúnde approved Law 14947 creating the Corporación de Turismo del Perú (Peruvian Tourism Corporation, COTURPERU) to manage tourism funding and planning.\textsuperscript{17}

Roca Muelle returned to head COTURPERU, an action he viewed as vindication of his original vision to use tourism as a force for national development. Speaking at the formal establishment of COTURPERU, Roca Muelle announced: “I am sure that this, together with the current agrarian reform law, will constitute two of the most important laws of the current regime to achieve the goals of economic development and social justice that constitute the most valuable objectives of the entire nation.”\textsuperscript{18} COTURPERU hired Checchi and Company of Washington, D.C. to draft a long-term tourism development plan for Peru. The “Checci Report,” published in July of 1965, outlined an aggressive plan for state investment in Peruvian tourism in hotel construction, tourism training, infrastructure improvements, cultural promotion, and advertising campaigns.\textsuperscript{19} The report justified the enormous spending it proposed by arguing that tourism no longer served as a supplemental economic sector or cultural activity of the state. Peru had the possibility to attracted 268,900 international tourist visits and $70 million in direct annual tourism revenue by 1974. According to the report, spending by tourists would produce a total of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Handelman, \textit{Struggle in the Andes}, 85.
\item \textsuperscript{17} AGN, Lima, Fondo de Hacienda, H-6, Legajo 2396, Cámara de Comercio de Lima, Boletín Semanal, No. 726, March 16, 1964. The state hotel chain also was placed under the supervision of COTURPERU.
\item \textsuperscript{18} BNP, “Promulgación de la Ley de Creación de la Corporación de Turismo del Perú,” in \textit{Boletín de la Corporación de Turismo del Perú}, Marzo-Abril de 1964, 26.
\item \textsuperscript{19} CBC, “Turismo, una industria de gran porvenir en el Perú,” \textit{Boletín de la COTURPERU}, no. 15, diciembre de 1965, 26-29; CBC, Checchi and Company, \textit{La perspectiva para el turismo en el Perú: Informe presentado por Checci y Compania bajo contrato con la Organización de Estados Americanos}, (Washington: Checchi and Company, 1965), 48-49, 64-82. The report recommended that the national state would have to spend $102 million in tourism infrastructure by 1974, including the creation of 2,700 new hotel rooms.
\end{itemize}
$225 million in annual income for Peru by 1974, equivalent to 7% of the predicted national GDP.\textsuperscript{20} For Peru, and Cusco in particular, tourism promised large economic gains.\textsuperscript{20}

COTURPERU, with the encouragement of the Checci Report, directed a large degree of its energy towards the promotion of tourism in Cusco. The Checci report noted that, “if Peru has a single attraction known throughout the world – it is Machu Picchu.”\textsuperscript{21} Cusqueños applauded the new interest of the state in tourism. \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} noted that: “the creation of this organization…has particular importance for our department, because Cuzco, without a doubt the zone of the country where one finds the best archeological wealth and artistic treasures.”\textsuperscript{22}

Immediately, COTURPERU began initiatives to study new hotel construction in Cusco and opened its first regional satellite office in the historic city on August 15, 1964.\textsuperscript{23} COTURPERU allocated more than 5 million soles for various restoration and infrastructure projects in the region in its 1965 budget.\textsuperscript{24} The efforts bore fruit and between 1960 and 1970, annual tourism arrivals to Cusco doubled from 26,026 to 52,834. Equally important, the coveted international market composed a large part of the tourism increase in Cusco rising from 40% to 63.6% of the overall tourist demographic.\textsuperscript{25}

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\textsuperscript{20} BNP, “Turismo, una industria de gran porvenir en el Perú,” \textit{Boletín de la COTURPERU}, no. 15, diciembre de 1965, p. 27-29.
\textsuperscript{21} BMC, “Turismo, una industria de gran porvenir en el Perú,” \textit{Boletín de la COTURPERU}, no. 15, diciembre de 1965, 28.
\textsuperscript{22} BMC, “La ley de turismo debe ser revisada,” ECC, March 31, 1964, 2.
\textsuperscript{24} BNP, “Presupuesto de COTURPERU para 1965,” \textit{Boletín de la COTURPERU}, no. 5, enero 1965, p. 4-6, BNP; “El Valle Sagrado de los Incas,” \textit{Boletín de la COTURPERU}, no. 5, enero 1965, 18-22; BMC, “5 millones: Pavimentación carretera ‘Valle Sagrado,’” ECC, December 30, 1964, 1. The funding went to paving of the Carretera del Valle Sagrado de los Incas, expansion of the Cusco hotel, illumination of the Cathedral and the Compania Church, the restoration of the Casona of Garcilaso de la Vega, and the purchase of two new railcars and two new buses to transport tourists to and from Machu Picchu.
However, in order to capitalize on tourism and attract well-to-do travelers, the Checci Report advised Peru to “improve its tourism ‘product.’” That is, make Peru a destination for elite, especially North American, travelers.\textsuperscript{26} “Peru is competing for the US market against places like England and France,” noted the report and, as a result, needed to remake its lodging and visiting facilities to serve a first-class visitor.\textsuperscript{27} State-owned hotels and facilities needed to be renovated to receive modern jet travelers from abroad.\textsuperscript{28} Tourism corridors, including Cusco’s Sacred Valley, required aesthetic improvements for travelers.\textsuperscript{29} It appears that COTURPERU had already taken steps to attract elite travelers to Peru before the formal release of the Checci Report. By mid-1964, the new agency pursued an aggressive propaganda campaign abroad by buying advertising space in the New York Times, the Miami Herald, and funding an 18 meter-slide of Machu Picchu to be displayed in Grand Central Terminal.\textsuperscript{30} COTURPERU also invested in tourism promotion in Europe at the Berlin International Fair of 1964.\textsuperscript{31}

North American consumers proved to be enthusiastic recipients of COTURPERU’s efforts. Already listening to Frank Sinatra’s “Come Fly with Me” inviting listeners to “float down to Peru” where “in llama land there’s a one man band and he’ll toot his flute for you,” potential postwar tourists gravitated towards the appeal of the Andes.\textsuperscript{32} In February 1964, the New York Times travel section published glowing reviews of visits to the “magic land of the

\textsuperscript{26} CBC, Checci, \textit{La perespectiva para el turismo en el Perú}, 3.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 13-14. The report justified the focus toward US travelers based on 1963 statistics. In that year, 62,500 people arrived in Peru. Of these, 17,200 were United States tourists, 10,000 business travelers, 26,500 were international tourists from countries besides the U.S., and 8,800 probable immigrants and/or non-tourist arrivals.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 35-38.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 54-57.
\textsuperscript{30} BNP, “Llamado a todos los sectores para que colaboren en la magna empresa de promoción turística…” \textit{Boletín de la COTURPERU}, no. 2, mayo-junio-julio, 1964, 6-7.
Incas” and Machu Picchu, a site, “considered by many to be the most fascinating sight in the Western Hemisphere.” Museum and exhibits also premiered in prominent tourist markets illustrating appealing to potential cultured travelers by displaying artifacts of Peru’s mythic and seemingly luxurious Pre-Columbian past. Between 1960 and 1963, Miguel Mujica Gallo traveled the world in exhibiting his “Gold of Peru” collection of pre-Hispanic artifacts. In 1965, another prominent exhibit titled, “The Treasures of Peruvian Gold” traveled to museums in across the United States. The Washington Post gave the exhibit’s October, 1965 opening at the National Gallery front-page treatment. Peruvian ambassador Celso Pastor de la Torre accompanied the Treasures of Peruvian Gold to endorse it as a key tool to increased cultural and touristic awareness of Peru in the United States. These policies did yield results; by 1967 Peru was the fifth-most visited country in South America. Although Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay still attracted more tourists, in the competition for coveted North American travelers, Peru ranked first with forty thousand arrivals. By 1968, 40.5% of all international tourists in Peru, the largest demographic group, originated from the United States.

The Peruvian media also embraced the concept of fashioning the country into a destination for the cultured international traveler. The November 1963 edition of Caretas sponsored a photo shoot of “Nordic Vicunas” at Machu Picchu. The photos of European models, wearing modern fashions posing amongst the stones of Machu Picchu reinforced one of the

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39 AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XIII, Caja 4, Silva, COPESCO, Estudio General del Trabajo (Parte I), cuadro no. 9, 20. The second largest group, tourists from South America, composed 31.8% of arrivals.
primary arguments in favor of tourism as a force of modernization and progress for Cusco (see, figure 4.2). The following year, Caretas sponsored another photo shoot at Machu Picchu featuring young stewardesses representing airlines transporting Peru’s new jet-age tourists. Cusco and Machu Picchu continued to serve as favorite fashion shoot locations into the mid-1960s for Caretas. COTURPERU also sponsored its own fashion shoots with models posing in Cusco in 1965. The image of a passenger jet flying over Machu Picchu emerged as a point of regional pride and the promise of modernization for Cusco well into the 1970s (Image 4.2).

Ironically, Machu Picchu’s own singular fame resulting from promotion threatened to overshadow archeological scholarship. For example, a 1960 travel column in the Boston Globe still erroneously described Machu Picchu as the resting place of Sun Virgins. When archeologist Gene Savoy revealed that he had found Vilcabamba, the true last capital of the Incas, outlets like the New York Times downplayed the significance of the discovery offering limited press coverage. Bingham’s false assertion that Machu Picchu was the final capital of the Inca, repeated in the press and travel guides, proved difficult to challenge in popular imagination that emphasized the archeological complex as the ultimate symbol of Peru’s pre-Hispanic past. The Boston Globe perhaps stated popular disbelief of Savoy’s discovery of Vilcabamba best by announcing: “Machu Picchu mightn’t be Machu Picchu after all!” As late as 1976, visitors
could not access the Vilcabamba archeological complex that remained isolated from the key tourism corridors selected for development.\textsuperscript{48}

However, behind the glossy images of modern travel, multiple problems still afflicted Peru’s tourism development. A travel article featured in August of 1967 in the \textit{Boston Globe} remarked that, “in Peru the most exciting tourist attraction is nearly impossible to get to. Machu Picchu is a four day event from Lima and you have to fight for it all the way.”\textsuperscript{49} \textit{El Comercio de Lima} also expressed its indignation over a perceived poor image of Peru received by tourists at Machu Picchu. “A semi-literate subject represents the fortress of Macchupicchu,” complained the Lima newspaper describing the impoverished employees working at the site.\textsuperscript{50} Much of COTUPERU’s shortcomings traced back to its head, Roca Muelle.\textsuperscript{51} In February of 1966, Felipe Benavides, a disgruntled former employee, gave an interview to \textit{El Expreso} arguing that Roca Muelle managed COTURPERU, “as if it was private property.” Benavides accused Roca Muelle of not keeping the executive board aware of new hotel construction contracts, failure to implement the recommendations of the Cecchi Report, and personnel mismanagement. Most seriously, however, Benavides accused Roca Muelle of being out of touch with a new era of tourism. Benavides observed, “Yes, he was a pioneer…more than 30 years ago, when airplanes flew with wood propellers. He isn’t familiar with the era of the jet.”\textsuperscript{52} Roca Muelle defended his administration, but by 1967 was replaced as head of COTURPERU.\textsuperscript{53}

However, the greatest threat to Cusco’s pursuit of elite tourism was perhaps the precarious social conditions of the region in the 1960s. Beginning in 1958, agrarian revolts in La

\textsuperscript{48} BMC, “Sólo con permiso del INC se podrá ir a Vilcabamba,” ECC, September 7, 1976, 1.
\textsuperscript{50} BNP, “Faltan respeto a turistas en ingreso a ‘Machu Picchu,’” \textit{ECL}, February 25, 1966.
\textsuperscript{51} “Turismo a la criolla,” \textit{Caretas}, 297, 18-25 Sep., 1964, 10A. Bustamante criticized the decision to renovate at great expense the Casa de Oquendo in Lima to serve as the institution’s headquarters.
\textsuperscript{52} BNP, “Crisis en Turismo por Culpa de Benjamin Roca Muelle,” \textit{Expreso}, February 4, 1966, 3.
Convención Province pressing for land reform had grown in scope and mobilization. By June of 1963, the revolts provoked the short-lived military junta to issue some of the first national comprehensive land reform policies in La Convención. The success of the La Convención uprising and the election of Belaúnde emboldened campesinos in the traditional rural zones of Cusco’s altiplano to seize land of neighboring haciendas. Pressured by conservative parties in control of Congress, Belaúnde adopted a hardline stance against the land seizures in Cusco. Violence between Peruvian police and peasants in Cusco increased from October of 1963. By February of 1964, at least 35 campesinos had died in confrontations with the police. In March of 1964, Belaúnde declared a state of siege in Cusco, suspending constitutional law in efforts to fight land seizures. For the remainder of Belaúnde’s administration, Cusco’s rural communities remained locked in a tense social and political stalemate with the national government. In Mesa Pelada, a zone near La Convención, foco warfare groups, Movimento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), engaged the military in a failed uprising in 1965. In addition to social unrest, Belaúnde’s agenda was frustrated by conservative opposition in congress and a deteriorating economic environment with 14 percent annual inflation and a painful devaluation of the sol in September of 1967. When the politically-sensitive topic of expropriating the US-owned International Petroleum Company’s holdings became mired in scandal in 1968 many observers predicted military intervention was imminent.56

The ongoing social chaos did not go unnoticed by visitors. One Boston Globe columnist, visiting Machu Picchu in 1960 praised the spectacular site, but also wrote his dismay at

54 Handleman, Struggle in the Andes, 81-83, 101; Niera, Los Andes: 95-99; Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo agrario en el Perú; José Tamayo Herrera, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 191-213.
55 Handleman, Struggle in the Andes, 113-115.
56 Klárén, Peru, 329-336
witnessing the stark poverty of Cusco. He characterized highland Peru as a mix of “beauty, squalor, and angry voices.”

On July 4, 1965, Lima’s luxurious Hotel Crillon suffered a bomb attack by guerillas. The uncomfortable collision between elite international travel and the region’s social tumult in 1965 was encapsulated on the front page of the October 19 edition of El Comercio del Cusco that announced the arrival of film stars escorted by COTURPERU alongside a headline reading, “Guerillas Captured!”

Conditions had not improved by June 1968 when the front page of El Comercio del Cusco placed an article on hotel hygiene quality next to another announcing: “Hunger forces campesinos to sell their children.”

Economic unrest in the latter years of Belaúnde’s government spread to directly affect the tourism sector through strikes, labor unrest, and budget cuts to preservation and tourism promotion institutions.

Tourism under the Revolutionary Armed Forces

As many predicted, on October 3, 1968 the military unseated Belaúnde in a bloodless coup led by Army General Juan Velasco. To the surprise of observers, the military officers dubbed their rule the, “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of Peru,” and quickly redirected national politics to the left. Velasco and his supporters in the Armed Forces, alarmed by growing radicalism in the face of the intransigence of Peru’s traditional conservative elite and Belaúnde’s frustrated reforms, claimed the mandate to undertake major, top-down, social reforms. Foreign mining and resources extraction companies were expropriated and nationalized, new development agencies to promote economic modernization appeared, and, in June of 1969,

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58 Walter, Peru and the United States, 70.
60 BMC, “Exigen higene en hoteles del Cuzco,” and “Campesinos venden a sus hijos, hambre los obliga,” ECC, June 4, 1968, 1.
the government carried out the largest agrarian reform in Latin American history. The military government also portrayed leftist credentials through more symbolic reforms. It declared Quechua a national language, opened up diplomatic and cultural exchanges with Cuba and socialist European states, and sponsored indigenous-focused art and folkloric projects. The military government also employed visual imagery to communicate its populist development goals.\textsuperscript{62} Machu Picchu also figured prominently in government cultural campaigns, often placed alongside images of industrious workers and rural development (Figure 4.3).\textsuperscript{63}

Immediately the new government acted to consolidate tourism management under the rapidly-growing state bureaucracy. In March of 1969, the military government replaced COTURPERU with the Empresa Nacional del Turismo (National Tourism Company, ENTURPERU), a smaller institution tasked with managing the state hotels.\textsuperscript{64} In December of that year, the state placed tourism development under the control of the newly-created Dirección General del Turismo (General Office of Tourism, DGTUR) within the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.\textsuperscript{65} National development plans placed tourism alongside agrarian reform, mining, and manufacturing as key economic goals for the military government.\textsuperscript{66} However, the most ambitious proposal to develop tourism as part of the military government’s involved the cooperation of transnational institutions including UNESCO and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

As early as 1965, UNESCO and the Peruvian government began negotiations to involve the institution in restoration of Machu Picchu. In 1966, the head of UNESCO, René Vironi,
arrived in Peru to formally begin planning for the creation of a more comprehensive plan to promote cultural tourism with historical preservation. In the final months of Belaúnde’s administration, the plan’s initial findings were released as part of the Plan Turístico y Cultural Perú-UNESCO (Peru-UNESCO Tourist and Cultural Plan, COPESCO).\(^{67}\) The new military government continued COPESCO and, in April of 1969, organized an executive committee headed by the Minister of Industry and Commerce to assume and direct administrative control of the institution aided with advisors partially funded by UNESCO and the United Nations Development Programme.\(^ {68}\) Despite its nationalist rhetoric and threats by the United States to suspend foreign aid loans, the military government proved adept at securing international financing for COPESCO.\(^ {69}\) Thanks to a foreign loan, by 1972, COPESCO’s total cost had reached $70,752,000, 60% provided by a loan from the IDB and 40% provided by the Peruvian state.\(^ {70}\) COPESCO’s area of influence extended 84,735 square kilometers extending from Lake Titicaca in Puno Department to La Convención in Cusco.\(^ {71}\)

Unlike previous institutions that sought to develop tourism as a supplementary source of economic growth, COPESCO pledged to use tourist-oriented development to radically change the social structure of the Peruvian altiplano. Weakening since the 1940s, during the 1950s and 1960s, the agrarian economy of Southern Peru had entered into a period of terminal decline. Economic growth on Peru’s coast in the 1950s had only further marginalized areas like Cusco. Growing populations and economic decline had forced nearly 800,000 people to abandon the

\(^{67}\) AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XII, Caja 4, Jean Marie Sertillange, *COPESCO: Estudio General de Turismo (Parte IV), Necesidades y Requerimientos en Infraestructura de Transportes en la Zona Cusco-Puno*, (September, 1971), 1-4.

