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Matter and Motion in Kant's Philosophy of Science

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dc.contributor.advisor Casey, Edward en_US
dc.contributor.author Sudan, Meghant en_US
dc.contributor.other Department of Philosophy en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-15T18:06:57Z
dc.date.accessioned 2015-04-24T14:53:12Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-15T18:06:57Z
dc.date.available 2015-04-24T14:53:12Z
dc.date.issued 2010-05-01 en_US
dc.identifier Sudan_grad.sunysb_0771E_10098.pdf en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1951/55636 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11401/72680 en_US
dc.description.abstract This dissertation examines Kant's project in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to present a `critically' approved account of physical entities, purportedly necessary for all scientific investigation. It develops an original interpretation of its key programmatic premises, which revolve around the attribution of motion to matter as a way of making further a priori claims about outer things in general. It clarifies the connections these premises have to central doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason such as Kant's theories about mathematical cognition and the constitution of perception according to sensation. Fatal flaws in Kant's project, however, compel revisions that affect those very doctrines that were supposed to provide a prior basis for it. The dissertation outlines these problems and the corresponding revisions with the help of Hegel's surprisingly sympathetic and detailed criticisms of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations. This has the added benefit of showing how Hegel's own philosophical approach is much more intimately informed by Kant's said project than it initially appears. In sum, Kant is asked to relinquish his transcendental-psychological framework in favor of an account of perception which is immanently reflective and which rests on rational-physical bases instead of providing an allegedly subjectivist basis for the latter. This result issues a challenge for us to think such revisions without helping oneself either to a blatant Hegelian rationalism or an anachronistic naturalism foreign to Kant. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree. en_US
dc.format Monograph en_US
dc.format.medium Electronic Resource en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Philosophy en_US
dc.title Matter and Motion in Kant's Philosophy of Science en_US
dc.type Dissertation en_US
dc.mimetype Application/PDF en_US
dc.contributor.committeemember Jeffrey Edwards en_US
dc.contributor.committeemember Allegra de Laurentiis en_US
dc.contributor.committeemember Daniel Dahlstrom. en_US


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