\(^{68}\) AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XII, Caja 4, Sertillange, *COPESCO: Estudio General del Turismo (Parte IV), Necesidades y Requerimientos en Infraestructura de Transportes en la Zona Cusco-Puno*, 3-4.


\(^{70}\) AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XII, Caja 4, *Plan COPESCO, Estudio Económico Financiero*.

\(^{71}\) AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XII, Caja 4, *Plan COPESCO, Estudio Económico Financiero*, 39.
departments of southern Peru between 1940 and 1961. The military government envisioned COPESCO as an important institutional tool in its goal to fundamentally re-order the colonial foundations of Cusco’s regional economy. For Velasco and many of his closest allies in the new military government the uprising in La Convención and the experience of fighting the MIR and ELN in 1965 had served as a formative moment in their political evolution. The counterinsurgency campaign highlighted the stark underdevelopment of Cusco and the potential danger of ignoring the region’s social and economic conditions. In fact, the new Minister of Industry and Commerce during the organization of COPESCO, Rear Admiral Jorge Dellepiane, emerged as one of the regime’s more leftist leaders. As a result, the new military government expanded the initiatives of COPESCO begun by Belaúnde. “In the Cusco-Puno zone, tourism, is the sector that can channel inversions for its own development and simultaneously provide infrastructural base for the social-economic development of the zone,” predicted one 1972 COPESCO assessment. Tourism, like the agrarian reform, would become an instrument of development and social change in Cusco.

In fact, COPESCO’s planners correctly recognized that agrarian reform alone would not provide a source of income to Cusco and neighboring Puno. It appears that COPESCO planners recognized what scholars like José María Caballero have argued the military government overlooked – that the agrarian crisis in highland Peru derived not from a concentration of territory in haciendas but a general lack of arable land and overpopulation. Even with the agrarian reform of 1969, 56% of the Cusco’s economically-active rural population lacked access

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74 North, “Ideological Orientations of Peru’s Military Rulers,” 256.
75 AM, DGTUR, EET, VII-XII, Caja 4, *Plan COPESCO. Estudio Económico Financiero*, 305.
To combat the region’s underdevelopment, COPESCO planners envisioned an immediate injection of state spending in “fixed social capital” through the construction of roads, hotels, and tourism infrastructure. Such spending would encourage private investment in a service economy in the region. COPESCO predicted that the combined public and private investment would quickly begin a, “chain reaction of auto-generated profits and spending that will extend to all economic sectors.” As a result, “tourism activity, not needing skilled labor, will become a generator of profits to absorb the workforce in a rapid, easy, and cheap process.”

In the eyes of COPESCO, tourism would provide a crucial role in absorbing rural labor into a modern service economy.

The COPESCO plan promoted tourism as a holistic, unifying force to promote rural development in Cusco and neighboring Puno, an idea reflected even in the institution’s own propaganda (Figure 4.4). The institution worked to assess and evaluate its effect on local employment and redistribution of tourism spending. For Aguas Calientes, COPESCO recommended US $217,000 in spending for a school, sanitary clinic, park, sewer system, and electrification. COPESCO justified the spending by noting that a better-educated and healthier workforce would provide better tourism development. Even the large upfront infrastructure spending of the COPESCO projects promised to “intensively absorb untrained labor,” providing, “cycles of general training that will quickly prepare personnel for services in hotels, vacation

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80 AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XII, Caja 4, Análisis del impacto económico de las inversiones del Plan COPESCO.
81 AM, DGTUR, EET I-VII, Caja 3, COPESCO Estudio General del Turismo (Parte IX), Análisis beneficio-costo de las inversiones del Plan COPESCO en la Zona Cuzco-Puno, (March, 1972), 151-152.
colonies, and youth lodges.”

One of the project’s most successful efforts was the pilot plan developed for Pisac that emphasized restoring the town’s archeological complex in coordination with rehabilitation of its small urban center. Another COPESCO initiative sent young university students to hundreds of small towns in Cusco and Puno to assess the potential to use the sites for cultural tourism. The town of Marangani received a positive assessment for tourism potential thanks to its well-preserved parish church and good road access. Unfortunately for the small town of La Quebrada in the Lares district of Cusco, the report concluded that it: “does not have any” tourism appeal and was simply a, “typical agricultural settlement.” The project examined human capital as well as structures in assessing tourism potential. One report on the town of Kitapayara in La Convención Valley recommended future tourism potential due to the fact that the, “native group is not well acculturated which permits [a visitor] to appreciate their old customs.”

COPESCO also funded an increase in preservation efforts throughout the region. Working with the United Nations Development Programme, COPESCO created Project PER-39 as an extensive program to document and catalog archeological sites over a two-year period. The military government dissolved, disrupted, or defunded institutions like the CRYF, COTURPERU, and the Archeological Council that provided funds for Machu Picchu’s preservation and operations. Between 1968 and October of 1971, care of Machu Picchu reverted
to the woefully-underfunded Departmental Archeology Council. “Only a profound care for Cuzco and archeology and a true spirit of sacrifice,” sustained Machu Picchu’s operations during the tumultuous years at the start of military rule according to Archeology Council head Chávez Ballón. Fortunately, the creation of COPESCO funneled much-needed preservation funding to Cusco. Between 1973 and 1975, COPESCO worked in coordination with the PER-39 project to coordinate the restoration of 27 different historical sites in and around Cusco. The funds also permitted a detailed catalog development of all archeological sites in Cusco, as well as funded artisan workshops to repair artifacts in Cusco and Juli. The PER-39 project included funding for photography and inspection of stonework in Machu Picchu in 1974. In September of 1974, the IDB awarded the Peruvian government a loan of $5,478,00 for historical preservation projects. With this start-up funding secured, the government formed a special unit to oversee a comprehensive maintenance and preservation program for Machu Picchu between 1975 and 1981.

The announced spending received a warm reception in Cusco where the regional-focused mission of COPESCO promised to relieve an increasingly stratified tourism economy. The demands for elite oriented hotels exceed the financial capabilities of Cusco’s weakening regional elite. As a result, most new hotel construction in the 1960s was financed and owned by Limeño economic interests. As early as 1967, El Comercio del Cusco criticized the increasing

89 CBC, Chávez Ballón, Informe Machupijchu, 1.
91 The PER-39 project was led by Alfred Valencia Zegarra, Arminda Gibaja Oviedo, José González Corrales under the supevision of the Mexican anthropologist José Luis Lorenzo. See, CBC, Alfredo Valencia Zegarra, “Historia y Evaluación de las investigaciones arqueológicas en el santuario histórico de Machu Picchu,” in Seminario-Taller Internacional Aqueología del Santuario Histórico Nacional y Sitio Patrimonio Mundial de Machu Picchu: Estado de la Cuestión y Propuestas Para un Plan Maestro, (Cusco: s.e., 1993), 100.
stratification of tourism development. “Tourism promotion for Cusco should be guided to give this city some positive benefit,” noted the editorial. The paper concluded that the new tourism economy threatened to, “place us in the role of the ‘willing stooge’ (tonto útil) in favor of outside companies and people.”93 Thus, Cusqueños welcomed state spending as an alternative to private, Lima-based capital interests. ENTURPERU announced plans to convert the San Francisco Monastery in Cusco’s historic center into a modern, 312-bed hotel in August of 1970.94 The following year, ENTURPERU pledged a second luxury hotel conversion for the former San Antonio del Abad Monastery.95 In February of 1970, the government released plans to construct a new auto highway connecting Ollantaytambo directly to Machu Picchu resolving bottlenecks along the Santa Ana rail line.96 Velasco personally arrived in Cusco on September 27, 1971 to formally approve the highway project.97 El Comercio del Cusco applauding Velasco’s visit and the state’s recent investment in tourism claiming: “they form a true rise in tourism promotion that Cusco needs and longs for.”98

New leadership in Peru had greatly expanded the scale and social goals of tourism development in Cusco. However, COPESCO endorsed most of the conclusions of the Checci Report that recommended continued state investment be directed towards creating upscale hotels to market to elite international tourists – primarily originating from the United States.99 The Velasco government did use tourism to support its leftist nationalist rhetoric. By 1972 Cusco

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93 BMC, “A quienes beneficia el turismo en el Cuzco?” ECC, June 20, 1967, 2.
95 BMC, “Cusco tendrá el hotel más lujoso y grande del Perú,” ECC, June 12, 1971, 1.
97 BMC, “Autopista a Machupichu es un hecho!” ECC, September 27, 1971, 1.
99 AM, DGTUR, EET VII-XII, Caja 4, Silva, COPESCO, Estudio General del Trabajo (Parte I): El Turismo en Sud América con especial énfasis en el Perú, 41, 64-65. Although some COPESCO scenarios recommended the national government to focus on attracting more tourists from South America, the North American market remained a development goal in all tourism plans.
saw visits by dignitaries from the Peoples’ Republic of China and the Soviet Union. However, the Velasco government maintained friendly relations with international tourism interests.

COPESCO recommended Peru continue to work to improve jet travel to key tourism markets in the United States and Europe. ENTURPERU signed lucrative hotel contracts with Holiday Inn, Marriott, and Braniff Airways and, with the exception of a dispute regarding AeroPeru’s landing rights, tourism served as a source of positive commercial and diplomatic cooperation.

Even at the height of the military government’s populist and revolutionary message in 1974, the imagery of tourism remained associated with cultured, modern travelers from the global north (figure 4.5).

**Hotel Machu Picchu**

Of all of COPESCO’s projects, the proposal for a modern tourist hotel adjacent to Machu Picchu captured Cusqueños’ attention and hopes for a tourism boom in the region. Unfortunately for the Velasco government, the project would come to represent the challenges and failures of its tourism development plans in Cusco. For many years, individuals proposed to construct a modern hotel at Machu Picchu at the site of the 1933 lodge. Albert Giesecke, working with the Chicago architectural firm of Schweikher & Elting, proposed the construction of an ambitious seven-story hotel to be built into the mountainside as early as 1953. Writing

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103 See front page of, BMC, ECC, Jan. 1, 1974, 1.

104 AG-0465, Albert Giesecke to Albert Rothschild, December 8, 1953.
to the *El Comercio de Cusco* in 1960, Giesecke argued: “It is equally important that the
government of Peru and the CYRF of Cuzco are finally able to have at the end of this coming
year a dignified, comfortable, and large hotel for the hundreds of visitors to Machu Picchu. The
CRYF has a copy of the plans. What are we waiting for?” By 1966, thanks to private
investment, Cusco boasted 16 hotels with 1,058 beds in 1966. Yet, these lodgings still proved insufficient – an important local grievance against national tourism authorities. “Why do we
do tourism promotion if when we receive a visitor we cannot offer him the indispensible: a bed?” asked *El Comercio del Cusco* in June of 1967. COPESCO planners estimated that, without immediate government investment in hotel construction, by 1975 Cusco could face a deficit of over five-thousand hotel beds. If hotel construction did not match growth, long-term tourism development in the region would suffer from missed opportunities and bad press.

COPESCO proposed an ambitious policy to construct hotel facilities for modern travelers in Cusco. In fact, COPESCO initially proposed three new 200-bed hotels for Cusco; one at
Machu Picchu, and two in Cusco city. The plan also proposed a vacation colony for
Urubamba and a “youth lodge” for backpackers at Machu Picchu. COPESCO backed the
creation of a luxury hotel at Machu Picchu justifying surveys stating that 77% of the coveted US
tourist market wanted to stay in first class hotels. Taking these recommendations into
consideration, the national government issued Ministerial Resolution 192-72 on February 21,
1972 approving the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to allocate 31 million soles towards the

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105 AG-D-033, Giesecke to ECC, October 10, 1960.
107 BMC, “En favor del turismo,” ECC, June 1, 1966, 2.
project and called for a commission of architects and planners to begin work on selecting proposals for the hotel.\textsuperscript{113} By February of 1972, the government completed formal estimates on construction costs and locations for the new hotel.\textsuperscript{114} All proposals under consideration featured modernist designs and several floors of rooms. Most proposals also placed the new hotel adjacent to the archeological complex, often dug into the hillside (Figures 4.6 and 4.7).\textsuperscript{115} On June 7, 1972, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce issued ministerial resolution, number 737-72, naming a planning commission to examine possible construction sites for new hotels in the Cusco region.\textsuperscript{116}

So convinced of the benefits of tourism development, the military and COPESCO planners never predicted that proposals to construct a large hotel adjacent to Machu Picchu would cause an outcry. Employing Machu Picchu as a nationalist symbol (Figure 4.3), the military did not foresee the possible negative reaction produced by granting elite travelers prime access to the site. More importantly, the Velasco government created and empowered new bureaucratic institutions that proved ideally suited to provide state resources against the hotel project. In March of 1971, the government created the Instituto Nacional del Cultura (National Culture Institute, INC) to centralize national cultural policy and historical preservation.\textsuperscript{117} In November of 1972, the INC assumed control of all national historic and archeological sites.
including Machu Picchu. Following new policy, COPESCO sent the initial hotel plans to the INC for review and received a response on October 12, 1971. The leadership of the INC responded with a conditional “favorable opinion,” but cautioned that the National Archeological Council (now under the control of the INC) needed to provide final approval for the hotel. More ominously, the report warned that the hotel project could potentially conflict with several national preservation laws including the 1929 original Tello Preservation Law 6634, the more recent Law Decree 14135 from 1962 declaring Urubamba an “archeological province,” and several international planning and preservation policies. As a response, the national government sent an INC team to Machu Picchu in early June and pledged to follow the recommendations of the committee.

Any hopes to quickly approve the hotel fell apart at a disastrous forum held on June 12, 1972 by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Five panel members, all representing tourism interests, expressed approval of the project. However, the remaining 14 members argued against constructing a new hotel on the current lodge site. Architect Santiago Agurto declared that a hotel on the site would be a “cultural injury.” Luis Miró Garland Quesada, another architect who worked with the CRYF, seconded Agurto’s objections regarding the project. A forestry engineer, Benjamín Almanza, voiced his objections by noting that a new hotel would threaten the biodiversity surrounding Machu Picchu. Scholar Luis E. Valcárcel also spoke against the project and artist Fernando de Szyszlo warned that, “it would be insensitive to only consider the tourist-

commercial element,” embodied by the hotel project. Others in attendance argued that the hotel project ran contrary to aims of the Velasco government’s revolutionary and nationalistic rhetoric. Architect Roberto Wakeham noted that constructing a hotel largely for wealthy foreign travelers did not conform to the current revolutionary goals of the military government. Doctor and Sociologist, Dr. Leopoldo Chiappo, also argued that the plan of hotel construction needed to be reviewed, “from the point of view of a revolutionary society that one wants to establish in the country.”

International pressure also grew against the hotel project. Scholars meeting in Mexico City for a conference in August, including John Murra and María Rostworowski, signed a petition protesting the hotel project. By August of 1972, even US dailies printed news articles regarding the uproar over the proposed hotel.

The relatively recent opposition to modernization projects at Machu Picchu opened up long-festering wounds regarding Peru’s endemic political and economic centralism. In Cusco, opposition to hotel smacked of Lima-centric machinations against regional development. “Sabotage of an already-approved project?” questioned El Comercio del Cusco on June 12, 1972 following the first delays of the hotel in preparation for the INC review. For El Comercio del Cusco, the need to secure funding for the Machu Picchu project appeared increasingly urgent as the government’s proposals for hotels in the former San Francisco and San Antonio del Abad monasteries had not progressed since 1970. The August 5, 1972 editorial of Cusco’s El Comercio petitioned the government to proceed with hotel construction despite preservationist protests by appealing to the military’s populist rhetoric citing the: “mindfulness that the people

125 BMC, “Comisión ejecutiva dirá donde se ubica hotel en Machupijchu,” ECC, June 12, 1972, 1.
support said project.”\textsuperscript{126} Another editorial from August 22 sought to identify Lima’s economic and political centralism as a key source of opposition to the hotel. “The stubborn persistence of hidden but powerful economic forces encysted in Lima,” were the true sources of opposition to the Machu Picchu hotel in the view of the \textit{El Comercio del Cusco}.\textsuperscript{127} For Cusqueños, COPESCO and the Machu Picchu hotel represented the region’s best change for economic independence, and well-financed investors in Lima wanted to scuttle the projects.

Seeking to reach a resolution, the national government called on the Ministry of Education to form a panel to evaluate the hotel project and suggest alternative sites. The committee realized its findings on August 14, 1972 and recommended the implementation of a “protected zone” surrounding the archeological complex. “Machu Picchu is an extremely complex site, linked with the environment that surrounds it through a true harmonious relationship between architecture and the topography,” argued the report’s conclusion.\textsuperscript{128} In September of 1972, the Education Ministry issued more details recommending a protected zone of 1,400 hectares that could not be altered, prohibiting construction of a new hotel next to the ruin.\textsuperscript{129} By early September 1972 rumors circulated that a compromise location near, but not adjacent to Machu Picchu would be selected for the hotel project. Unofficial sources hinted that officials had selected a new location 30 kilometers from the ruin.\textsuperscript{130}

Local interests, led by \textit{El Comercio del Cusco}’s editorial board reacted to rumors of the relocation as another threat from Lima-based economic interests, arguing that, “enemies of Cusco do not relent.”\textsuperscript{131} Tensions mounted until the provincial mayor of Cusco called an open

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item BMC, “Hotel en Machupicchu: Esperanza que se aleja? No,” ECC, Aug. 5, 1972, 12.
\item BMC, “Hotel en Machupicchu, tema que quema en Lima,” ECC, Aug. 22, 1972, 2.
\item Archivo Riva-Aguero, Colección Jorge Muelle (JM), “Informe de la Comisión Sobre La Delimitación del Área Intangible de Machu Picchu,” 5.
\item BNP, “Señalan 1,400 hectáres de zona intangible: Machu Picchu,” ECL, September 23, 1972, 1.
\item BMC, “A 20 kilómetros de Machupicchu sería construido Hotel Turistas,” ECC, September 11, 1972, 1.
\item BMC, “Enemigos del Cusco, no cejan” ECC, Sep. 6, 1972, 2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
town meeting on October 10 to demand construction of the Machu Picchu hotel on the current lodge site or an alternate location selected by COPESCO. Denouncing INC head, Martha Hildebrandt, the meeting threatened a general strike if their demands were not answered within 15 days. Reporting on the meeting, *El Comercio del Cusco* proudly noted that, “it had the virtue of certifying the unity of cusquenos when they see the goals of progress in danger for those who have a right to their land (*tiene derecho su tierra*).”

Although the calls for a general strike failed to materialize, two days later, Cusco’s leaders sent a formal petition to Lima to personally press the hotel project with Velasco.

As Cusqueños rallied to protect what they viewed as economic independence, in Lima INC director Hildebrandt viewed the mobilizations in Cusco as a short-sighted pursuit of development over the long-term needs of preservation. “Now,” retorted Hildebrandt in an October 17 interview with Lima’s *El Correo* newspaper, “we must defend Machu Picchu from Cuzqueños.” The INC director continued her response, arguing: “it’s incredible but odd that we, not the Cuzqueños, are the ones concerned with Cuzco.”

The remarks of Hildebrandt did little to diminish Cusqueños’ suspicions of Lima’s centralism and paternalism. In fact, Cusco’s mayor demanded that Hildebrandt travel to Cusco, mocking her as one of: “these *señores* that, at the eleventh hour, become *cusqueñistas* and look down from their balcony trying to devise tactics for the solutions that afflict Cusco.”

*El Comercio del Cusco* criticized Hildebrandt and the INC as pawns used by monopolistic tourism interests in Lima that, “will not have this valuable prey to suckle on,” once the state-owned Machu Picchu hotel was completed.

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regional leadership continued to view the hotel project as a vital link in Cusco’s revolutionary and populist development. To bolster this view, in early October labor unions representing the region’s brewers, bank workers, hotel employees, drivers, industrial workers, and even employees of the Coca-Cola bottling plant formally petitioned the national government to back the hotel in the name of workers’ rights. For final justification, *El Comercio del Cusco* reminded hotel opponents that cusqueños backed the recommendations of the Plan COPESCO, “developed by national and foreign experts of the highest level,” and therefore conformed to preservation standards.

Hildebrandt also appealed to the nationalist rhetoric of the revolutionary government in her recommendations against the hotel project. In her October, 1972 official report to the council of ministers, Hildebrandt noted: “Monuments of our old culture represent cash capital (capital contante y sonante). It is necessary put the ruins to work, (sic) it is true, but not in a hurried search of the ephemeral dollar, but in the employ of affirming our national identity.” The report went on to detail that, “Peru has many ruins, large ruins, magnificent ruins. But amongst all of them only Machu Picchu has reached the dimension of a symbol. Machu Picchu is Peru, just like Túpac Amaru.” Hildebrandt backed the arguments of preservationists arguing for the need to preserve Machu Picchu’s natural environment. Hildebrant ended the report noting “Conservation of cultural patrimony and tourism development has led to the creation of seemingly equitable, but false expression: cultural tourism (sic).” The conclusion appeared to refute one of the central goals promoted by COPESCO – the compatibility of development with preservation in Cusco.

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On October 31, 1972 the national government reached a compromise regarding the Machu Picchu hotel. Issuing Decree Law 19597, the government declared that the new hotel for Machu Picchu was an “urgent necessity,” but that the project would not take place in a new, “protected zone” marked by the Ministry of Education and the INC that surrounded the immediate environs of the ruin.\textsuperscript{140} A new commission arrived to the site in November and recommended that the lower zone of the Mandor Hacienda located along the Urubamba River at the base of the ruin as the best alternative option for the hotel (figure 4.8).\textsuperscript{141} Less than a week later, the provincial mayor of Cusco promised that the new Machu Picchu hotel would open by July of 1975.\textsuperscript{142} Yet, by February of 1973, the Minister of Industry and Commerce still predicted “four or five weeks” until authorities finalized the exact location for the new hotel. As usual, \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} blamed “large economic interests sealed off in Lima,” for delays with the hotel.\textsuperscript{143} However, press reports from Lima suggest that Cusco’s suspicions were overblown. For example, Lima’s \textit{El Comercio} editorial board continued to support efforts to construct the Machu Picchu hotel.\textsuperscript{144} As Cusqueños would discover, the government’s own deteriorating economic and political conditions, not Lima’s economic interests, would emerge as tourism development’s greatest threat.

\textbf{End of the Vacation}

By February of 1973 the military’s “revolution” had developed serious problems. The agrarian reform and expropriations of foreign economic interests had generated few revenue sources. Meanwhile Velasco’s deteriorating health and opposition to the regime’s controversial

\textsuperscript{140} BCP, Decreto Ley 19597, October 31, 1972.
\textsuperscript{141} BMC, \textit{COPESCO, Estudio de factibilidad Hotel Machu Picchu}, vol. 2, VII-18.
\textsuperscript{142} BMC, “Hotel Machupichu inaugurarían el 28 de julio del año 1975,” ECC, Nov. 11, 1972, 1.
\textsuperscript{143} BMC, “Grave denuncia,” ECC, June 1, 1973, 2.
\textsuperscript{144} BNP, “El hotel de Machu Picchu y el problema de su ubicación,” ECL, Sep. 25, 1973, 2.
labor laws eroded the government’s political standing.\textsuperscript{145} On June 1, 1973 \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} reported that preservation concerns had delayed progress on a proposed modern state hotel near Cusco’s city center originally proposed along with the Machu Picchu facility. The editorial board of Cusco’s \textit{El Comercio} refused to believe that the government would delay, “the construction of a great hotel complex in our city, serving as a source of work and unsuspected progress for this part of the country.”\textsuperscript{146} Similar to the Machu Picchu project, \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} speculated that, “economic forces, once disguised as ‘machupicchólogos,’ or ‘lovers of the land’” that derailed the Machu Picchu project lay behind the Cusco hotel proposal.\textsuperscript{147}

In September 1973, the national government announced over one billion soles in tourism infrastructure investment in Cusco, yet work on nearly all large tourism projects, including the hotel and highway to Machu Picchu, failed to commence.\textsuperscript{148} With the hotel project virtually suspended, local interests lobbied the government to at least complete the highway to Machu Picchu. Seeking to conform to the military’s populist goals, locals argued that the limited transportation options had driven ticket costs to the extent the working-class Peruvians could not access the ruin. “Open the doors of Cusco’s own house to all non-privileged Peruvians,” pleaded \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} in an October 11, 1973 editorial.\textsuperscript{149} If appeal to the government’s populist rhetoric failed, the local press exploited the military’s nationalist sentiment. For Peru’s Independence Day in 1974, \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} announced a campaign to push for the highway construction named: “Machupijchu, symbol of Peruvianess.”\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{145} Philip, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals}, 131-136.
\textsuperscript{146} BMC, “Grave denuncia,” ECC, June 1, 1973, 2.
\textsuperscript{147} BMC, “Hotel de San Sebastián debe ser realizado a breve plazo,” ECC, June 14, 1973, 2.
\textsuperscript{150} BMC, “Se proyecta gigantesca campaña para hacer vía a Machupijchu,” ECC, June 4, 1974, 1.
Despite local lobbying, the national government made no progress on the hotel or highway projects. Relations reached a nadir in November of 1973 when locals attacked and burned the Cusco headquarters of the chief administrative arm of the military government – SINAMOS. Key COPESCO projects remained promises well into 1974. In mid-October, Rear Admiral Alberto Jiménez de Lucio, the head of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, visited Cusco to promote tourist development projects. Upon arriving, the minister pledged an additional three billion soles in tourism including pledges to complete the desired highway and hotel projects simultaneously. “It fills us with pride that men of the current government have interest in the interior of the country…towards the drawing of foreign currency through the ‘industry without chimneys,’” applauded El Comercio del Cusco regarding the announcement.

Efforts continued to build a modern hotel near Machu Picchu. In 1975, COPESCO presented plans called for an 11-story hotel to be built into an incaic terrace named Huayrac Tambo that lay just outside the newly-declared protected zone. The project again sparked the protest of preservationist institutions in project PER-39 and the INC. However, budgetary pressures proved more effective in preventing the project than preservation concerns. In August of 1975, General Morales Bermúdez ousted the ill and politically-weak Velasco. The coup represented an immediate right-turn for national politics and development. Immediately, the government looked to enforce cut spending and reign in the growing national debt.

151 Tamayo, Historia regional del Cuzco republicano, 227.
152 BMC, Anunció inversión 3 mil mlls. para Cusco en infraestructura turística,” ECC, Oct. 18, 1974, 1;
continued to pledge its interest in tourism investment.\textsuperscript{157} However, by 1976 austerity measures forced even a modest restoration of the 1933 Machu Picchu lodge to be scaled-back.\textsuperscript{158}

The simultaneous goals of development, preservation, and social justice at the heart of the military’s tourism plans provoked conflicts besides the controversial Machu Picchu hotel project. Even the military’s vaunted agrarian reform brought different government institutions into conflict over Machu Picchu. Originally, four haciendas surrounded Machu Picchu.\textsuperscript{159} When, after 1969, the agrarian reform promised to redistribute ownership of the haciendas, officials in the cultural preservation bureaucracy raised objections over the effect of increased land use surrounding Machu Picchu. Concerns grew after a serious incident occurred in September of 1971 when Carlos Zavaleta, owner of the adjacent Hacienda Mandor, burned undergrowth to clear a zone for sheep grazing. The dry conditions permitted the fire to grow out of control and threaten Machu Picchu. Two weeks later, another set blaze ascended Huayna Picchu and, “entered the ruins, burning the plaza of the sacred rock and the eastern slope of the Intihuatana hill.” After this incident, archeology head Chávez Ballón concluded that: “this should serve as a motive to resolve for once and all the need for Machupicchu to be considered as a national park.” Chavez Ballón recommended that legislation be proposed creating a national park extending from kilometer 86 to kilometer 122 of the Urubamba River urging the state use the ongoing agrarian reform to expropriate lands, not for campesinos, but for the new reserve.\textsuperscript{160}

For preservationists and officials in the INC, the ongoing agrarian reform posed an equal threat to Machu Picchu as the hotel project. In a 1975 the report composed for the INC, preservationists presented several negative scenarios that the agrarian reform posed for Machu

\textsuperscript{157} “A costo mil mlls. se construye Hotel Machupijchu; 20 niveles,” ECC, Oct. 8, 1976, 1. (4953).
\textsuperscript{158} “Recortan partida para hotel de Machupijchu,” ECC, Sep. 11, 1976, 1. (4946).
\textsuperscript{159} AINC, 08.13.04-03-6, “Informe – Delimitación de Áreas Arqueológicas en los Fundos de Q’ente y St. Rita de Q’ente.” December 18, 1975.
Picchu. The report presented the results of the agrarian reform and distribution of lands as a direct threat. Included in the report’s predictions were, “total acquisition of lands into a cooperative, social company, or whatever it may be called,” a, “future avalanche of people,” and, “indiscriminate exploitation of forests.” The report recommended that INC leadership work to acquire as much surrounding land as possible to prevent it from being redistributed to campesinos. An additional report on the need to create a national park surrounding Machu Picchu appeared in March of 1977 in cooperation with Agrarian Zone XI officials. Once again, the report stressed the need to take urgent measures citing recent incursions into the Sacsayhuaman archeological complex and efforts to create a new agrarian cooperative along kilometers 108 and 109 of the Urubamba River adjacent to Machu Picchu.

Conflicts between tourism development and land redistribution also emerged amongst local communities in Cusco. The government faced difficulty justifying the reservation of prime tracts to serve foreign elite tourists while continuing its rhetoric of populist land reform. In October of 1973, campesinos invaded the territory reserved in the San Sebastian neighborhood for one of Cusco’s proposed tourism hotels. Despite the government’s rhetoric, the “toma de tierras” of the hotel property provoked a rapid police response to dislodge the campesinos. In other instances, campesinos themselves rejected the goals of the agrarian reform. The military government’s land reforms emphasized the formation of worker cooperatives on the expropriated land of haciendas. However, campesinos residing near major tourist attractions showed little interest in forming agricultural cooperatives. Campesinos residing in Aguas Calientes who

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161 AINC, 08.13.04-03-6, “Informe – Delimitación de Areas Arqueológicas en los Fundos de Q’ente y St. Rita de Q’ente,” December 18, 1975.
received the land of the former Hacienda Mandor immediately began negotiations to resell parcels to private hotel developers.\textsuperscript{164}

**Hippie Tourism**

Backpacking tourism in Peru appears to have taken many by surprise. Since the 1920s, one of the most appeal characteristics of tourism to Peruvians and Cusqueños was the image of attracting cultured world travelers. The image of elite tourism continued in the Checci Report as evidenced by its recommendations that, “‘rock and roll’ music should not be played in the lobbies of the hotels.”\textsuperscript{165} These assumptions continued in COPESCO planning documents that estimated that the average traveler to Peru in 1971 would be: “a business man or professional between 35 and 40, with a high degree of education and cultural level. It is almost guaranteed this man will travel with his family.”\textsuperscript{166} As late as June of 1972, Lima’s *La Prensa* called for increased luxury hotel construction based on the observation that, “an important percentage of tourists are people of advanced age, for whom comfortable accommodations prove essential. Very few are those who are willing to undertake adventures or stoically support difficult situations.”\textsuperscript{167} The Velasco government did promote efforts for “popular tourism” in Cusco.\textsuperscript{168} However the initiative was directed more towards middle class nationals instead of international backpackers. In fact, domestic tourism to Cusco spiked in the first years of the Velasco government, most likely due to the expansion of state bureaucracies and industries that swelled urban and middle-class incomes.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{164} José Koechlin, interview by Mark Rice, December 3, 2011. It is important to note that parcelization of Aguas Calientes occurred after the military government in the early 1980s.
\textsuperscript{165} CBC, Checci, *Perspectiva para el desarrollo del turismo en el Perú*, 35-38.
\textsuperscript{167} BNP, “La Promoción Turística y la Infraestructura,” *La Prensa*, June 10, 1972, 10.
However, by July of 1972, hippie travel to Peru had become evident enough that *El Comercio de Lima* dedicated a special Sunday supplement to investigate the new wave of, “travelers with long hair, worn-out bluejeans, or dressed in colorful clothing.” *El Comercio de Lima* continued to describe Peru’s news visitors observing: “They are people who what to see things deeper, that look to introduce themselves in the most tantalizingly distant from the West, that want to live like the Indians of Mexico, understand the misery of India, investigate socialism in Chile, or experiment Malaysian hospitality.” *El Comercio de Lima* noted that hippie arrivals to Peru were indeed a global phenomenon. “Our country’s embassy in France is literally assaulted with requests for information or for visas from young students who want to ‘share in the life of the Quechua Indian,’” remarked the article. *El Comercio de Lima*’s article also correctly correlated the rise of hippie tourism with a global rejection of modernity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. “Young people raised in an enormously technological society want to remember what pure air is, and their search for early ways of life is a return to roots lost over various centuries,” noted the article. The report concluded leaving little surprise the common destination of Peru’s new hippie tourism: “In the age of Aquarius, Machu Picchu is one of the most sacred places of the world.”¹⁷⁰

For many counter-cultural travelers of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Peru and the Andes did indeed serve as icons for the mystic. One US backpacker who arrived in Cusco with her husband in the 1970s recalled how visiting Peru was an opportunity for “going back to Earth.”¹⁷¹ Transnational economic and cultural links also helped re-introduce the Andes into the counter-culture’s subconscious. In 1970, Simon & Garfunkel released their Grammy-winning album, *Bridge over Troubled Waters*. The album featured a renewed version of Cusqueño composer

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¹⁷¹ Wendy Weeks, interview by Mark Rice, October 26, 2011.
Daniel Anomia Robles’ “El Condor Pasa.” Recorded using Andean instruments, Simon & Garfunkel’s “El Condor Pasa (If I Could)” increased global awareness of Cusco’s folkloric music. Alpaca coats and skirts increased in popularity in the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s while star New York Jets quarterback Joe Namath appeared in magazines displaying his llama hair carpet-covered Manhattan bachelor pad. Peruvians themselves helped re-imagine the image of Peru and Cusco as antidotes to the modern world. When a young German filmmaker named Werner Herzog arrived in Peru in 1971 to film a television program special and ran low on funds, a hotel owner stepped in to provide financing with the hopes that filming at Machu Picchu would promote tourism. The final version of Herzog’s project, Aguirre, the Wrath of God, quickly developed a following in art houses across Europe and the United States. For counter-cultural travelers, regional political changes, particularly the Mexican state’s crackdown on hippies following 1968, most likely played an important role in elevating Peru as an appealing destination. Although the military government held suspicious views against youth counter culture, Peru’s leftist political stance and general lack of state violence made it an attractive destination in an era when Latin America saw the rise of numerous authoritarian regimes.

Locals recognized the potential benefits of serving backpacking and independent travelers. By 1973, El Comercio del Cusco, in cooperation with local tourism promoters began

to publish an English-language “Tourist Supplement.” The supplement contained tips for all visitors, but offered content geared especially towards travelers without an agency or guide. Articles featured basic instructions for sending packages and listed the ingredients of common local dishes. Other entries contained lessons on Guaman Poma and the chronology of the Inca.\(^{177}\) Some editions of the Tourist Supplement even outlined the goals of COPESCO. In one article titled, “Tourism can Mean Social Progress,” from the September 7, 1973 edition, international readers learned about how COPESCO and the state were, “taking a closer look at the advantage of promoting social help projects with income from tourism.”\(^{178}\) Tourism Supplement articles also recommended backpacking trips to less-visited archeological sites.\(^{179}\) Peruvian tourism entrepreneurs acted to encourage counter-cultural travelers and attention to Cusco.

Unfortunately, for many locals hippie tourism brought more imagined threats than profits. Facilities at Machu Picchu and Cusco did not suit the demands of tourism of the Age of Aquarius. According to Cusco’s Archeology Council chief, Chavez Ballón, the “turismo libre” that increased in the late 1960s attracted both Peruvian university students from coastal cities as well as foreigners. The international visitors, according to Chávez Ballón, “are mostly called backpackers, ‘qepiris,’ and hippies, and do not want to pay for anything and create problems by wanting to violate policies.”\(^{180}\) The increase in backpacking tourism taxed the limited staff at Machu Picchu. Chávez Ballón complained that, “tourists leave fruit peels, cans, paper, food scraps, plastics, etc.” Even worse, “many times, unable to find a bathroom, they do their ‘business’ (necesidades) inside the ruins.” When not leaving refuse, Chávez Ballón complained

\(^{180}\) CBC, Chavez Ballón, Informe Machupicchu, 15.
that visitors wanted to scale walls damaging the ruins and causing personal injury. Problems of supervising backpackers increased in archeological sites adjacent to Machu Picchu like the Temple of the Moon and Winay Wayna where the Archeology Council staff had less vigilance. In these sites, “the backpackers sunbath naked or attempt to explore difficult zones,” reported Chávez Ballón. The lack of lodging facilities for backpackers also placed strains on Machu Picchu. Chávez Ballón estimated that, at any given night, 20 backpackers slept in unregulated tents surrounding the ruin.

In Cusco, where tourism treatment was associated with civility since the 1920s, the emergence of hippie travelers proved especially shocking to locals. Cusqueños had a low opinion of hippies before their arrival to the region in large numbers. In 1969, El Comercio del Cusco warned local parents to look out for, “the appearance of Cusqueño hippies, that constitute grotesque caricatures of their oversees peers.” One can imagine the shock of many of El Comercio del Cusco’s readers when they saw the June 1, 1971 headline announcing that hippies had turned Machu Picchu into a, “nudist paradise.” In the wake of such news, a report appeared in El Comercio del Cusco warning: “‘hippismo,” born in the West of North America, equal to rocanrolerismo and other forms of juvenile misconduct, has extended through America threatening to destroy the most vital elements of the nation.”

By the end of 1973, the local press expressed concern that, rather than being a curious destination for the counter culture, Cusco had become a center of hippie life. “Cusco is converting into an operations center of international ‘hippismo,’” complained El Comercio del Cusco. In fact, the local press reported

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181 Ibid., 5.
182 Ibid., 9.
183 BMC, “Los hippies y el crimen,” ECC, December 5, 1969, 2.
184 BMC, “Paradiso de nudistas Machupicchu: Hippis,” ECC, June 1, 1971, 1.
that Cusco’s Plaza de Armas had been transformed into a makeshift “Hippie Market” where backpackers sold their own artisan goods and travel material to the chagrin of local merchants. Relations between locals and hippies reached a low point in June of 1974 during a student civic campaign to pick up litter in Cusco named “Operation Cleaning.” Participants began hanging makeshift signs in Cusco’s Plaza de Armas stating: “Cusco: Clean of Hippies” much to the applause and approval of locals.

Local media quickly associated rumors of increased drug use with the arrival of hippies in Cusco. In early September of 1972 police arrested two hippies – one Peruvian and one Uruguayan – on charges of marijuana possession. *El Comercio del Cusco* published photos of the Uruguayan suspect demonstrating for police how he prepared his marijuana before, “flying” in the description of the reporter. The article concluded by reminding readers of the “grave danger” drugs posed to the community (figure 4.9). Local concerns over the relationship between hippie backpackers and drug consumption increased in June of 1973 when authorities discovered marijuana cultivations in backpacking lodges in the vicinity of Machu Picchu. Later that month, police arrested another suspect on charges of possession of marijuana inside Machu Picchu. Drugs proved to be just one of the moral dangers of hippie tourism according to many observers. In April of 1973 Lima’s *La Prensa* newspaper reported that backpacking shelters around Machu Picchu, “were converted into ‘refuges’ for groups of hippies that stayed there weeks and had all kinds of orgies.” It appeared that the search for cultural tourists had missed its mark.

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187 BMC, “‘Mercado Hippie’ Plaza de Armas,” ECC, June 21, 1974, 1.
188 BMC, “‘Cusco: Limpio de Hippies’ protest in streets and plazas,” ECC, June 20, 1974, 4.
Accessing “Developmental Tourism”

How do we assess the legacy of tourism development in Peru under Velasco, and, more importantly, what can it tell us about larger questions regarding the decision to rely on tourism-centered development as an answer to Cusco’s social and economic crises of the 1960s? As Abraham Lowenthal has noted, although the military government did not achieve many of its goals, the broad reach of its programs makes it difficult to judge the regime a failure. By this standard, tourism policy was quite successful. COPESCO oversaw $93 million in investments in Cusco and Puno, and tourism arrivals increased steadily throughout the 1970s – an achievement not matched in other economic sectors during the military government. In addition, COPESCO completed important infrastructure projects including 322 new kilometers of paved highways and electrification projects that benefited residents living in rural towns along tourist routes.

Yet, many observers concluded that COPESCO and tourism policy was a failure. First, the contradictory goals of cultural tourism – modern projects to endorse preservation, developing elite hotels to redistribute wealth, and its highly technocratic nature – resulted in a policy endorsed to create social and political unity in Cusco becoming a point of conflict. Julio Cotler notes: “Contrary to its hopes, however, the GRFA [the military government] became tangled up in the hostile actions its policies unleashed.” It appears that tourism policy in Cusco suffered the same fate as the military saw its own bureaucratic institutions and rhetoric employed in increasingly bitter fights regarding regionalism, preservation, and land redistribution. Even the

195 CBC, Oficina de Evaluación de Operaciones, Oficina del Contralor, Una revivision interina del impacto económico y social del Plan COPESCO, (December, 1981), 3-9, CBC.
unpredicted arrival of hippie travelers caused many to question the true intentions of tourism policy. Second, tourism plans, like many of the military’s economic policies, ultimately failed to redistribute wealth.\(^{197}\) COPESCO’s strategy to absorb Cusco’s under-employed rural workforce in tourism proved overly-optimistic and ambiguous.\(^{198}\) Even at the height of COPESCO’s hiring in 1974, the local press reported thousands of laborers unsuccessfully seeking employment with the institution.\(^{199}\) COPESCO’s plans to use tourism spending as a trickle-down or multiplying factor also largely failed. By 1981, jobs and investment provided by tourism only employed 3% of the Cusco regional workforce.\(^{200}\)

The failure to redistribute wealth points to the final problematic legacy of tourism development in Cusco under the military. Tourism policy failed in resolving Cusco’s economic and political dependence. Historians of Cusco have noted the paradoxical effect of the velasquista reforms that, instead of empowering locals, contributed to increased regional dependence on the state.\(^{201}\) Unfortunately, the highly technocratic and centralized nature of tourism development under the military continued this pattern. Although COPESCO did create jobs, most positions ultimately provided little training or savings for workers to actually re-invest as small entrepreneurs in the tourism economy. Materials, plans, and investments for COPESCO projects originated from outside Cusco.\(^{202}\) Finally, by focusing on attracting elite international travelers to Cusco, COPESCO ensured that tourism development would require capital investment and technical skill beyond the ability for local actors. Following 1972, domestic

\(^{201}\) Tamayo, *Historia regional del Cuzco Republicano*, 220; Rénique, *Los sueños de la sierra*, 266.
travel to Cusco leveled while the elite-oriented international tourism dominated by Lima and international capital increased.

An IDB report assessing COPESCO warned that its policies led to the creation of a “dual economy” of separate agrarian and tourism interests.\textsuperscript{203} The opening of Cusco’s Libertador Marriott in 1976 signaled the lost opportunity for public-sector and locally-controlled tourism development envisioned by the military government and COPESCO. In 1975, an INC report alerted the government that its strategies had led to, “consolidation of groups of power, in sectors dedicated to the commerce, industry, and tourism.”\textsuperscript{204} The INC concluded: “This reflects a clear loss of initiative on the local level, as well as the entrepreneurial sector, leadership, and social conditions.”\textsuperscript{205} Although the INC did accurately report on the negative effects of the centralized policies of the military government, it was incorrect to diagnose a lack of local initiative. The military government, by wiping out the political base of Cusco’s traditional elite, had unwittingly opened a vacuum for new tourism actors. Ironically, the hippies and counter-cultural travelers so scorned by cusqueños would soon emerge as the leaders of grassroots initiatives to remake tourism in Cusco. Eventually, their grassroots networks would become critical by the 1980s as the Peruvian state entered an era of political and economic instability.

\textsuperscript{203} CBC, Oficina de Evaluación de Operaciones, Oficina del Contralor, \textit{Una revivision interina del impacto económico y social del Plan COPESCO}, 19.
Figures

Figure 4.1, PANAGRA Jet Advertisement, in Caretas, May 25-June 8, 1960.

Image 4.2, Machu Picchu enters the jet age. From El Comercio del Cusco, June 3, 1970.
Figure 4.3, Machu Picchu symbolism in the Velasco Era. Reprinted in *El Comercio del Cusco*, September 18, 1972.

Figure 4.5. Even at the height of the Velasco populist period, tourism in Cusco remained imagined as elite, jet-set, and white. *El Comercio del Cusco*, January 1, 1974, 1.
Figure 4.6. One of the proposals for the new Machu Picchu hotel, *COPESCO: Estudio de factabilidad del hotel Machu Picchu*, vol. 1, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura.

Figure 4.7. Elevation of proposed hotel, note construction into terraces of the mountain, *COPESCO: Estudio de factabilidad del hotel Machu Picchu*, vol. 1, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura.
Figure 4.8, Topographical map of Machu Picchu after “protected zone” designation. The protected zone is marked by the dashed line. The black dot marks the site of the existing Machu Picchu lodge and proposed new hotel. White area to the immediate left of the lodge is the site of the archeological complex. The number “3” marks the preferred Mandor Baja alternative site selected for the hotel after the initial location was rejected by cultural authorities. COPESCO: *Estudio de factabilidad del hotel Machu Picchu*, vol. 1, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura.
Figure 4.9. *El Comercio del Cusco* documents the “hippie threat” brought by tourism. September 5, 1972.
Chapter 5

Between Maoists and Millionaires: Changes and Challenges Leading to the Modern Tourism Boom, 1975-1995

In September of 1992, cusqueño tour guide Roger Valencia led a small group of Australian tourists down the Inca Trail towards Machu Picchu. Considering the political and economic conditions of Cusco and Peru, Valencia was fortunate to have a group of international travelers to lead. For many, 1992 marked the nadir of tourism in Cusco as a stream of bad news regarding a cholera outbreak, President Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup in April, and the growing power of insurgent groups like the Shining Path, virtually shut down international travel to Peru. As the group progressed towards Machu Picchu, Valencia’s short-wave radio picked up a newsflash from Lima that promised to change his – and many cusqueños’ – fortunes. The broadcast announced the arrest of Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Shining Path who had commanded the Maoist insurgency’s efforts to overthrow the Peruvian state since 1980. The following morning, Valencia arrived in Machu Picchu where every guide and porter was celebrating and hugging each other as they shared the news.¹

Most of the details of Valencia’s story detail the tremendous challenges that Cusco’s tourism economy faced in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the story also reveals the many important changes that occurred during the crisis years of tourism in Cusco. As the Peruvian state’s plans to lead tourism development collapsed under the strains of debt and fiscal austerity and many middle class and elite travelers avoided Cusco as the country descended into internal war, a new travel economy began to emerge on the grassroots level. Backpackers, adventure travelers, and students arrived in Cusco despite, and in some cases because, of the perceived danger in the 1980s. To cater to these new arrivals, former hippie expats and local entrepreneurs

like Valencia refashioned Cusco’s attractions as sites of adventure and counter-cultural travel. Such groups not only helped tourism survive, but also aided the creation of new attractions like the Inca Trail to diversify travel in Cusco. When tourism began to recover after 1992, the adventure and exotic images forged by the grassroots activities of the 1980s emerged as the dominant model for travel to Cusco. Similar to previous eras of tourism in Cusco, transnational networks had helped redefine the region.

However, as tourism returned to the region, cusqueños also discovered the risks of outside and transnational influence. After 1992, cusqueños appeared to enjoy a bonanza of tourism investment. The Fujimori government restructured the national state’s tourism policy to market Cusco as an opportunity for investors. Soon, the work of adventure travel pioneers became the basis for well-financed luxury tourism projects funded by Lima and international investors. However, as investment and tourists poured into Cusco, locals found that their efforts had led to the creation of, in the words of Hal Rothman, “devil’s bargains,” with non-regional interests. Increasingly, the emergence of luxury and well-financed tourism ventures selling the appeal of an adventurous Cusco failed to meet local expectations. As tourism took-off in 1990s Cusco, many locals and the original adventure travel pioneers increasingly questioned the character and structure of the new regional economy that funneled benefits, profits, and control to non-cusqueño interests.

**Austerity Politics and Tourism**

After the fall of Velasco and his allies in 1975, the succeeding military regime led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez began to rapidly dismantle the state-led capitalist model constructed by his predecessor. In many ways, the deteriorating economic situation and mounting national debt forced Morales Bermúdez’s cut state spending and subsidies to meet an

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2 Rothman, *Devil’s Bargains*, 10.
increasingly challenging balance of payments crisis. However, critics also blamed the wide-ranging austerity imposed by the regime as short sighted measures that worsened economic conditions.\(^3\) Bleak economic fortunes provoked political instability and the Peruvian military looked to relinquish its political control over the state by agreeing to a constitutional convention in 1978 and national elections in 1980. Running on a centrist platform, Fernando Belaúnde returned to the presidency in 1980. The victory of Belaúnde ensured that the departure of state-led development begun under Morales Bermúdez would continue under during the return to civilian government.\(^4\)

The Peruvian state’s return to economic orthodoxy affected tourism policy. The Morales Bermudez government took measures to encourage private enterprise to lead tourism development and funding in place of the state-led model promoted by Velasco. In October of 1977, the government issued a general tourism reform that provided financial incentives for private investment. The reform also created the Fondo de Promocion Turística (Tourism Promotion Fund, FOPTUR), a new agency managed by representatives of both state and private interests to promote tourism in Peru.\(^5\) Originally funded by the state, in 1980 the Morales Bermudez government shifted the source of FOPTUR’s budget to rely on taxes on tourist businesses and hotels.\(^6\) The Belaúnde government continued FOPTUR’s structure and funding model after the return of civilian government in 1980 and still retained a Vice-Ministry of Tourism in the new Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism, and Integration (MICTI).\(^7\) Planning reports cited the achievements of Velasco-era policies in developing tourism.

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\(^5\) BCP, Decreto Ley 21948, October 4, 1977.

\(^6\) BCP, Decreto Ley 23015, April 30, 1980

\(^7\) BCP, Decreto Ley 2334, December 10, 1981.
However, new assessments, including one planning document from 1982, criticized strategies like the Plan COPESCO, for, “not yet achieving a significant participation of the private sector in this field.” Following this thinking, the state began to withdraw from the direct management of many tourism development projects.

Despite the challenges, international arrivals to Cusco continued to rise through the late 1970s. By 1979 Cusco boasted 48 hotels with a total of 2,909 beds. In 1980, Cusco achieved a record of 223,479 tourist arrivals, of which 146,025 were international travelers. Much of this growth stemmed from earlier state investments in tourism. Due to its funding agreements, Plan COPESCO projects continued to be fully-financed until the expiration of the BID loan in 1980. COPESCO continued to complete infrastructure projects in Cusco including backpacking lodges, information centers, and highway paving in Cusco in the 1980s. COPESCO’s “Phase II” proposed formally in 1980 envisioned a bold set of infrastructure development projects.

However, the Peruvian state, already facing a sovereign debt crisis, showed little interest in applying for a foreign loan similar to the original COPESCO financing. Instead, for its second phase, COPESCO funding originated entirely from the Peruvian state. The total spending of COPESCO II reached US $34,329,700; the funding was a significant sum, but approximately a third of the original COPESCO plan’s budget.

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Despite decreasing overall funding for tourism development, the Peruvian state still sought to pursue several infrastructure projects related to tourism development. The three most significant proposals included the development of helicopter transports between Cusco and Machu Picchu, a cable-car system to transport visitors between Aguas Calientes and the archeological site, and a new international airport located in Chinchero. All three projects originated as COPESCO plans in the 1970s and continued to have the support of national leaders into the early 1980s. Plans originating from 1974 estimated that state-supported helicopter service estimated to transport over 60,000 visitors between Cusco and Machu Picchu by 1983.\(^\text{14}\)

The construction of a cable car system at Machu Picchu received more serious consideration. As early as 1975, the military government had approved the cable car proposal and sent out bids to international engineering firms but then, distracted by political and economic crises, dropped the project.\(^\text{15}\) In 1982, the possibility of completing the cable car project emerged again when MICTI signed agreements to proceed with construction with Swiss and Lima-based contractors. However, the project never progressed beyond 1982 due to a lack of funds.\(^\text{16}\)

The proposed Chinchero International Airport project received the most interest at both the local and national levels. Although completed in 1964, Velasco Astete Airport in the city’s Quispicualla zone struggled to meet increasing tourism demand. The crash of a LANSA flight into the hills surrounding Cusco following its take-off from the Velasco Astete in 1970 raised concerns regarding the airport’s capacity and location.\(^\text{17}\) In 1978 COPESCO selected a plateau of land in Chinchero, located 24 kilometers northwest of Cusco City, as the preferred site for the

\(^{14}\) ACC (hereafter, ACC), *Transporte en helicóptero entre Cusco y Machu-Picchu: Estudio de pre-factabilidad técnica-económica*, (Lima: 1974), 53.

\(^{15}\) ACC, Informe Final: Evaluación de los propuestas para el diseño, suministro, construcción, formación de personal, y financiación del sistema ‘A,’ teleférico al hotel de Machu Picchu, (Lima: August, 29, 1975); BCP, Resolución Directoral DE-076-75, May 13, 1975.


\(^{17}\) “Ampliación del Aeropuerto, necesidad imposgrable,” ECC, August 19, 1970, 2.
new airport. In May of 1980, the military government issued Decreto Ley 23028 declaring the new airport a priority for the state.\(^{18}\) By 1980, COPESCO announced plans to solicit a loan for US $3.5 million to construct the proposed Chinchero Airport.\(^{19}\) In 1982, MICTI approved a contract with Airways Engineering Corporation and Novoa Engineering to proceed with formal plans for the airport.\(^{20}\) As planning commenced for the airport, COPESCO and government representatives estimated that the new facility could open as early as July of 1985.\(^{21}\) By 1986, however, the Chinchero Airport had not passed beyond planning documents despite lobbying by local officials and the press.\(^{22}\) As late as 1987, locals still held hope that the government would finally act on constructing an international airport that, in the words of *El Comercio del Cusco* would serve as, “one of the best contributions for the promotion of receptive tourism.”\(^{23}\) However, by 1988 and 1989 limited state funds only permitted modest security upgrades at the existing airport.\(^{24}\) Looking back in 1993, *El Comercio del Cusco* expressed its outrage over the fact that the Chinchero airport remained only a project on paper. “Studies and projects...have cost a world of money, these studies and requests have remained at a standstill,” noted the paper’s editorial board.\(^{25}\)

The fate of the Chinchero Airport reflected the reality of the economic pressures that faced Peru and Cusco in the 1980s as the Peruvian state under Belaúnde sought to cut spending. In 1980, 54.63% of tourism investment in Cusco was provided by public funding. By 1983, that

\(^{18}\) BCP, Decreto Ley 23028, May 7, 1980.
\(^{20}\) AM, DNT, Planes Operativos para Desarrollar, Caja 1, Folio Contrato de Prestación de Servicios de Consultoría para el Desarrollo de los Sitios Definativos de Ingeniería del Aeropuerto Internacional del Cusco, Resolución Ministerial 294-82 ITI/TUR, July 2, 1982.
\(^{23}\) BMC, “Cusco espera nuevo aeropuerto para su promoción turística,” ECC, June 4, 1988, 1.
\(^{24}\) BMC, “22 millones de intis para el puerto aéreo del Cusco,” ECC, December 16, 1988, 1; “CORPAC incumple convenio implementación aeropuerto,” ECC, June 12, 1989, 1
level had plummeted to 4.57%.\textsuperscript{26} FOPTUR did not avoid the austerity measures enforced by the Belaúnde government and it lost one quarter of its income due to government cuts in 1983.\textsuperscript{27} By 1985, COPESCO planners admitted that their goals changed to small-scale projects because, “the support of the state was not able to provide necessary budgets like the initial moments [of the institution] and until 1979.”\textsuperscript{28} The withdrawal of the state not only affected funding, but removed a key coordinating institution for long-term tourism planning. Even representatives of the private-sector Cámara Nacional de Turismo (National Tourism Chamber - CANATUR) lamented the withdrawal of state planning and investment in tourism. In a 1985 report, CANATUR argued that the lack of state involvement left private tourism interests uncoordinated and limited.\textsuperscript{29} “The absence of technical support, has characterized the taking of many operative, normative, and investment decisions with results not favorable for the development of the [tourism] sector,” concluded on review of state policy completed by the MICTI in 1986.\textsuperscript{30}

With unreliable state support, the tourism infrastructure in Cusco fell into disrepair. An article published in 1982 in Perspectiva magazine highlighted the conditions of Machu Picchu District. Once seen as the primary beneficiary of the Plan COPESCO, the district mayor, José Nouchi Portillo, lobbied the INC to share some of its ticket revenues so the town could enjoy basic services. The mayor noted: “As anyone can see, in this town, the people live in inhumane conditions. Essential public services like water, sewer, and power are only enjoyed by a minority.”\textsuperscript{31} Deferred maintenance and poor management in the Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles (National Railroad Company, ENAFER) took a toll on the operations on the Santa

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\textsuperscript{28} AM, DNT, Planes Operativos para Desarrollar, Caja 2, 34
\textsuperscript{29} Findings reprinted in: CBC, MICTI, Sistema de Planes de Desarrollo de Corto Plazo 1986: Plan Operativo del Sector Turismo, 5.
\textsuperscript{30} CBC, MICTI, Sistema de Planes de Desarrollo de Corto Plazo 1986: Plan Operativo del Sector Turismo, 3.
\textsuperscript{31} BNP, Luis Sifuentes Oré, “‘Descubriendo’ el pueblo de Machu Picchu,” Perspectiva, September 12, 1982, 12.
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Ana Railroad that led to Machu Picchu. A train derailment on the switchbacks leading from Cusco on June 25, 1985 left 17 passengers dead.32 Another derailment that occurred on April 3, 1986 injured 11 tourists.33 Worsening economic conditions limited ENAFER’s ability to purchase needed repairs and rolling stock for the railroad.34 MICTI’s 1987 annual assessment described Cusco’s roads, “in a terrible state,” and its airport as outdated and too small. The report also documented that the Santa Ana Railroad, “finds itself in a bad state of conservation and operation, operating with the use of old cars without bathrooms and/or in terrible conditions.” The buses that transported tourists between Aguas Calientes and Machu Picchu, owned by the state-owned ENTURPERU, were described as, “a risk for tourists.” Finally, the report described the Inca Trail as in a state of near complete abandon.35 By 1989, a backpacking guidebook also warned of bad travel infrastructure and noted that: “the operations of the railroad company have become highly erratic and capricious lately, partly due to a chronic shortage of spare parts, locomotives, etc.”36

In the wake of national austerity, local government looked to indirect sources to fill tourism and preservation budget needs. Local efforts received a boost with the election of Socialist Party candidate Daniel Estrada Pérez as mayor in 1983.37 Estrada promised a series of populist reforms for the city that also touched on tourism development. While campaigning, Estrada made headlines as a threat to tourism when he promised to “lie down in front of a plane [or, hijack it according to some sources] if the central government did not support the

34 See for example, “Servicio ferroviario a Quillabamba peligra,” ECC, June 20, 1988, 1.
37 Rénique, Los sueños de la sierra, 354-358.
municipality economically.”

Even before Estrada became mayor, local organizations had found independent sources of funding. In 1978, the INC, Cusco municipality, and the Archdiocese of Cusco had signed an agreement to form the Boleto Turístico (Tourism Ticket) that charged a flat US $10 fee to access all of the major tourists sites in the city. The three institutions then shared the funds from the Boleto Turístico to fund preservation. Following through on his promise, Estrada introduced the Tasa Municipal de Embarque (Municipal Boarding Fee) began charging non-residential aviation arrivals US $2. The Municipal Fee worked in tandem with the Boleto Turístico to contribute to the maintenance of historical sites and tourist infrastructure.

The national state did not ignore the growing crisis in tourism. Lobbied by the cusqueño deputy, Guillermo Bellido Yabar, the national state began to research reforms to rebound tourism levels with a special focus on Cusco. As early as February of 1985, a bicameral commission visited Cusco as part of its mandate to address the tourism crisis. Locals welcomed the interest, but viewed the possibility of reform with pessimism. El Comercio del Cusco suggested that the visiting representatives only needed to take the increasingly onerous and inconvenient trip to understand the problems of tourism in the region. With limited spending capabilities, the state attempted to attract private investment to infuse the tourism economy. In December of 1984, the government passed the Ley General del Turismo (General Tourism Law, Number 24027). The law created the Consejo Nacional del Turismo (National Tourism Council) to coordinate policy and propaganda between state and private interests, it cut electricity rates for new hotels, cut tax

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rates, and reduced tariffs for importing foreign-made products and construction materials for use in tourism. “If we attract big hotel chains, they alone will pull tourism traffic,” stated Bellido in favor of the state’s efforts to attract foreign private investment in tourism.  

Despite proposals for reform, tourism in Peru continued to suffer. In 1984, a dispute between landing and air transit rights between the United States and Peru resulted in the suspension of many routes between the two countries during the height of the traditional tourist season. Only at the end of 1986 did the two nations agree to re-establish regular commercial service. Unfortunately, the lack of direct routes between Peru and the world’s largest tourism market already produced dramatic declines in travel to Cusco. In 1985, cusqueños had lost faith in the promises of Belaúnde’s Acción Popular government as they prepared for new national elections. Campaigning for president, APRA candidate, Alan García made a symbolic visit to Machu Picchu to express his concern with the southern sierra and associate himself with nationalist symbols. García’s center-left promises won the cusqueño vote in 1985 in his victorious presidential campaign. However, after a short economic recovery, García’s fiscal policies only worsened conditions in Peru. By 1989 annual inflation in Peru reached 2,776%, throwing any long-term planning for tourism policy into disarray.

Tourism and Terror

Political and economic instability in the 1980s led to widespread and often violent general strikes. In Cusco, regional work stoppages often interfered with tourism, especially during the high season between May and August. In 1981 general strikes by state and industrial

laborers, including the railroad employees disrupted the tourism economy at the height of its tradition season in the month of June. In 1988, a strike by the historically militant teachers union nearly forced the cancelation of that year’s Inti Raymi festival. In addition to labor unrest, the local press argued that that the worsening economy led to an increase in criminal activities that often took advantage of tourists. One editorial in *El Comercio del Cusco* from June 4, 1981 lamented that, “the tourist that visits Cusco is threatened with assaults, robberies, and abuses, cases that are common and daily.” One particularly audacious assault involved the use of fake police uniforms to rob an entire bus of French tourists traveling through the Sacred Valley on June 3, 1984. *El Comercio del Cusco* worried about the effect of such notable attacks on visiting tourists. “Above all else, it is another hard and grave strike against the industry of tourism…it will force the tourist to think twice before coming to Cusco,” observed one editorial published a few days after the attack. In preparation for the traditional tourist draw of Inti Raymi in 1985, police in Cusco declared a state of emergency permitting them to detain without charges any suspects believed to be a threat to tourism. Most of the suspects sought by the police were, in the description of *El Comercio del Cusco*, “youths with hippie appearances,” and “a majority of elements of ‘morenos’ that have begun to rob without fear.”

However, concerns about labor unrest and crime paled in comparison to the threat that Peru’s internal war posed to tourism in Cusco. Formally named the Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso (Peruvian Communist Party – Shining Path), the Maoist Shining Path

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49 BMC, “Pretender sabotear fiestas del Cusco,” ECC, June 20, 1988, 1.
52 BMC, “¿Y los asaltos?” ECC, June 5, 1984, 2.
emerged out of Ayacucho in the 1970s under the leadership of Abimáel Guzmán. In 1980, Shining Path formally declared its intent to violently overthrow the Peruvian state. With brutal tactics and coercion, Shining Path expanded in Ayacucho and then throughout many other zones of Peru. It is worth noting that Shining Path was not the only group to take arms against the state. The Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, MRTA) also declared an armed fight against the Peruvian state. Peruvian police forces and the military adopted dirty war tactics to confront the insurgencies killing many innocent civilians in the process. The resulting conflict laid waste to much of Peru in the 1980s resulting in nearly 70,000 deaths. Based on its long history of leftist political mobilization, Cusco would appear to be fertile ground for an armed uprising similar to Shining Path. Yet, similar to other regions with a history of rural political activism, the ultra-orthodox politics of the Shining Path did not initially appeal to locals. Although the internal war affected Cusco, it largely escaped the worst violence that devastated many neighboring regions in southern Peru like Ayacucho, Puno, and Apurímac.


However, Cusco was far from immune to Shining Path attacks. Some of Shining Path’s first propaganda actions in urban Cusco involved attacks on tourism symbols. On the night of January 11, 1981 cusqueños discovered Shining Path images and slogans on painted on the Sacsayhuaman archeological complex and the stone of the 12 angles. The editors of El Comercio de Cusco expressed it surprise at the actions of, “a splinter group called Shining Path,” wondering why they were, “producing such strange things,” around Cusco. By the end of the month, locals began to take the Shining Path more seriously. The propaganda actions were followed by a dynamite explosion in the Zarzuela neighborhood, and attacks against the Banco International and the local army barracks. More serious attacks destroyed the Banco de Crédito and a local seat of the Education Ministry. By the beginning of February, 1981 locals already noted that Shining Path attacks had provoked a reduction in the amount of visitors, particularly international tourists, arriving in the region. Cusco’s hotels agreed to lower their rates that month in hopes of attracting tourists. However, these measures accomplished little as Shining Path attacks in Cusco continued. On September 11, 1981, Shining Path coordinated a dynamite attack on the local Coca-Cola bottling plant. The next day, Shining Path attacked the Hotel Savoy. The attack on the hotel that catered to international and elite travelers did not result in deaths, but provoked, “a great alarm amongst the guests and workers,” and likely struck another

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56 The vast majority of insurgent activity in Cusco was the result of the Shining Path. The MRTA only began activities in La Convención Province of Cusco in April of 1991 according to, CVR, Informe Final, tomo IV, 265.
57 The first Shining Path attacks in urban Cusco occurred in January of 1981, as documented by, CVR, Informe Final, tomo IV, 261. The first attack recorded in Cusco Department occurred on November 9, 1980 in Tinta in Canchis Province according to, CVR, Informe Final, tomo IV, 267.
blow against tourism promotion. Similar to Lima, Shining Path attacked electrical transmission lines between Cusco and the Machu Picchu hydro plant causing blackouts in the region. Like many Peruvians, as attacks increased with each year, cusqueños felt under siege from economic chaos and political violence. “It gives the impression that Cusco is an unprotected city (ciudad desguarnecida),” lamented El Comercio del Cusco in June 14, 1983 editorial.

Shortly after García had ordered the Peruvian military to suppress riots led by Shining Path prisoners in June of 1986, opponents of the government responded with a high profile attack on Cusco’s tourism economy. At 8:23am on June 25, a bomb exploded on the tourist train to Machu Picchu while it prepared to depart San Pedro Station near Cusco’s city center. The bomb, left in a red backpack on the storage rack above row 13 in car 1523, killed seven tourists and injured an additional 38. Among the dead included a family of German tourists, a Brazilian, and one traveler from the United States. Journalists reported a chaotic response to the bombing. Police “acted with confusion” and most victims had to find taxis to bring them to Cusco’s regional hospital where, “confusion reigned and post-operative attention was embarrassingly ‘off-hand’.” One US visitor remarked: “I have been in South Africa, Lebanon, and Cambodia, and never have I seen similar chaos.” One visiting tourist who was also a member of the Red Cross had to commandeer a local television station to plead for medical specialists to be sent from Lima to care for the injured. Initially rumors appeared that MRTA had organized the

attack, but no group took responsibility for the bombing. In 1987, investigators announced that
Shining Path had executed the bombing.\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{El Comercio del Cusco} immediately recognized how, in addition to the loss of life, the
bombing damaged the region’s image in Peru and abroad. “Now, the consequences of the most
condemnable act of terrorism against Cusco is traveling around the world with its resulting
charge of negative propaganda that will not stop to inflict serious setbacks not only for this part
of the country, but for all of Peru, which unfortunately, is already considered one of the countries
most punished by terrorism,” lamented \textit{El Comercio del Cusco}.\textsuperscript{70} Travel articles referenced the
train bombing in warning to tourists thinking of vacationing in Cusco. “Travel in the Peruvian
Andes has become more risky lately with the increase of terrorism by the rebel group Shining
Path,” warned an October, 1986 travel article in the \textit{New York Times}.\textsuperscript{71} Fears of terrorism
attacks on tourism occurred throughout the 1980s. On the eve of the 1987 Inti Raymi festival,
police announced that they had prevented a terrorist attack on the ceremony.\textsuperscript{72} Attacks against
police positions increased through 1986 and, by 1987, Shining Path had established its political
authority in the southern provinces of the region. The following year produced attacks on the
police station in Pisac and Shining Path organization in UNSAAC.\textsuperscript{73} Besides Shining Path, other
groups also engaged in violent attacks in Cusco including anti-Shining Path paramilitaries who
took responsibility for 1987 bombings in Cusco.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{69} BMC, “MRTA habría cometido el atentado del 25,” ECC, June 27, 1986, 1; “En busca de terroristas,” ECC, June
\textsuperscript{70} BMC, “Turismo y antiturismo,” ECC, June 27, 1986, 2.
\textsuperscript{71} N. D. K., “Tips on Transportation, Weather, and Hotels for a Trip to Peru’s Inca Capital,” NYT, October 5, 1986,
691.
\textsuperscript{72} BMC, “Escalada terrorista iba a producirse en Cusco,” ECC, June 11, 1987, 1.
\textsuperscript{73} CVR, \textit{Informe Final}, tomo II, 122.
\textsuperscript{74} Poole and Réñique, \textit{Peru: Time of Fear}, 9.
In 1987, Cusco received the death knell of international tourism; the US State Department issued a travel warning advising against trips to Peru. Although Shining Path activity in the Cusco countryside began to recede after 1988, tourism arrivals continued to plummet as international news regarding Peru’s instability continued to grow. Hoping to dispel notions of their region as dangerous, authorities in Cusco led by its mayor Carlos Chacón arranged the establishment of a sister city relationship with Jersey City, New Jersey in 1988. The mayor of Jersey City, Anthony Cucci, his wife Anna, and several representatives of Jersey City arrived in Cusco but, instead of providing an opportunity to highlight Cusco’s appeal, the visit ended in tragedy. Delegations representing both cities traveled to Machu Picchu on December 1, 1988. A 10-inch rod stuck into the tracks forced their railcar to derail and plunge down a cliff. The sabotage severely injured both Mayors Cucci and Chacón and killed their spouses. Peruvian authorities blamed leftist guerillas, but others suspected that the sabotage also had origins to an ongoing general strike. Some even suspected that disgruntled ENAFER employees had committed the sabotage. With the authors of the sabotage unknown and editorial appearing in El Comercio del Cusco condemned the attack as a “tragic act.” The paper’s editorial lamented: “In the world we are living, no one is sure to be alive.” Cusco’s tourism fortunes worsened in 1989. Security threats forced police to issue a “Red Alert” for Cusco during the traditional height of the tourist season in June. That same month, the INC

75 “U. S. Steps up Travel Warning to Peru,” NYT, April 12, 1987, XX3.
76 CVR, Informe Final, tomo II, 131.
77 BMC, “El Cusco y Jersey City hermanados en dolor,” ECC, December 3, 1988, 1; John T. McQuiston, “Mayor Back in Jersey City After Wife is Killed in Peru,” NYT, December 5, 1988, B3.
78 Conflicting accounts of the blame found in, BMC, “Excereable crimen en el marco de paro comunista,” ECC, December 3, 1988, 1; see, “Peru Rebels Blamed in Death of Jersey City Mayor’s Wife,” NYT, January 13, 1988, A8.
79 BMC, “Consejo demandará la total reorganización de ENAFER,” ECC, December 5, 1988, 1.
closed the Inca Trail, declaring it unsafe for transit due to security threats.\textsuperscript{81} Despite such measures, \textit{El Comercio de Cusco} stated that, during Cusco Week, the city, “is converting into an open field and easy access for the proliferation of crime.” In particular, the paper noted the particularly bad effect the growth of crime and disorder in the city had on tourism, “because it gives Cusco the worst image abroad, and for that reason the industry without chimneys has decreased so much.”\textsuperscript{82}

The election of Alberto Fujimori as President in 1990 did little to bring security to Cusco or aid the tourism economy. In fact, acts of violence continued and tourism entered a nosedive. Only several days after Fujimori’s electoral victory, a car bomb exploded on Cusco’s Avenida El Sol killing one person.\textsuperscript{83} Local officials attempted to encourage tourism and even organized a “Concert for Peace” featuring the National Symphony to take place at Machu Picchu on June 22, 1990 in an effort to promote the region.\textsuperscript{84} Yet, worse news arrived as a cholera epidemic broke out in Peru at the start of 1991.\textsuperscript{85} By February of 1991, FOPTUR admitted that tourism had entered into a critical state in Peru. The combined news of political violence, a recent cholera epidemic, and states of emergency made the country a pariah in the eyes of potential travelers. According to observers, cholera had a larger negative impact on tourism then news regarding terrorism. “Until 1991, nothing had succeeded in stopping the flow of visitors to our country like the news of the epidemic of \textit{vibrium cholerae},” observed \textit{Caretas} in September of 1991. The president of CANATUR estimated that cholera had reduced the returns on tourism by US $300 million.\textsuperscript{86} News that 25 passengers on an Aerolineas Argentinas flight that made a stopover in


\textsuperscript{82} BMC, “Cree la delincuencia y falta control policial,” ECC, June 27, 1989, 2.

\textsuperscript{83} BMC, “Coche-bomba deja 1 muerto y 8 heridos,” ECC, June 13, 1990, 1.

\textsuperscript{84} BMC, “Machupijchu marco concierto por la paz: Sinfónica Nacional,” ECC, June 22, 1990, 1.

\textsuperscript{85} Klarén, \textit{Perú}, 407.

Lima became infected with cholera provided even more justification for travelers to avoid Peru entirely.\textsuperscript{87} Caretas summed up the experience of tourism interests in Peru during the era with one headline published in November of 1991 (and printed in English) stating: “Goodbye Peru.”\textsuperscript{88} As late as February of 1993, the US government continued to warn tourists against hiking on the Inca Trail out of security concerns.\textsuperscript{89}

Cusco’s economy suffered disproportionately during the lowest days of tourism. \textit{El Comercio del Cusco} claimed that, by 1991, “three plagues” of insecurity, cholera, and lack of investment afflicted the region. “The famous ‘industry without chimneys’ as one knows as receptive tourism, is in virtual collapse,” announced the local paper in June of 1991.\textsuperscript{90} Caretas published an article on the lack of tourism in Cusco with the title, “Last Call” that showed photos of empty restaurants and hotels. The article estimated that Cusco, with facilities to serve roughly 2,000 tourists daily, hardly received 200 visits per day by August of 1991.\textsuperscript{91} Between 1989 and 1991, the estimated economic loss of tourism in the Inka Region alone was US $60 million.\textsuperscript{92} The Cámara Hotelera del Cusco (Hotel Chamber of Cusco) reported that, by April 11, 1991, 38 of Cusco’s 114 hotels had closed their doors due to a lack of business. Souvenir shops on Calle San Augustín had reported a total combined income of US $250 during the first three months of 1991; a dramatically low figure considering in years previous each business estimated it earned US $600 daily.\textsuperscript{93} One Caretas article from April of 1991 on the lack of international tourism in the region noted how: “when a cusqueño dares to enter a café or a restaurant, at the next table he

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\textsuperscript{88} “Goodbye Peru,” \textit{Caretas} 1187, November 25, 1991, 20.  \\
\textsuperscript{89} “Advertencias,” \textit{Caretas} 8764, February 11, 1993, 79.  \\
\textsuperscript{90} BMC, “Las tres plagas que espantan turistas,” ECC, June 21, 1991, 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{91} “Última llamada,” \textit{Caretas} 1171, August 5, 1991, 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{92} CBC, Victor Aguilar, Leonith Hinojosa, and Carlos Milla, \textit{Turismo y Desarrollo: Posibilidades en la Región Inka}, (Cusco: Cámara Regional del Turismo Cusco and Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas, 1992), 11.  \\
\textsuperscript{93} “¡Salvan al Cusco!” \textit{Expreso}, April 11, 1991, 3.
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hears a countryman speaking, or simply he doesn’t hear anyone." By July of 1991, in the middle of Cusco’s traditional high tourist season, 80 hotels had closed their doors. International tourist arrivals to the region became so scarce that on April 2, 1992 when 98 tourists arrived in Cusco from Miami, the news made the front page of El Comercio del Cusco. Only three days later, Fujimori would take dictatorial power of Peru in a self-coup on the pretext of providing national security. Despite this, violence against tourists in Cusco and attacks by Shining Path on police stations remained an almost-daily problem after the coup.

**Grassroots Growth**

For most observers, the 1980s marked a decade of lost opportunities. However, as the region’s tourism economy fell into a tailspin, state preservation reforms and grassroots economic activity laid the foundation for dynamic growth. The bitter fights over hotel proposals and agrarian reform around Machu Picchu during the Velasco government eventually revealed a silver lining. Concerned with protecting the environment surrounding the archeological complex, the INC began plans to create a historical sanctuary centered on Machu Picchu. The proposals to construct tourism facilities at Machu Picchu highlighted a flaw in Peru’s preservation policies that protected historical structures, but nothing else. As a result, the INC began to push for the state to consider the surroundings of sensitive historic sites as part of their preservation. By March of 1977, the INC prepared formal proposals for the creation of a national park surrounding Machu Picchu. Although plans proceeded slowly, the Belaúnde government endorsed the creation of the preserve. On January 1, 1981, the government issued

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Supreme Decree 001-81-AA creating the Machu Picchu Historical Sanctuary. Containing 32,592 hectares extending from Salkantay’s peak in the south to Willka Wiqi (also known as Nevado Verónica) in the north, the new historical sanctuary contained 31 archeological sites. 99 Two years later, the Bealúnde government’s Foreign Ministry coordinated with UNESCO to have both Machu Picchu and Cusco declared as World Heritage sites. 100 Management of Machu Picchu fell under the responsibility of two institutions: the INC which controlled the archeological sites and the Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (National Institute of Natural Resources, INRENA), a division of the Ministry of Agriculture which was responsible for environmental management. Although both institutions suffered under economic strain during the years of state austerity, for the first time the national state took over the long-term management of Machu Picchu. With the expiration of the COPESCO and PER-39-funded restoration of Machu Picchu in 1982, the INC conducted restoration work at the site. 101 The INC funded restoration projects at Machu Picchu in 1984, 1986, and 1987. 102

Another key preservation policy that would benefit adventure tourism was the creation of the Inca Trail. Bingham’s first expeditions cleared parts of the route that would become the Inca Trail. Later archeological expeditions undertaken by Paul Fejos and Victor Von Hagen in the

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1940s and 1950s brought further attention to the Inca road network of the Sacred Valley. However, the beginnings of the Inca Trail as a backpacker route stem from local efforts that commenced in the late 1960s. UNSAAC professor Victor Angles Vargas with the help of archeologist Manuel Chávez Ballón led restoration and hiking trips down the route that would become the contemporary Inca Trail. Maintenance on the Inca Trail continued in the next decade thanks to cooperation between preservation institutions and backpackers. In 1972, Cusco’s Archeology Council conducted an annual clearing of Inca Trail in the weeks before Inti Raymi in preparation of visitors. The following year, César Morales Arno coordinated an expedition on the Inca Trail organized by the Ministry of Education as well as the New Zealand tour company, Venturetreks. The expedition helped restore part of the Inca Trail, but Morales Arno’s report also offered suggestions for new hotel and lodging constructions along the route. In 1978, the President of the South American Exploreres Club, Don Montague, sent a letter to the INC volunteering his group’s services in cleaning and preserving the Camino Inca. Despite reduced budgets, the INC and MICTI coordinated to create improvements along the Inca Trail completed in 1987.

The continued demand for backpacking expeditions and Inca Trail trips derived largely from the counter-cultural travelers once scorned by locals. Suspicions against travelers labeled as hippies persisted. In June of 1980, El Comercio del Cusco reported that the Hotel Bolivar on Calle Tecsecocha had become, “a nest of hippies,” where “there occur the biggest scandals

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106 AINC, 08.13.04-03-6, Don Montague to INC, October 30, 1978.
caused by the hippies…consuming quantities of drugs, including alcohol.” By 1981, *El Comercio del Cusco* even suggested that the police conduct sting operations to round-up hippies who had overstayed their tourist visas and deport them from the city. However, these outrages overlooked the dynamic changes that many expatriate and former counter-cultural travelers had begun to introduce into the local tourism economy. The story of Wendy Weeks and her husband, Robert Randall is indicative of many expatriate experiences. Both arrived to Cusco in 1975 as backpackers, only to settle in the area, open their own lodge in the village of Ollantatambo, and begin to cater to fellow adventure travelers by the late 1970s charging between US $1 to US $5 per night. While operating the lodge, Weeks, Randall, and their expatriate colleagues organized hiking trips in the surrounding zones. “We uncovered what eventually were going to become very popular Inca roads,” recalled Weeks. The informal hiking reaped immediate benefits in the 1980s when well-financed adventure travelers began to arrive in search of hiking. “The ‘80s were boom years; boom,” remembered Weeks, “It wasn’t a hassle and you didn’t need a lot of money to make it work.” Although international tourism arrivals declined in the 1980s, the impressive increase in domestic arrivals to Cusco illustrates that, despite the crisis, grassroots tourism growth had achieved success (table 1).

New archeological work on neighboring ruins and Inca road networks surrounding Machu Picchu opened more opportunities for backpacking trips and investments. Besides hiking, other sectors of adventure tourism began to open up in Peru, largely thanks to the coordination of expatriate entrepreneurs. Lazo Berty, a citizen of the United State and Hungary and rafting enthusiast, reportedly saw a picture of the Apurímac River in an edition of National

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110 Wendy Weeks, interview by Mark Rice, October 26, 2011.
Geographic in 1982 and immediately began plans to travel to Peru to test the waters, literally. By 1986, at least 12 companies, most based in Cusco, catered to “hundreds” of annual tourists interested in rafting adventures. In 1984, backpacking excursions to Machu Picchu provided the subject for articles in the *New York Times* travel section. Despite the increasing Shining Path attacks, adventure tourism continued to expand in Peru through the mid-1980s. By 1988, adventure tourism investments had extended past the traditional Machu Picchu corridor into the province of Quillabamba. The growth of backpacking also introduced cusqueños into the new adventure tourism economy. UNSAAC students, particularly those who spoke English, were recruited to aid backpacking expeditions in the Sacred Valley. For many UNSAAC students, these early jobs provided background and training that they used to operate their own trips and agencies catering to adventure tourists.

The growth of adventure tourism in Cusco changed the establishments that catered to the new travel demographic. In some ways, the image of counter cultural travelers, once scorned in the 1960s and 1970s became a sign of the Cusco’s growing – but perhaps kitschy – cosmopolitanism (5.2). Nightclubs and bars in the city center appeared to cater to college-age travelers originating from Lima or from abroad. According to an article in *Caretas* published in August of 1988, establishments with names like Banana Club, Kamaikazee, and Kinos Cross, appeared in the Cusco’s city center marketed and younger traveling demographics. Not all were pleased with the changes. Cusqueños bristled at the appearance of the “brichero,” a local male who made a living from accompanying female tourists during their time in Cusco, as they

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114 “Recuerdo de por vida,” *Caretas* 925, “Viajemos” suplement.
became more prominent in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{118} Along with bricheros, concerns continued regarding the dubious activities of backpacking tourists. When the local press suspected the appearance of AIDS in Cusco, it immediately suspected that, “backpacker tourists and hippies are the carriers,” of the disease.\textsuperscript{119}

However, by the 1980s, cusquenos largely accepted and encouraged adventure tourism due to its key benefit; unlike traditional travelers pursued earlier, terrorism concerns did not discourage the arrival of backpackers and explores. In fact, the perception of danger may have even lured some to Peru. “Mystery. And now with word of terrorism. For many these conditions...seem too rough (picante),” described the established guide, Peter Frost, in 1983. However, Frost noted: “But there are those who still come, and it’s not just Machu Picchu and the easy life that attracts them...thousands of tourists have arrived to explore on foot the wild highlands of Peru and travel down rivers that roar in the Andes on rafts.”\textsuperscript{120} The continued appeal of Peru as a backpacking and adventure travel destination as economic and political insecurity increased baffled many, including the national press. “Beyond the recognized attractions of Peru, danger, curiously, is also an initiative to visit it,” reported Caretas in April of 1989. One US backpacker interviewed expressed a certain awe at conditions in Peru. “It appears incredible that despite all the political and economic disorder, the country functions,” wondered Brian Kennedy. Ultimately, the traveler confessed: “I love Peru.”\textsuperscript{121} Due to its persistence through the worst years of the tourism economy, adventure traveling also emerged as the first tourist sector to rebound after the capture of Guzmán. In June of 1993, \textit{El Comercio del

\textsuperscript{118} Oscar Malca, “La mala vida del imperio,” \textit{Caretas} 1018, August 8, 1988, 44-47.  
\textsuperscript{121} Jocelyne Frank, “Amor serrano?” \textit{Caretas}1053, April 17, 1989, 50-51.
*Cusco* reported that “currently there are reservations for this type of tour [backpacking], particularly in European countries, North America, and Canada.”

**Boom Times**

As bottom-up grassroots policies from below began to change the nature of travel in Cusco, as 1990 approached, events on the national level promised major shifts for the region’s tourism economy. That year, prominent writer Mario Vargas Llosa campaigned for President of Peru leading a rightist political coalition that promised to solve the country’s woes through a rapid, neoliberal “shock therapy.” Despite Vargas Llosa’s early lead, many Peruvians eventually backed a little-known agronomy professor named Alberto Fujimori who presented a more populist platform that promised reforms without harsh economic stabilization. Cusco, like most Andean regions of Peru, voted overwhelmingly in favor of Fujimori largely out of fear of the economic shocks proposed by Vargas Llosa. Fujimori may have campaigned as an economic moderate, but adopted a strict stabilization policy, termed the “Fujishock,” that surpassed many of the measures originally proposed by Vargas Llosa. Rapidly the Peruvian state removed or relaxed price subsidies, encouraged deregulation, and privatized its holdings. These measures, combined with news regarding increased terrorism, cholera, and Fujimori’s self-coup in April of 1992 contributed to Cusco’s worst period of tourism.

Although initially Fujimori’s policies devastated the region, the new economic model developed by the government created conditions to encourage private investment in Cusco tourism. Rather than participate directly in tourism development, under Fujimori the state promoted a new role: the marketing investment in Cusco to private investors. A 1992 planning

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document prepared for the MICITI stated the government’s new policy of: “Reorientation of the role and action of the Vice-ministry of Tourism in order to convert itself into a promotion and advisory authority for the private sector.”125 The government dissolved FOPTUR, replacing it in 1993 with the Comisión de Promoción del Perú (Peruvian Promotion Commission, PromPerú) as a new agency tasked with the promotion of Peru in international markets. Central to the mission of the new institution was the creation of the “Marca Peru” or “Peru Brand,” to make the nation attractive to investors and visitors.126 Although PromPerú’s efforts to project a positive image of Peru abroad extended to all markets, the need to attract private investment in tourism remained paramount.127 PROMPERU funded extensive research on tourist profiles and experiences in Peru to aid investors.128 The capture of Guzmán in 1992 marked a turning point in the state’s fight against Shining Path. After declining 85% between 1989 and 1992, tourism arrivals to Peru began to increase for the first time in early 1993.129 Fujimori used the growth of tourism, particular increases in international travel arriving in Cusco, as justification for his government’s neoliberal policies. Even Caretas, normally a critic of Fujimori, credited him with the recovery of tourism in Cusco. “Certainly, and besides the egotistical excesses of the president, things have begun to improve in the tourism sector for a time in this part,” noted the magazine.130

For many, the return of tourism, more than just an economic asset, represented a perceived return to normality for the nation. An article published in November of 1993 by El

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128 For a record of such activities see, PromPerú, Perfil de quejas y pedidos de los turistas: Memoria del Servicio de Protección al Turista, 1994-1999, (Lima: PromPerú, 2000).
130 “La pinta es lo de menos,” Caretas 1330, September 22, 1994, 35.
Suplemento del Expreso, concluded on an optimistic note by declaring that: “The nightmare has passed…God pressures, but does not strangle. For that, this year the future appears to have turned the roulette wheel in our favor.” Cusqueños expressed reserved delight as tourist arrivals began to slowly recover. International tourism visits to Cusco during the high tourism season of June through August increased by 50% in 1993. For the 1993 celebration of Inti Raymi, El Comercio del Cusco happily reported that: “after many months of partial inactivity, once again hotels and lodges have been totally full.” Caretas magazine also reported on Cusco’s positive change of fortune, noting in August of 1993 that, “the visits return, Cusco becomes happy, there is good news.” By September of 1993, adventure tourism in the Sacred Valley had expanded beyond the scope of hiking to include activities like wind gliding. In addition to an expansion in adventure tourism, the 1990s also saw rising demand for mystic tourism in Peru. “After achieving a certain level of material comfort, human beings at the end of the twentieth century desperately are looking for solutions to a series of spiritual questions not yet resolved,” observed Caretas in November of 1994 as it reported on the potential for Peru’s archeology to attract a new wave of travelers. Increased demand for hiking in the Sacred Valley prompted officials to add a second access point to the Inca Trail permitting a less-strenuous one-day hike to Machu Picchu in 1995. Most importantly, by 1995, observers reported that much-sought elite tourists had returned to Cusco. Caretas observed: “Others, more cautious and conservative, chased away during various years, now have returned in glory.” PromPerú’s statistics indicated that 60% of

132 “Turismo al aire,” Caretas 1282, October 14, 1993, 64.
133 “Hoteles y albergues totalmente copados,” June 24, 1993, 1.
tourists visiting Cusco, “are more than 30 years old, looking for better accommodations than the wholesome charm of sleeping in a tent.” The article concluded noting: “At sunset, the Plaza de Armas appears like Amsterdam”\(^{137}\) As investors geared tourism to serve a more elite group of travelers, traditional adventure and backpacking corridors also became reinvented. Coordinated by a former English expatriate and backpacker Nicholas Ashshov, Lima investors purchased the former state-run hotel in Urubamba to renovate it into an adventure tourism resort. “We are going to convert the Sacred Valley into an exploration center of the highest form,” stated Ashshov in an interview with Caretas in June of 1995.\(^{138}\)

However, after a decade of divestment, tourism interests in Cusco had to face the challenge of meeting increased demands of elite travelers. One hotel representative commented on the new challenge for tourism in Cusco after years of finding ways to cut costs and survive by stating: “The hotels [in Cusco] are the great survivors of the crisis and now find themselves in a period of recuperation.” As a result, new international tourists often arrived to less-than perfect lodging conditions. Other areas of tourism infrastructure, ranging from the Inca Trail to the Santa Ana railway, also struggled to cope with the challenge of serving a tourist population that featured increases in numbers as well as expectations of service. For many observers, tourism in Cusco needed to rise to the challenge in order to emerge as a site for international travel. “For each satisfied tourist, three more arrive and for every unsatisfied traveler, seven decide not to come,” warned one article appearing in Caretas in September of 1994.\(^{139}\) A study completed by the Monitor Company for PromPerú that surveyed international tourists confirmed the need to improve levels of service in Peru. Of the visiting tourists, 63% expressed dissatisfaction with the

\(^{138}\) “Como los propios dioses,” Caretas 1365, June 1, 1995, 58-60.
\(^{139}\) “La pinta es lo de menos,” Caretas 1330, September 22, 1994, 34-36.
lack of reliable hot water, 42% were unsatisfied with hotel cleanliness, and 86% were unsatisfied with informational material.\textsuperscript{140}

To meet the demands of an increasingly-elite traveling demographic, the Fujimori government promoted a quick infusion of private capital into Cusco’s hotel economy. In June of 1994, the government announced plans to privatize the state-owned ENTURPERU hotels in Cusco by August of that same year.\textsuperscript{141} Plans to divest the state from tourism resources, a strategy long encouraged in Cusco, met with mixed responses. \textit{El Comercio del Cusco’s} editorial page generally opposed the “Fujishock” of rapid market reforms. However, even the paper acknowledged that facilities of ENAFER railways and ENTURPERU hotels had fallen into disrepair. For many observes the selling of the state-owned hotel marked a fundamental shift in national policy. When President Prado inaugurated the Hotel Cusco in 1944 to great fanfare and civic pride, it marked one of the first major investments of the national state in the region’s tourism economy. Fifty years later, the state now looked to hand the building to private capital as the solution for regional tourism development. \textit{El Comercio de Cusco} expressed its hope that new a new model of operation would, “serve justice,” to “this hotel so loved by cusqueños.”\textsuperscript{142}

As the Cusco Hotel transferred to private hands, the state envisioned a much grander privatization plans for state hotels. One of the marquee projects involved the transfer of the San Antonio del Abad monastery in Cusco city. COPESCO planners had selected the monastery, abandoned since the 1950 earthquake, as a potential hotel location and began renovations on the

\textsuperscript{140} “Huésped y lustre,” \textit{Caretas} 1368, June 22, 1995, 58.
\textsuperscript{141} BMC, “Hoteles regionales privatizarán en Agosto,” ECC, June 4, 1994, 1.
\textsuperscript{142} BMC, “Hotel Cusco, 50 años de servicio,” ECC, June 23, 1994, 1.
historic structure in 1974.143 Budget cuts during the Morales Bermudez government let the project, dubbed the Hotel Monasterio, abandoned until ENTURPERU acquired the property and re-commenced renovations in 1987.144 Once again, financial and political crises had prevented completion of the project. In January of 1995, Lima-based Peru Hotel SA, purchased a thirty-year commission of several ENTURPERU properties including the Hotel Monasterio, the Machu Picchu Lodge, the Hotel Machu Picchu Inn in Aguas Calientes, and the Hotel Isla Esteves on Lake Titicaca. Sleek advertisements for Peru Hotel announced: “We are the new hotel chain of Peru.”145 As the opening of the Monastario approached, reports on the hotel lauded it as a new standard for luxury cultural tourism in Cusco. “[One] can not only pass by interiors finely decorated with art from the Cusco school, but also enjoy service in the five-star restaurant, 123 rooms, interior heating in all locations…and even a sauna and Jacuzzi,” stated one report appearing in a September, 1995 edition of Caretas.146 After an initial investment of US $11 million, the hotel opened its doors in May of 1996. Fujimori attended the inauguration of the new hotel, declaring it: “the best in South America.”147

If most cusqueños accepted the new policy of the state in regards to hotel divestment, objections emerged when cultural institutions of Peru appeared to become complicit in the march towards privatization. By 1994, the INC began to explore the possibility of offering private concessions on land and archeological sites under its control.148 That same year, the INC decided re-examine a proposed expansion of the Libertador Hotel, a project previously overruled citing the lodging’s proximity to the Coricancha archeological site. When the INC refused to

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143 Plans to complete the project under COPESCO announced in, BMC, “A costo de 408 mls. condicionan semenario S. Antonio para hotel,” ECC, December 17, 1976, 1.
144 “Santo Remedio,” Caretas 968, August 17, 1987, 77-78.
145 Peru Hotel, SA advertisement, Caretas 1381, September 1, 1995, 33.
147 “Apostando por el turismo,” Caretas 1412, May 2, 1996, 49.
acknowledge petitions from Cusco municipality to block the hotel expansion, Daniel Estrada, once again serving as mayor, looked to non-state actors to aid in protection of cultural patrimony in 1994. Estrada also reached out to UNESCO to pressure the INC against approving proposed hotel construction adjacent to Coricancha. Ultimately, the city government purchased the contested lot for US $280,000 to prevent it from becoming future hotel development. In August, UNESCO officials arrived in the Cusco as guests of the municipality to assess the Hotel Libertador site to back city claims against construction. El Comercio de Cusco applauded the arrival of UNESCO, arguing that it, “has the unavoidable duty to come to the request of cusqueños and Peruvians.” Unfortunately, the lobbying did not prevent the hotel owners from demolishing two Inca walls for the hotel expansion by the end of the month, an act categorized by the local press as a, “case of the insolence of economic power.” Two decades earlier, UNESCO advisers and cusqueños had allied to push for hotel development in the Plan COPESCO against the objections of Lima-based preservationists. Now, with limeño investors pushing for development, the transnational institution and locals were united against hotel expansion.

The negative effects of booming tourism also began to create conflict at Machu Picchu. As early as 1989, preservationists warned that tourism at Machu Picchu, if not managed properly could become an “eventual aggressive factor,” against the ruins. By 1992, the INC reported on the potential threat of overuse by tourists at Machu Picchu. “We know very well that Machupicchu is the principal and famous motivator of touristic demand towards Peru to the point

of converting itself into uncontainable, indispensible, and problematic flow, due to its negative effects on the ecosystem,” noted the INC. The report concluded that, “tourist activity was and will be a motive for worry.” However, the state appeared to value access and development at Machu Picchu over preservation. As early as 1992, the Peruvian government considered the construction of a cable car at Machu Picchu to be a “priority project,” and formally began accepting bids to reboot the project abandoned in the early 1980s. Simultaneously, the government approved helicopter flights to ferry tourists to and from Machu Picchu, operated by, in the words of *El Comercio del Cusco*, “a group of capital [limeño] entrepreneurs mainly composed of former Peruvian Air Force commanders and a group of cusqueño entrepreneurs whose agency was going to represent the predatory action against the Machu Picchu Historical Sanctuary.” By the end of the decade, UNESCO would be called on again to denounce tourist development practices at Machu Picchu.

Private management of the Machu Picchu lodge by Peru Hotel SA also proved controversial to locals. This reached to new levels when the corporation submitted plans to expand the Machu Picchu lodge in 1994. Fernando de Szyszlo, who had expressed his opposition to the COPESCO-approved Machu Picchu hotel project under Velasco, published an editorial in *Caretas* magazine to bring attention to the threat of private development at Machu Picchu. Other conflicts erupted over rumors of mistreatment of locals by the private hotel

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ownership. “The transnational corporation Peru Hotel...has converted [Machu Picchu] into its own feudal estate, guarded by watchmen, strictly prohibiting whatever national or foreign person from using its bathroom,” reported El Comercio del Cusco regarding the new management policies in June of 1995. The article featured a condemning subheading stating: “Cusqueños we are strangers in our own homeland.”162 By the end of the month, rumors circulated through Cusco that the government planned to privatize the management of the Machu Picchu archeological complex outright. Although El Comercio del Cusco could not find hard evidence to suggest of any such plans, one unnamed local official cryptically predicted that, “with the Fujimori regime, anything could happen, we already have examples like the Amnesty Law [offered to military members accused of human rights violations] and that is sufficient to suggest that now it is trying to strip the legacy of our ancestors from us.”163

Epilogue: Cracks in the “Golden Egg”? 

As soon as tourism in Cusco reached new heights, both local and national observers expressed feeling of regret over its unforeseen consequences on the region. Many questioned if efforts to make Cusco marketable to international travelers had eventually erased its true character. “At sunset, the Plaza de Armas appears more like Amsterdam with some bricheros conducting tourism, and by night there are pubs that are totally British where little Spanish is spoken,” observed one Caretas article from September of 1995. The article noted greater threats to the region’s character and appeal: “The Inca Trails are threatened to become just another road: trash and abuse are distorting what were nearly virgin passages. And there is a horrifying establishment of slot machines facing the very same cathedral. Helicopters too large are landing

162 “Privatizadores convierten Machupicchu zona prohibida,” ECC, June 8, 1995, 1.
in Aguas Calientes, their noise booming on the surrounding stones.” By 1996, UNESCO placed Cusco on a list of endangered historic sites citing bad planning and construction in the historic center. Reacting to the runaway development, some even looked back to the “bad days” with certain nostalgia. “Absent of tourists, the city looked clean and ordered,” stated one article published in June of 1996.

Besides the negative cultural consequences of tourism, many locals expressed outrage at the increased stratification of the region’s economy. When Rothman examined the development of tourist economies in the Western United States, he noted that, “when tourism creates sufficient wealth, it becomes too important to be left to the locals.” Increasingly, cusqueños shared his observations. One 1998 economic study on the effects of tourism in Cusco concluded: “We find that the great beneficiaries are large international investors and later the few Peruvian investors.” The report went on to detail that: “Economic classes of middle and lower classes that are related to tourism activities through small companies, or in the informal economy.” Although cusquenos continued to find opportunities to participate in tourism, as the market became more international and elite. Japanese and Israeli cuisine restaurants became a common sight in central Cusco. Tourism trade also increasingly fell under the management of limeño transplants. By July of 1999, Caretas noted the phenomenon of how, “limeños that arrived planning on tourism without thinking of it much found their true calling in Cusco, leaving behind the capital’s hustle for the cosmopolitan haven of the imperial city.” Increases in land value near historical sites and along trekking routes also became a source of local discontent. “It was

166 Rothman, Devil’s Bargains, 11.
shocking to us,” recalled one adventure travel pioneer when she discovered Lima-based agents engaging in land speculation in the Sacred Valley.170

As early as 1994, El Comercio del Cusco published a scathing editorial against the new tourism economy encouraged by the policies of the Fujimori era. The paper called for locals to, “kill the goose that lays the golden egg.” The editors marveled how: “the time of slim pickings (vacas flacas) are only a memory, the tourism boom once again has become present in our city.” Yet, “all have opened their eyes to the irresponsible and mercenary attitude,” that had come to define the new tourism economy. The essay concluded that, thanks to tourism: “Here reigns the most savage economy and those who pay the price, or pick up the pieces (los platos rotos) as one says, is the ‘pueblo cusqueño’ that now sees itself limited to agricultural products, while others become rich, the others, the most poor become the miserable ones. Things of the political economy of ‘Fujimorato señor.’” 171 However, local outrage did not prevent an acceleration of international tourism. In December of 1996, PROMPERU and government officials celebrated the milestone of the arrival of the 600,000 tourist to arrive in Peru.172

The following year, the state privatized the Santa Ana Railroad leading to Machu Picchu. The new railroad company, PeruRail featured a joint ownership by the Lima-based Peruvian Trains & Railways, SA and the multinational tourism company Orient-Express Hotels, Ltd. (now named Belmond). Quickly, Orient-Express purchased Peru Hotel’s holdings in the Machu Picchu Lodge, the Hotel Machu Picchu Inn, and the Hotel Monasterio creating a near-complete vertical integration of Cusco’s most-elite tourism transport and lodging. Under private ownership service and rolling stock on the Santa Ana Railroad increased in quantity and quality. However, the branding of the new luxury tourism service offered to Machu Picchu by PeruRail

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170 Wendy Weeks, interview by Mark Rice, October 26, 2011.
171 “Turismo: Mata a la gallina de los huevos de oro,” ECC, August 8, 1994, 2.
may, for many cusqueños, have proved to be “an awful name…but well worth remembering” – the Hiram Bingham Express.¹⁷³

¹⁷³ CBC, PeruRail. Peruanos Trabajando por el Perú. 1997. 3; Original quote found in YPEP, Box 15, Folder 239, “Speech Copy with Corrections,” Washington, DC, January 11, 1913
Conclusion

“The Synthesis of All Things Peruvian”: Revisiting the History of Tourism in Cusco

In July of 2011, the Peruvian state commemorated the centennial of Hiram Bingham’s announcement of his discovery of Machu Picchu. During the official ceremony, President Alan García proclaimed Machu Picchu as “the synthesis of all things Peruvian.”

Tourists apparently shared García’s sentiment. In 2011, annual tourist visits to Machu Picchu surpassed the one million mark for the first time in history. The tourism boom that accompanied the Bingham centenary marked the culmination of Machu Picchu’s rise from an obscure archeological complex into an almost-singular national symbol of Peru and the center of a booming international tourism industry. Less noted at the ceremonies were the looming threats by residents of nearby Urubamba Municipality to interrupt the ceremonies in order to protest over the lack of state response to devastating floods to the region. “We cannot celebrate one hundred years of Machu Picchu when the Sacred Valley is destroyed,” observed regional councilman Marcos Concha.

The juxtaposed events in July of 2011 illustrated the many paradoxes inherent in the rise of international tourism in Cusco. Machu Picchu’s centrality as a national symbol of Peru remained linked to the largely invented narrative lauding the supposed achievements of Bingham. More importantly, the protests on the ground illustrated tourism’s limited capacity to support inclusive development for Cusco’s economy. The fact that tourist-centered development in Peru draws on imagined narratives and fails to deliver the economic bonanza envisioned by its

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backers would be no surprise to scholars of tourism. However, Cusco’s experience with tourism has fundamentally altered the region’s economy, society, and relationship with the nation. At the conclusion of this story it is worth revisiting a number of important thematic threads that unite and diverge over a century of tourism promotion, its contestation, and patterns of development. Most importantly, the story of tourism development in Cusco illustrates the often shifting role and nature of these issues. In this conclusion, I will summarize the principal thematic threads that have linked the many layers of tourism development in Cusco.

First, the story of the rise of Machu Picchu as a global travel destination illustrates the importance of critically examining the creation of tourist destinations and national symbols not as a teleological process. This study has shown that, far from a predestined rise as a global icon following Bingham’s 1911 expedition, Machu Picchu nearly reverted to its status as “lost city” at numerous occasions. Scholarly studies on tourism, especially those sited in Latin American, are often based on analyzing the contemporary through an ethnographic methodology. These works offer critical evaluations on the effects of tourism on the communities, cultures, and environments where it is introduced. However, many of these approaches analyze the post facto effects of tourism after its economic foundation. Most historical studies of tourism also tend focus on the cultural and social reactions to tourism rather than the conditions that led to its emergence. By doing so, scholars sometimes take for granted that even the most iconic cultural attractions are rarely destined to become centers of tourism. Infrastructure, technology, cultural change, economic networks, political support, and social conditions all outweigh scenic or historical appeal in determining the success of tourism at a specific site.

Second, the role of technology is often overshadowed by political and economic events, has played a critical role in advancing tourism in Cusco. Machu Picchu’s appearance as a
“discovery” stems largely from the fact that it entered the global consciousness in the era of photography and mass media. Although photography was not new by 1911, Bingham’s use of portable and advanced Kodak cameras permitted him to take hundreds of detailed images that could be easily reproduced in newspapers and magazines marketed to an increasingly-literate and middle-class public in North America and Europe. John Urry has highlighted the clear connection between photographic images and the creation of the “tourist gaze” for global consumption.177 The fact that tourists still wait in line to capture the same iconic vista of the ruin with Huayna Picchu peak rising in the background, first snapped by Bingham in 1911, illustrates the lasting influence photos produced a century ago of the “lost city” rising out of the ceja de selva. The technology of filmmaking also aided Machu Picchu’s transformation into a global icon through the dissemination of Good Neighbor-era newsreels. In addition to visual technology, advances in transportation have also proved critical in developing tourism in Machu Picchu. Despite the rustic appearance of Machu Picchu, its proximity to the Santa Ana railway line permitted Bingham’s first exploration at the site. The railway’s ability to efficiently deliver tourists to the site has remained a key factor in the selection of Machu Picchu over rival, and more historically-important, archeological sites like Vilcambamba. In addition to rail travel, advances in aviation technology have also played a pivotal role in tourism development. Before the 1930s, air travel to Peru remained rare, therefore preventing any major leisure travel beyond the coast. However, improvements in aviation technology during the 1940s permitted cusqueños and tourism backers to lobby the state to invest in tourism possibilities in Peru’s now-accessible interior. The arrival of jet travel in the 1960s overcame the final barrier between Cusco and the global jet-set public, permitting the first significant tourism boom in the region after 1968.

In the third place, the rise of Machu Picchu underscores the need to view tourism development through a regional lens. In fact, the story of Cusco’s tourism illustrates the regional political and cultural foundations that laid the foundations to support tourism. Using the language of tourism, as early as the 1920s cusqueños began to recast their region’s indigenous heritage not as a sign of traditional backwardness, but as a modern attraction for cultured travelers. Thus, well before it emerged as source of development, tourism gained strong regional political support as a cultural and folkloric project. Unlike areas of Mexico or Cuba, where the development of tourism also provoked regional concerns regarding “border town” crime and vice, the early association between tourist development and regional pride ensured strong local support in Cusco that only began to erode with the arrival of counter-cultural travelers in the 1970s. The initial definition of tourism as a regional project also helps explains later conflicts over tourist-centered development in Cusco. At times, strong local support for tourism has helped cusqueños in efforts to lobby for needed resources and institutions for preservation. However, this same local support has also conflated inevitable conflicts with national and international efforts at cultural or environmental protection into perceived attacks on the region. For example, the controversial Machu Picchu hotel project in the 1970s and continued undermining of environmental and preservation policy have often morphed into – sometimes flawed – political campaigns in favor of Cusco’s regional independence. Finally, it is worth noting the risks to regional senses of importance and pride that tourism has posed in Cusco. If tourism has helped elevate Cusco as a symbol of Peru, it also has exposed cusqueños to harsh criticism when the region’s often desperate social and economic conditions failed to meet the glossy descriptions of travel brochures. Often, cusqueños have shouldered unjustified, and often paternalistic, criticism regarding perceived regional indifference towards visitors and their
Tourism has transformed Cusco into a transnational contact zone that has defined Peruvian national identity. However, tourism has also made Cusco into a place where, in the words of Claudio Lomnitz: “nationalism’s dirty linen can be exposed.”\textsuperscript{178} Thus, if tourism can promote Cusco and Machu Picchu as iconic symbols of Peruvian national identity, it can also transform them into representations of modern Peru’s blemishes.

However, if tourism in Cusco began as a regional project, it quickly became intertwined with the politics of the national state, the fourth analytical thread of this dissertation. The role of the central government in promoting tourism in Cusco reveals the often shifting policies of the Peruvian state towards regional development over the twentieth century. Unlike other Latin American nations where the state took an early and dominant role in attracting international tourists, in Peru the government has often vacillated between abandonment and embrace of tourism as a development strategy. The ebb and flow of the state in regard to tourism reflects changing national priorities. For example, the attack of Leguía’s Patria Nueva politics on the power of the traditional regional elite provided the initial motivation for regional efforts to promote travel in the 1920s. Tourism in Cusco formed part of the regional political response against Leguía’s statist campaign to modernize the Andes. The legacy of anti-Leguía politics explains the later promotion of Cusco tourism in the 1930s as Peru’s national state under Benavides worked to re-establish its links with regional elites. The increasing populist and developmentalist stance of the national state under the governments of Prado and later left-leaning Bustamante y Rivero of the 1940s also explains the growing consensus to use tourism in Cusco as an opportunity for regional economic and social development. The abrupt abandonment of populist tourism can also be explained by the return to orthodox liberal economic policy in the 1950s under the Odría dictatorship. After a decade-long abandonment,
the national state took a dramatic U-turn under the Belaúnde government as it sought to address the critical – and potentially revolutionary – state of Cusco’s regional agrarian unrest. The state returned to tourism promotion seeing it as a vital source for material betterment and social stability in Cusco. These efforts shifted into hyper drive under the Velasco government until 1975 when, once again Cusco suffered a reversal of fortune as the military’s economic collapse brought on policies of economic orthodoxy and austerity. These policies remained in place during the second Belaúnde and first García governments as tourism relied on private and individual initiative during an era where the Peruvian state confronted both economic and political instability. Under Fujimori in the 1990s, the Peruvian state once again returned to play a prominent role. However, the neo-liberal national state saw itself not as a motor of development, but instead as an institution for promoting and guiding private – and increasingly international – investment in Cusco’s tourism economy. Thus, tourism in Cusco became shaped not so much by the vision of the state, but by the wild fluctuations of its policies over the twentieth century.

If tourism tells us much about dialectic between the region and the nation in Peru, it also can highlight how regional and national efforts to secure development have converged, conflicted, and often produced unanticipated results. The fifth thread of this dissertation examines the changing cast of stakeholders struggling to control Cusco’s tourism development. Tourism development first emerged in the 1920s as a defensive measure used to bolster elite-sponsored folklore in a response to the era’s grassroots indigenous rebellions. For two decades, cusqueño elites lobbied the state to back tourism development to promote their top-down vision of indigenous culture and Peru’s past. Slowly, over the 1930s and 1940s, these efforts proved fruitful as the state, often using the justification of tourism promotion, lent cultural and economic
resources to events such as the 1934 Quadricentennial and the celebration of the first Inti Raymi festival to open Cusco’s state hotel in 1944. In the 1950s when the national state withdrew from tourism investment, cusqueños used, in the words of Mark Carey, “disaster economics,” of earthquake reconstruction to bolster their political and economic plans for the region.\textsuperscript{179} Ignoring the initial recommendations of planners to use earthquake reconstruction funds to promote agrarian modernization and industrialization, elites successfully used the disaster recovery to funnel funding into projects of tourism and preservation. By doing so, local elites continued to promote their vision of regional identity while avoiding pressing social reforms that would have eroded their local political dominance of Cusco. Cusqueño elites likely hoped to repeat this success during the first Belaúnde government of the early 1960s, only to see their plans dashed with the Velasco military coup in 1968. For a half-century, the cusqueño elite had hoped to work with a malleable national state that would invest heavily in regional tourism development. Ironically, the arrival of a truly developmentalist national state project in 1968 spelled the end for elite control of tourism in Cusco. Undercutting the elite’s political base through the agrarian reform, the Velasco state sought to create a tourism economy in Cusco that was led by the state. The Plan COPESCO implemented by Velasco sought to use cultural tourism directed at elite travelers as a central component for development in Cusco. Unfortunately, the optimistic goals to use tourism as a force for social change in Cusco failed along with the economic collapse of the Velasco regime by 1975. Even worse for many locals, Plan COPESCO attracted new counter-cultural and hippie travelers to the region instead of the promised big-spending elite. Despite the perceived failure of the Velasco regime’s activities in Cusco, it marked an important transition in the emergence of tourism. In the vacuum left by the state, grassroots operations – some of them organized by former hippies – created a new tourism

\textsuperscript{179} Carey, \textit{In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers}, 12.
model based on backpacking, adventure, and Cusco’s exotic natrualist appeal. These grassroots operations helped tourism survive during tumultuous years of economic collapse and political violence in Cusco during the 1980s. With the defeat of Shining Path during the neoliberal Fujimori regime, the tourism crafted by grassroots actors emerged as the dominant working model for development in Cusco. However, by the mid-1990s grassroots operations became eclipsed by well-financed corporate projects that packaged adventure and exotic imagery to an increasingly-elite travel demographic. By 2000, tourism in Cusco partly reflected the original goals of the cusqueño elite who sought its development in the 1920s; it attracted high-end travelers with the cultural appeal of an imagined folkloric past. However, these elites could never have imagined how tourism development would eventually slip from their control, to the state, to grassroots levels, to finally emerge under the direction of Lima and international capital interests.

The contemporary phase of tourism development is driven by generally transnational forces. I argue that transnational actors have long had an influential role throughout the history of tourism in Cusco as the sixth theme of this dissertation. In fact the first person to propose tourism development in Cusco, Albert Giesecke, himself epitomized a transnational figure. Brought to Cusco from the United States to reform the university, Giesecke’s international connections encouraged Bingham’s expeditions. Later, Giesecke used his various diplomatic and cultural posts to advocate for tourism development in Cusco throughout the Good Neighbor years and into the postwar era. Giesecke’s efforts gained support with other scholars and politicians – Luis E. Valcárcel for example – who used these networks to publicize Cusco’s culture and archeology outside of Peru. During the Good Neighbor Era, a branch of the United States government, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, played a crucial role in establishing
transnational economic and cultural connections to the Andes. Transnational business, including hotel investors, film companies, and airlines who began to look for economic opportunities in Cusco also played an outside role in promoting the region as a travel destination. Finally, the rise of multi-cultural institutions also aided the development of tourism. In particular, UNESCO provided critical resources in advising the earthquake recovery after 1950, the formation of COPESCO, the creation of Machu Picchu as a World Heritage site in 1983, and continued consultation regarding management over the site. However, this work has also highlighted the risks that transnational actors have posed for regional development. Transnational institutions and their influence can sometimes become employed in conflicts over tourism resources and institutions. The controversy that erupted over the COPESCO-proposed Machu Picchu hotel that pitted social development against preservation interests – both who claimed the mantel of UNESCO – provides a prime example. The continued co-optation of UNESCO and international advisors in disputes regarding neo-liberal era development and planning is another example of the negative consequences produced when transnational institutions are provided with broad advisory powers. The often technical bureaucratic complexity of transnational institutions often excludes everyday cusqueños in favor of groups that have greater familiarity with the language and policy of development and preservation. This factor limited the social influence of the Plan COPESCO to a few well-connected bureaucrats and investors at the expense of the agrarian population the state-led project hoped to help. More recently, the ability of well-financed investors to use the language of preservation and sustainable tourism to win UNESCO and international approval for their projects at the expense of local farmers and settlers provides a contemporary example of transnational institutions inadvertently exacerbating problems of unequal development in Cusco.
The transnational contact zone where such forces meet forms a seventh pole of the dissertation. It is critical to acknowledge the role of tourism in creating a transnational contact zone centered on Cusco and its impact on Peruvian national identity. In particular, the dissertation shows how tourism influenced the late-twentieth century emergence of a Peruvian state nationalism that promoted – at least abroad – the image of Peru as an Andean and indigenous nation. Peru has often served as a case study for failed or limited post-colonial nationalism. Inspired by Benedict Anderson’s observations, these studies have examined Peru’s inability to create inclusive imagined communities. In general, these studies have looked to domestic factors in determining the success or failure of nationalism while overlooking the influence of transnational factors. Other scholars, notably Eric Zolov’s and Claudio Lomnitz’s work on Mexico, have examined the influence of transnational forces as threats to established state nationalism in Latin America. This work underscores the importance of transnational forces on the construction of national identity in Latin America. This dissertation shows that the many transnational forces involved in promoting tourism bypassed Peru’s domestic political institutions to elevate Cusco’s regional folklore and archeological heritage as national identity. When Bingham first announced his discovery of Machu Picchu to the world, Peruvian elites were still promoting their nation as mestizo, coastal, and modernizing. The comments of President García a century later illustrate the degree to which the Peruvian state now embraces Machu Picchu as part of a nationalism that celebrates Andean identity and indigeneity – whatever their policies toward actual indigenous groups. The central role of tourism in this process highlights not only the intertwining of nationalism and transnationalism,

180 For example, see: Mallon, Peasant and Nation; Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided.
181 Anderson, Imagined Communities.
182 Eric Zolov, Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Lomnitz, Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico, 125-144.
it also invites additional scholarly work on similar historical case studies in post-colonial countries. How has transnational tourism helped frame and define national identity out of archeological complexes in South East Asia, or iconic landscapes of Africa, or the many emerging cultural tourist sites in Latin American countries?

However, it is important to not embrace a “heroic” narrative of tourism as the promoter of national identity. If tourism and transnationalism can offer alternate paths to the creation of nationalism, the imagery that they select and force are no less “imagined,” which forms the final thematic area of the dissertation. From its origins as a defensive response to indigenous rebellions, the imagery of tourism in Cusco has remained an elite-oriented cultural project. In addition, the narrative of Cusco tourism, due to its transnational character, has also consistently linked to serve the outside gaze. Mary Louise Pratt documents the process of transculturation that occurs in travel experiences where both locals and visitors engage in mutual borrowing of their different perspectives. It is true that the unique history and culture of Cusco has attracted international visitors and attention. However, it is also important to note that, in search of tourism development, cusqueños and Peruvians have sought to create narratives appealing to the outside gaze. One result of these efforts is the continued propagation of Bingham’s erroneous theories claiming Machu Picchu as the birthplace and final refuge of the Inca. Bingham himself, originally scorned in Peru for stealing artifacts, became a mythical figure created for tourism consumption in the 1940s. The contemporary Peruvian state’s celebration of Andean representations deployed for tourism narratives stands in contrast to the actual demographic shifts that have seen Peru become less indigenous and more urbanized over the course of the twentieth century. If the Peruvian elite’s celebration of mestizo nationalism at the start of the twentieth century proved anachronistic in a largely indigenous and rural nation, its contemporary

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embrace of incaic Machu Picchu appears equally artificial, or at least nostalgic, in twenty-first century Peru where popular culture is increasingly centered on the image of the urbanized “cholo.”

The tourism-centered iconography of Machu Picchu is equally divorced from the social reality of Cusco. As Dean MacCannell has argued, tourism is always based on the presentation of “staged authenticity” rather than reality.\footnote{Dean MacCannell, \textit{The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), 105-107.} However, in Cusco, where social reality is in stark contrast to the images presented to international travelers, it is easy to understand local resentment at recent tourism development. The threats of Urubamba residents on the eve of the centennial celebrations highlight the continued failure for tourism to bring social development to Cusco. It is true that tourism has had many positive effects on Cusco’s economic growth since the early 1990s. Many NGOs and peer institutions encourage sustainable tourism programs that both aid rural communities while supporting indigenous artisan production and cultural survival. Many other cusqueños have found safe, stable employment in the expanding service sector of restaurants, transportation, and lodging linked to the regional tourism economy. However, the popular imagery of tourism serving as Cusco’s “golden egg” is overstated, especially in the Lima press. In 2012, only 11.61% of the region’s gross domestic product originated from the tourism-oriented sectors related to restaurants, lodging, and services. The region’s largest economic sector – composing 26.7% - remains agricultural.\footnote{Statistics provided by Observatorio Turístico del Perú, Universidad San Martín de Porres, http://www.observatorioturisticodelperu.com/mapas/cuscpbib.pdf.} It is also important to note that the most lucrative elements of the tourism economy – including the monopoly over the rail line to Machu Picchu – remain in the hands of Lima-based and international capital that receive the largest benefits and that many of the workers in tourism are migrants from Lima. Yet, when social
movements block rail lines and protest Cusco’s tourism, they are denounced as demonstrating local ignorance of tourism’s promise of economic development. More likely, road and rail blockages and strikes against tourism are calculated measures taken by cusqueños to present grievances against a largely-uninterested national state.

Resolving the disconnect between the promise of tourism development and its continued limitations in Cusco requires a historical understanding of the groups and processes that guided its emergence over the twentieth century. This dissertation has explored the multi-layered and complex story that has transformed Machu Picchu, Cusco, and Peru’s ethnic concept of national identity. Hopefully, as awareness of the flaws in Cusco’s tourism economy increases, Peruvians, cusqueños, and the many transnational actors involved in its growth will be able to create policies that employ the region’s rich cultural heritage as a source of more inclusive development.
Table 1. Tourism arrivals to Cusco, 1954-1993

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**Bibliography**

**Archives and Collections**

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*Boletín de la Unión Panamericana*, Washington

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*Caretas*, Lima

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ECC  *El Comercio del Cusco*

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*Daily Boston Globe*

*Expreso*, Lima

*Los Angeles Times*

NYT  *New York Times*

*Perspectiva*, Lima

*El Peruano*, Lima

*Peruvian Times*, Lima

*La Prensa*, Lima

*El Sol*, Cusco

*Time*, New York

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Cosio, José Gabriel. “Una excursion a Machupiccho.” *Revista Universitaria* 1, no. 3 (December, 1912: 12-25.


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Namath. Produced by Rick Bernstein and Steve Sabol. 86 min. HBO Sports and NFL Films. 2012.


Rénique, José Luis. La batalla por Puno: Conflicto local y nación en los Andes peruanos. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2011.


Figure 0.1, Tourism arrivals to Cusco, 1954-1993

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